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Subject Area: Political Theory
Subject Area: War and Peace
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH. - George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, vol. V (1776-1777) [1890]

Edition used:

The Writings of George Washington, collected and edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890). Vol. V (1776-1777).

Part of: The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.

Morristown, 3 February, 1777.

Dear Sir,

Your two favors of the 30th last month reached me last night. I cannot say but I was a good deal surprised and disappointed at the contents. I never was very sanguine, as to any thing more being effected, than to oblige the garrison either to surrender or evacuate Fort Independence and retire within the Island. As neither has been done, I wish your summons had never been sent, as I am fearful it will expose us to the ridicule of our enemies. By falling back as far as you have done, one valuable purpose of your going down is lost, and that is, depriving the enemy of the forage of which they are in extreme want, and collecting it for our own use.1

If my accounts from Brunswic are true, the enemy have, notwithstanding your being upon their backs, drawn considerable reinforcements from New York. If so, and you think that nothing of consequence can be effected by you in the neighborhood of Kingsbridge, I would have you leave a sufficient force at Peekskill to make the passes secure, and throw the remainder over the river with orders to march immediately down here. For if the troops return from Rhode Island, and do not find you in Westchester county, they will certainly join their main body at Brunswic, and the garrison of York Island may likewise be much reduced, and the troops drawn from thence be likewise sent here. We must, in that case, collect all our force to oppose theirs. I wish we could possibly have foreseen, that the diversion upon your side would not have had the desired effect; for with the additions of the three thousand four hundred men, that have been with you, we could have distracted the enemy with a variety of attacks, and made some considerable advantages. The report of Carleton’s army having joined Howe’s is certainly without foundation.

The securing the forage in West Chester County, for our own use, or depriving the enemy from carrying it off for theirs, is an object of so much moment, that I desire some measures may yet be fallen upon to effect one or the other. Suppose a light body of troops, under an active officer, sufficient to repel any foraging parties of the Enemy, except they came out in very large bodies, should be left behind, and stationed as near Kingsbridge as possible. While they kept a good lookout they never could be surprised, for not being encumbered with any baggage, they could always move at a moment’s warning if the Enemy came out with a superior force, and move back when they returned. This would oblige them to forage with such large covering parties, that it would in a manner harrass their troops to death. We have found the advantage of such practices with us, for by keeping four or five hundred men far advanced, we not only oblige them to forage with parties of 1,500 and 2,000 to cover, but every now and then give them a smart brush. Your Waggons might always safely be at work in the rear of your party, for, at this season of the year, Kingsbridge is the only point from whence the Enemy can issue. As to the number necessary for the above purpose, I would have you consult Mr. Duer and the gentlemen who best know the Country. After fixing that matter, you will next determine what number are to be left at Peekskill, and I would have the remainder immediately marched forward to join me. One thing I would wish you to observe, that is, that the Troops that come over should be those who have the longest time to serve. In one of your former letters, you desired leave to return for a while to New England, when the service would admit of it. I have no objection to your doing it after you have made the arrangements recommended above. I must only wish that you will return as soon as your private affairs will admit, for several of the general officers are desirous of making a visit to their respective homes, before the campaign opens in the spring.

I am, dear Sir, yours, &c.

[1 ]This expedition was originally a project of the Convention of New York, and, by the consent and order of General Washington, who also had a larger object in view, it was put under the direction of General Heath, as the Continental commander in that district. General John Morin Scott headed a body of the New York co-operating militia. This gentleman and Mr. William Duer, both members of the Convention, were, with two or three others, appointed a committee to manage the affair in behalf of that assembly;—MS. Journal of the Convention, December 19th, 21st, 23d, 1776. They wrote separately to General Washington, disapproving the manner in which the attempt had been conducted. General Parsons expressed himself to the same effect.

In reply to the above letter, General Heath wrote:—“When I received your Excellency’s orders to march towards Kingsbridge, nothing could be more agreeable; but I cannot say that the taking command of a body of troops entirely militia was so. It was indeed far otherwise. Upon my arrival before the fort I summoned the garrison to surrender, as your Excellency is sensible is the practice on the first investing of a place. And this I did in particular at the motion of a gentleman before I left Peekskill, as it was supposed the garrison consisted of Hessian troops, and from some preceding circumstances it might answer a very good purpose. And although some of the enemy may laugh at a fort being summoned and not taken, I believe they will scarcely publish the summons. After this I called a council of war, as I did in every instance of importance during our continuance before the fort, and in every one of them the council was unanimous. I have taken the liberty of enclosing one of them, namely, that preceding our removal, by which your Excellency will perceive, that the landing of Lord Percy to surround us was not so much as mentioned. The facts were briefly these. The troops were scattered in a circle of more than eight miles. We tried to hut them, but the rain had driven four of General Lincoln’s regiments from their huts, with the loss of nearly all their ammunition. The enemy had sallied early one morning and surprised one of our outguards. The regiment nearest the place was struck with a panic, and had quitted their quarters, leaving their baggage. The troops were so scattered as not to be collected in less than two or three hours; in which case those that were quartered within cannon-shot of the fort would be entirely cut to pieces before they could be supported. A diffidence and uneasiness were discovered in even the bravest officers, in such a situation, and a universal desire to get more advantageously quartered. Every officer objected to a storm, as they apprehended the militia inadequate to such an enterprise. Every purpose it was supposed would be, and has been, answered by the troops in their present cantonment, except that of reducing the fort.”—Letter, February 6th.