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Subject Area: Political Theory
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

COMMUNICATION OF SENTIMENTS TO BENJAMIN HAWKINS. 1 - George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, vol. XII (1790-1794) [1891]

Edition used:

The Writings of George Washington, collected and edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890). Vol. XII (1790-1794).

Part of: The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols.

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COMMUNICATION OF SENTIMENTS TO BENJAMIN HAWKINS.1

Errors of Government toward the Indians:—Have not these been repaired by the subsequent treaties and purchases from those who claimed the soil? Some of the Tribes it is said would not attend the treaty at Fort Harmar, because they expect’d a relinquishment of their right to the land would be demanded. May it not rather be said that while they could War with impunity, they were better pleased and found it more profitable to plunder than to hunt, especially as they were stimulated to the first by the B[ritish] traders and the withholding of the Western Posts from the U. States.

But we are involved in actual war! is it just? or is it unjust? Mr. H. cannot believe fully in the latter because he is for providing in part the means for carrying it on. Is this to be done by offensive or defensive operations? Defensive ones I say, and I speak it boldly, from experience, and from the nature of things, are not only impracticable against such an enemy, but the expence attending them would be ruinous both to our finances and frontier settlements.

If offensive measures are to be carried on, must not troops advance into the enemy’s Country? What possible objection then can there be to the establishing of Posts there, when these posts answer the double purposes of annoyance and security? Cannot these posts, if peace should be concluded, be either demolished, or retained merely for the protection of our trade with these people, and to restrain settlements on the Indian lands? Without which it would be no easy matter. This experience has proved—and Mr. H. is not to be told that the Miami Village is a considerable distance from the B— garrison at Detroit. What cause then for alarm? True it is, pacific overtures were to have preceded hostile measures last campaign—and as true it is they did so. Though all the avenues thro’ which they were intended could not be opened, yet enough were opened to inform the Indians of the disposition of Government towards them;—and the obstacles in the others are strong evidences of the difficulties this government has to encounter.

The Kaskaskias is a circuitous, if not a dangerous rout by which to communicate with the Indians with whom we are at War. The Canadian French, subject to G. B. are not to be relied upon, unless particular characters could be selected, and that is hardly to be done with certainty and precision.

The defeat of the 4th of November may be ascribed to several causes; perhaps to none more justly than to the short enlistment of part of the force.—Mr. H—s’s ideas and mine with respect to the force, the composition of the troops, and the time for which they are to be engaged, differ very widely indeed—reasons to be assigned. The number of hostile Indians according to Mr. H— is under rated; the Estimate last year was 1200, when confined to the Miami and Wabash Tribes—now we have good reasons to believe that the Delawares, Wyandots and others were in the action with Genl. St. Clair.

Plan of the Secretary of War having passed thro’ the hands of the P—. and remaining in them (as will appear by a recurrence to dates) ten or more days, is a strong presumption of its having been considered and approved by him. Motives of delicacy have uniformly restrained the P— from introducing any topic which relates to Legislative matters to members of either House of Congress, lest it should be suspected that he wished to influence the question before it.

A Committee, from either house, would in his opinion (so far as the business related to legislative matters) have been new and embarrassing. If it did not mean to be governed by the sentiments which were drawn from the P—, why ask his opinion? as the official application for and disregard of them could not fail to wound his feelings. A free communication to a friend on any matter depending, when asked, he would have no scruple to make.

The sentiments of members of Senate or their views are unknown to the P— and what may be the object of the Secretary of War, or others, he knows not—his own are not concealed nor can he see more danger in raising men for three years than for three months, when withholding their pay and subsistence will discharge them at any time. but he can see an immense difference between the advantages of the one over the other, they are too numerous and self-evident to need detail—a few only will suffice. Short enlistments will, nay must, have an uncontroulable influence upon all the operations—long enlistments enable one to take advantage of time and circumstances. In the first case, before men become acquainted with their duty or the service they are destined for, their term expires, and there is to be a second edition of them. In the other case they grow more valuable every month and at half the expense of new men. In the first case too it is impossible to retain a man an hour beyond the term of his engagement. In the other he is bound for three years and may be discharged in three months or three days, if the service will admit of it. No man wishes less than the P— to see a standing army established; but if Congress will not enact a proper Militia Law (not such a milk and water thing as I expect to see—if I ever see any)—Defense and the Garrisons will always require some troops—it has ever been my opinion that a select militia properly trained might supercede the necessity for these,—but I despair on that head.

[1 ]A senator from North Carolina. Although these sentiments were delivered at a later date than the letter to Randolph, I have inserted them here as expressive of Washington’s ideas on Indian affairs. The letter of Hawkins has been lost.