The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Textual Introduction
• Preface to the Third Edition[*]
• Chapter I: Introductory Remarks
• Chapter II: The Relativity of Human Knowledge
• Chapter III: The Doctrine of the Relativity of Human Knowledge, As Held By Sir William Hamilton
• Chapter IV: In What Respect Sir William Hamilton Really Differs From the Philosophers of the Absolute
• Chapter V: What Is Rejected As Knowledge By Sir William Hamilton, Brought Back Under the Name of Belief
• Chapter VI: The Philosophy of the Conditioned
• Chapter VII: The Philosophy of the Conditioned, As Applied By Mr. Mansel to the Limits of Religious Thought
• Chapter VIII: Of Consciousness, As Understood By Sir William Hamilton
• Chapter IX: Of the Interpretation of Consciousness
• Chapter X: Sir William Hamilton’s View of the Different Theories Respecting the Belief In an External World
• Chapter XI: The Psychological Theory of the Belief In an External World
• Chapter XII: The Psychological Theory of the Belief In Matter, How Far Applicable to Mind
• Chapter XIII: The Psychological Theory of the Primary Qualities of Matter
• Chapter XIV: How Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel Dispose of the Law of Inseparable Association
• Chapter XV: Sir William Hamilton’s Doctrine of Unconscious Mental Modifications
• Chapter XVI: Sir William Hamilton’s Theory of Causation
• Chapter XVII: The Doctrine of Concepts, Or General Notions
• Chapter XVIII: Of Judgment
• Chapter XIX: Of Reasoning
• Chapter XX: On Sir William Hamilton’s Conception of Logic As a Science. Is Logic the Science of the Laws, Or Forms, of Thought?
• Chapter XXI: The Fundamental Laws of Thought According to Sir William Hamilton
• Chapter XXII: Of Sir William Hamilton’s Supposed Improvements In Formal Logic
• Chapter XXIII: Of Some Minor Peculiarities of Doctrine In Sir William Hamilton’s View of Formal Logic
• Chapter XXIV: Of Some Natural Prejudices Countenanced By Sir William Hamilton, and Some Fallacies Which He Considers Insoluble
• Chapter XXV: Sir William Hamilton’s Theory of Pleasure and Pain
• Chapter XXVI: On the Freedom of the Will
• Chapter XXVII: Sir William Hamilton’s Opinions On the Study of Mathematics
• Chapter XXVIII: Concluding Remarks
• Appendices
• Appendix A: Manuscript Fragments
• Appendix B: Textual Emendations
• Appendix C: Corrected References
• Appendix D: Bibliographic Index of Persons and Works Cited In the Examination, With Variants and Notes

Appendix A

Manuscript Fragments

of the mass of manuscript Mill produced in drafting, rewriting, and revising the Examination, nothing is known to be extant except the eight fragments printed below, all of which are drafts of revisions for the 3rd ed. Two of them are in the Yale collection, and so presumably derive from the Sotheby’s sale of 27 June, 1927; five are in the Houghton Library, Harvard, in the volume of manuscript material bought by George Herbert Palmer from the Avignon bookseller, J. Roumanille; and one is written on a sheet at the end of Mill’s final MS of the Autobiography, in the Columbia University Library. The five in the Harvard collection, one may reasonably assume, indicate that the relevant revisions were made in Avignon late in 1866; it is quite likely that the two at Yale were simply bundled with papers of more consequence taken back to England by Mary Taylor when she persuaded her aunt, Helen Taylor, to leave the Avignon house in 1905.

In the text above, the placing of these fragments is indicated by superscript letters. Here they are printed with page and line references to the text above, and with variant readings giving the final versions, except for the fifth, which was totally rewritten. Cancellations and interlineations are not indicated.

Fragment 1. Pp. 21.17-22.3 (Yale)

^arelative to us: & this could no longer be contested if the only relativity he meant was not relativity to us but to something else.^a

^bBut there is^b abundant evidence that the relativity which ^che meant to affirm of^c our knowledge of attributes was not merely relativity to their substances but also relativity to us. ^dWhenever the occasion presents itself he^d affirms of attributes as positively as of substances, that all our knowledge of them is relative to us. ^eHe asserts this in a passage already quoted.^*e “In saying that a thing is known in itself I do not mean that this object is known in its absolute existence, that is, out of relation to us. This is impossible for our knowledge is only of the relative.” ^fSo that, by the relativity of our knowledge he means relativity to us. Again, when speaking expressly of attributes^†—“by^f the expression what they are in themselves, in reference to the primary qualities, & of relative notion in reference to the secondary, Reid cannot mean that the former are known to us absolutely & in themselves, that is, out of relation to our cognitive faculties; for he elsewhere admits that all our knowledge is ^grelative.” To the same effect:^‡ “We^g can know, we can conceive, only what is relative, our knowledge of qualities or phenomena is necessarily relative; for these exist only as they exist in relation to our faculties.”^§ The distinction, ^hthen, which he draws^h between our knowledge of substances & that of attributes, though authentically a part of his philosophy, is quite irrelevant here. ⁱFor he unquestionably thinks, &ⁱ

Fragment 2. P. 38n.13-27 (Harvard)

as predicated of acts or mental states, & the ^asame as^a attributes of a person. ^bThe standard of right is indeed^b a positive limit, which even ideally can ^cbe only^c reached, not surpassed: but ^ddifferent persons may agree in^d exactly conforming to the standard, ^eyet^e differ in the strength of their adherence to it^f, in so much that influences (temptations for instance)^f might detach one of them from it, which would have no effect ^gon the other^g . There are thus, consistently with ^hperfect^h observance of the rule of right, innumerable gradations of the attribute, considered as in a ⁱperson. This I had overlooked. Butⁱ , on the other hand, ^jthe extreme limit of these gradations is the conception^j of a Person whom no influences, ^kno^k causes, either in or out of himself, can ^lmake or induce to deviate^l from the law of right. This I apprehend,^m, is^m a conception of Absolute, not of Infinite, righteousness. The doctrine, therefore, of the first edition, that an Infinite Being may have attributes which are Absolute but not ⁿInfinite, appearsⁿ to me maintainable. But as it is immaterial to my argument, & was only ^obrought in as an illustration which lay near^o at hand of the meaning of the terms, I withdraw it from ^pthe present discussion^p .

Fragment 3. Pp. 52.14-53.15^[*] (Harvard)

This ^ais^a unanswerable if by the Absolute we ^bare^b obliged to understand something which is not only “out of” all relation, but ^cis incapable of ever coming into relation with anything else: but^c is this what any one can possibly mean by the ^dAbsolute^d , who identifies the Absolute with the Creator? Granting that the Absolute implies an existence ^eof^e itself, standing in no relation to anything; the only Absolute with which we are concerned, or in which anybody believes, must not only be capable of entering into relation with things, but must be capable of entering into any ^fpossible relation^f with anything. May it not be known in some at least of those relations, & particularly in the relation of a Cause? And if it is a “finished, perfected, completed” Cause, i.e. the most a Cause that it is possible to be—the cause of everything except itself, then if known as such, it is known as an Absolute Cause. Has Sir W. Hamilton shewn that an Absolute Cause, thus understood, is inconceivable or unknowable? No: all he shews is, that although capable of being known, it

Fragment 4. P. 57.19-32 (Harvard)

the whole of both; & these being conceived as Infinite, to conceive a Being as occupying the whole of them is to conceive that Being as infinite. If thinking God as eternal & omnipresent is thinking him in Space & Time, ^athen we^a do think God in space & time. If thinking him as eternal & omnipresent is not thinking him in space & time, ^bthen we can think him^b out of Space & Time. ^cI^c have already shewn that the ideas of infinite space & time are real & positive conceptions: that of a Being who is in all ^dtime & space^d is no less so. To think anything ^emust^e be to condition it by attributes which are themselves thinkable; but not necessarily to condition it by a limited quantum of those attributes: on the contrary, we may think it under a degree of them greater than all limited degrees, & this is to think it as Infinite.^(a)

Fragment 5. P. 77n.33-41 (Columbia)

^aassociations, we^a have a natural tendency to disbelieve ^bit,^b but the suggestion to our mind of ^csome set of possible^c conditions which would be a Sufficient Reason for its ^dtruth^d , takes away its ^eunbelievability, or in other words^e enables us to ‘conceive it as possible.’ This view of Sir W. Hamilton’s meaning ^fwould account for^f his using the term in its third signification; which Mr Mansel (p. 132) also ^greduces^g to the first, but which may be better identified with the second: for of first truths also it is impossible to assign any Sufficient Reason. ^hThat for this reason, however, the truths which are the basis of all our conceptions of things should be nicknamed inconceivable, I hold to be an entirely inadmissible abuse of language.^h

Fragment 6. P. 118n.32^[*] (Harvard)

“is one & indivisible may logically (ratione) be considered as diverse & plural, & vice versa, what are really diverse & plural may logically be viewed as one & indivisible. As an example of the former;—the sides & angles of a triangle (or trilateral) as mutually correlative—as together making up the same simple figure—& as, without destruction of that figure, actually inseparable from it, & from each other, are really one; but in as much as they have peculiar relations which may, in thought, be considered severally & for themselves, they are logically twofold.”

Does Sir W. Hamilton mean to say that the sides of a triangle, & its angles, are really and in themselves one—that there is “identity” between them; & that they only differ as the same thing regarded in a different point of view? If so, the words one, same, & identity, must have changed their meaning. I could understand his expressions if they had been used of the figure itself. That, he might justly have said, is identical, is the same in itself, though it may be regarded in two relations or points of view; in relation to its sides, as a trilateral; in relation to its angles, as a triangle. But it might as well be said that a man’s head & his feet are the same thing regarded in different points of view, as that the sides & angles of a figure are so.

We shall find, in the sequel, that this particular confusion of ideas is habitual to Sir W. Hamilton: it is quite usual with him to overlook the difference between what is implied by a thing, & what is in the thing itself. The principal novelties which he attempted to introduce into the Science of Logic, originated, as we shall see, in non-observance of this distinction.

The following passage, from the “Discussions”, (pp. 47, 48) shews that in calling knowledge & the consciousness of knowledge “really identical” he only meant that they are inseparable. “I can feel without perceiving, I can perceive without imagining, I can imagine without remembering, I can remember without judging (in the emphatic signification), I can judge without willing. One of these acts does not immediately suppose the other. Though modes merely of the same indivisible subject, they are modes in relation to each other, really distinct, & admit, therefore, of psychological discrimination. But can I feel without being conscious that I feel? can I remember, without being conscious that I remember? or, can I be conscious, without being conscious that I perceive, or imagine, or reason? . . . . But

Fragment 7. P. 225n.25-33 (Harvard)

“got directly from the sense of touch”. This is ^aa good answer to Platner’s conclusion that those notions are obtained by sight alone: but it does not conflict with Platner’s observations, nor with any inference drawn from them by me. It is, on the contrary, exactly what I should expect^a . The sense of sight ^bnot being^b necessary to give the perception of simultaneity ^c(though it gives that perception more promptly & on a wider scale) is not necessary to the genesis I have suggested of the idea of extension out of the muscular feelings. Nor do I in the least doubt that a^c person born blind can acquire, ^dthough by a much slower^d process, all that there is in our notion of Space, except the visible picture: but he will be much longer before he realizes it completely, & in the case of Platner’s patient, that point does not seem to have been reached.

Fragment 8. Pp. 503.25-504.7^[*] (Yale)

A history of philosophy from his hand, unless proposing to himself a new object had altered his point of view, could not have been final; it would not have been a philosophical history of philosophy; but it would have stood in the same relation to such a work—in which accurate & complete annals stand to political history: it would have ^aprodigiously abridged the labour of subsequent historians & could have been an invaluable protection against their mistakes^a . Such, therefore,

[a-a][this fragmentary sentence, which may be cancelled by a vertical line, does not correspond to anything in the final text]

[b-b]67 There is, however,

[c-c]67 Sir W. Hamilton ascribed to

[d-d]67 He

[e-e]67 The passages already quoted apply as much to attributes as to substances. “In saying that we know only the relative, I virtually assert that we know nothing absolute—nothing existing absolutely, that is, in and for itself, and without relation to us and our faculties.”†

[f-f]67 In the following passages he is speaking solely of attributes. “By

[g-g]67 relative.”* “We

[h-h]67 therefore, which Sir W. Hamilton recognises

[i-i]67 He affirms without reservation, that [presumably there was a further difference in this sentence between the draft and the final version]

[a-a]67 same regarded as

[b-b]67 Conformity to the standard of right has

[c-c]67 only be

[d-d]67 persons, though all

[e-e]67 may

[f-f]67 : influences (temptations for example)

[g-g]67 upon another

[h-h]67 complete

[i-i]67 person. But

[j-j]67 there is an extreme limit to these gradations—the idea

[k-k]67 or

[l-l]67 deflect in the minutest degree

[m-m]67 to be

[n-n]67 infinite, still appears

[o-o]67 the illustration nearest

[p-p]67 the discussion

[[*] ]Headed in Mill’s hand “p. 50”, i.e., of the 2nd ed.

[a-a]67 would be

[b-b]67 were

[c-c]67 incapable of ever passing into relation. But

[d-d]67 it

[e-e]67 in

[f-f]67 relation whatever, except that of dependence,

[a-a]67 we

[b-b]67 we are capable of thinking something

[c-c]67 Mr. Mansel may make his choice between the two opinions. I

[d-d]67 Space and in all Time

[e-e]67 must of course

[a-a]67 We

[b-b]67 anything which, while it has never been presented in our experience, also contradictsour habitual associations:

[c-c]67 some possible

[d-d]67 existence

[e-e]67 incredibility, and

[f-f]67 explains, though it does not justify,

[g-g]67 endeavours to reduce

[h-h]67 [this sentence does not correspond to anything in the final text]

[[*] ]Headed in Mill’s hand “Note (a) continued.” In the printed version, Mill quotes part of the passage with which the fragment begins, but then departs totally from the wording of this draft.

[a-a]67 just what might have been expected, for I am far from agreeing with Platner that the notions of figure and distance come originally from sight.

[b-b]67 is not

[c-c]67 ; but, giving a prodigious number of simultaneous sensations in one glance, it greatly quickens all processes dependent on observation of the fact of simultaneousness. A

[d-d]67 by a more gradual

[[*] ]Headed in Mill’s hand “p. 560”, i.e., of the 2nd ed.

[a-a]67 been an invaluable protection against the mistakes of subsequent historians, and would have prodigiously abridged their labours