- The Writings of George Washington.
- 1778.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Major-general Heath.
- To Major-general Mcdougall.
- To General Schuyler.
- To the Marquis De Lafayette.
- To the Marquis De Lafayette. Instructions.
- To Gouverneur Morris, In Congress.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Richard Henry Lee.
- To John Parke Custis.
- To Gouverneur Morris.
- To Henry Laurens.
- To Landon Carter.
- To Major-general Lee. Instructions.
- To Sir Henry Clinton.
- Thoughts Upon a Plan of Operations For the Campaign of 1778. 1
- To the President of Congress.
- To Major-general Dickinson.
- To John Augustine Washington.
- To Henry Laurens.
- To Major-general Gates.
- To Major-general Charles Lee.
- To James Hunter, Esq., Near Fredericksburg, Va.
- To Joseph Reed, Delegate In Congress From Pennsylvania.
- To the President of Congress.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Major-general Gates.
- To Major-general Arnold.
- To the President of Congress.
- To the Marquis De Lafayette. Instructions.
- To Major-general Lee.
- To the President of Congress.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Major-general Gates.
- To John Augustine Washington.
- To Major-general Lord Stirling and the Members of the General Court-martial For the Trial of Major-general Lee.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Governor Clinton.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Governor Trumbull.
- To Count D’estaing.
- To Count D’estaing.
- To Major-general Sullivan.
- To John Parke Custis.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Count D’estaing.
- To Gouverneur Morris.
- To Henry Laurens.
- To the President of Congress.
- To the Marquis De Lafayette.
- To Major-general Sullivan.
- To Major-general Arnold.
- To the Board of War.
- To the President of Congress.
- To John Parke Custis.
- To Count D’estaing.
- To Lund Washington. 1
- To the President of Congress.
- To Henry Laurens.
- To Brigadier-general Nelson, Virginia.
- To Major-general Greene.
- To Major-general Sullivan.
- To Major-general Heath.
- To Major-general Sullivan.
- To Major General Greene.
- To the Marquis De Lafayette.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Gouverneur Morris.
- To Count D’estaing.
- To Major-general Sullivan.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Henry Laurens.
- To John Augustine Washington.
- To the Marquis De Lafayette.
- To the President of Congress.
- To the Marquis De Lafayette.
- To Gouverneur Morris.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Major-general Gates.
- To John Parke Custis.
- To Brigadier-general Andrew Lewis, Virginia.
- To Major-general Heath.
- To the President of Congress.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Mr. James Hill.
- To Count D’estaing.
- To Burwell Bassett.
- To Count D’estaing,
- To the President of Congress.
- To Henry Laurens.
- To Major-general Schuyler.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Joseph Reed, President of Pennsylvania.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Lund Washington.
- To Benjamin Harrison, Speaker of the House of Delegates of Virginia.
- To Major-general Schuyler.
- 1779.
- To the Committee of Congress Appointed to Confer With the Commander-in-chief.
- To the Committee of Congress.
- To Major-general Putnam.
- To the Committee of Congress.
- To Brigadier-general Mcintosh.
- To Major-general Schuyler.
- To the President of Congress.
- To John Jay, President of Congress.
- To Governor Livingston.
- To President Reed.
- To Major-general Gates.
- To the Marquis De Lafayette, Paris.
- To Sir Henry Clinton.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Henry Laurens, In Congress.
- To Colonel Daniel Brodhead, At Fort Pitt.
- To Major-general Schuyler.
- To George Mason.
- To President Reed.
- To James Warren, In Massachusetts.
- To President Reed.
- To John Jay.
- To Major-general Schuyler.
- To Colonel Daniel Brodhead.
- To Burwell Bassett.
- To Governor Livingston.
- To John Jay.
- To President Reed.
- To Monsieur Gerard, Minister Plenipotentiary From His Most Christian Majesty to the United States of America.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Governor Livingston.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Benjamin Harrison.
- To Brigadier-general Maxwell.
- To Brigadier-general Maxwell.
- To Gouverneur Morris.
- To the President of Congress.
- To John Armstrong.
- Circular to the States.
- To Major-general Sullivan. Instructions.
- To the President of Congress.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Major-general Gates.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Major Benjamin Tallmadge. 1
- To Major-general Sullivan.
- To the Marquis De Lafayette.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Brigadier-general Wayne. 2
- To Brigadier-general Wayne.
- To Governor Trumbull.
- To Brigadier-general Wayne.
- To the President of Congress.
- To Joseph Reed.
TO MAJOR-GENERAL McDOUGALL.
Head Quarters,Valley Forge,
5 May, 1778.
Dear Sir,
I have wrote pressingly to General Heath and General Putnam to forward the recruits of Massachusetts and Connecticut to the North River, with all possible despatch. If they arrive there during the continuance of your command, you will be pleased, agreeable to former orders, to send on those belonging to the regiments that are here immediately.
I very much fear that we, taking it for granted, that we have nothing more to do, because France has acknowledged our independency and formed an alliance with us, shall relapse into a state of supineness and perfect security. I think it more than probable, from the situation of affairs in Europe, that the enemy will receive no considerable if any reinforcements. But suppose they should not, their remaining force, if well directed, is far from being contemptible. In the desperate state of British affairs, it is worth a desperate attempt to extricate themselves; and a blow at our main army, if successful, would have a wonderful effect upon the minds of a number of people, still wishing to embrace the present terms, or indeed any terms offered by Great Britain. It behoves us therefore to make ourselves as respectable as possible, that, if the enemy continue in their detached state, we endeavor to destroy them by piecemeal; and if, on the contrary, they collect, they may not fall heavily upon us in some quarter. I cannot help thinking, from a late uncommon movement of their shipping, that they have something of this kind in view. Near two hundred sail of light transports have gone down the Delaware within a week past. New York is too valuable to be evacuated but upon the last extremity, and I therefore incline to think that the move, if any, will be from Rhode Island. If the troops should be brought from thence to New York, we must provide for the posts upon the North River, in proportion to the addition to the strength of the enemy; if to Philadelphia, we must draw down our force accordingly. For these reasons it is my wish to see the eastern recruits brought on towards the North River as quickly as possible. If there should be no alteration in the position of the enemy, you will, as before mentioned, send on those intended for the regiments here without loss of time. If there should be a move, we must alter our plan, according to circumstances. I am, &c.
“The enclosed copy of a letter from General Dickinson to me will inform Congress of the fate of the Continental frigates in Delaware; a fate (in the situation in which they were left) I had long predicted, and which I had taken much pains to avert, by using every argument in my power to have them sunk. In that case, their destruction would have been at least a work of time, difficulty, and expense, and might have been perhaps prevented. About one o’clock on Thursday I got notice of an intended move of the enemy by water; and, conjecturing the destination of it, had a detachment under General Maxwell (whose tour of duty it was) ready to march towards the Delaware by four o’clock: but a heavy rain prevented their moving till next morning.”—Washington to the President of Congress, 12 May, 1778.
“The late visit of the enemy to Bordentown has fully verified my predictions of what would be the fate of the frigates and other vessels there. As soon as the enemy had got full possession of the river, I urged the gentlemen of the Navy Board to scuttle and sink the frigates immediately. They objected to sinking them at that time, but said, that they would have them ballasted and ready to sink upon the approach of the enemy. I then wrote them, that they might depend the attack would be sudden, so they would find that those, entrusted with the execution of the business, would not be able to effect it, before the enemy had possession of the vessels. The event has proved it. Had hulks of such bulk been sunk, it would have taken a considerable time to have weighed them.”—Washington to Governor Livingston, 12 May, 1778.
A council of war was held on the 8th of May, at which were present the Major-Generals Gates, Greene, Stirling, Mifflin, Lafayette, Kalb, Armstrong, and Steuben; and the Brigadiers Knox and Duportail. This council was convened by order of Congress.
The Commander-in-chief first laid before the council the state of the enemy’s forces, which were estimated at somewhat more than sixteen thousand men rank and file fit for the field, besides cavalry and artillery. Of these about ten thousand, the flower of the army, were in Philadelphia, four thousand in New York, and two thousand on Rhode Island.
The Continental force amounted to about fifteen thousand, besides horse and artillery. Of these eleven thousand eight hundred were at Valley Forge, comprehending the sick present, and those on command, who might be called into action on an emergency. The detachment at Wilmington consisted of fourteen hundred. On the North River were eighteen hundred. When all the reinforcements were brought in, that it was reasonable to anticipate, the whole army fit for action could not be expected to amount to more than twenty thousand men. With this state of the two armies before them, the council were requested to decide what measures it was best to pursue.
After a full and unreserved discussion, it was the unanimous opinion of the council, that the line of conduct most consistent with sound policy, and best suited to promote the interests and safety of the United States, was to remain on the defensive and wait events, and not attempt any offensive operation against the enemy, till circumstances should afford a fairer opportunity of striking a successful blow. As the enemy were strongly fortified by nature, and by artificial works, in all their positions, it would require a greatly superior force to attack them, with any hope of a favorable issue. It was agreed, that to take Philadelphia by storm was impracticable, and that thirty thousand men would be requisite for a blockade. The Continental force could not be so much increased by the militia, even if that description of troops could be relied on for such an enterprise. In short, strong objections were believed to exist against all offensive movements. General Lee, who was not present at the council, signed his name to their written decision. Baron Steuben sat in the council, having been two days before appointed by Congress inspector-general, with the rank and pay of major-general.
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