Front Page Titles (by Subject) Appendix D: Quotation from %u201CColeridge%u201D in Mill's System of Logic (8th ed., 1872), 519-23 (VI, x, 5) - The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society
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Appendix D: Quotation from %u201CColeridge%u201D in Mill’s System of Logic (8th ed., 1872), 519-23 (VI, x, 5) - John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society 
The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, ed. John M. Robson, Introduction by F.E.L. Priestley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985).
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Quotation from “Coleridge” in Mill’s System of Logic (8th ed., 1872), 519-23 (VI, x, 5)
As indicated in the Textual Introduction, there is little evidence concerning the dating of the revisions of the essays in Dissertations and Discussions between their first periodical publication and their republication in 1859. However, Mill’s inclusion in his Logic of the long passage from “Coleridge” printed below supplies some interesting internal evidence.
The variant notes give all the substantive changes in the three versions of “Coleridge” and the nine versions of the Logic. The “Coleridge” versions are indicated by italic numerals: 40 = the periodical version, 1840; 59 = Dissertations and Discussions, 1st ed., 1859; 67 = Dissertations and Discussions, 2nd ed., 1867. The Logic versions are indicated by numerals in roman type: MS = manuscript (1840, with revisions through 1842); 43 = 1st ed., 1843; 46 = 2nd ed., 1846; 51 = 3rd ed., 1851; 56 = 4th ed., 1856; 62 = 5th ed., 1862; 65 = 6th ed., 1865; 68 = 7th ed., 1868; 72 = 8th ed., 1872 (the last in Mill’s lifetime).
An examination of the variants, substantive and accidental (the latter not here recorded), shows that there are two main groups: in the first and larger group, 59 and 67 (the 1st and 2nd eds. of D&D) agree with 51 and subsequent eds. of the Logic, but not with 40 (the periodical version) or MS, 43, 46 (the manuscript and first two eds. of the Logic); in the second, 59 and 67 agree with 40 and MS, 43, 46, but not with 51 and subsequent eds. of the Logic. Changes in the Logic that appear only prior to or subsequent to 1851 did not affect the text of 59 and 67; similarly, changes in 59 and 67 that do not appear in 51 do not appear in subsequent eds. of the Logic. In the absence of external evidence, of marked proof, and of all copy-texts except the manuscript of the Logic, the most likely explanation of these phenomena is that Mill, after having copied the passage into the Logic MS, revised the “Coleridge” with a view to republication (which did not occur until 1859); these revisions he transferred to the Logic when making the most extensive rewriting of that work, that is, for the 3rd ed. (1851). The revised “Coleridge,” with no further changes except a few accidentals, became the copy-text for 59. Further, it appears that when the time came for printing the 3rd ed. of the Logic, Mill made a few further changes, probably in proof, changes that are retained in subsequent eds. of the Logic, but do not appear in the reprinted “Coleridge” of 59 and 67.
The terminus ab quo for the revision of “Coleridge” is, therefore, some time after the writing of the MS of Book VI of the Logic (1840-42); the terminus ad quem is between the beginning of the revision of the 3rd ed. of the Logic and its printing (1851). This conclusion is not very startling, as it narrows the possible time, that is, the time between printings (1840 and 1859), by less than half; still, it places the revision before Mill’s marriage, and bears out the contention in the Textual Introduction. Some slight evidence suggests a date near the beginning of the possible period. The final variant in the passage, the earlier form of which appears only in 40 and MS, would by itself seem to upset the argument above and, even in the context of the other changes, is inconclusive as to the transmission of text; one can tentatively infer, however, that if the change was made first in the proof of the Logic, the “Coleridge” was revised not later than 1843, whereas if it was first made in the revision of the “Coleridge,” that revision was not later than 1842. Also, when John Parker agreed, in the spring of 1842, to publish the Logic, he turned down the suggestion that he publish the collection that later appeared as Dissertations and Discussions; Mill then proposed to publish the collection himself (see Earlier Letters, XIII, 514, 520-1). Again, therefore, it would appear likely that the revisions were made in 1842-43.
Mill prefaces the passage in the Logic with the comment that it is “extracted, with some alterations, from a criticism on the negative philosophy of the eighteenth century” (in MS, 43, 46 the reading is “forming part of a criticism on the negative philosophy of the eighteenth century”); actually the major alterations, as already indicated, were probably made in that criticism (i.e., in “Coleridge”), and not for the Logic. Only one change, the deletion in the Logic of a long footnote (508o), was made in the interests of the new context.
The passage is introduced in the Logic as an example of results that, although they “amount in themselves only to empirical laws . . . are found to follow with so much probability from general laws of human nature, that the consilience of the two processes raises the evidence to proof [MS,43,46 to complete proof], and the generalizations to the rank of scientific truths.” In a typical phrase, he apologizes for the quotation, saying: “. . . I quote, though (as in some former instances) from myself, because I have no better way of illustrating the conception I have formed of the kind of theorems of which sociological statics would consist.”
a The very first element of the social union, obedience to a government of some sort, has not been found so easy a thing to establish in the world. Among a timid and spiritless race like the inhabitants of the vast plains of tropical countries, passive obedience may be of natural growth; though even there we doubt whether it has ever been found among any people with whom fatalism, or in other words, submission to the pressure of circumstances as ba divine decreeb , did not prevail as a religious doctrine. But the difficulty of inducing a brave and warlike race to submit their individual arbitrium to any common umpire, has always been felt to be so great, that nothing short of supernatural power has been deemed adequate to overcome it; and such tribes have always assigned to the first institution of civil society a divine origin. So differently did those judge who knew savage cmenc by actual experience, from those who had no acquaintance with dthemd except in the civilized state. In modern Europe itself, after the fall of the Roman empire, to subdue the feudal anarchy and bring the whole people of any European nation into subjection to government (though Christianity in ethee most concentrated form fof its influencef was co-operatingg in the work) required thrice as many centuries as have elapsed since that time.
Now if these philosophers had known human nature under any other type than that of their own age, and of the particular classes of society among whom they hlivedh , it would have occurred to them, that wherever this habitual submission to law and government has been firmly and durably established, and yet the vigour and manliness of character which resisted its establishment have been in any degree preserved, certain requisites have existed, certain conditions have been fulfilled, of which the following may be regarded as the principal.
First: there has existed, for all who were accounted citizens,—for all who were not slaves, kept down by brute force,—a system of education, beginning with infancy and continued through life, of which whatever else it might include, one main and incessant ingredient was restraining discipline. To train the human being in the habit, and thence the power, of subordinating his personal impulses and aims, to what were considered the ends of society; of adhering, against all temptation, to the course of conduct which those ends prescribed; of controlling in himself alli feelings which were liable to militate against those ends, and encouraging all such as tended towards them; this was the purpose, to which every outward motive that the authority directing the system could command, and every inward power or principle which its knowledge of human nature enabled it to evoke, were endeavoured to be rendered instrumental. jThe entire civil and military policy of the ancient commonwealths was such a system of training; in modern nations its place has been attempted to be supplied, principally, by religious teaching.j And whenever and in proportion as the strictness of kthe restrainingk discipline was relaxed, the natural tendency of mankind to anarchy re-asserted itself; the state became disorganized from within; mutual conflict for selfish ends, neutralized the energies which were required to keep up the contest against natural causes of evil; and the nation, after a longer or briefer interval of progressive decline, became either the slave of a despotism, or the prey of a foreign invader.
The second condition of permanent political society has been found to be, the existence, in some form or other, of the feeling of allegiance or loyalty. This feeling may vary in its objects, and is not confined to any particular form of government; but whether in a democracy or in a monarchy, its essence is always the same; viz. that there be in the constitution of the state something which is settled, something permanent, and not to be called in question; something which, by general agreement, has a right to be where it is, and to be secure against disturbance, whatever else may change. This feeling may attach itself, as among the Jews (andl in most of the commonwealths of antiquity), to a common God or gods, the protectors and guardians of their state. Or it may attach itself to certain persons, who are deemed to be, whether by divine appointment, by long prescription, or by the general recognition of their superior capacity and worthiness, the rightful guides and guardians of the rest. Or it may mconnect itself with laws; with ancient liberties or ordinances. Or, finally, (and this is the only shape in which the feeling is likely to exist hereafter), it may attach itself to the principles of individual freedom and political and social equality, as realized in institutions which as yet exist nowhere, or exist only in a rudimentary state.m But in all political societies which have had a durable existence, there has been some fixed point: something which npeoplenoagreedo in holding sacred; whichp, wherever freedom of discussion was a recognised principle, it was of coursep lawful to contest in theory, but which no one could either fear or hope to see shaken in practice; which, in short (except perhaps during some temporary crisis) was in the common estimation placed qbeyondq discussion. And the necessity of this may easily be made evident. A state never is, nor until mankind are vastly improved, can hope to be, for any long time exempt from internal dissension; for there neither is nor has ever been any state of society in which collisions did not occur between the immediate interests and passions of powerful sections of the people. What, then, enables rnationsr to weather these storms, and pass through turbulent times without any permanent weakening of the ssecurities for peaceable existences ? Precisely this—that however important the interests about which men tfellt out, the conflict udidu not affect the fundamental vprinciplev of the system of social union which whappenedw to exist; nor threaten large portions of the community with the subversion of that on which they xhadx built their calculations, and with which their hopes and aims yhady become identified. But when the questioning of these fundamental principles is (not zthez occasional disease, aor salutary medicine,a but) the habitual condition of the body politic, and when all the violent animosities are called forth, which spring naturally from such a situation, the state is virtually in a position of civil war; and can never long remain free from it in act and fact.
The third essential condition bof stability in political societyb , is a strong and active principle of ccohesion among the members of the same community or statec . We need scarcely say that we do not mean dnationality, in the vulgar sense of the term;d a senseless antipathy to foreigners;efindifference to the general welfare of the human race, or an unjust preference of the supposed interests of our own country;fg a cherishing of hbadh peculiarities because they are national, or a refusal to adopt what has been found good by other countries.i We mean a principle of sympathy, not of hostility; of union, not of separation. We mean a feeling of common interest among those who live under the same government, and are contained within the same natural or historical boundaries. We mean, that one part of the community jdoj not consider themselves as foreigners with regard to another part; that they kset a value on their connexion—k feel that they are one people, that their lot is cast together, that evil to any of their fellow-countrymen is evil to themselves, and ldo not desire selfishly tol free themselves from their share of any common inconvenience by severing the connexion. How strong this feeling was in mthosem ancient commonwealths nwhich attained any durable greatness,n every one knows. How happily Rome, in spite of all her tyranny, succeeded in establishing the feeling of a common country among the provinces of her vast and divided empire, will appear when any one who has given due attention to the subject shall take the trouble to point it out.o In modern times the countries which have had that feeling in the strongest degree have been the most powerful countries; England, France, and, in proportion to their territory and resources, Holland and Switzerland; while England in her connexion with Ireland, is one of the most signal examples of the consequences of its absence. Every Italian knows why Italy is under a foreign yoke; every German knows what maintains despotism in the Austrian empire;* the pevilsp of Spain flow as much from the absence of nationality among the Spaniards themselves, as from the presence of it in their relations with foreigners: while the completest illustration of all is afforded by the republics of South America, where the parts of one and the same state adhere so slightly together, that no sooner does any province think itself aggrieved by the general government than it proclaims itself a separate nation.
[a]40, 59, 67 [no paragraph]
[b-b]40, MS, 43, 46, 59, 67 the decree of God
[c-c]40, MS, 59, 67 man [printer’s error in 43? See d-d below.]
[d-d]40, MS, 43, 46, 59, 67 him
[e-e]40, MS, 43, 46 its
[f-f]+51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72
[g]40, MS, 43, 46 with all its influences
[h-h]40, MS, 43, 46 moved
[i]40, MS, 59, 67 the] 43, 46, 51, 56 those
[j-j]40, MS, 43, 46 This system of discipline wrought, in the Grecian states, by the conjunct influence of religion, poetry, and law; among the Romans, by those of religion and law; in modern and Christian countries, mainly by religion, with little of the direct agency, but generally more or less of the indirect support and countenance, of law.
[k-k]40, MS, 43, 46 this
[l]40, MS, 43, 46, 51, 56, 59, 67 indeed
[m-m]40 attach itself to laws, to ancient liberties, or ordinances; to the whole or some part of the political, or even of the domestic, institutions of the state.] MS, 43, 46 as 40 . . . even the . . . as 40] 59, 67 as 40 . . . ordinances. Or . . . as 72
[n-n]40, MS, 43, 46, 59, 67 men
[o-o]56, 62, 65 agree [printer’s error?]
[p-p]40, MS, 43, 46 it might or might not be
[q-q]40, MS, 43 above] 46 above
[r-r]40, MS, 43, 46, 59, 67 society
[s-s]40, MS, 43, 46 ties which hold it together
[t-t]40, MS, 43, 46, 59 fall
[u-u]40, MS, 43, 46 does
[v-v]40, MS, 43, 46, 51, 59, 67 principles
[w-w]40, MS, 43, 46 happens
[x-x]40, MS, 43, 46 have
[y-y]40, MS, 43, 46 have
[z-z]40, MS, 43, 46 an
[a-a]+51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72
[b-b]40, MS, 43, 46 , which has existed in all durable political societies
[c-c]40, MS, 43, 46 nationality
[d-d]+51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72
[e]51, 56, 59, 67 an
[f-f]+51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72
[g]40, MS, 43, 46 or
[h-h]40, MS, 43, 46 absurd
[i]40, MS, 43, 46 In all these senses, the nations which have the strongest national spirit have had the least nationality.
[j-j]40, MS, 43, 46 shall
[k-k]40, MS, 43, 46 shall cherish the tie which holds them together; shall
[l-l]40, MS, 43, 46 that they cannot selfishly
[m-m]40, MS, 43, 46 the
[n-n]+51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72
[o]40, 59, 67 [footnote; see 135n-136n above]
[* ] (Written and first published in 1840.)
[p-p]40, MS woes