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Subject Area: War and Peace
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

TO GOVERNOR CLINTON. - George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, vol. X (1782-1785) [1891]

Edition used:

The Writings of George Washington, collected and edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890). Vol. X (1782-1785).

Part of: The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols.

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TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

I should not have undertaken at this time to address myself through Your Excellency to Congress, on the present state of our Military and Political affairs, (which are so blended as scarcely to admit of seperation in the discussion,) did I not apprehend that my silence might perhaps be construed into remissness in my official duties or inattention to the public interests, and that some inconveniences might be experienced by the neglect or delay. Influenced by these motives, and an ardent desire to carry the wishes of Congress into effect, I shall hope to be excused, after suggesting a few things, for entreating to be made acquainted, so far as may be deemed expedient, with their sentiments and expectations relative to our Future Operations.

Head-Quarters, 19 October, 1782.

Sir,

It scarcely needs be remarked here, as it is a fact of great notoriety, that the tranquillity, leisure, and inactivity of Winter-Quarters have ever been considered by all well informed warlike nations, when in a state of Hostility, as the only proper Season for taking into contemplation the probable operations of the ensuing Campaign, and for making the best arrangements in their power for carrying such projects as were finally determined upon into execution. It was not simply in conformity with this practice, but upon a perfect conviction of the propriety and expediency of it, that at the close of all my former campaigns I have thought myself not only warranted, but impelled by the strongest dictates of reason and duty, to exert all my influence and abilities in endeavoring to augment our force, and to make the greatest possible provision in every Department for enabling us to act with vigor at the opening of the next Campaign; and, in thus attempting to perform my duty, I derived no small share of satisfaction from a consciousness, that I should meet with the approbation and assistance of my Country; being at the same time so fully acquainted with the designs of the Enemy on the one hand, and with the inclinations of Congress on the other, that I could not hesitate a moment in my own mind to decide what general system of measures was proper to be adopted. But, as the complexion of our Political and Military Affairs is now entirely changed by the Negotiations for Peace, which are carrying on in Europe; as Congress have determined by the reduction which has lately taken place, that the number of men engaged on the present Establishment are adequate to the Services before us; and as that Honble. Body have much better opportunities, than any Individual can have, for collecting and comparing the intelligence necessary to judge, with a degree of certainty, whether Peace will be concluded in the course of the Winter, so as to supersede the necessity of any further military preparations; I could not think myself at liberty, without having recourse to their sentiments, to take the same measures and give the same orders, that I had on all former occasions deemed myself competent to do. On the contrary, I feared to delay any longer to express my apprehensions, that very fair opportunities might be lost, and that very great, if not irreparable injuries might be experienced (if the war should be continued, especially if it should begin to rage again), in case we should not also on our part be in a state of preparation for such an event.

I have received your favor of the 15th instant with the enclosures; and, though at the same time it is true, I have the general command of the allied army, as to all its movements, operations, &c., yet I have never considered myself as having an absolute right to interfere with the internal police and regulations of the French army, under the immediate orders of his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau; with which army it appears the persons mentioned in the papers contained in your letter are connected. I have, however, in order to produce an amicable settlement of the matter, communicated the contents to Colonel Wadsworth, and requested him to use his utmost endeavors to prevent any altercations and quarrels between the citizens of this State and the people employed by him. As he has engaged, that they will not impede the due execution of the civil authority, and as he writes to you by this conveyance, I cannot but hope matters will be explained to your satisfaction.1

In addition to every other consideration of a Foreign, a Military, or Political nature, the embarrassed state of our Finances, the necessity of using the strictest œconomy and preventing every unnecessary expenditure of public money in conducting our Military affairs, have in an especial manner prompted me to make this representation, that the Sovereign power may determine, what is the proper line of conduct to be pursued under our present circumstances; whether any and what preparations ought to be made during the Winter; and what our situation will be at the period proper for opening the Campaign (supposing the war should continue and require any offensive operations on our part), unless many of the essential articles which are wanting, particularly in the Quarter Master’s Department, should in the mean time be effectually and fully supplied. Amongst the most indispensable and yet most expensive of which, I must beg leave to mention the means of Transportation, Horses for Artillery, and Teams and Wheel-Carriages for Ordnance, Stores, and Baggage; without which, it is well known, an army becomes totally harmless and totally helpless; for, so far from being able to annoy and operate against its Enemy, it is neither able to take the Field, nor to advance or retire a single step, let the occasions or prospects be of a nature ever so pressing and important.

For my own part I shall still continue to exert all my influence and authority to prevent the interruption of that harmony, which is so essential, and which has so generally prevailed between the army and the inhabitants of the country; and I need scarcely add, that in doing this I shall give every species of countenance and support to the execution of the laws of the land.

Notwithstanding any of the foregoing observations, I hope it will be clearly understood, that it is very far from being my wish or desire, that our Military preparations should be increased in the smallest degree beyond what the exigence of the Circumstances may appear to demand. But, while I candidly confess, that I believe there is no man, who more earnestly wishes a speedy period may be put to the contest than myself, I must take the liberty to suggest, whether, (in case a peace should not take place in consequence of the present negotiations,) it would not be far more eligible in point of national policy and œconomy to attempt, by one great and decisive effort, to expel the Enemy from the remaining part of their possessions in the United States, than to suffer them with their enfeebled force to hold a Post and protract the war, until the accumulating expenses of our languid and defensive measures only shall amount to such an aggregate sum, as would have furnished the means of attempting the Siege of New York with a prospect of success?

In the present quiet state of the frontiers, and with assurances from Sir Guy Carleton, that the incursions of the savages are stopped by authority, I have it in contemplation to withdraw the Continental troops from the northward. There are many reasons, which will make that measure eligible, unless the troops, which have been raised on purpose for the defence of the frontiers of this State, should be thought incompetent to the duty, even taking into consideration the inactivity of the season and the situation of affairs; for, indeed, I confess, I do not consider the late reports of the enemy’s being in force at the Isle-au-Noix to indicate any thing farther than an attention to their own security. The severity of the approaching season, and every other circumstance, appear to me to militate against an attack upon our possessions this winter, and we shall not be at so great a distance, but that succor may be afforded as early in the spring as shall be necessary. At any rate, some measures must be immediately taken relative to the troops now there. I should be happy in receiving your sentiments as soon as may be, and am with great esteem and regard, &c.

In order that your Excellency and Congress may have as comprehensive and compleat view of our efficient force, our military apparatus, and the principal articles, which would be required for a vigorous Campaign, I have thought it expedient to forward the Enclosed Returns and estimates (the Estimate of the Engineer being omitted, because the articles in his department will be principally provided by the labors of the army); and I flatter myself it will be found, that the troops under my orders are at this moment as much collected and as well appointed, as could possibly be expected under our circumstances; and that all the means, which have been afforded, so far as depended on military arrangements, have been œconomized in the most prudent manner. I wait with great solicitude to hear the sentiments, expectations, and final pleasure of Congress, on the several points contained in this letter; and, in the mean time,

P. S. I should be much obliged by an answer at the return of the bearer.

I have the honor to be, &c.1

P. S.

I have directed the Troops of Pensyla., Delaware, Maryland & Virginia except the Legionary Corps to be comprehended in the Qr. Master’s Estimate, as they would undoubtedly be employed with this Army in case of any serious operation.

[1 ]This letter was referred, 11 February, to a committee composed of Hamilton, Peters, Bland, Rutledge, and Mifflin. In consequence of their report, the following resolves were adopted.

“That the Commander-in-chief be informed, that Congress, always happy to receive his sentiments either on the political or military affairs of these States, the utility of which they have upon so many occasions experienced, have paid all the attention to his letter of the 30th of January, which the importance of it demands.

“That, should the war continue another campaign, every motive of policy and economy would operate in favor of the enterprise suggested; but that, such are the present situation and prospects of these States, that it would be inexpedient at this time to determine upon the plan, or to enter upon the expensive preparations, which it would require.

“That the official accounts received by Congress, corresponding with other intelligence, afford appearances of an approaching peace.

“Ordered that the secretary of foreign affairs make a confidential communication to the Commander-in-chief of the state of the negotiations for peace, when the last advices were received.”—Secret Journal, vol. i., p. 254.

[1 ]This letter was referred, 11 February, to a committee composed of Hamilton, Peters, Bland, Rutledge, and Mifflin. In consequence of their report, the following resolves were adopted.

“That the Commander-in-chief be informed, that Congress, always happy to receive his sentiments either on the political or military affairs of these States, the utility of which they have upon so many occasions experienced, have paid all the attention to his letter of the 30th of January, which the importance of it demands.

“That, should the war continue another campaign, every motive of policy and economy would operate in favor of the enterprise suggested; but that, such are the present situation and prospects of these States, that it would be inexpedient at this time to determine upon the plan, or to enter upon the expensive preparations, which it would require.

“That the official accounts received by Congress, corresponding with other intelligence, afford appearances of an approaching peace.

“Ordered that the secretary of foreign affairs make a confidential communication to the Commander-in-chief of the state of the negotiations for peace, when the last advices were received.”—Secret Journal, vol. i., p. 254.