Front Page Titles (by Subject) APPENDICES - The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society
Return to Title Page for The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society
The Online Library of Liberty
A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.
Search this Title:
APPENDICES - John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society 
The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, ed. John M. Robson, Introduction by F.E.L. Priestley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985).
About Liberty Fund:
The online edition of the Collected Works is published under licence from the copyright holder, The University of Toronto Press. ©2006 The University of Toronto Press. All rights reserved. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form or medium without the permission of The University of Toronto Press.
Fair use statement:
Preface to Dissertations and Discussions (1859)
Dissertations and Discussions, I, iii-vi. For a discussion of this Preface (unaltered in the 2nd ed. of D&D) see the Textual Introduction, cxviff. above. JSM’s views on republication of his essays is discussed in the Textual Introduction to Essays on Economics and Society, in Collected Works, IV, xliv-xlv.
the republication in a more durable form, of papers originally contributed to periodicals, has grown into so common a practice as scarcely to need an apology; and I follow this practice the more willingly, as I hold it to be decidedly a beneficial one. It would be well if all frequent writers in periodicals looked forward, as far as the case admitted, to this reappearance of their productions. The prospect might be some guarantee against the crudity in the formation of opinions, and carelessness in their expression, which are the besetting sins of writings put forth under the screen of anonymousness, to be read only during the next few weeks or months, if so long, and the defects of which it is seldom probable that any one will think it worth while to expose.
The following papers, selected from a much greater number, include all of the writer’s miscellaneous productions which he considers it in any way desirable to preserve. The remainder were either of too little value at any time, or what value they might have was too exclusively temporary, or the thoughts they contained were inextricably mixed up with comments, now totally uninteresting, on passing events, or on some book not generally known; or lastly, any utility they may have possessed has since been superseded by other and more mature writings of the author.
Every one whose mind is progressive, or even whose opinions keep up with the changing facts that surround him, must necessarily, in looking back to his own writings during a series of years, find many things which, if they were to be written again, he would write differently, and some, even, which he has altogether ceased to think true. From these last I have endeavoured to clear the present pages. Beyond this, I have not attempted to render papers written at so many different, and some of them at such distant, times, a faithful representation of my present state of opinion and feeling. I leave them in all their imperfection, as memorials of the states of mind in which they were written, in the hope that they may possibly be useful to such readers as are in a corresponding stage of their own mental progress. Where what I had written appears a fair statement of part of the truth, but defective inasmuch as there exists another part respecting which nothing, or too little, is said, I leave the deficiency to be supplied by the reader’s own thoughts; the rather, as he will, in many cases, find the balance restored in some other part of this collection. Thus, the review of Mr. Sedgwick’s Discourse,[*] taken by itself, might give an impression of more complete adhesion to the philosophy of Locke, Bentham, and the eighteenth century, than is really the case, and of an inadequate sense of its deficiencies; but that notion will be rectified by the subsequent essays on Bentham and on Coleridge.[†] These, again, if they stood alone, would give just as much too strong an impression of the writer’s sympathy with the reaction of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth: but this exaggeration will be corrected by the more recent defence of the “greatest happiness” ethics against Dr. Whewell.[‡]
Only a small number of these papers are controversial, and in but two am I aware of anything like asperity of tone. In both these cases some degree of it was justifiable, as I was defending maligned doctrines or individuals, against unmerited onslaughts by persons who, on the evidence afforded by themselves, were in no respect entitled to sit in judgment on them: and the same misrepresentations have been and still are so incessantly reiterated by a crowd of writers, that emphatic protests against them are as needful now as when the papers in question were first written. My adversaries, too, were men not themselves remarkable for mild treatment of opponents, and quite capable of holding their own in any form of reviewing or pamphleteering polemics. I believe that I have in no case fought with other than fair weapons, and any strong expressions which I have used were extorted from me by my subject, not prompted by the smallest feeling of personal ill-will towards my antagonists. In the revision, I have endeavoured to retain only as much of this strength of expression, as could not be foregone without weakening the force of the protest.
Obituary of Bentham (1832)
Examiner, 10 June, 1832, 370-2. This, JSM’s first published commentary on Bentham, is described in his bibliography as “An obituary notice of Jeremy Bentham in the Examiner of 10th June 1832” (MacMinn, 21). The passage reprinted here is the central part of the obituary; the full text will be found in the volume of this edition given to newspaper writings. While the tone is more eulogistic, many of the remarks are paralleled in the more critical account in the Appendix to Bulwer (3-18 above) and in the passage from Bulwer’s text given below in Appendix C. See also my “John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham,” 259.
Let it be remembered what was the state of jurisprudence and legislation, and of the philosophy of jurisprudence and legislation, when he [Bentham] began his career. A labyrinth without a clue—a jungle, through which no path had ever been cut. All systems of law then established, but most of all that in which he himself was nurtured, were masses of deformity, in the construction of which reason in any shape whatever had had little to do, a comprehensive consideration of ends and means nothing at all: their foundation the rude contrivances of a barbarous age, even more deeply barbarous in this than in aught else; the superstructure an infinite series of patches, some larger, some smaller, stuck on in succession wherever a hole appeared, and plastered one over another until the monstrous mass exceeded all measurable bulk, and went beyond the reach of the strongest understanding and the finest memory. Such was the practice of law: was its theory in any better state? And how could it be so? for of what did that theory consist, but either of purely technical principles, got at by abstraction from these established systems, (or rather, constructed, generally in utter defiance of logic, with the sole view of giving something like coherence and consistency in appearance to provisions which in reality were utterly heterogeneous); or of vague cloudy generalities arbitrarily assumed à priori, and called laws of nature, or principles of natural law.
Such was existing jurisprudence; and that it should be such, was less surprising than the superstition by which, being such, it was protected. The English people had contrived to persuade themselves, and had to a great degree persuaded the rest of the world, that the English law, as it was when Mr. Bentham found it, was the perfection of reason. That it was otherwise, was the only political heresy, which no one had been found hardy enough to avow; even the English constitution you might (if you did it very gently) speak ill of,—but not the English law: Whig, Tory, and Democrat joined in one chorus of clamorous admiration, whenever the law or the courts of justice were the subject of discourse: and to doubt the merits of either appeared a greater stretch of absurdity than to question the doctrine of gravitation.
This superstition was at its height, when Mr. Bentham betook himself to the study of English law, with no other object than the ordinary one of gaining his living by practising a liberal profession. But he soon found that it would not do for him, and that he could have no dealing or concern with it in an honest way, except to destroy it. And there is a deep interest now, at the close of his life, in looking back to his very first publication, the Fragment on Government, which appeared considerably more than half a century ago, and which exhibits, at that remote period, a no less strong and steady conviction than appears in his very latest production, that the worship of the English law was a degrading idolatry—that instead of being the perfection of reason, it was a disgrace to the human understanding—and that a task worthy of him, or any other wise and brave man, to devote a life to, was that of utterly eradicating it and sweeping it away. This accordingly became the task of his own existence: glory to him! for he has successfully accomplished it. The monster has received from him its death wound. After losing many a limb, it still drags on, and will drag on for a few years more, a feeble and exanimate existence; but it never will recover. It is going down rapidly to the grave.
Mr. Bentham has fought this battle for now almost sixty years; the greater part of that time without assistance from any human being, except latterly what M. Dumont gave him in putting his ideas into French; and for a long time almost without making one human being a convert to his opinions. He exhausted every mode of attack; he assailed the enemy with every weapon, and at all points; now he fell upon the generalities, now upon the details; now he combatted evil by stripping it naked, and showing that it was evil; and now by contrasting it with good. At length his energy and perseverance triumphed. Some of the most potent leaders of the public became convinced; and they, in their turn, convinced or persuaded others: until at last the English law, as a systematic whole, is given up by every body, and the question, with all thinking minds even among lawyers, is no longer about keeping it as it is, but only whether, in rebuilding, there be a possibility of using any of the old materials.*
Mr. Bentham was the original mover in this mighty change. His hand gave the impulse which set all the others at work. To him the debt is due, as much as any other great work has ever been owing to the man who first guided other men to the accomplishment of it. The man who has achieved this, can afford to die. He has done enough to render his name for ever illustrious.
But Mr. Bentham has been much more than merely a destroyer. Like all who discredit erroneous systems by arguments drawn from principles, and not from mere results, he could not fail, even while destroying the old edifice, to lay a solid foundation for the new. Indeed he considered it a positive duty never to assail what is established, without having a clear view of what ought to be substituted. It is to the intrinsic value of his speculations on the philosophy of law in general, that he owes the greater part of his existing reputation; for by these alone is he known to his continental readers, who are far the most numerous, and by whom, in general, he is far more justly appreciated than in England. There are some most important branches of the science of law, which were in a more wretched state than almost any of the others when he took them in hand, and which he has so exhausted, that he seems to have left nothing to be sought by future enquirers; we mean the departments of Procedure, Evidence, and the Judicial Establishment. He has done almost all that remained to perfect the theory of punishment. It is with regard to (what is the foundation of all) the civil code, that he has done least, and left most to be done. Yet even here his services have been invaluable, by making far clearer and more familiar than they were before, both the ultimate and the immediate ends of civil law; the essential characteristics of a good law; the expediency of codification, that is, of law written and systematic; by exposing the viciousness of the existing language of jurisprudence, guarding the student against the fallacies which lurk in it, and accustoming him to demand a more precise and logically-constructed nomenclature.
Mr. Bentham’s exertions have not been limited to the field of jurisprudence, or even to that of general politics, in which he ranks as the first name among the philosophic radicals. He has extended his speculations to morals, though never (at least in his published works) in any great detail; and on this, as on every other subject which he touched, he cannot be read without great benefit.
Some of his admirers have claimed for him the title of founder of the science of morals, as well as of the science of legislation; on the score of his having been the first person who established the principle of general utility, as the philosophic foundation of morality and law. But Mr. Bentham’s originality does not stand in need of any such exaggerations. The doctrine of utility, as the foundation of virtue, he himself professes to have derived from Hume: he applied it more consistently and in greater detail, than his predecessors; but the idea itself is as old as the earliest Greek philosophers, and has divided the philosophic world, in every age of philosophy, since their time. Mr. Bentham’s real merit, in respect to the foundation of morals, consists in his having cleared it more thoroughly than any of his predecessors, from the rubbish of pretended natural law, natural justice, and the like, by which men were wont to consecrate as a rule of morality, whatever they felt inclined to approve of without knowing why.
The most prominent moral qualities which appear in Mr. Bentham’s writings, are love of justice, and hatred of imposture: his most remarkable intellectual endowments, a penetrating deep-sighted acuteness, precision in the use of scientific language, and sagacity and inventiveness in matters of detail. There have been few minds so perfectly original. He has often, we think, been surpassed in powers of metaphysical analysis, as well as in comprehensiveness and many-sidedness of mind. He frequently contemplates a subject only from one or a few of its aspects; though he very often sees further into it, from the one side on which he looks at it, than was seen before even by those who had gone all round it. There is something very striking, occasionally, in the minute elaborateness with which he works out, into its smallest details, one half-view of a question, contrasted with his entire neglect of the remaining half-view, though equally indispensable to a correct judgment of the whole. To this occasional one-sidedness, he failed to apply the natural cure; for, from the time when he embarked in original speculation, he occupied himself very little in studying the ideas of others. This, in almost any other than himself, would have been a fault; in him, we shall only say, that, but for it, he would have been a greater man.
Mr. Bentham’s style has been much criticised; and undoubtedly, in his latter writings, the complicated structure of his sentences renders it impossible, without some familiarity, to read them with rapidity and ease. But his earlier, among which are some of his most valuable productions, are not only free from this defect, but may even, in point of ease and elegance, be ranked among the best English compositions. Felicity of expression abounds even in those of his works which are generally unreadable; and volumes might be filled with passages selected from his later as well as his earlier publications, which, for wit and eloquence, have seldom been surpassed.
Comment on Bentham in Bulwer’s England and the English (1833)
edward lytton bulwer (later Bulwer-Lytton, later 1st Baron Lytton), England and the English (London: Bentley, 1833), II, 163-70. JSM comments in his Autobiography (139) that, in addition to the Appendix on Bentham (the first essay printed above), Bulwer also “incorporated” in his text “a small part” of JSM’s critique of Bentham. (See Textual Introduction, cxvi-cxvii above). It cannot be determined which part of the following passage is JSM’s, but the images of Bentham as destroyer and reconstructor, the description of Bentham as the great questioner (cf. 78), the reference to an age of transition, and the suggestion of Bentham’s seminality, are all typical of his attitude at the time; and both in wording and idea the fourth paragraph closely approximates comments on Bentham known to be his.
[In] legislative and moral philosophy, Bentham must assuredly be considered the most celebrated and influential teacher of the age—a master, indeed, whom few have acknowledged, but from whom thousands have, mediately and unconsciously, imbibed their opinions.
The same causes which gave so great a fertility to the school of the Economists, had their effect upon the philosophy of Bentham; they drew his genius mainly towards examinations of men rather than of man—of the defects of Law, and of the hypocrisies and fallacies of our Social System; they contributed to the material form and genus of his code, and to those notions of Utility which he considered his own invention, but which had been incorporated with half the systems that had risen in Europe since the sensualism of Condillac had been grafted upon the reflection of Locke. But causes far more latent, and perhaps more powerful, contributed also to form the mind and philosophy of Bentham. He had preceded the great French Revolution—the materials of his thoughts had been compounded from the same foundations of opinion as those on which the more enlightened advocates of the Revolution would have built up that edifice which was to defy a second deluge, and which is but a record of the confusion of the workmen. With the philosophy of the eighteenth century, which first adopted what the French reasoners term the Principle of Humanity—(that is, the principle of philanthropy—a paramount regard for multitudes rather than for sectarian interests,)—with this philosophy, I say, the whole mind of Bentham was imbued and saturate. He had no mercy, no toleration for the knots and companies of men whom he considered interrupters or monopolists of the power of the many—to his mind they were invariably actuated by base and designing motives, and such motives, according to his philosophy, they were even compelled to entertain. His intellect was as the aqueduct which bore aloft, and over the wastes and wrecks below, the stream of the philosophy of one century to the generations of the other. His code of morals, original in its results, is in many parts (unconsciously to himself) an eclecticism of nearly all the best parts of the various theories of a century. “The system of Condillac required its ‘moral’ code, and Helvetius supplied it.” The moral code of Helvetius required its legislative, and in Bentham it obtained it. I consider, then, that two series of causes conspired to produce Bentham—the one national, the other belonging to all Europe; the same causes on the one hand which produced with us the Economists—the same causes on the other hand which produced in France, Helvetius and Diderot, Volney, Condorcet, and Voltaire. He combined what had not been yet done, the spirit of the Philanthropic with that of the Practical. He did not declaim about abuses; he went at once to their root: he did not idly penetrate the sophistries of Corruption; he smote Corruption herself. He was the very Theseus of legislative reform,—he not only pierced the labyrinth—he destroyed the monster.
As he drew his vigour from the stream of Change, all his writings tended to their original source. He collected from the Past the scattered remnants of a defeated innovation, and led them on against the Future. Every age may be called an age of transition—the passing on, as it were, from one state to another never ceases; but in our age the transition is visible, and Bentham’s philosophy is the philosophy of a visible transition. Much has already happened, much is already happening every instant, in his country—throughout Europe—throughout the world, which might not have occurred if Bentham had not been; yet of all his works, none have been read by great numbers; and most of them, from their difficulties of style and subject, have little chance of ever being generally popular. He acted upon the destinies of his race by influencing the thoughts of a minute fraction of the few who think—from them the broad principles travelled onward—became known—(their source unknown)—became familiar and successful. I have said that we live in an age of visible transition—an age of disquietude and doubt—of the removal of time-worn landmarks, and the breaking up of the hereditary elements of society—old opinions, feelings—ancestral customs and institutions are crumbling away, and both the spiritual and temporal worlds are darkened by the shadow of change. The commencement of one of these epochs—periodical in the history of mankind—is hailed by the sanguine as the coming of a new Millennium—a great inconoclastic reformation, by which all false gods shall be overthrown. To me such epochs appear but as the dark passages in the appointed progress of mankind—the times of greatest unhappiness to our species—passages into which we have no reason to rejoice at our entrance, save from the hope of being sooner landed on the opposite side. Uncertainty is the greatest of all our evils. And I know of no happiness where there is not a firm unwavering belief in its duration.
The age then is one of destruction! disguise it as we will, it must be so characterized; miserable would be our lot were it not also an age of preparation for reconstructing. What has been the influence of Bentham upon his age?—it has been twofold—he has helped to destroy and also to rebuild. No one has done so much to forward, at least in this country, the work of destruction, as Mr. Bentham. The spirit of examination and questioning has become through him, more than through any one person besides, the prevailing spirit of the age. For he questioned all things. The tendencies of a mind at once sceptical and systematic, (and both in the utmost possible degree,) made him endeavour to trace all speculative phenomena back to their primitive elements, and to reconsider not only the received conclusions, but the received premises. He treated all subjects as if they were virgin subjects, never before embraced or approached by man. He never set up an established doctrine as a thesis to be disputed about, but put it aside altogether, commenced from first principles, and deliberately tasked himself systematically to discover the truth, or to re-discover it if it were already known. By this process, if he ever annihilated a received opinion, he was sure of having something either good or bad to offer as a substitute for it; and in this he was most favourably distinguished from those French philosophers who preceded and even surpassed him, as destroyers of established institutions on the continent of Europe. And we shall owe largely to one who reconstructed while he destroyed, if our country is destined to pass more smoothly through this crisis of transition than the nations of the continent, and to lose less of the good it already enjoys in working itself free from the evil;—his be the merit, if while the wreck of the old vessel is still navigable, the masts of the new one, which brings relief, are dimly showing themselves above the horizon! For it is certain, and will be seen every day more clearly, that the initiation of all the changes which are now making in opinions and in institutions, may be claimed chiefly by men who have been indebted to his writings, and to the spirit of his philosophy, for the most important part of their intellectual cultivation.
I had originally proposed in this part of my work to give a slight sketch of the principal tenets of Bentham, with an exposition of what I conceive to be his errors; pointing out at once the benefits he has conferred, and also the mischief he has effected. But slight as would be that sketch, it must necessarily be somewhat abstract; and I have therefore, for the sake of the general reader, added it to the volume in the form of an appendix.* I have there, regarding him as a legislator and a moralist, ventured to estimate him much more highly in the former capacity than the latter; endeavouring to combat the infallibility of his application of the principle of Utility, and to show the dangerous and debasing theories, which may be, and are, deduced from it. Even, however, in legislation, his greatest happiness principle is not so clear and undeniable as it is usually conceded to be. “The greatest happiness of the greatest number” is to be our invariable guide! Is it so?—the greatest happiness of the greatest number of men living, I suppose, not of men to come; for if of all posterity, what legislator can be our guide? who can prejudge the future? Of men living, then?—well—how often would their greatest happiness consist in concession to their greatest errors.
In the dark ages, (said once to me very happily the wittiest writer of the day, and one who has perhaps done more to familiarize Bentham’s general doctrines to the public than any other individual,) in the dark ages, it would have been for the greatest happiness of the greatest number of burn the witches; it must have made the greatest number, (all credulous of wizardry,) very uncomfortable to refuse their request for so reasonable a conflagration; they would have been given up to fear and disquietude—they would have imagined their safety disregarded and their cattle despised—if witches were to live with impunity, riding on broomsticks, and sailing in oyster-shells;—their happiness demanded a bonfire of old women. To grant such a bonfire would have been really to consult the greatest happiness of the greatest number, yet ought it to have been the principle of wise, nay, of perfect, (for so the dogma states,) of unimpugnable legislation? In fact, the greatest happiness principle, is an excellent general rule, but it is not an undeniable axiom.
Quotation from “Coleridge” in Mill’s System of Logic (8th ed., 1872), 519-23 (VI, x, 5)
As indicated in the Textual Introduction, there is little evidence concerning the dating of the revisions of the essays in Dissertations and Discussions between their first periodical publication and their republication in 1859. However, Mill’s inclusion in his Logic of the long passage from “Coleridge” printed below supplies some interesting internal evidence.
The variant notes give all the substantive changes in the three versions of “Coleridge” and the nine versions of the Logic. The “Coleridge” versions are indicated by italic numerals: 40 = the periodical version, 1840; 59 = Dissertations and Discussions, 1st ed., 1859; 67 = Dissertations and Discussions, 2nd ed., 1867. The Logic versions are indicated by numerals in roman type: MS = manuscript (1840, with revisions through 1842); 43 = 1st ed., 1843; 46 = 2nd ed., 1846; 51 = 3rd ed., 1851; 56 = 4th ed., 1856; 62 = 5th ed., 1862; 65 = 6th ed., 1865; 68 = 7th ed., 1868; 72 = 8th ed., 1872 (the last in Mill’s lifetime).
An examination of the variants, substantive and accidental (the latter not here recorded), shows that there are two main groups: in the first and larger group, 59 and 67 (the 1st and 2nd eds. of D&D) agree with 51 and subsequent eds. of the Logic, but not with 40 (the periodical version) or MS, 43, 46 (the manuscript and first two eds. of the Logic); in the second, 59 and 67 agree with 40 and MS, 43, 46, but not with 51 and subsequent eds. of the Logic. Changes in the Logic that appear only prior to or subsequent to 1851 did not affect the text of 59 and 67; similarly, changes in 59 and 67 that do not appear in 51 do not appear in subsequent eds. of the Logic. In the absence of external evidence, of marked proof, and of all copy-texts except the manuscript of the Logic, the most likely explanation of these phenomena is that Mill, after having copied the passage into the Logic MS, revised the “Coleridge” with a view to republication (which did not occur until 1859); these revisions he transferred to the Logic when making the most extensive rewriting of that work, that is, for the 3rd ed. (1851). The revised “Coleridge,” with no further changes except a few accidentals, became the copy-text for 59. Further, it appears that when the time came for printing the 3rd ed. of the Logic, Mill made a few further changes, probably in proof, changes that are retained in subsequent eds. of the Logic, but do not appear in the reprinted “Coleridge” of 59 and 67.
The terminus ab quo for the revision of “Coleridge” is, therefore, some time after the writing of the MS of Book VI of the Logic (1840-42); the terminus ad quem is between the beginning of the revision of the 3rd ed. of the Logic and its printing (1851). This conclusion is not very startling, as it narrows the possible time, that is, the time between printings (1840 and 1859), by less than half; still, it places the revision before Mill’s marriage, and bears out the contention in the Textual Introduction. Some slight evidence suggests a date near the beginning of the possible period. The final variant in the passage, the earlier form of which appears only in 40 and MS, would by itself seem to upset the argument above and, even in the context of the other changes, is inconclusive as to the transmission of text; one can tentatively infer, however, that if the change was made first in the proof of the Logic, the “Coleridge” was revised not later than 1843, whereas if it was first made in the revision of the “Coleridge,” that revision was not later than 1842. Also, when John Parker agreed, in the spring of 1842, to publish the Logic, he turned down the suggestion that he publish the collection that later appeared as Dissertations and Discussions; Mill then proposed to publish the collection himself (see Earlier Letters, XIII, 514, 520-1). Again, therefore, it would appear likely that the revisions were made in 1842-43.
Mill prefaces the passage in the Logic with the comment that it is “extracted, with some alterations, from a criticism on the negative philosophy of the eighteenth century” (in MS, 43, 46 the reading is “forming part of a criticism on the negative philosophy of the eighteenth century”); actually the major alterations, as already indicated, were probably made in that criticism (i.e., in “Coleridge”), and not for the Logic. Only one change, the deletion in the Logic of a long footnote (508o), was made in the interests of the new context.
The passage is introduced in the Logic as an example of results that, although they “amount in themselves only to empirical laws . . . are found to follow with so much probability from general laws of human nature, that the consilience of the two processes raises the evidence to proof [MS,43,46 to complete proof], and the generalizations to the rank of scientific truths.” In a typical phrase, he apologizes for the quotation, saying: “. . . I quote, though (as in some former instances) from myself, because I have no better way of illustrating the conception I have formed of the kind of theorems of which sociological statics would consist.”
a The very first element of the social union, obedience to a government of some sort, has not been found so easy a thing to establish in the world. Among a timid and spiritless race like the inhabitants of the vast plains of tropical countries, passive obedience may be of natural growth; though even there we doubt whether it has ever been found among any people with whom fatalism, or in other words, submission to the pressure of circumstances as ba divine decreeb , did not prevail as a religious doctrine. But the difficulty of inducing a brave and warlike race to submit their individual arbitrium to any common umpire, has always been felt to be so great, that nothing short of supernatural power has been deemed adequate to overcome it; and such tribes have always assigned to the first institution of civil society a divine origin. So differently did those judge who knew savage cmenc by actual experience, from those who had no acquaintance with dthemd except in the civilized state. In modern Europe itself, after the fall of the Roman empire, to subdue the feudal anarchy and bring the whole people of any European nation into subjection to government (though Christianity in ethee most concentrated form fof its influencef was co-operatingg in the work) required thrice as many centuries as have elapsed since that time.
Now if these philosophers had known human nature under any other type than that of their own age, and of the particular classes of society among whom they hlivedh , it would have occurred to them, that wherever this habitual submission to law and government has been firmly and durably established, and yet the vigour and manliness of character which resisted its establishment have been in any degree preserved, certain requisites have existed, certain conditions have been fulfilled, of which the following may be regarded as the principal.
First: there has existed, for all who were accounted citizens,—for all who were not slaves, kept down by brute force,—a system of education, beginning with infancy and continued through life, of which whatever else it might include, one main and incessant ingredient was restraining discipline. To train the human being in the habit, and thence the power, of subordinating his personal impulses and aims, to what were considered the ends of society; of adhering, against all temptation, to the course of conduct which those ends prescribed; of controlling in himself alli feelings which were liable to militate against those ends, and encouraging all such as tended towards them; this was the purpose, to which every outward motive that the authority directing the system could command, and every inward power or principle which its knowledge of human nature enabled it to evoke, were endeavoured to be rendered instrumental. jThe entire civil and military policy of the ancient commonwealths was such a system of training; in modern nations its place has been attempted to be supplied, principally, by religious teaching.j And whenever and in proportion as the strictness of kthe restrainingk discipline was relaxed, the natural tendency of mankind to anarchy re-asserted itself; the state became disorganized from within; mutual conflict for selfish ends, neutralized the energies which were required to keep up the contest against natural causes of evil; and the nation, after a longer or briefer interval of progressive decline, became either the slave of a despotism, or the prey of a foreign invader.
The second condition of permanent political society has been found to be, the existence, in some form or other, of the feeling of allegiance or loyalty. This feeling may vary in its objects, and is not confined to any particular form of government; but whether in a democracy or in a monarchy, its essence is always the same; viz. that there be in the constitution of the state something which is settled, something permanent, and not to be called in question; something which, by general agreement, has a right to be where it is, and to be secure against disturbance, whatever else may change. This feeling may attach itself, as among the Jews (andl in most of the commonwealths of antiquity), to a common God or gods, the protectors and guardians of their state. Or it may attach itself to certain persons, who are deemed to be, whether by divine appointment, by long prescription, or by the general recognition of their superior capacity and worthiness, the rightful guides and guardians of the rest. Or it may mconnect itself with laws; with ancient liberties or ordinances. Or, finally, (and this is the only shape in which the feeling is likely to exist hereafter), it may attach itself to the principles of individual freedom and political and social equality, as realized in institutions which as yet exist nowhere, or exist only in a rudimentary state.m But in all political societies which have had a durable existence, there has been some fixed point: something which npeoplenoagreedo in holding sacred; whichp, wherever freedom of discussion was a recognised principle, it was of coursep lawful to contest in theory, but which no one could either fear or hope to see shaken in practice; which, in short (except perhaps during some temporary crisis) was in the common estimation placed qbeyondq discussion. And the necessity of this may easily be made evident. A state never is, nor until mankind are vastly improved, can hope to be, for any long time exempt from internal dissension; for there neither is nor has ever been any state of society in which collisions did not occur between the immediate interests and passions of powerful sections of the people. What, then, enables rnationsr to weather these storms, and pass through turbulent times without any permanent weakening of the ssecurities for peaceable existences ? Precisely this—that however important the interests about which men tfellt out, the conflict udidu not affect the fundamental vprinciplev of the system of social union which whappenedw to exist; nor threaten large portions of the community with the subversion of that on which they xhadx built their calculations, and with which their hopes and aims yhady become identified. But when the questioning of these fundamental principles is (not zthez occasional disease, aor salutary medicine,a but) the habitual condition of the body politic, and when all the violent animosities are called forth, which spring naturally from such a situation, the state is virtually in a position of civil war; and can never long remain free from it in act and fact.
The third essential condition bof stability in political societyb , is a strong and active principle of ccohesion among the members of the same community or statec . We need scarcely say that we do not mean dnationality, in the vulgar sense of the term;d a senseless antipathy to foreigners;efindifference to the general welfare of the human race, or an unjust preference of the supposed interests of our own country;fg a cherishing of hbadh peculiarities because they are national, or a refusal to adopt what has been found good by other countries.i We mean a principle of sympathy, not of hostility; of union, not of separation. We mean a feeling of common interest among those who live under the same government, and are contained within the same natural or historical boundaries. We mean, that one part of the community jdoj not consider themselves as foreigners with regard to another part; that they kset a value on their connexion—k feel that they are one people, that their lot is cast together, that evil to any of their fellow-countrymen is evil to themselves, and ldo not desire selfishly tol free themselves from their share of any common inconvenience by severing the connexion. How strong this feeling was in mthosem ancient commonwealths nwhich attained any durable greatness,n every one knows. How happily Rome, in spite of all her tyranny, succeeded in establishing the feeling of a common country among the provinces of her vast and divided empire, will appear when any one who has given due attention to the subject shall take the trouble to point it out.o In modern times the countries which have had that feeling in the strongest degree have been the most powerful countries; England, France, and, in proportion to their territory and resources, Holland and Switzerland; while England in her connexion with Ireland, is one of the most signal examples of the consequences of its absence. Every Italian knows why Italy is under a foreign yoke; every German knows what maintains despotism in the Austrian empire;* the pevilsp of Spain flow as much from the absence of nationality among the Spaniards themselves, as from the presence of it in their relations with foreigners: while the completest illustration of all is afforded by the republics of South America, where the parts of one and the same state adhere so slightly together, that no sooner does any province think itself aggrieved by the general government than it proclaims itself a separate nation.
Bibliographic Index of Persons and Works Cited in the Essays, with Variants and Notes
Mill, like most nineteenth-century authors, is cavalier in his approach to sources, seldom identifying them with sufficient care, and frequently quoting them inaccurately. This Appendix is intended to help correct these deficiencies, and to serve as an index of names and titles (which are consequently omitted in the Index proper). Included also, at the end of the Appendix, are references to British statute law, which are entered in order of date under the heading “Statutes.” The material otherwise is arranged in alphabetical order, with an entry for each author and work quoted or referred to in the text proper and in Appendices A-D. In cases of simple reference only surnames are given. As the references in Appendix B will be found again in the volume of newspaper writings, and as those in Appendix C may be Bulwer’s rather than Mill’s they are identified as occurring in those appendices.
The entries take the following form:
1. Identification: author, title, etc., in the usual bibliographic form.
2. Notes (if required) giving information about JSM’s use of the source, indication if the work is in his library, and any other relevant information.
3. A list of the places where the author or work is quoted, and a separate list of the places where there is reference only. Those works that are reviewed are specially noted; individual works by Bentham, Coleridge, and Comte (except for the Cours) are not noted as “reviewed” because the articles on these authors are general and not specific reviews.
4. A list of substantive variants between JSM’s text and his source, in this form: Page and line reference to the present text. Reading in the present text] Reading in the source (page reference in the source).
The list of substantive variants also attempts to place quoted passages in their contexts by giving the beginnings and endings of sentences. Omissions of two sentences or less are given in full; only the length of other omissions is given. In a few cases, following the page reference to the source, cross-references are given to footnoted variants in the present text. Translated material is given in the original language. When the style has been altered by setting down quotations, the original form is retained in the entries.
Acts. See Statutes.
Addison, Joseph. Referred to: 114
— Cato. A Tragedy. London: Tonson, 1713.
12.39-40 “the woman who deliberates,”] When Love once plead’s Admission to our Hearts / (In spite of all the Virtue we can boast) / The Woman that Deliberates is lost. (P. 46; IV, i, 29-31)
Aeschylus. Referred to: 42, 324
Agrippa. Referred to: 136
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Alfred the Great (of England). Referred to: 151
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Ampère. Referred to: 354
Anaxagoras. Referred to: 276, 278
Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius. Referred to: 422
— Meditations. Referred to: 416
note: as the reference is general, no edition is cited. A Greek and Latin edition (Glasgow: Foulis, 1744) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
Apollonius. Referred to: 362
Archimedes. Referred to: 362
Aristotle. Referred to: 66, 125, 276, 292, 301, 309, 362
note: the reference at 301 is to G. H. Lewes’s Aristotle.
— De Anima. Quoted: 268
note: there are many editions of Aristotle in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quoted words derive from 415a, 23.
Augustus. See Caesar Augustus.
Aurelius. See Antoninus.
Bacon, Francis. Referred to: 9, 10, 83, 88, 119, 171, 174, 266
— Novum Organum Scientiarum. 2nd ed. Amsterdam: Ravensteiny, 1660.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. For convenience, reference is also given to Works (14 vols. Ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath. London: Longman, et al., 1857-74), which is also in JSM’s library. In this standard edition, the Novum Organum is in Vol. I; the English translation is in Vol. IV. The quotations at 29 and 111 are identical (the passage is marked with a marginal pencil line in JSM’s copy of the edition of 1660; that at 379 is indirect; the reference at 88 is to 113 (Works I, 205; Bk. I, Aph. cv; cf. Vol. IV, 97-8; see also Vol. III, 504, 601).
quoted: 29, 111, 379 referred to: 88
29.29 vera illa et media axiomata] At media sunt Axiomata illa vera, & solida, & viva, in quibus humanae res, & fortunae, sitae sunt; & supra haec quoque, tandem ipsa illa generalissima; talia scilicet, quae non abstracta sint, sed per hae media vere limitantur. (112, Works, I, 205; Bk. I, Aph. civ) [Cf. Works, IV, 97.]
111.1-2 [see previous entry]
379.33-4 we can obey nature in such a way as to command it] Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule. (47; Bk. I, Aph. iii) [Cf. 114; Bk. I, Aph. cxxix. For the Latin version, see 28; Works, I, 157, 222.]
Bain, Alexander. Referred to: 298.
— The Emotions and the Will. London: Parker, 1859.
note: the “first treatise” referred to at 246n is Bain’s The Senses and the Intellect (London: Parker, 1855).
referred to: 246n
“Balwhidder, Micah.” See Galt.
Bancroft. Referred to: 155.
Beattie. Referred to: 85, 86.
note: the reference at 85 derives from Bentham’s identification of the moralist intended in his second category (see 514:85.12 below).
“Beauchamp, Philip.” See Grote, Analysis.
Becket. Referred to: 142.
Bentham, Jeremiah. Referred to: 81.
Bentham, Jeremy. Referred to: 5-18 passim, 21, 26, 54, 77-115 passim, 119-21, 127, 128, 146, 150, 169-70, 172-4, 176, 179, 181, 183-5, 190, 191, 193n, 194, 195-6, 198-9, 201, 207, 209, 220n, 258n, 267, 290, 300, 307, 325, 394, 406, 413-14, 494, 495-8 (App. B), 499-502 (App. C).
note: the references at 172, 181, 183, 198 are in quotations from Whewell. The references at 406, 413-14 are to Bentham’s authorship of the Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion; see under Grote.
— The Works of Jeremy Bentham. Ed. John Bowring. Parts I to IV (1838). Vols. I and IV of complete edition in 11 vols. Edinburgh: Tait, 1843.
note: for ease of reference, most citations of Bentham’s writings are taken from this edition, which is in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The edition appeared in twenty-two separate parts between 1838 and 1843, and then was issued in eleven volumes in 1843. JSM’s review (“Bentham”) is of the first four parts, all published in 1838, which form Vols. I (Parts I and II) and IV (Parts III and IV) of the complete edition. The corresponding volume and part numbers, with dates of the parts, are as follows: Vols. I (Parts I and II, 1838; J. H. Burton’s “Introduction to the Study of Jeremy Bentham’s Works,” which appeared at the end of Part XXII in 1843, is also in Vol. I), II (VII and VIII, 1839), III (IX and X, 1839), IV (III and IV, 1838), V (V and VI, 1838), VI (XI and XII, 1839), VII (XIII and XIV, 1840), VIII (XV and XVI, 1841), IX (XVII and XVIII, 1841 and 1842), X (XIX and XX, 1842), XI (XXI and XXII, 1842 and 1843; for Burton’s “Introduction,” see Vol. I above). Parts I to IV contain the following works (most of which are not referred to in JSM’s review): Part I. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation; On the Promulgation of Laws, with Specimen of a Penal Code; On the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation; A Table of the Springs of Action; A Fragment on Government. Part II. Principles of the Civil Code; Principles of Penal Law. Part III. View of the Hard-Labour Bill; Panopticon; Postscript to Panopticon; Panopticon v. New South Wales; A Plea for the Constitution; Draught of a Code for a Judicial Establishment in France. Part IV. Bentham’s Draught for the Organization of Judicial Establishments; Emancipate Your Colonies; On Houses of Peers and Senates; Papers relative to Codification and Public Instruction; Codification Proposal.
— Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion. See Grote, Analysis.
— The Book of Fallacies; from the unfinished papers of Jeremy Bentham. Ed. Peregrine Bingham. London: Hunt, 1824.
note: for ease of reference, the quotations are also located in Works, II, 375-487.
quoted: 14-15, 90 referred to: 81-2
14.30-1 “In every human breast (rare . . . extraordinarily . . . excitement, excepted) ] 3. [i.e., the 3rd of the premises on which the following argument is based] In every human breast, rare . . . extraordinary . . . incitement, excepted, (392-3; Works, II, 482)
14.34 “Taking] [paragraph] Taking (363; Works, II, 482)
14.35 nor . . . exist] [not in italics] (363; Works, II, 482)
14.38-9 (which . . . virtuous) of], which . . . virtuous of (363; Works, II, 482)
90.17 “vague generalities.”] [title of Part IV, Chap. iii] (230ff.; Works, II, 440ff.)
— Constitutional Code; for the use of all nations and all governments professing liberal opinions. Vol. I. London: Heward, 1830.
note: no more published until the complete work appeared in Works, IX, which was not published at the time of JSM’s review.
referred to: 106
— Defence of Usury; shewing the impolicy of the present legal restraints on the terms of pecuniary bargains. In a series of letters to a friend. To which is added, a letter to Adam Smith, on the discouragements opposed by the above restraints to the progress of inventive industry. London: Payne, 1787.
note: in Works, III.
referred to: 81-2
— Deontology. See Bowring, Deontology.
— Essay on the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation. In Works, I, 169-94.
referred to: 105, 195
— “Essay on the Promulgation of Laws, and the Reasons thereof, with Specimen of a Penal Code,” in Works, I, 155-68.
84.1 “there are] [paragraph] There are (I, 161)
84.3 them. It] them. It is necessary to demonstrate certain palpable truths, in order that others, which may depend upon them, may be adopted. It (I, 161)
— A Fragment on Government; being an examination of what is delivered, on the subject of government in general in the introduction to Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries; with a preface, in which is given a critique on the work at large. London: Payne, 1776.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. In Works, I, 240-359.
referred to: 82, 496 (App. B)
— An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in Works, I, 1-154.
note: for ease of reference, the passages are collated with the version in Works (which is in JSM’s library), although he probably was using the edition in 2 vols. (London: Wilson, 1823), also in his library. (The Bowring edition was of course not published at the time of the early references.) Because of the importance of this work to JSM, the page reference to the Bowring edition is followed by references to the 1st ed. (London: Payne, 1789 [printed 1780—JSM gives this as the date of publication at 186]) and to the edition of 1823. In his copy of the latter, a faint pencil line (31n) marks the end of the paragraph describing the nine kinds of mistaken moralists in his favourite quotation from Bentham. The quotation at 186 is taken by JSM from Whewell’s version. Bowring’s bracketed identifications of the moralists in the passage quoted at 85-6 and elsewhere derive from Bentham’s inked marginalia in his copy (British Museum) of the 1st ed.; the mistaken spellings are Bentham’s. In the reference at 97 to Bentham’s sanctions, JSM omits the first of Bentham’s four sanctions, the “physical” (see Introduction to the Principles, Chap. iii, especially the note to the chapter title).
quoted: 5, 85-6, 110, 177-8, 271 referred to 8, 94, 97, 175-6
5.15-16 principle . . . principle,”] [paragraph] To this denomination [“principle of utility”] has of late [written 1822] been added or substituted, the greatest happiness or greatest felicity principle: this for shortness, instead of saying at length that principle which states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being the right and proper, and only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human action: of human action in every situation, and in particular in that of a functionary or set of functionaries exercising the powers of Government. (I, 1n; not in 1789 ed.; 1823 ed., I, 1n-2n)
5.21-2 “law . . . sense.”] [see 85-6 above, and entries below for that passage] (I, 8n-9n; 1789 ed., xiin-xvn; 1823 ed., I, 28n-31n)
5.26 accept the] accept of the (I, 8; 1789 ed., xiii; 1823 ed., I, 28)
5.27 reason for] reason, and that a sufficient one, for (ibid.; in both 1789 and 1823 the reading is as JSM gives it)
84.32-4 “contrivance . . . itself.”] contrivances . . . itself. (I, 8; cf. entry for 5.27 above)
85.8 man says] man [Lord Shaftesbury, Hutchinson, Hume, &c.] says (8n; 1789 ed., xiiin; 1823 ed., I, 29n: the latter two do not have these or the other identifications; the square brackets are Bowring’s)
85.9 that is] that it is (ibid.)
85.9 a ‘moral sense:’] a moral sense: (ibid.; correctly quoted at 177.35)
85.12 man comes] man [Dr. Beattie] comes (ibid.)
85.13 tells] teaches (ibid.,; correctly quoted at 177.39)
85.16 out as] out of the account as (ibid.; correctly quoted at 177.43)
85.24 man comes] man [Dr. Price] comes (ibid.; 1789 ed., xivn)
85.28 part] point (ibid.; 1823 ed., I, 30n)
85.30 there] here (ibid.; “there” in 1789 and 1823, printer’s error in Bowring)
85.34 man,] man [Dr. Clark], (ibid.)
86.4 philosopher,] philosopher [Woolaston], (I, 9n; 1789 ed., xivn; 1823 ed., I, 31n)
86.9 not be] not to be (ibid.; 1789 ed., xvn) [cf. cxxxvin]
86.12 and let] that let (ibid.) [cf. cxxxvin]
86.14 but to come] but come (ibid.; 1789 and 1823 agree with JSM)
86.25 “exhaustive method of classification,”] [the passage in which Bentham “ascribes everything original” in the Introduction to his method is at I, 101n (1789 ed., ccxn; 1823 ed., II, 73n); see also ibid., 17, 96n-97n, 137-9 (cf. 237-8, and III, 172), and for a more extended discussion of his method, VIII, 101ff.]
110.18-19 “principle . . . principle.”] [see entry for 5.15-16 above]
177.7 It] XII. It (I, 8; 1789 ed., xii; 1823 ed., I, 27)
177.13 these] those (ibid.) [printer’s error?]
177.14 In] XIII. In (ibid., 1789 ed., xiii)
177.20 proportion] proportion (ibid.)
177.24 The] XIV. The (ibid.)
177.29 reason for] reason, and that a sufficient one, for (ibid.) [cf. entry for 5.27 above]
177.29 phrase is different] phrases different (ibid.)
177.29 same] same.* (ibid.) [the rest of the quotation is all in this footnote; cf. 85-6 above, and entries for that passage. The entries below indicate only differences between the version here quoted and that quoted at 85-6; errors in both passages are therefore indicated for the former only]
177.34 One] 1. One (I, 8n; 1789 ed., xiiin; 1823 ed., I, 29n)
177.38 Another] 2. Another (ibid.)
177.40 much] surely (ibid.)
178.7 Another] 4. Another (ibid.; 1823 ed., I, 30n)
178.11 Another] 5. Another (ibid.)
178.15 A] 6. A (I, 9n; ibid.)
178.18-19 nature. [paragraph] We] [JSM omits Bentham’s 7th category here, and his 9th after the next paragraph; cf. 117] (ibid.)
178.19 We] 8. We (ibid.; 1823 ed., I, 31n)
185.34 religion] religions, (I, 142n-143n; 1789 ed., cccviiin; 1823 ed., II, 235n) [this and the following variants indicate JSM’s agreement with Whewell’s misquotations from Bentham, except as indicated]
185.35 kingdom] creation (ibid.)
185.39 ought] ought (ibid.) [given correctly in “Whewell”]
185.40 given. The] [9-sentence omission, indicated in “Whewell” by ellipsis] (ibid.; 1789 ed., cccviiin-cccixn)
185.40 may] may (ibid.) [given correctly in “Whewell”]
185.42 tyranny. It] tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.* [footnote:] *See Lewis XIVth Code Noir. [text:] It (ibid.; 1823 ed., II, 235n-236n) [ellipsis indicated in “Whewell”]
185.43-186.1 reasons insufficient] reasons equally insufficient (ibid.) [see previous entry]
186.1 caprice of a tormentor.] same fate? (ibid.) [see two previous entries]
186.5 day, a] day, or a (ibid.)
186.6 The] the (ibid.)
186.6-7 can they reason? nor, can they speak? but, can they suffer?] Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (ibid.) [italics given in “Whewell”]
271.34 fictitious entities] [a very common phrase in Bentham; see, e.g., I, 53n (1789 ed., cxin; 1823 ed., I, 191n); cf. 57n, and for a fuller treatment, VIII, 197ff.]
— Plan of Parliamentary Reform, in the Form of a Catechism, with Reasons for Each Article: with an Introduction, showing the necessity of radical, and the inadequacy of moderate, reform. London: Hunter, 1817.
note: in Works, III, 433-557; the comparative passage below is taken from this version.
257.35-6 “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one,”] [exact wording not located, but see:] [paragraph:] 3. The happiness and unhappiness of any one member of the community—high or low, rich or poor—what greater or less part is it of the universal happiness and unhappiness, than that of any other? (III, 459) [Cf.: “And, on what ground, in the eyes of a common guardian, can any one man’s happiness be shown to have any stronger or less strong claim to regard than any others?” (Codification Proposal, in Works, IV, 540) See also I, 302, 321; II, 252, 271-2; III, 211.]
— “Principles of the Civil Code,” in Works, I, 297-364.
note: at 104n and 154, JSM refers to this work as “Principles of Civil Law”; Part I is entitled “Objects of the Civil Law” and the phrase is used by Dumont in his Introduction (I, 299) to characterize the subject.
quoted: 197 referred to: 104n, 154
197.24-5 “takes . . . themselves,”] The government which interdicts them [divorces], takes . . . themselves. (I, 355)
— Rationale of Judicial Evidence, specially applied to English Practice. Ed. J. S. Mill. 5 vols. London: Hunt and Clarke, 1827.
note: in Works, VI-VII. The reference at 470 is to one of JSM’s editorial notes to the Rationale, I, 137 (where the criticism is of Price, not of Campbell). In JSM’s library, Somerville College.
quoted: 95n referred to: 470
95.n2 “love of justice”] 2. Another reason [why one of the “mendacity-restraining sanctions” may operate] is to be found in that love of justice, which, at least in a civilized state of society, may be considered as having more or less hold on every human breast.* [footnote by the Editor, i.e., JSM:] *This love of justice, commonplace moralists, and even a certain class of philosophers, would be likely to call an original principle of human nature. Experience proves the contrary: by any attentive observer of the progress of the human mind in early youth, the gradual growth of it may be traced. [paragraph] Among the almost innumerable associations by which this love of justice is nourished and fostered, that one to which it probably owes the greatest part of its strength, arises from a conviction which cannot fail to impress itself upon the mind of every human being possessed of an ordinary share of intellect,—the conviction, that if other persons in general were habitually and universally to disregard the rules of justice in their conduct towards him, his destruction would be the speedy consequence: and that by every single instance of disregard to those rules on the part of any one, (himself included), the probability of future violations of the same nature is more or less increased. (V, 638-639n; Works, VII, 570-570n) [Another passage using “love of justice” is to be found at I, 83 (Works, VI, 227).]
— The Rationale of Reward. London: Hunt, 1825.
note: in Works, II, 189-266; the comparative passages below are taken from this version.
113.35-6 “quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry:”] Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. (II, 253)
114.1 “All poetry is misrepresentation.”] [exact wording not located, but see:] Indeed, between poetry and truth there is a natural opposition: false morals, fictitious nature. The poet always stands in need of something false. . . . Truth, exactitude of every kind, is fatal to poetry. (II, 253-4)
— A Table of the Springs of Action. London: Hunter, 1817 [printed 1815].
note: in Works, I, 195-219.
quoted: 95, 109 referred to: 12, 95, 96
95:19-21 “Conscience . . . reputation;”] [“Conscience” and “Principle” appear under the “Eulogistic” motives in Table VII, which is concerned with “Pleasures and Pains of the Moral or Popular Sanction; viz. Pleasures of Reputation, or Good-Repute,” with a reference directing attention to Tables IX and X, concerned with pleasures and pains of the “Religious Sanction” and of “Sympathy.” “Moral Rectitude” and “Moral Duty” appear in Table VIII under the “Neutral” motives.] (Works, I, 201)
109.28 “interest-begotten prejudice”] [see title of §6] (I, 217; cf. title of Book of Fallacies, Part V, Chap. iv, in Works, II, 477]
— Traités de législation civile et pénale. Ed. Etienne Dumont. 3 vols. Paris: Bossange, Mason, and Besson, 1802.
note: the “Vue générale d’un corps complet de législation” (“de lois” in Table of Contents of Vol. I) is in Vol. I (moved to Vol. III of 2nd ed. 3 vols. Paris: Bossange, Rey, and Gravier, 1820). As the reading of these volumes marked “an epoch” in JSM’s life (Autobiography [New York: Columbia University Press, 1924], 45), the contents are of special interest: Vol. I. Discours préliminaire (by Dumont); Principes généraux de législation; Vue générale d’un corps complet de législation. Vol. II. Principes du code civil; Principes du code pénal. Vol. III. Principes du code pénal (cont.); Mémoire sur le Panoptique; Promulgation des lois; De l’influence de tems et des lieux en matière de législation.
referred to: 11, 496 (App. B)
— “Vue générale d’un corps complet de législation.” See Traités de législation civile et pénale.
Berkeley. Referred to: 46
Berthelot, Marcelin-Pierre-Eugène. “La science idéale et la science positive,” Revue des Deux Mondes, 2e sér., 48 (Nov., 1863), 442-59.
referred to: 264
Beverley, Robert Mackenzie. Referred to: 36n
note: for Beverley’s writings, see Sedgwick, Four Letters.
Bible. Referred to: 27-8, 144-5, 159, 160-2, 300, 322, 382, 416
— New Testament. Referred to: 65, 161, 218, 416-17, 423, 424-5, 469, 487
— Old Testament. Referred to: 161, 224, 396, 416n
— Acts. Referred to: 480n
note: the reference is to 9: 1-19; Paul’s conversion is also described in Acts, 22:3-16, 26:4-18; Galatians, 1:11ff.
— I Corinthians.
420.14 “Let us] If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? let us (15:32; cf. Isaiah, 22:13)
410.29-30 “follow . . . evil;”] Thou shalt not follow . . . evil; neither shalt thou speak in a cause to decline after many to wrest judgment: / Neither shalt thou countenance a poor man in his cause. (23:2-3)
— Genesis. Referred to: 27, 162, 435
note: the reference at 27 is in a quotation from Blakey.
note: the quotation is indirect.
423.40-1 its ways are not our ways] For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. (55:8)
quoted: 28, 416 referred to: 487
28.39 “He spake as never man spake.”] The officers answered, Never man spake like this man. (7:46)
416.36 “new commandment to love one another;”] A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another. (13:34)
417.3-4 “he that is without sin let him throw the first stone;”] So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and said unto them, He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. (8:7)
— Judges. Referred to: 320
note: the quotation is indirect.
416.n2-3 to love . . . thyself,] Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love . . . thyself: I am the Lord. (19:18)
— Luke. Referred to: 417
note: the reference is to 10:30-7.
— Mark. Referred to: 29, 424
note: the reference at 29 is general; see 3:5.
note: the reference at 417 is to 7:12; that at 423 is to 5:1ff.
quoted: 388 referred to: 417, 423
388.7-8 “to him that . . . given, but . . . taken even] For unto every one that . . . given, and he shall have abundance: but . . . taken away even (25:29)
— Revelations. Referred to: 27, 412
note: the reference at 27 is in a quotation from Blakey; that at 412 is to Chap. 18.
424.28 “the . . . God”] Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the . . . God. (13:1)
Bichat. Referred to: 289
Blackstone. Referred to: 82, 103, 151
Blainville. Referred to: 323
Blakey, Robert.History of Moral Science. 2 vols. London: Duncan, 1833.
reviewed: 21-9 quoted: 23-7
24.39 remembrance] remembrance (II, 117)
25.15 assert] assent [printer’s error in Blakey?] (II, 117)
25.41 The] [no paragraph] In considering the nature of man, they have looked upon him as a mere insulated being, without any reference to the relations in which he stands to the Great Author of his existence; and hence it is, in the majority of cases, that the (II, 300)
25.42 mind] mind such (II, 300)
25.42 is profusely] is so profusely (II, 300)
26.3 all things should be seen in God;] The metaphysical theory of Father Malenbranche [sic] is contained in this single principle, that all things should be seen in God. (II, 308)
26.10 All] [no paragraph] All (II, 317)
26.16 vibrations,*] [JSM’s footnote] (II, 317)
26.18-20 “there are . . . truth,” and that “we cannot . . . principle,”] [paragraph] There are . . . truth; but the great imperfection which runs through them all is, that they attempt to generalise too much. We cannot . . . principle. (II, 319)
26.22 “that . . . God,”] The abstract arguments, for and against this theory [of Archbishop King] have been detailed at a considerable length, in the essay on King’s system; but I will here advance a few additional reasons, principally of a more popular complexion, in favour of the doctrine, that . . . God. (II, 319-20)
27.26 I venture] [no paragraph] If this be the case [that supernatural revelation merely confirms natural morality], then I would say that the Scriptures are a complete failure; for I venture (II, 326)
Blignières, Célestin de.Exposition abrégée et populaire de la philosophie et de la religion positives. Paris: Chamerot, 1857.
referred to: 328, 329
Böhme. Referred to: 127
Bolingbroke. Referred to: 21
Bonner. Referred to: 155
Borgias. Referred to: 386
note: the reference is not specific, but clearly Cesare, Lucrezia, and Rodrigo (Pope Alexander VI) are intended.
Bossuet. Referred to: 324
Bowring, John.Deontology; or, The Science of Morality: in which the harmony and co-incidence of duty and self-interest, virtue and felicity, prudence and benevolence, are explained and exemplified. From the MSS of Jeremy Bentham. 2 vols. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Browne, Green, and Longman, 1834.
note: the reference at 90 is to I, 39ff. There is little reason to dispute JSM’s judgment, often expressed, that this work should be attributed in the main to Bowring, not to Bentham.
referred to: 90, 98-9, 174
Boyle. Referred to: 287n
Bridges. See Comte, A General View of Positivism.
Brougham, Henry Peter. “Law Reform: Introduction,” in Speeches of Henry Lord Brougham. 4 vols. Edinburgh: Black, 1838, II, 285-315.
note: the “character” of Bentham is on 287-304; for the “imputation” of “a jealous and splenetic disposition,” see especially 297-8. Brougham also includes, 304-6, a short sketch of James Mill.
referred to: 115n
Brown, John.Essays on the Characteristics. London: Davis, 1752.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 87, 170
— An Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times. 2 vols. London: Davis and Reymers, 1757-58.
referred to: 87n
Brown, Thomas. Referred to: 21, 46, 130, 298
— Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 4 vols. Edinburgh: Tait, 1820.
referred to: 267
Brutus. Referred to: 112
Buckle. Referred to: 287n, 322
Buonarotti. See Michelangelo.
Burke, Edmund.Reflections on the Revolution in France, and on the proceedings in certain societies in London relative to that event. In a letter intended to have been sent to a gentleman in Paris. In Works. 3 vols. London: Dodsley, 1792, III, 19-321.
note: this volume, and Vols. IV and V of the edition as later extended, formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
142.36-7 “rear her mitred front in courts and palaces,”] No! we will have her [religion] to exalt her mitred front in courts and parliaments. (III, 144)
Butler, Joseph. Referred to: 21, 64n, 65, 172
note: the reference at 172 is in a quotation from Whewell.
— The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. To which are added two brief dissertations: I. Of Personal Identity. II. Of the Nature of Virtue. London: Knapton, 1736.
note: at 64 JSM is quoting Sedgwick’s quotation from Butler; for variants, see under Sedgwick, A Discourse, 64.12-19.
quoted: 64 referred to: 469
Butler, Samuel.Hudibras. 2 vols. Ed. Zachary Grey. London: Vernor and Hood, et al., 1801.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
445.3-4 The dark lantern of the Spirit / Which none see by but those who bear it:] (The “new light”] ’Tis a dark-lanthorn of the spirit, / Which none see by but those that bear it; / A light that falls down from on high, / For spiritual trades to cozen by / An ignis fatuus, that bewitches / And leads men into pools and ditches, / To make them dip themselves, and sound / For Christendom in dirty pond; / To dive, like wild-fowl, for salvation, / And fish to catch regeneration. (I, 53-4; Pt. I, Canto I, ll.505-14.)
Byron. Referred to: 92
Caesar, Augustus. Referred to: 466
Caesar, Julius. Referred to: 362
Camden. See Pratt.
Campbell, George.A Dissertation on Miracles: containing an examination of the principles advanced by David Hume, in an Essay on Miracles. Edinburgh: Kincaid and Bell, 1762.
referred to: 470
Campbell, John. Referred to: 102
note: the reference is to Campbell as Attorney-General in 1838.
Caravaggio. Referred to: 136n
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Cardaillac. Referred to: 296
Carlyle, Thomas. “Novalis,” in Critical and Miscellaneous Essays. 5 vols. London: Fraser, 1840, II.
note: this edition probably was in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The references derive from JSM’s citations of Novalis, but there can be little doubt that he took them from Carlyle, and so they are entered below. The quotations are indirect.
quoted: 214, 336
214.37-8 simultaneous act of suicide under certain conditions] That theory of the human species ending by a universal simultaneous act of Suicide, will, to the more simple sort of readers, be new. (II, 288) [The passage is found in Chap. ii, “Die Natur,” of Novalis’s Die Lehrlinge zu Sais; see Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel, eds. Novalis Schriften. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960, I, 88-9.]
336.6 Spinoza . . . was a God-intoxicated man] [in translation from Novalis, Carlyle writes:] “Spinoza is a God-intoxicated man (Gott-trunkener Mensch).” (II, 296) [The passage is found in “Fragmente”; see Ludwig Tieck and Friedrich Schlegel, eds. Novalis Schriften. 4th ed. 3 parts. Berlin: Reimer, 1826, II, 261.]
— On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History. London: Fraser, 1841.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. JSM is citing Novalis, but there is little doubt that he took the reference from Carlyle, who cites the passage not only in Heroes, but twice in Sartor Resartus, and once in “Characteristics.”
407.41-408.1 My belief has gained infinitely to me from the moment when one other human being has begun to believe the same.] “It is certain,” says Novalis, “my Conviction gains infinitely, the moment another soul will believe in it.” (93) [The passage is found in Ludwig Tieck and Friedrich Schlegel, eds. Novalis Schriften. 4th ed. 3 parts. Berlin: Reimer, 1826, II, 104.]
— Past and Present. London: Chapman and Hall, 1843.
note: presentation copy, “To Mrs Taylor / with kind regards. / T.C.”, in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is of a common phrase in Carlyle, most fully developed in Bk. IV, Chap. iv, “Captains of Industry.”
— Sartor Resartus. 2nd ed. Boston: Munroe, 1837.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation at 214 is indirect.
quoted: 214, 333
214.23 What . . . be?] What Act of Legislature was there that thou shouldst be happy? A little while ago thou hadst no right to be at all. (197; Bk. II, Chap. ix)
333 “the Infinite nature of Duty,”] Thus, in spite of all motive-grinders, and mechanical profit-and-loss philosophies, with the sick ophthalmia and hallucination they had brought on, was the infinite nature of duty still dimly present to me. (170; Bk. II, Chap. vii) [the context of this comment by Teufelsdröckh gives the rest of JSM’s statement. Cf. Past and Present, 156-7 (Bk. II, Chap. xv).]
Carrier. Referred to: 386
Chalmers. Referred to: 151
Charles I (of England). Referred to: 155
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Charles II (of England). Referred to: 155
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Châteaubriand. Referred to: 92
Christ. See Jesus.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius.Brutus sive de claris oratoribus.
note: many editions of Cicero in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
145.14 instar omnium] Plato enim mihi unus instar est omnium. (51.191)
— De finibus bonorum et malorum. Referred to: 87
note: many editions of Cicero in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
— De Officiis. Referred to: 421
note: many editions of Cicero in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
Clare. Referred to: 136n
note: the reference, to “Strongbow,” is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Clarke. Referred to: 21, 85
note: the reference at 85 derives from Bentham’s identification (“Clark”) of the moralist intended in his fifth category.
Clarkson. Referred to: 188
Cogan. Referred to: 21
Coleridge, Henry Nelson. “Preface,” The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, III. London: Pickering, 1838, ix-xvi.
quoted: 162. See also Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, Literary Remains.
161.28 the only] [paragraph] His [Coleridge’s] friends have always known this to be the fact [that he criticized Biblical literalism]; and he vindicated this so openly that it would be folly to attempt to conceal it: nay, he pleaded for it so earnestly—as the only (III, xi)
161.32 former; for he] former,—that to suppress this important part of his solemn convictions would be to misrepresent and betray him. For he (III, xi)
161.36 fools! . . . Of the] fools! [3½-sentence omission] He trembled at the dreadful dogma which rests God’s right to man’s obedience on the fact of his almighty power,—a position falsely inferred from a misconceived illustration of St. Paul’s, and which is less humbling to the creature than blasphemous of the Creator; and of the (III, xii-xiii)
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. Referred to: 42, 77-8, 119-63 passim, 299, 494
— Aids to Reflection in the Formation of a Manly Character on the Several Grounds of Prudence, Morality, and Religion: Illustrated by select passages from our elder Divines, especially from Archbishop Leighton. 2nd ed. London: Hurst, Chance, 1831.
note: the 1st ed. (London: Taylor and Hessey, 1825) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, but his page references correspond to those in the edition cited (which agree with those in the edition of 1836 [London: Pickering]).
quoted: 128, 159
159.10-11 “the outward . . . virtue” is “the . . . men,”] For the outward . . . virtue being the . . . men, it must needs include the object of an intelligent self-love, which is the greatest possible happiness of one individual; for what is true of all, must be true of each. (37)
159.11 “happiness . . . man.”] For Pleasure (and happiness . . . man, and hence by the Greeks called εὐτυχία, i.e. good-hap, or more religiously εὐδαιμονία, i.e. favorable providence)—Pleasure, I say, consists in the harmony between the specific excitability of a living creature, and the exciting causes correspondent thereto. (39)
— Biographia Literaria: or, Biographical sketches of my literary life and opinions. 2 vols in 1. London: Rest Fenner, 1817.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The passage at 158 includes a quotation from Leibnitz, Trois lettres; the quotation at 129 is indirect.
quoted: 129, 158
129.24 they required . . . afresh.] [paragraph] To which I may add from myself, that what medical physiologists affirm of certain secretions, applies equally to our thoughts; they too must be taken up again into the circulation, and be again and again re-secreted in order to ensure a healthful vigor, both to the mind and to its intellectual offspring. (I, 234n)
158.30-1 “J’ai . . . nient.] [not in italics] (I, 250; see Leibnitz, Trois lettres, below)
— Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit. Ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge. London: Pickering, 1840.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 162n
— First Lay Sermon [The Statesman’s Manual]. 2nd ed. In On the Constitution of Church and State, and Lay Sermons. London: Pickering, 1839.
note: the indirect quotation, wrongly attributed by JSM, following Coleridge, to Bacon, actually derives from James Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Œconomy (2 vols. London: Millar and Cadell, 1767). For the identification, see Kathleen Coburn, ed., S. T. Coleridge’s Notebooks (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), I (Notes), 309 (21.11).
119.7-9 If it be true, as Lord Bacon affirms, that a knowledge of the speculative opinions of the men between twenty and thirty years of age is the great source of political philosophy,] Turn over the fugitive writings, that are still extant, of the age of Luther; peruse the pamphlets and loose sheets that came out in flights during the reign of Charles I and the Republic; and you will find in these one continued comment on the aphorism of Lord Bacon (a man assuredly sufficiently acquainted with the extent of secret and personal influence), that the knowledge of the speculative principles of men in general between the age of twenty and thirty is the one great source of political prophecy. (216n) [Cf. The Friend, I, 315.] [The passage in Steuart reads:] In every country we find two generations upon the stage at a time; that is to say, we may distribute into two classes the spirit which prevails; the one amongst men between twenty and thirty, when opinions are forming; the other of those who are past fifty, when opinions and habits are formed and confirmed. A person of judgment and observation may foresee many things relative to government, from an exact application to the rise and progress of new customs and opinions, provided he preserve his mind free from all attachments and prejudices, in favour of those which he himself has adopted, and in that delicacy of sensation necessary to perceive the influence of a change of circumstances. This is the genius proper to form a great statesman. (I, 11)
— The Friend: A series of Essays, in three volumes, to aid in the formation of fixed principles in politics, morals, and religion, with literary amusements interspersed. 3 vols. London: Rest Fenner, 1818.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotations at 126 and 151 are indirect. See also Bacon. JSM’s reference to Coleridge as an “arrant driveller” on political economy (155) may reflect his reading of I, 283-356.
quoted: 126, 151, 158-9
126.13-14 we see, before we know that we have eyes] as “Metaphysics” are the science which determines what can, and what can not, be known of Being and the Laws of Being, a priori (that is from those necessities of the mind or forms of thinking, which, though first revealed to us by experience, must yet have pre-existed in order to make experience itself possible, even as the eye must exist previous to any particular act of seeing, though by sight only can we know that we have eyes)—so might the philosophy of Rousseau and his followers not inaptly be entitled, Metapolitics, and the Doctors of this School, Metapoliticians. (I, 309n; cf. Literary Remains, I, 326n; Table Talk, 220)
151.6-8 the balance . . . trade] I entreat my readers to recollect, that the present question does not concern the effects of taxation on the public independence and on the supposed balance of the three constitutional powers, (from which said balance, as well as from the balance of trade, I own, I have never been able to elicit one ray of common sense.) (II, 74-5)
159.4-5 “to . . . self-contradiction”] This is, indeed, the main characteristic of the moral system taught by the Friend throughout, that the distinct foresight of Consequences belongs exclusively to that infinite Wisdom which is one with that Almighty Will, on which all consequences depend; but that for Man—to . . . self-contradiction, or in other words, to produce and maintain the greatest possible Harmony in the component impulses and faculties of his nature, involves the effects of Prudence. (I, 256)
159.6 “be] So act that thou mayest be (I, 340)
299.36-7 metapolitics] [see passage quoted in entry for 126.13-14 above]
— The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge. 4 vols. London: Pickering, 1836-39.
note: the quotation at 155.21-4 is indirect.
quoted: 144, 150, 155, 158, 159, 160-1, 162. See also Coleridge, Henry Nelson.
144.27 bibliolatry] [e.g. of common term in Coleridge:] But in fact the age was not ripe enough even for a Hooker to feel, much less with safety to expose, the Protestants’ idol, that is, their Bibliolatry. (III, 42)
150.19-20 “constituted” . . . “the . . . apostasy.”] For it is this very interpretation of the Church [as the “Clergy, the hierarchy exclusively” by Laud and his followers] that, according to my conviction, constituted . . . apostasy; and I hold it for one of the greatest mistakes of our polemic divines in their controversies with the Romanists, that they trace all the corruptions of the Gospel faith to the Papacy. (III, 386)
155.21-4 no . . . knowledge;] [paragraph] If any man, who like myself hath attentively read the Church history of the reign of Elizabeth, and the conference before, and with, her pedant successor, can shew me any essential difference between Whitgift and Bancroft during their rule, and Bonner and Gardiner in the reign of Mary, I will be thankful to him in my heart and for him in my prayers. One difference I see, namely, that the former professing the New Testament to be their rule and guide, and making the fallibility of all churches and individuals an article of faith, were more inconsistent, and therefore less excusable, than the Popish persecutors. (II, 388-9)
158.35 “truths misunderstood,” “half-truths . . . whole,”] For we are not bound to say the truth, where we know that we cannot convey it, but very probably may impart a falsehood instead; no falsehoods being more dangerous than truths misunderstood, nay, the most mischievous errors on record having been half-truths . . . whole. (III, 145)
159.20-1 “if . . . France,”] [paragraph] This just and acute remark [by Jeremy Taylor] is, in fact, no less applicable to Scripture in all doctrinal points, and if . . . France, the same criterion (that is, the internal evidence) must be extended to all points, to the narratives no less than to the precept. (III, 263)
159.22-6 “the . . . God;” . . . “clearly . . . and St. Paul.”] [paragraph] If we are quite certain that any writing pretending to divine origin contains gross contradictions to demonstrable truths in eodem genere, or commands that outrage the clearest principles of right and wrong; then we may be equally certain that the pretence is a blasphemous falsehood, inasmuch as the . . . God. [paragraph] This principle is clearly . . . and by St. Paul. (III, 293) [234g-g.]
159.30 “the] The (I, 367)
160.31-161.1 “the . . . of the word,” . . . “wilful . . . will;”] Alas! alas! how long will it be ere Christians take the plain middle road between intolerance and indifference, by adopting the . . . of heresy, that is, wilful . . . will; and of heretics, (for such there are, nay, even orthodox heretics), that is, men wilfully unconscious of their own wilfulness, in their limpet-like adhesion to a favourite tenet? (IV, 193)
161.4-5 “pseudo-Athanasius,” . . . “interprets Catholic . . . belief,”] And lastly, who authorized either you, or the pseudo-Athanasius, to interpret Catholic . . . belief, arising out of the apparent predominance of the grounds for, over those against, the truth of the positions asserted; much more, by belief as a mere passive acquiescence of the understanding? (IV, 193)
161.5-6 “true Lutheran doctrine,” . . . “neither] How infinitely safer the true Lutheran doctrine [than Jeremy Taylor’s]: God cannot be mocked; neither (III, 359)
161.7 condemn. To] condemn;—to (III, 359)
161.10 habit.] habit;—to watch over the secret movements of the heart, remembering ever how deceitful a thing it is, and that God cannot be mocked, though we may easily dupe ourselves: these, as the ground-work with prayer, study of the Scriptures, and tenderness to all around us, as the consequents, are the Christian’s rule, and supersede all books of casuistry, which latter serve only to harden our feelings and pollute the imagination. (III, 359)
161.12 ambitious] ambition (IV, 245)
161.18-20 “The notion . . . it,”] The very same principles on which the pontifical polemics vindicate the Papal infallibility, Fuller et centum alii apply to the (if possible) still more extravagant notion . . . it. (II, 385)
161.21-2 “there . . . unbelief;”] But in all superstition there . . . unbelief, and, vice versa, where an individual’s belief is but a superficial acquiescence, credulity is the natural result and accompaniment, if only he be not required to sink into the depths of his being, where the sensual man can no longer draw breath. (III, 229-30)
161.22 “if . . . extravagant”] [see entry for 161.18-20 above] (II, 385)
— I. On the Constitution of Church and State According to the Idea of Each. II. Lay Sermons:i.The Statesman’s Manual.ii.“Blessed are ye that sow beside all waters.” Ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge. London: Pickering, 1839.
note: this edition, in JSM’s library, is the one to which his references correspond; it includes the 3rd ed. of Church and State, and the 2nd ed. of the Lay Sermons. Also in JSM’s library is the 2nd ed. of Church and State (London: Hurst, Chance, 1830). The collations for the Lay Sermons are given under First Lay Sermon and Second Lay Sermon.
quoted: 135n-136n, 146-9, 150-2, 155
135.n9 us discharge] us, however, first discharge (160)
135.n17 could be] could have been (161)
147.10 the] [paragraph] The Nationalty, therefore, was reserved for the (46)
147.32 Religion] But I affirm that in the spiritual purpose of the word, and as understood in reference to a future state, and to the abiding essential interest of the individual as a person, and not as the citizen, neighbour, or subject, religion (48)
147.35 Christ. . . . . The] [ellipsis indicates 1-page omission] (48-9)
147.35 The clerisy] [paragraph] The Clerisy (49)
147.38 architecture, with] architecture, of the physical sciences, with (49)
148.5 ideas.] ideas.* [8-sentence footnote omitted] (50)
148.14 knowledge of] knowledges that (51)
148.27 “cannot] But I do assert, that the Nationalty cannot (54)
148.28 nation never] nation it never (54)
148.29 purposes,”] purposes. (54)
148.29-30 “a . . . civilization,”] These [permanency and progression] depend on a . . . civilization. (46)
148.37 I] But I (53)
148.39 contrary. . . . . In] [ellipsis indicates 5½-page omission; the sentence indicated in the entry for 148.27 above follows immediately after contrary] (53-4, 59)
148.39 In] [paragraph] In (59)
148.40 accident,] accident,* [3-sentence footnote, explaining the sense of the phrase, omitted] (59)
148.41 God. . . . . As] God, a mighty and faithful friend, the envoy indeed and liege subject of another State, but which can neither administer the laws nor promote the ends of this other State, which is not of the world, without advantage, direct and indirect, to the true interests of the States, the aggregate of which is what we mean by the world, that is, the civilized world. As (59-60)
150.16-18 “who, . . . pastorate,”] 3, of a school-master in every parish, who . . . pastorate; so that both should be labourers in different compartments of the same field, workmen engaged in different stages of the same process, with such difference of rank, as might be suggested in the names pastor and sub-pastor, or as now exists between rector and curate, elder and deacon. (56-7) [the full sentence runs for 2 pages]
151.10 Because] [paragraph] But a Constitution is an idea arising out of the idea of a State; and because (18)
151.11 in the] on the (18) [printer’s error?]
151.12 and what] and in what (19)
151.16-17 though (even . . . idea) not] though even . . . idea not (19)
151.23 is] [paragraph] There is yet another ground for the affirmation of its reality; that, as the fundamental idea, it is (19)
151.25 system: those principles in] system—(I use the term in its widest sense, in which the crown itself is included as representing the unity of the people, the true and primary sense of the word majesty);—those principles, I say, in (19)
151.33 It] [no paragraph] It (23)
151.35-6 and growing] and the growing (23)
151.38 States . . . Now] [ellipsis indicates omission of 14-line quotation from the “Ode to the Departing Year”] (24)
151.38 Now] [paragraph] Now (24)
151.39 men, or acknowledging] men, acknowledging (24)
152.2 permanence . . . progression.] permanence . . . progression.* [2-paragraph footnote] (24)
152.7 hand,” he says, “the] hand, with as little chance of contradiction, I may assert that the (26)
152.12 These] [paragraph] These (29)
152.13 classes I] classes, by an arbitrary but convenient use of the phrase, I (29)
152.23-4 “the . . . House;”] [paragraph] Thus in the theory of the Constitution it was provided that even though both divisions of the Landed Interest should combine in any legislative attempt to encroach on the rights and privileges of the Personal Interest, yet the representatives of the latter forming the . . . House, the attempt must be abortive; the majority of votes in both Houses being indispensable in order to the presentation of a bill for the completory act,—that is, to make it a law of the land. (30)
152.26-31 “the very weight . . . landholders” . . . “in . . . scale;” . . . “now . . . check;”] [paragraph] That the burgesses were not bound to elect representatives from among their own order, individuals bona fide belonging to one or other of the four divisions above enumerated; that the elective franchise of the cities, towns, and ports, first invested with borough-rights, was not made conditional, and to a certain extent at least dependent, on their retaining the same comparative wealth and independence, and rendered subject to a periodical revisal and re-adjustment; that, in consequence of these and other causes, the very weights . . . land-holders, have, in . . . scale; that they now . . . check;—these things are no part of the Constitution, no essential ingredients in the idea, but apparent defects and imperfections in its realization; which, however, we need neither regret nor set about amending, till we have seen whether an equivalent force has not arisen to supply the deficiency;—a force great enough to have destroyed the equilibrium, had not such a transfer taken place previously to, or at the same time with, the operation of the new forces. (31-2) [the next sentence is partly used by JSM in his concluding clause]
155.15-17 “a . . . head” . . . “either . . . them.”] Our state-policy a . . . head; our measures become either . . . them; for all true insight is foresight. (69)
155.8-9 “the . . . reigns”] (the . . . reigns) (102) [the full sentence runs for 1 page]
155.27-30 “a . . . kingdom” instead of “the . . . aware.”] . . . and if, I say, Henry [VIII] had then directed the Nationalty to its true national purposes, (in order to which, however, a . . . kingdom must have superseded the . . . aware); . . . . (56) [the full sentence, including the passage at 150.16-18 above, runs for 2 pages]
— “Pitt,” in James Gillman. The Life of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 2 vols. London: Pickering, 1838, I, 195-207.
note: reprinted from the Morning Post, 19 Mar., 1800; also appears in Coleridge’s Essays on His Own Times, A Second Series of The Friend (London: Pickering, 1850, II, 319-29).
referred to: 155
— Second Lay Sermon [Blessed are ye that sow beside all waters]. 2nd ed. In On the Constitution of Church and State, and Lay Sermons. London: Pickering, 1839.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
quoted: 155n, 156-7
155.n2 “Instead] Thus instead (403)
156.23 Let] [no paragraph] Let (414)
156.27 hope] hope* [3-sentence footnote omitted] (415)
157.25 “that] [paragraph] That agriculture requires principles essentially different from those of trade; that (413)
157.26 should] ought not to (413) [JSM puts the negative earlier in his paraphrase]
157.27 stock;”] stock,—admits of an easy proof from the different tenure of landed property,* [footnote includes sentence quoted by JSM at 157] and from the purposes of agriculture itself, which ultimately are the same as those of the State of which it is the offspring. (413-14)
— Specimens of the Table Talk of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge. 2nd ed. London: Murray, 1836.
note: the quotation at 121 is indirect.
quoted: 121, 160
121.24-5 every one is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian:] Every man is born an Aristotelian, or a Platonist. (95) [Cf. Literary Remains, III, 33: “Every man capable of philosophy at all (and there are not many such) is a born Platonist or a born Aristotelian.”]
160.3-4 Unitarians” and even infidels. “It] Unitarians and open infidels. It (91) [Cf. 160i-i.]
Combe. Referred to: 378
Comte, Auguste. Referred to: 263-368 passim, 406
— Appel aux conservateurs. Paris: Comte, Dalmont, 1855.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College, bound with a presentation copy of Comte’s Discours sur l’ensemble du positivisme (Paris: Mathias, Carilian-Gœury, and Dalmont, 1848).
referred to: 328n
— The Catechism of Positive Religion. Trans. Richard Congreve. London: Chapman, 1858.
referred to: 328
— Catéchisme positiviste, ou Sommaire exposition de la religion universelle, en onze entretiens systématiques entre une femme et un prêtre de l’humanité. Paris: Comte, Carilian-Gœury, and Dalmont, 1852.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College, where many of the cited passages are marked marginally. JSM often uses terms or ideas found repeatedly in Comte’s later works; some of the identifications are therefore typical rather than exact, and similar passages may be found in Comte’s Synthèse and Système. Where quotations (such as those at 340, 342, 346, 347) are indirect or summary, usually no collation is given.
quoted: 335, 336, 340, 342, 346, 347, 357 referred to: 323, 328n, 329
335.36 (du cœur sur l’esprit)] Toujours fondée sur un libre concours de volontés indépendantes, son existence composée, que toute discorde tend à dissoudre, consacre aussitôt la prépondérance continue du cœur sur l’esprit comme l’unique base de notre véritable unité. (19)
336.15-22 the . . . social.] [translated from:] En lui-même, il indique l’état de complète unité qui distingue notre existence, à la fois personnelle et sociale, quand toutes ses parties, tant morales que physiques, convergent habituellement vers une destination commune. [ellipsis indicates 3-sentence omission] [paragraph] Une telle harmonie, individuelle ou collective, ne pouvant jamais être pleinement réalisée dans une existence aussi compliquée que la nôtre, cette définition de la religion caractérise donc le type immuable vers lequel tend de plus en plus l’en semble des efforts humains. Notre bonheur et notre mérite consistent surtout à nous rapprocher autant que possible de cette unité, dont l’essor graduel constitue la meilleure mesure du vrai perfectionnement, personnel ou social. (2-3)
357.2 the living are more and more governed by the dead.] [translated from:] Les vivants sont toujours, et de plus en plus, gouvernés nécessairement par les morts: telle est la loi fondamentale de l’ordre humain. (32; cf. Système, III, xxxiv. Both passages marked marginally in JSM’s copies.)
— Cours de philosophie positive. 2nd ed. 6 vols. Preface, E. Littré. Paris: Ballière, 1864.
note: 1st ed. (6 vols. Paris: Bachelier, 1830-42) in JSM’s library. The 4th ed. (Paris: Baillière, 1877), in which the pagination agrees with JSM’s citations from the 2nd, is used in the following collations.
reviewed: 263-327 quoted: 294, 295-6, 298, 300, 301, 303-4, 312, 321, 330, 363
referred to: 328-9, 332, 359, 363, 366
294.13-14 “the degree . . . science,”] [translated from:] Ainsi, je ne propose point le dualisme universel et invariable comme une loi réelle de la nature, que nous ne pourrions jamais avoir aucun moyen de constater; mais je le proclame un artifice fondamental de la vraie philosophie chimique, destiné à simplifier toutes nos conceptions élémentaires, en usant judicieusement du genre spécial de liberté resté facultatif pour notre intelligence, d’après le véritable but et l’objet général de la chimie positive. (III, 81)
295.11-15 “without . . . to us”] [translated from:] [paragraph] En considérant sous un dernier aspect l’influence fondamentale d’une telle destination, suivant l’esprit de la philosophie relative, nous avons partout reconnu qu’elle détermine spontanément le genre de liberté resté facultatif pour notre intelligence, et dont nous devons savoir user, sans aucun vain scrupule, afin de satisfaire, entre les limites convenables, nos justes inclinations mentales, toujours dirigées, avec une prédilection instinctive, vers la simplicité, la continuité et la généralité des conceptions, tout en respectant constamment la réalité des lois extérieures, en tant qu’elle nous est accessible. (VI, 639-40)
295.15-19 “The most . . . wants”] [translated from:] Ainsi, le point de vue le plus philosophique conduit finalement, à ce sujet, à concevoir l’étude des lois naturelles comme destinée à nous représenter le monde extérieur, en satisfaisant aux inclinations essentielles de notre intelligence, autant que le comporte le degré d’exactitude commandé, à cet égard, par l’ensemble de nos besoins pratiques. (VI, 642)
295.21 “instinctive . . . harmony,”] [translated from:] Nos lois statiques correspondent à cette prédilection instinctive pour l’ordre et l’harmonie, dont l’esprit humain est tellement animé, que, si elle n’était pas sagement contenue, elle entraînerait souvent aux plus vicieux rapprochements; nos lois dynamiques s’accordent avec notre tendance irrésistible à croire constamment, même d’après trois observations seulement, à la perpétuité des retours déjà constatés, suivant une impulsion spontanée que nous devons aussi réprimer fréquemment pour maintenir l’indispensable réalité de nos conceptions. (VI, 642)
295.23-25 “les convenances . . . intelligence.”] Quand l’esprit relatif de la vraie philosophie moderne aura convenablement prévalu, tous les penseurs comprendront, ce que le règne de l’absolu empêche maintenant de sentir, que les convenances purement esthétiques doivent avoir une certaine part légitime dans l’usage continu du genre de liberté resté facultatif pour notre intelligence par la nature essentielle des véritables recherches scientifiques. (VI, 646-7)
295.26-9 “most eminent . . . reality”] [translated from:] Avant tout, sans doute, comme je l’ai ci-dessus expliqué, une telle liberté doit être employée de manière à faciliter le plus possible la marche ultérieure de nos conceptions réelles, en satisfaisants convenablement à nos plus éminentes inclinations mentales. Mais cette condition primordiale laissera partout subsister encore une notable indétermination, dont il conviendra de gratifier directement nos besoins d’idéalité, en embellissant nos pensées scientifiques, sans nuire aucunement à leur réalité essentielle. (VI, 647)
295.31-2 “severe . . . investigation”] [translated from:] D’éclatants exemples ont déjà montré qu’on peut obtenir aujourd’hui, en philosophie naturelle, d’éphémères triomphes, aussi faciles que désastreux, en se bornant à détruire, d’après une investigation trop minutieuse, les lois précédemment établies, sans aucune substitution quelconque de nouvelles règles; en sorte qu’une aveugle appréciation académique entraîne à récompenser expressément une conduite que tout véritable régime spéculatif frapperait nécessairement d’une sévère réprobation. (VI, 639)
295.35-6 “the . . . intelligence] [see entry for 295.15-19 above]
296.14 of moral . . . functions] [[translated from:] Sommaire. — Considérations générales sur l’étude positive des fonctions intellectuelles et morales, ou cérébrales. (III, 530; heading of Quarant-cinquième Leçon (1).)
297.31 “des diverses facultés élémentaires,”] [paragraph] A cette analyse anatomique de l’appareil cérébral, il faudra joindre, dans un ordre d’idées entièrement distinct quoique parallèle, l’analyse purement physiologique des diverses facultés élémentaires, qui devra finalement être constituée, autant que possible, en harmonie scientifique avec la première: toute idée anatomique devra, à son tour, étre provisoirement écartée dans ce second travail, au lieu de la fusion anticipée qu’on veut habituellement opérer entre les deux points de vue. (III, 573)
300.15-16 “la metaphysique constitutionnelles”] Mais ce déplorable ascendant devra vous faire attacher, en lieu convenable, une extrême importance à la discussion ultérieure de cet unique aspect spécieux de la doctrine stationnaire, qu’une exacte analyse historique caractérisera spontanément, en constatant la profonde inanité nécessaire de cette métaphysique constitutionnelle sur la pondération et l’équilibre des divers pouvoirs, d’après une judicieuse appréciation de ce même état politique qui sert de base ordinaire à de telles fictions sociales. (IV, 85-6)
301.32-3 “the absolute . . . conscience.”] [translated from:] [paragraph] En considérant maintenant la doctrine critique sous un point de vue plus spécial, il est évident que le droit absolu du libre examen, ou le dogma de la liberté illimitée de conscience, constitue son principe le plus étendu et le plus fondamental, surtout en n’en séparant point ses conséquences les plus immédiates, relatives à la liberté de la presse, de l’enseignement, ou de tout autre mode quelconque d’expression et de communication des opinions humaines. (IV, 43)
304.7-11 “the claims . . . slavery”] [translated from:] Sans doute, chaque individu, quelle que soit son infériorité, a toujours le droit naturel, à moins d’une conduite antisociale très-caractérisée, d’attendre de tous les autres le scrupuleux accomplissement continu des égards généraux inhérents à la dignité d’homme et dont l’ensemble, encore fort imparfaitement apprécié, constituera de jour en jour le principe le plus usuel de la morale universelle. Mais, malgré cette grande obligation morale, qui n’a jamais été directement niée depuis l’abolition de l’esclavage, il est évident que les hommes ne sont ni égaux entre eux, ni même équivalents, et ne sauraient, par suite, posséder, dans l’association, des droits identiques, sauf, bien entendu, le droit fondamental, nécessairement commun à tous, du libre développement normal de l’activité personnelle, une fois convenablement dirigée. (IV, 54)
304.23-5 “an arbitrary . . . kings”] [translated from:] Mais, en appréciant, comme il convient, l’indispensable office transitoire de ce dogme révolutionnaire, aucun vrai philosophe ne saurait méconnaître aujourd’hui la fatale tendance anarchique d’une telle conception métaphysique, lorsque, dans son application absolue, elle s’oppose à toute institution régulière, en condamnant indéfiniment tous les supérieurs à une arbitraire dépendance envers la multitude de leurs inférieurs, par une sorte de transport aux peuples du droit divin tant reproché aux rois. (IV, 55-6)
312.33 “dispersive speciality”] [translated from:] Quoique cette sorte d’automatisme humain ne constitue heureusement que l’extrême influence dispersive du principe de la spécialisation, sa réalisation, déjà trop fréquente, et d’ailleurs de plus en plus imminente, doit faire attacher à l’appréciation d’un tel cas une véritable importance scientifique, comme évidemment propre à caractériser la tendance générale et à manifester plus vivement l’indispensable nécessité de sa répression permanente. (IV, 430)
321.6 “consultative”] [paragraph] Il est donc évident que, bien loin de pouvoir directement dominer la conduite réelle de la vie humaine, individuelle ou sociale, l’esprit est seulement destiné, dans la véritable économie de notre invariable nature, à modifier plus ou moins profondément, par une influence consultative ou préparatoire, le règne spontané de la puissance matérielle ou pratique, soit militaire, soit industrielle. (V, 219)
330.6 “hygiène cérébrale.”] En conséquence, après avoir, dans ma première jeunesse, rapidement amassé tous les matériaux qui me paraissent convenir à la grande élaboration dont je sentais déjà l’esprit fondamental, je me suis, depuis vingt ans au moins, imposé, à titre d’hygiène cérébrale, l’obligation, quelquefois gênante, mais plus souvent heureuse, de ne jamais faire aucune lecture qui puisse offrir une importante relation, même indirecte, au sujet quelconque dont je m’occupe actuellement, sauf à ajourner judicieusement, selon ce principe, les nouvelles acquisitions extérieures que je jugerais utiles. (VI, 34)
363.13 “liberté facultative”] [see entry for 294.13-14 above] (III, 81)
— A General View of Positivism. Trans. John H. Bridges. London: Trübner, 1865.
referred to: 329
— Synthèse subjective, ou Système universel des conceptions propres à l’état normal de l’humanité. Tome premier, contenant le Système de logique positive, ou Traité de philosophie mathématique. Paris: Comte and Dalmont, 1856.
note: no more published. In JSM’s library, Somerville College, where many of the references are marginally marked. JSM often uses terms or ideas found repeatedly in Comte’s later works; some of the identifications are therefore typical rather than exact, and similar passages may be found in Comte’s Catéchisme and Système.
quoted: 346, 352, 355-7, 363-7 referred to: 328n
346.11 (vues d’ensemble).] Vainement les faux théoriciens invoquèrent-ils le développement de la science pour perpétuer le régime où les travaux de détail éteignaient les vues d’ensemble. (523-4; cf. Système, IV, 447)
352.27-8 “le plus perturbateur,”] A la science le plus abstraite appartient surtout une telle aptitude; car elle tend directement à discipliner le plus perturbateur des trois éléments humains, en faisant spontanément surgir, de son propre essor, l’irrésistible frein d’une pleine évidence. (70-1)
355.28-9 orgueil . . . sécheresse] Une invocation sagement continue de leur destination et de leur nature doit normalement suffire, quand elles sont régénérées, pour les empêcher de développer l’orgueil, et même de disposer à la sécheresse. (68-9)
356.20 la foi demontrable] [paragraph] Mieux appréciée, l’éducation encyclopédique, qui semble d’abord instituer la discussion, est surtout destinée à construire un foi toujours démontrable, mais rarement démontrée même au plus instruits. (93; cf. Système, IV, 267)
356.20-1 la foi toujours démontrée] [see entry above] (ibid.)
356.35-6 “distrust . . . order”] [translated from:] Nous devons d’abord considérer une telle conduite comme directement incompatible avec l’ordre normal, puisqu’elle émane d’une disposition défiante, sinon hostile, envers le sacerdoce fondamental. (278)
357.11-12 “the insurrection . . . dead.”] [translated from:] Religieusement jugés, les appels absolus à la démonstration constituent des émeutes des vivants contre les morts, en aspirant à faire prévaloir le raisonnement individuel sur la raison collective, proclamée par les interprètes de l’Humanité. (278)
363.26-33 its physio-chemical . . . material force.] [translated from:] Obligée de subir constamment les lois fondamentales de la vie planétaire, la Terre, quant elle était intelligente, pouvait développer son activité physico-chimique de manière à perfectionner l’ordre astronomique en changeant ses principaux coefficients. Notre planète put ainsi rendre son orbite moins excentrique, et dès lors plus habitable, en concertant une longue suite d’explosions analogues à celles d’où proviennent les comètes, suivant la meilleure hypothèse. Reproduites avec sagesse, les mêmes secousses, secondées par la mobilité végétative, purent aussi rendre l’inclinaison de l’axe terrestre mieux conforme aux futurs besoins du Grand-Être. A plus forte raison la Terre put-elle alors modifier sa figure générale, qui n’est au-dessus de notre intervention que parce que notre ascendant spirituel ne dispose pas d’un pouvoir matériel assez considérable. (10-11)
363.36-9 In proportion . . . activity.] [translated from:] A mesure que chaque planète s’améliorait, sa vie s’épuisait par excès d’innervation, mais avec la consolation de rendre son dévouement plus efficace quand l’extinction des fonctions spéciales, d’abord animales, puis végétatives, la réduirait aux attributs universels de sentiment et d’activité. (11)
364.2 (croyance)] [paragraph] Une pareille croyance peut aussi satisfaire une curiosité spontanée qui, ne comportant aucune règle pendant notre enfance, y devint souvent abusive, mais que notre maturité doit utiliser en la disciplinant. (11)
364.3 “perfecting our unity”] [translated from:] Il convient, au contraire, de supposer des transformations antérieures à l’économie actuelle, si ces hypothèses peuvent perfectionner notre unité, soit en complétant les notions philosophiques par les fictions poétiques, soit surtout en développant nos sympathies. (11-12)
364.3-4 “by supplying . . . fictions,] [see entry for 364.3 above] (11-12)
364.4-7 and developing . . . Grand Être.”] [translated from:] Toutefois, sa principale influence concerne la poèsie et la morale, vu son aptitude directe à développer les émotions sympathiques et les inspirations esthétiques. On conçoit alors le monde comme aspirant à seconder l’homme pour améliorer l’ordre universel sous l’impulsion du Grand-Être. (12)
364.19-23 “It is . . . social.”] [translated from:] Il importe que le domaine de la fiction devienne aussi systématique que celui de la démonstration, afin que leur harmonie mutuelle soit conforme à leurs destinations respectives, également dirigées vers l’essor continu de l’unité personnelle et sociale. (12)
364.32-5 “The final . . . existence.”] [translated from:] [paragraph] Rapportée à l’Humanité, l’unité finale inspire le besoin de cultiver la sympathie en développant notre reconnaissance pour tout ce qui sert au Grand-Être. Elle doit nous disposer à vénérer la fatalité sur laquelle repose l’ensemble de notre existence. (15)
365.17-21 One . . . more.] [translated and summarized from:] Une progression n’est vraiment normale que quand elle se réduit à trois termes; une combinaison ne peut jamais admettre plus de deux éléments, tout rapport étant binaire; une synthèse devient illusoire quand elle ne procède pas d’un seul principe. (108)
365.24-8 “Composed of . . . kind.”] [translated from:] [paragraph] Formé de deux progressions suivies d’une synthèse, ou d’une progression entre deux couples, le nombre sept, succédant à la somme des trois nombres sacrés, détermine le plus vaste groupe que nous puissions distinctement imaginer. Réciproquement, il pose la limite des divisions que nous pouvons directement concevoir dans une grandeur quelconque. (127)
366.14 l’arbitraire] Une impulsion religieuse doit sagement employer les nombres pour éviter, dans tous les modes de notre existence, un arbitraire constamment favorable à l’égoïsme. (107)
366.38-9 “plan for . . . importance.”] [translated from:] Son explication m’oblige à faire d’abord connaître le plan que j’ai finalement institué pour toutes les compositions importautes [sic], et pleinement pratiqué dans tout le cours du volume que j’achève. (755)
366.39-367.17 “Every volume . . . cantos,”] [translated from:] Relativement à chaque volume vraiment susceptible de former un traité distinct, il faut normalement instituer sept chapitres, outre l’introduction et la conclusion, et composer chacun de trois parties. Dans cette distribution fondamentale, qui se borne à préciser et systématiser des usages spontanément surgis, les deux divisions comportent des titres caractéristiques, quelquefois condensés en un seul mot. Examinée envers chaque tiers d’un chapitre quelconque, la règle consiste à le partager en sept sections, composées chacune de sept groupes de phrases, séparés par les alinéas usités. Normalement formée, la section offre un groupe central de sept phrases, que précèdent et suivent trois groupes de cinq: la section initiale de chaque partie réduit à trois phrases trois de ses groupes symétriquement placés; la section finale donne sept phrases à chacun des groupes extrêmes. [paragraph] Sous cet aspect, ma règle de composition rapproche la prose de la régularité poétique, vu ma réduction antérieure du maximum de toute phrase à deux lignes manuscrites ou cinq imprimées, c’est-à-dire deux cent cinquante lettres. A mesure que la préparation humaine s’accomplit, le perfectionnement de l’expression suscita des prescriptions plus précises, surtout caractérisées par le partage des chants en stances chez la population la plus esthétique. Normalement construits, les grands poëmes forment treize chants, décomposés en parties, sections et groupes comme mes chapitres, sauf l’entière égalité des groupes et des sections: en substituant le vers à la phrase, cette extension équivaut à celle de la principale épopée. Toutefois, la différence de structure ainsi réglée entre les volumes poétiques et les tomes philosophiques est plus apparente que réelle; car l’introduction et la conclusion d’un poëme doivent chacune comprendre trois de ses treize chants. (755-6)
367.22 “a synthetic . . . signification,”] [translated from:] Toute l’efficacité de la méthode repose sur le choix des deux sortes de mots, qui doivent toujours offrir une signification synthétique ou sympathique, et se rapporter, le plus possible, à la section ou partie correspondante. (757)
367.27 “conspiracy of silence”] [translated from:] [paragraph] On peut cependant assurer que la seconde conspiration du silence aura moins de succès et de durée que la première, puisque les meneurs de la double presse britannique ne sauraient longtemps empêcher leur public de connaître la seule doctrine vraiment conforme à ses vœux sociaux. (xxxvi)
— Système de politique positive. Paris: Saint-Simon, 1824.
note: this work, with the same basic title as the next entry, is Cahier 3 of Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon’s Catéchisme des Industriels. Footnotes in the text above referring to Comte’s Système derive from the later work, unless specifically noted.
301.39-302.6 There . . . opinions] [translated from:] [paragraph] Il n’y a point de liberté de conscience en astronomie, en physique, en chimie, en physiologie, dans ce sens que chacun trouverait absurde de ne pas croire de confiance aux principes établis dans ces sciences par les homme compétens. S’il en est autrement en politique, c’est parce que les anciens principes étant tombés, et les nouveaux n’étant pas encore formés, il n’y a point, a proprement parler, dans cet intervalle, de principes établis. (14)
— Système de politique positive, ou Traité de sociologie, instituant la Religion de l’humanité. 4 vols. Paris: Mathias, 1851-54.
note: after the first reference, identified in the notes simply as Système; the Système of 1824 is given its full title. In JSM’s library, Somerville College, where many references are indicated by marginal marks. JSM often uses terms or ideas found repeatedly in Comte’s later works; some of the identifications are therefore typical rather than exact, and similar passages may be found in Comte’s Catéchisme and Synthèse. The quotations at 309n, 331, 340, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 355, 356, 359, 361, 362, 366 are indirect or summary, and are collated only when comparison is useful.
quoted: 282-3, 286n-287n, 309n, 324n, 331, 335-6, 343-5, 349-53, 355-6, 358-9, 361-2, 365-6 referred to: 232, 328n, 329, 359, 362. See also Thomas à Kempis.
286.n25 “Conçu] [paragraph] Ainsi conçu (III, 41)
331.20 “moral regeneration”] [translated from:] Elle résulte essentiellement de deux influences intellectuelles, l’une involontaire, l’autre volontaire, complétées, en temps opportun, par l’incomparable régénération morale que je dus à ma sainte passion. (I, Preface, 6)
331.20-1 “une angélique influence”] [paragraph] Chacun des sept pas essentiels de ma construction religieuse caractérise spécialement l’angélique influence que son début proclama. (IV, 546)
331.21 “une incomparable passion privée.”] [exact wording not located, but see:] Mais tous ceux qui connaissent le premier volume, publié en juillet 1851, de mon Système de politique positive, savent aujourd’hui que ce cours fondamental résulta lui-même de la dédicace exceptionnelle que j’écrivis secrètement en 1846, d’après une incomparable affection privée. (II, xxxi)
336.1 “les calculs personnels.”] Sans méconnaître leur véritable utilité individuelle, elle évite d’y trop insister, de peur d’entretenir l’habitude des calculs personnels. (I, 97)
336.5-6 “inevitable infirmities.” [translated from:] Une fois dégagé de l’oppression théologique et de la sécheresse métaphysique, notre cœur sent aisément que le bonheur réel, tant privé que public, consiste surtout à développer autant que possible [sic] la sociabilité, en n’accordant à la personnalité que les satisfactions indispensables, à titre d’infirmités inévitables. (I, 222)
340.22 public functionary;] [derived from:] Aussi, dans toute société régulière, chaque citoyen fut-il toujours érigé en un fonctionnaire public, remplissant, bien ou mal, son office, spontané ou systématique. (I, 363)
341.36 sexe aimant] En effet, elle est entièrement liée à l’existence purement domestique du sexe aimant; elle ne peut donc devenir, pour la vie publique, une source suffisante de conseil, de consécration, et de discipline. (II, 313)
343.11 “le bois] La célébration du jugement suprême consiste surtout dans le transport solennel des nobles restes au bois (IV, 130)
343.38 “Cette] Mais cette (IV, 100)
343.39 universels. . . . Afin] universels, que je dois maintenant indiquer; ce qui prouvera que, jusque envers un tel complément, le culte positif surpasse l’adoration théologique, d’où pourtant émana cet heureux usage. [paragraph] Afin (IV, 100)
344.2 condition] constitution (IV, 100)
344.33 “fundamental couple”] [translated from:] [paragraph] Ma théorie de la famille les réduit à deux groupes, l’un formé du couple fondamental, l’autre du produit, ordinairement triple, de l’union conjugale. (IV, 293)
345.21 “le veuvage éternel.”] Dans le cas normal, la promesse du veuvage éternel sera solennellement renouvelée six mois après l’année du deuil, sans pouvoir désormais comporter aucune dispense. (IV, 128)
361.6-7 la . . . végétatifs] [exact wording not located, but passage generally derives from II, 437ff.]
365.15 “moral and intellectual properties of numbers.”] Leurs [les nombres] éminent attributs intellectuels et moraux, presqu’oubliés aujourd’hui, sont réservés à la sociologie, qui seule doit, à cet égard, rectifier et compléter les anciens pressentiments philosophiques. (I, 542)
Comte, Caroline (née Massin). Referred to: 311
Condillac. Referred to: 129, 499 (App. C), 500 (App. C)
Condorcet. Referred to: 500 (App. C)
Congreve, Richard. See Comte, Catechism of Positive Religion.
Constantine. Referred to: 138
Cooper, Anthony Ashley. Referred to: 21, 85, 86, 170
note: usually referred to as the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury. The reference at 85 derives from Bentham’s identification of the moralists intended in his first category.
Cousin. Referred to: 263, 444
Croesus. Referred to: 466
Cudworth. Referred to: 21
Cumberland. Referred to: 21
Dante. Referred to: 324
Darius. Referred to: 321
Davies, John Llewellyn. Quoted: 219n
note: the source, a private letter, has not been located.
De Beaumont, Gustave Auguste La Bonninière.L’Irlande sociale, politique et religieuse. 2 vols. Paris: Gosselin, 1839.
note: in JSM’s library.
referred to: 135n
Delolme. Referred to: 151
De Maistre. Referred to: 324
De Morgan. Referred to: 289n
De Quincey, Thomas. “On the True Relations to Civilisation and Barbarism of the Roman Western Empire,” Blackwoods’ Magazine, XLVI (Nov., 1839), 644-53.
note: the quotation derives from the title given the article in the Table of Contents and the running titles: “Philosophy of Roman History.”
Descartes, René. Referred to: 38n, 171, 266, 271, 359, 367-8, 441
— Dissertatio de methodo. In Principia philosophiæ. 4th ed. Amsterdam: Elzevir, 1664. (Separately paged.)
note: in JSM’s library. The passage referred to is almost certainly that in the argument following the third paragraph of Part IV (19-21), but JSM has distorted the sense (cf. Logic [8th ed.] II, 319 [V, iii, 3]). Cf. also Descartes’ Meditationes de prima philosophia, Meditation V, where the argument is given at greater length.
De Tocqueville. Referred to: 109, 325
De Vaux. Referred to: 331-2, 342, 345
Dewar. Referred to: 21
Diderot. Referred to: 323n, 500 (App. C)
Domitian. Referred to: 385
Dumont, Étienne. Ed. Jeremy Bentham, Traités de législation. See under Bentham, above.
Dunning. Referred to: 82
Eldon. See Scott.
Epicurus. Referred to: 87, 209, 210
Euclid. Referred to: 42
Fénélon. Referred to: 54, 324, 459
Ferguson. Referred to: 21
Fontenelle. Referred to: 359
Fourier. Referred to: 323
Fox. Referred to: 323n
Franklin. Referred to: 354
Galileo. Referred to: 144, 266, 287n
Gall. Referred to: 360
Galt, John (“Micah Balwidder”). Annals of the Parish; or The Chronicle of Dalmailing; during the ministry of the Rev. Micah Balwhidder. Written by himself. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1821.
note: the relevant passage (fictionally set in 1794) reads: “I told my people that I thought they had more sense than to secede from Christianity to become Utilitarians, for that it would be a confession of ignorance of the faith they deserted, seeing that it was the main duty inculcated by our religion to do all in morals and manners, to which the new-fangled doctrine of utility pretended” (286; Chap. xxxv).
referred to: 210n
Gardiner. Referred to: 155
Gillman, James.The Life of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. See Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “Pitt.”
Gisborne. Referred to: 21
Godwin. Referred to: 21, 170
Goethe. Referred to: 92
Goldsmith. Referred to: 114
Grote, George (“Philip Beauchamp”). Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion, on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind. London: Carlisle, 1822.
note: compiled and edited by Grote from Bentham’s MSS. A presentation copy to Helen Taylor of the French translation by M. E. Cazelles (Paris: Baillière, 1875) is in JSM’s library. At 413 JSM cites Bentham’s instances as (1) oaths, (2) duelling, (3) illicit sexual intercourse; in the Analysis the instances are (1) duelling, (2) fornication, (3) simony, (4) perjury (oaths).
referred to: 406, 413
Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume. Referred to: 92
— Cours d’histoire moderne. 6 vols. Paris: Pichon and Didier, 1828-32.
note: the 1st volume (not in JSM’s library), published separately but under the same general title as the later volumes, is subtitled Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe, depuis la chute de l’empire Romain jusqu’à la Révolution Française; the other five volumes (in JSM’s library) are subtitled Histoire de la civilisation en France, depuis la chute de l’empire Romain jusqu’en 1789. The indirect quotation at 34 is a general summary of the latter, I, 12-13; against the beginning of this passage in JSM’s copy is pencilled (probably in his hand), “Bacon? Locke? Newton?”
quoted: 39-40 referred to: 140n
— “Du Régime municipal dans l’empire Romain, au cinquième siècle de l’ère chrétienne, lors de la grande invasion des Germains en occident,” Essais sur l’histoire de France. 2nd ed. Paris: Brière, 1824, 1-51.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 140n
Hadrien (Publius Aelius Hadrianus). “Address to his soul.”
note: the “Address,” found in many collections is: “Animula vagula, blandula / Hospes comesque corporis, / Quae nunc abibis in loca; / Pallidula, rigida, nudula, / Nec, ut soles, dabis jocos.”
referred to: 427
Hamilton, William. Referred to: 267, 444
— Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. 4 vols. Ed. H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1859-60.
referred to: 296n
Hartley, David. referred to: 21, 23-4, 26, 48n, 97, 127, 130, 298
—Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations. London: Hitch and Austen, 1749.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 13
Hegel. Referred to: 171, 289
Helvétius, Claude-Adrien. Referred to: 48n, 54, 86, 131, 500 (App. C)
— De l’esprit. Paris: Durand, 1758.
note: as there is no edition in JSM’s library, the 1st is cited.
referred to: 110
Herder. Referred to: 139
Herodotus.History, Book II.
note: as the reference is general, no edition is cited. Two Greek and Latin eds. (9 vols. Glasgow: Foulis, 1761; 7 vols. Edinburgh: Laing, 1806) were formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville college.
referred to: 320n
Herschel, John F. W. Outlines of Astronomy. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1849.
referred to: 354n
Hildebrand (Pope Gregory VII). Referred to: 142
Hipparchus. Referred to: 362
Hippocrates. Referred to: 278
— Aphorisms, i, 1.
note: as the reference is common, no edition is cited. The phrase is often found in its Latin form, taken from Seneca, De Brevitate Vitae, 1.
Hobbes, Thomas. Referred to 21, 38n, 83, 122, 169, 172, 269, 359
note: the reference at 172 is in a quotation from Whewell.
— Elementorum philosophiae Sectio prima, De Corpore. In Opera philosophica quae Latine scripsit omnia. Ed. William Molesworth. 5 vols. London: Bohn, 1839-45, I.
note: this edition is in JSM’s library, Somerville College; JSM’s reference, of course, antedates the edition. The reference is to Part II, “Sive philosophia prima,” 81ff. (1655). The term is also used by Bacon, Advancement (1605), in Works, III, 346, and occurs in the title of Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641).
referred to: 6
Home. Referred to: 21
Homer. Referred to: 323, 324, 464
— The Odyssey.
note: as specific wording is not involved, no edition is cited. The passage referred to is XI, 489ff. A two-volume edition in Greek of The Iliad and The Odyssey (Oxford, 1800) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 427
Horace.Opera. Glasgow: Mundell, 1796.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
quoted: 63-4, 382
63.40 quodam] quadam (423; Epistle I, 32)
63.40 ultra:] ultra. (ibid.)
64.1 inungi.] inungui; / Nec, quia desperes invicti membra Glyconis, / Nodasa corpus nolis prohibere cheragra. (ibid., 29-31)
382.15 vetitum nefas,] Audax omnia perpeti / Gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas. (9; Carmina I, iii, 25-6)
Howard. Referred to: 422
Hume, David. Referred to: 21, 27, 48n, 80-1, 85, 86n, 127, 170, 266-7, 497 (App. B)
note: the reference at 85 derives from Bentham’s identification of the moralists intended in his first category.
— “Of Civil Liberty,” Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. 2 vols. Edinburgh: Cadell, 1793, I, 89-98.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. Until 1757 the essay was entitled “Of Liberty and Despotism.” The quotation is indirect.
44.n2 the world is yet too young to have a political philosophy] I am apt, however, to entertain a suspicion, that the world is still too young to fix many general truths in politics, which will remain true to the latest posterity. (89-90)
— An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. 2 vols. Edinburgh: Cadell, 1793, II.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. Until 1758 entitled Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding. JSM’s references are all to Essay X, “Of Miracles,” II, 124-47.
referred to: 470, 471-3, 477
Hutcheson. Referred to: 21, 85
note: the reference at 85 derives from Bentham’s identification (“Hutchinson”) of the moralists intended in his first category.
Inglis. Referred to: 149
Iphigenia. Referred to: 405
Jenyns, Soame. Referred to: 21, 170
note: at 21 JSM refers to him as Soames rather than Soame.
— A Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil. London: Dodsley, 1757.
referred to: 87; see also Samuel Johnson, “Review.”
Jephtha. Referred to: 320
Jesus. Referred to: 16, 28, 144, 218, 227, 376, 422-5, 481, 484-8
Jocelyn. Referred to: 146n
John (the Apostle). Referred to: 412
Johnson, Samuel. Referred to: 82, 170
— “Review of A Free Enquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil,” in The Works of Samuel Johnson. London: Buckland, Rivington, et al., 1787, X, 220-58.
note: reprinted from the Literary Magazine.
referred to: 87
Jouffroy. Referred to: 263
note: as there is no edition in JSM’s library, none is cited.
376.8-9 “quod . . . docuit”] Jus naturale est, quod . . . docuit. (Lib. I, Tit. ii)
Kames. See Home.
Kant, Immanuel. Referred to: 125, 127, 171, 266, 445-6
— Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Riga: Hartknoch, 1797.
note: no copy in JSM’s library; this edition is the one used by Coleridge, in whom JSM probably found the formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which is referred to in each of the quotations. JSM refers to the Metaphysics of Ethics on 207, where the passage is identified (the earlier, on 159, being indirect, in a quotation from Coleridge).
quoted: 159, 207, 249
207.28-9 “So . . . beings.”] [paragraph] Der categorische Imperativ ist also nur ein einziger, und zwar dieser: handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, dass sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde. (52; Chap. ii) [Cf. Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft: Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten konne” (I, i, 1, §7).]
Kepler. Referred to: 122, 287n, 288, 293
King. Referred to: 21
Knox. Referred to: 143
Kohl, Johann Georg.Kitschi-Gami, oder Erzählungen vom Obern See. Ein Beitrag zur Charakteristik der Amerikanischen Indianer. Bremen: Schünemann, 1859.
note: appeared in England in 1860 as Kitchi-Gami; Wanderings around Lake Superior. Trans. F. C. L. Wraxall. London: Chapman and Hall.
referred to: 274
Koran. Referred to: 417
Lacroix. Referred to: 42
Laffitte. Referred to: 359
note: the reference is to the “Director” of Positivism.
Lagrange. Referred to: 314
La Place, Pierre Simon de. Referred to: 314
— Traité de mécanique céleste. 5 vols. and supplement. Paris: Duprat, et al., 1798-1823.
referred to: 42
Latimer. Referred to: 143
Lavoisier. Referred to: 122, 289, 295
Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm von. Referred to: 171, 367-8, 434, 441, 446
— Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l’homme, et l’origine du mal. Amsterdam: I. Troyel, 1710.
referred to: 390n
— “Trois lettres à Mr. Remond de Montmort,” in Opera philosophica. 2 parts. Ed. J. E. Erdmann. Berlin: Eichler, 1840.
note: the quotation occurs in a quotation from Coleridge.
158.30 J’ai] [paragraph] J’ai [not in italics] (702)
Lewes, George Henry.Aristotle: A Chapter from the History of Science, including analyses of Aristotle’s scientific writings. London: Smith, Elder, 1864.
301.13-14 “the . . . unthinkable;”] Direct proof to the contrary would, of course, rectify this belief, but until that is furnished, the . . . unthinkable. (126)
Littré, Emile. Referred to: 264, 329
note: the reference at 264 is to Littré’s Preface to his edition of Comte’s Cours, q.v.
— Auguste Comte et la philosophie positive. Paris: Hachette, 1863.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The passage in Littré, 674, referred to by JSM at 306n is marked marginally in his copy.
referred to: 284-5, 290, 293n, 306n, 311n, 328n, 329
Livingston. Referred to: 196
note: the name is given incorrectly as “Livingstone” in Dissertations and Discussions; treated here as a typographical error.
Locke, John. Referred to: 21, 37, 54, 83, 122, 127, 128-30, 144, 169, 171, 441, 494, 499 (App. C)
— Of Human Understanding, in Works. New ed. 10 vols. London: Tegg, Sharpe, Offor, Robinson, and Evans, 1823, I.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
quoted: 49 referred to: 45-50, 62n, 125, 129-30
48.28-9 “in discoursing . . . this” . . . “before] Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing . . . this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that before (“The Epistle to the Reader,” xlvi-xlvii)
49.3-4 “To . . . assent.”] This, therefore, being my purpose; to . . . assent—I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or no. (1-2)
49.4-9 “To . . . discerning . . . of man . . . with.” “To give an account . . . have,” and “set down” some “measures . . . men.”] It shall suffice to my present purpose, to . . . discerning . . . of a man . . . with: and I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I can give any account . . . have, and can set down any measures . . . men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory;—and yet asserted, somewhere or other, with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained—may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it. (2)
49.9-11 “To] It is, therefore, worth while to (2)
49.12-14 “by . . . understanding,” to “discover . . . us;” and thereby to “prevail] If, by . . . understanding, I can discover . . . us; I suppose it may be of use to prevail (3)
Louis XIV (of France). Referred to: 405
Louis Napoleon. See Napoleon III.
Louis Philippe (of France). Referred to: 362
Lucan. Referred to: 136n
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Luther. Referred to: 138
Lycurgus. Referred to: 409
Machiavelli. Referred to: 290
Malebranche. Referred to: 26
Mandeville. Referred to: 21, 60
Mansfield. See Murray.
Marcus Antoninus; Marcus Aurelius. See Antoninus.
Manzoni. Referred to: 323
Mariotte. Referred to: 287n
Massinger, Philip.A New Way to Pay Old Debts, in The Plays of Philip Massinger. Ed. W. Gifford. 4 vols. London: Nicol, et al., 1805, III.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The reference is to Sir Giles Overreach, a character in the play.
referred to: 103
Massin. See Caroline Comte.
Maurice, Frederick Denison (“Rusticus”). Subscription no Bondage, or the practical advantages afforded by the Thirty-Nine Articles as guides in all the branches of academical education. Oxford: Parker, 1835.
referred to: 149e
Michelangelo. Referred to: 136n
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Michelet. Referred to: 92, 139
Mill, James. Referred to: 48n, 80, 267, 298, 425
note: the reference at 425 to a “cultivated and conscientious person of our own day” who held the Manichean creed is only possibly to James Mill (see Autobiography [New York: Columbia University Press, 1924], 28); it is also possible that Harriet Taylor embraced Manicheanism, and may be here intended.
— Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. 2 vols. London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1829.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College, as is the 2nd ed., ed. John Stuart Mill, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869).
referred to: 24, 130f
— The History of British India. 3 vols. London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1817.
note: the only edition now in JSM’s library, Somerville College, is the 3rd. ed., 6 vols. (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1826).
referred to: 320
Mill, John Stuart. “Appendix,” Dissertations and Discussions. 2 vols. London: Parker, 1859, I, 467-74.
note: abstracted from “Rationale of Representation,” London and Westminster Review, I and XXX (July, 1835), 347-9, and “De Tocqueville on Democracy in America,” ibid. (Oct., 1835), 110-112n. The 3 vol. ed. (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1867) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, with the 2nd ed. of Vol. IV (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1875), and Vols. I and II of the 3 vol. American ed. (Boston: Spencer, 1864), and Vols. I, III, and IV of the 4 vol. American ed. (New York: Holt, 1873).
referred to: 109n
note: JSM is quoting from his own article, printed at 77-115 above.
quoted: 119 referred to: 494
119.17 “the . . . established;”] Bentham has been in this age and country the . . . established. (78 above)
note: i.e., the essay printed at 117-163 above.
referred to: 494
note: i.e., the essay printed at 373-402 above. A copy of Three Essays on Religion (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1874) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 456, 459
— ed. Jeremy Bentham. Rationale of Judicial Evidence. See under Bentham.
note: i.e., the essay printed at 31-74 above.
referred to: 494
— A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1872.
note: the 8th ed., the last in JSM’s lifetime, and therefore definitive for purposes of this edition, is cited, although the references antedate its appearance; the references are not tied to specific wordings. The 1st (1843), 2nd (1846), 3rd (1851), 4th (1856), 6th (1865) eds. are in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The reference at 293n is to I, 373ff.; that at 238 is to II, 428-9; that at 470 is to II, 173-5.
referred to: 238, 293n, 470
note: i.e., the essay printed at 165-201 above.
referred to: 494
Milton, John.Paradise Lost.
note: as the reference is general, no edition is cited.
referred to: 42
— Sonnet XI, “A Book was Writ of Late.” In The Poetical Works of John Milton. London: Tonson, 1695.
72.21 “toad or asp”] Thy age, like ours, O Soul of Sir John Cheek, / Hated not Learning worse than Toad or Asp; / When thou taught’st Cambridge, and King Edward Greek. (25, of Poems upon Several Occasions; ll. 12-14)
Mirabeau, Honoré-Gabriel Riquetti, Comte de.Mémoires biographiques, littéraires, et politiques. 8 vols. Paris, 1834-35.
412.21 la culbute générale] Ah! Madame! le colin-maillard, poussé trop loin, finira par la culbute générale! (II, 188)
Mirabeau, Victor Riquetti, Marquis de. Referred to: 412
Mitford, William.The History of Greece. 10 vols. London: Cadell and Davies, 1818-20.
note: this is probably the edition that was formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College. As JSM’s note indicates, this passage was written in 1834, before the appearance of Connop Thirlwall’s History of Greece (8 vols., 1835-47), and George Grote’s History of Greece (12 vols., 1846-56), which JSM admired greatly.
referred to: 45
Molière. Referred to: 343
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Bride et de. Referred to: 109, 290
— De l’esprit des lois, ou du Rapport que les loix doivent avoir avec la constitution de chaque gouvernement, les moeurs, le climat, la religion, le commerce, etc. 2 vols. Geneva: Barrillot, 1748.
referred to: 378
Moses. Referred to: 159
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Murray. Referred to: 82
Nabis. Referred to: 385
Napoleon I (of France). Referred to: 362
Napoleon III (of France). Referred to: 344, 359
Newton, Isaac. Referred to: 266, 273, 288, 441, 459
— Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica. London, 1687.
note: the copy in JSM’s library, Somerville College, is the so-called “Jesuit’s Edition” (Geneva: Barrillot, 1739-42).
referred to: 23
Nisard, Jean Marie Napoléon Désiré.Etudes de moeurs et de critique sur les poètes latins de la décadence. 3 vols. Brussels: Hauman, 1834.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 92
Novalis (Hardenberg, Friedrich von). See Carlyle, Thomas, “Novalis” and On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History.
Oken. Referred to: 289
Owen. Referred to: 252
Paley, William. Referred to: 7, 21, 27, 37, 48n, 65, 69, 169-70, 172, 173
note: the reference at 172 is in a quotation from Whewell.
— Natural Theology: or, the evidences of the existence and attributes of the Deity, collected from the appearances of nature. London: Faulder, 1802.
referred to: 426, 447
— The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. London: Tegg, 1824.
note: at 68 and 70 (which is repeated from 68), JSM is following Sedgwick’s quotations from Paley, which differ from the text here cited in italicizing “the precise quantityof virtue” (68.40) and substituting “their” for “the” (68.46). The 15th ed. (2 vols. London: Faulder, 1804) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
quoted: 68, 70 referred to: 45, 50, 52-56, 145
Peel. Referred to: 146, 149
Penny Magazine. Referred to: 39n
Phidias. Referred to: 324
Philo Judaeus. Referred to: 487
Pitt, William (the younger). Referred to: 155
note: the reference is to Coleridge’s “character” of Pitt.
Plato. Referred to: 16, 54, 60, 90, 172, 271, 278, 373, 441
note: the references at 172 are in quotations from Whewell.
— The Dialogues of Plato. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1871.
note: the reference is general, so this standard edition, which is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, is cited.
referred to: 88
— Laws (Leges). Referred to: 437
note: the reference is to Jowett, IV, 460ff. (10.891e ff.).
note: the reference at 460 is to Jowett, I, 441-2, 447-52; the interlocutor referred to is Simmias.
referred to: 437, 460
— Protagoras. Referred to: 205
note: this dialogue, translated with notes by JSM, was published in the Monthly Repository, 8 (Feb.-Mar., 1834), 89-99, 203-11.
— Sophist. Referred to: 320n
— Statesman (Politicus). Referred to: 320n, 391, 425
note: the reference at 320n is to Jowett, III, 505 (290e); those at 391 and 425 are to ibid., 485 (273c).
Pope, Alexander. Referred to: 21
— Essay on Man. In Works. New ed. Ed. Joseph Warton, et al. 9 vols. and Supplemental Vol. London: Priestley, 1822 (Supplemental Vol. London: Hearne, 1825), III.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
quoted: 384, 388-9
384.34 “whatever is, is right.”] And, spite of Pride, in erring Reason’s spite, / One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right. (III, 47; Epistle I, 11. 293-4)
384.37 “Shall gravitation cease when you go by?”] When the loose mountain trembles from on high, / Shall gravitation cease, if you go by? (III, 134; Epistle IV, 11. 127-8)
388.41-389.1 “vindicate the ways of God to man”] Together let us beat this ample field, / Try what the open, what the covert yield; / the latent tracts, the giddy heights, explore / Of all who blindly creep, or sightless soar; / Eye Nature’s walks, shoot folly as it flies, / And catch the manners living as they rise; / Laugh where we must, be candid where we can; / But vindicate the ways of God to Man. (III, 11; Epistle I, 11. 9-16)
— Satires and Epistles of Horace Imitated. In Works. New ed. Ed. Joseph Warton, et al. 9 vols. and Supplemental Vol. London: Priestley, 1822 (Supplemental Vol. London: Hearne, 1825), IV.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College, where the quoted passage is marked marginally, though the marking is not characteristic of him.
82.31 “above all Greek, above all Roman fame,”] To thee, the World its present homage pays, / The Harvest early, but mature the praise: / Great Friend of Liberty; in Kings a Name / Above all Greek, above all Roman Fame: / Whose Word is Truth, as sacred and rever’d, / As Heav’n’s own Oracles from altars heard. (IV, 149; Epistles, Bk. II, Epistle I, 11. 23-8)
Pratt. Referred to: 82
Price. Referred to: 21, 85
note: the reference at 85 derives from Bentham’s identification of the moralist intended in his third category.
Priestley. Referred to: 21, 122, 130
Protagoras. Referred to: 205
Pseudo-Athanasius. Referred to: 161
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Ptolemy. Referred to: 122
Quarterly Review. Referred to: 45
Reid, Thomas. Referred to: 6, 86, 125, 129-30
— Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Edinburgh: J. Bell, 1788.
referred to: 266
Rembrandt. Referred to: 136n
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Robespierre. Referred to: 123
Robinet, Jean François Eugène.Notice sur l’oeuvre et sur la vie d’Auguste Comte. Paris: Dunod, 1860.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 328n, 329, 346
Roden. See Jocelyn.
Rousseau. Referred to: 110, 123, 299, 304, 376, 395
Royer-Collard. Referred to: 263
Rubens. Referred to: 136
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Russell. Referred to: 153
“Rusticus.” See Maurice.
Rutherford. Referred to: 21
St. Francis. Referred to: 324
St. George. Referred to: 103
St. Paul. Referred to: 144, 159, 275, 324, 424, 487
note: the reference at 159 is in a quotation from Coleridge.
St. Stephen. Referred to: 385
St. Vincent de Paul. Referred to: 324
Scarlett. Referred to: 61
Schelling. Referred to: 171
Scott. Referred to: 146
Sedgwick, Adam.A Discourse on the Studies of the University. 3rd ed. London: Parker, 1834.
note: the quotation at 37n is from the 4th ed. (Cambridge: Deighton and Parker, 1835).
reviewed: 33-74 quoted: 36-8, 39-45, 48-50, 51-2, 57-9, 60-1, 62-72 referred to: 494
36.25 “not . . . ears”] What I am now saying though I hope not . . . ears, is chiefly addressed to the younger members of our household. (8)
36.29 “He] [paragraph] He (vii)
37.17 world: in] world. In (10)
37.18 taste. Thirdly, the] taste. [paragraph] 3rdly. The (10)
37.19 beings: under] beings. Under (10)
39.26-30 “power of concentration;” . . . “the study . . . pride,” . . . “the narrow . . . faculties;”] Now these severe studies are on the whole favourable to self control: for, without fastening on the mind through the passions and the senses, they give it not merely a power of concentration, but save it from the languor and misery arising from vacuity of thought—the origin of perhaps half the vices of our nature. [paragraph] Again, the study . . . pride: for, in disentangling the phenomena of the material world, we encounter things which hourly tell us of the feebleness of our powers, and material combinations so infinitely beyond the reach of any intellectual analysis as to convince us at once of the narrow . . . faculties. (12)
40.12 I] [no paragraph] It is no part of my object either to praise or blame the system of early education in this country: but, before I pass on, I (33)
41.10-11 “our . . . education”] [paragraph] Assuming then that our . . . education; there still remains a question whether they are wisely followed up in the system of our University. (36)
41.12 “the] [paragraph] In following up the manly studies of this place, we ought to read the classic page, not merely to kindle delightful emotions—to gratify the imagination and the taste—but also to instruct the understanding; and to this end the (39)
41.18 It is notorious] [no paragraph] It is indeed notorious (39)
41.21 greater] greatest (39)
41.32 imitations.—] imitations— (37) [printer’s error in Sedgwick]
44.14 nature”] nature: and well it is for that country which learns wisdom by the experiments of other nations. (42)
45.11-13 “we can trace . . . life.] we can not only trace . . . life; but all the successive actions we contemplate are at such a distance from us, that we can see their true bearings on each other undistorted by that mist of prejudice with which every modern political question is surrounded. (42) [see next entry]
45.15-18 “all . . . surrounded.”] [see previous entry] (42)
47.n30-1 “distinction . . . capacities”] [paragraph] The distinction . . . capacities is almost overlooked in the work of Locke*. [6-sentence footnote] (48)
48.8 “greatest fault,” . . . “is] Its greatest fault is (57)
48.13 “the imaginative powers”] [see entry for 49.27-8 below; the phrase, which JSM says Sedgwick spends several pages “in celebrating,” occurs on 49, not as JSM suggests, after 57, and the “celebration” comes on 49-52]
48.13-15 “discards these . . . system” . . . “shutting his . . . soul”] For a metaphysician to discard these . . . system, is to shut his . . . soul, and is as unaccountable as it would be for a physiologist to overlook the very integuments of our animal frame. (49)
49.26 “deprives . . . imagination;”] [see entry for 48.8 above] (57)
49.27 “discards . . . system;”] [see entry for 48.13-15 above] (49)
49.27-8 “speaks of those powers only to condemn them;”] Of the imaginative powers he hardly says one word, or speaks of them only to condemn them. (49)
49.28-9 “denounces the . . . reason.”] [paragraph] In denouncing the . . . reason, Locke would have done well had he been considering mere demonstrative truth; but I find no such limitation to his censures. (50)
49.40-50.2 “regarding men . . . to the powers of imagination in . . . cheats”] Shall we, then, not merely overlook the [sic] powers of imagination; but, with Locke, regard men . . . to them in . . . cheats? (50)
50.10-11 “In] They [men] act in common cases through habit or affection; and in (51)
50.23 “the . . . judgment,”] [paragraph] Another great fault in the Essay of Locke (involved I think in his very system, which looking only to the functions of the soul forgets its innate capacities), is its omission of the . . . judgment. (52)
51.32-3 “denying . . . feelings”] [paragraph] To deny all natural religion is not more strange than to commence a system of moral philosophy by denying . . . feelings. (32)
58.11 “No] Some of his faculties may be powerless because untried—may have withered for want of nourishment; others by good training may have reached their full maturity: but no (54-5)
59.8 “carrying on [35,59 making] arithmetical computations.”] Virtue becomes [in the utilitarian system] a question of calculation—a matter of profit or loss; and if man gain heaven at all on such a system, it must be by arithmetical details—the computation of his daily work—the balance of his moral ledger. (67) [quoted on 92]
62.1-2 “powerless because untried.”] [see entry for 58.11 above] (54-5)
63.6-17 “Independently of . . . seems compatible] [no paragraph] Independently however of . . . seems to be compatible (63-4)
64.12-19 “However . . . yet in] [whole passage in italics] That however . . . yet that in (130) [in Butler, as cf. JSM, the passage reads:] For, as much as it has been disputed wherein Virtue consists, or whatever . . . there is in reality an . . . made Profession (“Of the Nature of Virtue,” in The Analogy of Religion, 310)
65.32 “foresight of consequences”] [see passage quoted on 63; JSM uses this phrase himself on 63]
67.17 “If] [no paragraph] If (63)
67.21 to its] to his (63) [see 67z-z]
67.28 life. It] life. [paragraph] It (63)
68.33 principle] principles (67) [cf. 70.22, where JSM quotes accurately]
71.13 “If] [no paragraph] If (176)
72.1-2 “suppressing all . . . virtue.”] Our will is swayed by passion and affection: and if we suppress all . . . virtue; do we thereby root up the bad passions that hurry us into crime? (77)
72.23-4 “the end” . . . “will . . . means”] [paragraph] If we accept a system of philosophy which looks on actions only as the means to obtain a worldly end, have we not cause to fear that the end will . . . means; and that sensual sin, in its most hideous form, will be endured, or perhaps impudently recommended, as a counterpoise to the evils that are wound about our nature, and enter into the very elements of a condition of probation? (78)
— Four Letters to the Editors of the Leeds Mercury in Reply to R. M. Beverley. Cambridge: not published, printed at the Pitt Press, 1836.
note: Sedgwick’s letters appeared on 7 Jan., c. end of Jan., 15 May, early in June, 1834. He says in the Preface that he had them reprinted in the Lent Term of 1835; whether JSM saw them in the Leeds Mercury or in the reprint we do not know. Robert Mackenzie Beverley’s part in the controversy may be seen in three pamphlets: A Letter to His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, Chancellor,on the Present Corrupt State of the University of Cambridge (London: Dinnis, 1833); Reply to Professor Sedgwick’s Letter, in the “Leeds Mercury,” Concerning the Present Corrupt State of the University of Cambridge (London: Dinnis, 1834); Reply of R. M. Beverley, Esq. to the Last Two Letters of Professor Sedgwick (Beverley: Johnson, 1834).
referred to: 36n
Seneca. Referred to: 136n
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Sethôs. Referred to: 320n
Shaftesbury. See Anthony Ashley Cooper.
note: the comparative passage is taken from the Variorum Edition of Horace H. Furness.
7.35 “germane to the matter;”] The phrase would be more germane to the matter if we could carry cannon by our sides; I would it might be hangers till then. (V, ii, 152-4)
note: the comparative passage is taken from the Variorium Edition of Horace H. Furness.
139.34 “a . . . nothing,”] It is a . . . nothing. (V, v, 30)
Smith, Adam. Referred to: 21, 26, 150, 290, 305
— Essays on Philosophical Subjects. London: Cadell and Davies, 1795.
note: the quotation is indirect, and based on Comte’s reference.
288.15-16 we are not told in any age or country of a god of Weight] Fire burns, and water refreshes; heavy bodies descend, and lighter substances fly upwards, by the necessity of their own nature; nor was the invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be employed in those matters. (25; “History of Astronomy,” § 3)
Socrates. Referred to: 16, 90, 205, 212, 276, 422, 441-2
Sophocles. Referred to: 42
Spagnoletti. Referred to: 136n
note: the reference is in a quotation from Coleridge.
Spencer, Herbert. Referred to: 298, 301
— Autobiography. 2 vols. London: Williams and Norgate, 1904.
note: the reference, of course, is not to these volumes, but to the letter (24/2/63) from Spencer to JSM that is printed therein. For JSM’s reply (25/2/63) and further correspondence, see David Duncan, The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer (London: Methuen, 1908), 108-9.
referred to: 258n
— The Classification of the Sciences: to which are added reasons for dissenting from the philosophy of M. Comte. London: Williams and Norgate, 1864.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The passage at 280n is mainly summary; in that quoted at 316, Spencer is quoting from his own Social Statics, Chap. xxx.
quoted: 280n-281n, 287n, 316 referred to: 265, 284
281.n4 “involved”] In other words, a general truth colligates a number of particular truths; while an abstract truth colligates no particular truths, but formulates a truth which certain phenomena all involve, though it is actually seen in none of them. (9)
287.n28 “M. Comte’s adherent, Mr. Buckle.”] But I am here dealing with what is known as “the Positive Philosophy;” and that the passage [from Comte] above quoted does not misrepresent it, is proved both by the fact that this doctrine is re-asserted at the commencement of the Sociology, and by the fact that M. Comte’s adherent, Mr. Buckle, re-asserts it in full. (37n)
316.22 self-interest] self-interests (37)
316.30 of society] of the society (38)
— “The Genesis of Science,” Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative. [1st Series.] London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1858, 158-227.
note: formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The article first appeared in the British Quarterly Review, XX (July, 1854), 108-62, as a review, inter alia, of Comte’s Cours.
quoted: 287n referred to: 284-5, 285n, 286n
287.n11 qualitative. . . . All . . . deductively; induction] qualitative: when inaccurately quantitative it usually consists of part induction, part deduction: and it becomes accurately quantitative only when wholly deductive. We do not mean that the deductive and the quantitative are coextensive; for there is manifestly much deduction that is qualitative only. We mean that all quantitative . . . deductively; and that induction (163-4)
Spencer.Social Statics: or, the Conditions essential to Human Happiness specified, and the First of them developed. London: Chapman, 1851.
referred to: 257n-258n
Spinoza. Referred to: 171, 336
note: the reference at 336 is in an indirect quotation from Novalis.
Spooner. Referred to: 149
Stahl. Referred to: 289
Statius, Publius Papinus.Thebais.
note: the quotation is from III, 661; as there is no edition in JSM’s library, Somerville College, none is cited.
Statutes. See 564
Steuart, James.An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Œconomy: being an essay on the science of domestic policy in free nations. 2 vols. London: Millar and Cadell, 1767.
note: JSM undoubtedly took this indirect quotation from Coleridge, who also falsely attributes it to Bacon. For the collation, see Coleridge, First Lay Sermon.
Stewart. Referred to: 6, 21, 129-30
Strongbow. See Clare.
Swedenborg. Referred to: 127
Swift. Referred to: 103
Taine, Hippolyte.Le positivisme anglais, étude sur Stuart Mill. Paris: Baillière, 1864.
note: formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 264
Taylor, Helen. “Introductory Notice” to John Stuart Mill, Three Essays on Religion. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1874.
note: included in full in text above, 371-2.
Thales (of Miletus). Referred to: 323
Thomas à Kempis.De Imitatione Christi.
note: as there is no edition in JSM’s library, Somerville College, none is cited. JSM probably took the quotation from Comte, who cites it, for example, to close his Système (IV, 556).
335.23 Amem . . . te.] Amem . . . te, / et omnes in te qui vere amant te / sicut jubet lex amoris lucens ex te. (Lib. III, Cap. v)
Tooke. Referred to: 245k
Turgot. Referred to: 290
Tycho. Referred to: 122
Ulpian (Domitius Ulpianus). In Justinian, Corpus Juris Civilis Romani, Digesta.
note: the passage given below is the original of the phrase commonly cited.
253.3 Volenti non fit injuria;] Quia nulla injuria est, quae in volentem fiat. (Lib. XLVII, Tit. x, 1, §5)
Volney. Referred to: 500 (App. C)
Voltaire, François Marie Arouet. Referred to: 80, 138, 323n, 359, 500 (App. C)
— Candide, ou l’optimisme. In Œuvres complètes. 66 vols. Paris: Renouard, 1817-25, XXXIX, 203-322.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 26, 390n
— La Princesse de Babilone. In Œuvres complètes. 66 vols. Paris: Renouard, 1817-25, XXXIX, 203-322.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The relevant passage is translated by James Mill in his Commonplace Book in the British Library of Political and Economic Science (Mill-Taylor Collection, Vol. 59, item 94).
100.37 “conservators of ancient barbarous usages.”] [translated from:] [paragraph] D’autres occupés, en plus petit nombre, étaient les conservateurs d’anciens usages barbares contre lesquels la nature effrayée réclamait à haute voix; ils ne consultaient que leurs régistres rongés des vers. (157-8; §10)
Von Hardenberg, Friedrich Leopold (“Novalis”).
note: as JSM undoubtedly got his references from Carlyle, the entries are collated under Carlyle, “Novalis” (for 214 and 336), and under Carlyle, Heroes (for 407-8). The quotations at 214 and 336 are indirect.
quoted: 214, 336, 407-8
Washington. Referred to: 422
Whewell, William. Referred to: 166-201 passim, 292, 494
— Elements of Morality, including Polity. 2 vols. London: Parker, 1845.
note: Whewell’s paragraph numbers, which JSM omits, are not indicated in the collations. The quotation at 200.8-9 is indirect.
reviewed: 167-201 quoted: 184n, 190n, 192-3, 200
184.n5 “our . . . aim;”] We may make other objects our ultimate objects; but we can do so, only by identifying them with this. Happiness is our . . . aim. (I, 359)
184.n20 “the belief in God’s government of the world,”] This conviction [that man’s duty is his happiness], men for the most part derive from Religion; that is, from their belief respecting God, and his government of Man. (II, 3)
190.n3 “the] The (I, 225)
190.n4 whom] which (I, 225)
190.n4 mankind] man (I, 225)
192.25-6 “for . . . man,” . . . “conceive . . . rules.”] Rules of action are necessary, therefore, for . . . man. We cannot conceive . . . Rules, and making part of an Order in which Rules prevail. (I, 33)
192.39-193.1 “are . . . agreement;” . . . “tend . . . unanimous; and that such rules . . . the character] General Rules being established, the Desires are . . . agreement. [4-sentence omission] They [the Reflex Sentiments, which result from settled Moral Rules] tend . . . unanimous. [paragraph] [1-sentence omission] Such Rules . . . the general character (I, 35)
193.7 “desire . . . men;”] With the development of this conception [of Benevolence], he [man] is led to a love of man as man, and a desire . . . men;—an affection in which all mankind are ready to sympathize, and which binds together man as man. (I, 138)
193.8-9 “absence . . . them.”] The absence . . . them, may be expressed by the term Benevolence, understood in its largest and fullest sense, as including all the ties of Love which bind men together. (I, 137-8)
193.9 “the] Liberality partakes of Benevolence; but Fairness may be conceived as the (I, 138)
193.10-11 “an . . . thought,”] These qualities, conceived in their most complete form, as extending from the Acts to the Words, and from the Words to the Intentions, may be termed Integrity, as implying an entire consistence of external and internal acts; or may be termed Truth, as implying an . . . thought: and the Idea of Truth, in this full and comprehensive sense, is a part of the Central Idea, or Idea of Morality. (I, 139)
193.12 “lying] Lying (I, 138)
193.14-15 “the . . . reason.”] The . . . Reason is recommended to us by Morality, under the Conceptions of Temperance and Chastity. (I, 139) [This control is called “Purity” on the next page.]
194.13-14 law: what] Law. What (I, 164)
200.6 slavery.”] Slavery; for the Moralist cannot authorize the citizen to choose what Laws he will obey, and what he will not. (I, 351)
200.8 nation.”] nation; but the National Law must be framed according to the National view of Morality. (I, 58)
200.8-9 spirit of the law, but the letter] In cases where the Law is equitable, it is our Duty to conform to the Spirit as well as to the Letter of the Law. (I, 213)
200.14-15 managed by the parents; in such] managed altogether by the parents. In such (I, 211)
200.16-18 “Reverence . . . citizen.”] [section] This view of the Constitution of each Country, as a Compact among the citizens, by no means tends to diminish the reverence and affection towards it, which we have stated to be one of the Duties of a citizen. (II, 204)
200.22-4 “men . . . promulgation.”] [section] In stating that men . . . promulgation; we follow the judgment of mankind, as formed in other similar cases. (II, 93)
200.28-9 “the . . . truth”] [section] In reply we say, that, in other subjects than Religion, men do not proceed on the supposition that persons holding two opposite Opinions have each an equal Right to assume his Doctrine to be the true one: that on the contrary, we go upon the supposition that there is Truth and Falsehood, as well as mere Opinion; and we condemn the . . . opinions, when . . . Truth. (II, 102)
200.30 “his duty to think rationally,”] As we have said, it is his duty to act and to think rationally; and what is rational thought, he can know only, by carefully unfolding his Reason. (II, 105)
200.31-2 “done . . . truth, since a . . . truth.”] Hence, if any one were to argue that the opinions to which he had been led must be blameless, since he had done . . . Truth; we should reply, that a . . . Truth; that every man should go on to the end of his life, constantly endeavouring to obtain a clearer and clearer view of the Truths, on which his Duty depends; and that his renouncing this task, and making up his mind that he has done all which he needs to do, is itself a Transgression of Duty, which prevents his Errour and Ignorance from being blameless. (II, 106)
— The History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Time. 3rd ed. 3 vols. London: Parker, 1857.
note: this edition (which postdates JSM’s reference) formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 167
— Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England. London: Parker, 1852.
note: the first quotation on 185-6 is Whewell’s quotation from Bentham.
reviewed: 167-201 quoted: 171-6, 178, 180-2, 183-4, 185-91, 195-9
172.10-11 action . . . actions] actions . . . action (x) [Printer’s error in “Whewell”?]
173.31 “discoverer . . . principle,”] This being the case [that Bentham himself referred to earlier works in which utilitarian “expressions and thoughts” appear], it is extraordinary that he should so constantly have talked of himself, and have been talked of by his admirers, as the discoverer . . . principle; the more so, as it was soon after, by Paley, put forth in a systematic manner, and unfolded into a treatise on Morality. (190)
174.15 “He showed] He adopted very early the views and doctrines which he employed his life in inculcating; and he also showed (189)
174.24 “Bentham] But Bentham (190)
175.1-5 “superfluous . . . blind,” . . . “such] [paragraph] It may seem superfluous . . . blind: but without at all wishing to deny great merit to some of Bentham’s labours, (as I shall soon have to show), I am obliged to say that such (200)
174.26 The] [no paragraph] The (202)
176.2 represented? . . . But] [ellipsis indicates 3-sentence omission] (203)
176.7-8 may be, &c.] may be. (203)
178.26 “Who] For who (205)
180.13 determine] determines (210)
180.40 “if] If (210)
180.43 Take] [no paragraph] Take (211)
181.9 value. But] value; but (211)
181.16 gratification. Who] gratification. The pleasure is evident and certain; the effect on other men’s habits obscure and uncertain. Who (211)
181.27 vices. And] vices; and (212)
181.29 impossible.] impossible.* [5-sentence footnote] (212)
182.5 How] [no paragraph] For on that principle [of utility], how (212)
183.18 Why] [no paragraph] Why (215)
184.3-4 “the . . . neighbours,”] That self-approval, and the . . . neighbours, are pleasures, cannot be denied. (216)
184.4 “fluctuating” . . . “public opinion,”] [“fluctuating” does not appear in this context, though “Public Opinion” appears several times on 217; JSM is presumably paraphrasing]
184.5-6 “loose and wide abstraction as education,” the “basis of morality.”] And thus these two wise and loose abstractions, Education and Public Opinion, become the real sources of Morality. (217)
185.36 as . . . human] [in italics] (224)
185.37 of sensibility?] [in italics] (224)
185.39 ought] ought (224)
185.40 given. The] given. . . . The (224) [ellipsis in Whewell indicates 9-sentence omission]
185.40 may] may (224)
185.42 tyranny. It] tyranny. . . . It (224) [ellipsis in Whewell indicates 1-sentence omission; see collation of passage under Bentham, Introduction, 185.42]
186.6-7 reason? . . . speak? . . . suffer?] [in italics] (224)
186.12 The] [no paragraph] The (223)
186.14 human] human (223)
186.19 We] [follows directly from previous quotation, without a paragraph break] We (223)
186.19 because we are] because we (223)
186.20 pleasures. . . . The] pleasures. The (223) [nothing here omitted]
186.21 pleasure] pleasures (223) [altered in 67 from earlier correct form, presumably because of next variant]
186.22 that] those (223) [see previous entry]
186.22 pleasures] pleasure (223)
186.23 them] them (223)
186.23 men. . . . . It] [ellipsis indicates 1½-page omission, including passage from Bentham quoted at 185.34-186.7 above] (223-5)
186.23 an obvious] our obvious (225) [printer’s error in Whewell?]
186.26 hogs.] hogs, not to say lice and fleas. (225)
187.16 “The moral rule of human action,” . . . “we must do what is right.”] [paragraph] And this supreme rule, that we must do what is right, is also the moral rule of human action. (xi) [quoted correctly at the end of the next quotation]
187.32 loss. But] loss: but (xi)
187.33 meaning. And] meaning. [paragraph] And (xi)
188.2 scheme.”] scheme; but whatever we so determine, we are involved in a moral system, as soon as we begin to use such words as right and ought. (xi)
188.4 “the] How is the (xii)
188.5-6 Rightness,” . . . “to . . . may be right.”] Rightness, brought into contact with these Impulses, these Springs of Human Action, as we may call them? [JSM skips two paragraphs, and draws from the following sentence] But the Desires which regard these great primary objects, Personal Safety, Possessions, Family, Civil Society,—how are they to . . . may conform to the condition which we have assigned; to the Supreme Rule of Human Action; in short, that they may be right? (xii-xiii)
188.8 “condition . . . requisite.”] How the Desires and Affections are to be regulated, so that they may be right in the highest sense, is an inquiry which requires a long train of careful thought: but is there no condition . . . requisite, as a general rule, in order that those Desires and Affections may be right? (xiii)
188.9-10 “other men” . . . “they] In order that the Desires and Affections with regard to the Personal Safety, Possessions, Family, Civil Condition of other men may be right, they (xiii)
188.18 “commonly] [paragraph] But these [four] large classes of Rights thus corresponding to the leading Desires and Affections of men, do not quite exhaust the kinds of Rights commonly (xiv) [in the next two paragraphs Whewell adds the fifth, Rights of Contract]
188.19 “those] And we have in like manner [to the five acting principles], five classes of Rights;—those (xv)
188.22 “in] [paragraph] In (xv)
188.22 manner do] manner, it may be asked, do (xv)
188.23 rightness?” . . . “we] Rightness? I reply, that we (xv)
188.39 “Our] [in answer to the supposed objection that “our Morality”, being derived from existing law, must necessarily be controlled by it, Whewell says:] [paragraph] To this we reply, our (xvii)
189.3 those subjects] these subjects (xvii)
189.30 “that] (V.) [i.e., objection 5] The same answer might be made if it were urged that (xviii)
189.36-7 because . . . not.] [not in italics] (xix)
190.n6 “If we] I will only observe, in order to obviate any mistakes which the statement of these opinions without any corrective might occasion, that if we (58)
190.24 condition] conditions (xx)
195.25 “that] He [Bentham] imagined that, (254)
195.34 “There] [no paragraph] There (254)
196.34-5 “at . . . system,”] He [Bentham] would not place the national historical element at the . . . system, where, however, it must be. (255)
196.40 “the . . . law”] Having thus noticed one great defect and error in Bentham’s system, his depreciation of historical law, I must now notice another point in which I think him also altogether defective and erroneous; namely in not fully recognizing the . . . Law. (257)
197.2-3 “is . . . lesson.”] Punishment is . . . Lesson (Morality, Art. 988). (257)
197.17-19 “Bentham’s . . . legislation,” . . . “what . . . marriage, and especially in] [paragraph] As an example of the results of Bentham’s . . . legislation, let us look at what . . . Marriage. [paragraph] On this subject he argues strongly in (258)
197.24-5 “takes . . . themselves,”] And as decisively condemnatory of this policy [of making marriages indissoluble] he says “The government which interdicts them [divorces] takes . . . themselves.” (Civil Code, Pt. III, c.v.) (258)
197.26 “government] Now upon this we may remark, that undoubtedly, in this and in many other cases, government (258)
197.28 and . . . them] [not in italics] (258)
198.11 it? . . . Such] it? As I understand him, he would not. Indeed such (259)
198.13 living] being (259) [printer’s error?]
198.21 “Marriage] [no paragraph] Marriage (259)
198.23 arrangement. So] arrangement. [paragraph] So (259)
198.26 universal? . . . No.] universal?—[ellipsis indicates 1-page omission] No. (259-60)
198.29 these arguments] these two arguments (260)
198.29 consistency.] consistency: no indication how marriages are to be perpetual, and yet dissoluble at will: no provision for the case in which the fickleness may come on while the children still need the cares of both parents (259-60)
199.5 “Bentham’s decision is, that liberty] Mr Bentham’s decision on this point is, that in such a case, liberty (261)
199.6 other. . . . Now] other. If a husband wish for a divorce from a wife whom he hates, and ill use her so that she gives her consent to the divorce, she may marry again, but he may not. Now (261)
199.17 “No] But we say that no (262)
— The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. 2 vols. London: Parker, 1840.
referred to: 167, 169
Whitgift. Referred to: 155
Wilberforce. Referred to: 188
Wollaston. Referred to: 21, 85
note: the reference at 85 derives from Bentham’s identification (“Woolaston”) of the moralist intended in his eighth category.
Wordsworth, William. Referred to: 92
— “The Excursion,” in The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth. 1st collected ed., in 5 vols. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1827, V.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
127.36 “the . . . divine,”] Oh! many are the Poets that are sown / By Nature; Men endowed with highest gifts, / The . . . divine, / Yet wanting the accomplishment of Verse / (Which, in the docile season of their youth, / It was denied them to acquire, through lack / Of culture and the inspiring aid of books, / Or haply by a temper too severe, / Or a nice backwardness afraid of shame); / Nor having e’er, as life advanced, been led / By circumstance to take unto the height / The measure of themselves, these favour’d Beings, / All but a scattered few, live out their time, / Husbanding that which they possess within, / And go to the grave, unthought of. (6-7; Bk. I, 11. 76-90)
Xenophon. Referred to: 41
9 George IV, c. 60. An Act to amend the Laws relating to the Importation of Corn (15 July, 1828).
note: repealed by 5 & 6 Victoria, Sess. 2, c. 14 (1842), which was in turn repealed by 9 & 10 Victoria, c. 22 (1846); JSM undoubtedly deleted the passage on 152 because of the latter, the famous repealing Act.
referred to: 152
2 William IV, c. 45. An Act to amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales (7 June, 1832).
referred to: 78, 153
3 & 4 William IV, c. 74. An Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries and for the Substitution of more simple Modes of Assurance (28 August, 1833).
referred to: 102
4 & 5 William IV, c. 76. An Act for the Amendment and better Administration of the Laws relating to the Poor in England and Wales (14 August, 1834).
referred to: 153
1 & 2 Victoria, c. 109. An Act to abolish Compositions for Tithes in Ireland, and to substitute Rent-charges in lieu thereof (15 August, 1838).
referred to: 78, 149
2 & 3 Victoria, c. 52. An Act for the further Regulation of the Duties on Postage until the Fifth Day of October 1840 (17 August, 1839).
referred to: 153
[[*] ]See pp. 31-74 above.
[[†] ]See pp. 75-115 and 117-63 above.
[[‡] ]See pp. 165-201 above.
[* ]We mean the old technical terms and distinctions; for the substantive provisions of that or any other system of law, must of course consist, in the far greater proportion, of things useful or unobjectionable.
[* ]See Appendix B. [I.e., the essays printed at 3-18 above.]
[a]40, 59, 67 [no paragraph]
[b-b]40, MS, 43, 46, 59, 67 the decree of God
[c-c]40, MS, 59, 67 man [printer’s error in 43? See d-d below.]
[d-d]40, MS, 43, 46, 59, 67 him
[e-e]40, MS, 43, 46 its
[f-f]+51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72
[g]40, MS, 43, 46 with all its influences
[h-h]40, MS, 43, 46 moved
[i]40, MS, 59, 67 the] 43, 46, 51, 56 those
[j-j]40, MS, 43, 46 This system of discipline wrought, in the Grecian states, by the conjunct influence of religion, poetry, and law; among the Romans, by those of religion and law; in modern and Christian countries, mainly by religion, with little of the direct agency, but generally more or less of the indirect support and countenance, of law.
[k-k]40, MS, 43, 46 this
[l]40, MS, 43, 46, 51, 56, 59, 67 indeed
[m-m]40 attach itself to laws, to ancient liberties, or ordinances; to the whole or some part of the political, or even of the domestic, institutions of the state.] MS, 43, 46 as 40 . . . even the . . . as 40] 59, 67 as 40 . . . ordinances. Or . . . as 72
[n-n]40, MS, 43, 46, 59, 67 men
[o-o]56, 62, 65 agree [printer’s error?]
[p-p]40, MS, 43, 46 it might or might not be
[q-q]40, MS, 43 above] 46 above
[r-r]40, MS, 43, 46, 59, 67 society
[s-s]40, MS, 43, 46 ties which hold it together
[t-t]40, MS, 43, 46, 59 fall
[u-u]40, MS, 43, 46 does
[v-v]40, MS, 43, 46, 51, 59, 67 principles
[w-w]40, MS, 43, 46 happens
[x-x]40, MS, 43, 46 have
[y-y]40, MS, 43, 46 have
[z-z]40, MS, 43, 46 an
[a-a]+51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72
[b-b]40, MS, 43, 46 , which has existed in all durable political societies
[c-c]40, MS, 43, 46 nationality
[d-d]+51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72
[e]51, 56, 59, 67 an
[f-f]+51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72
[g]40, MS, 43, 46 or
[h-h]40, MS, 43, 46 absurd
[i]40, MS, 43, 46 In all these senses, the nations which have the strongest national spirit have had the least nationality.
[j-j]40, MS, 43, 46 shall
[k-k]40, MS, 43, 46 shall cherish the tie which holds them together; shall
[l-l]40, MS, 43, 46 that they cannot selfishly
[m-m]40, MS, 43, 46 the
[n-n]+51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 67, 68, 72
[o]40, 59, 67 [footnote; see 135n-136n above]
[* ] (Written and first published in 1840.)
[p-p]40, MS woes