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Subject Area: War and Peace
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU. - George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, vol. IX (1780-1782) [1891]

Edition used:

The Writings of George Washington, collected and edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890). Vol. IX (1780-1782).

Part of: The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols.

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TO COUNT DE ROCHAMBEAU.

Sir,

I had last evening the honor of receiving your favor of the 31st of May by the Duke de Lauzun, who informs me, that he is authorized by your Excellency and Count de Barras to enter into a free communication with me upon the subject of the council of war held on board the Duc de Bourgogne, and to request my opinion upon the propriety of their determination.1

I must confess to your Excellency, that there is weight in the reasons, which are offered for the detention of his Majesty’s fleet in the harbor of Newport, in preference to its going round to Boston; but as I cannot think, that it will be as safe in all possible cases in the harbor of Newport, after a greater part of the French army has been withdrawn, as it would be in the harbor of Boston, I must adhere to my opinion, and to the plan fixed at Weathersfield, as most eligible, all circumstances considered. I would not, however, set up my single judgment against that of so many gentlemen of experience, more especially as the matter partly depends upon a knowledge of marine affairs, of which I candidly confess my ignorance. I would, therefore, in order to avoid delay, rest the matter upon the following footing. If your Excellency, the Count de Barras, and the other gentlemen should, upon a further consideration of the subject, aided by any new informations, which you may have received, still think it most advisable to adhere to the former resolution of the council, you may make use of the enclosed letters to the governors of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, which are left open for your inspection. If, on the contrary, you should change your opinions, the letters may be destroyed, as that which was written by me to the governor of Rhode Island from Weathersfield will be sufficient for the purpose of calling out five hundred militia for the present, and such further numbers as exigencies may require.

At any rate, I could wish that the march of the troops might now be hurried as much as possible. The strides, which the enemy are making to the southward, demand a collection of our force in this quarter, that we may endeavor to commence our operation. I know of no measure, which will be so likely to afford relief to the southern States, in so short a time, as a serious menace against New York. This your Excellency may remember was a principal inducement for our undertaking that operation, in preference to the other, which was spoken of; and I assure you the calls upon me from the southward are so pressing, that nothing but seeing our preparations against New York in some degree of forwardness will content them, or convince them that they are likely to derive any advantages from the force, which they see detained here. I have forwarded your Excellency’s despatch to the Minister by a Gentleman in the Quarter Master’s department.

I have the honor to be, &c.1

[1 ]Intelligence had been brought to Count de Rochambeau by his son and Count de Barras, that a strong armament had departed from Brest, or would immediately depart, under Count de Grasse, for the West Indies; and that, after he had passed the Azores, Count de Grasse would detach a convoy with somewhat more than six hundred recruits, escorted by the armed vessel Sagittaire, and destined to unite with the French army at Newport. Money for the army and navy was also to be brought by the Sagittaire. The news was likewise entrusted to Count de Rochambeau alone, that Count de Grasse had orders to sail with his fleet to the coast of the United States in the month of July or August, to relieve the squadron of M. de Barras; and in case M. de Rochambeau should march from Newport to unite with General Washington before the arrival of Count de Grasse’s fleet, then the squadron of Barras was to retire to the harbor of Boston for security, as it was supposed that, without the protection of the French army on shore, the vessels would be in danger of a naval attack from the enemy with a superior force.—Mémoires de Rochambeau, tom. i., p. 270.

It having been decided at the conference between the American and French commanders, held at Weathersfield, that the French army should leave Newport and march to the North River, the manner of disposing of the French fleet was taken into consideration immediately after the return of Count de Rochambeau. The result is explained in the following extract from a letter written by him to General Washington:

“The Count de Barras, instead of going to Boston according to his orders, has held a council of war, the result of which I send here enclosed. I hope your Excellency will as soon as possible send an order, that the militia, who are to be stationed on this Island, be raised to the number of one thousand. They will be joined by four hundred men, whom I shall leave under the orders of M. de Choisy, a brigadier-general, and a very good officer. I think that the State of Massachusetts may furnish the five hundred men, that have been demanded by the council of war for the surety of the squadron, and that it is suitable that your Excellency should send to M. de Choisy an order to convene a greater number in case of need, and letters for the governors of the States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

“It is useless to say to your Excellency, that one of the chief reasons, that decided the council of war to keep the squadron at Rhode Island, was the fear lest America should look upon this change from Newport to Boston as a retreat. The desire to be nearer for our future operations, when the superior naval force expected in the course of the summer shall arrive in these seas, has been another reason. Your Excellency knows that the harbor of Boston is very unfavorable at this season, on account of the south-west winds, that blow almost continually. The junction of M. de Barras with the forces that might come, would perhaps be delayed for a month, and consequently all the operations depending on it.”—MS. Letter, Newport, May 31st.

[1 ]“I fear, from the purport of the letter you did me the honor to write from N: Port on the 9th, that my sentiments respecting the council of war held on board the Duke de Burgogne the 31st of May, have been misconceiv’d, and I shall be very unhappy if they receive an interpretation different from the true intent and meaning of them. If this is the case, it can only be attributed to my not understanding the business of the Duke de Lauzun perfectly. I will rely therefore on your goodness and candor to explain, and rectify the mistake, if any has happened. My wishes perfectly coincided with the determination of the Board of War to continue the Fleet at Rhode Island, provided it could remain there in safety, with the force required, and did not impede the march of the Army towards the North River. But when Duke Lauzun informed me, that my opinion of the propriety and safety of this measure was required by the Board, and that he came hither at the particular desire of the Counts Rochambeau and de Barras, to obtain it, I was reduced to the painful necessity of delivering a sentiment different from that of a most respectable Board, or of forfeiting all pretensions to candor by the concealment of it. Upon this ground it was I wrote to the Generals to the effect I did, and not because I was dissatisfied at the alteration of the plan agreed to at Weathersfield. My fears for the safety of the Fleet, which I am now perswaded, were carried too far, were productive of a belief that the Generals, when seperated, might feel uneasy at every misterious preparation of the enemy, and occasion a fresh call for militia—this had some weight in my determination to give Boston (where I was sure no danger could be encountered but that of a blockade) a preference to Newport, where under some circumstances, though not such as were likely to happen, something might be enterprized.

“The Fleet being at Rhode Island is attended certainly with many advantages in the operations proposed, and I entreat you, and the Gentlemen who were of opinion that it ought to be risqued there for these purposes, will be assured that I have a high sense of the obligation you mean to confer on America by that resolve, and that your zeal to promote the common cause and my anxiety for the safety of so valuable a fleet were the only motives which gave birth to the apparent difference in our opinions.”—Washington to the Chevalier de Chastellux, 13 June, 1781.