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Subject Area: War and Peace
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

1782. - George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, vol. X (1782-1785) [1891]

Edition used:

The Writings of George Washington, collected and edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890). Vol. X (1782-1785).

Part of: The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols.

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Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


1782.

As to the movement and disposition of the French army, I will tell you exactly my idea and plan respecting it, and how the matter now rests. While we continued in the state of uncertainty, which has so long perplexed and prevented us from forming any projects whatever, I wished to have the corps of the Count de Rochambeau remain in a situation equally capable of looking either way, as circumstances might eventually require, being well persuaded in my own mind, that with their assistance (without the aid of a naval force) we should not at this time be able to do anything effectual against New York, defended by its present garrison; and, presuming still greater difficulties would oppose themselves to an attempt against Charleston, I proposed to postpone my final resolution until we should hear from the other side of the Atlantic. For, allowing your army, in conjunction with the French troops, to be completely competent to the object, the transportation by land of heavy artillery stores and apparatus appeared to me an inevitable obstacle, which I have fully explained in my letter of the 23d of April last. Besides, the diminution of an army in so long a march, and the innumerable advantages the enemy must derive from the command of the water, were considerations with me. And, as I flattered myself we might be able to keep the enemy in check with our present force, both in the northern and southern departments, I therefore thought it expedient, that the select corps of our allies in Virginia should continue unimpaired as a corps de reserve in that State, until new information or circumstances should produce new orders from me; unless the Count de Rochambeau should first be apprized of some contingence or event, which should render a movement in his opinion proper; in which case the matter was left to his determination. I have this moment learned from his Excellency, the Minister of France, that the Count has already commenced his march northward. What circumstances have led to this, I am unable to say; but expect to see the Count himself in a few days (by appointment) at Philadelphia, where it is proposed to enter into a discussion of the possible objects and views of the campaign, so far as our general and imperfect knowledge of affairs will admit, and from whence I shall have the pleasure to inform you of any thing of moment, that may in the mean time take place, or ultimately be in contemplation.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL HAZEN.

Under an idea, that the French troops would certainly be withdrawn from Virginia at some moment of the campaign, and perhaps unexpectedly, I have long since written to Governor Harrison on that subject, and requested that a body of men might be in readiness for the defence of the State on that occasion. Indeed I have written almost incessantly to all the States, urging, in the most forcible terms I could make use of, the absolute necessity of complying with the requisitions of Congress in furnishing their contingents of men and money, and am unhappy to say the success of these applications have not been equal to my expectation.

Head-Quarters, 3 May 1782.

Sir,

I am happy to assure you there was no foundation for the report of my having had a narrow escape in passing the Clove. In return, we have had a similar account respecting yourself, which I hope was equally groundless. Believe me, my dear Sir, I shall always consider myself deeply interested in whatever concerns you, and shall ever rejoice at your health, safety, and felicity.

The enemy, persisting in that barbarous line of conduct, they have pursued during the course of this war, have lately most inhumanly executed Captain Joshua Huddy, of the Jersey State troops, taken prisoner by them at a post on Tom’s River; and in consequence I have written to the British Commander-in-chief, that, unless the perpetrators of that horrid deed were delivered up, I should be under the disagreeable necessity of retaliating, as the only means left to put a stop to such inhuman proceedings.

Mrs. Washington, who is just setting out for Virginia, joins me in most affectionate regards to Mrs. Greene and yourself. I am, dear Sir, with the most perfect esteem, &c.

You will, therefore, immediately on receipt of this, designate by lot for the above purpose, a British captain, who is an unconditional prisoner, if such a one is in our possession; if not, a lieutenant under the same circumstances from among the prisoners at any of the posts, either in Pennsylvania or Maryland. So soon as you have fixed on the person, you will send him under a safeguard to Philadelphia, where the minister of war will order a proper guard to receive and conduct him to the place of his destination.

P. S. Although the campaign does not promise much activity, yet I shall wish you to keep me as regularly and accurately informed of the state of your department as possible, noting the strength, movements, and position of your own army, and that of the enemy. It may also be essential for me to be made acquainted with the resources of the country and every thing of a military or political nature, which may be interesting to our future plans and operations.1

For your information respecting the officers, who are prisoners in our possession, I have ordered the commissary of prisoners to furnish you with a list of them. It will be forwarded with this. I need not mention to you, that every possible tenderness, that is consistent with the security of him, should be shown to the person whose unfortunate lot it may be to suffer. I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN LAURENS.

TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JAMES ROBERTSON.1

Head-Quarters, 10 July, 1782.

My dear Sir,

Head-Quarters, 4 May, 1782.

Sir,

The last post brought me your letter of the 19th of May. I must confess, that I am not at all astonished at the failure of your plan. That spirit of freedom, which at the commencement of this contest would have gladly sacrificed every thing to the attainment of its object, has long since subsided, and every selfish passion has taken its place. It is not the public, but private interest, which influences the generality of mankind, nor can the Americans any longer boast an exception. Under these circumstances, it would rather have been surprising if you had succeeded, nor will you I fear succeed better in Georgia.1

I had the honor to receive your letter of the 1st instant. Your Excellency is acquainted with the determination expressed in my letter of the 21st of April to Sir Henry Clinton. I have now to inform you, that, so far from receding from that resolution, orders are given to designate a British officer for retaliation. The time and place are fixed; but I still hope the result of your court-martial will prevent this dreadful alternative.

In the present moment, there is very little prospect of the campaign being much more active in this quarter than in yours. However, little can be positively determined on, till we have some advices from Europe, which I am anxiously waiting for. When they arrive, I shall be better able to tell you what we may expect.

Sincerely lamenting the cruel necessity, which alone can induce so distressing a measure in the present instance, I do assure your Excellency, I am as earnestly desirous as you can be, that the war may be carried on agreeable to the rules, which humanity formed, and the example of the politest nations recommends, and shall be extremely happy in agreeing with you to prevent or punish every breach of the rules of war within the sphere of our respective commands.

Sir Guy Carleton is using every art to soothe and lull our people into a state of security. Adml. Digby is capturing all our vessels, and suffocating all our Seamen who will not enlist into the Service of His Britannic Majesty, as fast as possible in Prison Ships; and Haldimand, (with his savage allies,) is scalping and burning the Frontiers. Such is the line of conduct pursued by the different commanders, and such their politics. You have my best wishes, being always sincerely yours.

I am unacquainted with the circumstances of the detention of Badgely and Hatfield. The matter shall be examined into and justice done; but I must inform you, that in my opinion deserters, or characters, who for crimes they have committed are amenable to the civil power, cannot on either side be protected under the sanction of a flag. I do not pretend to say, the abovementioned persons are in that predicament.

TO JAMES McHENRY.

Recrimination would be useless. I forbear, therefore, to mention numerous instances, which have stained the reputation of your arms, marked the progress of this war with unusual severity, and disgraced the honor of human nature itself. While I wave this ungrateful discussion, I repeat the assertion, that it is my most ardent desire, not only to soften the inevitable calamities of war, but even to introduce on every occasion as great a share of tenderness and humanity as can possibly be exercised in a state of hostility.1

Phila., 18 July, 1782.

My dear Sir,

I have the honor to be, &c.

Mr. Lindsay handed me your favor of the 14th. The disposition of the Prisoners is not with me, but I have accompanied your request to the Secretary at War, and have no doubt of his acquiescence. If the Ladies should derive as much additional pleasure from the allurement of this Band, as I wish them, they will soon be at the summit of happiness.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

At present we are enveloped in darkness; and no man, I believe, can foretell all the consequences which will result from the naval Action in the West Indies—to say no worse of it, it is an unfortunate affair—& if the States cannot, or will not rouse to more vigorous exertions, they must submit to the consequences. Providence has done much for us in this contest, but we must do something for ourselves, if we expect to go triumphantly through with it.

Head Quarters,Newburg, 4 May, 1782.

Dear Sir,

My coming to this place was sudden as unexpected—Mrs. Washington left Head Qrs. on Tuesday.—On Thursday I rec’d a letter from Count De Rochambeau by one of his aids, which induced me to set off on Friday, and I arrived on Sunday; so that my being at the Minister’s celebration of the birth of the Dauphin, was purely accidental.1 I heard with concern by Colo. Rogers of your indisposition, but rejoice at your recovery.—As your fever has been obstinate may not change of air be of service to you—whether for this, or other purposes, allow me to add that I should be very happy in your spending some time with us at Head Quarters. In a letter which I have lately received from the Marqs. De la Fayette he desired to be particularly remembered to you.—I am with much truth, &c.

By the letter to Brigadier-General Hazen, which I have enclosed to you under a flying seal for your inspection, you will observe the distressing alternative to which we are at last reduced. I must request you will give that letter a safe and speedy conveyance.

P. S. Since writing the foregoing, I am informed by one of my Aids who I sent with Mr. Lindsay to the Secretary at War, that certain plans have been adopted by him, and sanctioned, that will prevent Mr. Lindsay getting the Music in the manner he at first proposed—but on terms which he (Lindsay) will readily accede to if the prisoners can be engaged to yield their acquiescence.

Since writing the above I have received your Letter respecting the Interview which Majr. Lynch reqs. with persons at New York. Please to inform that Gentleman that it is a rule Established by me (and I think by Congress) for all Citizens, to bring certificates from the Executive of the State in wch. they reside that they are permitted to their indulgence—it is then no more than an act of official duty with me—Let Mr. Lynch bring this to Head Qrs. at Newburgh, & I will order the officer commanding on the Lines, to furnish him with a Flag.

As soon as the British officer, whose unfortunate lot it is to be designated as the object of retaliation, shall arrive in Philadelphia, it will be necessary to have a sufficient escort, under the command of a very discreet and vigilant officer, in readiness to receive and conduct him to the cantonment of the troops of New Jersey. I pray you will be pleased to give the orders proper for the occasion, and direct the officer commanding the party to apply to the commandant of the Jersey line, who will have final instructions respecting the matter.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Keenly wounded as my feelings will be, at the deplorable destiny of the unhappy victim, no gleam of hope can arise to him but from the conduct of the enemy themselves. This he may be permitted to communicate to the British Commander-in-chief, in whose power alone it rests to avert the impending vengeance from the innocent by executing it on the guilty. At the same time it may be announced, that I will receive no application nor answer any letter on the subject, which does not inform me that ample satisfaction is made for the death of Captain Huddy on the perpetrators of that horrid deed. * * *1

Head-Quarters,Newburg,
6 August, 1782.

My dear Sir,

I have the honor to be, &c.

In my last letter, of the 9th of July in which I acknowledged your several favors of the 22d of April and 19th of May, I mentioned my expectation of soon meeting the Count de Rochambeau in Philadelphia, and my intention of writing you from that place, in case any thing of moment should turn up in the mean while; but as our hopes, that public despatches would have arrived from France before our meeting, have been disappointed, I can only inform you, that matters now rest in the same situation as described in my former letters, except with regard to the negotiations, which are said to be carrying on by the belligerent powers in Europe.

CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE STATES.

Indeed, I hardly know what to think or believe of the disposition of the court of Britain. Certain it is, the new administration have made overtures of peace to the several nations at war, apparently with a design to detach some one or another of them from the general combination; but, not having succeeded in their efforts for a separate negotiation, how far the necessity of affairs may carry them in their wishes for a general pacification upon admissible terms, I cannot undertake to determine. From the former infatuation, duplicity, and perverse system of British policy, I confess I am induced to doubt every thing, to suspect every thing; otherwise I should suppose, from the subsequent extract of a letter from Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby to me, dated the 2d instant, that the prospects of, and negotiation for, a general peace would be very favorable.1

“We are acquainted, Sir, by authority, that negotiations for a general peace have already commenced at Paris, and that Mr. Grenville is invested with full powers to treat with all parties at war, and is now at Paris in the execution of his commission. And we are likewise, Sir, further made acquainted, that his Majesty, in order to remove all obstacles to that peace, which he so ardently wishes to restore, has commanded his ministers to direct Mr. Grenville, that the independency of the thirteen provinces should be proposed by him, in the first instance, instead of making it a condition, of a general treaty; however, not without the highest confidence, that the loyalists shall be restored to their possessions, or a full compensation made them for whatever confiscations may have taken place.”

Head-Quarters, 4 May, 1782.

Sir,

These communications, they say, had just arrived by a packet. They further add, that Mr. Laurens was enlarged from all engagements,1 and that transports were prepared for conveying all American prisoners to this country to be exchanged here. Whatever the real intention of the enemy may be, I think the strictest attention and exertion, which have ever been practised on our part, instead of being diminished, ought to be increased thereby. Jealousy and precaution, at least, can do no harm. Too much confidence and supineness may be pernicious in the extreme.

I find myself arrived at that period, at which I hoped to have seen the battalions of the several States completed to their establishment, in conformity to the requisitions of Congress of the 19th of December last.

There having been a vague report, that a small embarkation of cavalry and infantry was to take place at New York, to relieve part of the garrison of Charleston, I have made use of this occasion to desire the secretary at war to put Armand’s legion immediately in motion to join you, and have requested he will use his endeavors to have the means afforded to facilitate and expedite the movement.

The enclosed returns of recruits, which I have caused to be made up to the 1st instant, will show how totally short of my expectations the exertions of the States have fallen. From your State you will find that only NA recruits have joined the army in consequence of the above requisition.1

A mail has lately been intercepted by the enemy between Philadelphia and Trenton, in which, I am informed, there were letters from you to me. These by the time of their capture were probably of the same date as your despatches to Congress, wherein the correspondence between General Leslie and yourself was enclosed. I mention these circumstances, that you may forward duplicates in case you should judge it necessary.

All my accounts from Europe concur in declaring, that the British King and ministry are still determined to prosecute the war. It becomes, therefore, our decided duty to be prepared to meet these hostile intentions, in whatever way they are to be carried into execution; to do which, our utmost exertions are now called for. You will suffer me therefore to entreat, that, if your State has any expectation from the military operations of this season, not another moment may be lost in providing for and carrying into most effectual execution the full completion of their battalions. It is scarcely necessary to inform you, that on this expectation all our calculations must be formed, and on this event must rest the hopes of the ensuing campaign.

You will, I imagine, have heard, before this reaches you, of the arrival of M. Vaudreuil with a fleet of thirteen ships of the line on this coast. I can give you no particulars, as I have no official account of his arrival. The army of the Count de Rochambeau, having, as I advised you in my last, marched towards the northward, at our meeting in Philadelphia, (it was concluded) upon a consideration of all circumstances, that this corps should proceed to join the army on the Hudson. They were at Baltimore by the last intelligence from that quarter.

My intelligence of the actual aid we may expect from our allies is not yet so explicit as will lead me to decide absolutely on the mode of operations for this campaign; but were our expectations of support from that quarter ever so promising, yet, from the negligence and languor of the States, from whence our own exertions are to spring, I am not at this day enabled to give any assurance of our being prepared to coöperate with our allies in any great objects equal to their expectations of our own ability. I am sorry to acquaint your Excellency, that I have the best authority to assure you, that the court of France is much dissatisfied with this want of vigor and exertion in the States, and with that disposition, which appears willing at least, if not desirous, to cast all the burthen of the American War upon them. Waving the injustice and impolicy of such a temper, (which to me appear very conspicuous,) how humiliating is the idea, that our dependence for support should rest on others, beyond that point which absolute necessity dictates; how discouraging to our allies, and how dishonorable to ourselves must be our want of vigor and utmost exertion, at a time when, if we are not wanting to ourselves, our prospects are the fairest that our wishes could extend to.

Since the receipt of the letter from the commissioners, Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby, I have seen a New York paper of the 3d instant, in which is a speech of General Conway, and some other articles, which appear to be designed to propose independence to America on certain conditions not admissible, namely, that the legislature of America should be totally independent of the Parliament of Great Britain, but that the King of England should have the same kind of supremacy here as in Ireland. I have not information sufficient to determine, whether this is the kind of independence alluded to in the letter of the commissioners, or not. I wish my suspicions, however, may be ill-founded. Wishing you all the success and happiness you can desire, I am, my dear Sir, with the highest sentiments of regard and esteem, &c.1

I find from the proceedings of the several States, that their calculation of deficiencies, formed on application to the several towns, who furnish the men, are greatly different from the returns sent from the army. I forbear mentioning many reasons, which might be assigned to produce this difference, and which in my opinion originate principally within the States, and will content myself with this one observation, that, should the States deceive themselves in this respect, and fail to furnish the expected force in the field, they will not only cast an essential injury upon the army, but the unhappy consequences of a failure in their expectations from a military operation will reverberate upon themselves, whilst recrimination can have no effect towards alleviating our protracted misfortunes and distress.

TO JOHN P. POSEY.

Although money matters are not within the line of my duty, yet, as they are so intimately connected with all military operations; and being lately informed by the financier in answer to some small requisitions upon him, that he has not yet received one penny in money from any one State, upon the requisition of Congress for the eight millions of dollars, but that, on the contrary, some of the States are devising ways to draw from him the small sums he has been able otherwise to establish, and that he is at this time barely able to feed the army, and that from hand to mouth; I cannot forbear to express my apprehensions from that quarter, and to urge, with the warmth of zeal and earnestness, the most pointed and effectual attention of your State to the actual raising and collecting of its proportion of the requisition. Upon the present plan of non-compliance with requisitions for men and supplies, let me seriously ask your Excellency, How is it possible for us to continue the war? How is it possible to support an army in money or recruits? To what a wretched state must we soon be reduced? How dangerous is it to suffer our affairs to run at hazard, and to depend upon contingencies? To what do the present measures tend, but to the utter ruin of that cause, which we have hitherto so long and nobly supported, and to crush all the fair hopes, which the present moment places before us, were we only to exert the power and abilities with which Providence has bountifully blessed this country? But if the States will not impose, or do not collect and apply, taxes for support of the war, the sooner we make terms the better; the longer we continue a feeble and ineffectual war, the greater will be our distress at the hour of submission. For my own part, I am fully convinced, that, without the means of execution, no officer, whoever he may be, who is placed at the head of the military department, can be answerable for the success of any plans he may propose or agree to.

Head Quarters,Newburgh,
7 August, 1782.

Sir,

Upon this subject I will only add, that, from past experience and from present prospects, I am persuaded, that, if the States would furnish the supplies agreeable to the late requisition, and would suffer the pay, clothing, and subsistence of the army to go through one common channel, that two thirds of their former expenses would be saved; and many partialities, discontents, and jealousies, which now subsist, would be removed and cease, and an establishment of order, regularity, and harmony in our general affairs would be experienced, which cannot arise from the present disjointed and different systems of finance adopted by separate States.

With a mixture of surprize, concern, and even horror, have I heard of your treatment of the deceased Mr. Custis; in the abuse in misapplication of the estate which he had committed—with much confidence I am sure, and I believe personal regard—to your management.

While acting in my military capacity, I am sensible of the impropriety of stepping into the line of civil polity. My anxiety for the general good, and an earnest desire to bring this long protracted war to a happy issue, when I hope to retire to that peaceful state of domestic pleasures, from which the call of my country has brought me to take an active part, and to which I most ardently wish a speedy return, I hope will furnish my excuse with your Excellency and legislature, while I request your pardon for this trespass. I have the honor to be, &c.

If what I have heard, or the half of it be true, you must not only be lost to the feelings of virtue, honor, and common honesty—but you must have suffered an unwarrantable thirst of gain to lead you into errors which are so pregrant with folly and indiscretion, as to render you a mark for every man’s arrow to level at. Can you suppose, Sir, that a manager can dissipate his Employer’s Estate with impunity? That there are not Laws in every free country by which Justice is to be obtained?—or that the Heirs of Mr. Custis will not find friends who will pursue you to the end of the Earth in order to come at it? If you do, you are proceeding upon exceedingly mistaken principles—but, for a moment only, let us suppose that you have taken the advantage of an unsuspecting friend—for such I am sure Mr. Custis was to you, and that you have acted so covertly, as to elude the Law; do you believe that in the hours of cool reflection—in the moment perhaps, when you shall find that ill-gotten pelf can no longer avail you; that your conscience will not smite you for such complicated iniquity as arises not only from acts of injustice, but the horrors of ingratitude; in abusing the confidence of a man who supposed you incapable of deceiving him, who was willing, and I believe did, in a great degree, commit his whole property to your care?

P. S. May 8th.—Since writing the above, I have been furnished with sundry New York papers, and an English paper, containing the last intelligence from England, with the debates of Parliament upon several motions made respecting the American war. Lest your Excellency may not have been favored with so full a sight of these papers as I have, I take the liberty to mention, that I have perused these debates with great attention and care, with a view if possible to penetrate their real design; and, upon the most mature deliberation I can bestow, I am obliged to declare it as my candid opinion, that the measure in all their views, so far as they respect America, is merely delusory, having no serious intention to admit our independence upon its true principles, but is calculated to produce a change of ministers to quiet the minds of their own people, and reconcile them to a continuance of the war; while it is meant to amuse this country with a false idea of peace, to draw us off from our connexion with France, and to lull us into a state of security and inactivity, which taking place, the ministry will be left to prosecute the war in other parts of the world with greater vigor and effect. Your Excellency will permit me on this occasion to observe, that, even if the nation and Parliament are really in earnest to obtain peace with America, it will undoubtedly be wisdom in us to meet them with great caution and circumspection, and by all means to keep our arms firm in our hands, and, instead of relaxing one iota in our exertions, rather to spring forward with redoubled vigor, that we may take the advantage of every favorable opportunity, until our wishes are fully obtained. No nation ever yet suffered in treaty by preparing, (even in the moment of negotiation,) most vigorously for the field.

The industry which the enemy are using to propagate their pacific reports, appears to me a circumstance very suspicious; and the eagerness with which the people, as I am informed are catching at them, is in my opinion equally dangerous.1

But this by the by—I do not mean to put this matter upon the footing of conscience. Conscience might have been kicked out of doors before you could have proceeded to the length of selling another man’s negroes for your own emolument, and this too after having applyed the greatest part, or the whole of the profits of his Estate to your benefit.—Conscience again seldom comes to a man’s aid while he is in the zenith of health, and revelling in pomp and luxury upon illgotten spoils. It is generally the last act of his life, and comes too late to be of much service to others here, or to himself hereafter. But, Sir, the footing I expect to see you put this matter upon is, to settle without delay, such acc’ts with the administrator of Mr. Custis’s Estate, whose duty it is to have it done, as you can support by authentic vouchers—That you will show by what authority you have sold any of his negroes, and to what purposes the money has been applied—and lastly, what crops you have made, what stocks you have raised, and how they have been disposed of. A settlement of this kind, altho’ it should appear by it that you have applied the greatest part, or even the whole of the money arising from the sales of them, to your own purposes, will be the next best thing to never having committed the wrong. How far Mr. Dandridge, as an Administrator, may chuse to push matters, I cannot undertake (never having heard from him on the subject) to say—but this you may rely on, that this affair shall be most critically investigated, and probed to the bottom; let the trouble and cost of doing it be what it may—as a man therefore who wishes for your own sake as well as that of an injured family, to see you act properly, I advise, and warn you of the consequences of a contrary conduct, being, Sir, yr. most h’ble Serv’t.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

TO THE MARQUIS DE VAUDREUIL.

Head-Quarters, 10 May, 1782.

Sir,

Head Quarters, 10 August, 1782.

Sir,

I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency the enclosed papers, No. 1 to—inclusive. They contain a continuance of the correspondence, which has been produced between me, General Robertson, and Sir Henry Clinton, in the case of Captain Huddy. That from Sir Henry Clinton did not come to hand till some days after the receipt of General Robertson’s letter, and after my reply to the latter. I am in daily expectation of an answer from General Robertson, which I hope will bring this ungrateful business to a conclusion.

I have the Honor to address you, at the particular Request, in Consequence of a Letter which I have just received from his Excelly. the Count de Rochambeau, inclosing to me the copy of a correspondence between him and you, relative to the Operations of the Fleet under your Command on the Coasts of N. America; wherein you mention to him a Wish, that while your Fleet should remain in the Neighborhood of Boston, you might be enabled to make a stroke at the Enemy’s post of Penobscot; and in the Discussion of which point, the Count de Rochambeau has referred you to my Opinion upon that Enterprise.

I take this opportunity to convey to Congress sundry English and New York newspapers, which have within a few days past been put into my hands. Their contents are new and interesting, and I take the earliest occasion to present them to Congress.

While I applaud, Sir, the generous Disposition declared in your Intentions for our Assistance, Candor requires me to be very explicit upon the subject—I am obliged therefore to say that it is my decided Opinion that, considering the Hazards that will attend the Enterprise, the Object is by no means equal to the Risque that will attend the attempt.

Although I view the debates, so far as they convey proposals of pacification to America, to be idle and delusory, yet I cannot but express my fears for the effect they may have upon the exertions of the States, which are already too feeble and void of energy. The people, so far as I am informed, are catching at the idea of peace with great eagerness; and the industry which the enemy are using for its propagation is to me a very suspicious circumstance. For my own part, I view our situation such, that, instead of relaxing, we ought to improve the present moment as the most favorable to our wishes. The British nation appear to be staggered and almost ready to sink beneath the accumulated weight of debt and misfortune. If we follow the blow with vigor and energy, I think the game is our own.1

Among many Reasons which influence my Mind in forming this Opinion, the great and very principal One, appears from your own Letter to Count de Rochambeau, where you mention to him, that you expect immediately to be followed into these Seas, by a superior British fleet. Admitting this Event to take place, and that your fleet should have proceeded to Penobscot (which is near One hundred Leagues from Boston, the only secure Harbor which you will find upon all those Eastern shores, and lies almost at the Bottom of a deep Bay,) it appears to me that your Fleet will be placed in the greatest Hazard of being totally destroyed. For in that Situation they will be compleatly imbayed, and a brisk S. Westerly Wind, which will be most favorable for the British fleet from N. York—and which would bring them into the Bay in a short Time, would be directly opposed to your Escape. So that was you to receive the earliest Intelligence of the Enemy’s fleet leaving N. York, under such Circumstances, yet you could not avail yourself of the Information, and at the same time would be placed in a position where no Harbor or fortification could give you any protection or shelter.

Just as I was closing these despatches, I received a letter from Sir Guy Carleton, covering sundry printed papers, a copy of which, with the papers, I have now the honor to enclose to your Excellency, together with the copy of my answer to him; and I flatter myself, that my conduct therein will be agreeable to the wishes of Congress. I have the honor to be, &c.1

Was this Argument of Danger to his Most Christian Majesty’s Ships not sufficient to govern your mind, I could mention that the Time that must be employed on this attempt will probably be much greater than you seem to apprehend. A month is as short as I should estimate, taking together all the necessary preparations and little cross events that must probably interpose. For I have not an Idea of the object being to be attained by a Coup de main, as I am lately informed by good Intelligence that the Fort is the most regularly constructed and best finished of any in America, is well situated, and garrisoned by the 74th Regiment, consisting of 800 Men, which will require a Regular Seige, to be conducted by cautious Approaches, with a considerable Addition of Men to the Number of Troops which are on Board your Fleet; with their necessary Cannon and Mortars, Stores, &c., the whole of which in all probability, was the Seige to be undertaken, and your fleet obliged to make a sudden departure, must all be sacrificed; as their Retreat by Land, (as has been heretofore experienced) would be almost totally impossible and impracticable, to be effected thro’ a Country which is as yet a mere Wilderness of large Extent and difficult passage.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Even supposing the best, that the Attempt should succeed and the object be gained, I am much in doubt, whether, without a superior naval force to be maintained on these Coasts we should be able to retain the post, as it would ever be subject to a renewed Attempt from the Enemy in Case we should keep up a Garrison there: or in Case of Evacuation, they might at any Time repossess the post, and continue the same Annoyance, that they now give up.

Head-Quarters, 10 May, 1782.

Sir,

Under these Considerations (without giving you any further Trouble) it is my Decided Opinion that the Object in contemplation is not of Importance, sufficient to justify the Hazzards and Risques which must probably be encountered in the Attempt to obtain it.

I had the honor last evening to receive your Excellency’s letter of the 7th, with the several papers enclosed. Ever since the commencement of this unnatural war, my conduct has borne invariable testimony against those inhuman excesses, which, in too many instances, have marked its various progress. With respect to a late transaction, to which I presume your Excellency alludes, I have already expressed my resolution, a resolution, formed on the most mature deliberation, and from which I shall not recede. I have to inform your Excellency, that your request of a passport for Mr. Morgann, to go to Philadelphia, shall be conveyed to Congress by the earliest opportunity; and I will embrace the first moment, that I shall have it in my power, to communicate to you their determination thereon.1

While I offer you this Opinion, Sir, I beg you will esteem it as coming from a Heart not only candid in its Sentiments, but at the same Time penetrated with a Sense of the Highest Gratitude to you for the noble Offer of your Assistance, which, it is our misfortune, that under present Circumstances, we are not able to avail ourselves of.

Many inconveniences and disorders having arisen from an improper admission of flags at various posts of the two armies, which have given rise to complaints on both sides; to prevent abuses in future, and for the convenience of communication, I have concluded to receive all flags, from within your lines, at the post of Dobbs’s Ferry, and nowhere else, so long as the head-quarters of the two armies remain as at present.

After giving you the foregoing Opinion upon present Appearances, I have only to add that in Case Circumstances should turn up so differently to our present Ideas, that you should, with the Advice of Genl. de Choisy think the attempt practicable, I can only refer you to the State of Massa. for such aid in Men, Cannon, Mortars, & Stores, as you shall judge necessary, it being the only practicable mode in which I can coöperate with your designs—and this Recommendation shall be most cheerfully given.

I have the honor to be, &c.1

The Chevalier de la Luzerne has requested me to establish a regular Chain of Communication between my Head Quarters and Boston, for the purpose of giving you the earliest Intelligence of every minute Circumstance that may occur respecting the Arrival or Operations of the British fleet at N. York, and for the purpose of free Intercourse with you on any other Circumstance that may turn up. You may depend, Sir, that this Establishment shall be immediately formed, and that every Service I can possibly render you in this or in any other Way in my power shall be most cheerfully afforded.

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

With the purest sentiments of Respect and Esteem, I have, &c.1

Headquarters, 17 May, 1782.

Sir:

TO THE CHEVALIER DE CHASTELLUX.

[EXTRACT.]

I have been honored with your Favor of the 23d of April—The Information it contains is in some Respects, pleasing and important—I thank you for the Communication; and need not assure you, that your Confidence shall never be abused by me.

Head Quarters,Newburg,
10 August, 1782.

In a circular Letter which I have lately written to the States, I have taken occasion to mention the failure you experience from them, in their non-payment of the Sums demanded by the Requisition of Congress for the 8.000.000 Dollars.—I have represented in the most pointed terms I could use, the ill Effects this failure must have upon our military Operations;—and have urged them, with the warmth of zeal & earnestness to a full & speedy compliance with your Expectations.—I wish this application may have its desired effect.

My time, during my winter’s residence in Philadelphia, was unusually (for me) divided between parties of pleasure and parties of business. The first,—nearly all of a sameness, at all times and places in this infant country—is easily conceived; at least is too unimportant for description. The second, was only diversified by perplexities, and could afford no entertainment. * * * My time, since I joined the army in this quarter, has been occupied principally in providing for disciplining and preparing the troops for the Field. Cramped as we have been, and now are for want of money, every thing moves slowly; but as this is no new case, I am not discouraged by it.

I am experiencing much Trouble from Complaints of the Army against Mr. Sands’s execution of his Contracts. By last post I transmitted to the Secretary of War, Copies of proceedings respecting the Contract for West point and its dependencies. & inclosed you will have those under the Contract for moving the Army.—It appears pretty evident to me, that the Contractors for the latter have availed themselves of Mr. Sands’s knowledge and Experience to reject every thing in the new one, that did not immediately tend to his ease and emolument in the old one;—and which like every thing else of the kind, that is not attended with mutual convenience, must effect its own reformation or destruction.—For it cannot be expected that an Army which has suffered every species of hardship and distress, that could arise from want of pay, deficiencies in their rations, and (till now) want of Cloathing, will submit contentedly to a measure which is not warranted by the Usage and customs of any other Army, merely because it is convenient and beneficial to the Contractors—Every man must know, and Mr. Sands acknowledges it, that issuing to a Regiment at one Draft, does not give to each Man the Ration which is prescribed for him by the Contract; and to compell the Officers, who may wish to corn a little Beef, or, by way of change to furnish their Tables with Poultry, or the smaller kinds of Meat—or who may sometimes be from camp, or Quarters, and at other Times wish to entertain a friend, to take their Allowance in the same draft, and at the same time with the Men, whether their necessities call for more or less, or forfeit it, is not only unusual, but extremely hard and disagreeable to them; and will, if continued, be productive of serious Consequences—not only from their disquietudes, but the Jealousies which will prevail among the Men, who with or without cause, will suspect that the Officers not only take their full Allowance, but will have it of the choisest pieces leaving them to share the deficiency in that which is more indifferent. * * * Besides, as the Contractors seem to think themselves under no legal Obligation, or controul to fulfill their Contract,—and are determined to encounter no Expence which they can possibly avoid,—I may be thwarted by & by in my Disposition of the Troops; because, by increasing their Clerks, it will add to their Expence. These Considerations, & the incessant Complaints which I am obliged to hear, & which engages a large portion of my Time, induces me to urge again, that the person who is to be the Arbiter of them may come forward without delay.

The enemy talk loudly, and very confidently of Peace—but whether they are in earnest, or whether it is to amuse and while away the time till they can prepare for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, time will evince. Certain it is, the refugees at New York are violently convulsed by a letter which, ere this, you will have seen published, from Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby to me, upon the subject of a general pacification and acknowledgement of the Independency of this Country.

I have not made these observations from a disinclination to support this Contract, or any other System by which the public interest can be promoted; and I should do injustice to the Officers of this Army, was I not to declare, that as far as my opportunities have gone (and I have conversed freely on the subject from the General to the Ensign) they seem equally well disposed to carry it into execution; but they can see no reason why the Contractors should pocket the benefits which flow from their distresses.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

If the Officers could receive their pay, or even their subsistence regularly, more especially, if they could, as I am told is the Custom with the British Service, have always a month of the latter in advance it is possible they would renounce both Sands & his Issues; but having none of the former & with difficulty come at the latter, it is both inconvenient and mortifying to them to be tyed up as they are, when it does not appear that the public interest is advanced by it; but admitting it is so in a small degree, we may spin the thread of Œconomy ’till it breaks.—Minds sowered by distresses are easily rankled—as a specimen of it, the privates of the Connecticut Line were the other day upon the eve of a general Mutiny, the vigilence of the Officers discovered it a few hours before they were to parade & the ring leaders have been tryed & executed—besides this, desertions are more prevalent than ever; by the last Returns a greater number went off than ever did in the same space before,—and tho’ I know how much you have laboured for the means of paying the Army, & how inapplicable the remark is to you, ’till you are furnished with these, I cannot help adding, that it is very difficult, if not impracticable to convince Military Men whose interests, feelings & wants are continually goading them, that people holding Civil offices are better entitled to receive the wages of service, punctually than they are.—I mention these things, my Dear Sir, not so much because I think it in your power to afford redress,as because, I think you should be acquainted with the temper that prevails.

Newburg, 11 August, 1782.

Sir,

I might have mentioned too in a more proper place, that while Mr. Sands was saving fifty or an hundred pounds in the establishment of his Issues, the public have expended, from the information I receive, at least 4000 pair of shoes & 1000 blankets extraordinary in transporting, two or three miles over rugged roads, the provision from these places on Men’s shoulders,—however I do not blame Mr. Sands more for this, than the Officer who permitted it.

Having been informed that Major-General Gates is in Philadelphia, and being now about to make my ultimate arrangements for the campaign, I take the liberty to request, that you will be pleased to inform me by the earliest conveyance whether he wishes to be employed in this army or not. As it is now in my power to give General Gates a command suitable to his rank, and as I have not heard from him since I wrote to him on the 18th of March last, I trouble you with this request, that I may be still made acquainted with his determination before the disposition of commands is finally concluded. * * * I have the honor to be, &c.1

May 25th.

TO THE COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

I had written the foregoing part of this Letter before I received the inclosed complaints, from which it appears that the Officers do not agree in sentiment with me in receiving their subsistence in money & purchasing their own provisions; But placing the matter as they do upon the footing of Right, their Observation shows that without their concurrence, the difficulties cannot be compounded in that way.

Head Quarters,Newburg,
16 August, 1782.

Sir,

Upon the whole matter, that the Army may not appear to be forming complaints without pointing to a remedy, I have prepared the general Outline of a System of Issues, which if adopted would in my Opinion, be equitable & satisfactory—This I intended to have sent to you by this Conveyance but to save Trouble & Delay have concluded it will be best to take the Sentiments of Mr. Sands & some of the most sensible & judicious Officers upon it; that all parties here may be agreed previous to communicatg. it for your Approbation.

I have been honored with your Excellency’s favor of the 13th by Mr. Lauberdiere who made so much despatch that he delivered it last night about 11 o’clock.

(Altho’ Mr. Sands has been repeatedly urged to furnish the stipulated Deposits for West point, yet that important post is now almost without a Barrel of salted provisions; by which means it is in a most alarmg. Situation, not being able, were the Enemy to make a sudden Attempt upon it, to hold a seige of three Days.) Add to this Omission, the whole Army have been without Meat of any kind, for three or four Days past.—I am at a loss to account for these neglects—I can only tell you the serious truth & ask what Remedy is provided in such Cases?—how is Mr. Sands to be compelled to perform his Duty? and where is the compulsory power lodged?

Were we certain, that a pacification had advanced so far as your Excellency thinks it has, or could we be assured that the British ministry were really sincere in their offers, which have been communicated through their Commander-in-chief, Sir Guy Carleton, I should think your Excellency might, without any inconvenience or danger, await the orders of your court where you now are,1 and dismiss all your wagons. But when we consider, that negotiations are sometimes set on foot merely to gain time, that there are yet no offers on the part of the enemy for a general cessation of hostilities, and that, although their commanders in this country are in a manner tied down by the resolves of their House of Commons to a defensive war only, yet they may be at liberty to transport part of their force to the West Indies, I think it highly necessary, for the good of the common cause, and especially to prevent the measure, which I have last mentioned, to unite our force upon the North River; and in this opinion I am confirmed by the sentiments contained in a letter from the minister of France to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, which he has been good enough to leave open for my inspection.

I fear you will think this Letter very tedious—but the subject required much to be said. I have mentioned to the Secy. at War, this Communication & have desired him to assist you in its Consideration.—I hope, that on Consultation, you will afford us speedy Relief, as I know not to what Extremities the present Uneasiness may push us. I am &c.1

“From the different accounts I can collect, it seems to be the design of England to make a general peace; but the demands on one side and the other will render a conclusion extremely difficult; and in that case that power will spare nothing to effectuate a peace with the United States, and turn all their efforts against us. As to a separate peace with the United States it will not take place. I am certain they will not make peace but in concert with us.” The minister also says to me; “You will judge better than us, if it is proper to march the French army or not. It is certain, that it will be necessary, if the English show any disposition to detach any considerable force to the West Indies.” What are the intentions of the enemy in this respect, it is impossible for me precisely to determine. Accounts out of New York, but not on very good authority, still continue to mention an embarkation to the West Indies. The garrison of Savannah has arrived at New York, and there are some grounds for believing that Charleston will be evacuated. Should that event take place, and the garrison come to New York also, they might without danger detach considerably, should our force continue divided.

TO COLONEL LEWIS NICOLA.

Upon the whole, Sir, I hardly imagine you will think it prudent to dismiss your carriages under present appearances and circumstances; and, if you do not, the cattle will be as easily and cheaply subsisted upon a march as in a settled camp. Should an accommodation take place, and should the orders of your court call you from the continent, your embarkation might be as easily made upon the Delaware or the Hudson, as upon the Chesapeake. From the foregoing therefore, I am of opinion, that no good consequences can result from your remaining at Baltimore, but that many advantages may attend your marching forward, and forming a junction with this army. Actuated by no motives, but those which tend to the general good, I have taken the liberty of giving your Excellency my sentiments with that freedom, with which I am convinced you would ever wish me to deliver them. I beg leave to return your Excellency my thanks for the attention you have paid, not only to the exchange of Colonel Laumoy, but of several others of our officers.

Newburg, 22 May, 1782.

Sir,

I have the honor to be, &c.

With a mixture of great surprise and astonishment, I have read with attention the sentiments you have submitted to my perusal. Be assured, Sir, no occurrence in the course of the war has given me more painful sensations, than your information of there being such ideas existing in the army, as you have expressed, and I must view with abhorrence and reprehend with severity. For the present the communicatn. of them will rest in my own bosom, unless some further agitation of the matter shall make a disclosure necessary.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

I am much at a loss to conceive what part of my conduct could have given encouragement to an address, which to me seems big with the greatest mischiefs, that can befall my Country. If I am not deceived in the knowledge of myself, you could not have found a person to whom your schemes are more disagreeable. At the same time, in justice to my own feelings, I must add, that no man possesses a more sincere wish to see ample justice done to the army than I do; and, as far as my powers and influence, in a constitutional way, extend, they shall be employed to the utmost of my abilities to effect it, should there be any occasion. Let me conjure you, then, if you have any regard for your Country, concern for yourself or posterity, or respect for me, to banish these thoughts from your mind, and never communicate, as from yourself or any one else, a sentiment of the like nature. I am, Sir, your most obedient servant.1

Head-Quarters, 18 August, 1782.

My dear Sir,

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL HAZEN.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your private letter of the 12th instant. I cannot but think the conduct of [Congress], respecting the release of Lord Cornwallis very extraordinary. Is it reasonable that Mr. Laurens should be at full liberty, and acting as a commissioner in Europe, while Lord Cornwallis, for whose liberation he pledged his own honor, and consequently as a public man the honor of the States, is held bound by his parole? Either disavow the propriety of Mr. Laurens’s conduct, and let him be remanded by the British ministry, or set Lord Cornwallis at equal liberty. I am placed in a very delicate situation. Sir Guy Carleton has given me official information of the transaction, and has called for a confirmation of Mr. Laurens’s act. I have referred the matter to the proper place, and I can obtain no answer. In my letters to General Carleton I am obliged to be for the present silent, but I certainly must expect to hear from him again. Do, my good Sir, endeavor to obtain a decision upon this matter.1

Head-Quarters, 4 June, 1782.

Sir,

Your public letter of the 12th covers a resolve of the same date, authorizing me to propose a meeting of commissioners for establishing a cartel, &c. Here again I am somewhat embarrassed, never having yet received either the approbation or disapprobation of Congress upon the proceedings of the former commissioners, General Knox and Mr. Gouverneur Morris, although they were transmitted so long ago as the 30th of April last. It appears by the report of those gentlemen, that the negotiation was principally broken off on account of the disposition, which plainly appeared on the part of the British commissioners to procure the exchange of their soldiers in our hands without settlement of accounts, making any payment, or giving any security for the payment of the large sum which, we conceive, is due. Now Congress, in the resolve to which I have just referred, make no reference to any former transaction, but authorize me to settle a cartel, “taking care that the liquidation of accounts and settlement of the balance due for the maintenance of prisoners be provided for therein.” From this it may possibly be said, it may be inferred, that they do approve the former proceedings, and mean to make the settlement of accounts a preliminary; but this is an inference only, and may be a false one; and therefore I wish you would be good enough to endeavor to find out the true meaning of the House, and to procure a determination upon the former proceedings.

I have received your favor of the 27th of May, and am much concerned to find, that Captain Asgill has been sent on, notwithstanding the information, which you had received, of there being two unconditional prisoners of war in our possession. I much fear, that the enemy, knowing our delicacy respecting the propriety of retaliating upon a capitulation officer in any case, and being acquainted that unconditional prisoners are within our power, will put an unfavorable construction upon this instance of our conduct. At least, under present circumstances, Captain Asgill’s application to Sir Guy Carleton will, I fear, be productive of remonstrance and recrimination only, which may possibly tend to place the subject upon a disadvantageous footing.1

1 The same commissioners will probably be appointed upon our part, and, could they be assured their former principles were thought good, they would proceed with more confidence upon a future occasion. I confess to you, I have found so many difficulties thrown in the way of all former transactions of this nature, that I could ever wish Congress to be as full and explicit as possible, as to the points which they would have either conceded or demanded. I would prefer that mode on many accounts, as you may easily conceive, to unlimited powers. But what I principally now want to be assured of is, whether they do or do not approve the conduct of the former commissioners, and the principles which they seemed desirous of establishing. With much truth and affection, I am, &c.1

To remedy, therefore, as soon as possible this mistake, you will be pleased immediately to order, that Lieutenant Turner, the officer you mention to be confined in York gaol, or any other prisoner, who falls within my first description, may be conveyed on to Philadelphia, under the same regulations and directions as were heretofore given, that he may take the place of Captain Asgill. In the meantime, lest any misinformation respecting Mr. Turner may have reached you, which might occasion further mistake and delay, Captain Asgill will be detained until I can learn a certainty of Lieutenant Turner’s or some other officer’s answering our purpose; and, as their detention will leave the young gentleman now with us in a very disagreeable state of anxiety and suspense, I must desire, that you will be pleased to use every means in your power to make the greatest despatch in the execution of this order.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

Head-Quarters,Newburg,
19 August, 1782.

Sir,

TO COLONEL ELIAS DAYTON.

Congress have been already furnished with copies of all letters, which had passed between the commanders-in-chief of the British forces in New York and myself, respecting the murder of Captain Huddy previous to the last of July. I have now the honor to enclose Sir Guy Carleton’s letter of the 1st instant, (in reply to mine of the 25th [30th?] ultimo,)2 and that of the 13th, which accompanied the proceedings of the general court-martial for the trial of Captain Lippincott. The proceedings, together with such other documents as relate to that unfortunate transaction, I also transmit by this opportunity.

Head-Quarters, 4 June, 1782.

Sir,

As Sir Guy Carleton, notwithstanding the acquittal of Lippincott, reprobates the measure in unequivocal terms, and has given assurances of prosecuting a further inquiry, it has changed the ground I was proceeding upon, and placed the matter upon an extremely delicate footing.

I am just informed by the secretary at war, that Captain Asgill, of the British guards, an unfortunate officer, who is destined to be the unhappy victim to atone for the death of Captain Huddy, had arrived in Philadelphia, and would set off very soon for the Jersey line, the place assigned for his execution. He will probably arrive as soon as this will reach you, and will be attended by Captain Ludlow, his friend, whom he wishes to be admitted to go into New York, with an address to Sir Guy Carleton on his behalf.

It would be assuming in me to ascribe causes to actions different from those, which are ostensibly and plausibly assigned; but, admitting that General Carleton has no other object but to procrastinate, he has, by disavowing the act, by declaring that it is held in abhorrence, by not even sanctioning the motives, which appear to have influenced Lippincott to become the executioner of Huddy, and by giving the strongest assurances that further inquisition shall be made, so far manifested the appearance of an earnest desire to bring the guilty to punishment, that I fear an act of retaliation upon an innocent person before the result of his inquisition is known, would be considered by the impartial and unprejudiced world in an unfavorable and perhaps unjustifiable point of view; more especially as the great end proposed by retaliation, which is to prevent a repetition of injuries, has been in a manner answered. For, you will please to observe, by the extract of General Clinton’s letter of the 26th of April to Governor Franklin,1 that he had expressly forbidden the Board of Directors to remove or exchange in future any prisoners of war in the custody of their commissary without having first obtained his approbation and orders.

You will therefore give permission to Captain Ludlow to go by the way of Dobbs’s Ferry into New York, with such representation as Captain Asgill shall please to make to Sir Guy. At the same time, I wish you to intimate to the gentlemen, that, although I am deeply affected with the unhappy fate, to which Captain Asgill is subjected, yet, that it will be to no purpose for them to make any representation to Sir Guy Carleton, which may serve to draw on a discussion of the present point of retaliation; that, in the stage to which the matter has been suffered to run, all argumentation on the subject is entirely precluded on my part; that my resolutions have been grounded on so mature deliberation, that they must remain unalterably fixed. You will also inform the gentlemen, that, while my duty calls me to make this decisive determination, humanity dictates a tear for the unfortunate offering, and inclines me to say, that I most devoutly wish his life may be saved. This happy event may be attained; but it must be effected by the British Commander-in-chief. He knows the alternative, which will accomplish it; and he knows, that this alternative only can avert the dire extremity from the innocent, and that in this way alone the manes of the murdered Captain Huddy will be best appeased.1

The same reasons, which induced me to lay the first steps I took in this affair before Congress, urge me to submit it to them at its present stage. It is a great national concern, upon which an individual ought not to decide. I shall be glad to be favored with the determination of Congress as early as possible, as I shall suspend giving any answer to Sir Guy Carleton, until I am informed how far they are satisfied with his conduct hitherto.

In the mean time, while this is doing, I must beg that you will be pleased to treat Captain Asgill with every tender attention and politeness (consistent with his present situation), which his rank, fortune, and connexions, together with his unfortunate state, demand.

I cannot close this letter without making a remark upon that part of Sir Guy’s, in which he charges me with want of humanity in selecting a victim from among the British officers so early as I did. He ought to consider, that, by the usage of war and upon the principles of retaliation, I should have been justified in executing an officer of equal rank with Captain Huddy immediately upon receiving proofs of his murder, and then informing Sir Henry Clinton that I had done so. Besides, it was impossible for me to have foreseen, that it would be so very long before the matter would be brought to some kind of issue. I have the honor to be, &c.1

I am, dear Sir, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL KNOX.

INSTRUCTIONS.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

Sir,

5 June, 1782.

My dear Sir,

You are hereby appointed to the command of West Point and its dependencies. But, as the army will lie for some time upon Verplanck’s Point, you will consider yourself as relieved till further orders from the care of attending to that post, Stony Point, and Dobbs’s Ferry, which are part of the dependencies, except so far as relates to their being constantly supplied with the proper quantity of ordnance. I have so thorough a confidence in you, and so well am I acquainted with your ability and activity, that I think it needless to point out to you the great outlines of your duty. I recommend the following matters to your attention.

Col. Hazen’s sending an Officer under the capitulation of York Town for the purpose of retaliation, has distressed me exceedingly—Be so good as to give me your opinion of the propriety of doing this upon Cap: Asgill if we should be driven to it for want of an unconditional prisoner.—

To visit the redoubts frequently; to see that they are kept in proper order; that the garrisons allotted to them are alert, and that they make it an invariable rule to sleep within the works. They should each be furnished constantly with ten days’ wood and water; and, if the contractors keep up such a magazine of salt provision upon the Point, as they ought to do by contract, the detached works should be provided with ten days’ provision also. The rolls to be frequently called. No officer to be absent without your leave, and no non-commissioned officer or soldier without the leave of a field-officer.

Presuming that this matter has been a subject of much conversation; pray, with your own, let me know the opinions of the most sensible of those with whom you have conversed.

The quarter-master having reported a scarcity of tents, you will be pleased to remove the tenth Massachussets regiment into the barracks, that their tents may be delivered up. No buildings, either public or private, are to be erected without your knowledge; and, when applications are made to you for that purpose, you will, if they are admitted, direct the commanding engineer to point out the situations, that they may not interfere with the defences of the place. The public buildings now carrying on, and the alterations and repairs of the works, will engage your particular attention. You know the necessity of bringing them to a certain state before the frost sets in. Given at Head-Quarters, at Newburg, the 29th of August, 1782.1

Congress by their Resolve has unanimously approved of my determination to retaliate—the Army have advised it—and the Country look for it—But how far it is justifiable upon an Officer under the faith of a Capitulation, if none other can be had, is the question?

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

Hazen’s sending Captn. Asgill on for this purpose making the matter more distressing, as the whole business will have the appearance of a farce, if some person is not sacraficed to the mains of poor Huddy; which will be the case, if an unconditional prisoner can not be found, and Asgill escapes—

Head-Quarters,Verplanck’s Point,
1 September, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I write to you in exceeding great haste; but beg your sentiments may be transmitted as soon as possible (by Express) as I may be forced to a decision in the course of a few days. * * *1

* * * * * *

TO ARCHIBALD CARY.

The late New York papers announce the evacuation of Charleston, as a matter which would certainly take place soon after the 7th of August. I have, upon this information, written to Major-General Smallwood and Colonel Butler to send forward to this army the recruits of Maryland and Pennsylvania, which are at Annapolis and Carlisle. I enclose the letters under flying seals to you, that you may take the sense of Congress upon the matter, before the orders are carried into execution.

Head Qrs.,Newburg, 15 June, 1782.

My dear Sir,

Congress having determined what troops should compose the southern army, I do not think myself absolutely at liberty to withdraw those, which are already there, or to stop the reinforcements intended for them, without first consulting Congress, and which I mean to do through you. So long ago as the 18th of March last, I calculated from appearances upon the evacuation of the southern States; and I then wrote to General Greene to hold himself in readiness to march to the northward the moment such an event should seem certain. In my idea, the infantry apportioned to the two Carolinas and Georgia will be sufficient to be left in the southern quarter. The South Carolina regiment of artillery having been reformed, it may be thought necessary to leave the small remains of Harrison’s and late Proctor’s there. It will be necessary, also, to consider what corps of horse shall remain. If Armand’s legion have not yet moved from Charlottesville, they certainly ought not to proceed. After having consulted Congress, and made the proper arrangements, you will be good enough to inform Major-General Greene of the result, that he may govern himself accordingly. The difficulty and enormous expense of supporting troops to the southward are sufficient inducements to draw off as many from thence as we possibly can.

I have been honored with your favor of the 25th ulto. enclosing sundry resolutions of your Assembly, respecting the insidious manœuvres of the enemy, who, it is evident, cannot mean well, because they take indirect steps to obtain that, to which a plain road is opened, and every good man is desirous of obtaining upon honorable terms. I thank you, my good Sir, for the resolves, whh. you did me the honr. to enclose. They breathe a proper spirit, and with others of a like kind in the different assemblies will, it is to be hoped, convince the enemy, that it is both their interest and policy to be honest.

The whole army, the garrison at West Point excepted, which is left under the command of Major-General Knox, moved down to this ground yesterday. I have sent Major-General Lord Stirling to Albany, to take the command of the two Continental regiments and the State troops upon the northern frontiers. The New York and Jersey lines have joined me here. I have received yours of the 20th ultimo, enclosing a list of the passengers wanting to go to South Carolina. I shall make the necessary application to Sir Guy Carleton. I have the honor to be, &c.

I very sincerely condole with you on your late heavy loss, but he that gave has a right to take away, and it is the duty of us all, to submit to his will, altho’ we cannot but feel the strokes we sustain.—

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

I should have been very happy to have seen you while I was in Virginia, if it had been but for a moment—indeed the pleasure must have been momentary—for my hours all the while I was in that State were so occupied by the constant duties of my station that I could devote no part of them to the enjoyment of my friends which was not only mortifying to me, but, probably displeasing to some of them.

Head-Quarters, 8 September, 1782.

Sir,

It gives me much pleasure to learn from so good authority as your pen, that the Assembly of Virginia is better composed than it has been for several years. Much, I think, may be expected from it; the path we are to tread is certainly a plain one; the object is full in our view, but it will not come to us; we must work our way to it by proper advances, and the means of doing this is men and money. In vain is it to expect, that our aim is to be accomplished by fond wishes for Peace; and equally ungenerous as fruitless will it be for one State to depend upon another to bring this to pass. For if I may be allowed to speak figuratively, our Assemblies, in Politics, are to be compared to the wheels of a clock in mechanics. The whole, for the general purposes of war, shd. be set in motion by the grt. wheel, (Congress;) and, if all will do their parts, the machine works easy; but a failure in one disorders the whole, and without the large one, (wch. sets ye whole in motn.,) nothg. can be done. It is by the united wisdom and exertions of the whole in Congress, who I presume do justice to all (but if they fail by being disproportionate in the first instance it should in my opinion be sought for and remedied in the second rather than derange the whole business of a Campaign by the delays incident to contention) that we are to depend upon. Without this we are no better than a rope of Sand, and are as easily broken asunder.

I have the honor to reply to your Excellency’s letter of the 23d of August, and to inform you, that Major-Generals Heath and Knox are nominated by me to meet Lieutenant-General Campbell and Mr. Elliot, as commissioners for the purpose of settling a general cartel for an exchange of prisoners. I propose, Sir, that the meeting be held at Tappan, as an intermediate and convenient place, and that it commence on the 18th day of this month, at which time my commissioners will attend, and will be accompanied by the commissary of prisoners.1 Your Excellency’s favor of the 29th, enclosing a copy of Governor Livingston’s letter to you of the 10th, came in due time to my hands. I am at a loss to discover for what purpose it was communicated to me; especially as I have more than once observed to you, that in matters of civil resort I have ever avoided any the least interference, and have transmitted to you the approbation of the sovereign power of these United States for my so doing. And of this nature appears to be the case of Ezekiel Tilton, who is the subject of your correspondence with the Governor.

I write thus openly and freely to you, my dear Sir, because I pant for retirement, and am persuaded that an end of our warfare is not to be obtained but by vigorous exertions. The subjugation of America, so far at least as to hold it in a dependent state, is of too much importance for Great Britain to yield the palm to us whilst her resources exist, or our inactivity, want of system, or dependence upon other powers or upon one another prevail. I can truly say, that the first wish of my Soul is to return speedily into the bosom of that country, which gave me birth, and, in the sweet enjoyment of domestic happiness and the company of a few friends, to end my days in quiet, when I shall be called from this stage. With great truth and sincerity, I am, &c.

I cannot help remarking, that your Excellency has several times lately taken occasion to mention, that “all hostilities stand suspended on your part.” I must confess, that, to me, this expression wants explanation. I can have no conception of a suspension of hostilities, but that which arises from a mutual agreement of the powers at war, and which extends to naval as well as land operations. That your Excellency has thought proper, on your part, to make a partial suspension, may be admitted; but, whether this has been owing to political or other motives, is not for me to decide. It is, however, a well known fact, that at the same time the British cruisers on our coasts have been more than usually alert; and, while Americans are admitted to understand their real interests, it will be difficult for them, when a suspension of hostilities is spoken of, to separate the idea of its extending to the sea as well as land.

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

I cannot ascribe the inroads of the savages upon our northwestern frontier to the causes, from whence your Excellency supposes them to originate; neither can I allow, that they are committed without directions from the commander-in-chief in Canada. For by prisoners and deserters it is apparent, that those ravaging parties are composed of white troops, under the command of officers regularly commissioned, as well as savages; and it would be a solecism to suppose, that such parties could be out, without the knowledge of their commander-in-chief. I have the honor to be, &c.1

Head Quarters, 16 June, 1782.

My dear Sir,

TO JAMES McHENRY.

Your two favors of the fourth Instant were delivered to me by General Lincoln.—It is an easy matter to perceive by the tenor of one of them you have imbibed an Opinion that the Officers of this Army are captious, and that by attempting to remove one complaint, a Door is opened to others.—I am not much surprized at this—You have probably adopted it from the Representation of Mr. Sands, of whom without doing him injustice, it may be said he is extremely plausible—extremely narrow minded—disingenuous and little abounding in a temper to conciliate the good will of the Army or to adopt any measure for the convenience and accommodation of the Officers.—These traits of Mr. Sands’s character are not drawn by a pen under the influence of prejudice, or of one improperly biassed in favor of the Army; they are facts of which I have and can produce proofs, and ’till the happening of which, I, upon the spot, was deceived.

Verplanck’s Point, 12 September, 1782.

My dear Sir,

Mr. Sands, Sir, if I have not formed a very erroneous opinion of him, is determined to make all the money he can by the Contracts—Herein I do not blame him,—provided he does it honestly, and with a reciprocal fulfillment of the agreement.—Of a want of the first, I do not accuse him; but his thirst of Gain leads him in my opinion into a mistaken principle of Action.—He is very tenacious of all those parts of the Contracts which point to the convenience and Emolument of the Contractors, and till very lately was determined to be his own Judge of them, but is regardless of other parts which enjoin certain [stipulations] upon them.—To these causes, and these only is to be ascribed I conceive, the present deplorable state of the Magazines, and the dangerous consequences which may flow from it, our frequent want of daily food, and the little prospect of better supplies, and the inconveniences which the Army experience in the mode of issuing. He cannot I presume charge these neglects to a failure on your part; and sure I am he cannot do it to the scarcity of Provisions, for the Country is surcharged with all kinds of it—But in expectation it is said of reducing the price of salt meat (which unfortunately it seems has risen upon him), he, notwithstanding the contract and repeated calls and the consequences of a failure, has neglected it to this moment. And to avoid the expence, it is moreover added, of Pasturage (for how else is it to be accounted for?) and perhaps a little diminution in the weight which all Armies, and all Contractors in the world are obliged to submit to, this Army became the sport of and suffered by every accident or delay, which happens to the droves of Beef cattle.

* * * Our prospects of peace are vanishing. The death of the Marquis of Rockingham has given a shock to the new administration, and disordered its whole system. Fox, Burke, Lord John Cavendish, Lord Keppel, and I believe others, have left it. Earl Shelburne takes the lead, as first lord of the treasury, to which office he was appointed by the King, on the instant the vacancy happened by the death of Lord Rockingham. This nobleman, Lord Shelburne, I mean, declares, that the sun of Great Britain will set the moment American independency is acknowledged, and that no man has ever heard him give an assent to the measure. On the other hand, the Duke of Richmond asserts, that the ministry, of which Lord Shelburne is one, came into office pledged to each other and upon the express condition, that America should be declared independent; that he will watch him, and, the moment he finds him departing therefrom, he will quit administration, and give it every opposition in his power.

I should not, my Dear Sir, have given you, who I know have business and perplexities enough without the trouble of reading these observations, (after being told that the Secretary at War would inquire into and redress grievances), but from a love of Justice, and a desire that every Man and description of Man, should be known and rewarded or punished according to their deserts, and because it would seem that your opinion has been founded on the representations of Mr. Sands, who yielding nothing himself, requiring every thing of others, and failing in the most essential parts of his Contract, adopts as is too commonly the case with little minds, the policy of endeavoring to place the adverse party in the wrong, that he may appear in a more favorable point of view himself.

That the King will push the war, as long as the nation will find men or money, admits not of a doubt in my mind. The whole tenor of his conduct, as well as his last proroguing speech, on the 11th of July, plainly indicate it, and shows in a clear point of view the impolicy of relaxation on our part. If we are wise, let us prepare for the worst. There is nothing, which will so soon produce a speedy and honorable peace, as a state of preparation for war; and we must either do this, or lay our account for a patched up inglorious peace, after all the toil, blood, and treasure we have spent. This has been my uniform opinion; a doctrine I have endeavored, amidst the torrent of expectation of an approaching peace, to inculcate, and the event, I am sure, will justify me in it. With much truth, I am, &c.1

The very thing which you and every body else points out as so easy to do, is not done, and is the principal hardship complained of by the Officers, who think it surprizing that they cannot enjoy a benefit which is essential to themselves and costs the public nothing, because it will give a little trouble to the Contractors.

TO JOSEPH REED.

Those Officers who claim the specific ration as a matter of right could not in justice, and I persuade myself would not in decency, complain if they should be compelled to draw or forfeit them. But the question in my Opinion is, whether they ought to be compelled to draw them (whether they want them or not) and whether (as it costs the public no more to give them the alternative of drawing the specific Ration or its value) it is not reasonable, especially under the deprivation of pay, to gratify them in it, as it is all they have to live upon.

Verplanck’s Point, 15 September, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I shall beg your indulgence but a little while longer till I subscribe fully to your observation that, without a Civil list, neither Civil nor Military Men can exist; but I must beg leave to add to it as my own that, if the Military should disband for want of Pay (while the war continues to rage) a period will very soon be put to the Civil Establishment under our present Constitution—the Civil and Military Men, having a reciprocal dependance upon each other, taxation of the property of one being equal to that of the other, and the wants of both the same, it is worthy of some considerations whether the first is to receive all and the other no part of their pay.

The appeal contained in your letter of the 11th instant is equally unexpected and surprising.2

These Sentiments, my dear Morris, are between ourselves, and tho’ freely communicated to you are concealed from the Officers of this Army, on whom I am constantly inculcating patience and forbearance; adding that their relief must flow from the Taxes, and that it is incumbent upon all and every of them to impress the necessity of Taxation upon their several Connexions and Friends as the only source of redress, for that you are totally unsupported and cannot work miracles.

Not knowing the particular charges which are alledged against you, it is impossible for me to make a specific reply. I can therefore only say in general terms that the employments you sustained in the year 1776, and in that period of the year, when we experienced our greatest distresses, are a proof that you was not suspected by me of infidelity, or want of integrity; for had the least suspicion of the kind reached my mind, either from observation or report, I should most assuredly have marked you out as a fit object of resentment.

As I never say any thing of a Man that I have the smallest scruple of saying to him, I would not be understood to mean by this being between ourselves that any part of it that effects Mr. Sands should be hid from him. You are perfectly at liberty if you think it necessary to communicate these my Sentiments to him.

While on our retreat through Jersey, I remember your being sent from Newark, to the Assembly of New Jersey, then sitting, to rouse and animate them to spirited measures for our support; and at the same time gen. Mifflin was sent to Pennsylvania for the same purpose. This employ was certainly a mark of my confidence in you at that time.

I hope some good will result from the deputation of Congress to the several States—Inclosed I send you a Copy of my Letter to them of the 4th of May, and should have done it sooner, if I could have trusted the conveyance without putting the Letter in Cypher. I pray you to make a tender of my best respects, in which Mrs. Washington joins me most cordially, to Mrs. Morris & Miss Livingston, and to believe that with every sentiment of esteem and Regard I am, &c.

Your conduct, so far as it came to my immediate notice, during the short period we lay on the west bank of the Delaware, appeared sollicitous for the public good; and your conduct at Princeton evidenced a spirit and zeal which to me appeared laudable and becoming a man well effected to the cause we were engaged in.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

It is rather a disagreeable circumstance to have private and confidential letters, hastily written as all mine of that class are, upon a supposition that they would remain between the parties only, produced as evidence in a matter of public discussion; but conscious that my public and private sentiments are at all times alike; I shall not withhold these letters should you think them absolutely necessary to your justification.

Head-Quarters, 17 June, 1782.

Dear Sir,

If I have in my possession any such letter as you particularly allude to, it is not at present with me—being in the field perfectly light, I have divested myself of all papers, public and private; but such of late date as I thought I might have occasion, in my present situation to refer to. The others remain at a considerable distance from me. I am, &c.

When pressed by necessity to adopt a measure, a choice is scarcely left to us. In answer, therefore, to your letter of the 12th instant, I am obliged to observe, that the tardiness of the States will compel us to that, which in my opinion policy forbids.

TO THOMAS PAINE.

At this critical moment, inclination would not lead me to consent to disbanding any corps of the army. But if the States cannot, or, what is the same, will not recruit the regiments, which are quotaed nor furnish the supplies which are necessary for their support, we must next consider what kind of troops under the present view of the matter can best be dispensed with; in doing which, I cannot hesitate to declare, that cavalry, in present circumstances and the probable operations of the campaign, will be least useful, and for that reason ought to be the first to be reduced. But how to effect this purpose appears difficult, the corps being very much dispersed, and the sentiments of the officers quite unknown to me. I confess I am at a loss how to point out any particular mode. To make it a matter of arrangement with the officers to determine among themselves who should go out, and who should remain in service, would be a work of time. To select the best from among the whole, is not only an invidious business, but requires a perfect knowledge of each individual character, a knowledge, which, with a few exceptions, I confess myself unpossessed of. And to retain the corps or officers by seniority may, and I am sure in some instances would, give the most indifferent officers in the whole line of the cavalry. Not being able to hit on any method, which is satisfactory to myself, I submit this point to your decision.

Head-Quarters, 18 September, 1782.

Sir,

If the regiments of artillery, allotted to the States of Pennsylvania and Virginia, cannot be completed, an event of which I see but little prospect, however inconsistent it may be with policy, and whatever consequence it may involve, I readily subscribe to the opinion of blending the two into one. Nothing surely can be more inconsistent with every principle of economy, than to keep up whole corps of officers for the sake of a few or a handful of men. There cannot, I think, be a doubt of the propriety of reducing Hazen’s regiment. The Canadian part of it may be formed into one or more companies according to their number, and be employed as watermen, or in other services suited to their circumstances; the remainder to be turned over to the States to which they respectively belong.

I have the pleasure to acknowledge your favor of the 7th, informing of your proposal to present me with fifty copies of your last publication1 for the amusement of the army. For this intention you have my sincere thanks, not only on my own account, but for the pleasure, I doubt not the gentlemen of the army will receive from the perusal of your pamphlets.

What prospects the States south of the Delaware have of getting their regiments filled, under the several modes adopted by them, I know not; therefore can give no opinion respecting them, but am certain that no regiment of infantry belonging to any State north of the Delaware ought to be reduced. Most of the staff departments of the army have undergone a recent change. Those, I presume, cannot want a revision. The quartermaster’s department has been regulated without any participation of mine, and I know too little of its present constitution to form any judgment upon it. The same is the state of my knowledge respecting the clothier’s department. I can only observe to you that, upon an application to me from the assistant clothier here for provisions, it appeared to me, that he had more persons employed under him than I thought necessary, and on that principle I refused to give him an order for his full request.

Your observations on the period of seven years, as it applies itself to and affects British minds, are ingenious, and I wish it may not fail of its effects in the present instance.1 The measures and the policy of the enemy are at present in great perplexity and embarrassment. But I have my fears, whether their necessities, (which are the only operating motive with them,) are yet arrived to that point, which must drive them unavoidably into what they will esteem disagreeable and dishonorable terms of peace; such, for instance, as an absolute, unequivocal admission of American independence, on the terms upon which she can accept it. For this reason, added to the obstinacy of the King, and the probable consonant principles of some of the principal ministers, I have not so full confidence in the success of the present negotiation for peace as some gentlemen entertain. Should events prove my jealousies to be ill founded, I shall make myself happy under the mistake, consoling myself with the idea of having erred on the safest side, and enjoying with as much satisfaction as any of my countrymen the pleasing issue of our severe contest. The case of Captain Asgill has indeed been spun out to a great length. But with you I hope that its determination will not be unfavorable to this Country. I am, Sir, &c.

Thus, Sir, I have given you my sentiments on your queries. If they shall prove of any use in effecting the salutary purposes you wish, I shall think myself happy in contributing in this way to the general weal.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Verplanck’s Point, 19 September, 1782.

Dear Sir,

TO JOHN DICKINSON, PRESIDENT OF DELAWARE.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your favor of the 11th. The political intelligence which we have lately had from Europe is so contradictory, that little dependence can be put upon it, more especially as we have it principally through the channel of an enemy’s paper, which I take it for granted, shews as fair a side as possible in their own favor.

Head-Quarters, 19 June, 1782.

Sir,

Why we have nothing from our ministers is, as you observe, truly unaccountable. In the Parliamentary debates consequent of the death of the Marquis of Rockingham and the resignation of Fox, Burke, &c., one side assert, and the other side deny matters so confidently, that there is no possibility of forming an accurate judgment. I cannot but look upon Lord Rockingham’s death, however, as the most unfortunate event, and that, at best, the negociation if not broken off, will be spun out to a considerable length. This, however, will be soon known, for if the ministry are seriously disposed to Peace, upon such terms as we can accept, their acts must soon evince it. In the meantime it will be our policy to proceed as if no negociations were on foot.

I feel myself much obliged by the friendly communication of your sentiments to me on the subject of retaliation, conveyed under your favor of the 30th May, a subject truly disagreeable and distressing to me. The horrid circumstances of barbarity, which introduced the instance which now gains our particular attention, came to me under the representation of so respectable a body of citizens, that they could not but gain my notice and interposition; especially from a consideration, that, if it was not taken up in this line, the people, strongly provoked by their feelings, on the occasion would probably have assumed the matter upon their own decision, and brought it to an issue under their own power, which mode of proceeding, if permitted, would have involved circumstances still more lamentable and calamitous.

I am extremely glad to hear from good authority that the Dutch Fleet had put to sea. The arrival of public cloathing from Holland is an interesting event—as the army is more in want of Linen just now than of any other article—except money. * * *

In taking my resolutions, I also found myself supported by many repeated declarations of Congress on this subject. And, after my resolutions being taken, I had the satisfaction to receive the fullest and most decided approbation of that honorable body in this particular instance. But, under all these circumstances, although I never had a doubt on the general propriety of the measure, yet it was not my intention, could it be avoided, to have taken, as a subject of retaliation, an officer under sanction of capitulation or convention; and my first orders were issued agreeable to that idea; but unfortunately it was reported to me, that no officer of an unconditional description was in our possession, which laid me under a necessity of giving further orders, exceeding my original intentions, in consequence of which the unhappy lot has fallen upon Captain Asgill, a prisoner under the capitulation of Yorktown.

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

I feel myself exceedingly distressed on this occasion; but, my resolutions having been taken upon the most mature deliberation, supported by the approbation of Congress, and grounded on the general concurrence of all the principal officers of the army, who were particularly consulted on the subject, cannot be receded from. Justice to the army and the public, my own honor, and, I think I may venture to say, universal benevolence, require them to be carried into full execution. It rests, therefore, with the British commander-in-chief to prevent this unhappy measure taking effect. An application is gone to Sir Guy Carleton from Captain Asgill, begging his interposition to avert his fate. The matter is now in agitation; and I am told that a strict inquiry is making into the conduct of Lippincott, who is charged as being the principal perpetrator of the cruel murder of Captain Huddy. Should this inquiry lead to giving satisfaction, by a compliance with my original demand to Sir Henry Clinton, my feelings will be greatly relieved, and I need not assure you, that I shall receive the highest pleasure from such an event. I am, &c.

Head Quarters, 22 September, 1782.

Dear Sir,

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TENCH TILGHMAN.

I am really more alarmed at the Contents of your letters of the 29th and 30th of Augt. and 9th of this month, than at any occurrence which hath lately happened—and I am embarrassed with respect to one paragraph in that of the 30th of Augt., vizt., “The other which is the principal one, that you may found a warm application on it to the States. You will I hope keep this intirely to yourself. You will see that I have not intrusted a view of it to my Secretary or any the Clerks”—On what am I to found an application to the States but upon your information of your inability to comply with your Contracts in consequence of their tardiness in paying their Taxes? Should I proceed of my own accord, as it were, they will think I am stepping out of my line, and may per haps hint to me that this reprehension would come more properly from another quarter—Until I hear from you I do not think myself at liberty to make use of your name. But ought we not, my dear Sir, to consider the danger of trusting a matter of so much importance, just at this moment when perhaps the enemy are balancing upon the total evacuation of these States, to a circular letter to the Legislatures? Letters of this kind are, from their nature, as public as the prints, and seldom fail by one means or the other to get into the hands of the enemy. I have several times found personal applications by Gentlemen of influence have much more effect than letters. Of this you will judge—and I think another matter ought immediately to be taken into most serious consideration—If you would be of opinion that the most strenuous exertions of the States will not enable them to pay in a sufficiency of Specie to comply with the Contracts, ought not a change of measures to be resolved on without loss of time? That if we must, thro’ necessity, revert to the ruinous system of Specifics, it may be done in time to lay up magazines before the Winter sets in. * * *

Head Qrs.,Newburgh, 9 July, 1782.

My dear Sir,

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

‘Till your letter of the 28th ulto. arrived (which is the first from you, & the only direct acct. of you, since we parted at Philadelphia, we have had various conjectures about you—some thought you were dead—others that you were married—and all that you had forgot us.—Your letter is not a more evident contradiction of the first and last of these suppositions than it is a tacit confirmation of the second; and as none can wish you greater success in the prosecution of the Plan you are upon than I do, so believe me sincere, when I request you to take your own time to accomplish it, or any other business you may have on hand—at the same time I must be allowed to add, that you have no friend that wishes more to see you than I do.—

Head Quarters,Verplanck’s Point,
23 September, 1782.

My dear Sir,

I have been in constant expectation ever since my arrival at this place, of a summons to meet Count Rochambeau at Philadelphia to settle a plan for the ensuing Campaign—The non arrival of the dispatches from his Court has hitherto prevented it—but the absolute necessity (to avoid delay after they do arrive)—has induced me to propose a meeting at all events, that we may settle such hypothetical plans as will facilitate our operations, without waiting an interview after the dispatches shall arrive. I shall know the result of this proposition in the course of a few days, as my dispatches left on the 24th ulto.

Since my last of the 6th of August I have received your favors of the 6th of June, 11th of July and 12 of August.

We have nothing New in this Quarter—Sir Guy, gives strong assurances of the pacific disposition of His most gracious Majesty—by Land—Sir (that is to be) Digby, gives proofs, if he is deficient in assurances, of His said Excellent Majesty’s kind intention of Capturing every thing that swims on the face of the Waters; and of his humane design of suffocating all those who are found thereon, in Prison Ships, if they will not engage in his service—This, to an American, whose genious is not susceptable of refined ideas, would appear somewhat inconsistent; but to the expanded mind of a Briton they are perfectly reconcilable. Whether they are right or wrong, time must determine.

I hope before this reaches you, you will be in possession of Charleston, and will have found a glorious end to your difficulties and distresses in the southern quarter.

I am just returned from a Visit to our Northern Posts, in which Albany, Schenectady, Saratoga, the — and the Fields of Burgoyne were visited1 —Mrs. Washington who sets out this day for Mount Vernon thanks you for your kind remembrance of her—she wishes you, as I do, as much happiness as you can do yourself.

An application from the government of South Carolina produced the resolve, of which the enclosed1 is a copy, and which, I doubt not, was immediately transmitted to you. From your being upon the spot, and from your thorough knowledge of southern affairs, I shall leave the execution of the resolve in a great measure to your own judgment. As you observe in your letter of the 12th of August, when my directions of the 18th March last were given, they were upon a presumption, that the enemy might evacuate Charleston in such season, that the troops destined to return to the northward might be here time enough to render service before the close of the campaign; but, that not being the case, their immediate removal does not become so essential; and therefore I leave it with you, either to retain the corps, which you may ultimately determine to send northward, until the weather becomes favorable for marching in the spring, or to send them forward immediately, as far as Virginia at least, if you find their subsistence more difficult and expensive, than it would be in the middle States. I will just give you a hint, that I fear subsistence will be upon a very precarious footing here during the winter; and you know the inconvenience of having troops arrive at their cantonments late in the season.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

The arrangement made by you for the distribution of the southern army agrees perfectly, in the main, with my own judgment. I think, for the following reason, that the first and third regiments of cavalry had best be left in Carolina. They both belong to Virginia, and will more than probably be incorporated the next year. Their separation, therefore, would render the incorporation difficult; and, as cavalry are of no great use in this quarter in offensive operations, and more easily subsisted southward than here, I am not anxious to have Lee’s legion. But with this you will do as you think best. Armand’s legion will not advance. I shall recommend their wintering in Virginia, as forage will be extremely scarce in all this country, owing to the severest drought ever known.

Newburg, 9th July, 1782.

Sir,

By the resolve before alluded to, I am directed to make the necessary inquiry into the circumstances of the southern States, and to employ such force therein as I may think proper, and to direct you, whilst in the southern department, to employ the troops under your command offensively or defensively in such manner as may be most conducive to the interests of the United States.

Having found a moment’s leisure to examine, myself, into the situation of affairs on the frontiers of this State, I have lately made a journey up the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers as far as Saratoga and Schenectady.2 Just before my arrival there, a party of three or four hundred of the enemy, consisting of British, refugees, and savages, had made an incursion down the Mohawk, attacked and captured (after a gallant defence) a small guard of Continental troops, who were stationed at the only remaining mill in the upper settlements, which they also destroyed.

The execution of the foregoing, I must, for the reasons mentioned in the beginning of my letter, leave also to you. Should the enemy evacuate the southern States, I know of no offensive operations but against St. Augustine, or the savages. The first I believe is out of our power, even were we authorized to undertake such an expedition; and the last must depend upon contingencies. I do not apprehend much danger from the savages, when the British are expelled from the seacoast.

By a deserter from this party we are informed, that the enemy are taking post at Oswego, and are either rebuilding the old, or erecting new fortifications there. Whatever the design of the enemy may be by thus occupying a new post, and extending themselves on the frontier, I consider it my duty to inform Congress thereof, and have for that purpose taken the liberty to forward this by the earliest safe conveyance since my return from the northward.

You will perceive it is the intention of Congress, that you should remain personally at the southward until further orders. You will, I doubt not, use every argument to induce those States to exert themselves in raising a permanent force for their own defence. They cannot expect, that, if the enemy evacuate the southern States, and keep a footing at New York, and at other places to the northward and eastward, that a force of almost half the Union should be kept in the southern States for defence only.

I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency copies and extracts of sundry letters, which have lately passed between the British commander-in-chief and myself. The subjects contained in them being principally of a civil nature, I must beg leave to submit them to the consideration and direction of Congress. I think it only necessary to remark, that, notwithstanding the plausibility of the terms on which Sir Guy Carleton proposes the exchange of American seamen for British soldiers, in his letter of the 7th instant, it must still be obvious, that it would amount to nearly the same thing to have the prisoners so exchanged employed against our allies in the West Indies, as it would to have them acting against ourselves on the continent.1

The situation of politics, I mean European, is upon so precarious a footing, that I really know not what account to give you of them. Negotiations were still going on at Paris in the middle of July; but the prospects of a peace were checked by the death of the Marquis of Rockingham. Dr. Franklin’s laconic description of the temper of the British nation seems most apt. “They are,” says he, “unable to carry on the war, and too proud to make peace.” I am, &c.

I have the honor to be, &c.2

TO JAMES DUANE, IN CONGRESS.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Verplanck’s Point, 30th September, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Newburg, 9 July, 1782.

My dear Sir,

I shall be obliged to you, or some friend in Congress to inform me what has been or is likely to be done with respect to my reference of the case of Captn. Huddy. I cannot forbear complaining of the cruel situation I now am and oftentimes have been placed in, by the silence of Congress in matters of high importance, which the good of Service, and my official duty have obliged me to call upon them, as the sovereign power of these United States, to decide. It is only in intricate and perplexing cases, that I have requested their orders, being always willing to bear my proportion of public embarrassments, and take a full share of responsibility. Conscious that I have treated that Honble. Body, and all their measures, with as much deference and respect as any Officer in the United States, I expected this aid.

Your letter of the 22d of April, also your two favors of the 19th of May with the returns of the army under your command, have been duly received; but, having been in momently expectation, that intelligence would arrive from Europe, or some other event turn up, which might disclose the intentions of the enemy, and give a clue for the final determination of the operations of the campaign, I have delayed for a few days giving you my answer. Notwithstanding I am at this hour as much in the dark as ever, I can defer no longer the pleasure I always experience from indulging myself in a free communication and interchange of sentiments with you. To participate and divide our feelings, hopes, fears, and expectations with a friend, is almost the only source of pleasure and consolation left us, in the present languid and and unpromising state of our affairs.

Why, then, if policy forbids a decision upon the difficult points I have referd., I am not to be informed of it, is beyond my conception, unless I was to ascribe it to causes, which I flatter myself do not exist. When I refer a matter to Congress, every proceeding on it on my part is suspended, until their pleasure is transmitted; and for this it is well known I have waited with unexampled patience. But when no notice is taken of my application; when measures, which I might otherwise adopt, are suspended; when my own feelings are wounded, and others perhaps are suffering by the delay, how is it possible for me to forbear expressing my disquietude?

It gives me infinite satisfaction to find, that, by your prudence and decision, you have put a period to the progress of a dangerous mutiny, and, by your example of patience and firmness, reclaimed the army amidst all their agravated sufferings to that good disposition, which it has been your great merit to preserve in your command through the worst times. Their distresses are truly deplorable; and, while the almost insurmountable difficulty of transporting clothing and the smaller supplies (which, General St. Clair reports, are still detained on the road for want of the means of conveyance) gives me the most sensible pain and anxiety, it but too clearly proves the impracticability of removing by land, under our present prospects of finance, the artillery of siege and immense quantity of stores necessary for a serious operation against Charleston.

The particular cause of it at this time arises from two things. First, while I am totally silent to the public, waiting the decision of Congs. on the case of Huddy, I see publications on this head (importing reflections) in one of the Pennsylvania Papers, which no man could have made, that had not access to my official letter of the 19th of August to Congress; and, secondly, because I feel exceedingly for Captn. Asgill, who was designated by Lot as a victim to the manes of Captain Huddy. While retaliation was apparently necessary, however disagreeable in itself, I had no repugnance to the measure. But, when the end proposed by it is answered, by a disavowal of the act, by a dissolution of the Board of Refugees, by a promise whether with or without meaning to comply with it, I shall not determine, that further inquisition should be made into the matter, I thought it incumbent upon me, to have the sense of Congress, who had most explicitly approved, and impliedly indeed ordered retaliation to take place before I proceeded any further in the matter. To this hour I am held in darkness.

The disastrous event of the naval action in the West Indies may, indeed, and probably will now give a total alteration to the complexion of the campaign. This will, in all human probability, operate more than any other circumstance against the evacuation of the southern States; for what would have been a very hazardous line of conduct, and would have exposed the enemy to a fatal blow in case of a naval coöperation on this coast, may now be considered as a rational and prudent measure, on their part. But the mode of defensive war (which the enemy affect to have adopted, in which I would however place but very little confidence), and especially the detachment from Charleston, which must have weakened them considerably, will, I hope, enable you in all events to hold your own ground until the southern and middle States shall have made some efforts for your reinforcement, and until the pecuniary affairs of the continent in general shall be put in a better situation. Some little, I flatter myself, will be done, although I must confess my expectations for the campaign are not very sanguine. I feel with you, my dear friend, all the regret and mortification, that can possibly be conceived, from a consideration that we shall be able to avail ourselves so imperfectly of the weakness and embarrassments of our enemy; while, on the other hand, I think there is reason to apprehend from some late indications the enemy have given, by taking post at Oswego and extending themselves on the frontier, that they mean, availing themselves of our languor and looking forward to the hour of pacification, to occupy as much territory as they are able to do, before a negotiation shall be entered upon. I wish we may be in a capacity to counteract their designs.

The letter of Asgill, (copy of which I inclose,) and the situation of his Father, which I am made acquainted with by the British prints, work too powerfully upon my humanity not to wish, that Congress would chalk a line for me to walk by in this business. To effect this, is the cause of the trouble you now receive from, dear Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant.1

I have given my opinion to Congress through the secretary at war, that it will be advisable to make a permanent incorporation of all the troops southward of the Delaware in the manner you propose; but, as the observations did not apply to the other troops, these regiments ought to remain on their present establishment.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.1

As to the movement and disposition of the French army, I will tell you exactly my idea and plan respecting it, and how the matter now rests. While we continued in the state of uncertainty, which has so long perplexed and prevented us from forming any projects whatever, I wished to have the corps of the Count de Rochambeau remain in a situation equally capable of looking either way, as circumstances might eventually require, being well persuaded in my own mind, that with their assistance (without the aid of a naval force) we should not at this time be able to do anything effectual against New York, defended by its present garrison; and, presuming still greater difficulties would oppose themselves to an attempt against Charleston, I proposed to postpone my final resolution until we should hear from the other side of the Atlantic. For, allowing your army, in conjunction with the French troops, to be completely competent to the object, the transportation by land of heavy artillery stores and apparatus appeared to me an inevitable obstacle, which I have fully explained in my letter of the 23d of April last. Besides, the diminution of an army in so long a march, and the innumerable advantages the enemy must derive from the command of the water, were considerations with me. And, as I flattered myself we might be able to keep the enemy in check with our present force, both in the northern and southern departments, I therefore thought it expedient, that the select corps of our allies in Virginia should continue unimpaired as a corps de reserve in that State, until new information or circumstances should produce new orders from me; unless the Count de Rochambeau should first be apprized of some contingence or event, which should render a movement in his opinion proper; in which case the matter was left to his determination. I have this moment learned from his Excellency, the Minister of France, that the Count has already commenced his march northward. What circumstances have led to this, I am unable to say; but expect to see the Count himself in a few days (by appointment) at Philadelphia, where it is proposed to enter into a discussion of the possible objects and views of the campaign, so far as our general and imperfect knowledge of affairs will admit, and from whence I shall have the pleasure to inform you of any thing of moment, that may in the mean time take place, or ultimately be in contemplation.

Head-Quarters, 2 October, 1782.

My dear Sir,

Under an idea, that the French troops would certainly be withdrawn from Virginia at some moment of the campaign, and perhaps unexpectedly, I have long since written to Governor Harrison on that subject, and requested that a body of men might be in readiness for the defence of the State on that occasion. Indeed I have written almost incessantly to all the States, urging, in the most forcible terms I could make use of, the absolute necessity of complying with the requisitions of Congress in furnishing their contingents of men and money, and am unhappy to say the success of these applications have not been equal to my expectation.

Painful as the task is to describe the dark side of our affairs, it sometimes becomes a matter of indispensable necessity. Without disguise or palliation, I will inform you candidly of the discontents, which at this moment prevail universally throughout the army.

I am happy to assure you there was no foundation for the report of my having had a narrow escape in passing the Clove. In return, we have had a similar account respecting yourself, which I hope was equally groundless. Believe me, my dear Sir, I shall always consider myself deeply interested in whatever concerns you, and shall ever rejoice at your health, safety, and felicity.

The complaint of evils, which they suppose almost remediless, are the total want of money or the means of existing from one day to another, the heavy debts they have already incurred, the loss of credit, the distress of their families (i. e. such as are married) at home, and the prospect of poverty and misery before them. It is vain, Sir, to suppose, that military men will acquiesce contentedly with bare rations, when those in the civil walk of life, (unacquainted with half the hardships they endure,) are regularly paid the emoluments of office. While the human mind is influencd. by the same passions, and have ye same inclinations to indulge, it cannt. be. A military man has the same turn to sociability as a person in civil life. He conceives himself equally called upon to live up to his rank, and his pride is hurt when circumstans. restrain him. Only conceive, then, the mortification they (even the general officers) must suffer, when they cannot invite a French officer, a visiting friend, or a travelling acquaintance, to a better repast, than stinking whiskey (and not always that) and a bit of Beef without vegetables will afford them.

Mrs. Washington, who is just setting out for Virginia, joins me in most affectionate regards to Mrs. Greene and yourself. I am, dear Sir, with the most perfect esteem, &c.

The officers also complain of other hardships, which they think might and ought to be remedied without delay; such as the stopping promotions, where there have been vacancies open for a long time; the withholding commissions from those, who are justly entitled to them, and have warrants or certificates of their appointments from the executive of their States; and particularly the leaving the compensation for their services in a loose, equivocal state, without ascertaining their claims upon the public, or making provision for the future payment of them.

P. S. Although the campaign does not promise much activity, yet I shall wish you to keep me as regularly and accurately informed of the state of your department as possible, noting the strength, movements, and position of your own army, and that of the enemy. It may also be essential for me to be made acquainted with the resources of the country and every thing of a military or political nature, which may be interesting to our future plans and operations.1

While I premise, that tho’ no one I have seen or heard of appears opposed to the principle of reducing the army as circumstances may require, yet I cannot help fearing the result of the measure in contemplation, under present circumstances, when I see such a number of men, goaded by a thousand stings of reflection on the past and of anticipation on the future, about to be turned into the world, soured by penury and what they call the ingratitude of the public, involved in debts without one farthing of money to carry them home, after having spent the flower of their days, and many of them their patrimonies, in establishing the freedom and independence of their country, and sufered everything human nature is capable of enduring on this side of death. I repeat it, in these irritable circumstances, without one thing to soothe their feelings or brighten the gloomy prospects, I cannot avoid apprehending that a train of evils will follow, of a very serious and distressing nature. On the other hand, could the officers be placed in as good a situation, as when they came into service, the contention, I am persuaded, would be, not who should continue in the field, but who should retire to private life.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN LAURENS.

I wish not to heighten the shades of the picture so far as the real life would justify me in doing, or I would give anecdotes of patriotism and distress, which have scarcely ever been paralleled, never surpassed in the history of mankind. But, you may rely upon it, the patience and long-sufferance of this army are almost exhausted, and that there never was so great a spirit of discontent as at this instant. While in the field, I think it may be kept from breaking out into acts of outrage; but when we retire into winter-quarters, (unless the storm is previously dissipated,) I cannot be at ease respecting the consequences. It is high time for a peace.

Head-Quarters, 10 July, 1782.

My dear Sir,

To you, my dear Sir, I need not be more particular in describing my anxiety and the grounds of it. You are too well acquainted, from your own service, with the real sufferings of the army, to require a longer detail. I will, therefore, only add, that, exclusive of the common hardships of a military life, our troops have been and still are obliged to perform more services foreign to their proper duty, without gratuity or reward, than the soldiers of any other army; for example, the immense labors expended in doing the duties of artificers in erecting fortifications and military works, the fatigue of building themselves barracks or huts annually, and of cutting and transporting wood for the use of all our posts and garrisons without any expense whatever to the public.

The last post brought me your letter of the 19th of May. I must confess, that I am not at all astonished at the failure of your plan. That spirit of freedom, which at the commencement of this contest would have gladly sacrificed every thing to the attainment of its object, has long since subsided, and every selfish passion has taken its place. It is not the public, but private interest, which influences the generality of mankind, nor can the Americans any longer boast an exception. Under these circumstances, it would rather have been surprising if you had succeeded, nor will you I fear succeed better in Georgia.1

Of this letter, (which, from the tenor of it, must be considered in some degree of a private nature,) you may make such use as you shall think proper, since the principal objects of it were, by displaying the merits, the hardships, the disposition, and critical state of the army, to give information that might eventually be useful, and to convince you with what entire confidence and esteem, I am, my dear Sir, &c.1

In the present moment, there is very little prospect of the campaign being much more active in this quarter than in yours. However, little can be positively determined on, till we have some advices from Europe, which I am anxiously waiting for. When they arrive, I shall be better able to tell you what we may expect.

TO JAMES McHENRY.

Sir Guy Carleton is using every art to soothe and lull our people into a state of security. Adml. Digby is capturing all our vessels, and suffocating all our Seamen who will not enlist into the Service of His Britannic Majesty, as fast as possible in Prison Ships; and Haldimand, (with his savage allies,) is scalping and burning the Frontiers. Such is the line of conduct pursued by the different commanders, and such their politics. You have my best wishes, being always sincerely yours.

Verplanck’s Point, 17 October, 1782.

My dear Sir,

TO JAMES McHENRY.

In a visit to the Post of Dobb’s Ferry last Saturday, I accidently met with Majr. Lynch at that place, and received from him your letter of the 30th ulto.

Phila., 18 July, 1782.

My dear Sir,

In a time like this, of general uncertainty, with respect to the designs of the British Court, it is not at all wonderful to find men engineering at every Corner for News—The North sends to the South, and the South to the North, to obtain it.—But at present, all I believe are equally ignorant.—My opinion of the matter is, that you could learn nothing decisive from the Cabinet itself.—I have long thought, and still think, they are trying the Chapter of accidents; and the good or ill success alone of this campaign, will fix their Councils. If they can obtain any advantages at Sea, or in the Indies—East or West, no matter where—I am of opinion they will continue the War—If their affairs on the other hand stand still, or continue to retrograde, their stomachs will come to, & Peace will be seriously thought of—

Mr. Lindsay handed me your favor of the 14th. The disposition of the Prisoners is not with me, but I have accompanied your request to the Secretary at War, and have no doubt of his acquiescence. If the Ladies should derive as much additional pleasure from the allurement of this Band, as I wish them, they will soon be at the summit of happiness.

From a letter I had from Marqs. De la Fayette of the 29th of June, nothing more could be collected than that doubts & darkness prevailed—that the business of Grenville, seemed to be that of procrastination.—In a word, that nothing was fixed; and that the cause of his stay was to see matters in such a train as to find the way clear before he left France.—In New Yk. they are as impatient as us for News—expecting the August Packet will remove all doubts, but herein they will be mistaken—later acc’ts than the Packet can bring, leave the negotiations at Paris in as doubtful a state as ever—A Letter which I have just received from Boston gives me the inclosed as an extract of a Letter from Mr. Adams (as this is a private letter, Mr. Adams’s name had better be withheld) of the 20 of Augt. from the Hague.—The Boston Gazette says, that the Combined Fleets had left the Channel, and that the Jamaica Fleet got in four days afterwards.—It also gives an acct. of an Action in the East Indies between the French & British Fleets, in which, after a hard fought action, they say victory inclined to the latter but that the Ships of Admiral Hughes were so much damaged he could not pursue—this is such an acknowledgment (from a British acct.) as to leave little to be apprehended from it.

At present we are enveloped in darkness; and no man, I believe, can foretell all the consequences which will result from the naval Action in the West Indies—to say no worse of it, it is an unfortunate affair—& if the States cannot, or will not rouse to more vigorous exertions, they must submit to the consequences. Providence has done much for us in this contest, but we must do something for ourselves, if we expect to go triumphantly through with it.

You will recollect the opinion I gave you upon the receipt of Carleton’s letter of the 2d of August to me. Subsequent events, as far as they have come to my knowledge prove it was well founded—& I wish future ones may not evince that to gain time, was all that the British ministry had in view—The impolicy therefore of suffering ourselves to be lulled by expectations of Peace, because we wish it, & because it is the Interest of G. Britain to hold up the ideas of it, will, more than probably, prove the ruin of our cause & the disbanding of the Army; for it should seem from the conduct the States are pursuing—that they do not conceive it necessary for the Army to receive any thing but hard knocks—to give them pay, is a matter which has long been out of the question; and we were upon the point of trying how we could live on without subsistence (as the superintendent was no longer able to fulfil his Contract with the Victualers of the Army, & they relinquishing it) when fortunately for us we met with Gentlemen, who, for an advanced price pr Ration, has saved us from starvation, or disbandment by giving a credit—Our horses have long been without everything which their own thriftiness could not procure.

My coming to this place was sudden as unexpected—Mrs. Washington left Head Qrs. on Tuesday.—On Thursday I rec’d a letter from Count De Rochambeau by one of his aids, which induced me to set off on Friday, and I arrived on Sunday; so that my being at the Minister’s celebration of the birth of the Dauphin, was purely accidental.1 I heard with concern by Colo. Rogers of your indisposition, but rejoice at your recovery.—As your fever has been obstinate may not change of air be of service to you—whether for this, or other purposes, allow me to add that I should be very happy in your spending some time with us at Head Quarters. In a letter which I have lately received from the Marqs. De la Fayette he desired to be particularly remembered to you.—I am with much truth, &c.

Let any man who will allow reason fair play, ask himself what must be the inevitable consequence of such policy.—Have not military men the same feelings of those in the Civil line?—why then should one set receive the constant wages of service—and the other be continually without them?—do the former deserve less for their watchings and toil—for enduring heat & cold—for standing in sunshine & in rain—for the dangers they are continually exposed to for the sake of their Country; by which means the man in Civil life sits quiet under his own Vine & Fig tree—solacing himself in all the comforts—pleasures—& enjoyments of life, free & unrestrained? let impartiality answr. the question.

P. S. Since writing the foregoing, I am informed by one of my Aids who I sent with Mr. Lindsay to the Secretary at War, that certain plans have been adopted by him, and sanctioned, that will prevent Mr. Lindsay getting the Music in the manner he at first proposed—but on terms which he (Lindsay) will readily accede to if the prisoners can be engaged to yield their acquiescence.

Since writing the above I have received your Letter respecting the Interview which Majr. Lynch reqs. with persons at New York. Please to inform that Gentleman that it is a rule Established by me (and I think by Congress) for all Citizens, to bring certificates from the Executive of the State in wch. they reside that they are permitted to their indulgence—it is then no more than an act of official duty with me—Let Mr. Lynch bring this to Head Qrs. at Newburgh, & I will order the officer commanding on the Lines, to furnish him with a Flag.

These are matters worthy of serious consideration—The patience—the fortitude—the long, & great suffering of this army is unexampled in history; but there is an end to all things & I fear we are very near one to this.—Which, more than probably will oblige me to stick very close to my flock this winter, & try like a careful physician, to prevent, if possible, the disorders getting to an incurable height.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

I am yr. very obedt. & affectn. servt.

P. S. I have this moment received a letter from the Marqs. De Vaudreuil informg. me, that a Vessel just arrived from Cadiz, wch. place she left the 24th of Augt., brings advices that the day following was fixed upon for a genl. assault of the Works at Gibralter, by ye combined force of F. & Spn.

Head-Quarters,Newburg,
6 August, 1782.

My dear Sir,

TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

In my last letter, of the 9th of July in which I acknowledged your several favors of the 22d of April and 19th of May, I mentioned my expectation of soon meeting the Count de Rochambeau in Philadelphia, and my intention of writing you from that place, in case any thing of moment should turn up in the mean while; but as our hopes, that public despatches would have arrived from France before our meeting, have been disappointed, I can only inform you, that matters now rest in the same situation as described in my former letters, except with regard to the negotiations, which are said to be carrying on by the belligerent powers in Europe.

Head-Quarters, 19 October, 1782.

Sir,

Indeed, I hardly know what to think or believe of the disposition of the court of Britain. Certain it is, the new administration have made overtures of peace to the several nations at war, apparently with a design to detach some one or another of them from the general combination; but, not having succeeded in their efforts for a separate negotiation, how far the necessity of affairs may carry them in their wishes for a general pacification upon admissible terms, I cannot undertake to determine. From the former infatuation, duplicity, and perverse system of British policy, I confess I am induced to doubt every thing, to suspect every thing; otherwise I should suppose, from the subsequent extract of a letter from Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby to me, dated the 2d instant, that the prospects of, and negotiation for, a general peace would be very favorable.1

“We are acquainted, Sir, by authority, that negotiations for a general peace have already commenced at Paris, and that Mr. Grenville is invested with full powers to treat with all parties at war, and is now at Paris in the execution of his commission. And we are likewise, Sir, further made acquainted, that his Majesty, in order to remove all obstacles to that peace, which he so ardently wishes to restore, has commanded his ministers to direct Mr. Grenville, that the independency of the thirteen provinces should be proposed by him, in the first instance, instead of making it a condition, of a general treaty; however, not without the highest confidence, that the loyalists shall be restored to their possessions, or a full compensation made them for whatever confiscations may have taken place.”

I have received your favor of the 15th instant with the enclosures; and, though at the same time it is true, I have the general command of the allied army, as to all its movements, operations, &c., yet I have never considered myself as having an absolute right to interfere with the internal police and regulations of the French army, under the immediate orders of his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau; with which army it appears the persons mentioned in the papers contained in your letter are connected. I have, however, in order to produce an amicable settlement of the matter, communicated the contents to Colonel Wadsworth, and requested him to use his utmost endeavors to prevent any altercations and quarrels between the citizens of this State and the people employed by him. As he has engaged, that they will not impede the due execution of the civil authority, and as he writes to you by this conveyance, I cannot but hope matters will be explained to your satisfaction.1

These communications, they say, had just arrived by a packet. They further add, that Mr. Laurens was enlarged from all engagements,1 and that transports were prepared for conveying all American prisoners to this country to be exchanged here. Whatever the real intention of the enemy may be, I think the strictest attention and exertion, which have ever been practised on our part, instead of being diminished, ought to be increased thereby. Jealousy and precaution, at least, can do no harm. Too much confidence and supineness may be pernicious in the extreme.

For my own part I shall still continue to exert all my influence and authority to prevent the interruption of that harmony, which is so essential, and which has so generally prevailed between the army and the inhabitants of the country; and I need scarcely add, that in doing this I shall give every species of countenance and support to the execution of the laws of the land.

There having been a vague report, that a small embarkation of cavalry and infantry was to take place at New York, to relieve part of the garrison of Charleston, I have made use of this occasion to desire the secretary at war to put Armand’s legion immediately in motion to join you, and have requested he will use his endeavors to have the means afforded to facilitate and expedite the movement.

In the present quiet state of the frontiers, and with assurances from Sir Guy Carleton, that the incursions of the savages are stopped by authority, I have it in contemplation to withdraw the Continental troops from the northward. There are many reasons, which will make that measure eligible, unless the troops, which have been raised on purpose for the defence of the frontiers of this State, should be thought incompetent to the duty, even taking into consideration the inactivity of the season and the situation of affairs; for, indeed, I confess, I do not consider the late reports of the enemy’s being in force at the Isle-au-Noix to indicate any thing farther than an attention to their own security. The severity of the approaching season, and every other circumstance, appear to me to militate against an attack upon our possessions this winter, and we shall not be at so great a distance, but that succor may be afforded as early in the spring as shall be necessary. At any rate, some measures must be immediately taken relative to the troops now there. I should be happy in receiving your sentiments as soon as may be, and am with great esteem and regard, &c.

A mail has lately been intercepted by the enemy between Philadelphia and Trenton, in which, I am informed, there were letters from you to me. These by the time of their capture were probably of the same date as your despatches to Congress, wherein the correspondence between General Leslie and yourself was enclosed. I mention these circumstances, that you may forward duplicates in case you should judge it necessary.

P. S. I should be much obliged by an answer at the return of the bearer.

You will, I imagine, have heard, before this reaches you, of the arrival of M. Vaudreuil with a fleet of thirteen ships of the line on this coast. I can give you no particulars, as I have no official account of his arrival. The army of the Count de Rochambeau, having, as I advised you in my last, marched towards the northward, at our meeting in Philadelphia, (it was concluded) upon a consideration of all circumstances, that this corps should proceed to join the army on the Hudson. They were at Baltimore by the last intelligence from that quarter.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

Since the receipt of the letter from the commissioners, Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby, I have seen a New York paper of the 3d instant, in which is a speech of General Conway, and some other articles, which appear to be designed to propose independence to America on certain conditions not admissible, namely, that the legislature of America should be totally independent of the Parliament of Great Britain, but that the King of England should have the same kind of supremacy here as in Ireland. I have not information sufficient to determine, whether this is the kind of independence alluded to in the letter of the commissioners, or not. I wish my suspicions, however, may be ill-founded. Wishing you all the success and happiness you can desire, I am, my dear Sir, with the highest sentiments of regard and esteem, &c.1

Verplanck’s Point, 20 October, 1782.

My dear Marqs.,

TO JOHN P. POSEY.

Whilst I thought there was a probability of my letters finding you in France, I continued to write to you at Paris. After that, I ceased to do so, expecting the more agreeable pleasure of embracing you in America. Your favor of the 29th of June, placing the time of your departure from thence on a contingency, and our latest advices from Europe, reporting that the negotiations for Peace were nearly in the same state as at the commencement of it, I shall renew my correspondence.

Head Quarters,Newburgh,
7 August, 1782.

Sir,

I approve, very highly, the motives which induced you to remain at your Court and I am convinced Congress will do the same—The Campaign, as you supposed, has been very inactive—We formed the junction with the French Corps (which is now encamped on our left ten miles distant) the middle of September; and have remained in perfect unison with them ever since their arrival. It may I believe with much truth be said, that a greater harmony between two Armies never subsisted than that which has prevailed between the French and Americans since the first junction of them last year. I had prepared a beautiful Corps for you to command, that would not, I am convinced, either in their appearance or action, have discredited any Officer, or Army whatever. It consisted of all the light Infantry of the Northern Army, to which Sheldon’s Legion would have been added. But we have done nothing more than to keep a watch upon the enemy this Campaign except restraining them from detaching; which I believe has been the consequence of our junction, and lying here. A few German Troops, and Refugees have been sent to Hallifax; from thence it was supposed they were to proceed to Canada. This took place before I came into the Field, which was on the last day of August. The cold weather puts us in mind of warm fire sides, and the two Armies will separate for this or some other purpose in the course of a few days. The French Army will go Easterly, we Northerly, and shall fix our cantonments in the vicinity of West point.

With a mixture of surprize, concern, and even horror, have I heard of your treatment of the deceased Mr. Custis; in the abuse in misapplication of the estate which he had committed—with much confidence I am sure, and I believe personal regard—to your management.

The Enemy in New York make no scruple of declaring their intention of evacuating Charles town. Many Transports went from the former about a month ago; with design, it was said, to take off the Garrison; but whether it is to be brought to the last mentioned place or carried to the West Indies is mere matter of conjecture—very probably the British Troops may go to the latter, and the foreigners to the former. Time only will shew this, as indeed it may another thing, viz—that the late changes in the British Councils may prevent the evacuation of it at all.

If what I have heard, or the half of it be true, you must not only be lost to the feelings of virtue, honor, and common honesty—but you must have suffered an unwarrantable thirst of gain to lead you into errors which are so pregrant with folly and indiscretion, as to render you a mark for every man’s arrow to level at. Can you suppose, Sir, that a manager can dissipate his Employer’s Estate with impunity? That there are not Laws in every free country by which Justice is to be obtained?—or that the Heirs of Mr. Custis will not find friends who will pursue you to the end of the Earth in order to come at it? If you do, you are proceeding upon exceedingly mistaken principles—but, for a moment only, let us suppose that you have taken the advantage of an unsuspecting friend—for such I am sure Mr. Custis was to you, and that you have acted so covertly, as to elude the Law; do you believe that in the hours of cool reflection—in the moment perhaps, when you shall find that ill-gotten pelf can no longer avail you; that your conscience will not smite you for such complicated iniquity as arises not only from acts of injustice, but the horrors of ingratitude; in abusing the confidence of a man who supposed you incapable of deceiving him, who was willing, and I believe did, in a great degree, commit his whole property to your care?

With respect to New York, various opinions have prevailed. Some thought the speedy evacuation of it inevitable; others, that it would be delayed till the spring; while a third set, less sanguine than either of the other two, believed that nothing short of military force would ever free the city of them, their whole design being, to amuse the Belligerent Powers and deceive America, till they could put their marine and other matters in a more prosperous train for prosecuting the war. The first, it is certain, were in an error, because the Troops are still at New York, but which of the other two may be right, your knowledge from what is transacting on the European theater enables you to judge better of than I. Certain it is, the loyalists and Refugees in New York are very much alarmed, and know not what to expect. As certain it is, Sir Guy Carleton holds himself in readiness to evacuate, or perform any other movement with his Army; while he endeavors assiduously in the mean while to propagate the favorable disposition of Great Britain to grant every thing America can require. Their Transports have wooded and watered, and lay ready for any Service; so have the Ships of War under Admiral Pigot, but I believe they are designed for the West Indies, with part of the Troops at New York, more than for any other purpose.—

But this by the by—I do not mean to put this matter upon the footing of conscience. Conscience might have been kicked out of doors before you could have proceeded to the length of selling another man’s negroes for your own emolument, and this too after having applyed the greatest part, or the whole of the profits of his Estate to your benefit.—Conscience again seldom comes to a man’s aid while he is in the zenith of health, and revelling in pomp and luxury upon illgotten spoils. It is generally the last act of his life, and comes too late to be of much service to others here, or to himself hereafter. But, Sir, the footing I expect to see you put this matter upon is, to settle without delay, such acc’ts with the administrator of Mr. Custis’s Estate, whose duty it is to have it done, as you can support by authentic vouchers—That you will show by what authority you have sold any of his negroes, and to what purposes the money has been applied—and lastly, what crops you have made, what stocks you have raised, and how they have been disposed of. A settlement of this kind, altho’ it should appear by it that you have applied the greatest part, or even the whole of the money arising from the sales of them, to your own purposes, will be the next best thing to never having committed the wrong. How far Mr. Dandridge, as an Administrator, may chuse to push matters, I cannot undertake (never having heard from him on the subject) to say—but this you may rely on, that this affair shall be most critically investigated, and probed to the bottom; let the trouble and cost of doing it be what it may—as a man therefore who wishes for your own sake as well as that of an injured family, to see you act properly, I advise, and warn you of the consequences of a contrary conduct, being, Sir, yr. most h’ble Serv’t.

You will have heard before this Letter can reach you, of the loss of the L’Eagle—it will be unpleasant therefore to repeat it—every body laments the misfortune, and pities poor L’Touche.—Duke Lauzun has been very sick but is now recovering fast—tho’ very thin and pale.

TO THE MARQUIS DE VAUDREUIL.

Poor Laurens1 is no more.—He fell in a trifling skirmish in South Carolina, attempting to prevent the Enemy from plundering the country of rice. Genl. Lee is also dead, he breathed his last at Philadelphia about a fortnight ago. Your aid G. W— has had an intermittent fever ever since April, and by the last accounts of him from Mount Vernon, where he is, he was very low and weak. As I despair of seeing my home this Winter, I have just sent for Mrs. Washington, who will think herself honored by yours and Madm. La Fayette’s notice. Make a tender of my best respects to her, and offer a blessing in my name to your Son, and my God Son. Present me also to Count Charlux and others with whom I have the honor of an acquaintance. The Count de Noailles will have the trouble of reading a letter from me. Adieu, my dear Marqs. believe me, &c.

Head Quarters, 10 August, 1782.

Sir,

TO DOCTOR WILLIAM GORDON.1

I have the Honor to address you, at the particular Request, in Consequence of a Letter which I have just received from his Excelly. the Count de Rochambeau, inclosing to me the copy of a correspondence between him and you, relative to the Operations of the Fleet under your Command on the Coasts of N. America; wherein you mention to him a Wish, that while your Fleet should remain in the Neighborhood of Boston, you might be enabled to make a stroke at the Enemy’s post of Penobscot; and in the Discussion of which point, the Count de Rochambeau has referred you to my Opinion upon that Enterprise.

Verplanck’s Point, 23 October, 1782.

Dear Sir,

While I applaud, Sir, the generous Disposition declared in your Intentions for our Assistance, Candor requires me to be very explicit upon the subject—I am obliged therefore to say that it is my decided Opinion that, considering the Hazards that will attend the Enterprise, the Object is by no means equal to the Risque that will attend the attempt.

I have been honored with your favor of the 2d Inst., & thank you for the extract of Mr. Adams’s letter.

Among many Reasons which influence my Mind in forming this Opinion, the great and very principal One, appears from your own Letter to Count de Rochambeau, where you mention to him, that you expect immediately to be followed into these Seas, by a superior British fleet. Admitting this Event to take place, and that your fleet should have proceeded to Penobscot (which is near One hundred Leagues from Boston, the only secure Harbor which you will find upon all those Eastern shores, and lies almost at the Bottom of a deep Bay,) it appears to me that your Fleet will be placed in the greatest Hazard of being totally destroyed. For in that Situation they will be compleatly imbayed, and a brisk S. Westerly Wind, which will be most favorable for the British fleet from N. York—and which would bring them into the Bay in a short Time, would be directly opposed to your Escape. So that was you to receive the earliest Intelligence of the Enemy’s fleet leaving N. York, under such Circumstances, yet you could not avail yourself of the Information, and at the same time would be placed in a position where no Harbor or fortification could give you any protection or shelter.

I never was among the sanguine ones, consequently shall be less disappointed than People of that description, if our warfare should continue. From hence (it being the opinion of some Men that our expectations have an accordance with our wishes) it may be inferred that mine are for a prolongation of the War.—But maugre this doctrine, and the opinion of others that a continuation of the War till the Powers of Congress—or political systems—and general form of Government are better established—I can say with much truth, that there is not a man in America that more fervently wishes for Peace, and a return to private life than I do.—Nor will any man go back to the rural & domestick enjoyments of it with more Heartfelt pleasure than I shall.—It is painful to me therefore, to accompany this declaration with an opinion that while the present King can maintain the influence of his Crown, & extort Men & Money from his subjects, so long will the principles by which he is governed push him on in his present wild career.—The late change in his Ministry is an evidence of this—and other changes which I suspect will soon take place, will convince us, I fear of the fallacy of our hopes.

Was this Argument of Danger to his Most Christian Majesty’s Ships not sufficient to govern your mind, I could mention that the Time that must be employed on this attempt will probably be much greater than you seem to apprehend. A month is as short as I should estimate, taking together all the necessary preparations and little cross events that must probably interpose. For I have not an Idea of the object being to be attained by a Coup de main, as I am lately informed by good Intelligence that the Fort is the most regularly constructed and best finished of any in America, is well situated, and garrisoned by the 74th Regiment, consisting of 800 Men, which will require a Regular Seige, to be conducted by cautious Approaches, with a considerable Addition of Men to the Number of Troops which are on Board your Fleet; with their necessary Cannon and Mortars, Stores, &c., the whole of which in all probability, was the Seige to be undertaken, and your fleet obliged to make a sudden departure, must all be sacrificed; as their Retreat by Land, (as has been heretofore experienced) would be almost totally impossible and impracticable, to be effected thro’ a Country which is as yet a mere Wilderness of large Extent and difficult passage.

It appears to me impracticable for the best Historiographer living, to write a full & correct history of the present revolution, who has not free access to the Archives of Congress—those of Individual States—the Papers of the Commander in chief, & commanding officers of separate departments. Mine, while the war continues, I consider as a species of Public property, sacred in my hands; & of little service to any Historian who has not that general information that is only to be derived with exactitude from the sources I have mentioned. When Congress then shall open their registers, & say it is proper for the servants of the public to do so, it will give me much pleasure to afford all the aid to your labors & laudable undertaking which my Papers can give—till one of those periods arrive I do not think myself justified in suffering an inspection of and extracts to be taken from my Records. * * *

Even supposing the best, that the Attempt should succeed and the object be gained, I am much in doubt, whether, without a superior naval force to be maintained on these Coasts we should be able to retain the post, as it would ever be subject to a renewed Attempt from the Enemy in Case we should keep up a Garrison there: or in Case of Evacuation, they might at any Time repossess the post, and continue the same Annoyance, that they now give up.

TO CAPTAIN CHARLES ASGILL.1

Under these Considerations (without giving you any further Trouble) it is my Decided Opinion that the Object in contemplation is not of Importance, sufficient to justify the Hazzards and Risques which must probably be encountered in the Attempt to obtain it.

Head-Quarters, 13 November, 1782.

Sir,

While I offer you this Opinion, Sir, I beg you will esteem it as coming from a Heart not only candid in its Sentiments, but at the same Time penetrated with a Sense of the Highest Gratitude to you for the noble Offer of your Assistance, which, it is our misfortune, that under present Circumstances, we are not able to avail ourselves of.

It affords me singular pleasure, to have it in my power to transmit to you the enclosed copy of an act of Congress, of the 7th instant, by which you are released from the disagreeable circumstances in which you have so long been. Supposing you would wish to go into New York as soon as possible, I also enclose a passport for that purpose.

After giving you the foregoing Opinion upon present Appearances, I have only to add that in Case Circumstances should turn up so differently to our present Ideas, that you should, with the Advice of Genl. de Choisy think the attempt practicable, I can only refer you to the State of Massa. for such aid in Men, Cannon, Mortars, & Stores, as you shall judge necessary, it being the only practicable mode in which I can coöperate with your designs—and this Recommendation shall be most cheerfully given.

Your letter of the 18th of October came regularly to my hands. I beg you to believe, that my not answering it sooner, did not proceed from inattention to you, or a want of feeling for your situation. I daily expected a determination of your case, and I thought it better to await that, than to feed you with hopes, that might, in the end, prove fruitless. You will attribute my detention of the enclosed letters, which have been in my hands about a fortnight, to the same cause.

The Chevalier de la Luzerne has requested me to establish a regular Chain of Communication between my Head Quarters and Boston, for the purpose of giving you the earliest Intelligence of every minute Circumstance that may occur respecting the Arrival or Operations of the British fleet at N. York, and for the purpose of free Intercourse with you on any other Circumstance that may turn up. You may depend, Sir, that this Establishment shall be immediately formed, and that every Service I can possibly render you in this or in any other Way in my power shall be most cheerfully afforded.

I cannot take leave of you, Sir, without assuring you, that, in whatever light my agency in this unpleasing affair may be viewed, I was never influenced, through the whole of it, by sanguinary motives, but by what I conceived a sense of my duty, which loudly called upon me to take measures, however disagreeable, to prevent a repetition of those enormities, which have been the subject of discussion. And that this important end is likely to be answered, without the effusion of the blood of an innocent person, is not a greater relief to you, than it is to, Sir, your most obedient and humble servant.

With the purest sentiments of Respect and Esteem, I have, &c.1

TO LUND WASHINGTON.

TO THE CHEVALIER DE CHASTELLUX.

[EXTRACT.]

Newburgh, 21 November, 1782.

Dear Lund,

Head Quarters,Newburg,
10 August, 1782.

My last letter would have informed you that I was disappointed in my application at Philadelphia for money, and that I had given up all thoughts of purchasing Dows’ land. Since then, I have met with an offer of £2000 York currency, for which, if I take it, I shall have to pay at the rate of 7 pr. ct. per annum interest.

My time, during my winter’s residence in Philadelphia, was unusually (for me) divided between parties of pleasure and parties of business. The first,—nearly all of a sameness, at all times and places in this infant country—is easily conceived; at least is too unimportant for description. The second, was only diversified by perplexities, and could afford no entertainment. * * * My time, since I joined the army in this quarter, has been occupied principally in providing for disciplining and preparing the troops for the Field. Cramped as we have been, and now are for want of money, every thing moves slowly; but as this is no new case, I am not discouraged by it.

Under this disadvantage and the difficulty I may experience in procuring money for repayment of the loan, I would have you before any conclusion is come to with Dow and comy., wait upon Mrs. French and Mr. Dulany for the last time, and know decidedly of them, whether, if a bargain is struck with Dow, they will make an even exchange—tract for tract. You may inform them as an apology for this application, that my reasons for requiring a definitive answer to this question are, that no man is better acquainted with their land than I am, so consequently, no person can be more fully convinced that £2000 is the full value of it;—more indeed, than I ever expected it would cost me, in case I should become the purchaser. That as this sum is the price fixed upon Dow’s land, and two or three purchasers are ready to strike, and the sale of it is only suspended on my account, from a disposition in Mr. Adam to give me the preference, I cannot avoid deciding thereon immediately. That as Mrs. French is unwilling to part with her land without having the value of the two tracts ascertained; it is an evidence in my mind, that she has reason to believe hers will be highest valued, and lastly, if this should be the case, and I, in addition to the £2000 should have a further sum to pay, it would advance the price of her land in the neck so much beyond its real value, that I think it most prudent to forego the purchase of Dow’s land as the means of effecting the exchange for hers, rather than run the hazard of paying too severely for the gratification of a mere fancy (for it is no more) of putting the whole neck under one fence; as it is well known that I stand in no need of land, or meadow for all my purposes.

The enemy talk loudly, and very confidently of Peace—but whether they are in earnest, or whether it is to amuse and while away the time till they can prepare for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, time will evince. Certain it is, the refugees at New York are violently convulsed by a letter which, ere this, you will have seen published, from Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby to me, upon the subject of a general pacification and acknowledgement of the Independency of this Country.

In my letter of the 15th of March last to Mr. Dulany, I observed: “If there are lands for which Mrs. French and you are disposed to barter your tract on Dogue Run, and these lands can be had upon reasonable terms, it will in the end be the same thing to me, as a direct purchase.” Whether the price fixed upon Dow’s land is reasonable or not, I, never having seen or heard of it, shall not take upon me to determine: but as it is much higher than I conceived any tract of its size, adjoining the land on which Mrs. French lives, could possibly be rated, I have no doubt of its being optional in me to purchase it or not, as my abilities and inclination shall decide. If Dow’s land contains half the improved, and improvable meadow which he says it does, and the difference could be determined by northern men, or men experienced in the worth of grass land, I should be sure of having it valued to considerably more than Mrs. French’s; and this you will readily believe when I tell you that improved meadow in this part of the country, many miles from any large town, sells from thirty to sixty pounds an acre. But my countrymen are too much used to corn blades and corn shucks; and have too little knowledge of the profit of grass lands, to estimate Dow’s meadow (if it is really good) at one quarter of its value; and as the rest of the tract may be but ordinary, or at best middling forest land, I should not be candid, if I did not declare my apprehension that this tract would be undervalued, not designedly, but for want of a practical knowledge of the advantages which are to be derived from meadows. I therefore think it more consistent with common prudence, if there cannot be an even interchange, to relinquish all hope of getting Mrs. French’s land, than to run the hazard of paying infinitely more than the worth; especially, as I observed before, when I should only please my fancy, and that at the expence of my judgment, by getting in return lands which are very much worn, without meadow, or ground capable of making it; little timber or fire wood, and both very inconvenient; decayed fences, and some inclosures already dependent upon me for their security; and this too, when I am conscious that Dow’s meadow alone, if it is as large and as good as he represents it, would yield more nett profit annually, than the labor of a dozen negroes on Mrs. French’s farm would do, well-managed.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

I have been thus particular that you may know my ultimate determination, and the reasons upon which it is founded. You have nothing more to do therefore, than to ask Mrs. French and Mr. Dulany simply whether they will take Dow’s land for theirs, tract for tract. If they agree to it, then strike the bargain with Dow & Co., get writings suitable to the purpose of all parties executed, and draw upon me for the money. On the other hand, if they do not agree to it, acquaint Dow & Co. therewith, and thank them for the preference given me; and inform me as soon as possible of the final conclusion of the business, that the gentleman1 who has offered me the money, may not be held in suspence. If I could get the money upon better terms than is offered, or if I knew how, or when I could replace it, I should have no objection to speculate in Dow’s land, if it has the quantity of meadow described, for I am sure, so near Alexandria, as it lies, it will become immensely valuable. Remember me kindly to your wife & all friends. I am, &c.1

Newburg, 11 August, 1782.

Sir,

TO LUND WASHINGTON.

Having been informed that Major-General Gates is in Philadelphia, and being now about to make my ultimate arrangements for the campaign, I take the liberty to request, that you will be pleased to inform me by the earliest conveyance whether he wishes to be employed in this army or not. As it is now in my power to give General Gates a command suitable to his rank, and as I have not heard from him since I wrote to him on the 18th of March last, I trouble you with this request, that I may be still made acquainted with his determination before the disposition of commands is finally concluded. * * * I have the honor to be, &c.1

Newburg, 21 November, 1782.

Dear Lund,

TO THE COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

The letter which will be enclosed with this, will inform you that since my letter by the last post I have had the offer of £2000 York currency, and the terms of it. But before you strike any bargain with Dow and Co. for their land, I would have you view it critically, and form your own judgment of the quality of it. To do this with any degree of accuracy, you must estimate the quantity of improved and unimprovable meadow; the nature of it; the quantity of Hay the first will yield; and the expence which will attend the cutting and making of it; how much of the latter can be added, and the cost of doing it; these things, with a proper valuation of the other parts of the tract, will show you whether I shall be safe in giving the price asked. Or if Dow will pay such as he once said he wou’d give to whomsoever should be the purchaser, there need be no hesitation in that case neither; because the rent will amount to more than the interest of the money. If the price of this land will not stand the test of the first mode of valuation; and the second, as I suspect, was nothing more than a mere puff, and it shall appear that there is some collusion or finesse in Dow & Co. to extort a high price from me, I know of but one other method by which you can proceed with propriety and safety; and that is, to pursue the mode which I have pointed out in the letter herewith enclosed, and which I have made a separate one, that you may as from yourself, candidly let them see, consider, and determine on it.

Head Quarters,Newburg,
16 August, 1782.

Sir,

If all these expedients fail, (as of your own motion) you might suggest the following proposition, provided Dow & Co. will allow time for the operation of it, vizt: Let the four persons named by Mrs. French to ascertain the value of the two tracts agree upon the choice of a fifth (an odd number is essential, in case of a diversity of opinion, to give a deciding voice. It is also necessary for another reason which I shall not name, but which is too obvious not to strike you). Let these five ascertain, after a thorough review of both tracts, and due consideration given to the local situation of each, the advantages and disadvantages attending both, the quantity of the land, &c., &c., the value of each tract—as a tract. Let both parties be at liberty to agree or disagree to this valuation; but let Mrs. French and Mr. Dulany declare explicitly if they are satisfied with the valuation and difference which shall be adjudged by these five persons, that it shall be a bargain on their part, if I agree to it, and you to give me immediate notice of it, that I may also say yea, or nay.

I have been honored with your Excellency’s favor of the 13th by Mr. Lauberdiere who made so much despatch that he delivered it last night about 11 o’clock.

You will have it in your power to inform Mr. Dulany, and may do it very truly, that I look upon £2000 to be a great price for his land; that my wishes to obtain it do not proceed from its intrinsic value, but from the motives I have candidly assigned in my other letter. That to indulge this fancy, (for in truth there is more fancy than judgment in it) I have submitted, or am willing to submit, to the disadvantage of borrowing as large a sum as I think this Land is worth, in order to come at it; but that, rather than go beyond this, as he and Mrs. French for some reasons unknown to me certainly expect their land will be valued higher than Dow’s;—I choose to forego the purchase of the latter, and relinquish thereby all prospect of obtaining his land through that means.

Were we certain, that a pacification had advanced so far as your Excellency thinks it has, or could we be assured that the British ministry were really sincere in their offers, which have been communicated through their Commander-in-chief, Sir Guy Carleton, I should think your Excellency might, without any inconvenience or danger, await the orders of your court where you now are,1 and dismiss all your wagons. But when we consider, that negotiations are sometimes set on foot merely to gain time, that there are yet no offers on the part of the enemy for a general cessation of hostilities, and that, although their commanders in this country are in a manner tied down by the resolves of their House of Commons to a defensive war only, yet they may be at liberty to transport part of their force to the West Indies, I think it highly necessary, for the good of the common cause, and especially to prevent the measure, which I have last mentioned, to unite our force upon the North River; and in this opinion I am confirmed by the sentiments contained in a letter from the minister of France to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, which he has been good enough to leave open for my inspection.

As the gentleman of whom I am to borrow the money will be held in suspense until I get a definitive answer from you, you will readily see the propriety of bringing the matter to issue some way or another, as soon as possible, and giving me notice. I am, &c.1

“From the different accounts I can collect, it seems to be the design of England to make a general peace; but the demands on one side and the other will render a conclusion extremely difficult; and in that case that power will spare nothing to effectuate a peace with the United States, and turn all their efforts against us. As to a separate peace with the United States it will not take place. I am certain they will not make peace but in concert with us.” The minister also says to me; “You will judge better than us, if it is proper to march the French army or not. It is certain, that it will be necessary, if the English show any disposition to detach any considerable force to the West Indies.” What are the intentions of the enemy in this respect, it is impossible for me precisely to determine. Accounts out of New York, but not on very good authority, still continue to mention an embarkation to the West Indies. The garrison of Savannah has arrived at New York, and there are some grounds for believing that Charleston will be evacuated. Should that event take place, and the garrison come to New York also, they might without danger detach considerably, should our force continue divided.

TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Upon the whole, Sir, I hardly imagine you will think it prudent to dismiss your carriages under present appearances and circumstances; and, if you do not, the cattle will be as easily and cheaply subsisted upon a march as in a settled camp. Should an accommodation take place, and should the orders of your court call you from the continent, your embarkation might be as easily made upon the Delaware or the Hudson, as upon the Chesapeake. From the foregoing therefore, I am of opinion, that no good consequences can result from your remaining at Baltimore, but that many advantages may attend your marching forward, and forming a junction with this army. Actuated by no motives, but those which tend to the general good, I have taken the liberty of giving your Excellency my sentiments with that freedom, with which I am convinced you would ever wish me to deliver them. I beg leave to return your Excellency my thanks for the attention you have paid, not only to the exchange of Colonel Laumoy, but of several others of our officers.

Head-Quarters,Newburg,
21 November, 1782.

Sir,

I have the honor to be, &c.

After I had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 29th of July, I lost not a moment in transmitting it to Congress, who had then under deliberation the proceedings of the British court-martial upon Captain Lippincott for the murder of Captain Huddy, and the other documents relating to that inhuman transaction. What would otherwise have been the determination of that honorable body, I will not undertake to say; but I think I may venture to assure your Excellency, that your generous interposition had no small degree of weight in procuring that decision in favor of Captain Asgill, which he had no right to expect from the very unsatisfactory measures, which had been taken by the British commander-in-chief to atone for a crime of the blackest dye, not to be justified by the practices of war, and unknown at this day amongst civilized nations. I however flatter myself, that our enemies have been brought to view this transaction in its true light, and that we shall not experience a repetition of the like enormity.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

Captain Asgill has been released, and is at perfect liberty to return to the arms of an affectionate parent, whose pathetic address to your Excellency could not fail of interesting every feeling heart in her behalf. I have no right to assume any particular merit from the lenient manner in which this disagreeable affair has terminated. But I beg you to believe, Sir, that I most sincerely rejoice, not only because your humane intentions are gratified, but because the event accords with the wishes of his Most Christian Majesty, and his royal and amiable consort, who, by their benevolence and munificence, have endeared themselves to every true American. I have the honor to be, &c.1

Head-Quarters, 18 August, 1782.

My dear Sir,

TO MAJOR BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your private letter of the 12th instant. I cannot but think the conduct of [Congress], respecting the release of Lord Cornwallis very extraordinary. Is it reasonable that Mr. Laurens should be at full liberty, and acting as a commissioner in Europe, while Lord Cornwallis, for whose liberation he pledged his own honor, and consequently as a public man the honor of the States, is held bound by his parole? Either disavow the propriety of Mr. Laurens’s conduct, and let him be remanded by the British ministry, or set Lord Cornwallis at equal liberty. I am placed in a very delicate situation. Sir Guy Carleton has given me official information of the transaction, and has called for a confirmation of Mr. Laurens’s act. I have referred the matter to the proper place, and I can obtain no answer. In my letters to General Carleton I am obliged to be for the present silent, but I certainly must expect to hear from him again. Do, my good Sir, endeavor to obtain a decision upon this matter.1

Head Quarters, 10 December, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Your public letter of the 12th covers a resolve of the same date, authorizing me to propose a meeting of commissioners for establishing a cartel, &c. Here again I am somewhat embarrassed, never having yet received either the approbation or disapprobation of Congress upon the proceedings of the former commissioners, General Knox and Mr. Gouverneur Morris, although they were transmitted so long ago as the 30th of April last. It appears by the report of those gentlemen, that the negotiation was principally broken off on account of the disposition, which plainly appeared on the part of the British commissioners to procure the exchange of their soldiers in our hands without settlement of accounts, making any payment, or giving any security for the payment of the large sum which, we conceive, is due. Now Congress, in the resolve to which I have just referred, make no reference to any former transaction, but authorize me to settle a cartel, “taking care that the liquidation of accounts and settlement of the balance due for the maintenance of prisoners be provided for therein.” From this it may possibly be said, it may be inferred, that they do approve the former proceedings, and mean to make the settlement of accounts a preliminary; but this is an inference only, and may be a false one; and therefore I wish you would be good enough to endeavor to find out the true meaning of the House, and to procure a determination upon the former proceedings.

I received your favor of the 8th last Evening by Express tho you have not met with that success you deserved and probably would have obtained had the Enterprise proceeded, yet I cannot but think your whole conduct in the affair was such as ought to entitle you still more to my confidence and esteem—for however it may be the practice of the World, and those who see objects but partially, or thro’ a false medium to consider that only as meritorious which is attended with success, I have accustomed myself to judge of human Actions very differently and to appreciate them by the manner in which they are conducted, more than by the Event; which it is not in the power of human foresight and prudence to command—In this point of view I see nothing irreparable & little occasion of serious regret, except the wound of the gallant Captain Brewster, from which I sincerely hope he may recover—Another time you will have less opposition from the Winds and Weather, and success will amply compensate you for this little disappointment.

1 The same commissioners will probably be appointed upon our part, and, could they be assured their former principles were thought good, they would proceed with more confidence upon a future occasion. I confess to you, I have found so many difficulties thrown in the way of all former transactions of this nature, that I could ever wish Congress to be as full and explicit as possible, as to the points which they would have either conceded or demanded. I would prefer that mode on many accounts, as you may easily conceive, to unlimited powers. But what I principally now want to be assured of is, whether they do or do not approve the conduct of the former commissioners, and the principles which they seemed desirous of establishing. With much truth and affection, I am, &c.1

I have almost determined to post you with the Infantry of the Legion contiguous to the Sound, in which case I shall expect you to persevere in your endeavors to keep me perfectly advised of the State of the Enemy,—and perhaps some favorable moment may yet occur.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

I am, Dear Sir, &c.

Head-Quarters,Newburg,
19 August, 1782.

Sir,

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Congress have been already furnished with copies of all letters, which had passed between the commanders-in-chief of the British forces in New York and myself, respecting the murder of Captain Huddy previous to the last of July. I have now the honor to enclose Sir Guy Carleton’s letter of the 1st instant, (in reply to mine of the 25th [30th?] ultimo,)2 and that of the 13th, which accompanied the proceedings of the general court-martial for the trial of Captain Lippincott. The proceedings, together with such other documents as relate to that unfortunate transaction, I also transmit by this opportunity.

Newburg, 14 December, 1782.

As Sir Guy Carleton, notwithstanding the acquittal of Lippincott, reprobates the measure in unequivocal terms, and has given assurances of prosecuting a further inquiry, it has changed the ground I was proceeding upon, and placed the matter upon an extremely delicate footing.

I cannot, my dear Genl., permit you to depart from this Country, without repeating to you the high sense I entertain of the Services you have rendered to America, by the constant attention, which you have paid to the Interest of it, by the exact order and discipline of the corps under your command, and by your readiness, at all times, to give facility to every measure which the force of the combined armies was competent to.

It would be assuming in me to ascribe causes to actions different from those, which are ostensibly and plausibly assigned; but, admitting that General Carleton has no other object but to procrastinate, he has, by disavowing the act, by declaring that it is held in abhorrence, by not even sanctioning the motives, which appear to have influenced Lippincott to become the executioner of Huddy, and by giving the strongest assurances that further inquisition shall be made, so far manifested the appearance of an earnest desire to bring the guilty to punishment, that I fear an act of retaliation upon an innocent person before the result of his inquisition is known, would be considered by the impartial and unprejudiced world in an unfavorable and perhaps unjustifiable point of view; more especially as the great end proposed by retaliation, which is to prevent a repetition of injuries, has been in a manner answered. For, you will please to observe, by the extract of General Clinton’s letter of the 26th of April to Governor Franklin,1 that he had expressly forbidden the Board of Directors to remove or exchange in future any prisoners of war in the custody of their commissary without having first obtained his approbation and orders.

To this testimony of your public character, I should be wanting to the feelings of my heart, was I not to add expressions of the happiness I have enjoyed in your private friendship, the remembrance of which will be one of the most pleasing circumstances of my life. My best wishes will accompany you to France, where I sincerely hope, and have no doubt, of your meeting with the smiles and rewards of a generous prince, and the warmest embraces of affectionate friends. Adieu. I have the honor to be, with great personal attachment, respect, and regard, your obedient and most humble servant.1

The same reasons, which induced me to lay the first steps I took in this affair before Congress, urge me to submit it to them at its present stage. It is a great national concern, upon which an individual ought not to decide. I shall be glad to be favored with the determination of Congress as early as possible, as I shall suspend giving any answer to Sir Guy Carleton, until I am informed how far they are satisfied with his conduct hitherto.

TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

I cannot close this letter without making a remark upon that part of Sir Guy’s, in which he charges me with want of humanity in selecting a victim from among the British officers so early as I did. He ought to consider, that, by the usage of war and upon the principles of retaliation, I should have been justified in executing an officer of equal rank with Captain Huddy immediately upon receiving proofs of his murder, and then informing Sir Henry Clinton that I had done so. Besides, it was impossible for me to have foreseen, that it would be so very long before the matter would be brought to some kind of issue. I have the honor to be, &c.1

Newburg, 14 December, 1782.

Dear Sir,

TO MAJOR-GENERAL KNOX.

INSTRUCTIONS.

In the course of a few days, Congress will, I expect, receive an address from the army on the subject of their grievances. This address, though couched in very respectful terms, is one of those things, which, though unpleasing, is just now unavoidable. For I was very apprehensive once, that matters would take a more unfavorable turn, from the variety of discontents which prevail.

Sir,

The temper of the army is much soured, and has become more irritable than at any period since the commencement of the war. This consideration alone prevented me (for every thing else seemed to be in a state of inactivity and almost tranquillity) from requesting leave to spend this winter in Virginia, that I might give some attention to my long-neglected private concerns. The dissatisfactions of the army had arisen to a great and alarming height, and combinations among the officers to resign at given periods in a body were beginning to take place, when, by some address and management, their resolutions have been converted into the form in which they will now appear before Congress. What that honorable body can or will do in the matter, does not belong to me to determine; but policy, in my opinion, should dictate soothing measures; as it is an uncontrovertible fact, that no part of the community has undergone equal hardships, and borne them with the same patience and fortitude, as the army has done.

You are hereby appointed to the command of West Point and its dependencies. But, as the army will lie for some time upon Verplanck’s Point, you will consider yourself as relieved till further orders from the care of attending to that post, Stony Point, and Dobbs’s Ferry, which are part of the dependencies, except so far as relates to their being constantly supplied with the proper quantity of ordnance. I have so thorough a confidence in you, and so well am I acquainted with your ability and activity, that I think it needless to point out to you the great outlines of your duty. I recommend the following matters to your attention.

Hitherto the officers have stood between the lower order of the soldiery and the public; and in more instances than one, at the hazard of their lives, have quelled very dangerous mutinies. But if their discontents should be suffered to rise equally high, I know not what the consequences may be. The spirit of enthusiasm, which overcame every thing at first, is now done away. It is idle, therefore, to expect more from military men, than from those discharging the civil departments of government. If both were to fare alike with respect to the emoluments of office, I would answer for it, that the military character should not be the first to complain. But it is an invidious distinction, and one that will not stand the test of reason or policy, that one set should receive all, and the other no part (or that which is next to it), of their pay. In a word, the experiment is dangerous; and, if it succeeded, would only prove, that the one class are actuated by more zeal than the other, not that they have less occasion for their money. I am, with sincere esteem, &c.1

To visit the redoubts frequently; to see that they are kept in proper order; that the garrisons allotted to them are alert, and that they make it an invariable rule to sleep within the works. They should each be furnished constantly with ten days’ wood and water; and, if the contractors keep up such a magazine of salt provision upon the Point, as they ought to do by contract, the detached works should be provided with ten days’ provision also. The rolls to be frequently called. No officer to be absent without your leave, and no non-commissioned officer or soldier without the leave of a field-officer.

TO BARTHOLOMEW DANDRIDGE.

The quarter-master having reported a scarcity of tents, you will be pleased to remove the tenth Massachussets regiment into the barracks, that their tents may be delivered up. No buildings, either public or private, are to be erected without your knowledge; and, when applications are made to you for that purpose, you will, if they are admitted, direct the commanding engineer to point out the situations, that they may not interfere with the defences of the place. The public buildings now carrying on, and the alterations and repairs of the works, will engage your particular attention. You know the necessity of bringing them to a certain state before the frost sets in. Given at Head-Quarters, at Newburg, the 29th of August, 1782.1

Newburg, 18 December, 1782.

Dear Sir,

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

Your favor of the 5th of last month came safe to my hands—at this place; in the vicinity of which the Army is cantoned.

Head-Quarters,Verplanck’s Point,
1 September, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I am fully persuaded from all accounts, that in Posey you have to deal with a most consumate villain; and from your own, that you have pursued the most prudent method of managing him, and for obtaining that justice which is due to Mr. Custis’s Estate. I am clear in Sentiment with you, that he should be removed from his present Stewardship as soon as it can be done with any degree of propriety; for, be assured, Sir, that a man so devoid of principle as he is, to be guilty, not only of the barefaced frauds with which he is accused, but the abominable Sin of ingratitude, will neglect no opportunity of converting to his own use, when he can do it with impunity, every species of property that is committed to his care, and will do it the more readily after his reputation will have suffered, than before—The most hardened villain, altho’ he Sins without remorse, wishes to cloak his iniquity—if possible under specious and [mutilated] but when character is no more, he bids defiance to the opinions of Mankind, and is under no other restraint than that of the Law, and the punishments it inflicts. Posey, I am persuaded, will be no exception to this rule—and that the sooner the Estate can be taken out of his hands the less it will suffer—as it cannot be in worse.—

* * * * * *

With respect to the valuation of the Stock, if upon an investigation of the matter, and comparing it with the Scale of depreciation as settled by Congress, it shall be found, when reduced to specie value, that the sum amounts to more than the number and kind of cattle had of me are worth, let a just value be placed on them, and it will meet my entire approbation. Mr. Custis, as I wrote him, was alarmed at the nominal, without attending to the real price of the stock—for if 20 paper Dollars in those days, was valued at, and would purchase no more than one Silver D[ollar] valuing any article at £6 Currency, was neither more nor less than fixing it at a Dollar specie—If therefore the valuation of Colo. Bassett when estimated by this rule, and fixed upon this principle, is not too high, there certainly can be no cause of complaint; and upon this footing I am willing to place the matter—A Dollar in specie may be a hundred pounds according to the scale of depreciation, but if no man will give more than Six shillings for it, that sum is most certainly the intrinsic worth of it. It never was, nor is it now my intention to put the Estate of Mr. Custis to the least inconvenience to pay the Debt it owes me. On the contrary, if I ever get it at all, to receive it at such a time and in such a manner as to occasion the least possible distress is all I aim at. Therefore, as it seemed to be your opinion and it was clearly mine, that the stud, and other Horses belonging to that Estate (which were not wanted for immediate use) had better be sold—and as I really wanted one, and could have made it very convenient to have taken both of his covering Horses, I directed Mr. Lund Washington to get them in discount of my Debt; but if I can obtain nothing without advancing the money, as an indifferent purchaser, I shall certainly decline this mode of gratifying my wants, as I have no more idea of advancing money (in truth I have it not to advance) to an estate that owes it to me, than I have of demanding it from one that cannot, with convenience pay it. If therefore you cannot let me have one of the stud horses upon the above terms, I must not only do without him, but any other as I have not the means of purchasing.

The late New York papers announce the evacuation of Charleston, as a matter which would certainly take place soon after the 7th of August. I have, upon this information, written to Major-General Smallwood and Colonel Butler to send forward to this army the recruits of Maryland and Pennsylvania, which are at Annapolis and Carlisle. I enclose the letters under flying seals to you, that you may take the sense of Congress upon the matter, before the orders are carried into execution.

The French Army have Embarked at Boston for the West Indies; but had not Sailed when I heard last from that Quarter—Lord Howe has relieved Gibraltar—The French have taken and destroyed the British Interest in Hudson’s Bay, to the Amount it is said of 10,000,000 of Livres. The British Fleet have left New York in two divisions, and a detachment of Troops it is reported are going from that place to the West Indies; but when they will embark is uncertain. A number of Transports are collected there but I believe they are only waiting for decisive orders from their Court; which in my judgment would not Issue till after the meeting of Parliament, when the Parties for and against the American War will try their strength. We shall then know whether we are [mutilated] under our Vine and fig Trees in Peace, or prosecute the War.

Congress having determined what troops should compose the southern army, I do not think myself absolutely at liberty to withdraw those, which are already there, or to stop the reinforcements intended for them, without first consulting Congress, and which I mean to do through you. So long ago as the 18th of March last, I calculated from appearances upon the evacuation of the southern States; and I then wrote to General Greene to hold himself in readiness to march to the northward the moment such an event should seem certain. In my idea, the infantry apportioned to the two Carolinas and Georgia will be sufficient to be left in the southern quarter. The South Carolina regiment of artillery having been reformed, it may be thought necessary to leave the small remains of Harrison’s and late Proctor’s there. It will be necessary, also, to consider what corps of horse shall remain. If Armand’s legion have not yet moved from Charlottesville, they certainly ought not to proceed. After having consulted Congress, and made the proper arrangements, you will be good enough to inform Major-General Greene of the result, that he may govern himself accordingly. The difficulty and enormous expense of supporting troops to the southward are sufficient inducements to draw off as many from thence as we possibly can.

It gives me much pleasure to hear that your good Mother, yourself, Mrs Dandridge, and Family, are well. My affectionate regards are presented to them all, in which your Sister, who arrived here the 30th of last month, joins. I am, &c.

The whole army, the garrison at West Point excepted, which is left under the command of Major-General Knox, moved down to this ground yesterday. I have sent Major-General Lord Stirling to Albany, to take the command of the two Continental regiments and the State troops upon the northern frontiers. The New York and Jersey lines have joined me here. I have received yours of the 20th ultimo, enclosing a list of the passengers wanting to go to South Carolina. I shall make the necessary application to Sir Guy Carleton. I have the honor to be, &c.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

TO SIR GUY CARLETON.

Head Quarters,Newburg,
18 December, 1782.

My Dear Sir,

Head-Quarters, 8 September, 1782.

Sir,

By the Southern Mail of last Week I received your Letter of the 4th of Octr. enclosing the Returns of your Army: and I am just now favored with that of the 11th of Octr. covering the Returns for the month of Octr.: as I find by the latter, you had recd. mine of the 23d of Septr., I can have no occasion to suggest anything farther at this time respecting the disposition of the Troops after the Enemy shall have abandoned the Southern States—the latitude already given, will in a sufficient manner I believe, enable you to act for the public good, as the state of affairs may then seem to demand.

I have the honor to reply to your Excellency’s letter of the 23d of August, and to inform you, that Major-Generals Heath and Knox are nominated by me to meet Lieutenant-General Campbell and Mr. Elliot, as commissioners for the purpose of settling a general cartel for an exchange of prisoners. I propose, Sir, that the meeting be held at Tappan, as an intermediate and convenient place, and that it commence on the 18th day of this month, at which time my commissioners will attend, and will be accompanied by the commissary of prisoners.1 Your Excellency’s favor of the 29th, enclosing a copy of Governor Livingston’s letter to you of the 10th, came in due time to my hands. I am at a loss to discover for what purpose it was communicated to me; especially as I have more than once observed to you, that in matters of civil resort I have ever avoided any the least interference, and have transmitted to you the approbation of the sovereign power of these United States for my so doing. And of this nature appears to be the case of Ezekiel Tilton, who is the subject of your correspondence with the Governor.

There has been during the Summer much speculalation & many conjectures that New York would be evacuated before Winter, as I informed you in my last letter which was dated the 18th of Octr. but at the same time I mentioned “I had no such idea;” and the event has justified my opinion.—I am not without expectations, however, that a detachment will be made in the course of the Winter to the West Indies: indeed many appearances strongly indicate this, or at least, that some orders of embarkation are expected, such as the great preparation of Transports there being now about 120, collected from various quarters, lying in the east River compleatly fitted for sea—and Reports still continue to assert that several thousand British Troops will yet be detached.

I cannot help remarking, that your Excellency has several times lately taken occasion to mention, that “all hostilities stand suspended on your part.” I must confess, that, to me, this expression wants explanation. I can have no conception of a suspension of hostilities, but that which arises from a mutual agreement of the powers at war, and which extends to naval as well as land operations. That your Excellency has thought proper, on your part, to make a partial suspension, may be admitted; but, whether this has been owing to political or other motives, is not for me to decide. It is, however, a well known fact, that at the same time the British cruisers on our coasts have been more than usually alert; and, while Americans are admitted to understand their real interests, it will be difficult for them, when a suspension of hostilities is spoken of, to separate the idea of its extending to the sea as well as land.

The sailing of the Fleet from New York in two divisions, I suppose must have been well known in Carolina; as in all probability the last squadron served to convoy a part of the Garrison of Charles Town to the W. Indies agreeably to your expectation—But I imagine you could not have learned, (it having been a secret to this time which it was not prudent to commit to paper) that the Orders of the Court of Versailles to the Count de Rochambeau, (who is himself about to sail for France) were that the Corps under his orders should go to the West Indies, in case the evacuation of New York or Charles Town should take place—In expectation that the latter would happen, the French Army marched into the eastern States, towards the last of Octr., under pretext of taking Winter Quarters there, but in fact, with the design of embarking on board the Fleet of M. the Marquis de Vaudrieul at Boston; whenever the event on which their ultimate movement depended, became sufficiently ascertained. From the general concurrence of intelligence & a variety of circumstances the Enemy’s intention to leave Charles Town has approached so near to a certainty, that all the Army of His Most Christn. Majesty (excepting the Legion of Lauzun which remains behind) have embarked, and are to sail in two days from this time—As soon as this Fleet is clear of the Coast, & the destination of the Troops shall be positively known at N. York, (as I observed before) it appears not improbable a considerable Corps of British will be sent to Jamaica; for the safety of which Island the apprehensions of the Enemy appear to be very much alarmed, on account of the large force at the Havanna & the arrival of the Marquis de Bouilli with a reinforcemt. from France—How far the Combined Powers will in reality prosecute a serious operation in that quarter, since the failure of the attempt against Gibraltar; (of the relief of which by the Fleet under Lord Howe you will I dare say have heard before this reaches you) or how far the last mentioned circumstance will tend to hasten or retard a general Pacification, I cannot undertake to determine with certainty. Many Politicians imagine that the fewer capital advantages either of the Belligerent Powers in Europe has over the other, the smaller will be the obstacles that will present themselves in the course of the negociation for Peace—but almost everything respecting this business in my opinion, will rather depend on the strength or weakness of Shelburne’s & Fox’s Parties in the British Parliament.

I cannot ascribe the inroads of the savages upon our northwestern frontier to the causes, from whence your Excellency supposes them to originate; neither can I allow, that they are committed without directions from the commander-in-chief in Canada. For by prisoners and deserters it is apparent, that those ravaging parties are composed of white troops, under the command of officers regularly commissioned, as well as savages; and it would be a solecism to suppose, that such parties could be out, without the knowledge of their commander-in-chief. I have the honor to be, &c.1

To wait Events, & profit by the occasions which may occur, I have concentred the Army to a point as much as possible.—At West Point and the Cantonment 4 miles from this place is our whole force, except the Rhode Island Regt. at the Northws. & one or two Corps on the Lines—this Army indeed is not numerous, but the efficient strength is greater in proportion to the total numbers, than ever it has been; the Troops are tolerably well appointed, and have improved very much in their discipline during the last Campaign. The Enemy’s regular Force in New York I compute to be between ten & eleven thousand.—Should they weaken themselves by a detachment of 4 or 5000 men & still attempt to hold that Garrison another Campaign, it would be an indelible blot to the reputation of this Country, not to furnish sufficient means for enabling us to expel them from the Continent.—And yet I am free to confess, I have accustomed myself not to be over sanguine in any of my calculations, especially when I consider the want of energy in government, & the want of that disposition in too many of the People, which once influenced them chearfully to yield a part to defend the remainder of their property.

TO JAMES McHENRY.

Thus, my dear Sir, have I given for your own private satisfaction, a pretty general detail of the affairs of our Allies, ourselves, & our Enemies in this part of the Continent.—Hoping & expecting the Southern States will be restored to perfect tranquility before this is delivered to you, I have only to add that Mrs. Washington joins me in requesting Mrs. Greene & yourself to accept our best wishes & Compliments—it will ever give me pleasure to hear from you on matters of business or friendship, being with sentiments of perfect esteem & regard &c.

Verplanck’s Point, 12 September, 1782.

My dear Sir,

I am &c.

* * * Our prospects of peace are vanishing. The death of the Marquis of Rockingham has given a shock to the new administration, and disordered its whole system. Fox, Burke, Lord John Cavendish, Lord Keppel, and I believe others, have left it. Earl Shelburne takes the lead, as first lord of the treasury, to which office he was appointed by the King, on the instant the vacancy happened by the death of Lord Rockingham. This nobleman, Lord Shelburne, I mean, declares, that the sun of Great Britain will set the moment American independency is acknowledged, and that no man has ever heard him give an assent to the measure. On the other hand, the Duke of Richmond asserts, that the ministry, of which Lord Shelburne is one, came into office pledged to each other and upon the express condition, that America should be declared independent; that he will watch him, and, the moment he finds him departing therefrom, he will quit administration, and give it every opposition in his power.

1783.

That the King will push the war, as long as the nation will find men or money, admits not of a doubt in my mind. The whole tenor of his conduct, as well as his last proroguing speech, on the 11th of July, plainly indicate it, and shows in a clear point of view the impolicy of relaxation on our part. If we are wise, let us prepare for the worst. There is nothing, which will so soon produce a speedy and honorable peace, as a state of preparation for war; and we must either do this, or lay our account for a patched up inglorious peace, after all the toil, blood, and treasure we have spent. This has been my uniform opinion; a doctrine I have endeavored, amidst the torrent of expectation of an approaching peace, to inculcate, and the event, I am sure, will justify me in it. With much truth, I am, &c.1

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

TO JOSEPH REED.

Newburg, 8 January, 1783.

Dear Sir,

Verplanck’s Point, 15 September, 1782.

Dear Sir,

The last Post brought me your favor of the 26th ulto., covering Doctor Smith’s Draft of the 23d for Fifty Guineas. I am obliged to you for paying the money, and charging it to the account mentioned; altho’ I was provided for the demand and should have paid the Bill at Sight.

The appeal contained in your letter of the 11th instant is equally unexpected and surprising.2

I have lately purchased a piece of Land near Alexandria at the price of £2000 Virginia Curry. with a view to exchange it for a small Tract in the centre of the one in which my Seat is—a tract I have been twenty years endeavoring to obtain with little or no prospect of success before. To enable me to pay for it, I have borrowed the money in this State (of the Governor), and expected to have answered the Bills at this place; till by yesterday’s Post I was informed by my Agent Mr. Lund Washington, that the money was to be paid in Philadelphia; and that Mr. Robert Adam & Co. of Alexandria (who have the Bills upon me,) were to set out in a few days to receive the money. Under these circumstances, permit me to ask, if you can make it convenient, in the course of business, to pay the sum of Eighteen hundred and Eighty pounds Virga. Curry. in Specie dollars at Six Shillings, in Philadelphia and receive the like sum in specie (which I have by me) here? If you can, the Inclosed Letter to Mr. Robt. Adam may be delivered. If you cannot, be so good as to return or destroy it. I beg leave to suggest that the specie I have is unclipped, consequently if I could pay it here by weight I should be no looser; but, rather than disappoint those who expect to receive the money in Philadelphia I would pay it to your order if you answer the Bills upon me at that place—by tale & abide the loss.

Not knowing the particular charges which are alledged against you, it is impossible for me to make a specific reply. I can therefore only say in general terms that the employments you sustained in the year 1776, and in that period of the year, when we experienced our greatest distresses, are a proof that you was not suspected by me of infidelity, or want of integrity; for had the least suspicion of the kind reached my mind, either from observation or report, I should most assuredly have marked you out as a fit object of resentment.

The distresses to which I know you have been driven from the numerous calls upon you, for money without adequate funds to answer them, have ever been a restraint upon my applications for the most necessary purposes. Perhaps I may have carried it to a criminal length with respect to secret Services; because, rather than add to your embarrassments by my demands, I have submitted to grope in the dark without those certain and precise informations which every man at the head of an army ought, and the public Interest requires he should have, and this maugre the aid of my private purse and other funds which were not applicable to this essentially necessary purpose. Having given you this information I shall only add that, if it is in your power to afford me assistance it will come very opportunely. If it is not,—I am where I am.

While on our retreat through Jersey, I remember your being sent from Newark, to the Assembly of New Jersey, then sitting, to rouse and animate them to spirited measures for our support; and at the same time gen. Mifflin was sent to Pennsylvania for the same purpose. This employ was certainly a mark of my confidence in you at that time.

I shall be obliged to you (the Secretary at War having passed this place before the plan which you and he had determined upon for the Issues for the present year arrived) to inform me why and upon what principle the regulation respecting the Sixteenth Ration for the women of the Army was made?

Your conduct, so far as it came to my immediate notice, during the short period we lay on the west bank of the Delaware, appeared sollicitous for the public good; and your conduct at Princeton evidenced a spirit and zeal which to me appeared laudable and becoming a man well effected to the cause we were engaged in.

I have no doubt of a perfect agreement between the Army and the present Contractors; nor of the advantages which will flow from the consequent harmony. Sure I am, the Army will ask no more of the Contractors than their indubitable rights; and I am persuaded there is too much liberality and good sense in the latter to descend to the low dirty tricks which were practiced in the time of Comfort Sands, whose want of liberality—I will go further, and say lack of common honesty—defeated his favorite scheme of making money, which appears to be the only object he had in view.

It is rather a disagreeable circumstance to have private and confidential letters, hastily written as all mine of that class are, upon a supposition that they would remain between the parties only, produced as evidence in a matter of public discussion; but conscious that my public and private sentiments are at all times alike; I shall not withhold these letters should you think them absolutely necessary to your justification.

It is unnecessary for me I hope to add, in answer to your favor of the 19th ulto., that every support in my power towards carrying your schemes of economy into effect shall be rendered most chearfully—as will any assistance I can give towards promoting your plan of revenue. Altho’ I am sorry to observe there does not appear to be the best disposition in some States to second your views.

If I have in my possession any such letter as you particularly allude to, it is not at present with me—being in the field perfectly light, I have divested myself of all papers, public and private; but such of late date as I thought I might have occasion, in my present situation to refer to. The others remain at a considerable distance from me. I am, &c.

Mrs. Washington joins me in respectful & affectionate compliments to Mrs. Morris and yourself, and best wishes for the return of many happy New Years. The advanced Season and prospect of bad weather induced her to take the most direct Road to this place; otherwise she would have had the pleasure of seeing Mrs. Morris in Philadelphia.

TO THOMAS PAINE.

With great truth, &c.

Head-Quarters, 18 September, 1782.

Sir,

TO TENCH TILGHMAN.

I have the pleasure to acknowledge your favor of the 7th, informing of your proposal to present me with fifty copies of your last publication1 for the amusement of the army. For this intention you have my sincere thanks, not only on my own account, but for the pleasure, I doubt not the gentlemen of the army will receive from the perusal of your pamphlets.

Newburg, 10 January, 1783.

My dear Sir,

Your observations on the period of seven years, as it applies itself to and affects British minds, are ingenious, and I wish it may not fail of its effects in the present instance.1 The measures and the policy of the enemy are at present in great perplexity and embarrassment. But I have my fears, whether their necessities, (which are the only operating motive with them,) are yet arrived to that point, which must drive them unavoidably into what they will esteem disagreeable and dishonorable terms of peace; such, for instance, as an absolute, unequivocal admission of American independence, on the terms upon which she can accept it. For this reason, added to the obstinacy of the King, and the probable consonant principles of some of the principal ministers, I have not so full confidence in the success of the present negotiation for peace as some gentlemen entertain. Should events prove my jealousies to be ill founded, I shall make myself happy under the mistake, consoling myself with the idea of having erred on the safest side, and enjoying with as much satisfaction as any of my countrymen the pleasing issue of our severe contest. The case of Captain Asgill has indeed been spun out to a great length. But with you I hope that its determination will not be unfavorable to this Country. I am, Sir, &c.

I have been favored with your letters of the 22d & 24th of last month from Philadelphia; and thank you for the trouble you have had with my small commissions.—I have sent Mr. Rittenhouse the glass of such spectacles as suit my eyes, that he may know how to grind his Christals.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Neither Duportail nor Gouvion are arrived at this place.—To the latter, I am refered by the Marqs. la Fayette for some matters which he did not chuse to commit to writing.1 —The sentim’nt however which he has delivered (with respect to the negociations for Peace) accord precisely with the ideas I have entertained of this business ever since the secession of Mr. Fox, viz—that no peace would be concluded before the meeting of the British parliament.—And that, if it did not take place within a month afterwards, we might lay our acc’t for one more Campaign—at least.

Verplanck’s Point, 19 September, 1782.

Dear Sir,

The obstinacy of the King, and his unwillingness to acknowledge the Independence of the Country, I have ever considered as the greatest obstacles in the way of a Peace. Lord Shelburne, who is not only at the head of the Administration, but has been introducing others of similar sentiments to his own, has declared, that nothing but dire necessity should ever force the measure. Of this necessity, men will entertain different opinions. Mr. Fox, it seems, thought the period had arrived some time ago; and yet the Peace is not made—nor will it, I conceive, if the influence of the Crown can draw forth fresh supplies from the Nation, for the purpose of carrying on the War. By the meeting of Parliament, Lord Shelburne would have been able to ascertain two things—first, the best terms on which G. Britain could obtain Peace.—Secondly, the ground on which he himself stood.—If he found it slippery, and that the voice of the people was for pacific measures; he would then, have informed the Parliament that, after many months spent in negociation,—such were the best terms he could obtain;—and that the alternative of accepting them,—or preparing vigorously for the prosecution of the War, was submitted to their consideration (being an extraordinary case) and decision. A little time therefore, if I have formed a just opinion of the matter, will disclose the result of it. Consequently, we shall either soon have Peace, or not the most agreeable prospect of War, before us—as it appears evident to me, that the States generally, are sunk into the most profound lethargy, while some of them are running quite retrograde.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your favor of the 11th. The political intelligence which we have lately had from Europe is so contradictory, that little dependence can be put upon it, more especially as we have it principally through the channel of an enemy’s paper, which I take it for granted, shews as fair a side as possible in their own favor.

The King of G. B. by his letters Patent, (which I have seen) has authorized Mr. Oswald to treat with any Commissioner or Com’rs from the United States of America, who shall appear with proper powers. This, certainly, is a capital point gained. It is at least breaking ground on their part, and I dare say proved a bitter pill to Royalty; that, it was indispensably necessary to answer one of the points above mentioned, as the American Commissioners would enter in no business with Mr. Oswald till his Powers were made to suit their purposes. Upon the whole, I am fixed in an opinion that Peace, or a pretty long continuance of the War, will have been determined before the adjournment for the Hollidays; and as it will be the middle or last of February before we shall know the result, time will pass heavily on in this dreary mansion—where we are, at present fast locked in frost and snow.—1

Why we have nothing from our ministers is, as you observe, truly unaccountable. In the Parliamentary debates consequent of the death of the Marquis of Rockingham and the resignation of Fox, Burke, &c., one side assert, and the other side deny matters so confidently, that there is no possibility of forming an accurate judgment. I cannot but look upon Lord Rockingham’s death, however, as the most unfortunate event, and that, at best, the negociation if not broken off, will be spun out to a considerable length. This, however, will be soon known, for if the ministry are seriously disposed to Peace, upon such terms as we can accept, their acts must soon evince it. In the meantime it will be our policy to proceed as if no negociations were on foot.

Nothing new has happened in this quarter since you left it, except the abuse of me in a New York Paper for having given false information to the Count de Vergennes, which (says the writer) was the occasion of the insinuation in his Letter to me of a want of British Justice. I have not seen the Paper but am told the author of the piece is quite in a passion at my want of ingenuity, and ascribes the release of Captn. Asgill to a peremptory order from the Court of France (in whose service he places me,) notwithstanding the soft and complaisant language of the French Minister’s Letter.

I am extremely glad to hear from good authority that the Dutch Fleet had put to sea. The arrival of public cloathing from Holland is an interesting event—as the army is more in want of Linen just now than of any other article—except money. * * *

Mrs. Washington has received the Shoes you ordered for her, and thanks you for your attention to her request—I receive with great sensibility and pleasure your assurances of affection and regard. It would be but a renewal of what I have often repeated to you, that there are few men in the world to whom I am more attached by inclination than I am to you. With the Cause, I hope—most devoutly hope—there will soon be an end to my Military Services, when, as our places of residence will not be far apart, I shall never be more happy than in your Company at Mt. Vernon. I shall always be glad to hear from, and keep up a corrispondence with you.—

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

Mrs. Washington joins me in every wish that can tend to your happiness—Humphreys and Walker, who are the only Gentlemen of the Family that are with me at present—will speak for themselves.—If this finds you at Baltimore, I pray my respects to Mr. Carroll and Family.—With the greatest esteem and regard, I am, &c.

Head Quarters, 22 September, 1782.

Dear Sir,

TO BUSHROD WASHINGTON.1

I am really more alarmed at the Contents of your letters of the 29th and 30th of Augt. and 9th of this month, than at any occurrence which hath lately happened—and I am embarrassed with respect to one paragraph in that of the 30th of Augt., vizt., “The other which is the principal one, that you may found a warm application on it to the States. You will I hope keep this intirely to yourself. You will see that I have not intrusted a view of it to my Secretary or any the Clerks”—On what am I to found an application to the States but upon your information of your inability to comply with your Contracts in consequence of their tardiness in paying their Taxes? Should I proceed of my own accord, as it were, they will think I am stepping out of my line, and may per haps hint to me that this reprehension would come more properly from another quarter—Until I hear from you I do not think myself at liberty to make use of your name. But ought we not, my dear Sir, to consider the danger of trusting a matter of so much importance, just at this moment when perhaps the enemy are balancing upon the total evacuation of these States, to a circular letter to the Legislatures? Letters of this kind are, from their nature, as public as the prints, and seldom fail by one means or the other to get into the hands of the enemy. I have several times found personal applications by Gentlemen of influence have much more effect than letters. Of this you will judge—and I think another matter ought immediately to be taken into most serious consideration—If you would be of opinion that the most strenuous exertions of the States will not enable them to pay in a sufficiency of Specie to comply with the Contracts, ought not a change of measures to be resolved on without loss of time? That if we must, thro’ necessity, revert to the ruinous system of Specifics, it may be done in time to lay up magazines before the Winter sets in. * * *

Newburg, 15 January, 1783.

Dear Bushrod,

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

You will be surprised, perhaps, at receiving a letter from me; but if the end is answered for which it is written, I shall not think my time misspent. Your father, who seems to entertain a very favorable opinion of your prudence, and I hope you merit it, in one or two of his letters to me speaks of the difficulty he is under to make you remittances. Whether this arises from the scantiness of his funds, or the extensiveness of your demands, is matter of conjecture with me. I hope it is not the latter; because common prudence, and every other consideration, which ought to have weight in a reflecting mind, is opposed to your requiring more than his conveniency, and a regard to his other children will enable him to pay; and because he holds up no idea in his Letter, which would support me in the conclusion. Yet when I take a view of the inexperience of youth, the temptations in and vices of cities, and the distresses to which our Virginia gentlemen are driven by an accumulation of Taxes and the want of a market, I am almost inclined to ascribe it in part to both. Therefore, as a friend, I give you the following advice.

Head Quarters,Verplanck’s Point,
23 September, 1782.

My dear Sir,

Let the object, which carried you to Philadelphia, be always before your Eyes. Remember, that it is not the mere study of the Law, but to become eminent in the profession of it, which is to yield honor and profit. The first was your choice; let the second be your ambition, and that dissipation is incompatible with both; that the Company, in which you will improve most, will be least expensive to you; and yet I am not such a Stoic as to suppose that you will, or to think it right that you should, always be in Company with senators and philosophers; but of the young and juvenile kind let me advise you to be choice. It is easy to make acquaintances, but very difficult to shake them off, however irksome and unprofitable they are found, after we have once committed ourselves to them. The indiscretions and scrapes, which very often they involuntarily lead one into, prove equally distressing and disgraceful.

Since my last of the 6th of August I have received your favors of the 6th of June, 11th of July and 12 of August.

Be courteous to all, but intimate with few; and let those few be well tried before you give them your confidence. True friendship is a plant of slow growth, and must undergo and withstand the shocks of adversity before it is entitled to the appellation.

I hope before this reaches you, you will be in possession of Charleston, and will have found a glorious end to your difficulties and distresses in the southern quarter.

Let your heart feel for the afflictions and distresses of every one, and let your hand give in proportion to your purse; remembering always the estimation of the widow’s mite, but, that it is not every one who asketh that deserveth charity; all, however, are worthy of the inquiry, or the deserving may suffer.

An application from the government of South Carolina produced the resolve, of which the enclosed1 is a copy, and which, I doubt not, was immediately transmitted to you. From your being upon the spot, and from your thorough knowledge of southern affairs, I shall leave the execution of the resolve in a great measure to your own judgment. As you observe in your letter of the 12th of August, when my directions of the 18th March last were given, they were upon a presumption, that the enemy might evacuate Charleston in such season, that the troops destined to return to the northward might be here time enough to render service before the close of the campaign; but, that not being the case, their immediate removal does not become so essential; and therefore I leave it with you, either to retain the corps, which you may ultimately determine to send northward, until the weather becomes favorable for marching in the spring, or to send them forward immediately, as far as Virginia at least, if you find their subsistence more difficult and expensive, than it would be in the middle States. I will just give you a hint, that I fear subsistence will be upon a very precarious footing here during the winter; and you know the inconvenience of having troops arrive at their cantonments late in the season.

Do not conceive that fine clothes make fine men any more than fine feathers make fine Birds. A plain genteel dress is more admired, and obtains more credit than lace and embroidery, in the Eyes of the judicious and sensible.

The arrangement made by you for the distribution of the southern army agrees perfectly, in the main, with my own judgment. I think, for the following reason, that the first and third regiments of cavalry had best be left in Carolina. They both belong to Virginia, and will more than probably be incorporated the next year. Their separation, therefore, would render the incorporation difficult; and, as cavalry are of no great use in this quarter in offensive operations, and more easily subsisted southward than here, I am not anxious to have Lee’s legion. But with this you will do as you think best. Armand’s legion will not advance. I shall recommend their wintering in Virginia, as forage will be extremely scarce in all this country, owing to the severest drought ever known.

The last thing, which I shall mention, is first in importance; and that is, to avoid Gaming. This is a vice which is productive of every possible evil; equally injurious to the morals and health of its votaries. It is the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity, and father of mischief. It has been the ruin of many worthy familys, the loss of many a man’s honor, and the cause of Suicide. To all those who enter the lists, it is equally fascinating. The successful gamester pushes his good fortune, till it is overtaken by a reverse. The losing gamester, in hopes of retrieving past misfortunes, goes on from bad to worse, till grown desperate he pushes at everything and loses his all. In a word, few gain by this abominable practice, (the profit if any being diffused) while thousands are injured.

By the resolve before alluded to, I am directed to make the necessary inquiry into the circumstances of the southern States, and to employ such force therein as I may think proper, and to direct you, whilst in the southern department, to employ the troops under your command offensively or defensively in such manner as may be most conducive to the interests of the United States.

Perhaps you will say, “My conduct has anticipated the advice,” and “Not one of these cases applies to me.” I shall be heartily glad of it. It will add not a little to my happiness, to find those to whom I am nearly connected pursuing the right walk of life. It will be the sure road to my favor, and to those honors and places of profit, which their Country can bestow; as merit rarely goes unrewarded. I am, dear Bushrod, your affectionate uncle.

The execution of the foregoing, I must, for the reasons mentioned in the beginning of my letter, leave also to you. Should the enemy evacuate the southern States, I know of no offensive operations but against St. Augustine, or the savages. The first I believe is out of our power, even were we authorized to undertake such an expedition; and the last must depend upon contingencies. I do not apprehend much danger from the savages, when the British are expelled from the seacoast.

TO JOHN AUGUSTINE WASHINGTON,

You will perceive it is the intention of Congress, that you should remain personally at the southward until further orders. You will, I doubt not, use every argument to induce those States to exert themselves in raising a permanent force for their own defence. They cannot expect, that, if the enemy evacuate the southern States, and keep a footing at New York, and at other places to the northward and eastward, that a force of almost half the Union should be kept in the southern States for defence only.

Newburgh, 16 January, 1783.

My dear Brother,

The situation of politics, I mean European, is upon so precarious a footing, that I really know not what account to give you of them. Negotiations were still going on at Paris in the middle of July; but the prospects of a peace were checked by the death of the Marquis of Rockingham. Dr. Franklin’s laconic description of the temper of the British nation seems most apt. “They are,” says he, “unable to carry on the war, and too proud to make peace.” I am, &c.

Since the letter which Bushrod delivered to me in Philadelphia, I have received your favors of the 24th of July from Westmoreland, and 12th of Novr. from Berkley.

TO JAMES DUANE, IN CONGRESS.

The latter gave me extreme pain. In God’s name, how did my brother Samuel contrive to get himself so enormously in debt? Was it by making purchases? By misfortunes? or sheer indolence and inattention to business? From whatever cause it proceeded, the matter is now the same, and curiosity only prompts me to the enquiry, as it does to know what will be saved, and how it is disposed of. In the list of his debts, did it appear that I had a claim upon him for the purchase money of the land I sold to Pendleton on Bullskin? I have never received a farthing for it yet, and think I have been informed by him, that he was to pay it.

Verplanck’s Point, 30th September, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I have heard a favorable account of Bushrod, and doubt not but his prudence will direct him to a proper line of conduct; I have given him my sentiments on this head, and persuade myself that with the advice of Mr. Wilson, to whose friendship, as well as instruction in his profession, I recommended him; and the admonition of others: he will stand as good a chance as most youth of his age, to avoid the vices of large cities, which have their advantages and disadvantages in fitting a man for the great theater of public life.

I shall be obliged to you, or some friend in Congress to inform me what has been or is likely to be done with respect to my reference of the case of Captn. Huddy. I cannot forbear complaining of the cruel situation I now am and oftentimes have been placed in, by the silence of Congress in matters of high importance, which the good of Service, and my official duty have obliged me to call upon them, as the sovereign power of these United States, to decide. It is only in intricate and perplexing cases, that I have requested their orders, being always willing to bear my proportion of public embarrassments, and take a full share of responsibility. Conscious that I have treated that Honble. Body, and all their measures, with as much deference and respect as any Officer in the United States, I expected this aid.

I have lately received a letter from my mother, in which she complains much of the knavery of the overseer at the Little Falls quarter. She says she can get nothing from him. It is pretty evident, I believe, that I get nothing from thence, while I have the annual rent of between eighty and an hundred pounds to pay. The whole profit of the plantation, according to her account, is applied to his own use; which is hard upon me, as I had no earthly inducement to meddle with it, but to comply with her wish and to free her from care. This, like every other matter of private concern to me, has been totally neglected; but it is too much, while I am suffering in every other way (and hardly able to keep my own estate from sale) to be saddled with all the expence of hers, and not be able to derive the smallest return from it. She has requested that I should get somebody to attend to it: I must therefore ask the favor of you, to take it under your care. I know of none in whose hands it can be better placed; none to whom it will be less inconvenient; and who is more interested in the good management of the land. For as it lies directly in your rout to Berkley, and in the neighborhood of our friends, where you must always make a halt, it will give you very little additional trouble to provide an overseer; call upon him as you pass and repass, and settle annual accounts with him, by which means I shall have some knowledge of his transactions, and a certainty that whatever is made will go towards payment of the rent. I shall by this post inform my mother of this application to you, hoping you will find no difficulty in the undertaking.

Why, then, if policy forbids a decision upon the difficult points I have referd., I am not to be informed of it, is beyond my conception, unless I was to ascribe it to causes, which I flatter myself do not exist. When I refer a matter to Congress, every proceeding on it on my part is suspended, until their pleasure is transmitted; and for this it is well known I have waited with unexampled patience. But when no notice is taken of my application; when measures, which I might otherwise adopt, are suspended; when my own feelings are wounded, and others perhaps are suffering by the delay, how is it possible for me to forbear expressing my disquietude?

While I am talking of my mother and her concerns, I am impelled to mention some things which have given, and still continue to give me pain. About two years ago, a gentleman of my acquaintance1 informed me, that it was in contemplation, to move for a pension for her in the Virginia Assembly; that he did not suppose I knew of the measure proposed; and that he did not believe it would be very agreeable to me to have it done; but wished, however, to know my sentiments thereon. I instantly wrote him, that it was new and astonishing to me, and begged that he would prevent the motion if possible; or oppose it, if made; for I was sure she had not a child that would not be hurt at the idea of her becoming a pensioner—or in other words, receiving charity from the public. Since then I have heard nothing of that matter; but learn from very good authority, that she is, upon all occasions and in all companies, complaining of the hardness of the times, of her wants and difficulties; and if not in direct terms, at least by strong innuendoes, endeavors to excite a belief that times are much altered, &c., &c., which not only makes her appear in an unfavorable point of view, but those also who are connected with her. That she can have no real wants, that may not easily be supplied, I am sure of. Imaginary wants are indefinite; and oftentimes insatiable; because they sometimes are boundless, and always changing. The reason of my mentioning these matters, is that you may enquire into her real wants, and see what is necessary to make her comfortable. If the rent is insufficient to do this, while I have anything, I will part with it to make her so; and wish you to take measures in my behalf accordingly. At the same time, I wish you to represent to her in delicate terms, the impropriety of her complaints, and acceptance of favors, even where they are voluntarily offered, from any but relations. It will not do to touch upon this subject in a letter to her, and therefore I have avoided it.

The particular cause of it at this time arises from two things. First, while I am totally silent to the public, waiting the decision of Congs. on the case of Huddy, I see publications on this head (importing reflections) in one of the Pennsylvania Papers, which no man could have made, that had not access to my official letter of the 19th of August to Congress; and, secondly, because I feel exceedingly for Captn. Asgill, who was designated by Lot as a victim to the manes of Captain Huddy. While retaliation was apparently necessary, however disagreeable in itself, I had no repugnance to the measure. But, when the end proposed by it is answered, by a disavowal of the act, by a dissolution of the Board of Refugees, by a promise whether with or without meaning to comply with it, I shall not determine, that further inquisition should be made into the matter, I thought it incumbent upon me, to have the sense of Congress, who had most explicitly approved, and impliedly indeed ordered retaliation to take place before I proceeded any further in the matter. To this hour I am held in darkness.

I do not believe that Sir Guy Carleton gives countenance to those dirty picaroons that infest your rivers. If they are encouraged at all, it must be by the Admiral, in whose element they are; but I am rather inclined to think that they are navigated by a lawless banditti, who would rob both sides with equal facility, if they could do it with equal impunity.

The letter of Asgill, (copy of which I inclose,) and the situation of his Father, which I am made acquainted with by the British prints, work too powerfully upon my humanity not to wish, that Congress would chalk a line for me to walk by in this business. To effect this, is the cause of the trouble you now receive from, dear Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant.1

With respect to Peace, we are held in a very disagreeable state of suspence, and shall remain in it, I expect, ’till some time in February. My opinion of it, however, has been uniformly the same since the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, and succession of Mr. Fox. It is, that nothing would be concluded ’till the meeting of the British Parliament in November, and if the influence of the Crown could prevent it, that it would not take place even then, if the independence of this country is to be a consequence of it. That previous to the session, the negotiation from the Court of Britain would be employed in intriguing, in an investigation of powers, hearing propositions, and probing the intentions and expectations of the belligerent powers, to the bottom. The latter being accomplished, Lord Shelburne, if he found himself standing upon slippery ground, or that the voice of the people was loud for peace, would say to Parliament: that after many months spent in negotiation, here are the best terms we can obtain; and, as they involve consequences of great national concern, and have been the subject of seven years war and debate, it is fitting that Parliament should decide on them, and either accept them, or prepare vigorously for the prosecution of the war. This would put the matter upon a broad basis, remove responsibility from his door, and blunt the edge of opposition, which otherwise I am persuaded will be found to be very keen. The King having by his letters patent (which I have seen) authorised Mr. Oswald to treat with any commissioner or commissioners from the United States of America, vested with proper powers, is certainly a great point gained; but it was unavoidable on their part, and our commissioners refused to enter upon any business with Mr. Oswald without. And the minister dared not to meet the Parliament without having attempted something under the Peace Bill which passed the session before. Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the terms of Peace were agreed upon before the adjournment for the Christmas holidays, or that we shall have at least another campaign. How well the States have provided for the continuance of the war, let their acts and their policy answer. The army as usual is without pay, and a great part of the soldiery without shirts; and tho’ the patience of them is equally threadbare, it seems to be a matter of small concern to those at a distance. In truth, if one was to hazard an opinion for them on this subject, it would be, that the army having contracted a habit of encountering distress and difficulties, and of living without money, it would be injurious to it, to introduce other customs. We have, however, (but this depended upon ourselves) built the most comfortable barracks in the vicinity of this place (wch. is near Wt. Point) that the troops have ever yet been in.

TO THE SECRETARY AT WAR.1

I was very sorry to find that my sister was in bad health. I suppose you are to be congratulated on your gouty fit. My love, in which Mrs. Washington joins, is offered to you both and the rest of the family. Compliments to all friends.

Head-Quarters, 2 October, 1782.

My dear Sir,

TO SAMUEL OGDEN.

Painful as the task is to describe the dark side of our affairs, it sometimes becomes a matter of indispensable necessity. Without disguise or palliation, I will inform you candidly of the discontents, which at this moment prevail universally throughout the army.

Newburg, 19 January, 1783.

Sir,

The complaint of evils, which they suppose almost remediless, are the total want of money or the means of existing from one day to another, the heavy debts they have already incurred, the loss of credit, the distress of their families (i. e. such as are married) at home, and the prospect of poverty and misery before them. It is vain, Sir, to suppose, that military men will acquiesce contentedly with bare rations, when those in the civil walk of life, (unacquainted with half the hardships they endure,) are regularly paid the emoluments of office. While the human mind is influencd. by the same passions, and have ye same inclinations to indulge, it cannt. be. A military man has the same turn to sociability as a person in civil life. He conceives himself equally called upon to live up to his rank, and his pride is hurt when circumstans. restrain him. Only conceive, then, the mortification they (even the general officers) must suffer, when they cannot invite a French officer, a visiting friend, or a travelling acquaintance, to a better repast, than stinking whiskey (and not always that) and a bit of Beef without vegetables will afford them.

In every conversation which I have had with you, on the subject of your letters of the 31st of last month, and 15th inst., I was pointed, because I meant to deal candidly, in assuring you, it was not my intention to interest myself in behalf of any particular characters, that my motives were altogether public, and that if I could not take the business up upon the broadest basis, and while a defection on the part of the refugees would be productive of advantages to the American cause, I would have no concern with it.

The officers also complain of other hardships, which they think might and ought to be remedied without delay; such as the stopping promotions, where there have been vacancies open for a long time; the withholding commissions from those, who are justly entitled to them, and have warrants or certificates of their appointments from the executive of their States; and particularly the leaving the compensation for their services in a loose, equivocal state, without ascertaining their claims upon the public, or making provision for the future payment of them.

I am sorry to observe to you, that there appears to me to be a delay on the part of the refugees or loyalists, which is to be ascribed more to design than to necessity. It seems as if the object with them was to get at the ultimatum of Great Britain, before any decided steps should be taken with the country they have abandoned. This, sir, you will do me the justice to acknowledge, is not only incompatible with my ideas, but to my express declaration to you:—for the foundation on which I meant to build, and the only one upon which I could attempt to include and recommend obnoxious characters, was their decision and influence; and the consequent advantages, while the intention of the enemy should be suspended and unknown.

While I premise, that tho’ no one I have seen or heard of appears opposed to the principle of reducing the army as circumstances may require, yet I cannot help fearing the result of the measure in contemplation, under present circumstances, when I see such a number of men, goaded by a thousand stings of reflection on the past and of anticipation on the future, about to be turned into the world, soured by penury and what they call the ingratitude of the public, involved in debts without one farthing of money to carry them home, after having spent the flower of their days, and many of them their patrimonies, in establishing the freedom and independence of their country, and sufered everything human nature is capable of enduring on this side of death. I repeat it, in these irritable circumstances, without one thing to soothe their feelings or brighten the gloomy prospects, I cannot avoid apprehending that a train of evils will follow, of a very serious and distressing nature. On the other hand, could the officers be placed in as good a situation, as when they came into service, the contention, I am persuaded, would be, not who should continue in the field, but who should retire to private life.

The matter has already been near three months in agitation, and for aught that has come to my knowledge, is yet in statu quo. One month, perhaps, a few days now, will unfold the designs of the British cabinet, or rather those of the Parliament. Let me ask then, if these be to prosecute the war vigorously, will the gentlemen of that class, in whose behalf you particularly interest yourself (after their address to the king of Great Britain, which I have lately seen) give any aid to this country? If the determination is in favor of peace, and peace takes place on the terms which are expected, will not their inveterate obstinacy and procrastination, put it out of the power of any man, to adduce an argument in their favor?

I wish not to heighten the shades of the picture so far as the real life would justify me in doing, or I would give anecdotes of patriotism and distress, which have scarcely ever been paralleled, never surpassed in the history of mankind. But, you may rely upon it, the patience and long-sufferance of this army are almost exhausted, and that there never was so great a spirit of discontent as at this instant. While in the field, I think it may be kept from breaking out into acts of outrage; but when we retire into winter-quarters, (unless the storm is previously dissipated,) I cannot be at ease respecting the consequences. It is high time for a peace.

I confess to you, Sir, their policy strikes me in so unfavorable a point of view, that I no longer find an inclination to have any further agency in the business; for I am convinced from their address, and other circumstances, that they will never turn their faces towards this country until the back of Great Britain is turn’d upon them. And that their delay proceeds from no other cause than an intention to await the event of their application in another quarter.

To you, my dear Sir, I need not be more particular in describing my anxiety and the grounds of it. You are too well acquainted, from your own service, with the real sufferings of the army, to require a longer detail. I will, therefore, only add, that, exclusive of the common hardships of a military life, our troops have been and still are obliged to perform more services foreign to their proper duty, without gratuity or reward, than the soldiers of any other army; for example, the immense labors expended in doing the duties of artificers in erecting fortifications and military works, the fatigue of building themselves barracks or huts annually, and of cutting and transporting wood for the use of all our posts and garrisons without any expense whatever to the public.

I have only to add that I am the more confirmed in this opinion, upon observing that there is no idea held up in the copy of your brother’s letter of the 3d of December (the original of which never came to my hands,) or in any of the subsequent ones, which gives the smallest insight into the business; or that will support me in any deduction favorable to it; the former of which is expressly contrary to the information I received from you at our last interview, as the letter from your brother to you (which was to pass through my hands) was to be couched in such terms, as I should understand, tho’ unintelligible to others, who should be unacquainted with the business. Your own letter of the 31st, committed to the care of Mr. Morris, was brought here a few days ago only, by a common soldier, who delivered it at the office and retired before I had read, and could enquire how he came by it, nor do I know at this hour. Upon the maturest consideration, Sir, I have so fully made up my judgment on this subject, that I could wish never to hear any thing farther upon it. I am, sir, &c.

Of this letter, (which, from the tenor of it, must be considered in some degree of a private nature,) you may make such use as you shall think proper, since the principal objects of it were, by displaying the merits, the hardships, the disposition, and critical state of the army, to give information that might eventually be useful, and to convince you with what entire confidence and esteem, I am, my dear Sir, &c.1

TO MAJOR THOMAS LANSDALE.

TO JAMES McHENRY.

Newburg, 25 January, 1783.

Sir:

Verplanck’s Point, 17 October, 1782.

My dear Sir,

I was hurt yesterday at the appearance of the Detachment under your Command, as I conceive you must have been, if you viewed and drew a comparison between it and the Regiment on your Left. The Clothes of the latter have been upon the Soldiers backs almost, if not quite, twelve months,—while it is scarce Six since any part of yours has been issued.

In a visit to the Post of Dobb’s Ferry last Saturday, I accidently met with Majr. Lynch at that place, and received from him your letter of the 30th ulto.

Dirt and Trash too, of every denomination was so liberally strewed, even upon your parade, and immediately before the doors of your Hutts, that it was difficult to avoid the Filth.

In a time like this, of general uncertainty, with respect to the designs of the British Court, it is not at all wonderful to find men engineering at every Corner for News—The North sends to the South, and the South to the North, to obtain it.—But at present, all I believe are equally ignorant.—My opinion of the matter is, that you could learn nothing decisive from the Cabinet itself.—I have long thought, and still think, they are trying the Chapter of accidents; and the good or ill success alone of this campaign, will fix their Councils. If they can obtain any advantages at Sea, or in the Indies—East or West, no matter where—I am of opinion they will continue the War—If their affairs on the other hand stand still, or continue to retrograde, their stomachs will come to, & Peace will be seriously thought of—

The true distinction, Sir, between what is called a fine Regiment, and an indifferent one will ever, upon investigation, be found to originate in, and depend upon the care, or the inattention, of the Officers belonging to them.—That Regiment whose Officers are watchful of their men, and attentive to their wants, who will see that proper use is made, and a proper account taken, of whatever is drawn for them; and that Regimental and Company Inspections are frequent in order to examine into the state of their Arms, ammunition, Clothing, and other necessaries, to prevent loss or embezzlement;—who will see that the Soldiers Clothes are well made, kept whole, and clean; that their Hutts are swept and purified; that the Trash, and all kinds of Offal is either burnt or buried; that Vaults or proper necessaries are erected and every person punished who shall on those occasions go elsewhere in the Camp; that their Provision is in good order well cooked and eat at proper hours;—those Officers, I say, who attend to these things—and their duty strictly enjoins it on them—give health, comfort, and a Military pride to their Men, which fires and fits them for every thing great and noble. It is by this means the character of a Regiment is exalted while sloth, inattention, and neglect produce the reverse of these in every particular and must infallibly lessen the reputation of the Corps.

From a letter I had from Marqs. De la Fayette of the 29th of June, nothing more could be collected than that doubts & darkness prevailed—that the business of Grenville, seemed to be that of procrastination.—In a word, that nothing was fixed; and that the cause of his stay was to see matters in such a train as to find the way clear before he left France.—In New Yk. they are as impatient as us for News—expecting the August Packet will remove all doubts, but herein they will be mistaken—later acc’ts than the Packet can bring, leave the negotiations at Paris in as doubtful a state as ever—A Letter which I have just received from Boston gives me the inclosed as an extract of a Letter from Mr. Adams (as this is a private letter, Mr. Adams’s name had better be withheld) of the 20 of Augt. from the Hague.—The Boston Gazette says, that the Combined Fleets had left the Channel, and that the Jamaica Fleet got in four days afterwards.—It also gives an acct. of an Action in the East Indies between the French & British Fleets, in which, after a hard fought action, they say victory inclined to the latter but that the Ships of Admiral Hughes were so much damaged he could not pursue—this is such an acknowledgment (from a British acct.) as to leave little to be apprehended from it.

I observed with concern that none of your officers had espontoons; that some of them were even without side arms; and of those that had, some were so remiss in their duty as not to know they were to salute with them. From these considerations I am led to point you to the Genl. Orders of the 9th of August and 1st of September, and to recommend in pointed terms to your Officers the necessity and advantage of making themselves perfectly masters of the Printed “Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States.” Ignorance of them cannot, nor will it be any excuse, while it may bring disgrace on the Corps they belong to and produce much confusion in the army if they should form and manœuvre with it.—

You will recollect the opinion I gave you upon the receipt of Carleton’s letter of the 2d of August to me. Subsequent events, as far as they have come to my knowledge prove it was well founded—& I wish future ones may not evince that to gain time, was all that the British ministry had in view—The impolicy therefore of suffering ourselves to be lulled by expectations of Peace, because we wish it, & because it is the Interest of G. Britain to hold up the ideas of it, will, more than probably, prove the ruin of our cause & the disbanding of the Army; for it should seem from the conduct the States are pursuing—that they do not conceive it necessary for the Army to receive any thing but hard knocks—to give them pay, is a matter which has long been out of the question; and we were upon the point of trying how we could live on without subsistence (as the superintendent was no longer able to fulfil his Contract with the Victualers of the Army, & they relinquishing it) when fortunately for us we met with Gentlemen, who, for an advanced price pr Ration, has saved us from starvation, or disbandment by giving a credit—Our horses have long been without everything which their own thriftiness could not procure.

As it is the first time I have seen them under Arms, and some allowance is to be made for the rawness of the Corps, I will substitute admonition in place of reprehension—but it is my desire that you should inform the officers I shall expect to see a very great alteration in the police of the Corps and appearance of the Men before the next Inspection.

Let any man who will allow reason fair play, ask himself what must be the inevitable consequence of such policy.—Have not military men the same feelings of those in the Civil line?—why then should one set receive the constant wages of service—and the other be continually without them?—do the former deserve less for their watchings and toil—for enduring heat & cold—for standing in sunshine & in rain—for the dangers they are continually exposed to for the sake of their Country; by which means the man in Civil life sits quiet under his own Vine & Fig tree—solacing himself in all the comforts—pleasures—& enjoyments of life, free & unrestrained? let impartiality answr. the question.

The Soldiers of your detachment, with a few exceptions, would look very well in the line of the Army if their Clothes were in good order, well fitted, and the Men made to appear neat and clean. I am, &c.

These are matters worthy of serious consideration—The patience—the fortitude—the long, & great suffering of this army is unexampled in history; but there is an end to all things & I fear we are very near one to this.—Which, more than probably will oblige me to stick very close to my flock this winter, & try like a careful physician, to prevent, if possible, the disorders getting to an incurable height.

TO ELIAS BOUDINOT, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.1

I am yr. very obedt. & affectn. servt.

P. S. I have this moment received a letter from the Marqs. De Vaudreuil informg. me, that a Vessel just arrived from Cadiz, wch. place she left the 24th of Augt., brings advices that the day following was fixed upon for a genl. assault of the Works at Gibralter, by ye combined force of F. & Spn.

Head-Quarters,Newburg,
30 January, 1783.

Sir,

TO GOVERNOR CLINTON.

I should not have undertaken at this time to address myself through Your Excellency to Congress, on the present state of our Military and Political affairs, (which are so blended as scarcely to admit of seperation in the discussion,) did I not apprehend that my silence might perhaps be construed into remissness in my official duties or inattention to the public interests, and that some inconveniences might be experienced by the neglect or delay. Influenced by these motives, and an ardent desire to carry the wishes of Congress into effect, I shall hope to be excused, after suggesting a few things, for entreating to be made acquainted, so far as may be deemed expedient, with their sentiments and expectations relative to our Future Operations.

Head-Quarters, 19 October, 1782.

Sir,

It scarcely needs be remarked here, as it is a fact of great notoriety, that the tranquillity, leisure, and inactivity of Winter-Quarters have ever been considered by all well informed warlike nations, when in a state of Hostility, as the only proper Season for taking into contemplation the probable operations of the ensuing Campaign, and for making the best arrangements in their power for carrying such projects as were finally determined upon into execution. It was not simply in conformity with this practice, but upon a perfect conviction of the propriety and expediency of it, that at the close of all my former campaigns I have thought myself not only warranted, but impelled by the strongest dictates of reason and duty, to exert all my influence and abilities in endeavoring to augment our force, and to make the greatest possible provision in every Department for enabling us to act with vigor at the opening of the next Campaign; and, in thus attempting to perform my duty, I derived no small share of satisfaction from a consciousness, that I should meet with the approbation and assistance of my Country; being at the same time so fully acquainted with the designs of the Enemy on the one hand, and with the inclinations of Congress on the other, that I could not hesitate a moment in my own mind to decide what general system of measures was proper to be adopted. But, as the complexion of our Political and Military Affairs is now entirely changed by the Negotiations for Peace, which are carrying on in Europe; as Congress have determined by the reduction which has lately taken place, that the number of men engaged on the present Establishment are adequate to the Services before us; and as that Honble. Body have much better opportunities, than any Individual can have, for collecting and comparing the intelligence necessary to judge, with a degree of certainty, whether Peace will be concluded in the course of the Winter, so as to supersede the necessity of any further military preparations; I could not think myself at liberty, without having recourse to their sentiments, to take the same measures and give the same orders, that I had on all former occasions deemed myself competent to do. On the contrary, I feared to delay any longer to express my apprehensions, that very fair opportunities might be lost, and that very great, if not irreparable injuries might be experienced (if the war should be continued, especially if it should begin to rage again), in case we should not also on our part be in a state of preparation for such an event.

I have received your favor of the 15th instant with the enclosures; and, though at the same time it is true, I have the general command of the allied army, as to all its movements, operations, &c., yet I have never considered myself as having an absolute right to interfere with the internal police and regulations of the French army, under the immediate orders of his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau; with which army it appears the persons mentioned in the papers contained in your letter are connected. I have, however, in order to produce an amicable settlement of the matter, communicated the contents to Colonel Wadsworth, and requested him to use his utmost endeavors to prevent any altercations and quarrels between the citizens of this State and the people employed by him. As he has engaged, that they will not impede the due execution of the civil authority, and as he writes to you by this conveyance, I cannot but hope matters will be explained to your satisfaction.1

In addition to every other consideration of a Foreign, a Military, or Political nature, the embarrassed state of our Finances, the necessity of using the strictest œconomy and preventing every unnecessary expenditure of public money in conducting our Military affairs, have in an especial manner prompted me to make this representation, that the Sovereign power may determine, what is the proper line of conduct to be pursued under our present circumstances; whether any and what preparations ought to be made during the Winter; and what our situation will be at the period proper for opening the Campaign (supposing the war should continue and require any offensive operations on our part), unless many of the essential articles which are wanting, particularly in the Quarter Master’s Department, should in the mean time be effectually and fully supplied. Amongst the most indispensable and yet most expensive of which, I must beg leave to mention the means of Transportation, Horses for Artillery, and Teams and Wheel-Carriages for Ordnance, Stores, and Baggage; without which, it is well known, an army becomes totally harmless and totally helpless; for, so far from being able to annoy and operate against its Enemy, it is neither able to take the Field, nor to advance or retire a single step, let the occasions or prospects be of a nature ever so pressing and important.

For my own part I shall still continue to exert all my influence and authority to prevent the interruption of that harmony, which is so essential, and which has so generally prevailed between the army and the inhabitants of the country; and I need scarcely add, that in doing this I shall give every species of countenance and support to the execution of the laws of the land.

Notwithstanding any of the foregoing observations, I hope it will be clearly understood, that it is very far from being my wish or desire, that our Military preparations should be increased in the smallest degree beyond what the exigence of the Circumstances may appear to demand. But, while I candidly confess, that I believe there is no man, who more earnestly wishes a speedy period may be put to the contest than myself, I must take the liberty to suggest, whether, (in case a peace should not take place in consequence of the present negotiations,) it would not be far more eligible in point of national policy and œconomy to attempt, by one great and decisive effort, to expel the Enemy from the remaining part of their possessions in the United States, than to suffer them with their enfeebled force to hold a Post and protract the war, until the accumulating expenses of our languid and defensive measures only shall amount to such an aggregate sum, as would have furnished the means of attempting the Siege of New York with a prospect of success?

In the present quiet state of the frontiers, and with assurances from Sir Guy Carleton, that the incursions of the savages are stopped by authority, I have it in contemplation to withdraw the Continental troops from the northward. There are many reasons, which will make that measure eligible, unless the troops, which have been raised on purpose for the defence of the frontiers of this State, should be thought incompetent to the duty, even taking into consideration the inactivity of the season and the situation of affairs; for, indeed, I confess, I do not consider the late reports of the enemy’s being in force at the Isle-au-Noix to indicate any thing farther than an attention to their own security. The severity of the approaching season, and every other circumstance, appear to me to militate against an attack upon our possessions this winter, and we shall not be at so great a distance, but that succor may be afforded as early in the spring as shall be necessary. At any rate, some measures must be immediately taken relative to the troops now there. I should be happy in receiving your sentiments as soon as may be, and am with great esteem and regard, &c.

In order that your Excellency and Congress may have as comprehensive and compleat view of our efficient force, our military apparatus, and the principal articles, which would be required for a vigorous Campaign, I have thought it expedient to forward the Enclosed Returns and estimates (the Estimate of the Engineer being omitted, because the articles in his department will be principally provided by the labors of the army); and I flatter myself it will be found, that the troops under my orders are at this moment as much collected and as well appointed, as could possibly be expected under our circumstances; and that all the means, which have been afforded, so far as depended on military arrangements, have been œconomized in the most prudent manner. I wait with great solicitude to hear the sentiments, expectations, and final pleasure of Congress, on the several points contained in this letter; and, in the mean time,

P. S. I should be much obliged by an answer at the return of the bearer.

I have the honor to be, &c.1

P. S.

I have directed the Troops of Pensyla., Delaware, Maryland & Virginia except the Legionary Corps to be comprehended in the Qr. Master’s Estimate, as they would undoubtedly be employed with this Army in case of any serious operation.

TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Verplanck’s Point, 20 October, 1782.

My dear Marqs.,

Newburg, 6 February, 1783.

My dear Sir,

Whilst I thought there was a probability of my letters finding you in France, I continued to write to you at Paris. After that, I ceased to do so, expecting the more agreeable pleasure of embracing you in America. Your favor of the 29th of June, placing the time of your departure from thence on a contingency, and our latest advices from Europe, reporting that the negotiations for Peace were nearly in the same state as at the commencement of it, I shall renew my correspondence.

I have the pleasure to inform you that your Packet for Govr. Greene which came enclosed to me (in your private Letter of the 12th of December) was forwarded in an hour after it came to my hands by a Gentleman returning to Rhode Island (Welcome Arnold, Esq.); there can be no doubt therefore of its having got safe to the Governor.

I approve, very highly, the motives which induced you to remain at your Court and I am convinced Congress will do the same—The Campaign, as you supposed, has been very inactive—We formed the junction with the French Corps (which is now encamped on our left ten miles distant) the middle of September; and have remained in perfect unison with them ever since their arrival. It may I believe with much truth be said, that a greater harmony between two Armies never subsisted than that which has prevailed between the French and Americans since the first junction of them last year. I had prepared a beautiful Corps for you to command, that would not, I am convinced, either in their appearance or action, have discredited any Officer, or Army whatever. It consisted of all the light Infantry of the Northern Army, to which Sheldon’s Legion would have been added. But we have done nothing more than to keep a watch upon the enemy this Campaign except restraining them from detaching; which I believe has been the consequence of our junction, and lying here. A few German Troops, and Refugees have been sent to Hallifax; from thence it was supposed they were to proceed to Canada. This took place before I came into the Field, which was on the last day of August. The cold weather puts us in mind of warm fire sides, and the two Armies will separate for this or some other purpose in the course of a few days. The French Army will go Easterly, we Northerly, and shall fix our cantonments in the vicinity of West point.

It is with a pleasure, which friendship only is susceptible of, I congratulate you on the glorious end you have put to hostilities in the Southern States. The honor and advantages of it, I hope and trust you will long live to enjoy. When this hemisphere will be equally free, is yet in the womb of time to discover. A little while, ’t is presumed, will disclose the determinations of the British senate with respect to Peace or War, as it seems to be agreed on all hands, that the present Premier, (especially if he should find the opposition powerful,) intends to submit the decision of these matters to Parliament. The Speech, the addresses, and Debates, for which we are looking in every direction, will give a data, from which the bright rays of the one, or gloomy prospect of the other, may be discovered.

The Enemy in New York make no scruple of declaring their intention of evacuating Charles town. Many Transports went from the former about a month ago; with design, it was said, to take off the Garrison; but whether it is to be brought to the last mentioned place or carried to the West Indies is mere matter of conjecture—very probably the British Troops may go to the latter, and the foreigners to the former. Time only will shew this, as indeed it may another thing, viz—that the late changes in the British Councils may prevent the evacuation of it at all.

If historiographers should be hardy enough to fill the page of History with the advantages, that have been gained with unequal numbers, (on the part of America) in the course of this contest, and attempt to relate the distressing circumstances under which they have been obtained, it is more than probable, that Posterity will bestow on their labors the epithet and marks of fiction; for it will not be believed, that such a force as Great Britain has employed for eight years in this country could be baffled in their plan of subjugating it, by numbers infinitely less, composed of men oftentimes half starved, always in Rags, without pay, and experiencing at times every species of distress, which human nature is capable of undergoing.

With respect to New York, various opinions have prevailed. Some thought the speedy evacuation of it inevitable; others, that it would be delayed till the spring; while a third set, less sanguine than either of the other two, believed that nothing short of military force would ever free the city of them, their whole design being, to amuse the Belligerent Powers and deceive America, till they could put their marine and other matters in a more prosperous train for prosecuting the war. The first, it is certain, were in an error, because the Troops are still at New York, but which of the other two may be right, your knowledge from what is transacting on the European theater enables you to judge better of than I. Certain it is, the loyalists and Refugees in New York are very much alarmed, and know not what to expect. As certain it is, Sir Guy Carleton holds himself in readiness to evacuate, or perform any other movement with his Army; while he endeavors assiduously in the mean while to propagate the favorable disposition of Great Britain to grant every thing America can require. Their Transports have wooded and watered, and lay ready for any Service; so have the Ships of War under Admiral Pigot, but I believe they are designed for the West Indies, with part of the Troops at New York, more than for any other purpose.—

I intended to have wrote you a long letter on sundry matters; but Major Burnet popped in unexpectedly at a time, when I was preparing for the celebration of the day, and was just going to a review of the troops, previous to the feu de joie.1 As he is impatient, from an apprehension that the sleighing failing, and as he can give you the occurrences of this quarter more in detail than I have time to do, I will refer you to him. I cannot omit informing you, however, that I let no opportunity slip to inquire after your son George at Princeton, and that it is with pleasure I hear he enjoys good health and is a fine promising boy. Mrs. Washington joins me in most affectionate regard and best wishes for Mrs. Greene and yourself. With great truth and sincerity, and every sentiment of friendship, I am, &c.1

You will have heard before this Letter can reach you, of the loss of the L’Eagle—it will be unpleasant therefore to repeat it—every body laments the misfortune, and pities poor L’Touche.—Duke Lauzun has been very sick but is now recovering fast—tho’ very thin and pale.

TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

Poor Laurens1 is no more.—He fell in a trifling skirmish in South Carolina, attempting to prevent the Enemy from plundering the country of rice. Genl. Lee is also dead, he breathed his last at Philadelphia about a fortnight ago. Your aid G. W— has had an intermittent fever ever since April, and by the last accounts of him from Mount Vernon, where he is, he was very low and weak. As I despair of seeing my home this Winter, I have just sent for Mrs. Washington, who will think herself honored by yours and Madm. La Fayette’s notice. Make a tender of my best respects to her, and offer a blessing in my name to your Son, and my God Son. Present me also to Count Charlux and others with whom I have the honor of an acquaintance. The Count de Noailles will have the trouble of reading a letter from me. Adieu, my dear Marqs. believe me, &c.

Newburg, 11 February, 1783.

Dear Sir,

TO DOCTOR WILLIAM GORDON.1

I am about to write you a Letter on a subject equally important and delicate, which may be extensive in its consequences and serious in its nature. I shall confine myself to the recital of what I believe to be facts, and leave it with you to make deductions.

Verplanck’s Point, 23 October, 1782.

Dear Sir,

The printed remonstrance of Mr. Chittenden and his Council, addressed to the president of Congress and founded upon the resolves of the 5th of December last, contains a favorable recital in their own behalf, of what I suppose to be facts; but, if my memory serves me, it is an uncandid performance, inasmuch as it keeps out of view an important transaction of theirs, which was consequent of those resolves.1 Be this as it may, matters seem to be approaching too fast to a disagreeable Issue, for the quiet of my mind. The resolves on one hand, and the remonstrance on the other, (unless it should be annulled by the Legislature at their next meeting, which I do not expect,) seems to leave little room for an amicable decision.

I have been honored with your favor of the 2d Inst., & thank you for the extract of Mr. Adams’s letter.

Matters being thus situated, permit me to ask how far, and by what means, coercion is to be extended? The army, I presume, will be the answer to the latter. Circumstances (for no determination whatever after blood is once drawn) alone can prescribe bounds to the former. It has been said, but of this you can judge better than I, that the delegates from the New England States in Congress, or a majority of them, are willing to admit these People into the Federal Union, as an Independent and Sovereign State. Be this as it may, two things I am sure of, viz: that they have a powerful interest in those States, and pursued very politic measures to strengthen and increase it, long before I had any knowledge of the matter, and before the tendency of it was seen into or suspected, by granting upon very advantageous terms large Tracts of Land, in which, I am sorry to find, the army in some degree have participated.

I never was among the sanguine ones, consequently shall be less disappointed than People of that description, if our warfare should continue. From hence (it being the opinion of some Men that our expectations have an accordance with our wishes) it may be inferred that mine are for a prolongation of the War.—But maugre this doctrine, and the opinion of others that a continuation of the War till the Powers of Congress—or political systems—and general form of Government are better established—I can say with much truth, that there is not a man in America that more fervently wishes for Peace, and a return to private life than I do.—Nor will any man go back to the rural & domestick enjoyments of it with more Heartfelt pleasure than I shall.—It is painful to me therefore, to accompany this declaration with an opinion that while the present King can maintain the influence of his Crown, & extort Men & Money from his subjects, so long will the principles by which he is governed push him on in his present wild career.—The late change in his Ministry is an evidence of this—and other changes which I suspect will soon take place, will convince us, I fear of the fallacy of our hopes.

Let me next ask, by whom is that district of country principally settled? And of whom is your present army (I do not confine the question to this part of it, but will extend it to the whole) composed? The answers are evident,—New England men. It has been the opinion of some, that the appearance of force would awe these People into submission. If the General Assembly ratifie and confirm what Mr. Chittenden and his Council have done, I shall be of a very different sentiment; and, moreover, that it is not a trifling force that will subdue them, even supposing they do derive no aid from the enemy in Canada; and that it will be a very arduous task indeed, if they should, to say nothing of a diversion, which may and doubtless would be made in their favor from New York, if the war with Great Britain should continue.

It appears to me impracticable for the best Historiographer living, to write a full & correct history of the present revolution, who has not free access to the Archives of Congress—those of Individual States—the Papers of the Commander in chief, & commanding officers of separate departments. Mine, while the war continues, I consider as a species of Public property, sacred in my hands; & of little service to any Historian who has not that general information that is only to be derived with exactitude from the sources I have mentioned. When Congress then shall open their registers, & say it is proper for the servants of the public to do so, it will give me much pleasure to afford all the aid to your labors & laudable undertaking which my Papers can give—till one of those periods arrive I do not think myself justified in suffering an inspection of and extracts to be taken from my Records. * * *

The Country is very mountainous, full of Defiles, and extremely strong. The Inhabitants, for the most part, are a hardy race, composed of that kind of People, who are best calculated for soldiers; in truth, who are soldiers; for many, many hundreds of them are Deserters from this army, who, having acquired property there, would be desperate in the defence of it, well knowing that they were fighting with Halters about their necks.

TO CAPTAIN CHARLES ASGILL.1

It may be asked, if I am acquainted with the sentiments of the army on the subject of this dispute. I readily answer, No, not intimately. It is a matter of too delicate a nature to agitate for the purpose of information. But I have heard many officers of rank and discernment, and have learnt by indirect inquiries that others, express the utmost horror at the very idea of shedding blood in an affair of this sort; comparing it in its consequences, tho’ not in its principles, to the quarrel with Great Britain, who thought it was only to hold up the rod and all would be hush! I cannot at this time undertake to say, that there would be any difficulty with the army, if it was to be ordered upon this Service, but I should be exceedingly unhappy to see the experiment made. For, besides the reasons before suggested, I believe there would be a great and general unwillingness in it to embrue their hands in the blood of their Brethren. I have to add, that almost at the same instant a number of the printed copies of the remonstrance were disseminated through every part of the army. What effect it will have, I know not. The design is obvious.

Head-Quarters, 13 November, 1782.

Sir,

I promised in the beginning of this letter, that I should content myself with a simple relation of facts. I shall only lament, therefore, that Congress did not in the commencement of this dispute act decidedly. This matter, as you well know, was much agitated last winter, and a Committee of Congress, with whom I had the honor to be in conference, and of wch. I believe you were one, saw Mr. Chittenden’s letter to me and approved of my writing him an answer to the effect it was given.1 With great regard, (and in much haste, as Col. Pickering is waiting) I am, &c.

It affords me singular pleasure, to have it in my power to transmit to you the enclosed copy of an act of Congress, of the 7th instant, by which you are released from the disagreeable circumstances in which you have so long been. Supposing you would wish to go into New York as soon as possible, I also enclose a passport for that purpose.

P. S. Altho’ there can be no doubt of Congress having received the remonstrance alluded to in this letter, I send, nevertheless, one of the printed copies.

Your letter of the 18th of October came regularly to my hands. I beg you to believe, that my not answering it sooner, did not proceed from inattention to you, or a want of feeling for your situation. I daily expected a determination of your case, and I thought it better to await that, than to feed you with hopes, that might, in the end, prove fruitless. You will attribute my detention of the enclosed letters, which have been in my hands about a fortnight, to the same cause.

TO LUND WASHINGTON.

I cannot take leave of you, Sir, without assuring you, that, in whatever light my agency in this unpleasing affair may be viewed, I was never influenced, through the whole of it, by sanguinary motives, but by what I conceived a sense of my duty, which loudly called upon me to take measures, however disagreeable, to prevent a repetition of those enormities, which have been the subject of discussion. And that this important end is likely to be answered, without the effusion of the blood of an innocent person, is not a greater relief to you, than it is to, Sir, your most obedient and humble servant.

Newburg, 12 February, 1783.

Dear Lund,

TO LUND WASHINGTON.

Your letter of the 29th of Jany. came by the last Post,—You do not seem to have considered the force and tendency of the words of yr. letter when you talk of the probability only of sending me “the long promised account.” “The irregularity of them” is not, you add, “for want of knowledge in keeping them, but neglect, your aversion to writing,” &c. &c. These are but other words for saying, “as I am not fond of writing, and it is quite immaterial whether you have any knowledge or information of your private concerns or whether the accts. are kept properly or no, I have delayed, and do not know how much longer I may continue to delay bringing you acquainted with these accts., irregular as they are.”

Newburgh, 21 November, 1782.

Dear Lund,

Delicacy hitherto, and a hope that you long ago would have seen into the propriety of the measure without a hint of it from me, has restrained me from telling you, that annual accounts of my Crops, together with the receipts and expenditure of my Money, State of my stocks, &c., ought to have been sent to me as regularly as the year came about. It is not to be supposed, that all the avocations of my public duties, great and laborious as they have been, could render me totally insensible to the only means by which myself and family, and the character I am to maintain in life hereafter, is to be supported; or that a precise account of these matters would not have been exceedingly satisfactory to me. Instead of this, except the accounts rendered at Valley Forge in the year 1778, I have received none since I left home; and not till after two or 3 applications in the course of last year, could I get any accounts of the Crop of the preceding one; and then only of the Corn, by the Post on Sunday last.

My last letter would have informed you that I was disappointed in my application at Philadelphia for money, and that I had given up all thoughts of purchasing Dows’ land. Since then, I have met with an offer of £2000 York currency, for which, if I take it, I shall have to pay at the rate of 7 pr. ct. per annum interest.

I have often told you, and I repeat it with much truth, that the entire confidence which I placed in your integrity made me easy, and I was always happy at thinking that my affairs were in your hands—which I could not have been if they had been under the care of a common manager. But this did not exempt me from the desires which all men have, of knowing the exact state of them. I have now to beg that you will not only send me the account of your receipts and expenditures of specie, but of every other kind of money subsequent to the account exhibited at Valley Forge, which ended some time in April, 1778. I want to know before I come home (as I shall come home with empty pockets, whenever Peace shall take place) how affairs stand with me, and what my dependence is. I wish to know also what I have to expect from the wheat of 1781 and ’82, as you say the two crops are so blended that they cannot be rendered seperately; how are settlements to be made with and justice done to the several Parties Interested under these Circumstances?

Under this disadvantage and the difficulty I may experience in procuring money for repayment of the loan, I would have you before any conclusion is come to with Dow and comy., wait upon Mrs. French and Mr. Dulany for the last time, and know decidedly of them, whether, if a bargain is struck with Dow, they will make an even exchange—tract for tract. You may inform them as an apology for this application, that my reasons for requiring a definitive answer to this question are, that no man is better acquainted with their land than I am, so consequently, no person can be more fully convinced that £2000 is the full value of it;—more indeed, than I ever expected it would cost me, in case I should become the purchaser. That as this sum is the price fixed upon Dow’s land, and two or three purchasers are ready to strike, and the sale of it is only suspended on my account, from a disposition in Mr. Adam to give me the preference, I cannot avoid deciding thereon immediately. That as Mrs. French is unwilling to part with her land without having the value of the two tracts ascertained; it is an evidence in my mind, that she has reason to believe hers will be highest valued, and lastly, if this should be the case, and I, in addition to the £2000 should have a further sum to pay, it would advance the price of her land in the neck so much beyond its real value, that I think it most prudent to forego the purchase of Dow’s land as the means of effecting the exchange for hers, rather than run the hazard of paying too severely for the gratification of a mere fancy (for it is no more) of putting the whole neck under one fence; as it is well known that I stand in no need of land, or meadow for all my purposes.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

In my letter of the 15th of March last to Mr. Dulany, I observed: “If there are lands for which Mrs. French and you are disposed to barter your tract on Dogue Run, and these lands can be had upon reasonable terms, it will in the end be the same thing to me, as a direct purchase.” Whether the price fixed upon Dow’s land is reasonable or not, I, never having seen or heard of it, shall not take upon me to determine: but as it is much higher than I conceived any tract of its size, adjoining the land on which Mrs. French lives, could possibly be rated, I have no doubt of its being optional in me to purchase it or not, as my abilities and inclination shall decide. If Dow’s land contains half the improved, and improvable meadow which he says it does, and the difference could be determined by northern men, or men experienced in the worth of grass land, I should be sure of having it valued to considerably more than Mrs. French’s; and this you will readily believe when I tell you that improved meadow in this part of the country, many miles from any large town, sells from thirty to sixty pounds an acre. But my countrymen are too much used to corn blades and corn shucks; and have too little knowledge of the profit of grass lands, to estimate Dow’s meadow (if it is really good) at one quarter of its value; and as the rest of the tract may be but ordinary, or at best middling forest land, I should not be candid, if I did not declare my apprehension that this tract would be undervalued, not designedly, but for want of a practical knowledge of the advantages which are to be derived from meadows. I therefore think it more consistent with common prudence, if there cannot be an even interchange, to relinquish all hope of getting Mrs. French’s land, than to run the hazard of paying infinitely more than the worth; especially, as I observed before, when I should only please my fancy, and that at the expence of my judgment, by getting in return lands which are very much worn, without meadow, or ground capable of making it; little timber or fire wood, and both very inconvenient; decayed fences, and some inclosures already dependent upon me for their security; and this too, when I am conscious that Dow’s meadow alone, if it is as large and as good as he represents it, would yield more nett profit annually, than the labor of a dozen negroes on Mrs. French’s farm would do, well-managed.

Head-Quarters,Newburg,
26 February, 1783.

Sir,

I have been thus particular that you may know my ultimate determination, and the reasons upon which it is founded. You have nothing more to do therefore, than to ask Mrs. French and Mr. Dulany simply whether they will take Dow’s land for theirs, tract for tract. If they agree to it, then strike the bargain with Dow & Co., get writings suitable to the purpose of all parties executed, and draw upon me for the money. On the other hand, if they do not agree to it, acquaint Dow & Co. therewith, and thank them for the preference given me; and inform me as soon as possible of the final conclusion of the business, that the gentleman1 who has offered me the money, may not be held in suspence. If I could get the money upon better terms than is offered, or if I knew how, or when I could replace it, I should have no objection to speculate in Dow’s land, if it has the quantity of meadow described, for I am sure, so near Alexandria, as it lies, it will become immensely valuable. Remember me kindly to your wife & all friends. I am, &c.1

I am sorry to have to acquaint your Excellency, for the information of Congress, that a project, which I had formed for attacking the enemy’s post at Oswego, so soon as the sleighing should be good and the ice of the Oneida Lake should have acquired sufficient thickness to admit the passage of the detachment, has miscarried. The report of Colonel Willett, to whom I had entrusted the command of the party (consisting of a part of the Rhode Island regiment, and the State troops of New York, in all about five hundred men), will assign reasons for the disappointment.

TO LUND WASHINGTON.

Although the expedition has not been attended with success, the officers and soldiers employed on it are entitled to great credit for the spirit, activity, and patience exhibited by them in the course of the attempt; and, I am certain, nothing that depended upon Colonel Willett to give efficacy to it was wanting.1

Newburg, 21 November, 1782.

Dear Lund,

Major Tallmadge, whom I had placed on the Sound, with the infantry of Sheldon’s legion, for the purpose of interrupting as much as possible on that side the trade with New York, has been more successful, as will appear by his report, a copy of which is likewise enclosed. The zeal and activity of Major Tallmadge, and the promptness and bravery of the party acting under his orders on this occasion, have merited and received my thanks.2 The detachments also belonging to the command of Brigadier-General Hazen, which are occasionally advanced to Bergen, Newark, and Elizabethtown, to intercept the illicit commerce in that quarter, appear to have been very alert, and they have succeeded in several instances. I flatter myself Congress will be persuaded, nothing on my part has been omitted to carry fully into execution the resolution of the 30th of October last.1 But at the same time I am under the necessity to declare, in my own vindication, that, unless the civil powers of the different States will adopt the most energetic measures, and make the greatest exertions to carry them into effect, it will be impossible to put a stop to an evil, which has increased to an alarming height, and which, (notwithstanding all our efforts,) is still increasing, and, I am informed, prevails nowhere in such an uncontrolled manner as on the seacoast of Connecticut. I have the honor to be, &c.2

The letter which will be enclosed with this, will inform you that since my letter by the last post I have had the offer of £2000 York currency, and the terms of it. But before you strike any bargain with Dow and Co. for their land, I would have you view it critically, and form your own judgment of the quality of it. To do this with any degree of accuracy, you must estimate the quantity of improved and unimprovable meadow; the nature of it; the quantity of Hay the first will yield; and the expence which will attend the cutting and making of it; how much of the latter can be added, and the cost of doing it; these things, with a proper valuation of the other parts of the tract, will show you whether I shall be safe in giving the price asked. Or if Dow will pay such as he once said he wou’d give to whomsoever should be the purchaser, there need be no hesitation in that case neither; because the rent will amount to more than the interest of the money. If the price of this land will not stand the test of the first mode of valuation; and the second, as I suspect, was nothing more than a mere puff, and it shall appear that there is some collusion or finesse in Dow & Co. to extort a high price from me, I know of but one other method by which you can proceed with propriety and safety; and that is, to pursue the mode which I have pointed out in the letter herewith enclosed, and which I have made a separate one, that you may as from yourself, candidly let them see, consider, and determine on it.

TO BENJAMIN HARRISON.

If all these expedients fail, (as of your own motion) you might suggest the following proposition, provided Dow & Co. will allow time for the operation of it, vizt: Let the four persons named by Mrs. French to ascertain the value of the two tracts agree upon the choice of a fifth (an odd number is essential, in case of a diversity of opinion, to give a deciding voice. It is also necessary for another reason which I shall not name, but which is too obvious not to strike you). Let these five ascertain, after a thorough review of both tracts, and due consideration given to the local situation of each, the advantages and disadvantages attending both, the quantity of the land, &c., &c., the value of each tract—as a tract. Let both parties be at liberty to agree or disagree to this valuation; but let Mrs. French and Mr. Dulany declare explicitly if they are satisfied with the valuation and difference which shall be adjudged by these five persons, that it shall be a bargain on their part, if I agree to it, and you to give me immediate notice of it, that I may also say yea, or nay.

Newburg, 4 March, 1783.

You will have it in your power to inform Mr. Dulany, and may do it very truly, that I look upon £2000 to be a great price for his land; that my wishes to obtain it do not proceed from its intrinsic value, but from the motives I have candidly assigned in my other letter. That to indulge this fancy, (for in truth there is more fancy than judgment in it) I have submitted, or am willing to submit, to the disadvantage of borrowing as large a sum as I think this Land is worth, in order to come at it; but that, rather than go beyond this, as he and Mrs. French for some reasons unknown to me certainly expect their land will be valued higher than Dow’s;—I choose to forego the purchase of the latter, and relinquish thereby all prospect of obtaining his land through that means.

* * * * * *

As the gentleman of whom I am to borrow the money will be held in suspense until I get a definitive answer from you, you will readily see the propriety of bringing the matter to issue some way or another, as soon as possible, and giving me notice. I am, &c.1

What, my dear Sir, could induce the State of Virginia to rescind their assent to the Impost Law? How are the numerous creditors in Civil as well as Military life to be paid unless there are regular & certain funds established to discharge the Interest of Monies which must be borrowed for these purposes? and what Tax can be more just, or better calculated to this end than an Impost?—

TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

The Alarm Bell which has been rung with such tremendous sound of the danger of entrusting Congress with the money is too selfish & futile to require a serious answer—Who are Congress, but the People?—do they not return to them at certain short periods?—Are they not amenable at all times to them for their Conduct—& subject to recall?—What interest therefore can a man have under these circumstances distinct from his Constituents?—Can it be supposed, that with design, he would form a junto—or dangerous Aristocracy that would operate against himself in less than a Month perhaps after it should be established?—I can have no conception of it.

Head-Quarters,Newburg,
21 November, 1782.

Sir,

But from the observations I have made in the course of this war—and my intercourse with the States both in their united and seperate capacities have afforded ample opportunities of judging—I am decidedly of opinion that if the Powers of Congress are not enlarged, and made competent to all general purposes that the blood that has been spilt—the Expences which have been incurred—and the distresses which we have undergone will avail us nothing—and that the band which at present holds us together, by a very feeble thread, will soon be broken when anarchy & confusion must ensue.

After I had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 29th of July, I lost not a moment in transmitting it to Congress, who had then under deliberation the proceedings of the British court-martial upon Captain Lippincott for the murder of Captain Huddy, and the other documents relating to that inhuman transaction. What would otherwise have been the determination of that honorable body, I will not undertake to say; but I think I may venture to assure your Excellency, that your generous interposition had no small degree of weight in procuring that decision in favor of Captain Asgill, which he had no right to expect from the very unsatisfactory measures, which had been taken by the British commander-in-chief to atone for a crime of the blackest dye, not to be justified by the practices of war, and unknown at this day amongst civilized nations. I however flatter myself, that our enemies have been brought to view this transaction in its true light, and that we shall not experience a repetition of the like enormity.

You will excuse the freedom of these sentiments—they proceed from an honest heart Altho’ they should be found to be the result of erroneous thinking—they will at least prove the sincerity of my friendship, as they are totally undisguised.

Captain Asgill has been released, and is at perfect liberty to return to the arms of an affectionate parent, whose pathetic address to your Excellency could not fail of interesting every feeling heart in her behalf. I have no right to assume any particular merit from the lenient manner in which this disagreeable affair has terminated. But I beg you to believe, Sir, that I most sincerely rejoice, not only because your humane intentions are gratified, but because the event accords with the wishes of his Most Christian Majesty, and his royal and amiable consort, who, by their benevolence and munificence, have endeared themselves to every true American. I have the honor to be, &c.1

With great esteem &c.

TO MAJOR BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.

TO ALEXANDER HAMILTON, IN CONGRESS.1

Head Quarters, 10 December, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Newburg, 4 March, 1783.

Dear Sir,

I received your favor of the 8th last Evening by Express tho you have not met with that success you deserved and probably would have obtained had the Enterprise proceeded, yet I cannot but think your whole conduct in the affair was such as ought to entitle you still more to my confidence and esteem—for however it may be the practice of the World, and those who see objects but partially, or thro’ a false medium to consider that only as meritorious which is attended with success, I have accustomed myself to judge of human Actions very differently and to appreciate them by the manner in which they are conducted, more than by the Event; which it is not in the power of human foresight and prudence to command—In this point of view I see nothing irreparable & little occasion of serious regret, except the wound of the gallant Captain Brewster, from which I sincerely hope he may recover—Another time you will have less opposition from the Winds and Weather, and success will amply compensate you for this little disappointment.

I have received your favor of February [7th], and thank you for the information and observations it has conveyed to me. I shall always think myself obliged by a free communication of Sentiments, and have often thought, (but suppose I thought wrong, as it did not accord with the practice of Congress,) that the public interest might be benefited if the Commander-in-Chief of the Army were let more into the political and pecuniary state of our affairs than he is. Enterprises, and the adoption of military and other arrangements, that might be exceedingly proper in some circumstances, would be altogether improper in others. It follows, then, by fair deduction, that, where there is a want of information, there must be a chance-medley; and a man may be upon the brink of a precipice before he is aware of his danger, when a little foreknowledge might enable him to avoid it. But this by the by.

I have almost determined to post you with the Infantry of the Legion contiguous to the Sound, in which case I shall expect you to persevere in your endeavors to keep me perfectly advised of the State of the Enemy,—and perhaps some favorable moment may yet occur.

The hint contained in your Letter, and the knowledge I have derived from the public Gazettes, respecting the non-payment of Taxes, contains all the information which I have received of the danger, that stares us in the face on acct. of our funds; and, so far was I from conceiving, that our Finances was in so deplorable a state at this time, that I had imbibed ideas from some source of information or another, that, with the prospect of a loan from Holland, we should be able to rub along yet a little further.

I am, Dear Sir, &c.

To you, who have seen the danger, to which the army has been exposed, to a political dissolution for want of subsistence, and the unhappy spirit of licentiousness, which it imbibed by becoming in one or two instances its own proveditors, no observations are necessary to evince the fatal tendency of such a measure; but I shall give it as my opinion, that it would at this day be productive of civil commotions and end in blood. Unhappy situation this! God forbid we should be involved in it.

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

The predicament, in which I stand as Citizen and soldier, is as critical and delicate as can well be conceived. It has been the subject of many contemplative hours. The suffering of a complaining army on one hand, and the inability of Congress and tardiness of the States on the other, are the forebodings of evil, and may be productive of events, which are more to be deprecated than prevented. But I am not without hope, if there is such a disposition shown, as prudence and policy will dictate, to do justice, that your apprehensions in case of Peace are greater than there is cause for. In this, however, I may be mistaken, if those ideas, which you have been informed are propagating in the army, should be extensive; the source of which may be easily traced, as the old leaven it is said, for I have no proof of it, is again beginning to work under a mask of the most perfect dissimulation and apparent cordiality.

Newburg, 14 December, 1782.

Be these things as they may, I shall pursue the same steady line of conduct, which has governed me hitherto; fully convinced, that the sensible and discerning part of the army cannot be unacquainted, (altho’ I never took pains to inform them), with the services I have rendered it on more occasions than one. This, and pursuing the suggestions in your letter, which I am happy to find coincides with my practice for several months past (which has turned the business of the army into the Channel it now is), leaves me under no great apprehension of its exceeding the bounds of reason and moderation, notwithstanding the prevailing sentiment there is, that the prospect of compensation for past services will terminate with the war.

I cannot, my dear Genl., permit you to depart from this Country, without repeating to you the high sense I entertain of the Services you have rendered to America, by the constant attention, which you have paid to the Interest of it, by the exact order and discipline of the corps under your command, and by your readiness, at all times, to give facility to every measure which the force of the combined armies was competent to.

The just claims of the army ought, and it is to be hoped will have their weight with every sensible legislature in the United States, if Congress point to their demands, and show, if the case is so, the reasonableness of them, and the impracticability of complying with them without their aid. In any other point of view, it would in my opinion be impolitic to introduce the army on the Tapis, lest it should excite jealousy and bring on its concomitants. The States cannot surely be so devoid of common sense, common honesty, and common policy, as to refuse their aid on a full, clear, and candid representation of facts from Congress; more especially if these should be enforced by members of their own body, who might demonstrate what the inevitable consequences of failure will lead to.

To this testimony of your public character, I should be wanting to the feelings of my heart, was I not to add expressions of the happiness I have enjoyed in your private friendship, the remembrance of which will be one of the most pleasing circumstances of my life. My best wishes will accompany you to France, where I sincerely hope, and have no doubt, of your meeting with the smiles and rewards of a generous prince, and the warmest embraces of affectionate friends. Adieu. I have the honor to be, with great personal attachment, respect, and regard, your obedient and most humble servant.1

In my opinion it is a matter worthy of consideration, how far an adjournment of Congress for a few months is advisable. The Delegates in that case, if they are in unison themselves respecting the great defects of our constitution, may represent them fully and boldly to their constituents. To me, who know nothing of the business which is before Congress, nor of the arcanum, it appears that such a measure would tend to promote the public weal; for it is clearly my opinion, unless Congress have powers competent to all general purposes, that the distresses we have encountered, the Expense we have incurred, and the blood we have spilt in the course of an eight years war, will avail us nothing.

TO JOSEPH JONES, IN CONGRESS.

The contents of your letter is known only to myself. Your prudence will be at no loss to know what use to make of these sentiments. I have the honor to be, &c.1

Newburg, 14 December, 1782.

Dear Sir,

TO ROBERT MORRIS.

In the course of a few days, Congress will, I expect, receive an address from the army on the subject of their grievances. This address, though couched in very respectful terms, is one of those things, which, though unpleasing, is just now unavoidable. For I was very apprehensive once, that matters would take a more unfavorable turn, from the variety of discontents which prevail.

Head Quarters, 8 March, 1783.

Sir:

The temper of the army is much soured, and has become more irritable than at any period since the commencement of the war. This consideration alone prevented me (for every thing else seemed to be in a state of inactivity and almost tranquillity) from requesting leave to spend this winter in Virginia, that I might give some attention to my long-neglected private concerns. The dissatisfactions of the army had arisen to a great and alarming height, and combinations among the officers to resign at given periods in a body were beginning to take place, when, by some address and management, their resolutions have been converted into the form in which they will now appear before Congress. What that honorable body can or will do in the matter, does not belong to me to determine; but policy, in my opinion, should dictate soothing measures; as it is an uncontrovertible fact, that no part of the community has undergone equal hardships, and borne them with the same patience and fortitude, as the army has done.

Very painfull Sensations are excited in my mind by your Letter of the 27th of Febry.1 It is impossible for me to express to you the Regret with which I received the Information it contains.

Hitherto the officers have stood between the lower order of the soldiery and the public; and in more instances than one, at the hazard of their lives, have quelled very dangerous mutinies. But if their discontents should be suffered to rise equally high, I know not what the consequences may be. The spirit of enthusiasm, which overcame every thing at first, is now done away. It is idle, therefore, to expect more from military men, than from those discharging the civil departments of government. If both were to fare alike with respect to the emoluments of office, I would answer for it, that the military character should not be the first to complain. But it is an invidious distinction, and one that will not stand the test of reason or policy, that one set should receive all, and the other no part (or that which is next to it), of their pay. In a word, the experiment is dangerous; and, if it succeeded, would only prove, that the one class are actuated by more zeal than the other, not that they have less occasion for their money. I am, with sincere esteem, &c.1

I have often reflected, with much solicitude upon the disagreeableness of your Situation and the Negligence of the Several States, in not enabling you to do that Justice to the public Creditors, which their Demands require. I wish the step you have taken may sound the Alarm to their inmost Souls, and rouse them to a just Sense of their own Interest, honor, and Credit. But I must confess to you, that I have my fears. For as danger becomes further removed from them, their feelings seem to be more callous to those noble Sentiments, with which I could wish to see them inspired. Mutual Jealousies, local prejudices, and misapprehensions have taken such deep Root, as will not easily be removed.

TO BARTHOLOMEW DANDRIDGE.

Notwithstanding the Embarrassments which you have experienced, I was in hopes that you would have continued your Efforts to the close of the War, at least; but if your Resolutions are absolutely fixed, I assure you I consider the Event as one of the most unfortunate that could have fallen upon the States, and most sincerely deprecate the sad consequences which I fear will follow. The Army, I am sure, at the same Time that they entertain the highest sense of your Exertions will lament the step you are obliged to take, as a most unfortunate Circumstance to them. I am &c.

Newburg, 18 December, 1782.

Dear Sir,

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Your favor of the 5th of last month came safe to my hands—at this place; in the vicinity of which the Army is cantoned.

Head-Quarters, 12 March, 1783.

Sir,

I am fully persuaded from all accounts, that in Posey you have to deal with a most consumate villain; and from your own, that you have pursued the most prudent method of managing him, and for obtaining that justice which is due to Mr. Custis’s Estate. I am clear in Sentiment with you, that he should be removed from his present Stewardship as soon as it can be done with any degree of propriety; for, be assured, Sir, that a man so devoid of principle as he is, to be guilty, not only of the barefaced frauds with which he is accused, but the abominable Sin of ingratitude, will neglect no opportunity of converting to his own use, when he can do it with impunity, every species of property that is committed to his care, and will do it the more readily after his reputation will have suffered, than before—The most hardened villain, altho’ he Sins without remorse, wishes to cloak his iniquity—if possible under specious and [mutilated] but when character is no more, he bids defiance to the opinions of Mankind, and is under no other restraint than that of the Law, and the punishments it inflicts. Posey, I am persuaded, will be no exception to this rule—and that the sooner the Estate can be taken out of his hands the less it will suffer—as it cannot be in worse.—

It is with inexpressible concern I make the following report to your Excellency. Two days ago, anonymous papers were circulated in the army, requesting a general meeting of the officers on the next day. A copy of one of these papers is enclosed, No. 1. About the same time, another anonymous paper, purporting to be an address to the officers of the army, was handed about in a clandestine manner. A copy of this is marked No. 2. To prevent any precipitate and dangerous resolutions from being taken at this perilous moment, while the passions were all inflamed, as soon as these things had come to my knowledge the next morning, I issued the enclosed order, No. 3. In this situation the matter now rests.

With respect to the valuation of the Stock, if upon an investigation of the matter, and comparing it with the Scale of depreciation as settled by Congress, it shall be found, when reduced to specie value, that the sum amounts to more than the number and kind of cattle had of me are worth, let a just value be placed on them, and it will meet my entire approbation. Mr. Custis, as I wrote him, was alarmed at the nominal, without attending to the real price of the stock—for if 20 paper Dollars in those days, was valued at, and would purchase no more than one Silver D[ollar] valuing any article at £6 Currency, was neither more nor less than fixing it at a Dollar specie—If therefore the valuation of Colo. Bassett when estimated by this rule, and fixed upon this principle, is not too high, there certainly can be no cause of complaint; and upon this footing I am willing to place the matter—A Dollar in specie may be a hundred pounds according to the scale of depreciation, but if no man will give more than Six shillings for it, that sum is most certainly the intrinsic worth of it. It never was, nor is it now my intention to put the Estate of Mr. Custis to the least inconvenience to pay the Debt it owes me. On the contrary, if I ever get it at all, to receive it at such a time and in such a manner as to occasion the least possible distress is all I aim at. Therefore, as it seemed to be your opinion and it was clearly mine, that the stud, and other Horses belonging to that Estate (which were not wanted for immediate use) had better be sold—and as I really wanted one, and could have made it very convenient to have taken both of his covering Horses, I directed Mr. Lund Washington to get them in discount of my Debt; but if I can obtain nothing without advancing the money, as an indifferent purchaser, I shall certainly decline this mode of gratifying my wants, as I have no more idea of advancing money (in truth I have it not to advance) to an estate that owes it to me, than I have of demanding it from one that cannot, with convenience pay it. If therefore you cannot let me have one of the stud horses upon the above terms, I must not only do without him, but any other as I have not the means of purchasing.

As all opinion must be suspended until after the meeting on Saturday, I have nothing further to add, except a wish that the measure I have taken to dissipate a storm, which had gathered so suddenly and unexpectedly, may be acceptable to Congress; and to assure them that, in every vicissitude of circumstances, still actuated with the greatest zeal in their service, I shall continue my utmost exertions to promote the welfare of my country, under the most lively expectation, that Congress have the best intention of doing ample justice to the army as soon as circumstances will possibly admit.

The French Army have Embarked at Boston for the West Indies; but had not Sailed when I heard last from that Quarter—Lord Howe has relieved Gibraltar—The French have taken and destroyed the British Interest in Hudson’s Bay, to the Amount it is said of 10,000,000 of Livres. The British Fleet have left New York in two divisions, and a detachment of Troops it is reported are going from that place to the West Indies; but when they will embark is uncertain. A number of Transports are collected there but I believe they are only waiting for decisive orders from their Court; which in my judgment would not Issue till after the meeting of Parliament, when the Parties for and against the American War will try their strength. We shall then know whether we are [mutilated] under our Vine and fig Trees in Peace, or prosecute the War.

I have the honor to be, &c.

P. S. Since writing the foregoing, another anonymous paper is put in circulation, a copy of which is enclosed, No. 4.1

It gives me much pleasure to hear that your good Mother, yourself, Mrs Dandridge, and Family, are well. My affectionate regards are presented to them all, in which your Sister, who arrived here the 30th of last month, joins. I am, &c.

ADDRESS TO THE OFFICERS.1

TO MAJOR-GENERAL GREENE.

Gentlemen,

Head Quarters,Newburg,
18 December, 1782.

My Dear Sir,

By an anonymous summons an attempt has been made to convene you together. How inconsistent with the rules of propriety, how unmilitary, and how subversive of all good order and discipline, let the good sense of the army decide.

By the Southern Mail of last Week I received your Letter of the 4th of Octr. enclosing the Returns of your Army: and I am just now favored with that of the 11th of Octr. covering the Returns for the month of Octr.: as I find by the latter, you had recd. mine of the 23d of Septr., I can have no occasion to suggest anything farther at this time respecting the disposition of the Troops after the Enemy shall have abandoned the Southern States—the latitude already given, will in a sufficient manner I believe, enable you to act for the public good, as the state of affairs may then seem to demand.

In the moment of this summons, another anonymous production was sent into circulation; addressed more to the feelings and passions, than to the reason and judgment of the army. The author of the piece is entitled to such credit for the goodness of his pen, and I could wish he had as much credit for the rectitude of his heart; for, as men see through different optics, and are induced by the reflecting faculties of the mind to use different means to obtain the same end, the author of the address should have had more charity, than to mark for suspicion the man, who should recommend moderation and longer forbearance, or in other words, who should not think as he thinks, and act as he advises. But he had another plan in view, in which candor and liberality of sentiment, regard to justice, and love of country, have no part; and he was right to insinuate the darkest suspicion, to effect the blackest designs.

There has been during the Summer much speculalation & many conjectures that New York would be evacuated before Winter, as I informed you in my last letter which was dated the 18th of Octr. but at the same time I mentioned “I had no such idea;” and the event has justified my opinion.—I am not without expectations, however, that a detachment will be made in the course of the Winter to the West Indies: indeed many appearances strongly indicate this, or at least, that some orders of embarkation are expected, such as the great preparation of Transports there being now about 120, collected from various quarters, lying in the east River compleatly fitted for sea—and Reports still continue to assert that several thousand British Troops will yet be detached.

That the address is drawn with great art, and is designed to answer the most insidious purposes, that it is calculated to impress the mind with an idea of premeditated injustice in the sovereign power of the United States, and rouse all those resentments, which must unavoidably flow from such a belief; that the secret mover of this scheme, whoever he may be, intended to take advantage of the passions, while they were warmed by the recollection of past distresses, without giving time for cool, deliberate thinking, and that composure of mind which is so necessary to give dignity and stability to measures, is rendered too obvious by the mode of conducting the business, to need other proof than a reference to the proceeding.

The sailing of the Fleet from New York in two divisions, I suppose must have been well known in Carolina; as in all probability the last squadron served to convoy a part of the Garrison of Charles Town to the W. Indies agreeably to your expectation—But I imagine you could not have learned, (it having been a secret to this time which it was not prudent to commit to paper) that the Orders of the Court of Versailles to the Count de Rochambeau, (who is himself about to sail for France) were that the Corps under his orders should go to the West Indies, in case the evacuation of New York or Charles Town should take place—In expectation that the latter would happen, the French Army marched into the eastern States, towards the last of Octr., under pretext of taking Winter Quarters there, but in fact, with the design of embarking on board the Fleet of M. the Marquis de Vaudrieul at Boston; whenever the event on which their ultimate movement depended, became sufficiently ascertained. From the general concurrence of intelligence & a variety of circumstances the Enemy’s intention to leave Charles Town has approached so near to a certainty, that all the Army of His Most Christn. Majesty (excepting the Legion of Lauzun which remains behind) have embarked, and are to sail in two days from this time—As soon as this Fleet is clear of the Coast, & the destination of the Troops shall be positively known at N. York, (as I observed before) it appears not improbable a considerable Corps of British will be sent to Jamaica; for the safety of which Island the apprehensions of the Enemy appear to be very much alarmed, on account of the large force at the Havanna & the arrival of the Marquis de Bouilli with a reinforcemt. from France—How far the Combined Powers will in reality prosecute a serious operation in that quarter, since the failure of the attempt against Gibraltar; (of the relief of which by the Fleet under Lord Howe you will I dare say have heard before this reaches you) or how far the last mentioned circumstance will tend to hasten or retard a general Pacification, I cannot undertake to determine with certainty. Many Politicians imagine that the fewer capital advantages either of the Belligerent Powers in Europe has over the other, the smaller will be the obstacles that will present themselves in the course of the negociation for Peace—but almost everything respecting this business in my opinion, will rather depend on the strength or weakness of Shelburne’s & Fox’s Parties in the British Parliament.

Thus much, Gentlemen, I have thought it incumbent on me to observe to you, to show upon what principles I opposed the irregular and hasty meeting, which was proposed to be held on Tuesday last, and not because I wanted a disposition to give you every opportunity, consistent with your own honor and the dignity of the army, to make known your grievances. If my conduct heretofore has not evinced to you, that I have been a faithful friend to the army, my declaration of it at this time would be equally unavailing and improper. But, as I was among the first, who embarked in the cause of our common country; as I have never left your side one moment, but when called from you on public duty; as I have been the constant companion and witness of your distresses, and not among the last to feel and acknowledge your merits; as I have ever considered my own military reputation as inseparably connected with that of the army; as my heart has ever expanded with joy, when I have heard its praises, and my indignation has arisen, when the mouth of detraction has been opened against it; it can scarcely be supposed, at this late stage of the war, that I am indifferent to its interests. But how are they to be promoted? The way is plain, says the anonymous addresser; if war continues, remove into the unsettled country; there establish yourselves, and leave an ungrateful country to defend itself. But whom are they to defend? Our wives, our children, our farms and other property, which we leave behind us? Or, in the state of hostile separation, are we to take the two first (the latter cannot be removed) to perish in a wilderness with hunger, cold, and nakedness? If peace takes place, neither sheath your swords, says he, until you have obtained full and ample justice. This dreadful alternative, of either deserting our country in the extremest hour of distress, or turning our arms against it, which is the apparent object, unless Congress can be compelled into instant compliance, has something so shocking in it, that humility revolts at the idea. My God! What can this writer have in view by recommending such measures. Can he be a friend to the army? Can he be a friend to this country? Rather is he not an insidious foe? Some emissary, perhaps from New York, plotting the ruin of both by sowing the seeds of discord and separation between the civil and military powers of the continent? And what a compliment does he pay to our understandings, when he recommends measures, in either alternative, impracticable in their nature?

To wait Events, & profit by the occasions which may occur, I have concentred the Army to a point as much as possible.—At West Point and the Cantonment 4 miles from this place is our whole force, except the Rhode Island Regt. at the Northws. & one or two Corps on the Lines—this Army indeed is not numerous, but the efficient strength is greater in proportion to the total numbers, than ever it has been; the Troops are tolerably well appointed, and have improved very much in their discipline during the last Campaign. The Enemy’s regular Force in New York I compute to be between ten & eleven thousand.—Should they weaken themselves by a detachment of 4 or 5000 men & still attempt to hold that Garrison another Campaign, it would be an indelible blot to the reputation of this Country, not to furnish sufficient means for enabling us to expel them from the Continent.—And yet I am free to confess, I have accustomed myself not to be over sanguine in any of my calculations, especially when I consider the want of energy in government, & the want of that disposition in too many of the People, which once influenced them chearfully to yield a part to defend the remainder of their property.

But here, Gentlemen, I will drop the curtain, because it would be as imprudent in me to assign my reasons for this opinion, as it would be insulting to your conception to suppose you stood in need of them. A moment’s reflection will convince every dispassionate mind of the physical impossibility of carrying either proposal into execution.

Thus, my dear Sir, have I given for your own private satisfaction, a pretty general detail of the affairs of our Allies, ourselves, & our Enemies in this part of the Continent.—Hoping & expecting the Southern States will be restored to perfect tranquility before this is delivered to you, I have only to add that Mrs. Washington joins me in requesting Mrs. Greene & yourself to accept our best wishes & Compliments—it will ever give me pleasure to hear from you on matters of business or friendship, being with sentiments of perfect esteem & regard &c.

There might, Gentlemen, be an impropriety in my taking notice, in this address to you, of an anonymous production; but the manner in which that performance has been introduced to the army, the effect it was intended to have, together with some other circumstances, will amply justify my observations on the tendency of that writing. With respect to the advice given by the author to suspect the man, who shall recommend moderate measures and longer forbearance, I spurn it, as every man who regards that liberty, and reveres that justice, for which we contend, undoubtedly must. For, if men are to be precluded from offering their sentiments on a matter, which may involve the most serious and alarming consequences, that can invite the consideration of mankind, reason is of no use to us; the freedom of speech may be taken away, and, dumb and silent, we may be led away like sheep to the slaughter.

I am &c.

I cannot, in justice to my own belief, and what I have great reason to conceive is the intention of Congress, conclude this address without giving it as my decided opinion, that that honorable body entertain exalted sentiments of the services of the army, and, from a full conviction of its merits and sufferings, will do it complete justice. That their endeavors to discover, and establish funds for this purpose have been unwearied, and will not cease, till they have succeeded, I have no doubt; but, like all other large bodies, where there is a variety of different interests to reconcile, their deliberations are slow. Why then should we distrust them; and, in consequence of that distrust, adopt measures, which may cast a shade over that glory, which has been so justly acquired, and tarnish the reputation of an army, which is celebrated through all Europe for its fortitude and patriotism? And for what is this done? To bring the object we seek nearer? No! Most certainly, in my opinion, it will cast it at a greater distance.

[1 ]For nearly three years Sir Henry Clinton had from time to time solicited his recall, and at length the King granted him permission to return to Europe, which he received the last week in April. The command then devolved on General Robertson. He retained this station, however, only about a week, when Sir Guy Carleton arrived in New York, and took command of the British armies in America, as the permanent successor of Sir Henry Clinton.

[1 ]“In answer to my letter the British general informs me, that a court-martial is ordered for the trial of the persons complained of; but at the same time says, that those people offer, in justification of the fact, a number of instances of cruelty committed by us, and particularly in Monmouth county. Though this is by no means admitted, but on the contrary orders are given to designate and send to camp a British officer, who, if my demand is not complied with, will be executed; yet I cannot forbear observing to your Excellency, that, whilst we demand satisfaction from the enemy for the violences they commit, it becomes us to be particularly careful, that they have not a like claim on us; and I must beg you to make it known to all persons acting in a military capacity in your State, that I shall hold myself obliged to deliver up to the enemy, or otherwise to punish, such of them as shall commit any act, which is in the least contrary to the laws of war, I doubt not of your doing the same with those, who come under the civil power.

“The enemy also complain of the detention of Hatfield and Badgely, who, they say, were out by direction of our commissary of prisoners under sanction of a flag. I must beg your Excellency to inform me, as soon as possible, of the circumstances attending their capture, and the causes of their detention. If those causes are not strictly just, I could wish they were sent in.”—Washington to Governor Livingston, 6 May, 1782. One Hatfield had offered in the spring of 1780 to supply Washington with intelligence, and though the General was “suspicious of the man” he did employ him, but to what extent is not known. This was thought to be Moses Hatfield, and may have been the same who is thus associated with Isaac Badgely. These two men were condemned as guilty of treason by the civil tribunal of New Jersey.

“As I had the honor in my last [June 10th] of transmitting the circumstances relating to Hatfield and Badgely, to inform you, that, finding them entirely in the hands of the civil power, it was not within my line to say any thing further on the subject; so, from the tenor of your letter, it becomes necessary for me now to be very explicit in mentioning to your Excellency, that, in matters of civil resort, I am not authorized, in any case, to make the least interference. The civil laws, within the several States, having been passed without any agency of mine, I am equally excluded from any part in their execution; neither is it to be supposed, that they are under any control or influence from me. The civil power, therefore, of the States only being competent to the discussion of civil points, I shall leave them solely to their consideration, being determined to confine myself to the proper line of my duty, which is purely military.”—Washington to Sir Guy Carleton, 22 June, 1782.

[1 ]General Lincoln, by some error, informed Washington that there was no “unconditional prisoner of war” available, and Washington on the 18th directed Hazen to carry out the instructions of the 3d.

[1 ]The second paragraph in the letter is altered to Virginia and Maryland, and the following substituted, viz.:

“From the returns I have been able to obtain of recruits furnished by the several States, I am very sorry to observe that their exertions to this time have almost totally disappointed this expectation.”—Note by Washington.

[1 ]“If I should have occasion for the Militia of your state, the call will be sudden, and their movements must be rapid, otherwise great expense will accrue and only disgrace and disappointment will ensue. For these reasons I beg leave to recall your Excellency’s attention to my letter of the 5 March last, and to pray most earnestly that every previous arrangement may be taken to facilitate their march when requested.”—To Virginia and Maryland. Note by Washington.

[1 ]“We wanted no fresh opiate to increase that stupor into which we had fallen, but I much fear that the idle, and delusive offers of Peace with which the Country resounds, will, if it is not powerfully counteracted, be exceedingly injurious to us—not (I apprehend) from any disposition in the people to listen to improper terms, but from a misconception of what is really meant, and the arts which are used to make them believe that Independence, and what not, are proffered to them. Under these ideas they ask, why need we be taxed, or why need we be put to the expence and trouble of compleating our Battalions?

“It is to be hoped that the despatches which are now on their passage to Congress, will announce the aids which are intended for us by the Court of France, as it is high time the plan of campaign was known, which cannot be the case till we have materials to project one. Would to God there may not be too much truth in the British account (in the York Gazettes) of the advantages gained by her in the naval action off Guadaloupe—it may be productive of a total derangement of the plans of the French Court, this campaign.”—Washington to R. R. Livingston, 22 May, 1782.

“What may be the real intention of the present Ministry, respecting America—or what effect the naval action in the West Indies may have upon the intended operations of this year, and consequently upon the conduct of the Powers at war, is difficult to say. There is, however, one plain line chalked out for us; by pursuing which we cannot err; and it gives me pleasure to hear that Congress are inculcating this by a deputation from their own Body. If Rodney’s victory is as decisive and important as the New York gazettes endeavor to make it; and the new Ministry should not be too much buoyed up by it; there is no measure so likely to produce a speedy termination of the War as vigorous preparations for meeting the enemy in full expectation of it, if they are only playing the insidious game. This will make them think of Peace in good earnest.”—Washington to Robert R. Livingston, 5 June, 1782.

[1 ]Read in Congress, May 13th.

The papers enclosed in the letter were printed copies of the proceedings of the House of Commons, on the 4th of March, 1782, respecting an address to the King in favor of peace; and also a copy of the bill reported in consequence thereof, enabling his Majesty to conclude a peace or truce with the revolted colonies in North America.

The French cabinet were somewhat concerned as to the effect, which these movements of the British Parliament might have in America. As soon as they were known at Versailles, Count de Vergennes wrote to M. de la Luzerne expressing his apprehensions.

“The object of the British King,” said he, “in acceding to these resolutions, is obvious. He would persuade the Americans, that he is sincerely disposed to a reconciliation, and would spare nothing to impress this persuasion by influencing their feelings towards England, and causing them to be unfaithful to France. On examining the comparative situation of England and America, one could hardly hesitate to decide what impression these resolutions should make; yet the strong propensity of the Americans to inactivity; their need of peace and the desire they manifest for it; the embarrassment as to their means of continuing the war; the great number of English partisans among them; all these causes united are enough to excite the fear, that the wishes of the people may prevail over the patriotism and zeal of Congress, and that this body will be forced to lend an ear to the pretended pacific overtures of the court of London. Such a step would of course be infinitely disagreeable to France, because it would effectually change the object and mode of prosecuting the war; it would augment the hostile resources of England, and would cause France to lose a great part of the fruit of her offensive efforts in carrying on the war for the independence of America. It is therefore of the highest importance, that the United States should continue of the same principles as heretofore, remain immovably attached to the alliance, and follow the example of France in refusing to listen to a separate peace with England. Every principle of honor and interest requires this conduct in the Americans.

“It should not be concealed from you, that the English ministry have recently sent a secret emissary to us, with propositions for a separate peace. The conditions, which he offered, were such as would have satisfied the King, if he had been without allies. He stipulated, among other things, the uti possidetis, the suppression of the English commission at Dunkirk, and advantages in India. But these offers did not move the King. His Majesty acknowledges no other rule, than that which is traced in his engagements; and he answered, that, however ardent might be his wishes for the reëstablishment of peace, he could not commence a negotiation to that end without the participation of his allies. The English commissioner replied, that he perfectly understood this answer to refer to America, as well as Spain, but objected, that recognising the independence of the colonies did not enter into the system of England. I replied, that this was the basis of the system of the King. Upon this he asked, if there was no mode of treating with France without involving the affairs of America. I sent to him for answer the first pacific overtures, which we had communicated to the mediators. I added, that, whether England should treat of the affairs of America with us, or hold a direct negotiation with the United States, she could not avoid treating with the deputies of Congress; and thus she would be compelled to recognise the authority of that body. I cannot say whether any thing will result from this advance on the part of the English ministry, whether it was meant as an apple of discord between us and our allies; but, whatever may have been the intention, the issue ought at least to be a new and strong proof to the Americans of the fidelity of the King to his engagements, and to convince them of the extreme injustice of deviating from his example.”—MS. Letter from Vergennes to Luzerne, Versailles, March 23, 1782.

A few days afterwards, in writing again upon the same subject, Count de Vergennes said:

“Although we desire that Congress may neither open a direct negotiation, nor make a separate peace, yet we have no wish to prevent that body from following the system, which we ourselves have traced in our answer to the mediating courts. We are and always shall be disposed to consent, that the American plenipotentiaries in Europe shall treat, in conformity to their instructions, directly and without our intervention, with those from the court of London, while we shall be engaged in a negotiation on our part; provided that the two negotiations shall proceed with an equal progress, that the two treaties shall be signed at the same time, and that neither of them shall take effect without the other.”—MS. Letter, April 9th—Sparks.

[1 ]On the very day on which Congress received Washington’s letter, Madison could write that the request of Carleton “will certainly be refused, and General Washington directed to receive and forward any despatches which may be properly addressed to Congress,” and when an audience was given to the French minister, on the 13th, “it was deemed politic at this crisis to display every proper evidence of affectionate attachment to our ally.”

“Sir Guy Carleton attempted to commence a correspondence with Congress, but that assembly wholly declined his advances. He then wrote to some of the governors of the States, but their answers were equally pointed and repulsive. He next addressed himself to the people, not directly, but through the channel of the newspapers in New York; exhorting them to change their leaders and recall their present members of Congress, and speaking of the new disposition for reconciliation and peace on the part of the mother country; but all without effect. Another attempt is to humiliate Congress by representing them to be under the influence of France, and particularly of the French minister in the United States. But he has used another instrument more powerful than these. He treats all the Americans, who fall into his hands, with extreme kindness; exhorts them not to bear arms against Great Britain; admits freely into New York the wives of the captains of vessels, which have been taken and brought into that harbor, and at their solicitation releases their husbands. And he has even written to General Washington, that he will send back the captured Carolinians in the King’s ships and at the King’s expense; and that he would do all in his power to cause them to forget their past injuries.”—Luzerne to Vergennes, 14 June, 1782.

[1 ]It was decided by Congress, that the Commander-in-chief should be directed to refuse a passport for Mr. Morgann to bring despatches to Philadelphia.—Journals, May 14th. The advances of Sir Guy Carleton bore so strong a similarity to those of the commissioners in 1778, which proved delusive and fruitless, that Congress deemed it advisable not to open any door for an intercourse through this channel, and more especially as the business of negotiating a peace was entrusted to the American commissioners in Europe.

Had the tenor of Sir Guy Carleton’s instructions been known in America, it is probable that a more conciliating temper would have been shown by Congress. The late change of ministry had produced a change in the determinations of the British Cabinet, and in the measures for prosecuting the war, wholly unexpected and as yet not even conjectured in the United States. This will appear by the following extracts from the directions of the new secretary at war to Sir Guy Carleton when he left England:

“The first object of your attention must be the withdrawing of the garrison, artillery, provisions, stores of all kinds, and every species of public property from New York and its dependencies to Halifax. The same steps are to be taken with reference to the garrisons of Charleston and Savannah. The garrison of St. Augustine you will determine upon according to circumstances on your arrival. The execution of the whole, both in point of mode and time, is left to your discretion. In case you should meet with obstructions by any attack supported by a formidable force, or from disappointments, so that it will not be in your power to effect the evacuation without great hazard of considerable loss, an early capitulation, which may secure the main object, is thought preferable to an obstinate defence of the place without hope of answering any national purpose by it.

“In the execution of his Majesty’s command you must always bear in recollection, that the removal and reservation of his Majesty’s troops for his service is the immediate object, to which all other considerations must give way. But you must likewise lose no time to avail yourself of the change of measures which has lately taken place, for the purpose of reconciling the minds and affections of his Majesty’s American subjects, by such open and generous conduct as may serve to captivate their hearts, and remove every suspicion of insincerity. With this view, it may be well worthy of your most serious consideration, whether, though you should not meet with the obstructions we have now too much reason to apprehend, it would not be best to take the part of communicating, immediately upon your arrival, the enclosed resolutions of the House of Commons, bearing as they do incontestable marks of the universal sense of the kingdom, and his Majesty’s resolution, in consequence, of withdrawing the troops. You may state every circumstance, if occasion offers, which has passed or is passing here, which can tend to revive old affections or extinguish late jealousies. You may observe, that the most liberal sentiments have taken root in the nation.”—MS. Instructions to Sir Guy Carleton, April 4th.

It is obvious from these instructions that Sir Guy Carleton had a very delicate and difficult task to perform, especially as in the present state of feeling in America it would have been impossible for him to make himself believed for a moment, if he had communicated the sentiments of the British ministry. Even the cautious course which he found it necessary to adopt excited suspicions of his sincerity, and an apprehension that some design was at bottom which required to be guarded against, as is manifest from Washington’s letters and all the proceedings of Congress. No one had dreamed that it was seriously the purpose of the British ministry at this time to evacuate all the maritime posts in the United States. The object of the ministry was a vigorous prosecution of the war in the West Indies against France and Spain, having already determined to concede the independence of the thirteen colonies.

The real intentions of the British cabinet, however, were early penetrated by Count de Vergennes. Within three weeks after the departure of Sir Guy Carleton from England, that minister wrote as follows to M. de la Luzerne.

“Every appearance indicates, that the British intend withdrawing their forces from the United States; or, at least, that the war will not be prosecuted there any more. They are probably preparing to continue the war in the Islands against the House of Bourbon. Attempts are made for a separate peace. Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams will undoubtedly render an account of the proposals which have been offered to them. Their language has been firm, and in the true principles of the alliance. In this respect we cannot applaud them too highly, and you may testify to Congress our entire satisfaction. If the English continue hostilities on the continent, it will be interesting to see in what manner the Americans will endeavour to render themselves useful to an ally, who has served them so largely. I do not expect from them much effective aid; but I hope they will be sufficiently enlightened not to ascribe to the good-will of the new ministry that which cannot and ought not to be considered in any other light than as the effect of their weakness.”—MS. Letter from Vergennes to Luzerne, Versailles, May 2d.—Sparks.

[1 ]The italicized parts of this letter were written in cypher.

[1 ]The above remarkable letter is a transcript from the first draft in Washington’s handwriting. The following certificate is appended to it, and is also in the same handwriting, except the signatures, which are autographs of the signers.

“The foregoing is an exact copy of a letter, which we sealed and sent off to Colonel Nicola, at the request of the writer of it.

“D. Humphreys,A. D. C.

“Jonathan Trumbull, Jun.,Secretary.”

The discontents among the officers and soldiers in the army, respecting the arrearages of their pay and their future prospects, had already increased to an alarming degree. Colonel Nicola, being a man of respectable character, somewhat advanced in life, and also on terms of intimacy with the Commander-in-chief, seems to have been much consulted by the other officers, and made a medium for communicating verbally their complaints, grievances, and apprehensions. To these Washington had listened with his usual complaisance, with an unfeigned expression of feeling for the distresses of the troops, and an unqualified declaration, that no efforts on his part should be wanting to procure for them the justice and remuneration which their long services and sacrifices had merited.

In this stage of affairs, either of his own motion, or from the instigation of others, Colonel Nicola addressed to the Commander-in-chief a paper of an extraordinary tenor, which drew from him the above reply. After some general remarks on the deplorable condition of the army, and the little hope they could have of being properly rewarded by Congress, the Colonel proceeds to a political disquisition on the different forms of government, and comes to the conclusion that republics are, of all others, the least susceptible of stability, and the least capable of securing the rights, freedom, and property of individuals. His inference is, that America can never prosper, or become a nation, under such a form. The English government he considers the most successful experiment that has yet been tried. Then reverting somewhat in detail to the financial operations of the war, and to the multiplied and increasing burdens which everywhere bore heavily upon the people, he added:

“This must have shown to all, and to military men in particular, the weakness of republics, and the exertions the army had been able to make by being under a proper head. Therefore I little doubt, that, when the benefits of a mixed government are pointed out, and duly considered, such will be readily adopted. In this case it will, I believe, be uncontroverted, that the same abilities which have led us through difficulties, apparently insurmountable by human power, to victory and glory, those qualities, that have merited and obtained the universal esteem and veneration of an army, would be most likely to conduct and direct us in the smoother paths of peace.

“Some people have so connected the ideas of tyranny and monarchy, as to find it very difficult to separate them. It may therefore be requisite to give the head of such a constitution, as I propose, some title apparently more moderate; but if all other things were once adjusted, I believe strong arguments might be produced for admitting the title of King, which I conceive would be attended with some material advantages.”

That this hint was well understood by Washington, is evident from the tone of his rebuke, which is stern, direct, and severe, and such as to preclude most effectually any further advances. Nor is it to be presumed, that Colonel Nicola was alone in the scheme thus put forward under the sanction of his name. There was unquestionably at this time, and for some time afterwards, a party in the army, neither small in number, nor insignificant in character, prepared to second and sustain a measure of this kind, which they conceived necessary to strengthen the civil power, draw out the resources of the country, and establish a durable government.—Sparks.

[1 ]“At the drawing of lots, which was done in the presence of Major Gordon and all the British captains within the limits prescribed, the unfortunate lot has fallen on Captain Charles Asgill, of the guards, a young gentleman nineteen years of age; a most amiable character; the only son of Sir Charles Asgill; heir to an extensive fortune and an honorable title; and of course he has great interest in the British court and army. The British officers are highly enraged at the conduct of Sir Henry Clinton; they have solicited my leave to send an officer to New York on this occasion, or that I would intercede with the minister of war to grant it. Being fully convinced, that no inconvenience could possibly arise to our cause from this indulgence, but, on the contrary, that good policy and humanity dictate the measure, I was pleased at the application, and with cheerfulness have recommended to the minister of war to grant the honorable Captain Ludlow, son to the Earl of Ludlow, leave to carry the representations of those unfortunate officers, who openly declare they have been deserted by their general, and given up to suffer for the sins of the guilty.”—Hazen to Washington, 27 May, 1782.

[1 ]In the draft of this letter the following paragraph is struck out: “I wish you also to inform Captn. Asgill, with all the tenderness possible, that no address from him or any of his friends can be admitted from them directly to me—that I can attend to no application but such as shall be made by the British Commander in chief.”

[1 ]“You will inform me, as early as possible, of the present situation of Captain Asgill, the prisoner destined for retaliation, and what prospect he has of relief from his application to Sir Guy Carleton, which I have been informed he has made through his friend Captain Ludlow. I have heard nothing yet from New York in consequence of this application. His fate will be suspended till I can be informed the decision of Sir Guy; but I am impatient, lest this should be unreasonably delayed. The enemy ought to have learned before this, that my resolutions are not to be trifled with. I am, &c.

“P. S. I am informed that Captain Asgill is at Chatham without guard, and under no constraint. This, if true, is certainly wrong. I wish to have the young gentleman treated with all the tenderness possible, consistent with his present situation; but, until his fate is determined, he must be considered as a close prisoner, and be kept in the greatest security. I request, therefore, that he be sent immediately to the Jersey line, where he is to be kept close prisoner, in perfect security, till further orders.”—Washington to Colonel Dayton, 11 June, 1782.

[1 ]He set out on the 24th June.

[2 ]Haldimand thought this visit was caused by a suspected movement on the part of Vermont.

[1 ]According to the proposal of Count de Rochambeau, a conference was held at Philadelphia, respecting the future operations of the campaign. The two commanders met there on the 15th of July. As no instructions had been received from the French court, it was not in the power of Count de Rochambeau to give any decided information as to the time a French fleet might be expected on the coast from the West Indies, or its strength when arrived. He had reason to suppose, however, that it would come to the northward; and, as the sickly season was approaching in Virginia, he had put his troops under marching orders about the 1st of July, and expected they would reach Baltimore before the end of the month. It was agreed, therefore, that the French army should remain a few days at Baltimore, till further instructions or intelligence should be received, and that, unless special reasons might appear to the contrary, the army should continue its march northwardly, and join the American forces on the Hudson. This plan was thought advisable, moreover, to prevent Sir Guy Carleton from sending detachments from New York to Jamaica, where they might be turned against the French in the West Indies.

An elaborate memoir, pointing out various plans of a campaign, was presented by General Washington to Count de Rochambeau, who forwarded it to the French court. Immediately after the interview General Washington returned to Newburg, where he arrived on the 27th of July.

[1 ]The plan here mentioned, which Colonel Laurens was extremely anxious to carry into effect, was to raise a regiment of black levies in South Carolina. He brought the subject before the legislature of the State, and pursued it with all his zeal and influence, but the measure was not approved. “It was some consolation, however,” said he, “to perceive that truth and philosophy had gained some ground, the suffrages in favor of the measure being twice as numerous as on a former occasion. Some hopes have been lately given me from Georgia; but I fear, when the question is put, we shall be outvoted there with as much disparity as we have been in this country.”—Bacon’s Bridge, South Carolina, May 19th.

[1 ]Dr. Rush gave a full account of this celebration in a letter dated 16 July, 1782, printed in the Portfolio of 1817, and again in the Magazine of American History, 1877, p. 506.

[1 ]In sending the same extract to Doctor McHenry, Washington wrote:

“Here then, if these expressions are not Intrenched in General Conway’s speech (when he threw out an Idea of giving to America the same kind of Independency that they were about granting to Ireland) is a solid basis for our Commissioners to raise their superstructure upon; and things may, & probably soon will be brought to a speedy and happy Issue.—But, if the Ministry mean no more than Genl. Conway has hinted at, ’t is plain their only aim is to gain time, that they may become more formidable at Sea—form new Alliances, if possible—or disunite us.—Be their object what it may, we, if wise, should push our preparations with vigor; for nothing will hasten Peace, more, than to be in a Condition for War, and if the contest is to continue, ’t is indispensably necessary.

“One thing however is certain, but how it came to pass is not very well understood; and that is, that the Letter of Carleton & Digby to me, has been published in New York, and has spread universal consternation among all the Tribes of Refugees;—who, actuated by different Passions—or the same passion in different degrees & forms & are a mere medley of confused-enraged & dejected characters.—Some it is said are cursing—others crying—while far the greatest part of them are struck dumb, and do not know what to do.”—Washington to James McHenry, 15 August, 1782.

[1 ]Congress had directed Washington to “remand immediately Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis to the United States, unless the Honorable Henry Laurens be forthwith released from his captivity, and furnished with passports to any part of Europe or America, at his option, or be admitted to a general parole.” Sir Guy Carleton replied that Laurens had been for some time in perfect freedom, and had considered Cornwallis as exchanged.

[1 ]“As a result of this conference [at Philadelphia], I was sent on the 19th [of July] to York, in Virginia, on a mission then secret but no longer so; this was to embark, as soon as possible, our siege artillery, which we had left at West Point, 8 leagues above York on the same river, and move it up the Chesapeake Bay to Baltimore. . . . The army is to leave Baltimore the 15th, to pass here [Philadelphia] and to march to the North River.”—Fersen to his Father, 8 August, 1782. The army did not begin to move until the 20th.

[1 ]Count Rochambeau did not approve of the plan, and the project was abandoned.

[1 ]This notice was conveyed to General Gates, who answered: “General Lincoln has acquainted me, that it is your Excellency’s desire to know, if I wish to take command in the army this campaign. I beg your Excellency to believe, that I am always ready to obey your commands, and shall be most happy when I can execute them to your satisfaction. I have but to entreat, that no attention to me or my rank may interfere or break in upon any part of your arrangments. My zeal for the public interest makes me exceedingly anxious to be present at the great concluding stroke of this war.”—MS. Letter, Philadelphia, August 17th.

Since the unfortunate battle of Camden, General Gates had been in retirement at his seat in Virginia. The court of inquiry, ordered by Congress to examine into that matter, had never been convened. The subject was at length brought forward anew, and it was resolved, “That the resolution of the 5th of October, 1780, directing a court of inquiry on the conduct of Major-General Gates be repealed; and that he take command in the army as the Commander-in-chief shall direct.”—Journals, August 14th. This resolution passed with only three dissenting voices. He rejoined the army on the 5th of October, and took command of the right wing as senior officer.

[1 ]At Baltimore.

[1 ]The letter from Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby to General Washington was referred by Congress to a committee, who, on the part relating to Mr. Laurens, “proposed and reported, that the General should he directed to empower his commissioners [for negotiating a cartel] to release Earl Cornwallis from his parole in return for the indulgence granted to Mr. Laurens; but Mr. Rutledge, one of the committee, inveighed against this with so much warmth and indignation, that it was rejected with a loud and general No from all parts of the House. Nothing was said on the proposition of exchanging soldiers for seamen. Congress deemed it inexpedient to touch upon that matter at present, or to do any thing that might serve as a pretext for refusing to settle a cartel; and apprehended, if a general cartel was established, provision might be made therein for a release of our seamen, as well as for preventing the capture of unarmed citizens.”—Charles Thomson’s MS. Sketch of the Debate in Congress, August 12th.

At the solicitation of Mr. Laurens after he was set at liberty, and after the return of Lord Cornwallis to England, Dr. Franklin sent to the latter a paper discharging him from his parole, but reserving to Congress the approbation or disallowance of the act. In consequence of this form of release, Lord Cornwallis considered himself at liberty, and took his seat in the House of Peers.—Diplomatic Correspondence, vol. iii., pp, 362, 373.

[1 ]On the 28th Washington applied direct to Congress for a determination of the following points, before he could carry the resolution of the 12th into effect: “Whether I am to confirm the exchange of Lord Cornwallis for the Hon’ble Mr. Laurens; and whether it is their intention, that the proposal contained in the letter of Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby, of the 2d of August, “to exchange soldiers for sailors,” on the conditions mentioned by those gentlemen, should be acceded to. The last, should we be fortunate enough to obtain a liquidation of accounts (and we must go prepared to suppose that we shall be able to effect it), will be the great point in controversy; and, as it is one of the vast political importance, I wish to be explicitly instructed by Congress upon it.”—See Journals of Congress, 9 September, 1782.

[1 ]“What can Induce Congress to restrain the Issues of the full Number of Rations to any Officer in the Army, which his Rank entitles him to?—when if they mean fair, it is to the public a mere matter of moonshine, whether the Financier pays the Value of them to that Officer if he does not draw them—or to the Contractor if he does?

“Can these things fail to irritate—and irritating, are they not pregnant with mischief? Is it policy—is it Justice to keep a sore constantly gangreened, when no good End is, or possibly can be answered by it? Should men, who have indured more, & received less of their pay than any other Class of people in public Service, have so little Consideration or Attention paid to their Interests or Comforts?

“Would to God, false policy, Inattention or something else, may not be productive of disagreement which will prove irreconcilable.”—Washington to the Secretary at War, 21 August, 1782.

[2 ]Washington, on the 25th, named Heath and two aids to meet a British officer of equal rank at Phillips House, on August 5th, to receive the proceedings of the court-martial on Captain Lippincott. Sir Guy Carleton, however, wished to send with the papers Chief-Justice Frederick Smith to make additional explanations, and Attorney-General Kempe to “enter into such explanations as might tend to remove all reciprocal complaints in the province of New Jersey.” Washington very properly declined to complicate what was merely a military question, with another that belonged to the civil government.

[1 ]President of the Board of Directors of the Associated Loyalists, and immediately responsible for the hanging of Huddy.

[1 ]Read in Congress August 26th. Referred to Rutledge, McKean, and Duane. October 15th, Witherspoon and Wright were added.

[1 ]For nearly three years Sir Henry Clinton had from time to time solicited his recall, and at length the King granted him permission to return to Europe, which he received the last week in April. The command then devolved on General Robertson. He retained this station, however, only about a week, when Sir Guy Carleton arrived in New York, and took command of the British armies in America, as the permanent successor of Sir Henry Clinton.

[1 ]The army moved from Newburg, on the 31st of August, to Verplanck’s Point, where an encampment was established. This change was in consequence of an agreement with Count de Rochambeau to form a junction of the American and French armies at that place, and also to be nearer to the enemy in case any hostile attempts should be made from New York; although, from the inactivity and pacific declarations of Sir Guy Carleton, such attempts were not anticipated.

[1 ]“In answer to my letter the British general informs me, that a court-martial is ordered for the trial of the persons complained of; but at the same time says, that those people offer, in justification of the fact, a number of instances of cruelty committed by us, and particularly in Monmouth county. Though this is by no means admitted, but on the contrary orders are given to designate and send to camp a British officer, who, if my demand is not complied with, will be executed; yet I cannot forbear observing to your Excellency, that, whilst we demand satisfaction from the enemy for the violences they commit, it becomes us to be particularly careful, that they have not a like claim on us; and I must beg you to make it known to all persons acting in a military capacity in your State, that I shall hold myself obliged to deliver up to the enemy, or otherwise to punish, such of them as shall commit any act, which is in the least contrary to the laws of war, I doubt not of your doing the same with those, who come under the civil power.

“The enemy also complain of the detention of Hatfield and Badgely, who, they say, were out by direction of our commissary of prisoners under sanction of a flag. I must beg your Excellency to inform me, as soon as possible, of the circumstances attending their capture, and the causes of their detention. If those causes are not strictly just, I could wish they were sent in.”—Washington to Governor Livingston, 6 May, 1782. One Hatfield had offered in the spring of 1780 to supply Washington with intelligence, and though the General was “suspicious of the man” he did employ him, but to what extent is not known. This was thought to be Moses Hatfield, and may have been the same who is thus associated with Isaac Badgely. These two men were condemned as guilty of treason by the civil tribunal of New Jersey.

“As I had the honor in my last [June 10th] of transmitting the circumstances relating to Hatfield and Badgely, to inform you, that, finding them entirely in the hands of the civil power, it was not within my line to say any thing further on the subject; so, from the tenor of your letter, it becomes necessary for me now to be very explicit in mentioning to your Excellency, that, in matters of civil resort, I am not authorized, in any case, to make the least interference. The civil laws, within the several States, having been passed without any agency of mine, I am equally excluded from any part in their execution; neither is it to be supposed, that they are under any control or influence from me. The civil power, therefore, of the States only being competent to the discussion of civil points, I shall leave them solely to their consideration, being determined to confine myself to the proper line of my duty, which is purely military.”—Washington to Sir Guy Carleton, 22 June, 1782.

[1 ]The commissioners met at Tappan on the 25th of September, but effected nothing. The powers of the British commissioners were not satisfactory to the other party, and they separated without commencing a negotiation.—Heath’s Memoirs, p. 354.

[1 ]General Lincoln, by some error, informed Washington that there was no “unconditional prisoner of war” available, and Washington on the 18th directed Hazen to carry out the instructions of the 3d.

[1 ]Sir Guy Carleton had written: “If these Indians come not solely to revenge the cruelties practised on their brethren, their motives are to me wholly unknown. To my knowledge, they cannot have directions from the commander-in-chief on that side; and these proceedings not only have my disapprobation, but I shall very willingly assist in restoring tranquillity on that frontier also.”—August 29th.

[1 ]The second paragraph in the letter is altered to Virginia and Maryland, and the following substituted, viz.:

“From the returns I have been able to obtain of recruits furnished by the several States, I am very sorry to observe that their exertions to this time have almost totally disappointed this expectation.”—Note by Washington.

[1 ]The first division of the French Army, under Count de Rochambeau, arrived at King’s Ferry, from the south, on the 15th of September. Count de Rochambeau describes the junction of the French and American armies as follows:

“General Washington wishing to testify his respect for France, and his recognition of the benefits she had rendered, caused us to pass between two lines of troops, clad, equipped, and armed with clothing and arms from France, and from the English magazines taken at Yorktown, which the French army had relinquished to the Americans. He ordered the drums to beat a French march during the whole review, and the two armies rejoined with the most lively demonstrations of reciprocal satisfaction.”—Mémoires de Rochambeau, tom. i., p. 309.

[1 ]“If I should have occasion for the Militia of your state, the call will be sudden, and their movements must be rapid, otherwise great expense will accrue and only disgrace and disappointment will ensue. For these reasons I beg leave to recall your Excellency’s attention to my letter of the 5 March last, and to pray most earnestly that every previous arrangement may be taken to facilitate their march when requested.”—To Virginia and Maryland. Note by Washington.

[2 ]Reed had become engaged in an acrid political controversy with General Cadwallader, in which it was charged that in December, 1776, he had meditated going over to the British. He asked Washington for “a few lines expressive of your sense of my conduct in the fall and winter of 1776,” and to give his sanction to using the letters Washington had written to him at that time.

[1 ]“We wanted no fresh opiate to increase that stupor into which we had fallen, but I much fear that the idle, and delusive offers of Peace with which the Country resounds, will, if it is not powerfully counteracted, be exceedingly injurious to us—not (I apprehend) from any disposition in the people to listen to improper terms, but from a misconception of what is really meant, and the arts which are used to make them believe that Independence, and what not, are proffered to them. Under these ideas they ask, why need we be taxed, or why need we be put to the expence and trouble of compleating our Battalions?

“It is to be hoped that the despatches which are now on their passage to Congress, will announce the aids which are intended for us by the Court of France, as it is high time the plan of campaign was known, which cannot be the case till we have materials to project one. Would to God there may not be too much truth in the British account (in the York Gazettes) of the advantages gained by her in the naval action off Guadaloupe—it may be productive of a total derangement of the plans of the French Court, this campaign.”—Washington to R. R. Livingston, 22 May, 1782.

“What may be the real intention of the present Ministry, respecting America—or what effect the naval action in the West Indies may have upon the intended operations of this year, and consequently upon the conduct of the Powers at war, is difficult to say. There is, however, one plain line chalked out for us; by pursuing which we cannot err; and it gives me pleasure to hear that Congress are inculcating this by a deputation from their own Body. If Rodney’s victory is as decisive and important as the New York gazettes endeavor to make it; and the new Ministry should not be too much buoyed up by it; there is no measure so likely to produce a speedy termination of the War as vigorous preparations for meeting the enemy in full expectation of it, if they are only playing the insidious game. This will make them think of Peace in good earnest.”—Washington to Robert R. Livingston, 5 June, 1782.

[1 ]Probably one of the numbers of the Crisis. Paine was now writing a series of articles under that title, suited to the political state of the times. He had laid aside his pen for several months, when, in the February preceding, Mr. Robert Morris induced him to take it up again, and promised him a stipulated sum of money as a compensation for his services. This was done with the knowledge and approbation of General Washington, who was then in Philadelphia. The Crisis was accordingly revived, and continued to the end of the war. See on this subject an extract from Mr. Morris’ Diary, in the Diplomatic Correspondence, vol. xii., p. 95.—Sparks.

[1 ]Read in Congress, May 13th.

The papers enclosed in the letter were printed copies of the proceedings of the House of Commons, on the 4th of March, 1782, respecting an address to the King in favor of peace; and also a copy of the bill reported in consequence thereof, enabling his Majesty to conclude a peace or truce with the revolted colonies in North America.

The French cabinet were somewhat concerned as to the effect, which these movements of the British Parliament might have in America. As soon as they were known at Versailles, Count de Vergennes wrote to M. de la Luzerne expressing his apprehensions.

“The object of the British King,” said he, “in acceding to these resolutions, is obvious. He would persuade the Americans, that he is sincerely disposed to a reconciliation, and would spare nothing to impress this persuasion by influencing their feelings towards England, and causing them to be unfaithful to France. On examining the comparative situation of England and America, one could hardly hesitate to decide what impression these resolutions should make; yet the strong propensity of the Americans to inactivity; their need of peace and the desire they manifest for it; the embarrassment as to their means of continuing the war; the great number of English partisans among them; all these causes united are enough to excite the fear, that the wishes of the people may prevail over the patriotism and zeal of Congress, and that this body will be forced to lend an ear to the pretended pacific overtures of the court of London. Such a step would of course be infinitely disagreeable to France, because it would effectually change the object and mode of prosecuting the war; it would augment the hostile resources of England, and would cause France to lose a great part of the fruit of her offensive efforts in carrying on the war for the independence of America. It is therefore of the highest importance, that the United States should continue of the same principles as heretofore, remain immovably attached to the alliance, and follow the example of France in refusing to listen to a separate peace with England. Every principle of honor and interest requires this conduct in the Americans.

“It should not be concealed from you, that the English ministry have recently sent a secret emissary to us, with propositions for a separate peace. The conditions, which he offered, were such as would have satisfied the King, if he had been without allies. He stipulated, among other things, the uti possidetis, the suppression of the English commission at Dunkirk, and advantages in India. But these offers did not move the King. His Majesty acknowledges no other rule, than that which is traced in his engagements; and he answered, that, however ardent might be his wishes for the reëstablishment of peace, he could not commence a negotiation to that end without the participation of his allies. The English commissioner replied, that he perfectly understood this answer to refer to America, as well as Spain, but objected, that recognising the independence of the colonies did not enter into the system of England. I replied, that this was the basis of the system of the King. Upon this he asked, if there was no mode of treating with France without involving the affairs of America. I sent to him for answer the first pacific overtures, which we had communicated to the mediators. I added, that, whether England should treat of the affairs of America with us, or hold a direct negotiation with the United States, she could not avoid treating with the deputies of Congress; and thus she would be compelled to recognise the authority of that body. I cannot say whether any thing will result from this advance on the part of the English ministry, whether it was meant as an apple of discord between us and our allies; but, whatever may have been the intention, the issue ought at least to be a new and strong proof to the Americans of the fidelity of the King to his engagements, and to convince them of the extreme injustice of deviating from his example.”—MS. Letter from Vergennes to Luzerne, Versailles, March 23, 1782.

A few days afterwards, in writing again upon the same subject, Count de Vergennes said:

“Although we desire that Congress may neither open a direct negotiation, nor make a separate peace, yet we have no wish to prevent that body from following the system, which we ourselves have traced in our answer to the mediating courts. We are and always shall be disposed to consent, that the American plenipotentiaries in Europe shall treat, in conformity to their instructions, directly and without our intervention, with those from the court of London, while we shall be engaged in a negotiation on our part; provided that the two negotiations shall proceed with an equal progress, that the two treaties shall be signed at the same time, and that neither of them shall take effect without the other.”—MS. Letter, April 9th—Sparks.

[1 ]“I fully believe we have seen our worst days over. The spirit of the war on the part of the enemy is certainly on the decline, full as much as we think for. I draw this opinion, not only from the difficulties we know they are in, and the present promiscuous appearance of things, but from the peculiar effect, which certain periods of time have more or less upon all men. The British have accustomed themselves to think of the term of seven years in a manner different from other periods of time. They acquire this partly by habit, by religion, by reason, and by superstition. They serve seven years apprenticeship; they elect their parliament for seven years; they punish by seven years’ transportation, or the duplicate, or triplicate of that term; their leases run in the same manner; and they read that Jacob served seven years for one wife and seven years for another; and the same term, likewise, extinguishes all obligations (in certain cases) of debt, or matrimony; and thus this particular period, by a variety of concurrences, has obtained an influence in their minds superior to that of any other number.

“They have now had seven years’ war, and are not an inch farther on the continent than when they began. The superstitious and the popular part will conclude that it is not to be; and the reasonable part will think they have tried an unsuccessful scheme long enough, and that it is in vain to try it any longer; and the obstinate part of them will be beaten out, unless, consistent with their former sagacity, they get over the matter at once, by passing a new declaratory act to bend Time in all cases whatsoever, or declare him a rebel.”—Thomas Paine to Washington, September 7th.

[1 ]On the very day on which Congress received Washington’s letter, Madison could write that the request of Carleton “will certainly be refused, and General Washington directed to receive and forward any despatches which may be properly addressed to Congress,” and when an audience was given to the French minister, on the 13th, “it was deemed politic at this crisis to display every proper evidence of affectionate attachment to our ally.”

“Sir Guy Carleton attempted to commence a correspondence with Congress, but that assembly wholly declined his advances. He then wrote to some of the governors of the States, but their answers were equally pointed and repulsive. He next addressed himself to the people, not directly, but through the channel of the newspapers in New York; exhorting them to change their leaders and recall their present members of Congress, and speaking of the new disposition for reconciliation and peace on the part of the mother country; but all without effect. Another attempt is to humiliate Congress by representing them to be under the influence of France, and particularly of the French minister in the United States. But he has used another instrument more powerful than these. He treats all the Americans, who fall into his hands, with extreme kindness; exhorts them not to bear arms against Great Britain; admits freely into New York the wives of the captains of vessels, which have been taken and brought into that harbor, and at their solicitation releases their husbands. And he has even written to General Washington, that he will send back the captured Carolinians in the King’s ships and at the King’s expense; and that he would do all in his power to cause them to forget their past injuries.”—Luzerne to Vergennes, 14 June, 1782.

[1 ]Resolve of the 9th of Sept. respecting Southern Army.

[1 ]It was decided by Congress, that the Commander-in-chief should be directed to refuse a passport for Mr. Morgann to bring despatches to Philadelphia.—Journals, May 14th. The advances of Sir Guy Carleton bore so strong a similarity to those of the commissioners in 1778, which proved delusive and fruitless, that Congress deemed it advisable not to open any door for an intercourse through this channel, and more especially as the business of negotiating a peace was entrusted to the American commissioners in Europe.

Had the tenor of Sir Guy Carleton’s instructions been known in America, it is probable that a more conciliating temper would have been shown by Congress. The late change of ministry had produced a change in the determinations of the British Cabinet, and in the measures for prosecuting the war, wholly unexpected and as yet not even conjectured in the United States. This will appear by the following extracts from the directions of the new secretary at war to Sir Guy Carleton when he left England:

“The first object of your attention must be the withdrawing of the garrison, artillery, provisions, stores of all kinds, and every species of public property from New York and its dependencies to Halifax. The same steps are to be taken with reference to the garrisons of Charleston and Savannah. The garrison of St. Augustine you will determine upon according to circumstances on your arrival. The execution of the whole, both in point of mode and time, is left to your discretion. In case you should meet with obstructions by any attack supported by a formidable force, or from disappointments, so that it will not be in your power to effect the evacuation without great hazard of considerable loss, an early capitulation, which may secure the main object, is thought preferable to an obstinate defence of the place without hope of answering any national purpose by it.

“In the execution of his Majesty’s command you must always bear in recollection, that the removal and reservation of his Majesty’s troops for his service is the immediate object, to which all other considerations must give way. But you must likewise lose no time to avail yourself of the change of measures which has lately taken place, for the purpose of reconciling the minds and affections of his Majesty’s American subjects, by such open and generous conduct as may serve to captivate their hearts, and remove every suspicion of insincerity. With this view, it may be well worthy of your most serious consideration, whether, though you should not meet with the obstructions we have now too much reason to apprehend, it would not be best to take the part of communicating, immediately upon your arrival, the enclosed resolutions of the House of Commons, bearing as they do incontestable marks of the universal sense of the kingdom, and his Majesty’s resolution, in consequence, of withdrawing the troops. You may state every circumstance, if occasion offers, which has passed or is passing here, which can tend to revive old affections or extinguish late jealousies. You may observe, that the most liberal sentiments have taken root in the nation.”—MS. Instructions to Sir Guy Carleton, April 4th.

It is obvious from these instructions that Sir Guy Carleton had a very delicate and difficult task to perform, especially as in the present state of feeling in America it would have been impossible for him to make himself believed for a moment, if he had communicated the sentiments of the British ministry. Even the cautious course which he found it necessary to adopt excited suspicions of his sincerity, and an apprehension that some design was at bottom which required to be guarded against, as is manifest from Washington’s letters and all the proceedings of Congress. No one had dreamed that it was seriously the purpose of the British ministry at this time to evacuate all the maritime posts in the United States. The object of the ministry was a vigorous prosecution of the war in the West Indies against France and Spain, having already determined to concede the independence of the thirteen colonies.

The real intentions of the British cabinet, however, were early penetrated by Count de Vergennes. Within three weeks after the departure of Sir Guy Carleton from England, that minister wrote as follows to M. de la Luzerne.

“Every appearance indicates, that the British intend withdrawing their forces from the United States; or, at least, that the war will not be prosecuted there any more. They are probably preparing to continue the war in the Islands against the House of Bourbon. Attempts are made for a separate peace. Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams will undoubtedly render an account of the proposals which have been offered to them. Their language has been firm, and in the true principles of the alliance. In this respect we cannot applaud them too highly, and you may testify to Congress our entire satisfaction. If the English continue hostilities on the continent, it will be interesting to see in what manner the Americans will endeavour to render themselves useful to an ally, who has served them so largely. I do not expect from them much effective aid; but I hope they will be sufficiently enlightened not to ascribe to the good-will of the new ministry that which cannot and ought not to be considered in any other light than as the effect of their weakness.”—MS. Letter from Vergennes to Luzerne, Versailles, May 2d.—Sparks.

[1 ]Captain Asgill had been for some time released from close confinement, and allowed to go at large on parole at Chatham and in the neighborhood of that place. He wrote to General Washington, requesting permission to return to Europe, on account of the illness of his father, and the distressed state of his mother and sister in consequence of that event, and of their anxiety for the fate impending over the son and brother.

In writing to the Secretary at War, a week after the above letter, General Washington said: “The delay of Congress places me not only in a very delicate, but a very awkward situation with the expecting world. Was I to give my private opinion respecting Asgill, I should pronounce in favor of his being released from his duress, and that he should be permitted to go to his friends in Europe.”—October 7th.

[1 ]The italicized parts of this letter were written in cypher.

[1 ]This letter was enclosed to Robert Morris, to whom Washington wrote: “I confess it seems to me, not only an act of policy but of justice, instead of irritating the minds of our officers and men, to soothe and accommodate them in all their reasonable wishes and expectations, as far as the circumstances will admit it. I am sensible you coincide entirely in the same sentiment.”—20 October, 1782. And to McHenry, whose needs were urgent, he wrote on the 23d [or 24th] of October:

“To make such an application as you require to the Financier, would, I know, be unavailing—first, because he has most decidedly refused to adjust, & discharge the claim of any Officer who is a resident in & the subject of the United States—and secondly, every other consideration apart what would alone be a sufficient bar—because he has not the means of doing it—The States are so tardy in collecting the Taxes, that the most trivial sum cannot be obtained for the most pressing purposes—and in one sense, it may be said, that the Officers of the Army are actually starving for want of a small portion of their pay—the Horses of it, for want of money to procure forage, are actually in this condition—In a word, Sir, for want of a little money to pay the transportation of some very essential articles, the Troops have suffered, & continue to suffer amazingly; and for the want of the said money, we have been obliged to relinquish a contract for subsisting the Army at 10d a Ration & give 13d for the sake of three months credit.

“There have been instances I know, where some foreign Officers, who had no state to resort to—& who were reduced to the last extremity—have received a small part of their pay, but trifling in comparison of their demands, or dues.—Judge ye therefore under these circumstances, how fruitless would be any application to the Financier for money.

“The only mode I am told, by which you can be relieved, is for me to apply to Congress to recommend your case to the State of Maryland; that you may be included in the Officers belonging to it—this I have accordingly done (as you may see by the Inclosed) through its proper channel—the Secretary at War—who is now here, and on whom I shall enforce the measure in terms which I persuade myself will give facility to an official act.”

[1 ]The above remarkable letter is a transcript from the first draft in Washington’s handwriting. The following certificate is appended to it, and is also in the same handwriting, except the signatures, which are autographs of the signers.

“The foregoing is an exact copy of a letter, which we sealed and sent off to Colonel Nicola, at the request of the writer of it.

“D. Humphreys,A. D. C.

“Jonathan Trumbull, Jun.,Secretary.”

The discontents among the officers and soldiers in the army, respecting the arrearages of their pay and their future prospects, had already increased to an alarming degree. Colonel Nicola, being a man of respectable character, somewhat advanced in life, and also on terms of intimacy with the Commander-in-chief, seems to have been much consulted by the other officers, and made a medium for communicating verbally their complaints, grievances, and apprehensions. To these Washington had listened with his usual complaisance, with an unfeigned expression of feeling for the distresses of the troops, and an unqualified declaration, that no efforts on his part should be wanting to procure for them the justice and remuneration which their long services and sacrifices had merited.

In this stage of affairs, either of his own motion, or from the instigation of others, Colonel Nicola addressed to the Commander-in-chief a paper of an extraordinary tenor, which drew from him the above reply. After some general remarks on the deplorable condition of the army, and the little hope they could have of being properly rewarded by Congress, the Colonel proceeds to a political disquisition on the different forms of government, and comes to the conclusion that republics are, of all others, the least susceptible of stability, and the least capable of securing the rights, freedom, and property of individuals. His inference is, that America can never prosper, or become a nation, under such a form. The English government he considers the most successful experiment that has yet been tried. Then reverting somewhat in detail to the financial operations of the war, and to the multiplied and increasing burdens which everywhere bore heavily upon the people, he added:

“This must have shown to all, and to military men in particular, the weakness of republics, and the exertions the army had been able to make by being under a proper head. Therefore I little doubt, that, when the benefits of a mixed government are pointed out, and duly considered, such will be readily adopted. In this case it will, I believe, be uncontroverted, that the same abilities which have led us through difficulties, apparently insurmountable by human power, to victory and glory, those qualities, that have merited and obtained the universal esteem and veneration of an army, would be most likely to conduct and direct us in the smoother paths of peace.

“Some people have so connected the ideas of tyranny and monarchy, as to find it very difficult to separate them. It may therefore be requisite to give the head of such a constitution, as I propose, some title apparently more moderate; but if all other things were once adjusted, I believe strong arguments might be produced for admitting the title of King, which I conceive would be attended with some material advantages.”

That this hint was well understood by Washington, is evident from the tone of his rebuke, which is stern, direct, and severe, and such as to preclude most effectually any further advances. Nor is it to be presumed, that Colonel Nicola was alone in the scheme thus put forward under the sanction of his name. There was unquestionably at this time, and for some time afterwards, a party in the army, neither small in number, nor insignificant in character, prepared to second and sustain a measure of this kind, which they conceived necessary to strengthen the civil power, draw out the resources of the country, and establish a durable government.—Sparks.

[1 ]To some of the topics of this letter General Lincoln replied, in his private capacity, as follows:

“You mention as a ground of complaint, that the compensation to the army for their services is left in a loose, equivocal state, and of this I am fully convinced; and from the knowledge I have of the temper of Congress, I have little expectation that the matter of half-pay, to which I suppose you allude, will be in a better situation than it now is, until it shall be recommended by Congress to the several States to provide for their own officers; which I am apprehensive will not be done unless Congress know in some way or other, that it is the wish of the officers that they should do it.

“You know, Sir, that no moneys can be appropriated but by the voice of nine States. There was not that number in favor of half-pay, when the vote to grant it passed in Congress, which was a vote before the confederation was signed and practised upon, but it is not now. I see little probability, that a sum equal to the half-pay will be appropriated to that purpose, and apportioned on the several States. Massachusetts is one of those States, which have always been opposed to the measure. Indeed, there is but one State east of this, which agreed to it. In the first place, there is too great a part of the Union opposed to the half-pay to think of carrying it through. The States in opposition cannot be coerced. They say they are willing to make a handsome compensation by compromise, and that they will give a sum which shall be just and honorable. From this it will be difficult, if not impossible, to persuade them to depart. I am myself fully of opinion, that it will be much the best for the army to be referred to their several States, and that their expectations will end in chagrin and disappointments if they look for half-pay from Congress. Let us for a moment reflect how Congress will avail themselves of money to discharge this debt. They cannot appropriate any part of the sum to this use, which shall be annually apportioned on the several States, for the reasons I mentioned before; there are not nine States in favor of it. Should it be said, that it may be paid out of the revenue of some general tax, it will not remove the objection. The money arising from these general taxes must also be appropriated, if such taxes were passed. No one of those proposed has yet passed, and I see little probability that any of them will soon, if ever.”—October 14th.

[1 ]“At the drawing of lots, which was done in the presence of Major Gordon and all the British captains within the limits prescribed, the unfortunate lot has fallen on Captain Charles Asgill, of the guards, a young gentleman nineteen years of age; a most amiable character; the only son of Sir Charles Asgill; heir to an extensive fortune and an honorable title; and of course he has great interest in the British court and army. The British officers are highly enraged at the conduct of Sir Henry Clinton; they have solicited my leave to send an officer to New York on this occasion, or that I would intercede with the minister of war to grant it. Being fully convinced, that no inconvenience could possibly arise to our cause from this indulgence, but, on the contrary, that good policy and humanity dictate the measure, I was pleased at the application, and with cheerfulness have recommended to the minister of war to grant the honorable Captain Ludlow, son to the Earl of Ludlow, leave to carry the representations of those unfortunate officers, who openly declare they have been deserted by their general, and given up to suffer for the sins of the guilty.”—Hazen to Washington, 27 May, 1782.

[1 ]Colonel Wadsworth was the contractor for supplying the French army, and a deputy under him had refused to submit to a constable, who served upon him a justice’s warrant. This was considered a contempt of the civil authority, and caused a complaint to be forwarded by the justice to the governor of the State.

[1 ]In the draft of this letter the following paragraph is struck out: “I wish you also to inform Captn. Asgill, with all the tenderness possible, that no address from him or any of his friends can be admitted from them directly to me—that I can attend to no application but such as shall be made by the British Commander in chief.”

[1 ]Laurens was killed at Chehaw Neck on the 27th of August.

[1 ]“You will inform me, as early as possible, of the present situation of Captain Asgill, the prisoner destined for retaliation, and what prospect he has of relief from his application to Sir Guy Carleton, which I have been informed he has made through his friend Captain Ludlow. I have heard nothing yet from New York in consequence of this application. His fate will be suspended till I can be informed the decision of Sir Guy; but I am impatient, lest this should be unreasonably delayed. The enemy ought to have learned before this, that my resolutions are not to be trifled with. I am, &c.

“P. S. I am informed that Captain Asgill is at Chatham without guard, and under no constraint. This, if true, is certainly wrong. I wish to have the young gentleman treated with all the tenderness possible, consistent with his present situation; but, until his fate is determined, he must be considered as a close prisoner, and be kept in the greatest security. I request, therefore, that he be sent immediately to the Jersey line, where he is to be kept close prisoner, in perfect security, till further orders.”—Washington to Colonel Dayton, 11 June, 1782.

[1 ]George Augustine Washington.

[1 ]He set out on the 24th June.

[1 ]The case of Captain Asgill was laid before Count de Vergennes by Lady Asgill, and that minister wrote the following letter to Washington:

“It is not in quality of a King, the friend and ally of the United States, (though with the knowledge and consent of his Majesty) that I now have the honor to write to your Excellency. It is as a man of sensibility and a tender father, who feels all the force of paternal love, that I take the liberty to address to your Excellency my earnest solicitations in favor of a mother and family in tears. Her situation seems the more worthy of notice on our part, as it is to the humanity of a nation at war with her own, that she has recourse, for what she ought to receive from the impartial justice of her own generals.

“I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency a copy of a letter, which Lady Asgill has just written me. I am not known to her, nor was I acquainted that her son was the unhappy victim, destined by lot to expiate the odious crime that a formal denial of justice obliges you to avenge. Your Excellency will not read this letter without being extremely affected: it had that effect upon the King and Queen, to whom I communicated it. The goodness of their Majesties’ hearts induces them to desire, that the inquietudes of an unfortunate mother may be calmed, and her tenderness reassured. I felt, Sir, that there are cases where humanity itself exacts the most extreme rigor; perhaps the one now in question may be of the number; but, allowing reprisals to be just, it is not less horrid to those who are the victims; and the character of your Excellency is too well known, for me not to be persuaded that you desire nothing more than to be able to avoid the disagreeable necessity.

“There is one consideration, Sir, which, though it is not decisive, may have an influence on your resolution. Captain Asgill is doubtless your prisoner, but he is among those whom the arms of the King contributed to put into your hands at Yorktown. Although this circumstance does not operate as a safeguard, it however justifies the interest I permit myself to take in this affair. If it is in your power, Sir, to consider and have regard to it, you will do what is agreeable to their Majesties; the danger of young Asgill, the tears, the despair of his mother, affect them sensibly: and they will see with pleasure the hope of consolation shine out for those unfortunate people.

“In seeking to deliver Mr. Asgill from the fate which threatens him, I am far from engaging you to secure another victim; the pardon, to be perfectly satisfactory, must be entire. I do not imagine it can be productive of any bad consequences. If the English general has not been able to punish the horrible crime you complain of, in so exemplary a manner as he should, there is reason to think he will take the most efficacious measures to prevent the like in future.

“I sincerely wish, Sir, that my intercession may meet success; the sentiment which dictates it, and which you have not ceased to manifest on every occasion, assures me, that you will not be indifferent to the prayers and to the tears of a family, which has recourse to your clemency through me. It is rendering homage to your virtue to implore it.”—Versailles, 29 July, 1782.

Washington sent the letter to Congress by special messenger, without any observations, and in that body the question was referred on the 29th to Rutledge, Osgood, Montgomery, Boudinot, and Duane. On September 7th was reported a resolution directing the release of Asgill. To the French minister Washington wrote on November 19th:

“This moment I received the resolution of Congress in favor of Captain Asgill. I transmitted it to him and at the same time sent him my Passport to go into New York. It will depend on him to go to Europe, if he pleases—his Parole not being limited.”

“Your Excellency will have been informed, before this reaches you, of the liberation of Captain Asgill. I am, notwithstanding, directed to recall your attention to that part of your letter of the 3d of August last, in which you say, ‘I have given orders to the judge-advocate to make further inquisition, and to collect evidence for the prosecution of such other persons as may appear to have been criminal in this transaction.’ In full confidence, that measures have been taken to carry your Excellency’s intentions into execution, I have to request the favor of you to inform me what probability there is, that the persons who have been really guilty of the action, which has been the subject of former discussion, will be brought to a proper account.”—Washington to Sir Guy Carleton, 20 November, 1782. Sir Guy deprecated a reopening of the question, and it rested there.

[2 ]Haldimand thought this visit was caused by a suspected movement on the part of Vermont.

[1 ]Gov. George Clinton.

[1 ]See Washington to Robert Morris, 8 January, 1783, p. 126, post.

[1 ]On December 23d Washington notified Governor Clinton that the bargain was completed, and he should draw upon him for £1880 Virginia currency—that is, six shillings to the dollar.

[1 ]According to the proposal of Count de Rochambeau, a conference was held at Philadelphia, respecting the future operations of the campaign. The two commanders met there on the 15th of July. As no instructions had been received from the French court, it was not in the power of Count de Rochambeau to give any decided information as to the time a French fleet might be expected on the coast from the West Indies, or its strength when arrived. He had reason to suppose, however, that it would come to the northward; and, as the sickly season was approaching in Virginia, he had put his troops under marching orders about the 1st of July, and expected they would reach Baltimore before the end of the month. It was agreed, therefore, that the French army should remain a few days at Baltimore, till further instructions or intelligence should be received, and that, unless special reasons might appear to the contrary, the army should continue its march northwardly, and join the American forces on the Hudson. This plan was thought advisable, moreover, to prevent Sir Guy Carleton from sending detachments from New York to Jamaica, where they might be turned against the French in the West Indies.

An elaborate memoir, pointing out various plans of a campaign, was presented by General Washington to Count de Rochambeau, who forwarded it to the French court. Immediately after the interview General Washington returned to Newburg, where he arrived on the 27th of July.

[1 ]The army removed from the encampment at Verplanck’s Point, crossed the Hudson at West Point, and, on the 28th of November, arrived at New Windsor, where they were cantoned in huts during the winter. The head-quarters of the Commander-in-chief were in the meantime re-established at Newburg.

[1 ]The plan here mentioned, which Colonel Laurens was extremely anxious to carry into effect, was to raise a regiment of black levies in South Carolina. He brought the subject before the legislature of the State, and pursued it with all his zeal and influence, but the measure was not approved. “It was some consolation, however,” said he, “to perceive that truth and philosophy had gained some ground, the suffrages in favor of the measure being twice as numerous as on a former occasion. Some hopes have been lately given me from Georgia; but I fear, when the question is put, we shall be outvoted there with as much disparity as we have been in this country.”—Bacon’s Bridge, South Carolina, May 19th.

[1 ]Similar letters were written to others of the French commanders. Mr. Sparks prints one to the Baron de Vioménil, on whom devolved the command of the French troops after Rochambeau had left them, and to the Chevalier de Chastellux (vol. viii., 365, 366).

The fleet sailed from Boston on the 24th of December, with all the troops on board, except Lauzun’s legion.

After Count de Rochambeau left the camp for Philadelphia, General Washington wrote to him as follows:

“It is with infinite satisfaction, that I embrace the earliest opportunity of sending to Philadelphia the cannon, which Congress were pleased to present to your Excellency, in testimony of their sense of the illustrious part you bore in the capture of the British army under Lord Cornwallis at York in Virginia. The carriages will follow by another conveyance. But, as they were not quite ready, I could not resist the pleasure, on that account, of forwarding these pieces to you previous to your departure, in hopes the inscription and devices, as well as the execution, may be agreeable to your wishes.”—December 29th.

This letter was answered by Count de Rochambeau from Annapolis, in Maryland, just as he was on the point of sailing from that port to France. “Though I was gone from Philadelphia,” said he, “before the cannon arrived there, give me leave to observe, that your usual attention and politeness have been shown to the last moment, of which this is a fresh proof. I write to the Chevalier de la Luzerne to keep them till peace, when they may be carried over without danger of being taken. We are just getting under sail. In this moment I renew to your Excellency my sincere acknowledgments for your friendship, and am with the most inviolable personal attachment and respect your obedient servant.”—11 January, 1783.

The Marquis de Chastellux and General de Choisy sailed in the same vessel with the Count de Rochambeau.

[1 ]Dr. Rush gave a full account of this celebration in a letter dated 16 July, 1782, printed in the Portfolio of 1817, and again in the Magazine of American History, 1877, p. 506.

[1 ]The reply of Jones, printed in Letters of Joseph Jones, 97, is very important, as it was the letter that was read at the meeting of the officers called by the Newburg addresses.

[1 ]In sending the same extract to Doctor McHenry, Washington wrote:

“Here then, if these expressions are not Intrenched in General Conway’s speech (when he threw out an Idea of giving to America the same kind of Independency that they were about granting to Ireland) is a solid basis for our Commissioners to raise their superstructure upon; and things may, & probably soon will be brought to a speedy and happy Issue.—But, if the Ministry mean no more than Genl. Conway has hinted at, ’t is plain their only aim is to gain time, that they may become more formidable at Sea—form new Alliances, if possible—or disunite us.—Be their object what it may, we, if wise, should push our preparations with vigor; for nothing will hasten Peace, more, than to be in a Condition for War, and if the contest is to continue, ’t is indispensably necessary.

“One thing however is certain, but how it came to pass is not very well understood; and that is, that the Letter of Carleton & Digby to me, has been published in New York, and has spread universal consternation among all the Tribes of Refugees;—who, actuated by different Passions—or the same passion in different degrees & forms & are a mere medley of confused-enraged & dejected characters.—Some it is said are cursing—others crying—while far the greatest part of them are struck dumb, and do not know what to do.”—Washington to James McHenry, 15 August, 1782.

[1 ]Lafayette had written, June 25, 1782, to Livingston, giving his sentiments on the negotiations for peace.—Diplomatic Correspondence.

[1 ]Congress had directed Washington to “remand immediately Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis to the United States, unless the Honorable Henry Laurens be forthwith released from his captivity, and furnished with passports to any part of Europe or America, at his option, or be admitted to a general parole.” Sir Guy Carleton replied that Laurens had been for some time in perfect freedom, and had considered Cornwallis as exchanged.

[1 ]“Ever since the Secession of Mr. Fox and others from the administration, I have been decidedly of opinion, that Peace would not take place before that epoch; that it would depend upon the strength of the contending parties and their influence on the nation, whether it would then happen or not; and that the intermediate space would be employed in Intriguing, in an investigation of powers, in hearing propositions, and probing the intentions of one another to the bottom. These I suppose would have been pretty well understood on all sides by the 26th of Novr. (as the ground on which Lord Shelburne is placed also would). It followed, then, in my judgment, that the ministry wd. communicate to, and take the sense of Parliament on the terms upon which Peace could be obtained; and leave it with the nation to accept them, or furnish the means of prosecuting the war vigorously. The Power given to Mr. Oswald, to treat with any Commissioner or Commissioners properly authorized from the United States of America, is more than I expected wd. happen before the meeting of Parliament. But, as the Gentlemen on the part of America could not treat with Him unless such powers were given, it became an act of necessity to cede them to effect their other purposes. Thus I account for the indirect acknowledgment of our Independence by the King, who, I dare say, felt some severe pangs at the time he put his hand to the Letters Patent. It is not, however, less efficacious or pleasing on that account; and breaking the Ice is a great point gained. There can be but very little doubt, I believe, of the conclusn. of the commercial treaty with Holland; but I have apprehensions that that Power will be the most difficult to satisfy at the general Treaty of Peace.

“It is with great pain I hear of the repeal of the Impost Law in Virginia. What could induce it? What office is Mr. Jefferson appointed to, that he has, you say, lately accepted? If it is that of commissioner of peace, I hope he will arrive too late to have any hand in it.—Washington to Robert R. Livingston, 8 January, 1783.

[1 ]“As a result of this conference [at Philadelphia], I was sent on the 19th [of July] to York, in Virginia, on a mission then secret but no longer so; this was to embark, as soon as possible, our siege artillery, which we had left at West Point, 8 leagues above York on the same river, and move it up the Chesapeake Bay to Baltimore. . . . The army is to leave Baltimore the 15th, to pass here [Philadelphia] and to march to the North River.”—Fersen to his Father, 8 August, 1782. The army did not begin to move until the 20th.

[1 ]The favorite nephew of General Washington, to whom he left the estate at Mount Vernon, and who was for many years one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

[1 ]Count Rochambeau did not approve of the plan, and the project was abandoned.

[1 ]Benj. Harrison. See Vol. IX., p. 182.

[1 ]This notice was conveyed to General Gates, who answered: “General Lincoln has acquainted me, that it is your Excellency’s desire to know, if I wish to take command in the army this campaign. I beg your Excellency to believe, that I am always ready to obey your commands, and shall be most happy when I can execute them to your satisfaction. I have but to entreat, that no attention to me or my rank may interfere or break in upon any part of your arrangments. My zeal for the public interest makes me exceedingly anxious to be present at the great concluding stroke of this war.”—MS. Letter, Philadelphia, August 17th.

Since the unfortunate battle of Camden, General Gates had been in retirement at his seat in Virginia. The court of inquiry, ordered by Congress to examine into that matter, had never been convened. The subject was at length brought forward anew, and it was resolved, “That the resolution of the 5th of October, 1780, directing a court of inquiry on the conduct of Major-General Gates be repealed; and that he take command in the army as the Commander-in-chief shall direct.”—Journals, August 14th. This resolution passed with only three dissenting voices. He rejoined the army on the 5th of October, and took command of the right wing as senior officer.

[1 ]Mr. Boudinot was elected President of Congress on the 4th of November. After the departments of finance, war, and foreign affairs went into operation, the correspondence of the Commander-in-chief with Congress passed chiefly through the hands of the secretaries, and his letters were directed to them.

[1 ]At Baltimore.

[1 ]This letter was referred, 11 February, to a committee composed of Hamilton, Peters, Bland, Rutledge, and Mifflin. In consequence of their report, the following resolves were adopted.

“That the Commander-in-chief be informed, that Congress, always happy to receive his sentiments either on the political or military affairs of these States, the utility of which they have upon so many occasions experienced, have paid all the attention to his letter of the 30th of January, which the importance of it demands.

“That, should the war continue another campaign, every motive of policy and economy would operate in favor of the enterprise suggested; but that, such are the present situation and prospects of these States, that it would be inexpedient at this time to determine upon the plan, or to enter upon the expensive preparations, which it would require.

“That the official accounts received by Congress, corresponding with other intelligence, afford appearances of an approaching peace.

“Ordered that the secretary of foreign affairs make a confidential communication to the Commander-in-chief of the state of the negotiations for peace, when the last advices were received.”—Secret Journal, vol. i., p. 254.

[1 ]The letter from Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby to General Washington was referred by Congress to a committee, who, on the part relating to Mr. Laurens, “proposed and reported, that the General should he directed to empower his commissioners [for negotiating a cartel] to release Earl Cornwallis from his parole in return for the indulgence granted to Mr. Laurens; but Mr. Rutledge, one of the committee, inveighed against this with so much warmth and indignation, that it was rejected with a loud and general No from all parts of the House. Nothing was said on the proposition of exchanging soldiers for seamen. Congress deemed it inexpedient to touch upon that matter at present, or to do any thing that might serve as a pretext for refusing to settle a cartel; and apprehended, if a general cartel was established, provision might be made therein for a release of our seamen, as well as for preventing the capture of unarmed citizens.”—Charles Thomson’s MS. Sketch of the Debate in Congress, August 12th.

At the solicitation of Mr. Laurens after he was set at liberty, and after the return of Lord Cornwallis to England, Dr. Franklin sent to the latter a paper discharging him from his parole, but reserving to Congress the approbation or disallowance of the act. In consequence of this form of release, Lord Cornwallis considered himself at liberty, and took his seat in the House of Peers.—Diplomatic Correspondence, vol. iii., pp, 362, 373.

[1 ]This day was the anniversary of the signing of the treaty of alliance between France and the United States, and the feu de joie was in commemoration of that event. The parole for the day, as entered in the Orderly Book, was “America and France”; and the countersigns, “United,” “For ever.” The following notice was also published in the general orders. “The Commander-in-chief, who wishes on the return of this auspicious day to diffuse the feelings of gratitude and pleasure as extensively as possible, is pleased to grant a full and free pardon to all military prisoners now in confinement.”

[1 ]On the 28th Washington applied direct to Congress for a determination of the following points, before he could carry the resolution of the 12th into effect: “Whether I am to confirm the exchange of Lord Cornwallis for the Hon’ble Mr. Laurens; and whether it is their intention, that the proposal contained in the letter of Sir Guy Carleton and Admiral Digby, of the 2d of August, “to exchange soldiers for sailors,” on the conditions mentioned by those gentlemen, should be acceded to. The last, should we be fortunate enough to obtain a liquidation of accounts (and we must go prepared to suppose that we shall be able to effect it), will be the great point in controversy; and, as it is one of the vast political importance, I wish to be explicitly instructed by Congress upon it.”—See Journals of Congress, 9 September, 1782.

[1 ]“Without amusements or avocations I am spending another winter (I hope it will be the last that I shall be kept from returning to domestic life,) amongst these rugged and dreary mountains. I have, however, the satisfaction of seeing the troops better covered, better clothed, and better fed, than they have ever been in any former winter quarters. And this circumstance alone would make any situation tolerable to me. In a little time I hope to turn their duty into an amusement by awakening again the spirit of emulation, & love of military parade and glory, which was so conspicuous the last campaign. I shall expect (as soon as the weather will permit in the Spring) to see the general officers daily on horseback at the head of their commands, teaching them by precept and example every thing that is reputable and glorious in the profession of arms; let me hint in season, I presume you will not choose to be absent, or second in exertion on these occasions to any of your brother officers.

“In the meantime I shall struggle to while away this season in laying a foundation for those things. To-morrow, being the anniversary of the alliance with France, we shall have a military exhibition. There will be a review and feu de joie, and afterwards a cold collation at the new public building.”—Washington to Major-General Heath, 5 February, 1783.

[1 ]“What can Induce Congress to restrain the Issues of the full Number of Rations to any Officer in the Army, which his Rank entitles him to?—when if they mean fair, it is to the public a mere matter of moonshine, whether the Financier pays the Value of them to that Officer if he does not draw them—or to the Contractor if he does?

“Can these things fail to irritate—and irritating, are they not pregnant with mischief? Is it policy—is it Justice to keep a sore constantly gangreened, when no good End is, or possibly can be answered by it? Should men, who have indured more, & received less of their pay than any other Class of people in public Service, have so little Consideration or Attention paid to their Interests or Comforts?

“Would to God, false policy, Inattention or something else, may not be productive of disagreement which will prove irreconcilable.”—Washington to the Secretary at War, 21 August, 1782.

[1 ]The remonstrance here mentioned is published, and the whole subject explained, in Collections of the Vermont Historical Society, ii., 315 et. seq.

[2 ]Washington, on the 25th, named Heath and two aids to meet a British officer of equal rank at Phillips House, on August 5th, to receive the proceedings of the court-martial on Captain Lippincott. Sir Guy Carleton, however, wished to send with the papers Chief-Justice Frederick Smith to make additional explanations, and Attorney-General Kempe to “enter into such explanations as might tend to remove all reciprocal complaints in the province of New Jersey.” Washington very properly declined to complicate what was merely a military question, with another that belonged to the civil government.

[1 ]See the letter to Mr. Chittenden, dated January 1st, 1782.

The effect of that letter is thus described in Allen’s History of Vermont.

“The universal confidence that the people of America placed in their Commander-in-chief, from the firm, steady, persevering, and able manner he had conducted the war; his known integrity, wisdom, and virtue, gave him more influence over the legislature of Vermont, than any other man in existence.” p. 223.

[1 ]President of the Board of Directors of the Associated Loyalists, and immediately responsible for the hanging of Huddy.

[1 ]The expedition failed through the treachery or ignorance of an Indian guide. Colonel Willett approached with his party in the night within five miles of Fort Oswego, when his principal guide lost his way, and the darkness and extreme fatigue of walking on snow-shoes prevented their discovering the fort, till the morning dawned, and it was necessary to retire. In reply to Colonel Willett’s letter reporting the result, General Washington said:

“Unfortunate as the circumstance is, I am happy in the persuasion that no imputation or reflection can justly reach your character, and that you are enabled to draw much consolation from the animated zeal, fortitude, and activity of the officers and soldiers who accompanied you. The failure, it seems, must be attributed to some of those unaccountable events which are not within the control of human means, and which, tho’ they often occur in military life, yet require not only the fortitude of the soldier, but the calm reflection of the Philosopher to bear.

“I cannot omit expressing to you the high sense I entertain of your persevering exertions and active zeal on the occasion of this expedition, and begging you to accept my warmest thanks, and that you will be pleased to communicate my gratitude to the officers and men under your command for the share they have taken in that service.”—Washington to Colonel Willett, 5 March, 1783.

[1 ]Read in Congress August 26th. Referred to Rutledge, McKean, and Duane. October 15th, Witherspoon and Wright were added.

[2 ]The enemy’s armed vessels in the Sound were carrying on and protecting an illicit trade with the inhabitants along the coast. A privateer of this description, mounting eleven carriage-guns and four swivels, was boarded by a party sent by Major Tallmadge in a fast sailing vessel, and after a short but sharp conflict was captured. Major Tallmadge represented the enterprise as conducted with great courage and gallantry on the part of the assailants.

[1 ]The army moved from Newburg, on the 31st of August, to Verplanck’s Point, where an encampment was established. This change was in consequence of an agreement with Count de Rochambeau to form a junction of the American and French armies at that place, and also to be nearer to the enemy in case any hostile attempts should be made from New York; although, from the inactivity and pacific declarations of Sir Guy Carleton, such attempts were not anticipated.

[1 ]Directing the Commander-in-chief to take the most effectual measures to prevent a clandestine intercourse between New Jersey and the city of New York, by which the enemy were supplied with provisions.

[1 ]The commissioners met at Tappan on the 25th of September, but effected nothing. The powers of the British commissioners were not satisfactory to the other party, and they separated without commencing a negotiation.—Heath’s Memoirs, p. 354.

[2 ]“It is much to be regretted, that, while I am using every means in my power to comply with the orders of Congress, founded in my judgment on our true interest and policy, there should be such a counteraction as we daily experience from individuals. But lamentable indeed is our situation, when States, or the administration of them, are leaping over those bounds, which should ever be deemed the sacred barrier betwn. us and the enemy, without which all opposition to their measures must soon cease, or dwindle into something ridiculous enough.

“That the intercourse with New York by way of the Sound is in a manner without restriction, I have little doubt of; and that the very Boats, which are Armed and Commissioned for the purpose of cutting off the Communication, are employed in facilitating the Trade, I have a recent instance of in one caught by Major Tallmadge in the act and with the goods on board. We have only to persevere, and with the means we possess give all the checks to it in our power. Every officer, who exerts himself in this business, will meet every support I can give, and will undoubtedly merit the approbation of Congress.”—Washington to Lieut.-Col. William S. Smith, 3 March, 1783.

[1 ]Sir Guy Carleton had written: “If these Indians come not solely to revenge the cruelties practised on their brethren, their motives are to me wholly unknown. To my knowledge, they cannot have directions from the commander-in-chief on that side; and these proceedings not only have my disapprobation, but I shall very willingly assist in restoring tranquillity on that frontier also.”—August 29th.

[1 ]Colonel Hamilton left the army after the capitulation at Yorktown, and took his seat in Congress as a delegate from the State of New York on the 25th of November, 1782.

[1 ]The first division of the French Army, under Count de Rochambeau, arrived at King’s Ferry, from the south, on the 15th of September. Count de Rochambeau describes the junction of the French and American armies as follows:

“General Washington wishing to testify his respect for France, and his recognition of the benefits she had rendered, caused us to pass between two lines of troops, clad, equipped, and armed with clothing and arms from France, and from the English magazines taken at Yorktown, which the French army had relinquished to the Americans. He ordered the drums to beat a French march during the whole review, and the two armies rejoined with the most lively demonstrations of reciprocal satisfaction.”—Mémoires de Rochambeau, tom. i., p. 309.

[1 ]On the evening of February 20th Hamilton said in a private company: “It was certain that the army had secretly determined not to lay down their arms until due provision and a satisfactory prospect should be afforded on the subject of their pay; that there was reason to expect that a public declaration to this effect would soon be made; that plans had been agitated, if not formed, for subsisting themselves after such declaration; that, as a proof of their earnestness on this subject, the Commander was already become extremely unpopular, among almost all ranks, from his known dislike to every unlawful proceeding; that this unpopularity was daily increasing and industriously promoted by many leading characters; that his choice of unfit and indiscreet persons into his family was the pretext, and with some the real motive; but the substantial one, a desire to displace him from the respect and confidence of the army, in order to substitute General , as the conductor of their efforts to obtain justice. Mr. Hamilton said that he knew General Washington intimately and perfectly; that his extreme reserve, mixed sometimes with a degree of asperity of temper, both of which were said to have increased of late, had contributed to the decline of his popularity; but that his virtue, his patriotism and firmness, would, it might be depended upon, never yield to any dishonorable or disloyal plans into which he might be called; that he would suffer himself to be cut to pieces; that he (H.) knowing this to be his true character, wished him to be the conductor of the army in their plans for redress, in order that they might be moderated and directed to proper objects, and exclude some other leader who might foment and misguide their councils; that with this view he had taken the liberty to write to the General on this subject, and to recommend such a policy to him.”—Madison Papers, i., 350, 351. Hamilton’s letter may be found in his Works (Lodge), viii., 94. In it he said:

“The difficulty will be to keep a complaining and suffering army within the bounds of moderation. This your Excellency’s influence must effect. In order to do it, it will be advisable not to discountenance their endeavors to procure redress, but rather, by intervention of confidential and prudent persons, to take the direction of them. This, however, must not appear. It is of moment to the public tranquillity, that your Excellency should preserve the confidence of the army without losing that of the people. This will enable you, in case of extremity, to guide the current, and to bring order, perhaps even good, out of confusion. ’T is a part that requires address; but ’t is one which your own situation, as well as the welfare of the community, points out.”

[2 ]Reed had become engaged in an acrid political controversy with General Cadwallader, in which it was charged that in December, 1776, he had meditated going over to the British. He asked Washington for “a few lines expressive of your sense of my conduct in the fall and winter of 1776,” and to give his sanction to using the letters Washington had written to him at that time.

[1 ]Announcing his intended resignation of office.

[1 ]Probably one of the numbers of the Crisis. Paine was now writing a series of articles under that title, suited to the political state of the times. He had laid aside his pen for several months, when, in the February preceding, Mr. Robert Morris induced him to take it up again, and promised him a stipulated sum of money as a compensation for his services. This was done with the knowledge and approbation of General Washington, who was then in Philadelphia. The Crisis was accordingly revived, and continued to the end of the war. See on this subject an extract from Mr. Morris’ Diary, in the Diplomatic Correspondence, vol. xii., p. 95.—Sparks.

[1 ]Read in Congress, March 17th. Referred to Gilman, Dyer, Clark, Rutledge, and Mercer. The committee was composed to “saddle with this embarrassment the men who had opposed the measures necessary for satisfying the army, viz: the half-pay and permanent funds; against one or other of which the individuals in question had voted.” Madison further recorded that “the steps taken by the General to avert the gathering storm, and his professions of inflexible adherence to his duty to Congress and to his country, excited the most affectionate sentiments towards him . . . [The situation] gave peculiar awe and solemnity to the present moment, and oppressed the minds of Congress with an anxiety and distress which had been scarcely felt in any period of the Revolution.”

[1 ]“I fully believe we have seen our worst days over. The spirit of the war on the part of the enemy is certainly on the decline, full as much as we think for. I draw this opinion, not only from the difficulties we know they are in, and the present promiscuous appearance of things, but from the peculiar effect, which certain periods of time have more or less upon all men. The British have accustomed themselves to think of the term of seven years in a manner different from other periods of time. They acquire this partly by habit, by religion, by reason, and by superstition. They serve seven years apprenticeship; they elect their parliament for seven years; they punish by seven years’ transportation, or the duplicate, or triplicate of that term; their leases run in the same manner; and they read that Jacob served seven years for one wife and seven years for another; and the same term, likewise, extinguishes all obligations (in certain cases) of debt, or matrimony; and thus this particular period, by a variety of concurrences, has obtained an influence in their minds superior to that of any other number.

“They have now had seven years’ war, and are not an inch farther on the continent than when they began. The superstitious and the popular part will conclude that it is not to be; and the reasonable part will think they have tried an unsuccessful scheme long enough, and that it is in vain to try it any longer; and the obstinate part of them will be beaten out, unless, consistent with their former sagacity, they get over the matter at once, by passing a new declaratory act to bend Time in all cases whatsoever, or declare him a rebel.”—Thomas Paine to Washington, September 7th.

[1 ]“When the General took his station in the desk or pulpit, which you may recollect, was in the Temple, he took out his written address from his coat pocket, and his spectacles, with his other hand, from his waistcoat pocket, and then addressed the officers in the following manner: ‘Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray, but almost blind, in the service of my country.’ This little address, with the mode and manner of delivering it, drew tears from [many] of the officers.”—Colonel Cobb’s letter.

[1 ]Resolve of the 9th of Sept. respecting Southern Army.

[1 ]Captain Asgill had been for some time released from close confinement, and allowed to go at large on parole at Chatham and in the neighborhood of that place. He wrote to General Washington, requesting permission to return to Europe, on account of the illness of his father, and the distressed state of his mother and sister in consequence of that event, and of their anxiety for the fate impending over the son and brother.

In writing to the Secretary at War, a week after the above letter, General Washington said: “The delay of Congress places me not only in a very delicate, but a very awkward situation with the expecting world. Was I to give my private opinion respecting Asgill, I should pronounce in favor of his being released from his duress, and that he should be permitted to go to his friends in Europe.”—October 7th.

[1 ]This letter was enclosed to Robert Morris, to whom Washington wrote: “I confess it seems to me, not only an act of policy but of justice, instead of irritating the minds of our officers and men, to soothe and accommodate them in all their reasonable wishes and expectations, as far as the circumstances will admit it. I am sensible you coincide entirely in the same sentiment.”—20 October, 1782. And to McHenry, whose needs were urgent, he wrote on the 23d [or 24th] of October:

“To make such an application as you require to the Financier, would, I know, be unavailing—first, because he has most decidedly refused to adjust, & discharge the claim of any Officer who is a resident in & the subject of the United States—and secondly, every other consideration apart what would alone be a sufficient bar—because he has not the means of doing it—The States are so tardy in collecting the Taxes, that the most trivial sum cannot be obtained for the most pressing purposes—and in one sense, it may be said, that the Officers of the Army are actually starving for want of a small portion of their pay—the Horses of it, for want of money to procure forage, are actually in this condition—In a word, Sir, for want of a little money to pay the transportation of some very essential articles, the Troops have suffered, & continue to suffer amazingly; and for the want of the said money, we have been obliged to relinquish a contract for subsisting the Army at 10d a Ration & give 13d for the sake of three months credit.

“There have been instances I know, where some foreign Officers, who had no state to resort to—& who were reduced to the last extremity—have received a small part of their pay, but trifling in comparison of their demands, or dues.—Judge ye therefore under these circumstances, how fruitless would be any application to the Financier for money.

“The only mode I am told, by which you can be relieved, is for me to apply to Congress to recommend your case to the State of Maryland; that you may be included in the Officers belonging to it—this I have accordingly done (as you may see by the Inclosed) through its proper channel—the Secretary at War—who is now here, and on whom I shall enforce the measure in terms which I persuade myself will give facility to an official act.”

[1 ]To some of the topics of this letter General Lincoln replied, in his private capacity, as follows:

“You mention as a ground of complaint, that the compensation to the army for their services is left in a loose, equivocal state, and of this I am fully convinced; and from the knowledge I have of the temper of Congress, I have little expectation that the matter of half-pay, to which I suppose you allude, will be in a better situation than it now is, until it shall be recommended by Congress to the several States to provide for their own officers; which I am apprehensive will not be done unless Congress know in some way or other, that it is the wish of the officers that they should do it.

“You know, Sir, that no moneys can be appropriated but by the voice of nine States. There was not that number in favor of half-pay, when the vote to grant it passed in Congress, which was a vote before the confederation was signed and practised upon, but it is not now. I see little probability, that a sum equal to the half-pay will be appropriated to that purpose, and apportioned on the several States. Massachusetts is one of those States, which have always been opposed to the measure. Indeed, there is but one State east of this, which agreed to it. In the first place, there is too great a part of the Union opposed to the half-pay to think of carrying it through. The States in opposition cannot be coerced. They say they are willing to make a handsome compensation by compromise, and that they will give a sum which shall be just and honorable. From this it will be difficult, if not impossible, to persuade them to depart. I am myself fully of opinion, that it will be much the best for the army to be referred to their several States, and that their expectations will end in chagrin and disappointments if they look for half-pay from Congress. Let us for a moment reflect how Congress will avail themselves of money to discharge this debt. They cannot appropriate any part of the sum to this use, which shall be annually apportioned on the several States, for the reasons I mentioned before; there are not nine States in favor of it. Should it be said, that it may be paid out of the revenue of some general tax, it will not remove the objection. The money arising from these general taxes must also be appropriated, if such taxes were passed. No one of those proposed has yet passed, and I see little probability that any of them will soon, if ever.”—October 14th.

[1 ]Colonel Wadsworth was the contractor for supplying the French army, and a deputy under him had refused to submit to a constable, who served upon him a justice’s warrant. This was considered a contempt of the civil authority, and caused a complaint to be forwarded by the justice to the governor of the State.

[1 ]Laurens was killed at Chehaw Neck on the 27th of August.

[1 ]George Augustine Washington.

[1 ]The case of Captain Asgill was laid before Count de Vergennes by Lady Asgill, and that minister wrote the following letter to Washington:

“It is not in quality of a King, the friend and ally of the United States, (though with the knowledge and consent of his Majesty) that I now have the honor to write to your Excellency. It is as a man of sensibility and a tender father, who feels all the force of paternal love, that I take the liberty to address to your Excellency my earnest solicitations in favor of a mother and family in tears. Her situation seems the more worthy of notice on our part, as it is to the humanity of a nation at war with her own, that she has recourse, for what she ought to receive from the impartial justice of her own generals.

“I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency a copy of a letter, which Lady Asgill has just written me. I am not known to her, nor was I acquainted that her son was the unhappy victim, destined by lot to expiate the odious crime that a formal denial of justice obliges you to avenge. Your Excellency will not read this letter without being extremely affected: it had that effect upon the King and Queen, to whom I communicated it. The goodness of their Majesties’ hearts induces them to desire, that the inquietudes of an unfortunate mother may be calmed, and her tenderness reassured. I felt, Sir, that there are cases where humanity itself exacts the most extreme rigor; perhaps the one now in question may be of the number; but, allowing reprisals to be just, it is not less horrid to those who are the victims; and the character of your Excellency is too well known, for me not to be persuaded that you desire nothing more than to be able to avoid the disagreeable necessity.

“There is one consideration, Sir, which, though it is not decisive, may have an influence on your resolution. Captain Asgill is doubtless your prisoner, but he is among those whom the arms of the King contributed to put into your hands at Yorktown. Although this circumstance does not operate as a safeguard, it however justifies the interest I permit myself to take in this affair. If it is in your power, Sir, to consider and have regard to it, you will do what is agreeable to their Majesties; the danger of young Asgill, the tears, the despair of his mother, affect them sensibly: and they will see with pleasure the hope of consolation shine out for those unfortunate people.

“In seeking to deliver Mr. Asgill from the fate which threatens him, I am far from engaging you to secure another victim; the pardon, to be perfectly satisfactory, must be entire. I do not imagine it can be productive of any bad consequences. If the English general has not been able to punish the horrible crime you complain of, in so exemplary a manner as he should, there is reason to think he will take the most efficacious measures to prevent the like in future.

“I sincerely wish, Sir, that my intercession may meet success; the sentiment which dictates it, and which you have not ceased to manifest on every occasion, assures me, that you will not be indifferent to the prayers and to the tears of a family, which has recourse to your clemency through me. It is rendering homage to your virtue to implore it.”—Versailles, 29 July, 1782.

Washington sent the letter to Congress by special messenger, without any observations, and in that body the question was referred on the 29th to Rutledge, Osgood, Montgomery, Boudinot, and Duane. On September 7th was reported a resolution directing the release of Asgill. To the French minister Washington wrote on November 19th:

“This moment I received the resolution of Congress in favor of Captain Asgill. I transmitted it to him and at the same time sent him my Passport to go into New York. It will depend on him to go to Europe, if he pleases—his Parole not being limited.”

“Your Excellency will have been informed, before this reaches you, of the liberation of Captain Asgill. I am, notwithstanding, directed to recall your attention to that part of your letter of the 3d of August last, in which you say, ‘I have given orders to the judge-advocate to make further inquisition, and to collect evidence for the prosecution of such other persons as may appear to have been criminal in this transaction.’ In full confidence, that measures have been taken to carry your Excellency’s intentions into execution, I have to request the favor of you to inform me what probability there is, that the persons who have been really guilty of the action, which has been the subject of former discussion, will be brought to a proper account.”—Washington to Sir Guy Carleton, 20 November, 1782. Sir Guy deprecated a reopening of the question, and it rested there.

[1 ]Gov. George Clinton.

[1 ]See Washington to Robert Morris, 8 January, 1783, p. 126, post.

[1 ]On December 23d Washington notified Governor Clinton that the bargain was completed, and he should draw upon him for £1880 Virginia currency—that is, six shillings to the dollar.

[1 ]The army removed from the encampment at Verplanck’s Point, crossed the Hudson at West Point, and, on the 28th of November, arrived at New Windsor, where they were cantoned in huts during the winter. The head-quarters of the Commander-in-chief were in the meantime re-established at Newburg.

[1 ]Similar letters were written to others of the French commanders. Mr. Sparks prints one to the Baron de Vioménil, on whom devolved the command of the French troops after Rochambeau had left them, and to the Chevalier de Chastellux (vol. viii., 365, 366).

The fleet sailed from Boston on the 24th of December, with all the troops on board, except Lauzun’s legion.

After Count de Rochambeau left the camp for Philadelphia, General Washington wrote to him as follows:

“It is with infinite satisfaction, that I embrace the earliest opportunity of sending to Philadelphia the cannon, which Congress were pleased to present to your Excellency, in testimony of their sense of the illustrious part you bore in the capture of the British army under Lord Cornwallis at York in Virginia. The carriages will follow by another conveyance. But, as they were not quite ready, I could not resist the pleasure, on that account, of forwarding these pieces to you previous to your departure, in hopes the inscription and devices, as well as the execution, may be agreeable to your wishes.”—December 29th.

This letter was answered by Count de Rochambeau from Annapolis, in Maryland, just as he was on the point of sailing from that port to France. “Though I was gone from Philadelphia,” said he, “before the cannon arrived there, give me leave to observe, that your usual attention and politeness have been shown to the last moment, of which this is a fresh proof. I write to the Chevalier de la Luzerne to keep them till peace, when they may be carried over without danger of being taken. We are just getting under sail. In this moment I renew to your Excellency my sincere acknowledgments for your friendship, and am with the most inviolable personal attachment and respect your obedient servant.”—11 January, 1783.

The Marquis de Chastellux and General de Choisy sailed in the same vessel with the Count de Rochambeau.

[1 ]The reply of Jones, printed in Letters of Joseph Jones, 97, is very important, as it was the letter that was read at the meeting of the officers called by the Newburg addresses.

[1 ]Lafayette had written, June 25, 1782, to Livingston, giving his sentiments on the negotiations for peace.—Diplomatic Correspondence.

[1 ]“Ever since the Secession of Mr. Fox and others from the administration, I have been decidedly of opinion, that Peace would not take place before that epoch; that it would depend upon the strength of the contending parties and their influence on the nation, whether it would then happen or not; and that the intermediate space would be employed in Intriguing, in an investigation of powers, in hearing propositions, and probing the intentions of one another to the bottom. These I suppose would have been pretty well understood on all sides by the 26th of Novr. (as the ground on which Lord Shelburne is placed also would). It followed, then, in my judgment, that the ministry wd. communicate to, and take the sense of Parliament on the terms upon which Peace could be obtained; and leave it with the nation to accept them, or furnish the means of prosecuting the war vigorously. The Power given to Mr. Oswald, to treat with any Commissioner or Commissioners properly authorized from the United States of America, is more than I expected wd. happen before the meeting of Parliament. But, as the Gentlemen on the part of America could not treat with Him unless such powers were given, it became an act of necessity to cede them to effect their other purposes. Thus I account for the indirect acknowledgment of our Independence by the King, who, I dare say, felt some severe pangs at the time he put his hand to the Letters Patent. It is not, however, less efficacious or pleasing on that account; and breaking the Ice is a great point gained. There can be but very little doubt, I believe, of the conclusn. of the commercial treaty with Holland; but I have apprehensions that that Power will be the most difficult to satisfy at the general Treaty of Peace.

“It is with great pain I hear of the repeal of the Impost Law in Virginia. What could induce it? What office is Mr. Jefferson appointed to, that he has, you say, lately accepted? If it is that of commissioner of peace, I hope he will arrive too late to have any hand in it.—Washington to Robert R. Livingston, 8 January, 1783.

[1 ]The favorite nephew of General Washington, to whom he left the estate at Mount Vernon, and who was for many years one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

[1 ]Benj. Harrison. See Vol. IX., p. 182.

[1 ]Mr. Boudinot was elected President of Congress on the 4th of November. After the departments of finance, war, and foreign affairs went into operation, the correspondence of the Commander-in-chief with Congress passed chiefly through the hands of the secretaries, and his letters were directed to them.

[1 ]This letter was referred, 11 February, to a committee composed of Hamilton, Peters, Bland, Rutledge, and Mifflin. In consequence of their report, the following resolves were adopted.

“That the Commander-in-chief be informed, that Congress, always happy to receive his sentiments either on the political or military affairs of these States, the utility of which they have upon so many occasions experienced, have paid all the attention to his letter of the 30th of January, which the importance of it demands.

“That, should the war continue another campaign, every motive of policy and economy would operate in favor of the enterprise suggested; but that, such are the present situation and prospects of these States, that it would be inexpedient at this time to determine upon the plan, or to enter upon the expensive preparations, which it would require.

“That the official accounts received by Congress, corresponding with other intelligence, afford appearances of an approaching peace.

“Ordered that the secretary of foreign affairs make a confidential communication to the Commander-in-chief of the state of the negotiations for peace, when the last advices were received.”—Secret Journal, vol. i., p. 254.

[1 ]This day was the anniversary of the signing of the treaty of alliance between France and the United States, and the feu de joie was in commemoration of that event. The parole for the day, as entered in the Orderly Book, was “America and France”; and the countersigns, “United,” “For ever.” The following notice was also published in the general orders. “The Commander-in-chief, who wishes on the return of this auspicious day to diffuse the feelings of gratitude and pleasure as extensively as possible, is pleased to grant a full and free pardon to all military prisoners now in confinement.”

[1 ]“Without amusements or avocations I am spending another winter (I hope it will be the last that I shall be kept from returning to domestic life,) amongst these rugged and dreary mountains. I have, however, the satisfaction of seeing the troops better covered, better clothed, and better fed, than they have ever been in any former winter quarters. And this circumstance alone would make any situation tolerable to me. In a little time I hope to turn their duty into an amusement by awakening again the spirit of emulation, & love of military parade and glory, which was so conspicuous the last campaign. I shall expect (as soon as the weather will permit in the Spring) to see the general officers daily on horseback at the head of their commands, teaching them by precept and example every thing that is reputable and glorious in the profession of arms; let me hint in season, I presume you will not choose to be absent, or second in exertion on these occasions to any of your brother officers.

“In the meantime I shall struggle to while away this season in laying a foundation for those things. To-morrow, being the anniversary of the alliance with France, we shall have a military exhibition. There will be a review and feu de joie, and afterwards a cold collation at the new public building.”—Washington to Major-General Heath, 5 February, 1783.

[1 ]The remonstrance here mentioned is published, and the whole subject explained, in Collections of the Vermont Historical Society, ii., 315 et. seq.

[1 ]See the letter to Mr. Chittenden, dated January 1st, 1782.

The effect of that letter is thus described in Allen’s History of Vermont.

“The universal confidence that the people of America placed in their Commander-in-chief, from the firm, steady, persevering, and able manner he had conducted the war; his known integrity, wisdom, and virtue, gave him more influence over the legislature of Vermont, than any other man in existence.” p. 223.

[1 ]The expedition failed through the treachery or ignorance of an Indian guide. Colonel Willett approached with his party in the night within five miles of Fort Oswego, when his principal guide lost his way, and the darkness and extreme fatigue of walking on snow-shoes prevented their discovering the fort, till the morning dawned, and it was necessary to retire. In reply to Colonel Willett’s letter reporting the result, General Washington said:

“Unfortunate as the circumstance is, I am happy in the persuasion that no imputation or reflection can justly reach your character, and that you are enabled to draw much consolation from the animated zeal, fortitude, and activity of the officers and soldiers who accompanied you. The failure, it seems, must be attributed to some of those unaccountable events which are not within the control of human means, and which, tho’ they often occur in military life, yet require not only the fortitude of the soldier, but the calm reflection of the Philosopher to bear.

“I cannot omit expressing to you the high sense I entertain of your persevering exertions and active zeal on the occasion of this expedition, and begging you to accept my warmest thanks, and that you will be pleased to communicate my gratitude to the officers and men under your command for the share they have taken in that service.”—Washington to Colonel Willett, 5 March, 1783.

[2 ]The enemy’s armed vessels in the Sound were carrying on and protecting an illicit trade with the inhabitants along the coast. A privateer of this description, mounting eleven carriage-guns and four swivels, was boarded by a party sent by Major Tallmadge in a fast sailing vessel, and after a short but sharp conflict was captured. Major Tallmadge represented the enterprise as conducted with great courage and gallantry on the part of the assailants.

[1 ]Directing the Commander-in-chief to take the most effectual measures to prevent a clandestine intercourse between New Jersey and the city of New York, by which the enemy were supplied with provisions.

[2 ]“It is much to be regretted, that, while I am using every means in my power to comply with the orders of Congress, founded in my judgment on our true interest and policy, there should be such a counteraction as we daily experience from individuals. But lamentable indeed is our situation, when States, or the administration of them, are leaping over those bounds, which should ever be deemed the sacred barrier betwn. us and the enemy, without which all opposition to their measures must soon cease, or dwindle into something ridiculous enough.

“That the intercourse with New York by way of the Sound is in a manner without restriction, I have little doubt of; and that the very Boats, which are Armed and Commissioned for the purpose of cutting off the Communication, are employed in facilitating the Trade, I have a recent instance of in one caught by Major Tallmadge in the act and with the goods on board. We have only to persevere, and with the means we possess give all the checks to it in our power. Every officer, who exerts himself in this business, will meet every support I can give, and will undoubtedly merit the approbation of Congress.”—Washington to Lieut.-Col. William S. Smith, 3 March, 1783.

[1 ]Colonel Hamilton left the army after the capitulation at Yorktown, and took his seat in Congress as a delegate from the State of New York on the 25th of November, 1782.

[1 ]On the evening of February 20th Hamilton said in a private company: “It was certain that the army had secretly determined not to lay down their arms until due provision and a satisfactory prospect should be afforded on the subject of their pay; that there was reason to expect that a public declaration to this effect would soon be made; that plans had been agitated, if not formed, for subsisting themselves after such declaration; that, as a proof of their earnestness on this subject, the Commander was already become extremely unpopular, among almost all ranks, from his known dislike to every unlawful proceeding; that this unpopularity was daily increasing and industriously promoted by many leading characters; that his choice of unfit and indiscreet persons into his family was the pretext, and with some the real motive; but the substantial one, a desire to displace him from the respect and confidence of the army, in order to substitute General , as the conductor of their efforts to obtain justice. Mr. Hamilton said that he knew General Washington intimately and perfectly; that his extreme reserve, mixed sometimes with a degree of asperity of temper, both of which were said to have increased of late, had contributed to the decline of his popularity; but that his virtue, his patriotism and firmness, would, it might be depended upon, never yield to any dishonorable or disloyal plans into which he might be called; that he would suffer himself to be cut to pieces; that he (H.) knowing this to be his true character, wished him to be the conductor of the army in their plans for redress, in order that they might be moderated and directed to proper objects, and exclude some other leader who might foment and misguide their councils; that with this view he had taken the liberty to write to the General on this subject, and to recommend such a policy to him.”—Madison Papers, i., 350, 351. Hamilton’s letter may be found in his Works (Lodge), viii., 94. In it he said:

“The difficulty will be to keep a complaining and suffering army within the bounds of moderation. This your Excellency’s influence must effect. In order to do it, it will be advisable not to discountenance their endeavors to procure redress, but rather, by intervention of confidential and prudent persons, to take the direction of them. This, however, must not appear. It is of moment to the public tranquillity, that your Excellency should preserve the confidence of the army without losing that of the people. This will enable you, in case of extremity, to guide the current, and to bring order, perhaps even good, out of confusion. ’T is a part that requires address; but ’t is one which your own situation, as well as the welfare of the community, points out.”

[1 ]Announcing his intended resignation of office.

[1 ]Read in Congress, March 17th. Referred to Gilman, Dyer, Clark, Rutledge, and Mercer. The committee was composed to “saddle with this embarrassment the men who had opposed the measures necessary for satisfying the army, viz: the half-pay and permanent funds; against one or other of which the individuals in question had voted.” Madison further recorded that “the steps taken by the General to avert the gathering storm, and his professions of inflexible adherence to his duty to Congress and to his country, excited the most affectionate sentiments towards him . . . [The situation] gave peculiar awe and solemnity to the present moment, and oppressed the minds of Congress with an anxiety and distress which had been scarcely felt in any period of the Revolution.”

[1 ]“When the General took his station in the desk or pulpit, which you may recollect, was in the Temple, he took out his written address from his coat pocket, and his spectacles, with his other hand, from his waistcoat pocket, and then addressed the officers in the following manner: ‘Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray, but almost blind, in the service of my country.’ This little address, with the mode and manner of delivering it, drew tears from [many] of the officers.”—Colonel Cobb’s letter.