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Subject Area: Political Theory
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

TO JOHN ARMSTRONG. [PRIVATE.] - George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, vol. XII (1790-1794) [1891]

Edition used:

The Writings of George Washington, collected and edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890). Vol. XII (1790-1794).

Part of: The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols.

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TO JOHN ARMSTRONG.

[PRIVATE.]

Dear Sir,

I am persuaded, that no one will be more ready than yourself to make the proper allowances for my not having sooner acknowledged the receipt of your friendly letter of the 23d of December, as you there express a conviction, that the pressure of my public duties will allow me but very little time to attend to my private correspondences. This is literally the truth, and to it must be imputed the lateness as well as the brevity of this letter.

The loss of the brave officers and men, who fell in the late unfortunate affair at the westward, is, I hope, the only one which the public sustain on the occasion, that cannot be readily repaired. The loss of these is not only painful to their friends, but is a subject of serious regret to the public. It is not, however, our part to despond; we must pursue such measures as appear best calculated to retrieve our misfortune, and give a happy issue to the business. I am sure there never was a people, who had more reason to acknowledge a divine interposition in their affairs, than those of the United States; and I should be pained to believe, that they have forgotten that agency, which was so often manifested during our revolution, or that they failed to consider the omnipotence of that God, who is alone able to protect them.

Your friendly wishes for my happiness and prosperity are received with gratitude, and are sincerely reciprocated by, dear Sir, your affectionate, &c.1

[1 ]The following remarks respecting St. Clair’s defeat, contained in General Armstrong’s letter, will have value as coming from the hero of Kittaning, who had distinguished himself in a warfare with Indians.

“Who could doubt, who knows the abilities of the first officers of that army, that the only successful mode of coping with Indians in a forest had not been preconcerted over and over long before that day. The partial or momentary advantage, gained by the flanking parties only as I apprehend with screwed bayonets, would easily discover the error of the former arrangement; but, alas, it was then too late, either to devise a new one, or change the old for a better. Placing the militia in a body over the brook, permit me to say, was an unwarrantable step, where two or three small pickets would have served a better purpose. It seems probable, that too much attachment to regular or military rule, or a too great confidence in the artillery (which it seems formed part of the lines, and had a tendency to render the troops stationary), must have been the motives, which led to the adopted order of action. I call it adopted, because the General does not speak of having intended any other, whereby he presented a large and visible object, perhaps in close order too, to an enemy near enough to destroy, but from their known modes of action comparatively invisible; whereby we may readily infer, that five hundred Indians were fully sufficient to do us all the injury we have sustained, nor can I conceive them to have been many more. But tragical as the event has been, we have this consolation, that during the action our officers and troops discovered great bravery, and that the loss of a battle is not always the loss of the cause. In vain, however, may we expect success against our present adversaries, without taking a few lessons from them, which I thought Americans had learned long ago. The principles of their military action are rational, and therefore often successful. We must in a great degree take a similar method in order to counteract them.

“As the best of men are liable to mistakes, shall we lay all the blame of this heavy misfortune to the score of natural causes, and our half-surprised and mangled army? No, verily; for, if we do, the last error will be greater than the first. No, Sir; the people at large, in behalf of whom the action was brought on, are more essentially to blame, and lost the battle. An infatuating security seemed to pervade the minds of all men amongst us. We pondered not sufficiently the nature and importance of the object.”—December 23, 1791.