The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• The Writings of George Washington.
• 1777.
• To Major-general Putnam.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Governor Trumbull.
• To Governor Henry.
• To the Council of Safety of New York.
• To John Augustine Washington.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Major-general Putnam.
• To Lieutenants Bird, Dorsey, Craig, Moore, and Gray. 1
• To Governor Clinton.
• To Benjamin Franklin, In Paris.
• To Benjamin Harrison, In Congress.
• To Brigadier-general Wayne.
• To Major-general Gates.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress. 2
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Major-general Sullivan.
• To General Cadwalader.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Governor Livingston.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Major-general Heath.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress. 1
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Lieutenant-colonel Alexander Hamilton.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Major-general Putnam.
• To Major-general Gates.
• To Lord Stirling.
• To John Parke Custis.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Sir William Howe. 1
• To the President of Congress.
• To Colonel Christopher Greene. Instructions.
• To Governor Livingston.
• To Brigadier-general Potter. 1
• To Lieutenant-colonel Samuel Smith.
• To Governor George Clinton.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Thomas Wharton, President of Pennsylvania.
• To Richard Henry Lee.
• To Baron D’arendt. Instructions.
• To John Augustine Washington.
• To Major-general Putnam.
• To John Hancock. 1
• To Major-general Sullivan.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Brigadier-general Forman.
• Circular to Pulaski and Colonels of Horse.
• To Major-general Putnam.
• Call For a Council of Officers.
• To Francis Hopkinson and John Wharton, of the Navy Board. 1
• To Landon Carter.
• To Lieutenant-colonel Alexander Hamilton.
• To Major-general Gates.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Brigadier-general Varnum.
• To Governor Livingston.
• To Sir William Howe.
• To Jeremiah Powell, President of the Council of Massachusetts.
• To General Thomas Nelson.
• To Col. Theodorick Bland.
• To Brigadier-general Conway.
• To Henry Laurens, President of Congress. 2
• To the President of Congress.
• To Brigadier-general Varnum.
• To Major-general Heath.
• To Governor Henry.
• To Sir William Howe.
• To John Parke Custis.
• To Alexander Hamilton.
• To Brigadier-general Conway.
• To Major-general St. Clair, Major-general Baron De Kalb, and Brigadier-general Knox. Instructions.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Richard Henry Lee, In Congress.
• To Major-general Putnam.
• To the Officers and Soldiers of the Militia In the Counties of Hunterdon, Burlington, Gloucester, Salem, and Cumberland.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Major-general Greene.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Major-general Greene.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Major-general Putnam.
• To Joseph Reed.
• To Major-general Gates.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Governor Livingston.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Governor Trumbull.
• To George Read, President of Delaware.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the Executives of the Eastern States.
• To Major-general Conway. 1
• To Governor Livingston.
• 1778.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Major General Gates.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Governor Wharton.
• To Major-general Arnold. 1
• To Sir William Howe.
• To Major-general Heath.
• To Major-general Putnam.
• To Major-general Gates.
• To Major-general Charles Lee.
• To a Committee of Congress. 1
• To Sir William Howe.
• To Henry Laurens.
• To John Parke Custis.
• To Governor Livingston.
• To Peter Colt. 2
• To Thomas Nelson, Jr.
• To Major-general Gates.
• To Brigadier-general Wayne. Instructions.
• To Sir William Howe.
• To Major-general Mcdougall.
• To Major-general Gates.
• To Governor Livingston.
• To Richard Henry Lee.
• To Governor George Clinton.
• An Address to the Inhabitants of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. 1
• To William Duer.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Bryan Fairfax. 2
• To Thomas Wharton, President of Pennsylvania.
• To Colonel George Baylor. Instructions.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Brigadier-general Parsons, At West Point.
• Copy of the Letter Referred to Above.
• To the Marquis De Lafayette.
• To Lieutenant-general Burgoyne.
• To George William Fairfax, In England.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Robert R. Livingston.
• To Philip Schuyler, James Duane, and Volkert P. Douw, Commissioners of Indian Affairs.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Governor Livingston.
• To Major-general Mcdougall.
• To the President of Congress.
• To James Bowdoin, President of the Council of Massachusetts.
• To Brigadier-general John Cadwalader.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Sir William Howe.
• To the President of Congress.
• To John Ternant. 1
• To Major-general Armstrong.
• To Patrick Henry.
• To Patrick Henry.
• To Governor Trumbull.
• To Thomas Mckean. 1
• To Colonel Josias C. Hall.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Colonel Mathias Ogden.
• To the President of Congress.
• To the General Officers In Camp.
• To John Banister, Delegate In Congress.
• To Major-general Mcdougall.
• To Major-general Charles Lee.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Gouverneur Morris, In Congress.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Governor Livingston.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Major-general Heath.
• To the President of Congress.
• To Henry Laurens.

TO JOHN BANISTER, DELEGATE IN CONGRESS.

Valley Forge, 21 April, 1778.

Dear Sir,

On Saturday evening I had the pleasure to receive your favor of the 16th instant.

I thank you very much for your obliging tender of a friendly intercourse between us; and you may rest assured that I embrace it with cheerfulness, and shall write you freely, as often as leisure will permit, of such points as appear to me material and interesting. I am pleased to find, that you expect the proposed establishment of the army will succeed; though is it a painful consideration, that matters of such pressing importance and obvious necessity meet with so much difficulty and delay. Be assured, the success of the measure is a matter of the most serious moment, and that it ought to be brought to a conclusion as speedily as possible. The spirit of resigning commissions has been long at an alarming height, and increases daily. Applications from officers on furlough are hourly arriving and Genls. Heath at Boston—McDougall on the north River and Mason of Virginia are asking what they are to do with the appliants to them.

The Virginia line has sustained a violent shock in this instance. Not less than ninety have already resigned to me. The same conduct has prevailed among the officers from the other States, though not yet to so considerable a degree; and there are but too just grounds to fear, that it will shake the very existence of the army, unless a remedy is soon, very soon, applied. There is none, in my opinion, so effectual as the one pointed out.1 This, I trust, will satisfy the officers, and at the same time it will produce no present additional emission of money. They will not be persuaded to sacrifice all views of present interest, and encounter the numerous vicissitudes of war, in the defence of their country, unless she will be generous enough on her part to make a decent provision for their future support. I do not pronounce absolutely, that we shall have no army if the establishment fails, but the army we may have will be without discipline, without energy, incapable of acting with vigor, and destitute of those cements necessary to promise success on the one hand, or to withstand the shocks of adversity on the other. It is indeed hard to say how extensive the evil may be, if the measure should be rejected, or much longer delayed. I find it a very arduous task to keep the officers in tolerable humor, and to protract such a combination in quitting the service, as might possibly undo us for ever.

The difference between our service and that of the enemy is very striking. With us, from the peculiar, unhappy situation of things, the officer, a few instances excepted, must break in upon his private fortune for present support, without a prospect of future relief. With them, even companies are esteemed so honorable and so valuable, that they have sold of late from fifteen to twenty-two hundred pounds sterling; and I am credibly informed, that four thousand guineas have been given for a troop of dragoons. You will readily determine how this difference will operate; what effects it must produce. Men may speculate as they will; they may talk of patriotism; they may draw a few examples from ancient story, of great achievements performed by its influence; but whoever builds upon them, as a sufficient basis for conducting a long and bloody war, will find themselves deceived in the end. We must take the passions of men as nature has given them, and those principles as a guide, which are generally the rule of action. I do not mean to exclude altogether the idea of patriotism. I know it exists, and I know it has done much in the present contest. But I will venture to assert, that a great and lasting war can never be supported on this principle alone. It must be aided by a prospect of interest, or some reward. For a time it may, of itself, push men to action, to bear much, to encounter difficulties; but it will not endure unassisted by interest.

The necessity of putting the army upon a respectable footing, both as to numbers and constitution, is now become more essential than ever. The enemy are beginning to play a game more dangerous, than their efforts by arms (though these will not be remitted in the smallest degree), and which threatens a fatal blow to the independence of America, and to her liberties of course. They are endeavoring to ensnare the people by specious allurements of peace. It is not improbable they have had such abundant cause to be tired of the war, that they may be sincere in the terms they offer, which, though far short of our pretensions, will be extremely flattering to minds, that do not penetrate far into political consequences; but, whether they are sincere or not, they may be equally destructive; for, to discerning men nothing can be more evident, than that a peace on the principles of dependence, however limited, after what has happened, would be to the last degree dishonorable and ruinous.1 It is however much to be apprehended, that the idea of such an event will have a very powerful effect upon the country, and if not combated with the greatest address will serve, at least, to produce supineness and disunion. Men are naturally fond of peace, and there are symptoms which may authorize an opinion, that the people of America are pretty generally weary of the present war. It is doubtful, whether many of our friends might not incline to an accommodation on the grounds held out, or which may be, rather than persevere in a contest for independence. If this is the case, it must surely be the truest policy to strengthen the army, and place it upon a substantial footing. This will conduce to inspire the country with confidence; enable those at the head of affairs to consult the public honor and interest, notwithstanding the defection of some and temporary inconsistency and irresolution of others, who may desire to compromise the dispute; and, if a treaty should be deemed expedient, will put it in their power to insist upon better terms, than they could otherwise expect.

Besides the most vigorous exertions at home to increase and establish our military force upon a good basis, it appears to me advisable, that we should immediately try the full extent of our interest abroad, and bring our European negotiations to an issue. I think France must have ratified our independence,1 and will declare war immediately, on finding that serious proposals of accommodation are made; but lest, from a mistaken policy or too exalted an opinion of our power from the representations she has had, she should still remain indecisive, it were to be wished, proper persons were instantly despatched, or our envoys already there instructed to insist pointedly on her coming to a final determination.2 It cannot be fairly supposed, that she will hesitate a moment to declare war, if she is given to understand, in a proper manner, that a reunion of the two countries may be the consequence of procrastination. A European war and a European alliance would effectually answer our purposes. If the step I now mention should be eligible, despatches ought to be sent at once by different conveyances, for fear of accidents. I confess, it appears to me a measure of this kind could not but be productive of the most salutary consequences. If possible, I should also suppose it absolutely necessary to obtain good intelligence from England, pointing out the true springs of this manœuvre of ministry; the preparations of force they are making; the prospects there are of raising it; the amount, and when it may be expected.

It really seems to me, from a comprehensive view of things, that a period is fast approaching, big with events of the most interesting importance; when the counsels we pursue, and the part we act, may lead decisively to liberty or to slavery. Under this idea, I cannot but regret that inactivity, that inattention, that want of something, which unhappily I have but too often experienced in our public affairs. I wish that our representation in Congress was complete and full from every State, and that it was formed of the first abilities among us. Whether we continue to war or proceed to negotiate, the wisdom of America in council cannot be too great. Our situation will be truly delicate. To enter into a negotiation too hastily, or to reject it altogether, may be attended with consequences equally fatal. The wishes of the people, seldom founded in deep disquisitions, or resulting from other reasonings than their present feelings, may not entirely accord with our true policy and interest. If they do not, to observe a proper line of conduct for promoting the one, and avoiding offence to the other, will be a work of great difficulty.

Nothing short of independence, it appears to me, can possibly do. A peace on other terms would, if I may be allowed the expression, be a peace of war. The injuries we have received from the British nation were so unprovoked, and have been so great and so many, that they can never be forgotten. Besides the feuds, the jealousies, the animosities, that would ever attend a union with them; besides the importance, the advantages, we should derive from an unrestricted commerce; our fidelity as a people, our gratitude, our character as men, are opposed to a coalition with them as subjects, but in case of the last extremity. Were we easily to accede to terms of dependence, no nation, upon future occasions, let the oppressions of Britain be never so flagrant and unjust, would interpose for our relief; or, at most, they would do it with a cautious reluctance, and upon conditions most probably that would be hard, if not dishonorable to us. France, by her supplies, has saved us from the yoke thus far; and a wise and virtuous perseverance would, and I trust will, free us entirely.

I have sent Congress Lord North’s speech, and the two bills offered by him to Parliament. They are spreading fast through the country, and will soon become a subject of general notoriety. I therefore think they had best be published in our papers, and persons of leisure and ability set to work to counteract the impressions they may make on the minds of the people.

Before I conclude, there are one or two points more, upon which I will add an observation or two. The first is, the indecision of Congress and the delay used in coming to determinations on matters referred to them. This is productive of a variety of inconveniences; and an early decision, in many cases, though it should be against the measure submitted, would be attended with less pernicious effects. Some new plan might then be tried; but, while the matter is held in suspense, nothing can be attempted. The other point is, the jealousy, which Congress unhappily entertain of the army, and which, if reports are right, some members labor to establish. You may be assured, there is nothing more injurious, or more unjustly founded. This jealousy stands upon the commonly received opinion, which under proper limitations is certainly true, that standing armies are dangerous to a State, and from forming the same conclusion of the component parts of all, though they are totally dissimilar in their nature. The prejudices in other countries have only gone to them in time of peace, and these from their not having in general cases any of the ties, the concerns, or interests of citizens, or any other dependence, than what flowed from their military employ; in short, from their being mercenaries, hirelings. It is our policy to be prejudiced against them in time of war; & though they are citizens, having all the ties and interests of citizens, and in most cases property totally unconnected with the military line.

If we would pursue a right system of policy, in my opinion, there should be none of these distinctions. We should all be considered, Congress and army, as one people, embarked in one cause, in one interest; acting on the same principle, and to the same end. The distinction, the jealousies set up, or perhaps only incautiously let out, can answer not a single good purpose. They are impolitic in the extreme. Among individuals the most certain way to make a man your enemy is to tell him you esteem him such. So with public bodies; and the very jealousy, which the narrow politics of some may affect to entertain of the army, in order to a due subordination to the supreme civil authority, is a likely mean to produce a contrary effect; to incline it to the pursuit of those measures, which they may wish it to avoid. It is unjust, because no order of men in the Thirteen States has paid a more sanctimonious regard to their proceedings than the army; and indeed it may be questioned whether there has been that scrupulous adherence had to them by any other, for without arrogance or the smallest deviation from truth it may be said, that no history now extant can furnish an instance of an army’s suffering such uncommon hardships as ours has done, and bearing them with the same patience and fortitude. To see men, without clothes to cover their nakedness, without blankets to lie on, without shoes, by which their marches might be traced by the blood from their feet, and almost as often without provisions as with them, marching through the frost and snow, and at Christmas taking up their winter-quarters within a day’s march of the enemy, without a house or hut to cover them, till they could be built, and submitting to it without a murmur, is a proof of patience and obedience, which in my opinion can scarce be paralleled.

There may have been some remonstrances or applications to Congress, in the style of complaint, from the army, and slaves indeed should we be, if this privilege were denied, on account of their proceedings in particular instances; but these will not authorize nor even excuse a jealousy, that they are therefore aiming at unreasonable powers, or making strides dangerous or subversive of civil authority. Things should not be viewed in that light, more especially as Congress in some cases have relieved the injuries complained of, & which had flowed from their own acts. I refer you to my letter to yourself and Colo. Lee which accompanies this upon the subject of money for such of the old Virginia troops as have or may reinlist.

In respect to the volunteer plan, I scarce know what opinion to give at this time. The propriety of a requisition on this head will depend altogether on our operations. Such kind of troops should not be called for, but upon the spur of the occasion, and at the moment of executing an enterprise. They will not endure a long service; and, of all men in the military line, they are the most impatient of restraint and necessary government.

As the propositions and the speech of Lord North must be founded in the despair of the nation of succeeding against us; or from a rupture in Europe, that has actually happened, or certainly will happen;1 or from some deep political manœuvre; or from what I think still more likely, a composition of the whole, would it not be good policy, in this day of uncertainty and distress to the Tories, to avail ourselves of the occasion, and for the several States to hold out pardon &c. to all delinquents returning by a certain day?1 They are frightened, and this is the time to operate upon them. Upon a short consideration of the matter, it appears to me, that such a measure would detach the Tories from the enemy, and bring things to a much speedier conclusion, and of course be a mean of saving much public treasure.

I will now be done and I trust that you excuse, not only the length of my letter, but the freedom with which I have delivered my sentiments in the course of it upon several occasions. The subjects struck me as important and interesting, and I have only to wish, that they may appear to you in the same light.

I am, dear Sir, with great regard, &c.2

[1 ]That is, an establishment of half-pay for the officers after the termination of the war. A plan for this purpose had been agreed upon by the committee in camp, and was now under debate in Congress. It was thought extremely important by General Washington, as appears by some of his preceding letters, and he used his utmost endeavors to promote it; but there was a division in Congress. Some of the members were wholly opposed to it, particularly a majority of the members from the Eastern States, as encouraging too far the idea of a standing army; others were of opinion, that Congress had no power to act in the matter, without special instructions from the States; and others were for limiting the time. This variety of opinion caused embarrassment in Congress, and delay in adopting the report of the committee for the new arrangements of the army. For other particulars respecting the subject of half-pay, see Sparks’ Life of Gouverneur Morris, vol. i., p. 152.

[1 ]There was at this time in Parliament a small party in favor of granting independence to America, and of instructing the commissioners to make a treaty on that footing. Governor Pownall held out this idea, and enforced it with strong arguments, in the debate on the address to the king, in reply to his message accompanying the declaration of the French ambassador, which gave notice of the treaty between France and the United States. “This treaty,” said Governor Pownall, “does not alter my idea of the probability of our having even yet peace with America, if we will but take the way that leads to it, and the only one that is open. Nothing but the perverseness of our own conduct can cross it. We know that the Americans are and must be independent; and yet we will not treat with them as such. If government itself retains the least idea of sovereignty, it has already gone too far for that; if it entertains the least hope of peace, it has not gone far enough; and every step we shall take to put the Americans back from independency, will convince them the more of the necessity of going forward.”—Parliamentary Debates, March 17th, 1778.—Sparks.

[1 ]This was true, although the fact was not yet known in America. The treaties of commerce and alliance between France and the United States were signed on the 6th of February. The first meeting between the French minister and the American commissioners, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty, was held at Versailles on the 12th of December. It was stated, in an article of the treaty of alliance, to be its direct end, “to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, of the United States, as well in matters of government as commerce.”—See Diplomatic Correspondence, vol. i., pp. 355, 364.

[2 ]It seems there were some fears at this moment as to the effect which might be produced on the American people by the advances of the British ministry in Lord North’s propositions. In a reply to General Washington’s circular letter, asking the advice of the general officers respecting a plan of the campaign, the Marquis de Lafayette stated, as reasons for vigorous measures, the expected reinforcements of the enemy, and the approaching arrival of three commissioners, “whom I fear,” said he, “more than ten thousand men.”—MS. Letter, April 25th.

General Washington himself, in a letter to his brother, written a few days after the above, speaks as follows, alluding to the British commissioners. “It will require,” he observes, “all the skill, wisdom, and policy of the first abilities of these States to manage the helm, and steer with judgment to the haven of our wishes, through so many shelves and rocks as will be thrown in our way. This, more than ever, is the time for Congress to be filled with the first characters from every State, instead of having a thin assembly, and many States totally unrepresented, as is the case at present. I have often regretted the pernicious, and what appears to me fatal policy of having our ablest men engaged in the formation of the more local governments, and filling offices in their respective States, leaving the great national concern (on which the superstructure of all and every of them absolutely depends, and without which none can exist,) to be managed by men of more contracted abilities. Indeed, those at a distance from the seat of war live in such perfect tranquillity, that they conceive the dispute to be in a manner at an end; and those near it are so disaffected, that they only serve as embarrassments. Between the two, therefore, time slips away without the necessary means for opening the campaign in season or with propriety.”

[1 ]This conjecture was well founded. There is no room to doubt that, when the Conciliatory Bills were brought before Parliament by Lord North, the ministry were convinced a negotiation was pending between the French court and the American commissioners. During the debate (February 17th), and in reply to Lord North’s speech, Mr. Fox affirmed, upon information on which reliance might be placed, that a treaty had already been signed; and when the question was pressed by Mr. Grenville upon Lord North, he answered, “that he could not say from authority that the treaty alluded to was signed; that, indeed, it was possible, nay too probable, but not authenticated by the ambassador.”—Almon’s Parliamentary Register, vol. viii., pp. 385, 389. The question how the British were informed of the signing of the treaty before the formal notice of the French minister, led to a serious dispute among the American commissioners at Paris.

[1 ]This measure was adopted by Congress two days after the above letter was written.—Journals, April 23d.

[2 ]“With respect to your future treatment of the Tories, the most effectual way of putting a stop to their traitorous practices will be shooting some of the most notorious offenders wherever they can be found in flagrante delicto. This summary punishment inflicted on a few traitors will probably strike terror into others and deter them from exposing themselves to a similar fate.”—Washingington to Joseph Kirkbride, Lieutenant of the County of Bucks, 20 April, 1778.