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Subject Area: War and Peace
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

TO THE MARQUIS DE VAUDREUIL. - George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, vol. X (1782-1785) [1891]

Edition used:

The Writings of George Washington, collected and edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890). Vol. X (1782-1785).

Part of: The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols.

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TO THE MARQUIS DE VAUDREUIL.

Head-Quarters, 10 May, 1782.

Sir,

Head Quarters, 10 August, 1782.

Sir,

I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency the enclosed papers, No. 1 to—inclusive. They contain a continuance of the correspondence, which has been produced between me, General Robertson, and Sir Henry Clinton, in the case of Captain Huddy. That from Sir Henry Clinton did not come to hand till some days after the receipt of General Robertson’s letter, and after my reply to the latter. I am in daily expectation of an answer from General Robertson, which I hope will bring this ungrateful business to a conclusion.

I have the Honor to address you, at the particular Request, in Consequence of a Letter which I have just received from his Excelly. the Count de Rochambeau, inclosing to me the copy of a correspondence between him and you, relative to the Operations of the Fleet under your Command on the Coasts of N. America; wherein you mention to him a Wish, that while your Fleet should remain in the Neighborhood of Boston, you might be enabled to make a stroke at the Enemy’s post of Penobscot; and in the Discussion of which point, the Count de Rochambeau has referred you to my Opinion upon that Enterprise.

I take this opportunity to convey to Congress sundry English and New York newspapers, which have within a few days past been put into my hands. Their contents are new and interesting, and I take the earliest occasion to present them to Congress.

While I applaud, Sir, the generous Disposition declared in your Intentions for our Assistance, Candor requires me to be very explicit upon the subject—I am obliged therefore to say that it is my decided Opinion that, considering the Hazards that will attend the Enterprise, the Object is by no means equal to the Risque that will attend the attempt.

Although I view the debates, so far as they convey proposals of pacification to America, to be idle and delusory, yet I cannot but express my fears for the effect they may have upon the exertions of the States, which are already too feeble and void of energy. The people, so far as I am informed, are catching at the idea of peace with great eagerness; and the industry which the enemy are using for its propagation is to me a very suspicious circumstance. For my own part, I view our situation such, that, instead of relaxing, we ought to improve the present moment as the most favorable to our wishes. The British nation appear to be staggered and almost ready to sink beneath the accumulated weight of debt and misfortune. If we follow the blow with vigor and energy, I think the game is our own.1

Among many Reasons which influence my Mind in forming this Opinion, the great and very principal One, appears from your own Letter to Count de Rochambeau, where you mention to him, that you expect immediately to be followed into these Seas, by a superior British fleet. Admitting this Event to take place, and that your fleet should have proceeded to Penobscot (which is near One hundred Leagues from Boston, the only secure Harbor which you will find upon all those Eastern shores, and lies almost at the Bottom of a deep Bay,) it appears to me that your Fleet will be placed in the greatest Hazard of being totally destroyed. For in that Situation they will be compleatly imbayed, and a brisk S. Westerly Wind, which will be most favorable for the British fleet from N. York—and which would bring them into the Bay in a short Time, would be directly opposed to your Escape. So that was you to receive the earliest Intelligence of the Enemy’s fleet leaving N. York, under such Circumstances, yet you could not avail yourself of the Information, and at the same time would be placed in a position where no Harbor or fortification could give you any protection or shelter.

Just as I was closing these despatches, I received a letter from Sir Guy Carleton, covering sundry printed papers, a copy of which, with the papers, I have now the honor to enclose to your Excellency, together with the copy of my answer to him; and I flatter myself, that my conduct therein will be agreeable to the wishes of Congress. I have the honor to be, &c.1

Was this Argument of Danger to his Most Christian Majesty’s Ships not sufficient to govern your mind, I could mention that the Time that must be employed on this attempt will probably be much greater than you seem to apprehend. A month is as short as I should estimate, taking together all the necessary preparations and little cross events that must probably interpose. For I have not an Idea of the object being to be attained by a Coup de main, as I am lately informed by good Intelligence that the Fort is the most regularly constructed and best finished of any in America, is well situated, and garrisoned by the 74th Regiment, consisting of 800 Men, which will require a Regular Seige, to be conducted by cautious Approaches, with a considerable Addition of Men to the Number of Troops which are on Board your Fleet; with their necessary Cannon and Mortars, Stores, &c., the whole of which in all probability, was the Seige to be undertaken, and your fleet obliged to make a sudden departure, must all be sacrificed; as their Retreat by Land, (as has been heretofore experienced) would be almost totally impossible and impracticable, to be effected thro’ a Country which is as yet a mere Wilderness of large Extent and difficult passage.

[1 ]“We wanted no fresh opiate to increase that stupor into which we had fallen, but I much fear that the idle, and delusive offers of Peace with which the Country resounds, will, if it is not powerfully counteracted, be exceedingly injurious to us—not (I apprehend) from any disposition in the people to listen to improper terms, but from a misconception of what is really meant, and the arts which are used to make them believe that Independence, and what not, are proffered to them. Under these ideas they ask, why need we be taxed, or why need we be put to the expence and trouble of compleating our Battalions?

“It is to be hoped that the despatches which are now on their passage to Congress, will announce the aids which are intended for us by the Court of France, as it is high time the plan of campaign was known, which cannot be the case till we have materials to project one. Would to God there may not be too much truth in the British account (in the York Gazettes) of the advantages gained by her in the naval action off Guadaloupe—it may be productive of a total derangement of the plans of the French Court, this campaign.”—Washington to R. R. Livingston, 22 May, 1782.

“What may be the real intention of the present Ministry, respecting America—or what effect the naval action in the West Indies may have upon the intended operations of this year, and consequently upon the conduct of the Powers at war, is difficult to say. There is, however, one plain line chalked out for us; by pursuing which we cannot err; and it gives me pleasure to hear that Congress are inculcating this by a deputation from their own Body. If Rodney’s victory is as decisive and important as the New York gazettes endeavor to make it; and the new Ministry should not be too much buoyed up by it; there is no measure so likely to produce a speedy termination of the War as vigorous preparations for meeting the enemy in full expectation of it, if they are only playing the insidious game. This will make them think of Peace in good earnest.”—Washington to Robert R. Livingston, 5 June, 1782.

[1 ]Read in Congress, May 13th.

The papers enclosed in the letter were printed copies of the proceedings of the House of Commons, on the 4th of March, 1782, respecting an address to the King in favor of peace; and also a copy of the bill reported in consequence thereof, enabling his Majesty to conclude a peace or truce with the revolted colonies in North America.

The French cabinet were somewhat concerned as to the effect, which these movements of the British Parliament might have in America. As soon as they were known at Versailles, Count de Vergennes wrote to M. de la Luzerne expressing his apprehensions.

“The object of the British King,” said he, “in acceding to these resolutions, is obvious. He would persuade the Americans, that he is sincerely disposed to a reconciliation, and would spare nothing to impress this persuasion by influencing their feelings towards England, and causing them to be unfaithful to France. On examining the comparative situation of England and America, one could hardly hesitate to decide what impression these resolutions should make; yet the strong propensity of the Americans to inactivity; their need of peace and the desire they manifest for it; the embarrassment as to their means of continuing the war; the great number of English partisans among them; all these causes united are enough to excite the fear, that the wishes of the people may prevail over the patriotism and zeal of Congress, and that this body will be forced to lend an ear to the pretended pacific overtures of the court of London. Such a step would of course be infinitely disagreeable to France, because it would effectually change the object and mode of prosecuting the war; it would augment the hostile resources of England, and would cause France to lose a great part of the fruit of her offensive efforts in carrying on the war for the independence of America. It is therefore of the highest importance, that the United States should continue of the same principles as heretofore, remain immovably attached to the alliance, and follow the example of France in refusing to listen to a separate peace with England. Every principle of honor and interest requires this conduct in the Americans.

“It should not be concealed from you, that the English ministry have recently sent a secret emissary to us, with propositions for a separate peace. The conditions, which he offered, were such as would have satisfied the King, if he had been without allies. He stipulated, among other things, the uti possidetis, the suppression of the English commission at Dunkirk, and advantages in India. But these offers did not move the King. His Majesty acknowledges no other rule, than that which is traced in his engagements; and he answered, that, however ardent might be his wishes for the reëstablishment of peace, he could not commence a negotiation to that end without the participation of his allies. The English commissioner replied, that he perfectly understood this answer to refer to America, as well as Spain, but objected, that recognising the independence of the colonies did not enter into the system of England. I replied, that this was the basis of the system of the King. Upon this he asked, if there was no mode of treating with France without involving the affairs of America. I sent to him for answer the first pacific overtures, which we had communicated to the mediators. I added, that, whether England should treat of the affairs of America with us, or hold a direct negotiation with the United States, she could not avoid treating with the deputies of Congress; and thus she would be compelled to recognise the authority of that body. I cannot say whether any thing will result from this advance on the part of the English ministry, whether it was meant as an apple of discord between us and our allies; but, whatever may have been the intention, the issue ought at least to be a new and strong proof to the Americans of the fidelity of the King to his engagements, and to convince them of the extreme injustice of deviating from his example.”—MS. Letter from Vergennes to Luzerne, Versailles, March 23, 1782.

A few days afterwards, in writing again upon the same subject, Count de Vergennes said:

“Although we desire that Congress may neither open a direct negotiation, nor make a separate peace, yet we have no wish to prevent that body from following the system, which we ourselves have traced in our answer to the mediating courts. We are and always shall be disposed to consent, that the American plenipotentiaries in Europe shall treat, in conformity to their instructions, directly and without our intervention, with those from the court of London, while we shall be engaged in a negotiation on our part; provided that the two negotiations shall proceed with an equal progress, that the two treaties shall be signed at the same time, and that neither of them shall take effect without the other.”—MS. Letter, April 9th—Sparks.

[1 ]“We wanted no fresh opiate to increase that stupor into which we had fallen, but I much fear that the idle, and delusive offers of Peace with which the Country resounds, will, if it is not powerfully counteracted, be exceedingly injurious to us—not (I apprehend) from any disposition in the people to listen to improper terms, but from a misconception of what is really meant, and the arts which are used to make them believe that Independence, and what not, are proffered to them. Under these ideas they ask, why need we be taxed, or why need we be put to the expence and trouble of compleating our Battalions?

“It is to be hoped that the despatches which are now on their passage to Congress, will announce the aids which are intended for us by the Court of France, as it is high time the plan of campaign was known, which cannot be the case till we have materials to project one. Would to God there may not be too much truth in the British account (in the York Gazettes) of the advantages gained by her in the naval action off Guadaloupe—it may be productive of a total derangement of the plans of the French Court, this campaign.”—Washington to R. R. Livingston, 22 May, 1782.

“What may be the real intention of the present Ministry, respecting America—or what effect the naval action in the West Indies may have upon the intended operations of this year, and consequently upon the conduct of the Powers at war, is difficult to say. There is, however, one plain line chalked out for us; by pursuing which we cannot err; and it gives me pleasure to hear that Congress are inculcating this by a deputation from their own Body. If Rodney’s victory is as decisive and important as the New York gazettes endeavor to make it; and the new Ministry should not be too much buoyed up by it; there is no measure so likely to produce a speedy termination of the War as vigorous preparations for meeting the enemy in full expectation of it, if they are only playing the insidious game. This will make them think of Peace in good earnest.”—Washington to Robert R. Livingston, 5 June, 1782.

[1 ]Read in Congress, May 13th.

The papers enclosed in the letter were printed copies of the proceedings of the House of Commons, on the 4th of March, 1782, respecting an address to the King in favor of peace; and also a copy of the bill reported in consequence thereof, enabling his Majesty to conclude a peace or truce with the revolted colonies in North America.

The French cabinet were somewhat concerned as to the effect, which these movements of the British Parliament might have in America. As soon as they were known at Versailles, Count de Vergennes wrote to M. de la Luzerne expressing his apprehensions.

“The object of the British King,” said he, “in acceding to these resolutions, is obvious. He would persuade the Americans, that he is sincerely disposed to a reconciliation, and would spare nothing to impress this persuasion by influencing their feelings towards England, and causing them to be unfaithful to France. On examining the comparative situation of England and America, one could hardly hesitate to decide what impression these resolutions should make; yet the strong propensity of the Americans to inactivity; their need of peace and the desire they manifest for it; the embarrassment as to their means of continuing the war; the great number of English partisans among them; all these causes united are enough to excite the fear, that the wishes of the people may prevail over the patriotism and zeal of Congress, and that this body will be forced to lend an ear to the pretended pacific overtures of the court of London. Such a step would of course be infinitely disagreeable to France, because it would effectually change the object and mode of prosecuting the war; it would augment the hostile resources of England, and would cause France to lose a great part of the fruit of her offensive efforts in carrying on the war for the independence of America. It is therefore of the highest importance, that the United States should continue of the same principles as heretofore, remain immovably attached to the alliance, and follow the example of France in refusing to listen to a separate peace with England. Every principle of honor and interest requires this conduct in the Americans.

“It should not be concealed from you, that the English ministry have recently sent a secret emissary to us, with propositions for a separate peace. The conditions, which he offered, were such as would have satisfied the King, if he had been without allies. He stipulated, among other things, the uti possidetis, the suppression of the English commission at Dunkirk, and advantages in India. But these offers did not move the King. His Majesty acknowledges no other rule, than that which is traced in his engagements; and he answered, that, however ardent might be his wishes for the reëstablishment of peace, he could not commence a negotiation to that end without the participation of his allies. The English commissioner replied, that he perfectly understood this answer to refer to America, as well as Spain, but objected, that recognising the independence of the colonies did not enter into the system of England. I replied, that this was the basis of the system of the King. Upon this he asked, if there was no mode of treating with France without involving the affairs of America. I sent to him for answer the first pacific overtures, which we had communicated to the mediators. I added, that, whether England should treat of the affairs of America with us, or hold a direct negotiation with the United States, she could not avoid treating with the deputies of Congress; and thus she would be compelled to recognise the authority of that body. I cannot say whether any thing will result from this advance on the part of the English ministry, whether it was meant as an apple of discord between us and our allies; but, whatever may have been the intention, the issue ought at least to be a new and strong proof to the Americans of the fidelity of the King to his engagements, and to convince them of the extreme injustice of deviating from his example.”—MS. Letter from Vergennes to Luzerne, Versailles, March 23, 1782.

A few days afterwards, in writing again upon the same subject, Count de Vergennes said:

“Although we desire that Congress may neither open a direct negotiation, nor make a separate peace, yet we have no wish to prevent that body from following the system, which we ourselves have traced in our answer to the mediating courts. We are and always shall be disposed to consent, that the American plenipotentiaries in Europe shall treat, in conformity to their instructions, directly and without our intervention, with those from the court of London, while we shall be engaged in a negotiation on our part; provided that the two negotiations shall proceed with an equal progress, that the two treaties shall be signed at the same time, and that neither of them shall take effect without the other.”—MS. Letter, April 9th—Sparks.