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Subject Area: Political Theory
Subject Area: War and Peace
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS. 1 - George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, vol. V (1776-1777) [1890]

Edition used:

The Writings of George Washington, collected and edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890). Vol. V (1776-1777).

Part of: The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols.

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.1

White Plains, 6 November, 1776.

Sir,

I have the honor to inform you, that on yesterday morning the enemy made a sudden and unexpected movement from the several posts they had taken in our front. They broke up their whole encampments the preceding night, and have advanced towards Kingsbridge and the North River. The design of this manœuver is a matter of much conjecture and speculation, and cannot be accounted for with any degree of certainty. The grounds we had taken possession of were strong and advantageous, and such as they could not have gained without much loss of blood in case an attempt had been made. I had taken every possible precaution to prevent their outflanking us; which may have led to the present measure. They may still have in view their original plan, and, by a sudden wheel, try to accomplish it. Detachments are constantly out to observe their motions, and to harass them as much as possible.

In consequence of this movement I called a council of general officers to-day, to consult of such measures as should be adopted in case they pursued their retreat to New York; the result of which is herewith transmitted.1 In respect to myself, I cannot indulge an idea that General Howe, supposing he is going to New York, means to close the campaign, and to sit down without attempting something more. I think it highly probable, and almost certain, that he will make a descent with a part of his troops into Jersey; and, as soon as I am satisfied, that the present manœuver is real and not a feint, I shall use every means in my power to forward a part of our force to counteract his designs; nor shall I be disappointed if he sends a detachment to the southward for the purpose of making a winter campaign. From the information I have received, there is now a number of transports at Red Hook, with about three thousand troops on board. Their destination, as given out, is to Rhode Island; but this seems altogether improbable for various reasons; among others, the season is much against it. In the southern States they will find it milder, and much more favorable for their purposes. I shall take the liberty of mentioning, that it may not be improper to suggest the probability of such a measure to the Assemblies and Conventions in those States, that they may be on their guard, and of the propriety of their establishing and laying up magazines of provisions and other necessaries in suitable places. This is a matter of exceeding importance, and what cannot be too much attended to.

From the approaching dissolution of the army, and the departure of the new levies, which is on the eve of taking place, and the little prospect of levying a new one in time, I have wrote to the eastern States, by the unanimous advice of the general officers, to forward supplies of militia in the room of those that are now here, and who, it is feared, will not be prevailed on to stay any longer than the time they are engaged for. The propriety of this application, I trust, will appear, when it is known that not a single officer is yet commissioned to recruit, and when it is considered how essential it is to keep up some show of force and shadow of an army.1 I expect the enemy will bend their force against Fort Washington, and invest it immediately. From some advices, it is an object that will attract their earliest attention.

I am happy to inform you, that, in the engagement on Monday se’nnight, I have reason to believe our loss was by no means so considerable as was conjectured at first. By some deserters and prisoners we are told, that of the enemy was tolerably great; some accounts make it about four hundred in killed and wounded; all agree that among the former there was a Colonel Carr of the thirty-fifth regiment. The force that will be sent to Jersey after I am satisfied of Mr. Howe’s retreat, in addition to those now there, according to my present opinion, will make it necessary for me to go with them, to put things in a proper channel, and such a way of defence as shall seem most probable to check the progress of the enemy, in case they should attempt a descent there, or a move towards Philadelphia. I have the honor to be, &c.1

[1 ]Sparks prints no letters of Washington between October 22d and November 6th, and it was through Colonel Harrison that he communicated with Congress. The interval was crowded with movements of both armies, hardly a day passing without some skirmish. On the 27th the British attacked the position of the Americans on Chatterton’s Hill, and remained in possession of the field. On the two following days preparations were made by the enemy for again attacking the Americans, but something occurred to prevent, and not till the third was there an active movement, when the American sentries noted an unusual commotion in the British camp that resulted in the sudden march towards Kingsbridge.

General Greene, who was now stationed at Fort Lee (formerly called Fort Constitution), gave notice on the 31st of October, that the enemy had taken possession of Fort Independence on the north side of Kingsbridge, having made their appearance in that quarter two days before; that he had previously caused every thing valuable to be removed, and the bridges to be cut down. “I should be glad to know your Excellency’s mind,” he adds, “about holding all the ground from Kingsbridge to the lines. If we attempt to hold the ground, the garrison must be reinforced; but if the garrison is to be drawn into Fort Washington, and we only keep that, the number of troops on the island is too large.” In reply the Commander-in-chief wrote, that the question could be answered only by being on the spot, and knowing all the circumstances, and that he should submit the whole to the judgment of General Greene, reminding him of the original design to garrison the works, and preserve the lower lines as long as they could be kept, and thus, by holding a commmunication across the river, to stop the enemy’s ships from passing up or down.

In this period the following orders and other matter must be noted: “The moving state of the army will occasion some irregularity, but the General hopes that officers of all ranks, will exert themselves, to correct all abuses, particularly the following;

“Straggling from camp, or plundering parties.

“Taking up and keeping horses. Loading the teams with heavy lumber and unnecessary baggage.

“Firing in and about the camp.

“To prevent the first the Rolls are to be frequently called, at least three times a day, and the absent punished.—To prevent the second, all horses not belonging to the Artillery or Ammunition or Field-Officers, to be collected and sent to the Quarter-Master-General, near Head Quarters. To prevent the third the Field Officers should have a general examination of the baggage of their regiments, and all heavy chests, Tables, Chairs, and other lumber be left, or after this, they will be thrown off the wagons wherever met with: To prevent firing in camp, the order of yesterday to be executed, by giving the offender 10 lashes on the spot, let him belong to what regiment he may.”—Orderly Book, 1 November, 1776.

“The General is sorry to find, that there are some soldiers, so lost to all sense of Honor, and Honesty, as to leave the Army, when there is the greatest necessity for their services. He calls upon the Officers of every Rank, to exert themselves, in putting a stop to it, and absolutely forbids any officer, under the rank of a Brigadier General, discharging any officer, or soldier, or giving any permission to leave the camp on any pretence whatever.

“The situation of the Army and the Season, requiring that the Soldiery should be as well accommodated as possible, especially at night; the taking of straw, or even grain in the sheaf, is not to be considered as included in the orders against plundering.”—Orderly Book, 3 November, 1776.

“Our situation is altered in no instance, unless in the number of our troops, which is every day decreasing, by their most scandalous desertion and return home.”—Robert H. Harrison to the President of Congress, 3 November, 1776.

“By command of his Excellency, I have the honor to acknowledge his receipt of your favors of the 24th ulto., and to inform you, that he esteems the plan you propose to lay before Congress for preventing more Rations being drawn, than may be due, well calculated to answer the end. That respecting the sick, seems to him, not entirely perfect. The Captains or Commanders of Companies are prohibited from drawing pay for such sick as may be discharged from the Hospitals as unfit for service. If during their stay, and before it can be known, whether their case will or will not admit of their return, it should become necessary to make up a Regimental pay abstract, in what manner are the officers to make up their Rolls? Are they to include the sick or not? As this is a case that may and must of necessity frequently happen, it appears to his Excellency, that the intended regulation should be more general, and restrain the officers from including in their pay abstracts or Rolls, all the sick they send to the Hospitals and the pay due ’em previous to their going. In such case, those who are discharged as unfit for service may receive their pay as intended, those who returned to duty, can obtain what was due them, when the Regiment was paid, by applying to the paymaster with the officer and Surgeon’s Certificates, or be included in a subsequent abstract. The Inconveniences and abuses which are designed to be remedied by these regulations, his Excellency does not apprehend to arise so much from necessity as Incident to the nature of Armies, as from the imperfect institution of the present, and the great mixture and diversity of Troops composing it; and also from the inattention of the officers in whose appointments but too little regard has been had to choosing men of merit and honor.

“The defenceless State of Pensylvania as communicated by the Committee of Safety to your Honble. body, is a matter of much concern to his Excellency, which is not a little aggravated by the part too many seem ready to take in favor of the Enemy. He trusts however the defection will be too inconsiderable to threaten any alarming consequences. . . .

“Agreable to your request his Excellency has consulted with Genl. Lee upon the best mode for employing the French Gentlemen and of making them serviceable. The result is, that they should be appointed to Regiments by Congress according to the Ranks they have been pleased to give ’em, and with the same pay as is allowed other officers in such cases. Their want of our Language is rather an objection, but it is hoped they will attain a sufficient Knowledge of it, ere it be long, to be of great service, and that in the Interim their advice and assistance in directing of Works may be of use where they may be stationed.”—Harrison to the President of Congress, 4 November, 1776.

“The General is very sensible that the time of service, of many of the Militia, will soon expire but as this is the most interesting and critical part of the Campaign, and their departure would greatly discourage the other troops and injure the service, He doubts not their love to their Country will induce them to prolong their stay until the Close of the Campaign, which must soon happen.”—Orderly Book, 5 November, 1776.

[1 ]The council agreed unanimously, that, in case the enemy were retreating towards New York, it would be proper immediately to throw a body of troops into New Jersey, that those raised on the east side of Hudson’s River should be detached for this purpose, and that three thousand men should be stationed at Peekskill and the passes of the Highlands.

[1 ]“The situation of our affairs is critical and truly alarming; the dissolution of our army, is fast approaching, and but little if any prospect of levying a new one in a reasonable time. A large part of it, under the denomination of new levies are now on the eve of their departure, and this at a time when the enemy have a very numerous and formidable force, watching an opportunity to execute their plans, and to spread ruin and devastation among us. Impressed with the importance of these matters, I this day laid them before a council of general officers, with a view of obtaining their opinion upon the same, and of the measures, which in their judgment should be immediately adopted. The result was that I should apply to several of the States for supplies of militia. . . . The hope and probability of raising a new army within a convenient time are so little, and the consequences so evidently alarming, if a sufficient force is not kept up to counteract the designs of the enemy in the meantime, that the council and myself have unanimously agreed that the militia should be engaged, if possible, to continue till the 1st of March. We flatter ourselves by that time, if not long before, such an army will be levyed as to render any future claims, upon them, unless in cases of the most pressing emergency, altogether unnecessary.”—Washington to the Massachusetts General Assembly, 6 November, 1776. He asked for 4000 men from Massachusetts, but “well knowing the condition of your State, and the difficulties you have experienced on account of the frequent and large drafts from it from time to time” declined to mention any quota for Connecticut.

In reply to a complaint of the Commissioners of Pennsylvania, that recruiting orders had not been issued to Col. Magaw and Col. Cadwalader, Washington wrote on the 6th explaining the want of money, and added: “You will I doubt not agree with me in that it could not be the General’s duty or that of any other General officer to attend upon the officers of these two battalions to know whether they would serve, or set about the business of recruiting, and I am very confident that no application was made for money or recruiting orders. Nor, indeed, could they, for the enemy landed immediately after at Frog’s Point, the army immediately moved and has been moving ever since, so that there has not been leisure or opportunity for transacting business of this kind. Our communication with Mount Washington has now been cut off for two weeks and, in short, the variety of avocations to the immediate safety and interests of the army, under constant alarms, and the approach of the enemy has made that very natural to those on the spot which may appear very much otherwise to gentlemen whose short stay at such times in the camp does not enable them to judge of the difficulties which occur on such occasions.”

[1 ]Read in Congress November 11th.

The Court-house and several private houses in the village of White Plains were burnt on the night of the 5th of November. This wanton act was caused by a major in the army, and was severely censured by the Commander-in-chief in the general orders of the next day.—“It is with the utmost astonishment and abhorrence, that the General is informed, that some base and cowardly wretches last night set fire to the Court-house and other buildings, which the enemy had left; the army may rely on it, that they shall be brought to justice and meet with the punishment they deserve.” When the army evacuated their first works at White Plains, on the 31st of October, a few barns and other houses within the lines, containing forage and public stores, which could not be removed, were burnt by order of the General. Some historians have erroneously confounded the two incidents, and represented the burning of the houses in the village as an act authorized by the Commander-in-chief.