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APPENDICES - John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume IX - An Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy 
The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume IX - An Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of The Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in his Writings, ed. John M. Robson, Introduction by Alan Ryan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
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c NOTE TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTER
The principal objection is the same which was made to the two preceding chapters: that the explanation given of Extension presupposes Extension: that the notion itself is surreptitiously introduced, to account for its own origin. The case of the objectors is most compactly stated by Mr. Mahaffy, in the following extract:
The briefest way of criticizing the long passage [quoted from Mr. Bain] will be to enumerate its fallacies in general heads. (α) A knowledge of our organism as extended must not be begged, when we are going to explain extension; hence, such expressions as the “range of a limb” or “sweep of a limb,” must either be carefully confined to the mere succession of feelings in moving it, or they beg the question: and indeed, as suggesting extension in the very statement, they should be avoided when we are describing the phenomena from which extension is to be derived. (β) Any mention or postulating of direction cannot be for a moment allowed; for what possible meaning can direction have except in space? In particular, lineal (by which I suppose Mr. Bain principally means rectilinear) direction would be only given with great difficulty by the moving of limbs, and we should be brought back to the old Greek notion of circular motion being the most natural. This difficulty, as well as a host of others, are urged with great acuteness by Mr. Abbott. ([Thomas Kingsmill Abbott,] Sight and Touch [(London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1864)], Chap. v [pp. 60ff.].) More especially he states, from E. H. Weber, that touch cannot give us the idea of a right line at all, and consequently not the slightest idea of direction. [Abbott, p. 70, referring to Ernst Heinrich Weber, “Der Tastsinn und das Gemeingefühl,” in Rudolph Wagner, Handwörterbuch der Physiologie, 4 vols. (Braunschweig: Bieweg, 1842-53), Vol. III, pp. 481-588.] (γ) No such notion as velocity or rapidity can be admitted, far less such a notion as the comparison of quicker and slower motions. In fact, the idea of motion requires as its logical antecedent both space and time, and is not identical with pure succession. Suppose we had nothing but the series of our thoughts to analyse, we could never get beyond the idea of a series, nor could we ever by any chance get the notion of acceleration or retardation in it. For what is quicker or slower? Nothing but more space traversed in less time, and vice versâ. Motion cannot be apprehended without something fixed, which is only given us by relations of space, as Kant has well shown. The motion of our thoughts, then, is in the first place, only an analogical expression; and secondly, could never have been felt without something in space whereby not only to measure the increased or diminished velocity of our thinking, but even to learn that there is any velocity at all in the matter. The evidence of dreaming seems to corroborate this view. Why is it, that, the intuitions of velocity afforded us by space being removed, the current of thoughts is found by itself completely incompetent to suggest or estimate speed at all? (δ) What we necessarily use to measure extension must not for that reason have originally suggested it. And yet all that the association school ever attempt to prove is only this: that all the measures of extension can be traced to series of muscular feelings in time. The knowledge of extension is one thing, and primitive; the measure of extension is another, and empirical; and we should not accept Mr. Bain’s confusion of them together (perhaps identification of them), without some further proof than his bare statement.
Upon all these assumptions, however, the theory of Mr. Bain is based, and the intelligent reader will find them scattered over the very surface of the argument. I would call particular attention to the passage . . . “We must learn to feel that a slow motion for a long time is the same as a quicker motion with less duration, which we can easily do by seeing that they both produce the same effect in exhausting the full range of the limb.” Surely it is clear that without space we could never get the idea of motion, which involves space as much as time—in fact, a series in time only changes, it does not move; and even granting we had the idea, we could never discriminate whether that motion was quicker or slower, except the notion of something permanent in space, and motion in space, were given. The same petitio principii is made by Mr. Mill.*
(β) Direction, Mr. Mahaffy maintains, must not be mentioned or referred to in the analysis of extension, because direction means space, and space must not be called in to account for itself. It would have been nearer the truth if, instead of saying that direction means space, he had said that space means direction. Space is the aggregate of directions, as Time is of successions. To postulate direction, therefore, is to postulate, not space, but the element which the notion of space is made of. Mr. Bain, however, does not postulate direction. He postulates the distinctive sensations which, from the first, accompany the motions of a limb in what we, with our acquired perceptions, call variety of directions. There are such distinctive sensations, otherwise we should not even now know, when our eyes are shut, in what direction our arm is moving. According to Mr. Bain, the difference in the sensations depends on the difference in the muscles exerted. “All directions that call forth the play of the same muscles, are similar directions as respects the body: different muscles mean different directions.”* These sensations, shading, as they do, gradually into one another, without abruptness or break, are well fitted to give rise to the feeling of continuity, which unites all our different notions of different directions into one notion of space.†
(δ) “What we necessarily use to measure extension” need not, as Mr. Mahaffy justly observes, have originally suggested it: but if all the facts of consciousness involved in what we call extension can be accounted for on the supposition that the measure is the thing itself, no other evidence needs be required.* The apparent testimony of consciousness to a difference between them, is perfectly explicable by the totally altered aspect which, as I have shown in the text, our cognizance of Extension puts on when the sense of sight has assumed the lead of it. When a larger collection of carefully observed facts respecting persons blind from birth, shall have been subjected to an acuter and more discriminating analysis, the additional insight which we may hope to obtain into the psychology of such persons, will probably dissipate the remains of obscurity which still hang over some of the details of the subject.
Dr. M‘Cosh [Examination, pp. 101-72,] and the writer in Blackwood are constructive thinkers as well as critics, and endeavour to prove, in a direct manner, that the notion of extension is not acquired through our muscular sensations. The evidence on which they chiefly insist is that, antecedently to experience, we localize our sensations at different points of our body: according to Dr. M‘Cosh, at the extremities of the nerve-fibres; every sensation being, by nature, felt at the point where the nerve terminates. The writer in Blackwood says, “We do not commence our sentient life with sensations felt nowhere—we certainly have no memory of pains that were not felt somewhere—in that arena, in fact, which we come to call our body.” The absence of remembrance of what took place soon after birth being, as I have so often observed, no proof that it did not happen, the proof offered is,
that no ingenuity whatever will get our pains into our bodies, or give us knowledge of these bodies, unless we commence with the admission that certain pains and pleasures of a physical order are, as soon as they attain to any distinctness, felt in different parts of a certain arena, thus localizing each other. . . . Many writers describe this localization as an acquired perception. Now, no one doubts for a moment that the accurate localization of our sensations is acquired by experience; but that experience, we maintain, would not be possible were there not some vague localization given us at once, by simultaneous sensations felt in different parts of our system. How else do we get our first idea of space or position?†
To this last question I have already endeavoured to give an answer.* With regard to the localization, so far as it regards our external sensations, I see no difficulty in believing that it takes place altogether by the process to which, as the writer admits, we are indebted for our power of “accurate localization.” I am bit by an animal, or my skin is irritated at some point, and I am at first unable, as occasionally happens even now, to fix the exact place of the sensation. I move my hand along the surface until I find the place where the friction of the hand relieves the irritation, or where its contact increases the smart. I am now expressing these facts in the ordinary language of mankind, but I have sufficiently explained the sense which that language bears in my own doctrine. The view I have taken of the manner in which we obtain our cognition of place, does not rest on any previous localization, even vague, of our sensations. Nor does the localizing of a sensation, say in one of our limbs, amount to anything but attributing to the sensation an uniform and close conjunction, either synchronous or by immediate succession, with the group of sensations of various kinds which constitute my perception of the limb. In general we probably first discover that the sensation is connected with the limb, by perceiving that the exciting cause of the sensation is connected with it. Mr. Bain states the matter as follows:
I can associate one pain with the sight of my finger, another pain with the sight of my toe, and a third with the position of my arm that determines the crown of my head. An infant at the outset knows not where to look for the cause of an irritation when anything touches it; by and by the child observes a coincidence between a feeling and a pressure operating on some one part; whence a feeling in the hand is associated with the sight of the hand, and so for other members.—When the feeling is more internal, as in the interior of the trunk, we have greater difficulty in tracing the precise seat, often we are quite at a loss on the point. In this case we have to trust to some indications that come to the surface, or to the effect of superficial pressure on the deep parts. By getting a blow on the ribs we come to connect feelings in the chest with the place in our map of the body: we can thus make experiments on the deep-seated organs and learn the meaning of their indications. But the more inaccessible the parts, the more uncertainty is there in assigning the locality of their sensations.†
There are some difficulties, not yet completely resolved, respecting the localization of our internal pains, for the solution of which we need more careful and intelligent observation of infants. But I think enough is known to show that the localization of our sensations is not the starting point of our knowledge of place and position, but follows it. It is true that (as Dr. M‘Cosh observes) “if a child is wounded in the arm, it will not hold out its foot.”* But, before it has given evidence of having “any acquired perceptions,” will it hold out its arm either? On the theory that the localization is an acquired perception, it should do neither the one nor the other.†
Dr. M‘Cosh has another argument to prove that we have an original power of localizing our sensations, and, strange to say, it is the very one which is usually thought to be the strongest proof that the power is acquired: viz., the persistence of the association which makes us refer sensations to a limb, after the limb has been cut off. “Müller,” says Dr. M‘Cosh, “has collected a number of such cases,” of which one will be a sufficient sample: “a student named Schmidts, from Aix, had his arm amputated above the elbow thirteen years ago; he has never ceased to have sensations as if in the fingers.”‡ It is a singular oversight in Dr. M‘Cosh to adduce these facts as proof that we localize the sensation at the extremities of the nerves. He forgets that after the arm was cut off, the extremity of the nerve was in the stump, and that it is there, and not in the fingers, that, if his theory were true, the sensation ought to have been felt. The reference of it to the limb which was gone could only be a case of irresistible association. It does not directly negative the existence of an instinctive localization; but it proves that, if there be any such, an acquired association can overpower it. So in respect to the following fact, also quoted from Müller: “When, in the restoration of a nose, a flap of skin is turned down from the forehead and made to unite with the stump of the nose, the new nose thus formed has, as long as the isthmus of skin by which it maintains its original connexions remains undivided, the same sensations as if it were still on the forehead; in other words, when the nose is touched, the patient feels the impression in the forehead.”* But the nerve that conveys the impression no longer terminates in the forehead; it terminates in the new nose; and according to Dr. M‘Cosh’s theory the sensation should be felt there, exactly as it is after the “isthmus of skin” has been divided, the old nervous connexion cut off, and a new one gradually formed. Dr. M‘Cosh’s facts well nigh destroy his own theory; but they are such as, on the association theory, would certainly happen. The last, especially, is of great value to that theory, because it is one of the strongest instances which show that there is a distinctive “Quale” (as one of Dr. M‘Cosh’s German authorities calls it)[*] belonging to the sensation conveyed by each one of the nerves, which hinders it from being confounded with the sensation conveyed by any other nerve, and enables it to form associations special to itself with the part of the body it serves, which, as we see, persist even after it has been taken away to serve another part.
dDr. M‘Cosh, in his reply, denies that his facts conflict with his theory, for his theory is, that we intuitively localize our sensations, not where the nerves really terminate, but where they “normally” terminate; that is, not where the termination is, but where it ought to be. [“Mill’s Reply,” p. 350.] In other words, we, naturally and intuitively, feel our sensations in a place which, in the case of an amputated limb, is not only outside our body, but may be at a distance of one or two feet from it: and this seat of sensation in the space outside our bodies follows us wherever we go. This is what Dr. M‘Cosh would rather believe, than that the reference of the feeling to such a place is an illusion produced by association. In support of his opinion he refers to a case mentioned by Professor Valentin (along with three others of a similar character) in which a girl whose left hand was congenitally imperfect, said she had the internal sensation of a palm of the hand and five fingers (which she did not possess) as perfectly in her left hand as in her right .[†] But what does this prove, except that she had the same sensations in the nerves of her left hand as in those of her right, which of course, therefore, carried the same association. Dr. M‘Cosh should show a case in which sensations were referred to non-existent fingers when there were no real fingers to suggest the notion.
The only further case referred to by Dr. M‘Cosh, is one mentioned by Schopenhauer on the authority of Frorieps; that of “Eva Lauk, an Esthonian girl, fourteen years old, born without arms or legs, but who, according to her mother, had developed herself intellectually quite as rapidly as her brothers and sisters, and without the use of limbs had reached a correct judgment concerning the magnitude and distance of visible objects, quite as quickly as they.”* This, unfortunately, is all the information which Schopenhauer gives on this interesting case. In Dr. M‘Cosh’s judgment, it entirely disproves the opinion “that a sweep of the arm or leg, considered merely as a group of sensations without extension,” could give the idea of extension. [Ibid., p. 352.] He means, probably, that it proves that the idea can be acquired without any use of arms or legs. But we do not know of what nature the girl’s idea of extension was. What we are told is, that she had notions of magnitude and distance, which she applied to objects with the same correctness as other people. But her notion of distance may have been only such as could be formed by the time expended in being carried to the spot; and her notion of magnitude may have been acquired when objects were in contact with her body—perhaps still by means of muscular feelings of pressure and motion. Above all, it must be remembered that the girl was surrounded by people possessing legs and arms, and had their aid in associating the discriminating sensations of sight with the facts, of touch and of the muscles, to which they correspond. Such assistance is a great help even to children who have the ordinary complement of legs and arms; they all must acquire the association much more quickly through the help given them by the acts and words of other people. It may be confidently assumed that Eva Lauk had this help, probably in more than usual measure, and did not find out wholly by herself that a greater mass of visual sensation indicated a greater mass of tactual sensation answering to it.d
j NOTE TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTER
Dr. Ward thus expresses the test of necessary truth:
If in any case I know by my very conception of some ens, that a certain attribute, not included in that conception, is truly predicable of that ens, such predication is a self-evidently necessary proposition. Take, for instance, the axiom that all trilateral figures are triangular. If, by my very conception of a trilateral figure, I know its triangularity . . . then I know infallibly that a trilateral non-triangular figure is an intrinsically repugnant chimera; that in no possible region of existence could such a figure be found; that not even an Omnipotent Being could form one.
Consequently “the triangularity of all trilateral figures is cognizable as a self-evidently necessary truth;” not grounded on, nor deriving its evidence from, experience.[*]
It is not denied, nor deniable, that there are properties of things which we know to be true (as Dr. Ward expresses it) by our “very conception” of the thing. But this is no argument against our knowing them solely by experience, for (as is truly and aptly said by Professor Bain in his Logic) these are cases in which in the very process of forming the conception, we have experience of the fact.[†] It is not likely that Dr. Ward has returned to the notion (so long abandoned and even forgotten by intuitionists) of ideas literally innate, and thinks that we bring with us into the world the conception of a trilateral figure ready made. He doubtless believes that it is at least suggested by observation of objects. Now, the fact of three sides and that of three angles are so intimately linked together in external nature, that it is impossible for the conception of a three-sided figure to get into the mind without carrying into the mind with it the conception of three angles. Therefore, when we have once got the conception of a trilateral, we have no need of further experience to prove triangularity. The conception itself, which represents all our previous experience, suffices. And if the Association theory be true, it must follow from it, that whenever any property of external things is in the relation to the things which is required for the formation of an inseparable association, that property will get into the conception, and be believed without further proof. Dr. Ward will say that triangularity is not included in the conception of a trilateral. But this is only true in the sense that triangularity is not in the connotation of the name. Many attributes not included in the definition are included in the conception. Dr. Ward cannot but see that on the experience hypothesis, this not only may, but must be the case.*
Dr. Ward goes on to deny that uniformity of experience can produce the belief that the truth thus uniformly experienced is necessary. If it could, he says, the fact itself of the uniformity of nature—the fact that phænomena succeed each other according to uniform laws—resting on a broader basis of experience than any particular law of nature, has all the conditions for being regarded as a necessary truth, and must produce “a practical necessity of fancying that in every possible region of existence phænomena succeed each other by uniform laws;”* now, we are under no such necessity, as I myself have strenuously maintained.[*] But my answer to Mr. Mansel’s instances is applicable to this of Dr. Ward’s. Is it seriously that he compares our experience of the uniformity of nature, in point of obviousness and familiarity, with our experience of the straightness of straight lines? The uniformity is, in the first stages of our experience, an actual paradox; first appearances are against it; they seem to show that some events do indeed succeed each other with an approach, though only an approach, to uniformity, but that a far greater number have no fixed order whatever. How can it be maintained that we have, at that early period of our observations, such experience of this universal truth, as to incorporate it in our conception of every object in nature, and create an irresistible association of uniformity of sequence with all possible events? As we gradually learn the correct interpretation of our experience, and become aware that uniformity of sequence is an universal truth, a powerful, though even then, not an irresistible association, does grow up; accordingly the law that whatever begins to exist has a cause, is classed by most of the intuitional philosophers as a necessary truth, though (strange to say) a necessary truth with an exception.
But Dr. Ward contends (Dr. M‘Cosh had already said the same thing)† that there is a fallacy of ambiguity in the phrase “necessity of thought.” He charges me with using the phrase “in two senses fundamentally different. A necessity of thought may, no doubt, be most intelligibly understood to mean a law of nature whereby under certain circumstances I necessarily think this, that, and the other judgment. But it may also be understood to mean a law of nature whereby I think as necessary this, that, and the other judgment.” He agrees with me
that from a necessity of thought in the former sense, no legitimate argument whatever can be deduced for a necessity of objective truth. Supposing I felt unusually cold a few moments ago, it is a necessity of thought that I should now remember the circumstance. Yet that past experience was no necessary truth. It is a necessity of thought again that I expect the sun to rise to-morrow: and many similar instances could be adduced. The only necessity of thought which proves the self-evident necessity of objective truth, is the necessity of thinking that such truth is self-evidently necessary.*
Dr. Ward says that “mere constant and uniform experience cannot possibly account for the mind’s conviction of self-evident necessity.” Nor do I pretend that it does. The experience must not only be constant and uniform, but the juxtaposition of the facts in experience must be immediate and close, as well as early, familiar, and so free from even the semblance of an exception that no counter association can possibly arise. Dr. Ward gives two contrasted examples: “I have never even once experienced the equality of 2 + 9 to 3 + 8, and yet am convinced that not even Omnipotence could overthrow that equality. I have most habitually experienced the warmth-giving property of fire, and yet see no reason for doubting that Omnipotence can at any time suspend or remove that property. That which I have never experienced I regard as necessary; that which I have habitually and unexceptionably experienced I regard as contingent.”†
To the first example I answer, that if the equality of 2 + 9 and 3 + 8 does not come to us in the first instance by direct experience (though fully ratified by it), neither does it come by direct intuition. It is gained by a succession of steps, each resting on actual trial. True, it may be but a mental trial; as by merely fancying myself “holding two pebbles in one hand and nine in the other, and then transferring one pebble from the larger to the smaller group.”[*] But the mere imagination of this transfer would not, and ought not to carry conviction to me, if I had not previously observed that change of place makes no difference in the number of objects. All reasoning from conceptions is open to, and finally rests upon, an appeal to the sensations. With respect to the warmth-giving property of fire, the instance is not happily chosen; for warmth is so much the differentia of fire, the principal connotation of the word, that what was believed not to warm would certainly not be called fire. But (disregarding this) Dr. Ward’s illustration may be met in the same manner in which I have met the similar illustrations of Mr. Mansel. Fire, it is true, will always, under certain needful conditions, give warmth; but the sight of fire is very often unattended with any sensation of warmth. It is not concomitance of the outward facts that creates the association, but concomitance of the sensible impressions. The visible presence of fire and the sensation of warmth are not in that invariable conjunction and immediate juxtaposition, which might disable us from conceiving the one without the other, and might therefore lead us to suppose their conjunction to be a necessary truth.
Dr. Ward’s criticisms on the view I take of the Law of Causation belong not to the present work, but to my System of Logic. One more of his objections, however, may be noticed here. He says, that while I account for the “power of ascertaining axioms by mere mental experience” from “one of the characteristic properties of geometrical forms,” viz., that they can be painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to reality, I entirely leave out of account arithmetical and algebraic axioms, though these, equally with geometrical, can be arrived at by merely mental experimentation.* I do not leave them out of account, but have assigned, in my Logic, another and equally conclusive reason why they can be studied in our conceptions alone, namely, that arithmetical and algebraic truths being true not of any particular kind of things, but of all things whatever, any mental conceptions whatever will adequately represent them.j[*]
of the mass of manuscript Mill produced in drafting, rewriting, and revising the Examination, nothing is known to be extant except the eight fragments printed below, all of which are drafts of revisions for the 3rd ed. Two of them are in the Yale collection, and so presumably derive from the Sotheby’s sale of 27 June, 1927; five are in the Houghton Library, Harvard, in the volume of manuscript material bought by George Herbert Palmer from the Avignon bookseller, J. Roumanille; and one is written on a sheet at the end of Mill’s final MS of the Autobiography, in the Columbia University Library. The five in the Harvard collection, one may reasonably assume, indicate that the relevant revisions were made in Avignon late in 1866; it is quite likely that the two at Yale were simply bundled with papers of more consequence taken back to England by Mary Taylor when she persuaded her aunt, Helen Taylor, to leave the Avignon house in 1905.
In the text above, the placing of these fragments is indicated by superscript letters. Here they are printed with page and line references to the text above, and with variant readings giving the final versions, except for the fifth, which was totally rewritten. Cancellations and interlineations are not indicated.
Fragment 1. Pp. 21.17-22.3 (Yale)
bBut there isb abundant evidence that the relativity which che meant to affirm ofc our knowledge of attributes was not merely relativity to their substances but also relativity to us. dWhenever the occasion presents itself hed affirms of attributes as positively as of substances, that all our knowledge of them is relative to us. eHe asserts this in a passage already quoted.*e “In saying that a thing is known in itself I do not mean that this object is known in its absolute existence, that is, out of relation to us. This is impossible for our knowledge is only of the relative.” fSo that, by the relativity of our knowledge he means relativity to us. Again, when speaking expressly of attributes†—“byf the expression what they are in themselves, in reference to the primary qualities, & of relative notion in reference to the secondary, Reid cannot mean that the former are known to us absolutely & in themselves, that is, out of relation to our cognitive faculties; for he elsewhere admits that all our knowledge is grelative.” To the same effect:‡ “Weg can know, we can conceive, only what is relative, our knowledge of qualities or phenomena is necessarily relative; for these exist only as they exist in relation to our faculties.”§ The distinction, hthen, which he drawsh between our knowledge of substances & that of attributes, though authentically a part of his philosophy, is quite irrelevant here. iFor he unquestionably thinks, &i
Fragment 2. P. 38n.13-27 (Harvard)
as predicated of acts or mental states, & the asame asa attributes of a person. bThe standard of right is indeedb a positive limit, which even ideally can cbe onlyc reached, not surpassed: but ddifferent persons may agree ind exactly conforming to the standard, eyete differ in the strength of their adherence to itf, in so much that influences (temptations for instance)f might detach one of them from it, which would have no effect gon the otherg . There are thus, consistently with hperfecth observance of the rule of right, innumerable gradations of the attribute, considered as in a iperson. This I had overlooked. Buti , on the other hand, jthe extreme limit of these gradations is the conceptionj of a Person whom no influences, knok causes, either in or out of himself, can lmake or induce to deviatel from the law of right. This I apprehend,m, ism a conception of Absolute, not of Infinite, righteousness. The doctrine, therefore, of the first edition, that an Infinite Being may have attributes which are Absolute but not nInfinite, appearsn to me maintainable. But as it is immaterial to my argument, & was only obrought in as an illustration which lay nearo at hand of the meaning of the terms, I withdraw it from pthe present discussionp .
Fragment 3. Pp. 52.14-53.15[*] (Harvard)
This aisa unanswerable if by the Absolute we bareb obliged to understand something which is not only “out of” all relation, but cis incapable of ever coming into relation with anything else: butc is this what any one can possibly mean by the dAbsoluted , who identifies the Absolute with the Creator? Granting that the Absolute implies an existence eofe itself, standing in no relation to anything; the only Absolute with which we are concerned, or in which anybody believes, must not only be capable of entering into relation with things, but must be capable of entering into any fpossible relationf with anything. May it not be known in some at least of those relations, & particularly in the relation of a Cause? And if it is a “finished, perfected, completed” Cause, i.e. the most a Cause that it is possible to be—the cause of everything except itself, then if known as such, it is known as an Absolute Cause. Has Sir W. Hamilton shewn that an Absolute Cause, thus understood, is inconceivable or unknowable? No: all he shews is, that although capable of being known, it
Fragment 4. P. 57.19-32 (Harvard)
the whole of both; & these being conceived as Infinite, to conceive a Being as occupying the whole of them is to conceive that Being as infinite. If thinking God as eternal & omnipresent is thinking him in Space & Time, athen wea do think God in space & time. If thinking him as eternal & omnipresent is not thinking him in space & time, bthen we can think himb out of Space & Time. cIc have already shewn that the ideas of infinite space & time are real & positive conceptions: that of a Being who is in all dtime & spaced is no less so. To think anything emuste be to condition it by attributes which are themselves thinkable; but not necessarily to condition it by a limited quantum of those attributes: on the contrary, we may think it under a degree of them greater than all limited degrees, & this is to think it as Infinite.(a)
Fragment 5. P. 77n.33-41 (Columbia)
aassociations, wea have a natural tendency to disbelieve bit,b but the suggestion to our mind of csome set of possiblec conditions which would be a Sufficient Reason for its dtruthd , takes away its eunbelievability, or in other wordse enables us to ‘conceive it as possible.’ This view of Sir W. Hamilton’s meaning fwould account forf his using the term in its third signification; which Mr Mansel (p. 132) also greducesg to the first, but which may be better identified with the second: for of first truths also it is impossible to assign any Sufficient Reason. hThat for this reason, however, the truths which are the basis of all our conceptions of things should be nicknamed inconceivable, I hold to be an entirely inadmissible abuse of language.h
Fragment 6. P. 118n.32[*] (Harvard)
“is one & indivisible may logically (ratione) be considered as diverse & plural, & vice versa, what are really diverse & plural may logically be viewed as one & indivisible. As an example of the former;—the sides & angles of a triangle (or trilateral) as mutually correlative—as together making up the same simple figure—& as, without destruction of that figure, actually inseparable from it, & from each other, are really one; but in as much as they have peculiar relations which may, in thought, be considered severally & for themselves, they are logically twofold.”
Does Sir W. Hamilton mean to say that the sides of a triangle, & its angles, are really and in themselves one—that there is “identity” between them; & that they only differ as the same thing regarded in a different point of view? If so, the words one, same, & identity, must have changed their meaning. I could understand his expressions if they had been used of the figure itself. That, he might justly have said, is identical, is the same in itself, though it may be regarded in two relations or points of view; in relation to its sides, as a trilateral; in relation to its angles, as a triangle. But it might as well be said that a man’s head & his feet are the same thing regarded in different points of view, as that the sides & angles of a figure are so.
We shall find, in the sequel, that this particular confusion of ideas is habitual to Sir W. Hamilton: it is quite usual with him to overlook the difference between what is implied by a thing, & what is in the thing itself. The principal novelties which he attempted to introduce into the Science of Logic, originated, as we shall see, in non-observance of this distinction.
The following passage, from the “Discussions”, (pp. 47, 48) shews that in calling knowledge & the consciousness of knowledge “really identical” he only meant that they are inseparable. “I can feel without perceiving, I can perceive without imagining, I can imagine without remembering, I can remember without judging (in the emphatic signification), I can judge without willing. One of these acts does not immediately suppose the other. Though modes merely of the same indivisible subject, they are modes in relation to each other, really distinct, & admit, therefore, of psychological discrimination. But can I feel without being conscious that I feel? can I remember, without being conscious that I remember? or, can I be conscious, without being conscious that I perceive, or imagine, or reason? . . . . But
Fragment 7. P. 225n.25-33 (Harvard)
“got directly from the sense of touch”. This is aa good answer to Platner’s conclusion that those notions are obtained by sight alone: but it does not conflict with Platner’s observations, nor with any inference drawn from them by me. It is, on the contrary, exactly what I should expecta . The sense of sight bnot beingb necessary to give the perception of simultaneity c(though it gives that perception more promptly & on a wider scale) is not necessary to the genesis I have suggested of the idea of extension out of the muscular feelings. Nor do I in the least doubt that ac person born blind can acquire, dthough by a much slowerd process, all that there is in our notion of Space, except the visible picture: but he will be much longer before he realizes it completely, & in the case of Platner’s patient, that point does not seem to have been reached.
Fragment 8. Pp. 503.25-504.7[*] (Yale)
A history of philosophy from his hand, unless proposing to himself a new object had altered his point of view, could not have been final; it would not have been a philosophical history of philosophy; but it would have stood in the same relation to such a work—in which accurate & complete annals stand to political history: it would have aprodigiously abridged the labour of subsequent historians & could have been an invaluable protection against their mistakesa . Such, therefore,
the following list includes the corrections and emendations made silently in the text. Accidental typographical errors in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd editions are not recorded, nor are substantives in those editions, except that those which are probably typographical errors, but have some plausibility, are recorded as variants in the text, with a query as to their status. In the list, after the page and line number of this edition, the first reading is that of the unamended text; this is followed by the corrected reading as it would appear if we followed the style and format of the 4th ed. (i.e., our restyling, for example of quotations, sometimes gives the actual reading in the text a slightly different appearance from that in the list below). The entries conclude, where appropriate, with a justification (in square brackets) for the emendations. The asterisks indicate typographical errors which occurred as a result of the resetting of lines that, in the previous edition, began with the word before which the quotation marks appear (in the original editions all quotations of more than two lines have quotation marks at the beginning of all lines). The four entries between 103 and 112 are included because Gathering K in the 4th ed. exists in two states, one of which contains the erroneous readings.
civ. 7 ).[.)]
Table of Contents, Chap. ix On the [Of the] [as in title in text in all eds., and in Table of Contents in 651, 652]
Table of Contents, Chap xx of Forms [, or Forms,] [as in title in text in all eds.]
Table of Contents, Chap. xxv 553  [paging altered in this edition]
Table of Contents, Chap. xxvi 561  [paging altered in this edition]
Table of Contents, Chap. xxvii 591  [paging altered in this edition]
Table of Contents, Chap. xxviii 617  [paging altered in this edition]
14.18 immediately, [immediately] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
16.36 complement [complement,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
17.13 phænomena— [phænomena,—] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
18.17 “inferred [inferred]*
31.27 “the phænomena [the “phænomena] [as in Source, 67]
43.15 cognizable [cognisable] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
44.6 est [best] [dropped character]
45.1 [line space added] [as in 651, 652]
45n.17 divine [Divine] [as in Source, 67; note added in 67]
52.12 of a cause [of a Cause] [as in 651, 652, and elsewhere in sentence]
55n.4-5 denominates “plurality [“denominates plurality] [as in Source, 651]
89. Title conditioned [conditioned,] [as in 651, 652, and Table of Contents of all eds.]
95.16 a “conscious [“a conscious] [as in Source, 651, 652]
103.35 am I [I am] [as in 651, 652, 67, and other state of 72]
104.19 It is [Is it] [as in 651, 652, 67, and other state of 72]
111.40 now; [now:] [as in 651, 652, 67, and other state of 72]
112.27 organ; [organ:] [as in 651, 652, 67, and other state of 72]
116.30 feeling; [feeling:] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
117n.2 194,5 [194-5] [as in 651, 652]
119.17 relative. The [relative.” “The] [to indicate that two passages are quoted]
119.31 [I believe [I [believe] [as in 651, 652, and to conform to Source]
119.35 [of the God [of the [God] [as in 651, 652, and to conform to Source]
133.6-7 instrumeut [instrument]
138.2 consciousness [Consciousness] [as in 651, 652, and with same and the following sentences]
138.22 sense [Sense] [as in Source, 651, 652]
142.15 himself [himself.]
150.20 minds. [minds.”] [as in 651, 652, 67; indicated in this edition by a line space]
150.22 quality [duality] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
151.24 that [“that] [as in 651, 652, 67]*
153n.1 Dissertation C [Note C] [to conform to usage elsewhere]
158.8 succ eds [succeeds]
168.6 it [it,] [as in 651, 652, 67]
173.33 decidedly [“decidedly] [as in 651, 652, 67]
173.37 surrendered [surrendered,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
182.10 ourselves [ourselves.]
190.5 mind [Mind] [as in 651, 652, 67, and elsewhere in same passage]
205n.8 consciousness, [consciousness;] [as in Source, 67; note added in 67]
213.19 matter [Matter] [as in 651, 652, and elsewhere in passage]
223.5-6 Pyschological [Psychological]
223.12 Pyschological [Psychological]
228.32 conceiving [perceiving] [as in Source, 651]
237.3 by [“by] [as in 651, 652, 67]
239.11 on the [on] [as in Source, 651)
252.34 one into [into one] [as in both Sources, 651]
253.18 into mind [into the mind] [as in both Sources, 651]
253.34 another, [another idea,] [as in Source, 651]
253.38 impotant [important]
256.23 results [result] [as in Source, 651, 652]
256.28 constituted [constituent] [as in Source, 651, 652]
272.4 Lecture, [Lecture,* [footnote:] *Lectures, i, 338.] [as in 651, 652, 67; the footnote was erroneously deleted when a revision in 72 deleted the other original footnotes on this page]
273.12 science [science,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
274n.4 be neither [neither be] [as in Source, 651]
277.28 immediately [mediately] [as in Source, 651]
277.28 consciousness— [consciousness,—] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
277.40 Germany, Prussia [Germany,—Prussia] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
278.26 ideas of A [ideas A] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
281n.9 restricted [astricted] [as in Source, 651]
282.40 antecedent [antecedents] [as in 651, 652, 67]
286.25 and an alkali [and alkali] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
287.4 compositions [compositions,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
287.6 to the [to their] [as in Source, 651]
288.8 retraction [retractation] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
288.12 reading [reaching] [as in 651, 652, 67]
289.19 retraction [retractation] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
291.22 explanation [explanation,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
294.12 cause [Cause] [as in 651, 652, 67, and same sentence]
295.20 this, [this] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
295.40 transport— [transport,—] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
297.10 is [“is] [as in 651, 652, 67]
298.20 principle [Principle] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
304.31 tell; [tell:] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
306.7 [line space added to make references clear]
306.10 it [it,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
306.14 generals [generals,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
306.25-6 object, and [object, and,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
306.32 extended [extended,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
306.34 extended, [extended] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
306.42 then [then,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
307.17 “the employment [the “employment] [as in Source, 651, 652]*
308n.3 co-existing [coexisting] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
309.20 not [not,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
310n.1 iii,137 [iii.137]
318.18 is a part of it [it is a part of] [as in 651, 652]
319.6 follows:* [follows:†]
319.19 that is [that it is] [as in 651, 652, 67]
322.16-17 “the words [the “words] [as in Source, 651, 652]*
325.22 manner [manner,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
332.12 ?” [”?] [the question is JSM’s, not Source’s]
333.10 judgment [Judgment] [as in 651, 652, and elsewhere]
337n.19 for [“for] [as in 651, 652, 67]
337n.27 Hamilton’s. [Hamilton’s,]
338.7 subject [Subject] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
342.10 those [these] [as in Source, 651]
347.13 reasoning [Reasoning] [as in 651, 652, and elsewhere in same sentence]
348.11 is [in] [as in 651, 652]
348n.3 Ibid [Ibid.]
349n.1 ‘the [“the]
350n.1 practical, not productive [practical, not productive] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
356.8 soul [Soul] [as in 651, 652, 67, and to conform to rest of passage]
368.23 material [Material] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
369.16 ἑξοχήν [ἐξοχήν] [correct in 651, 652, 67]
376.19 principle [Principle] [as in 651, 652, and to conform to rest of passage]
380.16 Concepts [concepts] [as in 651, 652, 67, and to conform to rest of passage]
382.14 leave [have] [as in 651, 652, 67]
382.15 laws [laws,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
384.11 object [objects] [as in 651, 652, and for sense]
391n.5 a crocodile [the crocodile] [as in Source, 67; passage added in 67]
397.5 means every [means Every] [as in 651, 652, 67, and to conform to rest of passage]
398.40 all [All] [for sense]
399n.12 this [his] [as in 651, 652, 67, and to match mine in same sentence]
399n.20 is B [is all B] [for sense]
400n.7 is [is,] [as in 651, 652, 67]
400n.13 all [All] [for sense]
400n.22 Schiebler [Scheibler] [correctly given in 651]
401.13 some [Some] [for sense]
401.14 some [Some] [for sense]
401.29 all [All] [for sense]
403.30 words [moods] [as in Source]
405.23 Roman [Roman,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
407.10 the “harmony [“the harmony] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
408n.1 Lectures [*Lectures]
410.5 disjunctive [Disjunctive] [as in 651, 652, and elsewhere in passage]
411.18 no [No] [as in 651, 652, 67, and to conform to rest of passage]
411.38 immediata, [immediata] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
415.18 Logicæ; [Logicæ:] [as in 651, 652, 67, and for consistency]
415n.7 Logicæ [Logicum]
417.11 vacuum; [vacuum:] [as in 651, 652, and for consistency]
423n.7 says [says,] [reference moved to end of quotation]
427n.6 now [now] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
427n.13 these: [these;] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
427n.30 same: [same;] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
427n.35 contra. [contra,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
431.34 reaction” (what [reaction.” [What] [for intelligibility and to accommodate altered style]
432.22 forth, nor [forth, nor,] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
438.39 responsibility, [responsibility,—] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
440n.2 Lectures i [Lectures, i]
440.16 necessity [Necessity] [as in 651, 652, 67, and to conform to rest of passage]
442n.5 Appendix [(Appendix]
443n.2 on [to] [as passim]
445.12 egress [regress] [as in 651, 652, 67, and for sense]
447.24-5 phliosophers [philosophers]
458n.7 a “well [“a well] [as in Source, 67; passage added in 67]
468.34 shunned [shunned.]
469.9 happen, [happen.]
478.21 qualities [quantities] [as in 651, 652, and for sense]
479.31 Laws [laws] [as in 651, 652, 67, and elsewhere in sentence]
483.5 make [makes]
483.11 “It [“ ‘It] [as in Source]
483.11 time, says Baillet, since [time,’ says Baillet, ‘since] [JSM adds says Baillet,]
483.18 traces. [traces.’] [as in Source]
483.19 Revera [‘Revera] [as in Source]
483.25 expedire.” . . . [expedire. . . .’] [to conform to Source; 651, 652, 67 lack the quotation marks]
483.29 of [“of] [as in 651, 652; the quotation from Hamilton continues]
483.36 mankind.” [mankind.’ ”] [as in Source]
486n.8 35, 42 [35-42] [as in 651, 652, 67]
487.11 “Wonder, says Aristotle, is . . . philosophy; [“ ‘Wonder,’ says Aristotle, ‘is . . . philosophy;’] [as in Source]
487.15 world,’ [world,] [as in Source, 651, 652]
487.25 heavens.” [heavens.’ ”] [as in Source]
490.10 pyschological [psychological]
491n.20 This [This,] [as in 651, 652, 67]
503n.7 τῆν [τὴν] [as in Source]
503n.7 ἴνα [ἵνα] [as in Source, 651, 652, 67]
in the following list the entries take this form: page and line reference in this edition; reading in the copy-text; corrected reading [in square brackets]. The addition of “Vol.” or “P.” and such changes as “p.” to “P.” are not noted, if there is no other correction made. In all references to “Footnotes to Reid” we have silently added “n” to JSM’s page references. Also, except where a correction is involved, the division or combination of references is not noted. Apart from these exceptions, and the corrections listed below, all other changes are signalled in the text by square brackets.
13n.1 p. 643 [pp. 643-4]
14n.5 844 [844n]
15n.2 866 [866n]
21n.5 866 [866n]
22n.1 p. 320 [pp. 322n-3n]
26n.12 p. 313 [Pp. 313n-14n]
27n.2 Reid, 886 [“Dissertations,” p. 880]
27n.8-9 79 [79n]; p. 82 [pp. 82-3]
27n.19 30 [30n]
28n.7 p. 83 [pp. 83-4]
34n.8 90-98 [90-6]
42n.3 p. 13 [pp. 14-15]
43n.4 pp. 32, 33 [p. 33]
44n.1 pp. 34, 35 [p. 35]
45n.19 107 [107n]
50n.4 50 [50n]
52n.24 159 [159n]
61n.9 Pp. 749, 750 [p. 750]
64n.3 p. 36 [pp. 36-7]
64n.19 126 [126n]
64n.24 126 [126n]
74n.2 234, 235 [235-6]
76n.12 132 [132n]
77n.8 36 [36n]
77n.39 132 [132n]
81n.6 100 et seq. [100-4]
99n.40 pp. 28, 29 [p. 28]
111n.2 228 [pp. 228-9]
111n.4-112n.1 218-221 [*218-19 †219-21]
118n.20 806 [806n]
123n.13 129 [129n]
132n.1-2 pp. 743-745 [divided into two, p. 743, p. 745]
137n.19 p. 129 [pp. 129-30]
141n.6 pp. 52, 53 [P. 52]
142n.4 894 [894n]
149n.1 377 
149n.3 p. 283 [pp. 283-4]
150n.1-151n.2 288-95 [reference split into two (the first, on p. 150n.1, is to 288; and the second, on p. 151n.2 is corrected to 292-4)]
152n.1 pp. 296-7 [p. 296]
153n.21 817 [817n]
154n.4 p. xxxix [pp. xxxviii—xl]
154n.6 p. 684 [pp. 684-6]
165n.17-18 p. 309 [pp. 309-10]
169n.1 p. 56 [pp. 56-7]
170n.4 p. 123 [pp. 123-4]
205n.9 p. 7 [Pp. 7-8]
214n.8 854, 855 [864n-5n]
220n.1 869 [869n]
224n.1 p. 174 [pp. 174-5]
225n.25 143 [143n]
229n.1 p. 167 [pp. 167-8]
234n.5 p. 376 [pp. 376-7]
234n.5 368 
234n.43 p. 377 [pp. 377n-8n]
235n.1 861 [861n]
237n.8 pp. 874, 875 [p. 875n]
237n.11 151 [151n]
262n.16 p. 90 [pp. 90-1]
266n.16 p. xxvii [Pp. xxvii-xxviii]
266n.19 112 [112n]
267n.1 p. 149 [pp. 149-50]
274n.20 339-346 [339-40]
275n.1-3 347-349 and 349-351 [references split among three separate notes]
278n.1 iii [i]
290n.9 620 [620n]
298n.2 p. 149 [pp. 149-50]
302n.3 286 
302n.4 p. 287 [pp. 287-8]
303n.1 287-290 [288-90]
305n.1 p. 298 [pp. 298-300]
306n.1-307n.1 131-137 [131, 134-6] [reference split between two separate notes]
317n.6 p. 276 [pp. 276-7]
319n.1 p. 171 [pp. 171-2]
321n.1 121, 127 [121, 126, 127]
321n.3 283 [283n]
321n.5 212 
330n.1 p. 204 [pp. 204-5]
332n.14 53-56 [53-5]
334n.1 787, 788 [787n-8n]
337n.8 p. 58 [pp. 58-9]
358n.1 p. 78 [pp. 78-9]
373n.1 113 [713n]
383n.19 527, 528 [527-9]
393n.4 379-384 [379 and ff.]
396n.2 601 [691n]
400n.19 p. 259 [pp. 259-61]
401n.11 600, 601 [690n-1n]
414n.9 Sect. 5 et 6 [§§8 and 9]
415n.10 p. 197 [pp. 197-8]
416n.2 652 [652n]
420n.1 pp. 628, 631 [p. 628n]
422n.4 861 [861n]
434n.1 p. 495 [pp. 494-5]
438n.1 25 et seqq. [25-6]
440n.2 26, 37 [26-7]
449n.6 22 et seqq. [22-3]
452n.1 13, 14 [43-4]
466n.7 46 [46n]
491n.20 pp. 247, 248 [p. 248]
497n.13 p. 2 [pp. 3-4]
Bibliographic Index of Persons and Works Cited in the Examination, with Variants and Notes
mill, like most nineteenth-century authors, is cavalier in his approach to sources, seldom identifying them with sufficient care, and frequently quoting them inaccurately. This Appendix is intended to help correct these deficiencies, and to serve as an index of names and titles (which are consequently omitted in the Index proper). The material is arranged in alphabetical order, with an entry for each person or work quoted or referred to in the text.
The entries take the following form:
1. Identification: author, title, etc., in the usual bibliographic form.
2. Notes (if required) giving information about JSM’s use of the source, indication if the work is in his library, and any other relevant information.
3. A list of the places where the author or work is quoted, and a separate list of the places where there is reference only. Those works that are reviewed are so noted.
4. A list of substantive variants between JSM’s text and his source, in this form: Page and line reference to the present text. Reading in the present text] Reading in the source (page reference in the source).
The list of substantive variants also attempts to place quoted passages in their contexts by giving the beginnings and endings of sentences. Omissions of two sentences or less are given in full; only the length of other omissions is given. Translated material from the French is given in the original. When the style has been altered, the original form is retained in the entries (except that the quotation marks in the left margin of the original, used to signal the continuation of quotations, are omitted).
Abbott, Thomas Kingsmill.Sight and Touch: an attempt to disprove the received (or Berkeleian) theory of vision. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1864.
note: the reference is in a quotation from Mahaffy. Fraser’s article mentioned at 242n was apparently not republished.
referred to: 240
242n.3 “Let us suppose] Let us then suppose (70)
242n.5 which, therefore, is] which is therefore (70)
242n.8 farthest] furthest (70)
note: the quotation is in a quotation from Hamilton, who mistakenly attributes the passage to Abelard. See St. Augustine.
Aldrich, Henry.Artis Logicæ Compendium. Oxford: Sheldonian Theatre, 1704.
note: JSM’s reference is to “Quæstionum Logicarum Determinatio, quæst. 19,” which is Lib. II, Cap. v, §15 in the 1st ed. (Oxford: Sheldonian Theatre, 1691), but is there designated as JSM designates it in the ed. cited (a copy of which is in the London Library, and may have been part of JSM’s donation of his father’s books). The first sentence he quotes is the rubric for the section. A copy of the ed. edited by H. L. Mansel (Oxford: Graham, 1852) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, inscribed “From the Author” on the flyleaf.
415.6 “Contraria . . . distant. Non] 19. Contraria . . . distant. / §.19. Non (118)
Alembert, Jean le Rond d’. Mélanges de littérature, d’histoire, et de philosophie. New ed. 5 vols. Amsterdam: Chatelain, 1759-67.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. Both references, which are to the same passage, derive from Hamilton.
referred to: 228, 255n
Alexander, Patrick Proctor.Mill and Carlyle. An Examination of Mr. John Stuart Mill’s Doctrine of Causation in Relation to Moral Freedom. With an Occasional Discourse on Sauerteig, by Smelfungus. Edinburgh: Nimmo, 1866.
quoted: 449n, 450n, 451n, 457n, 460n, 462n, 463n
referred to: civ, 449n, 457n, 460n, 463n, 466n, 467n
449n.3 consciousness. . . . As] consciousness; certain it is at least, it was at one time by Mr Mill himself so considered—vide “System of Logic,” as before quoted—“The practical feeling of Free-will common in a greater or less degree to all mankind.” [ellipsis indicates 4-sentence omission] As (22-3) [cf. entry for 450n.26 below]
449n.23 “general . . . race;”] To the general . . . race, philosophers with rigour excepted. (25)
449n.25 “unless . . . thousand,”] It is not that the philosopher will lie like a thief, in wilful misreport of his consciousness; but by the very conditions of the case, unless . . . thousand, he is incapable of an accurate observation and candid notation of its contents. (25)
450n.26 “practical feeling of Free Will”] Perhaps it is not; but what I feel I am able to do is surely a subject of consciousness; certain it is at least, it was at one time by Mr Mill himself so considered—vide “System of Logic,” as before quoted—“The practical feeling of Free-will common in a greater or less degree to all mankind.” (22) [cf. Mill, A System of Logic, CW, VIII, 836]
450n.26-7 “a feeling of Moral Freedom which we are conscious of,”] “The feeling of moral Freedom we are conscious of.” (22-3) [cf. Mill, A System of Logic, CW, VIII, 841]
450n.27-8 “was . . . conscious”] And as Mr Mill himself now interprets this feeling of Freedom of which he was . . . conscious, it “must have meant” a being “conscious before he had decided that he was able to decide either way.” (23)
451n.2 he not] not he (29)
451n.14-15 “veritable consciousness.” . . . “ a fraudulent substitute palmed upon him”] Should Mr Mill, on the other hand, deny that he is so conscious, we venture to assert with some confidence, that his consciousness contradicts that of every man not a Necessitarian philosopher; and further, that it is not his veritable consciousness, but a fraudulent substitute palmed off upon him by the “system” to which he is wedded. (29)
457n.2-3 “our current moralities” . . . “as a form of superstition,”] And no man who reasons with the least strictness can fail to evolve for himself this result of the doctrine; having done which, he can only, on the ground of logic, regard our current Moralities as a form of superstition, useful, perhaps—as the Christian religion is admitted still to have its uses by many who for themselves will have none of it—but not otherwise entitled to the respect of an advanced intelligence. (118)
457n.3-4 “moral ideas as illusions,” . . . “it . . . motives:”] Precisely according to the decisiveness with which we recognise moral ideas as illusions, it . . . motives. (119)
457n.5-7 “The . . . evaporated:”] The . . . evaporated—it has absolutely, so to speak, evaporated in the emancipated world—relatively in the emancipated individual—on the obvious ground of the extinction in him of the special sympathy. (119)
457n.8-9 “in . . . indifference,” . . . “might . . . are,”] Also, in the emancipated world, the other remaining “external sanctions” might . . . are, in . . . indifference, which—even in the supposed disappearance of all virtue—would be nearly sure to proclaim itself in the virtue of charity. (119) [JSM has reversed clausal order]
457n.10-11 “succeed . . . gorilla.”] But instantly the tendency to so degrade itself would begin to operate in the world, and—give him time—how much we decline to specify—our faith in man is fixed that he would succeed . . . Gorilla, so as even to satisfy the strictest scientific requirements of the Professor Huxley of the period. (120-1)
462n.32 “How should] For how should (65)
462n.3-6 “could . . . assurance,” . . . “that . . . one, we should be obliged to admit that their doom was not just in the particular instance.”] Of assassins who “ regard themselves not as criminals but as heroic martyrs,” we may boldly say that could . . . assurance that . . . one, however, on obvious grounds of general expediency, we might acquiesce in the doom awarded them, the Justice of it as deserved or due to their deed, considered in itself, and as an isolated act, we should very peremptorily deny. Justifiable we should call it in general not just in the particular instance. (63-4)
462n.12 “may . . . virtue.”] Generally, in such cases, while we may doubt if it be morally just (deserved) that the particular hero should suffer for what may really have been an act of sublime virtue, his punishment may yet seem justifiable to us, on the ground that no society could afford to grow a succession of them. (64)
462n.22 “culpable . . . it.”] As to “crimes committed in obedience to a perverted conscience,” it seems sufficient to say that we consider them justly (or deservedly) punished as so committed; we hold the felon responsible for his crime, if not immediately perhaps, yet mediately as culpable . . . it, in so far as this may fairly be surmised to have emerged under the conditions of sanity. (63)
463n.12-16 “asserting . . . motives;” . . . “to assert an absolute commencement as the mode under . . . though inconceivable, has . . . believed:” . . . “would . . . uncaused.”] How, while with emphasis asserting . . . motives, could Hamilton also intend to assert “an absolute commencement” as the mode under . . . though “inconceivable, was . . . believed? This would . . . uncaused. (80)
Ammonius Hermiæ.Ammonii Hermiæ in Aristotelis de Interpretatione Librum Commentarius. Venice: Aldus, 1546.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College; Vol. I of the 3-vol. set is inscribed: “This is indeed a liber rarissimus & was bought by me at Norwich upon the sale of Mr. Hobson’s books. SP [i.e., Samuel Parr].” The quotation of Aristotle at 413 is from Ammonius, 175.
Anon. “Mill on Hamilton,” North American Review, CIII (July, 1866), 250-60.
referred to: cv, 32n
31.3 “An existence] But if Hamilton’s more extended use of the word be admissible, then an existence (252)
31.6 things. . . . If the meaning] [ellipsis indicates 3-sentence omission] This is the issue of the book; but if the meaning (252-3)
31.6 word phenomenon which] word “phenomenon” which (253)
31.8 figure, &c., though] figure, etc., though (253)
Archimedes. Referred to: 482
note: the references at 142, 152, 395 are in quotations from Hamilton; that at 328 is in a quotation from Reid; one of those at 385 is in a quotation from Hamilton, the other in a quotation from Baynes.
referred to: cvii, 142, 152, 328, 385, 389, 395, 489n, 494, 502
— Categories, in The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics (Greek and English). Trans. Harold P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938, 12-108.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The quotations at 413-16, Latin translations of vi, 6a17-18, are in quotations from various writers on logic.
quoted: 413, 413-16
referred to: 345
— The Metaphysics (Greek and English). Trans. Hugh Tredennick. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1933.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The quotations at 40, 40n are in a quotation from Hamilton; that at 413 is in a quotation from Ammonius Hermiæ; the indirect quotation at 487 is in a quotation from Hamilton; the quotations at 498, 503n derive from Hamilton.
quoted: 40, 40n, 411, 413, 487, 498, 503, 503n
— The Nichomachean Ethics (Greek and English). Trans. H. Rackham. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The quotation at 105n is in a quotation from Mansel; that at 349n is in a quotation from Hamilton; those at 503, 503n derive from Hamilton; the references derive from Hamilton.
quoted: 105n, 349n, 503, 503n
referred to: 349, 435
— On the Heavens (Greek and English). Trans. W. K. C. Guthrie. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference.
— On Interpretation, in The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics (Greek and English). Trans. Harold P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938, 114-78.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference.
quoted: 411-12, 413
— On the Soul, in On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath (Greek and English). Trans. W. S. Hett. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935, 8-203.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The notion of species sensibiles, mistakenly attributed to Lucretius at 15, originated in this work. The reference at 356 derives from Reid and Hamilton.
referred to: 15, 155, 356
— Parts of Animals, in Parts of Animals, Movement of Animals, Progression of Animals (Greek and English). Trans. A. L. Peck. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937, 52-430.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference.
— The Physics (Greek and English). Trans. Philip H. Wickstead and Francis M. Cornford. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The reference derives from Hamilton.
referred to: 425
note: the reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 152, 174
— Des vrayes et des fausses idées, contre ce qu’enseigne l’auteur de la Recherche de la vérité. Cologne: Schouten, 1683.
note: the reference derives from Reid.
referred to: 175
— and Pierre Nicole. The Port-Royal Logic. See Baynes.
note: the reference at 497n is in a quotation from Grote.
referred to: 368, 417, 418, 430, 485, 485n, 497n
— De Augmentis Scientiarum, in The Works of Francis Bacon. Ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath. 14 vols. London: Longman, et al., 1857-74, I, 415-840.
referred to: 368
— Novum Organum, in ibid., I, 119-365.
note: the reference at 368 is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 368, 423
Bailey, Samuel.Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Second Series. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1858.
note: the references are to Letter IV. The Doctrines of Sir William Hamilton Regarding Perception.
referred to: 162n, 178
— A Review of Berkeley’s Theory of Vision, designed to Show the Unsoundness of that Celebrated Speculation. London: Ridgway, 1842.
referred to: 178, 236n, 242n-3n, 256n
Baillet, Adrien.La Vie de Monsieur Des-Cartes. 2 vols. Paris: Horthemels, 1691.
note: the quotations are in a quotation from Hamilton.
Bain, Alexander. Referred to: 9, 51, 216n
— Logic. 2 pts. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1870.
note: the two pts. are separately paginated. The exact wording suggested by the reference at 268 has not been found, but the doctrine is reflected in the passage cited, as well as elsewhere in the work.
referred to: 268, 293n
— The Senses and the Intellect. London: Parker, 1855.
note: the reference at 216n is in a quotation from McCosh; the quotation at 241 is in a quotation from Mahaffy. See also 2nd ed. below.
quoted: 217-19, 241
referred to: 216, 216n, 224, 227n, 234n, 235, 236, 240, 249
217.9 “When a muscle] Under this head it may be asserted that when a muscle (113)
217.10 carried; there] carried; that there (113)
218.4-5 former (from . . . effort) chiefly] former chiefly (114)
218.9 effort. . . . [paragraph] If] [ellipsis indicates 1-paragraph omission] (114)
218.10 If] 26. If (114)
218.10-11 determination] discrimination (114)
218.25-6 manner. . . . [paragraph] It] manner. But we shall defer the consideration of this attribute till we come to speak of the senses, more especially Touch and Sight. [paragraph] It (115)
218.41 once whether] once as to whether (115)
218.47 The third] 27. The third (116)
219.3 quicker motion with] quicker movement with (116)
219.8 extension. . . . [paragraph] We] [ellipsis indicates 1-paragraph omission] (116)
219.9 We] 28. We (116)
241.24 quicker motion with] quicker movement with (116)
— The Senses and the Intellect. 2nd ed. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1864.
note: the exact wording of the reference has not been found, but Bain, in describing the phenomenon, uses “Law of Relativity” and “principle of relativity” in the passage cited (cf. ibid., 5, 325-6, 399ff., and 1st ed. [London: Parker, 1855]). The same wordings occur in Bain’s Mental and Moral Science (London: Longmans, Green, 1868), 83, 185; in his The Emotions and the Will, 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1865), 599; and in his Logic, I, 3. See also 1st ed. above.
quoted: 226-7, 231-4, 234n, 242, 245
referred to: 5, 216n, 228
226.17-18 eye,” . . . “is] eye is (370)
227.3 visible [“visual”] organ] visible organ (371)
227.5 orbit. . . . [paragraph] When] [ellipsis indicates 2-page omission] (371-4)
227.11 further experience] further experience (374)
231.12 “I] The statement here made that all sensations, of which we are conscious as one out of another, afford a condition of apprehending extension, seems to me to imply and take for granted the point in dispute: for I (376)
234n.32 place, the essential] place, as remarked in the text, the essential (377n)
245.26 members.—When] members. [paragraph] When (398)
245.28 In this case] In such a case (398)
245.30 By getting a blow on] By a hurt on (398)
245.31 place in our] place on our (398)
245.34 sensations.”] sensations; if, in addition, they are not well supplied with distinctive nerves, the difficulty is still greater. (398)
Bartholinus, Casparus.Enchiridion Logicum ex Aristotele. 3rd ed. Leipzig: Cober, 1618.
note: this ed., which JSM cites, is in the London Library, and may have been one of his father’s books given by JSM.
415.14 se mutuo] mutuo se (186)
Bayle, Pierre.Dictionnaire historique et critique. 2 vols. Rotterdam: Reinier Leers, 1697.
referred to: 425
Baynes, Thomas Spencer.An Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms, being that which gained the prize proposed by Sir Wm. Hamilton in the year 1846 for the best exposition of the new Doctrine propounded in his Lectures. With an Historical Appendix. Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox, 1850.
—, trans. Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole. The Port-Royal Logic. 3rd ed. Edinburgh: Sutherland, Knox; London: Simkin, Marshall, 1854.
note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The reference derives merely from the title-page of Baynes’s Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms.
referred to: 386n
Bentham, Jeremy. Referred to: 37
note: the reference at 153n is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 6, 10, 15n, 110, 152, 153n, 155, 163n, 183, 195, 196, 209n, 307, 362, 424, 493n
— The Analyst: or, a discourse addressed to an infidel mathematician:wherein it is examined whether the object, principles, and inferences, of the modern analysis are more distinctly perceived, or more evidently deduced, than religious mysteries and points of faith, in The Works of George Berkeley, D. D. 3 vols. London: Priestley, 1820, II, 401-55.
note: this ed. (now lacking Vol. I) in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 428
— A Defence of Free-Thinking in Mathematics. In Answer to a Pamphlet of Philalethes Cantabrigiensis, entitled, Geometry no Friend to Infidelity, or a Defence of Sir Isaac Newton and the British Mathematicians. Also, An Appendix concerning Mr. Walton’s Vindication of the Principles of Fluxions against the Objections contained in the Analyst. Wherein it is attempted to put this controversy in such a light as that every reader may be able to judge thereof, in ibid., III, 1-62.
referred to: 428
— An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, in ibid., I, 225-316.
referred to: 230, 242n-3n
— A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in the sciences, with the grounds of scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, are inquired into, in ibid., I, 1-106.
note: JSM undoubtedly takes the quotation from Hamilton (who elides the paragraph that JSM does), but makes two errors in transcription that Hamilton does not (see final two entries in the collation below).
304.4 “It] VII. It (5)
304.16 Again] VIII. Again (6)
304.28 whatever] whatsoever (6)
304.29-30 sense. [paragraph] Whether] sense. [1-paragraph omission] X. Whether (6-8)
304.30 abstracting their ideas] [in italics] (8)
304.34 part] parts (8)
304.42 am] own (8)
Bible. Referred to: 204n
— Acts. Quoted: 35
— I Corinthians.
note: the quotation is indirect.
note: the quotation is indirect.
471.34 a cloud of witnesses] Wherefore seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily be set us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us. (12:1)
note: the quotation is indirect.
44.13-14 he who feeds the ravens] Who provideth for the raven his food,/When his young ones cry unto God,/And wander for lack of meat. (38:41-3)
note: the quotation is indirect.
439.21-2 the eye must have been made by one who sees, and the ear by one who hears.] He that planted the ear, shall he not hear?/He that formed the eye, shall he not see? (94:9)
Bland, Miles.Algebraical Problems, producing simple and quadratic equations, with their solutions; designed as an introduction to the higher branches of analytics. Cambridge: Nicholson, 1812.
referred to: 476
— Geometrical Problems deducible from the first six books of Euclid, arranged and solved. To which is added, an Appendix containing the elements of plane geometry. Cambridge: Nicholson, 1819.
referred to: 476
Bolton, M. P. W. Inquisitio Philosophica. An Examination of the Principles of Kant and Hamilton. London: Chapman and Hall, 1866.
referred to: vii, 29n, 35n
52n.21-2 “In discussing] It is to be observed that in discussing (159n)
52n.22 Absolute] “Absolute” (159n)
note: the reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 487
Boswell, James.Life of Johnson. 2nd ed. 3 vols. London: Dilly, 1793.
note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 183
Brerewood, Edward.Tractatus Quidam Logici de Prædicabilibus, et Prædicamentis. 3rd ed. Oxford: Turner, 1637.
note: a copy of this ed. is in the London Library, and may be part of the donation by JSM of his father’s books. JSM gives Tractatus Decimus, §§5 and 6, rather than §§8 and 9. (In the 1st ed., ibid., 1628, the passage is also in §§8 and 9.)
414.21 “Contraria a Dialecticis] [paragraph] Contraria à Dialecticis (367)
414.21-3 Sunt Opposita . . . natura.] [in italics] (367)
414.22 et eodem] et eidem (367)
414.23 natura. . . . Sed] [ellipsis indicates 1-paragraph omission, and a move from §8 to the beginning of the 1st paragraph of §9] (367-8)
414.24 præcipue] præcipuæ (368)
414.24 Dialecticorum] Dialecticorum (368)
414.24 authoritans] authoritatis (368)
414.25 Aristotele] Aristotele (368)
414.25-6 breviorum: Contraria] breviorem. [paragraph] Contraria (368)
note: the references at 168 and 169 are in quotations from Hamilton.
referred to: 10, 17, 115, 116, 153, 153n, 168, 169, 171, 172, 183, 196, 197, 217n, 239, 291, 294, 362, 440, 490n, 493n, 497, 497n-8n.
— Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind. 19th ed. 4 vols. Edinburgh: Black; London: Longman, 1851.
note: the reference at 225n is in a quotation from Mahaffy; the last reference at 158 is in a quotation from Hamilton.
quoted: 167n, 221n
referred to: 15, 155-9, 163-8, 174-6, 219-21, 224, 225n, 424
167n.4-5 “I do not,” . . . “conceive] In the view which I take of the subject, accordingly, I do not conceive (II, 11)
221n.3-4 feelings” . . . “when] feelings, however, when (II, 3)
221n.4 was] we (II, 3)
221n.5 divisibility . . . parts] [not in italics] (II, 3)
221n.5-6 length . . . divisibility.] [not in italics] (II, 3)
221n.9 “It would] It certainly, at least, would (II, 7)
221n.10 efforts] effort (II, 7)
221n.12 mind.”] mind, and arisen too in circumstances which must lead to the combination of them in one complex notion. (II, 7)
Brutus, Marcus Junius.
note: the reference derives from Alexander.
referred to: 462n
Burgersdijck, Franco.Institutionum logicarum libri duo. Cambridge: Field, 1660.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. JSM’s spelling is Burgersdyk, and he refers to the work as Burgersdicii Institutiones Logicæ.
413.14-15 “Oppositorum . . . contradictoria.] [paragraph] VI. Oppositorum . . . contradicentia. (94)
413.15-16 contradictoria. [paragraph] Disparata] [1-paragraph omission] (94)
413.16 Disparata . . . modo.] VIII. [misprint for VII.] Disparata . . . modo. (94)
413.16-17 modo. Sic homo & equus, album & cæruleum] modo. [paragraph] I. § Sic homo & equus, album & cæruleum (94-5)
413.20 oppositorum] oppositionis (95)
413.20-1 genere. . . . [paragraph] Contraria] genere. Album & nigrum non sunt disparata, licèt album non solùm nigro, sed etiam mediis coloribus opponatur: aliter enim album nigro opponitur, aliter coloribus mediis. Similitur nec liber & servus disparata sunt, licèt servus non solùm libero, sed etiam domino opponatur, quia non est idem oppositionis genus utrobique: nam dominus & servus sunt relativè opposita; liber & servus, contraria. [paragraph] Contraria (95)
413.21 Contraria . . . distant.] [in italics] (95)
413.21 absolute] absoluta (95)
note: the reference in each case is to the well-known dilemma, Buridan’s ass, or asinus Buridani. In fact, it is not found in his works, but has traditionally been attributed to him, probably in derision.
referred to: 451n, 468
Burke, Edmund. Referred to: 160
Byron, George Gordon.Don Juan, in The Works of Lord Byron. Ed. Thomas Moore. 17 vols. London: Murray, 1832-33, XV-XVII.
referred to: 27n
note: the reference is to his “peculiar gift”; s.v. Plutarch.
referred to: 281
Calderwood, Henry.The Philosophy of the Infinite. Edinburgh: Constable; London: Hamilton and Adams, 1854.
referred to: 92, 93n
— “The Sensational Philosophy—Mr. J. S. Mill and Dr. M’Cosh,” British and Foreign Evangelical Review, XV (April, 1866), 396-412.
referred to: ciii
Cambridge Problems: Being a collection of the printed questions proposed to the candidates for the degree of Bachelor of Arts, at the General Examination, from the year 1801 to the year 1820 inclusively. London: Black and Armstrong, 1836.
note: this work is merely illustrative: see also the compilations Mathematical Problems and Examples . . . 1821-1836 (Cambridge: Grant, 1837), and A. H. Frost, ed., The Mathematical Questions . . . 1838-49 (Cambridge: Hall, 1849), and volumes for individual years, such as Cambridge Problems . . . 1843 (Cambridge: Hall, 1843).
referred to: 476
Cardaillac, Jean-Jacques Séverin de.Etudes élémentaires de philosophie. 2 vols. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1830.
note: JSM quotes Hamilton’s rendering of the passage from Cardaillac.
Carlyle, Thomas.Sartor Resartus. 2nd ed. Boston: Munroe; Philadelphia and Pittsburgh: Kay, 1837.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
423.1-2 “a thing can only act where it is; with . . . only where] Again, Nothing can act but where it is: with . . . only where (59; I, viii)
Cazelles, Emile Honoré. “Introduction du traducteur,” in Herbert Spencer, Les premiers principes. Trans. E. H. Cazelles. 3rd ed. Paris: Germer Baillière, 1883, i-lxxx.
note: the 1st ed., 1870, was not easily available, but the “Introduction” (to which JSM refers) to the 3rd ed. is dated Sept., 1870. Cazelles also translated (after 1870) Spencer’s Principles of Biology, and Principles of Sociology, Bain’s The Senses and the Intellect, and Bentham’s The Influence of Natural Religion; he translated JSM’s Examination (1869), Subjection of Women (1869), Autobiography (1874), and Three Essays on Religion (1875).
referred to: 250n
Cazillac [“Rey Régis”].Histoire naturelle et raisonnée de l’âme. 2 vols. London: n.p., 1789.
note: we have not found Cazillac’s forenames. The reference derives from Maine de Biran, who notes that “Régis’ ” work is little known.
referred to: 237-8
Cheselden, William. “An Account of some Observations made by a young Gentleman, who was born blind, or lost his Sight so early, that he had no Remembrance of ever having seen, and was couch’d between 13 and 14 Years of Age,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, XXXV (1728), 447-50.
note: the quotation at 232n is indirect; that at 236n derives from Hamilton. The passages here cited contain references also to Cheselden’s anonymous patient.
quoted: 232n, 236n
referred to: 236
232n.18-19 and asked . . . sense, feeling, or seeing.] We thought he soon knew what Pictures represented, which were shew’d to him, but we found afterwards we were mistaken; for about two Months after he was couch’d, he discovered at once, they represented solid Bodies; when to that Time he consider’d them only as Party-colour’d Planes, or Surfaces diversified with Variety of Paint; but even then he was no less surpriz’d, expecting the Pictures would feel like the Things they represented, and was amaz’d when he found those Parts, which by their Light and Shadow appear’d now round and uneven, felt only flat like the rest; and ask’d . . . Sense, Feeling or Seeing? (449) [the clause, which JSM has not placed in quotation marks, is, in fact, a direct quotation from Cheselden]
236n.7-8 “to touch his eyes, as . . . skin.”] [paragraph] When he first saw, he was so far from making any Judgment about Distances, that he thought all Objects whatever touch’d his Eyes, (as he expressed it) as . . . Skin; and thought no Objects so agreeable as those which were smooth and regular, tho’ he could form no Judgment of their Shape, or guess what it was in any Object that was pleasing to him: He knew not the Shape of any Thing, nor any one Thing from another, however different in Shape or Magnitude; but upon being told what Things were, whose Form he before knew from feeling, he would carefully observe, that he might know them again; but having too many Objects to learn at once, he forgot many of them; and (as he said) at first he learn’d to know, and again forgot a thousand Things in a Day. (448)
note: the reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 152
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. “Preface to Christabel,” in Christabel; Kubla Khan, a Vision; The Pains of Sleep. London: Murray, 1816.
note: Coleridge refers not to “one of his critics,” but “a set of critics.”
referred to: 216n
Comte, Auguste. Referred to: 17, 216n-17n, 299, 472
— Cours de philosophie positive. 6 vols. Paris: Bachelier, 1830-42.
note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 10, 216n-17n, 300, 472
— Synthèse subjective. Paris: Comte and Dalmont, 1856.
note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
472n.9 fournir] former (98)
— Système de politique positive, ou Traité de sociologie, instituant la religion de l’humanité. 4 vols. Paris: Vol. I, Mathias, Carilian-Gœury and Dalmont; Vol. II, Comte, Carilian-Gœury and Dalmont, Mathias and Ladrange; Vols. III and IV, Comte, Carilian-Gœury and Dalmont, 1851-54.
note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 314
Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de.
note: the references at 152, and 487 are in quotations from Hamilton.
referred to: 152, 208n, 364n, 440, 487
— La Logique, ou les premiers développemens de l’art de penser, in Œuvres complètes. 31 vols. Paris: Dufart, 1803, XXX.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College; though JSM’s description of Chap. i as “on the Soul” is accurate, the title actually is “Comment la nature donne les premières leçons de l’art de penser.”
referred to: 440n
note: the reference at 487 is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 333, 487
note: the reference derives from Alexander.
referred to: 462n
Cousin, Victor. Referred to: 33, 33n, 143, 152, 495
— Cours de philosophie. Histoire de la philosophie du dix-huitième siècle. 2 vols. Brussels: Hauman, 1836.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 139-40, 142
— Cours de philosophie: Introduction à l’histoire de la philosophie. Brussels: Hauman, 1836.
note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College; JSM derives his references from Hamilton’s review of the 1st ed. (Paris: Pichon and Didier, 1828) in Discussions (originally in the Edinburgh Review, L [Oct., 1828], 194-221). The quotations and references all derive from Leçons iv and v. The quotation at 43 is of Hamilton’s translation of Cousin’s passage; that at 55n is of Hamilton’s conflation of passages from Cousin.
quoted: 43, 55n
referred to: 34-7, 34n, 39, 40n, 41n, 43-4, 44n-5n, 47, 51, 52-5, 56n, 59, 62, 64, 79, 83-4, 91n, 120, 136-7, 447
43.8 “where . . . terms;”] La condition de l’intelligence, c’est la différence; et il ne peut y avoir acte de connaissance que là où il y a plusieurs termes. (129) [JSM is quoting from Hamilton’s translation of Cousin]
Crakanthorp, Richard.Logicæ libri quinque. London: Teage, 1622.
note: JSM’s spelling is Crackanthorp. JSM reverses the order of the two passages.
414.9-10 “Contraria . . . opponatur. Sic] [paragraph] Contraria . . . opponatur; Sic (206)
414.14-15 “Disparata sunt . . . opponatur.] [paragraph] Desparata sic dicta disseparata, sunt . . . opponatur. (206)
414.16 quam Liberalitati. Sic] qua liberalitati: Sic (206)
Crousaz, Jean Pierre de.
note: the reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 152
Cudworth, Ralph.The True Intellectual System of the Universe: wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and its impossibility demonstrated. Trans. John Harrison. 3 vols. London: Tegg, 1845.
note: the reference derives from Mansel.
referred to: 50n
Cunningham, John. “Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy,” Edinburgh Review, CXXIV (July, 1866), 120-50.
referred to: civ, 21n, 22n
note: the first reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 487
note: the references are in quotations from Hamilton.
referred to: 152, 421
De Morgan, Augustus. Referred to: 428
— The Elements of Algebra, Preliminary to the Differential Calculus, and Fit for the Higher Classes of Schools. London: Taylor, 1835.
referred to: 429
— Formal Logic: or, The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable. London: Taylor and Walton, 1847.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
403.28 “numerically definite”] A numerically definite proposition is of this kind. (142)
— “On the Symbols of Logic, the theory of the Syllogism, and in particular of the Copula, and the application of the Theory of Probabilities to some questions of evidence,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, I (Feb., 1850), 90-5.
note: the quotation at 400n is indirect.
referred to: 399n
note: the reference at 152 is in a quotation from Hamilton; those at 483-4 derive from Hamilton and Baillet; that at 497n is in a quotation from Grote.
referred to: 152, 474, 478, 483-5, 493n, 497n
— Dissertatio de Methodo Rectè Utendi Ratione, et Veritatem in Scientiis Investigandi, in Opera Philosophica. 4th ed. Amsterdam: Elzevir, 1664.
note: this ed. (works separately paged) in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The reference at 141-2 derives from Hamilton.
referred to: 141-2, 502
— Lettres de Mr Descartes. Ed. Claude Clerselier. 3 vols. Paris: Angot, 1657-67.
note: the reference (to a letter to Henry More, of 15 April, 1649) derives from Mansel.
referred to: 50n
— Principia Philosophiæ, in Opera Philosophica. 4th ed. Amsterdam: Elzevir, 1664.
note: this ed. (works separately paged) in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is in a quotation from Hamilton, cited by Mansel; the reference at 50n derives from Mansel; that at 297 is in a quotation from Mansel.
referred to: 29n, 50n, 155, 198, 297, 422
28n.6-7 ‘ut sunt, vel . . . possunt.’] Cum vero putamus nos percipere colores in objectis, etsi revera nesciamus quidnam sit, quod tunc nomine coloris appellamus, nec ullam similitudinem intelligere possumus, inter colorem quem supponimus esse in objectis, & illum quem experimur esse in sensu; quia tamen hoc ipsum non advertimus, & multa alia sunt, ut magnitudo, figura, numerus, &c. quæ clarè percipimus, non alitera à nobis sentiri vel intelligi, quam ut sunt, aut . . . possunt in objectis; facile in eum errorem delabimur, ut judicemus, id, quod in objectis vocamus colorem, esse quid omnino simile colori quem sentimus, atque ita ut id, quod nullo modo percipimus, à nobis clarè percipi arbitremur. (18)
— Regulae ad directionem ingenii. Amsterdam: Blaev, 1701.
note: the quotation is in a quotation from Hamilton.
483.19-24 “Revera nihil inanius . . . nugarum . . . imaginationem ipsa ratione uti desuescamus] Nam revera nihil inanius . . . nugarum . . . imaginationem . . . ipsa ratione uti desuescamus (12; Reg. IV)
Diogenes (the Cynic). Referred to: 482
Du Hamel, Jean-Baptiste.Philosophia Vetus et Nova ad usum scholæ accommodata. 5th ed. Amsterdam: Gallet, 1700.
note: a copy of this ed., which JSM cites, is in the London Library, and may have been one of James Mill’s books donated by JSM.
Du Trieu, Phillipus.Manuductio ad logicam sive dialectica studiosæ juventuti ad logicam præparandæ. London: printed McMillan, 1826.
note: this reprint, which was formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College (Grote’s copy is in the University of London Library), of the 1662 ed. (Oxford: Oxlad and Pocock; also formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College) was made for the group, including JSM, studying at Grote’s house in the 1820s (see Autobiography, ed. Stillinger, 74).
413.34-414.1 genere. . . . [paragraph] Secunda] genere: sive illud sit proximum, sicut albedo et nigredo ponuntur sub colore; sive remotum, sicut injustitia et justitia ponuntur sub diversis generibus proximis, scilicet virtute et vitio, sed illis mediantibus ponuntur sub eodem genere remoto, nempe habitu, et ulterius sub qualitate. Itaque contraria saltem debent esse ejusdem prædicamenti. Per hanc partem excluduntur privantia et contradictoria. [paragraph] Secunda (74)
414.2 precise repugnent. . . . Hinc] præcise repugnent: quod eodem modo explicandum est quo supra. Hinc (74)
Edwards, Jonathan. Referred to: 440
note: the reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 152
Esser, Wilhelm.System der Logik. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Munster: Theissing, 1830.
note: the quotations and references derive from Hamilton’s Lectures, the editors of which use this ed. of Esser’s Logik.
quoted: 323n, 354, 384, 407-8
referred to: 355, 494, 494n
note: as the references are general, no ed. is cited.
referred to: 62, 441
Faraday, Michael.Lectures on the Various Forces of Matter and on the Chemical History of a Candle. London: Griffin, Bohn, 1863.
489.10 into] into (3)
Fell, John.Grammatica Rationis, sive Institutiones Logicæ. Oxford: Sheldonian Theatre, 1673.
note: a copy of this (the 1st) ed. is in the London Library, and may have been part of the donation by JSM of his father’s books.
415.19 “Contraria adversa sunt accidentia, posita] [paragraph] Contraria adversa sunt Accidentia (ut prius definiebantur [p. 52]) posita (121)
415.19 genere] Genere (121)
Ferrier, James Frederick. Referred to: 7
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb.Die Bestimmung des Menschen, in Sämmtliche Werke. Ed. J. H. Fichte. 8 vols. Berlin: von Velt, 1845, II, 165-319.
note: the reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 151
Franz, Joann Christoph August. “Memoir of the Case of a Gentleman born blind, and successfully operated upon in the 18th year of his age, with Physiological Observations and Experiments,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, CXXXI (1841), 59-68.
note: the passage here cited contains references to Franz’s anonymous patient.
231n.9-12 a sheet . . . denominations,”] A sheet . . . denominations. (64)
231n.16-17 solid cube and a sphere . . . diameter, was] solid cube and a sphere . . . diameter, were (65)
231n.18-19 a quadrangular and a circular . . . a square . . . a disc] a quadrangular and a circular . . . a square . . . a disc (65)
231n.30-1 it; in fact, said he, I must give it up.] it; “in fact,” said he, “I must give it up.” (65)
232n.5 object] objects (65)
232n.7-8 surprised he . . . with mathematical] surprised that he . . . with these solid mathematical (65)
Fraser, Alexander Campbell. “Berkeley’s Theory of Vision,” North British Review, XLI (Aug., 1864), 199-230.
referred to: 240, 243n
232n.32-3 “at . . . objects,”] After couching, the boy could, in this instance, we are told, at . . . objects. (215)
232n.33-4 “were . . . figure,” . . . “it] Though he could not say which was the cube, and which the sphere, he saw that they were . . . figure. It (215)
— “Mr. Mill’s Examination of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy,” North British Review, XLIII (Sept., 1865), 1-58.
quoted: 29n, 31-2, 32, 32n, 187n
referred to: civ-cv, 32n-3n
29n.12-13 “the solid . . . extended percepts . . . conscious or] The solid . . . extended percepts . . . conscious of them or (22)
31.39 in our minds] in our own minds (16)
32.6 How does] How then does (15)
32n.4-5 “there . . . of sense-consciousness] Except Berkeley, we know no other philosopher in these islands who begins by acknowledging that Matter, whatever it may turn out to be, is at any rate that which we find in our proper conscious experience—that consciousness is not a mere medium for representing an extended and solid world which exists behind it,—and that there . . . of sense-consciousness (20)
32n.13-14 “a . . . Sir W. . . . country,”] We regard it as a . . . Sir William . . . country. (20)
187n.9-10 “Men cannot . . . live,” . . . “without . . . term external.] Man cannot . . . live without . . . term “external.” (26)
Froriep, Ludwig Friedrich von.
note: JSM gives “Frorieps”; see Heuck.
referred to: 248
note: JSM gives “Frorieps”; see Heuck.
referred to: 248
note: the reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 487
George IV (of England).
note: the reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 160
Gérard, Balthasar. Referred to: 461
Gerson, Levi Ben.
note: the quotation is taken from Grote (q.v. for collation), who takes it from Hamilton.
Gibbon, Edward. Referred to: 482
— “Memoirs of My Life and Writings,” in Miscellaneous Works. Ed. John Baker Holroyd, Lord Sheffield. 2 vols. London: Strahan, Cadell and Davies, 1796, I, 1-185.
496.1 “I] But as my childish propensity for numbers and calculations was totally extinct, I (I, 65-6)
496.1 impressions] impression (I, 66)
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Referred to: 486n, 489
Grote, George. “John Stuart Mill on the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton,” Westminster Review, n.s. XXIX (Jan., 1866), 1-39.
note: the quotation of Levi Ben Gerson at 400n-1n is taken by JSM from Grote, who takes it from Hamilton.
quoted: 400n-1n, 401n, 491n-2n, 492n, 497n
referred to: cv, 58n, 497n-8n
400n.25 “Sir W. Hamilton,” . . . “insists] Sir W. Hamilton, in this proceeding, insists (31)
400n.26 more;] more;* [*footnote omitted] (31)
400n.27 may] may (31)
400n.27 is not] is not (32)
400n.32 accidens. . . . If] accidens. Mr. Mill is, nevertheless, of opinion (pp. 439-443) that though “the quantified syllogism is not a true expression of what is in thought, yet writing the predicate with a quantification may be sometimes a real help to the Art of Logic.” We see little advantage in providing a new complicated form, for the purpose of expressing in one proposition what naturally throws itself into two, and may easily be expressed in two. If (32)
400n.41 quæsita] quæsita (32n)
401n.1 All Man is all Rational] all man is all rational (32n)
401n.1 all man is rational] all man is rational (32n)
401n.2 that rational is denied of everything but man] that rational is denied of everything but man (32n)
401n.3 quæsita] quæsita (32n)
401n.4 quæsitum] quæsitum, (32n)
401n.5 only—Does . . . that? and not,] only—Does . . . that? and not (32n)
401n.6 and . . . else.”] and . . . else?” (32n)
491n.40 so. We] so. [JSM omits eight sentences] We (2-3)
492n.3 not. . . . To those] not. [ellipsis indicates 4-sentence omission] How far Sir W. Hamilton has there furnished good proof of his own doctrines on External Perception, and on the Primary Qualities of Matter, we shall not now determine; but to those (3)
492n.4 reasonings are] reasonings on these subjects are (3)
492n.15 “in] Now, in (2)
492n.18 editors,”] editors; and our impression, as readers of his lectures, disposes us to credit them. (2-3)
Guy, Robert Ephrem (“R.E.G.”). “Calderwood and Mill upon Hamilton,” Dublin Review, n.s. V (Oct., 1865), 474-504.
referred to: civ
Hamilton, William.Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform, chiefly from the Edinburgh Review; corrected, vindicated, enlarged in notes and appendices. 2nd ed. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans; Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1853.
note: the reference at 4 is inferential; Hamilton first became widely known through the early essays in Discussions. The references at 34, 39, 58, 58n are specifically to the first essay, “On the Philosophy of the Unconditioned” (which first appeared in the Edinburgh Review in 1829); those at 51n.5-8, 444n are to App. I (A), “Conditions of the Thinkable Systematised”; that at 163 and the quotations at 163 and 168-9 relate to “Philosophy of Perception” (which first appeared in the Edinburgh Review in 1830); the references at 438n, 470-2, 482, 487n, 496n and the quotations at 474, 475, 476, 477, 480, 483, 484 are to “On the Study of Mathematics” (which first appeared in the Edinburgh Review in 1836 and is indexed separately); that at 492n is to the third section, “Education,” and App. III, “Educational.”
quoted: 13, 18, 19n-20n, 20, 29n, 34n-5n, 35-6, 36, 39, 39n, 41, 42, 42-3, 43, 43-4, 44, 44n, 52n, 53, 55n, 58n, 62, 66, 76n-7n, 79, 91, 94, 113, 116, 136, 155, 157, 163, 163-4, 168, 168-9, 169, 259-60, 260, 290n, 321, 350, 395-6, 396, 396n, 401n, 418, 420, 424, 442-3, 442n, 443, 463n, 474, 475, 476, 477, 480, 483, 484, 498n
referred to: 4, 29n, 34, 39, 39n, 43n, 51n, 58, 58n, 154-5, 161, 163, 174n, 316n, 348n, 352, 416n, 421n, 428, 438n, 444n, 470-2, 482, 487n, 492n, 496n
13.14 unknown. . . . Nor] unknown.* [3-sentence footnote omitted] The philosopher speculating the worlds of matter and of mind, is thus, in a certain sort, only an ignorant admirer. In his contemplation of the universe, the philosopher, indeed, resembles Æneas contemplating the adumbrations on his shield; as it may equally be said of the sage and of the hero,—/“Miratur; Rerumque ignarus, Imagine gaudet. [no end quotation marks]/Nor (App. I, 644)
18.38-19.1 “harmoniously re-echoed by every philosopher of every school;” . . . “with the exception of a few late Absolute theorizers in Germany;”] With the exception, in fact, of a few late Absolutist theorisers in Germany, this is, perhaps, the truth of all others most harmoniously re-echoed by every philosopher of every school; and, as has so frequently been done, to attribute any merit, or any singularity to its recognition by any individual thinker, more especially in modern times, betrays only the ignorance of the encomiasts. [JSM has reversed the clausal order] (App. I, 644)
19n.12-20n.5 “become . . . themselves.”] [see 13.9-13 in the text above] (App. I, 643-4)
20.25-7 “become . . . qualities.” [see 13.9-12 in the text above] (App. I, 643-4)
29n.23 “things in themselves.] The Hypothetical Realist contends, that he is wholly ignorant of things in themselves, and that these are known to him, only through a vicarious phænomenon, of which he is conscious in perception;/“Rerumque ignarus, Imagine gaudet.” (57)
35n.4-5 To . . . God] To . . . God (15n)
35.9 “At] But at (9)
35.9-10 these [finite] existences] these existences (9)
36.10 “limiting and conditioning one another.”] In every act of consciousness we distinguish a Self or Ego, and something different from self, a Non-ego; each limited and modified by the other. (9)
39n.3 “finished, perfected, completed,”] [paragraph] 2. [Hamilton’s second meaning of “Absolute”] Absolutum means finished, perfected, completed; in which sense the Absolute will be what is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect, complete, total, and thus corresponds to τὸ ὅλον and τὸ τέλειον of Aristotle. (14n)
39.9-10 “the unconditionally unlimited,” . . . “the unconditionally limited.”] The unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed to the mind; they can be conceived, only by thinking away from, or abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself is realised; consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative,—negative of the conceivable itself. (13)
39.16 “The term] [The term (14n)
41.8-12 Infinite . . . Absolute . . . negative;] Infinite . . . Absolute . . . negative, [cf. entry for 39.9-10 above] (13)
41.17 coincide)] coincide*) [footnote omitted] (13)
41.21-2 space, in time, or in degree] space, in time, or in degree (13)
41.23 Infinite and the Absolute properly so called, are] Infinite and the Absolute, properly so called,† are [footnote omitted] (13)
41.36 a fasciculus of negations] [not in italics] (17)
42.6 Conditioned] Conditioned (14)
42.15 is known] is only known (14)
42.16 cold] void (14)
42.17 [paragraph] How] [no paragraph] (14)
42.30 Cognoscendo . . . cognoscitur.] “Cognoscendo . . . cognoscitur.” (15)
42.36 “his] In vindicating the truth of this statement, we shall attempt to show:—in the first place, that M. Cousin is at fault in all the authorities he quotes in favour of the opinion, that the Absolute, Infinite, Unconditioned, is a primitive notion, cognisable by our intellect; in the second, that his (25)
42.37 reverse;” “that] reverse; in the third, that (25)
43.2 Absolute;” and “that] Absolute; and in the fourth, that (25)
43.8 “where . . . plurality of terms;”] “The condition of intelligence,” says M. Cousin, “is difference; and an active knowledge is only possible where . . . plurality of terms. (31-2)
43.12 “as] [paragraph] Our author [Cousin] admits, and must admit, that the Absolute, as (33)
43.12 one. Absolute] one; absolute (33)
43.13 difference. . . . The condition] difference; the Absolute, and the Knowledge of the Absolute, are therefore identical. [ellipsis indicates 3-sentence omission] But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference; consequently the condition (33)
43.16-18 first . . . second . . . contradictory of the Absolute] first . . . second . . . contradictory of the absolute (33)
43.22 third] third (33)
43.23 contradictory . . . intelligence] [in italics] (33)
43.26 either] Either (33)
43.26 or] or (33)
43.31 what] What (35)
43.32-3 end. . . . Abstractly] end; and in the accomplishment of that end, it consummates its own perfection. Abstractly (35)
43.34-6 “is . . . perfection;” . . . “even for its reality] Further, not only is . . . perfection,—it is dependent on it even for its reality (35)
44.2 which it] which alone it (35)
44.4 in its effects] in its effects (35)
44n.11 “One] On this hypothesis, one (36)
44n.13-14 from the better . . . better] [in italics] (36)
44n.14 both states are equal] both states are equal (36)
44n.15 consider. The] consider. [paragraph] The (36)
44n.20-1 fate. The] fate. [paragraph] The (36)
44n.24 first cause] first cause (36)
44n.27 cause, the actual] cause, the real, the actual (36)
52n.17-18 “the unconditionally limited,”] [see entry for 39.9-10 above] (13)
53.10 “finished, perfected, completed”] [see entry for 39n.3 and its collation] (14n)
53.30 “to think is to condition”] [see 42.8 above] (14)
55n.2 “variously] [paragraph] The first of these Ideas, elements, or laws, though fundamentally one, our author [Cousin] variously (8)
55n.3-4 &c.,” . . . “we will] &c.; (we would (8)
55n.4 Unconditioned.”] Unconditioned.) (8)
55n.5 “plurality] The second, [see collation for 55n.2 above] he denominates plurality (8)
55n.6 &c.,” . . . “we would style the Conditioned.”] &c.; (we would style it the Conditioned.) (8)
58n.22-3 “in Laputa or the Empire”] [paragraph] Out of Laputa or the Empire it would be idle to enter into an articulate refutation of a theory, which founds philosophy on the annihilation of consciousness, and on the identification of the unconscious philosopher with God. (21)
62.30 “given . . . cognitions . . . beliefs:”] [paragraph] Our knowledge rests ultimately on certain facts of consciousness, which as primitive, and consequently incomprehensible, are given . . . cognitions . . . beliefs. (86)
62.31 “Consciousness] But if consciousness (86)
62.31 words our] words, if our (86)
62.31 primary experience] primary experience (86)
62.32 is a faith.”] be a faith; the reality of our knowledge turns on the veracity of our constitutive beliefs. (86)
66.13 “There] And as the one or the other of contradictories must be true, whilst both cannot; it proves, that there (App. I, 624)
66.13-14 ground,” . . . “for] ground for (App. I, 624)
66.14-15 our . . . possibility] our . . . possibility (App. I, 624)
79.28 “Things] But practically, the fact, that we are free, is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability; and this fact of liberty cannot be redargued on the ground that it is incomprehensible, for the philosophy of the Conditioned proves, against the necessaritarian, that things (App. I, 624)
79.29 may] may (App. I, 624)
79.33 “The] [paragraph] The (15)
79.33 between the two] between two (15)
79.33 unconditionates] inconditionates (15)
79.34 neither . . . possible] neither . . . possible (15)
79.35-6 one . . . necessary] one . . . necessary (15)
79.36 necessary. . . . The] necessary. On this opinion, therefore, our faculties are shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The (15)
79.38 the extremes] two extremes (15)
91.23 “Absolutum] [paragraph] 1. Absolutum (14n)
91.23 freed or loosed] freed or loosed (14n)
94n.14 “finished, perfected, completed,”] [see 39n.3 and its collation above] (14n)
113.8 Consciousness . . . world.] Consciousness . . . world.* [footnote omitted] (51)
116.40 “the] But if, on the one hand, consciousness be only realised under specific modes, and cannot therefore exist apart from the several faculties in cumulo; and if, on the other, these faculties can all and each only be exerted under the condition of consciousness; consciousness, consequently, is not one of the special modes into which our mental activity may be resolved, but the (48)
116.40 condition”] condition of them all. (48)
157.16 belief of the existence] belief of the existence (89)
157.17 belief . . . knowledge . . . existence] belief . . . knowledge . . . existence (89)
157.19 is] be (89)
157.22 I . . . exists] I . . . exists (89)
157.23 I believe . . . existing] I believe . . . existing (89)
157.23-5 I believe . . . perception] I believe . . . perception (89)
157.26 identical. The] identical. [paragraph] The (89)
157.29 belief in the existence] belief in the existence (89)
157.29-30 belief in the knowledge] belief in the knowledge (89)
157.30 but they] but, on grounds to which it is not here necessary to advert, they (89)
157.37 “Our] [paragraph] Our (86)
157.39 cognitions] cognitions (86)
157.39 beliefs] beliefs (86)
163.4 “the mind] And here, the mind (67)
163.8 “alternative] The other alternative (67)
163.10-11 “either blindly determines itself” or “is blindly determined”] And here the mind either blindly determines itself, or is blindly determined by an extrinsic and intelligent cause. (67)
163.12 “utterly] The former lemma is the more philosophical, in so far as it assumes nothing hyperphysical; but it is otherwise utterly (67)
168.31-2 “We proceed,” . . . “to] [paragraph] These being premised, we proceed to (58)
168.34 third] third (58)
169.10 “This is too strong,” . . . “Brown’s . . . is not . . . import.] Brown’s . . . is therefore, not . . . import. [This is too strong. See Diss. p. 820.] [Hamilton’s square brackets] (60)
260.22 “when] On this theory, also, when (App. I, 615)
290n.3 a Nihilo] [not in italics] (App. I, 620n)
290n.13-14 “the Potential” . . . “what is . . . time.”] [included as part of Hamilton’s scheme of modal predication] A, / E.) The Potential, (τὸ ἐν δυνάμει, potentiale, quod in posse, in potentia, est, &c.,) what is . . . time, = the not actual. (App. II, 703)
321.23 “Concept,” . . . “is] Mr. Stewart has even bestowed on the reproductive imagination the term Conception;—happily, we do not think; as both in grammatical propriety, and by the older and correcter usage of philosophers, this term (or rather the product of this operation—Concept) is (283n)
321.24 simply.”] simply, and in this sense is admirably rendered by the Begriff (what is grasped up) of the Germans. (283n)
350.4 “ethics, politics, religion] Art he [Whately] defines the application of knowledge to practice; in which signification, ethics, politics, religion (134)
350.4-5 practical sciences would be arts:”] practical sciences, must be arts. (134)
395.9 “The self-evident] In the second place, the self-evident (App. II, 650)
395.32-3 species . . . Syllogism] Species . . . Syllogisms (App. II, 651)
396.16 “In] Its [the meaning of “some”] peculiar indefinitude is a contribution from the contingency of our ignorance, and with our ignorance would disappear; for, (to say nothing of Individuals or Individualised Generals,) in (App. II, 691n)
396.17 all, or some, or none] all, or none, or some (App. II, 691n)
396n.4 “the Indesignate] The double inadvertence, as I think, of Aristotle, (An. Pr. I. 2.) in recognising the indesignate (ἀδιόζιστον) to be at once a quantity and an indefinitude, (for the Indesignate (App. II, 691n)
396n.5-6 or . . . presumed] [not in italics] (App. II, 691n)
396n.6 presumed.”] presumed);—this vagueness,—this material, subjective and contingent indefinitude, lay at the root of his [Aristotle’s] whole doctrine of Particularity, the indefinitude of which quantity he should have kept purely formal, objective, and necessary, instead of confounding the two indefinitudes together. (App. II, 691n)
401n.12 “Every] Its [the meaning of “some”] peculiar indefinitude is a contribution from the contingency of our ignorance, and with our ignorance would disappear; for, (to say nothing of Individuals or Individualised Generals,) in reality and in thought, every (App. II, 691n) [cf. 396.16]
418.21 “Nature] But nature (App. I, 622)
418.22 necessary.”] necessary;—μηδὲν περιττῶς; and to excogitate a particular force, to perform what can be better explained on the ground of a general imbecillity, is contrary to every rule of philosophising. (App. I, 622)
418.23 “that] Not only is it a maxim of his [Aristotle’s] philosophy, that (App. I, 629)
418.26 πολλὰ):”] πολλά.) (App. I, 629)
420.29 “the] [paragraph] The Law of Parcimony (as the rule ought to be distinctively called), the (App. I, 628n)
420.30 when] where (App. I, 628n)
420.30-1 hypothesis,” has “never . . . adequately expressed;”] hypothesis, has, though always virtually in force, never . . . adequately enounced. (App. I, 628n)
420.32-3 “Neither more nor more onerous causes . . . phænomena] It should be thus expressed:—Neithermore,normore onerous,causes . . . phænomena. (App. I, 628n)
442n.4 conceived, be] conceived possible, be (App. I, 615)
442n.4-5 show our] shews out our (App. I, 615)
443.1 But . . . the] But practically, the fact, that we are free, is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the consciousness of our moral accountability; and this fact of liberty cannot be redargued on the ground that it is incomprehensible, for the philosophy of the Conditioned proves, against the necessitarian, that things there are, which may, nay must be true, of which the understanding is wholly unable to construe to itself the possibility. [paragraph] But this philosophy is not only competent to defend the fact of our moral liberty, possible though inconceivable, against the assault of the fatalist; it retorts against himself the very objection of incomprehensibility by which the fatalist had thought to triumph over the libertarian. It shews, that the (App. I, 624-5)
463n.3-4 “would . . . worthless;”] [see quotation at 442n.4 and its collation] (App. I, 615)
463n.4-6 “the . . . will;”] [see 442.32-4 above] (App. I, 624)
474.17 “do] [paragraph] That they [mathematics] do (282)
474.17 generalization,”] generalization is equally apparent. (282)
475.9-10 “Are mathematics then,” . . . “of] [paragraph] Are Mathematics then of (313)
475.13 mental distraction] mental distraction (314)
475.14 continuous attention] continuous attention (314)
475.15 mind.”] mind; and it is almost the one only, or at least the one principal, accorded to it by the most intelligent philosophers. (314)
475.16 But] [paragraph] But (322)
475.25-6 “We are far,” . . . “from] [paragraph] We are far from (290)
475.28 old. . . . Unlike] old; but this we assert,—that the most ordinary intellect may, by means of these methods and formulæ, once invented, reproduce and apply, by an effort nearly mechanical, all that the original genius discovered. [ellipsis indicates 3-sentence omission] [paragraph] Unlike] (290)
475.36 “Mathematical] [paragraph] 1.) As to the difficulties:—Mathematical (291)
475.36-7 deducing conclusions] deducing conditions (291)
475.7-8 looking out for premises] looking out for premises (291)
476.30 “to] To (268n)
476.32 Newton:”] Newton. (268n)
477.18 measurable] mensurable (334)
480.10-11 “hypothetically . . . calculus.”] [see 477 above] (335)
480.33 “continuous attention”] [see 475 above] (314)
483.11 “It] [paragraph] “It (277)
483.11 time, says Baillet, since] time, since (277)
483.18 traces. The] traces.” (Cartesii Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, Reg. iv. MSS.)—[The (277)
483.19 Revera] “Revera (277)
483.20 talium] taliam (277)
483.25 expedire.” . . . Baillet] expedire. Quum vero postea cogitarem, unde ergo fieret, ut primi olim Philosophiæ inventores, neminem Matheseos imperitum ad studium sapientiæ vellent admittere, [a fable, the oldest recorders of which flourished above eight centuries subsequent to Plato,*] [4-sentence footnote omitted] tanquam hæc disciplina omnium facillima et maxime necessaria videatur, ad ingenia capessendis aliis majoribus scientiis erudienda et præparanda; plane suspicatus sum, quamdam eos Mathesim agnovisse, valde diversam a vulgari nostrae ætatis.”]—Baillet (278)
483.36 mankind.”] mankind.”† [footnote omitted] (278)
484.14 “did] For, though himself [Socrates] not inconversant with these,” (which he had studied under the celebrated geometer, Theodorus of Cyrene), “he did (323) [Hamilton is quoting from Xenophon]
484.14-15 they” . . . “could] they could (323)
484.17 acquirements.”] acquirements.”∥ [footnote] ∥Xenophontis Memorabilia, l.iv.c.7, §§3, 5. (323)
484.21 “The] [paragraph] Before entering on details, it is proper here, once for all to premise:—In the first place, that the (266)
484.21 question,” . . . “does] question does (266)
484.22-4 value of mathematical science, considered . . . results, but the utility of mathematical study, that is, in . . . mind] value of mathematicalscience,considered . . . results, but the utility of mathematicalstudy, that is, in . . . mind (266)
484.24 mind.] mind; and in the second [place], that the expediency is not disputed, of leaving mathematics, as a co-ordinate, to find their level among the other branches of academical instruction. (266)
498n.20 “not] His [Hume’s] reasoning is from their [the foundations of knowledge] subsequent contradiction to their original falsehood; and his premises, not (87)
498n.20 himself,” but “accepted] himself, are accepted (87)
— “Dissertations on Reid,” in The Works of Thomas Reid. Ed. William Hamilton. Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart; London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1846, 742-914.
note: this ed. used for all references and quotations, with the exception of those at 33n, 117, 255n where the 6th ed. (2 vols. [Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1863]), which contains additional material not included in earlier eds. and employed by JSM in these places only, is used. See also Hamilton’s “Foot-notes to Reid” below. “Dissertations on Reid” is JSM’s title, which we have accepted and used in all cases; in the work, a half-title page gives “Dissertations, Historical, Critical, and Supplementary, by the Editor.”
quoted: 13-14, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 26, 26n-7n, 28n, 33n, 61, 63n, 65n, 76, 80, 113, 114, 117, 118n, 123n, 129n, 132, 132-3, 133, 134, 136, 138-9, 142, 153n, 155, 156, 172, 173-4, 175, 214n, 219-20, 234-5, 237, 238, 239, 255n, 296n, 311n, 362n, 423n-4n, 447
referred to: 3, 22, 29-30, 30n, 79, 114, 131, 168, 174, 216n, 251n, 334, 422n, 437
13.28-14.1 Realism” . . . “asserts] Realism, asserts (825)
14.11 “that] His philosophy, if that of Natural Realism, founded in the common sense of mankind, made it incumbent on him to shew, that (842)
14.12 example—called up or suggested] example, ‘called up or suggested,’ (842)
14.15 knowledge of] knowledge or consciousness of (842)
14.17 “If] [no paragraph] But if (842)
14.20 at least] at best (842)
14.27 “The notion of body being given] Psychologically speaking, an attribute would not be primary if it could be thought away from body; and the notion of body being supposed given (844n)
14.29 “The] It is thus apparent that the (846)
14.30 deduced] deduced (846)
14.32 implies.”] implies: whereas the Secundo-primary and Secondary must be induced a posteriori; both being attributes contingently super-added to the naked notion of matter. (846)
14.35 “that] For they [Secundo-primary Qualities] are all only various forms of a relative or superable resistance to displacement, which, we learn by experience, bodies oppose to other bodies, and, among these, to our organism moving through space;—a resistance similar in kind (and therefore clearly conceived) to that (848)
15.1 “The Primary” Qualities “are] 5. The Primary are (857)
15.3-5 Secundo-primary” . . . “as] Secundo-primary, as (857)
15.5 us. . . . We] us. [ellipsis indicates 3-paragraph omission] [paragraph] 9. Under this head [Considered as in Bodies] we (857)
15.11 us. . . . We] us. [ellipsis indicates 5½-paragraph omission] In other words:—We (858)
15.12 self;] self;* [footnote:] *How much this differs from the doctrine of Reid, Stewart, &c., who hold that in every sensation there is not only a subjective object of sensation, but also an objective object of perception, see Note D*, §1. (858)
15.13 once.”] once.† [4-paragraph footnote omitted] (858)
15.29 “In] But in (866n)
15.34 mediately:”] mediately. (866n)
18.13-24 “immediately . . . primary”] [see passages quoted on 13-15 above]
21.24 “In] But in (866n)
21.26 out . . . us] [not in italics] (866n)
21.26-7 our . . . relative] [not in italics] (866n)
26.5-9 “as . . . bodies,” . . . “as . . . us;” . . . “essential . . . existing;” . . . “modes . . . not-self,” . . . “modes . . . self;”] [see 13-15 above]
26n.16 proper,” . . . “is] proper is (880)
26n.18 condition.”] condition; but every Sensation has not a Perception proper as its conditionate—unless, what I think ought to be done, we view the general consciousness of the locality of a sensorial affection as a Perception proper. (880)
26n.18-19 “The fact . . . other:”] But though the fact . . . other, this is all;—for the two cognitions, though coexistent, are not proportionally coexistent. (880)
27n.1-2 “in . . . to one another”] It may accordingly be stated as a general rule—That, above a certain point, the stronger the Sensation, the weaker the Perception; and the distincter the perception the less obtrusive the sensation; in other words—Though Perception proper and Sensation proper exist only as they coexist, in . . . to each other. (880)
27n.3 “The] [paragraph] 16. Using the term strictly, the (858)
27n.4 Primary” qualities “are] Primary are (858)
28n.15 philosophers” (Locke and Descartes) “we] philosophers, we (839)
33n.8 [paragraph] “That] [paragraph] 1. [first of two principles] That (965) [Note N breaks off at the end of the passage quoted, before the second principle is discussed]
33n.15 The . . . knowledge.] [not in italics] (965)
33n.19 other: these] other. These (965)
33n.21 comparison”] comparison. (965)
61.11 “St.] [no paragraph] St (760)
61.11 know] know (760)
61.11 but believe] we believe (760)
61.25 a mere mode] a mode (750)
61.29 nature.”] nature, / Quæ nisi sit veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis. (750)
63n.2 “the] [paragraph] IX. The ninth, is that the (763)
63n.2 knowledge.] Knowledges.* [footnote:] *Knowledges, in common use with Bacon and our English philosophers till after the time of Locke, ought not to be discarded. It is however unnoticed by any English Lexicographer. (763)
65n.2 “the original data of reason,”] But reason itself must rest at last upon authority; for the original data of reason do not rest on reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. (760)
76.14 “The] For the (745)
76.16 incomprehensible . . . that is . . . we] incomprehensible. [JSM moves back to the previous sentence] For it will argue nothing against the trustworthiness of consciousness, that all or any of its deliverances are inexplicable—are incomprehensible; that is, that we (745)
80.1 “the] [paragraph] To this head [The Law of Relativity or Integration], I may simply notice, though I cannot now explain, are to be referred those compulsory relatives, imposed upon thought by that great, but as yet undeveloped, law of our intellectual being, which I have elsewhere denominated the (911)
80.1-3 That . . . necessary] That . . . necessary (911)
80.3-4 necessary.” . . . “from . . . intellect” that “we] necessary. From . . . intellect, we (911)
113.32-3 “consciousness . . . act] [paragraph] 15.—“Consciousness . . . act (810)
114.4-5 “all . . . immediate.”] Therefore all . . . immediate. (810)
117.34 [paragraph] “Consciousness is] [no paragraph] Consciousness also is (932)
117.39 intensity. . . . It] [ellipsis indicates 4-sentence omission] (932)
117.40 intension.”] intension; and as the extensive quantity of such movements is always in the inverse ratio of its intensive, that consciousness will be most perfect which is concentrated within the smallest sphere. (932)
118n.15 “The] As an example of the former [something in itself indivisible, which may be considered by the mind plural];—the (806n)
123n.48-9 “the . . . knowledge.”] [paragraph] IX. The ninth [condition determining a class of names], is that the . . . Knowledges.* [footnote:] *Knowledges, in common use with Bacon and our English philosophers till after the time of Locke, ought not to be discarded. It is however unnoticed by any English Lexicographer. (763)
129n.8 “As] For as (744)
132.3 “How] [paragraph] Limiting, therefore, our consideration to the question of authority; how (743)
132.9 lie:”] lie. (743)
132.10 “organized] Nature is not gratuitously to be assumed to work, not only in vain, but in counteraction of herself; our faculty of Knowledge is not, without a ground, to be supposed an instrument of illusion; man, unless the melancholy fact be proved, is not to be held organized (745) [cf. entry for 133.7 below]
132.37 “Such a supposition” . . . “if] But such a supposition, if (743)
132.38 illegitimate.” “The] illegitimate. For, on the contrary, the (743)
132.39-133.1 instance” . . . “be] instance, be (743)
133.1-2 false,” . . . “that] false, that (743)
133.4 “neganti . . . probatio.] “Neganti . . . probatio.” (745)
133.7 illusion.”] [for the conclusion of the sentence, see entry for 132.10 above]
134.3 “The] [paragraph] It is therefore manifest that we may throw wholly out of account the (745)
134.4-5 themselves,” . . . “scepticism is confessedly impossible,”] themselves; seeing that scepticism in regard to them, under this limitation, is confessedly impossible; and that it is only requisite to consider the argument from Common Sense, as it enables us to vindicate the truth of these phænomena, viewed as attestations of more than their own existence, seeing that they are not, in this respect, placed beyond the possibility of doubt. (745)
136.20 “Many] I should indeed hardly have deemed that it required an articulate statement, were it not that, in point of fact, many (749)
138.15 “The first problem of philosophy” is “to] [paragraph] The first problem of Philosophy—and it is one of no easy accomplishment—being thus to (752) [see next entry]
138.18-19 possession:” . . . “of no easy accomplishment;” . . . “argument . . . sense” . . . “manifestly] possession; and the argument . . . sense being the allegation of these feelings or beliefs as explicated and ascertained, in proof of the relative truths and their necessary consequences;—this argument is manifestly (752) [see also entry above]
138.22 sense] Sense (752) [treated as printer’s error in text]
142.6 “into] He [Aristotle] did not, it may be observed, fall into (894n)
142.8-9 thought,” . . . “to evolve the conditions under] thought. He makes no fruitless attempt to shew the genesis of the former; far less does he attempt to evolve the laws under (894n)
142.10 thinking;”] thinking. (894n)
153n.8-14 Natural Realism . . . themselves. . . . Both build . . . Reid] Both build . . . Reid. . . . Natural Realism . . . themselves (817n) [JSM has altered the order of Hamilton’s sentences]
153n.16 perceived, lurks] perceived, there lurks (817n)
153n.27 “Representative knowledge,” . . . “is] [paragraph] In a third respect Representative knowledge is not self-sufficient; for it is (811)
156.8-10 “such . . . the reality . . . man.”] For if we modify the obnoxious language of Descartes and Locke; and, instead of saying that the ideas or notions of the primary qualities resemble, merely assert that they truly represent, their objects, that is, afford us such . . . the extended reality . . . man,—and this is certainly all that one, probably all that either philosopher, intended,—Reid’s doctrine and theirs would be found in perfect unison. (842)
156.18 “in their own nature occult and inconceivable,”] On this ground, the Primary, being thought as essential to the notion of Body, are distinguished from the Secundo-primary and Secondary, as accidental; while the Primary and Secundo-primary, being thought as manifest or conceivable in their own nature, are distinguished from the Secondary, as in their own nature occult and inconceivable. (846)
172.20-1 “in . . . work,” . . . “if] Reid, therefore, as I have already observed, (p. 129a, note,) may seem to have become doubtful of the tendency of the doctrine advanced in his earlier work; and we ought not, at all events, to hold him rigorously accountable for the consequences of what, if (821)
173.32-3 “seem . . . presentationism,”] For while some of its statements seem . . . presentationism, others, again appear only compatible with those of an egoistical representationism. (882)
173.33 “decidedly] For my own part, I am decidedly (820)
173.35 mankind, he] mankind, that he (820)
175.24 “was] Krug is a Kantian; and as originally promulgated in his ‘Entwurf eines neuen Organons,’ 1801, (§5), his system was (797)
214n.1-2 “mental . . . move,”] If this volition become transeunt, be carried into effect, it passes into the mental . . . move. (864n)
214n.3 “for we are,” . . . “conscious] For we are conscious (864n)
214n.5 of the limb] in the limb (865n)
219.32 ipso facto] [not in italics] (869n)
219.34 sought. The] sought, (p. 146a.)—The (869n)
219.40 involves] involve (869n)
219.41 in length] or length (869n)
219.43 in consciousness a succession in time] to consciousness a length in time (869n)
219.45 second or third is affirmed] second or the third be affirmed (869n)
220.1 in length] or length (869n)
234.4-6 “The opinions,” . . . “so] The opinions so (861n)
235.3-4 eo ipso] [not in italics] (861n)
237.9 were made] were, however, made (875n)
237.10 of motive] of the motive (875n)
237.15 say whence] say from whence (875n)
237.16 proceeded. . . . The] proceeded. It is unfortunately not stated whether he could discriminate one pain from another, say the pain of pinching from the pain of pricking; but had this not been the case, the notice of so remarkable a circumstance could hardly, I presume, have been overlooked. The (875n)
238.13-14 “A perception” . . . “of] [paragraph] 25. Thus a perception of (881)
238.16 The primary] [paragraph] 26. The primary (881)
238.17 i.e.] [not in italics] (881)
238.17 immediately know] immediately know (881)
238.22-3 “extension] [paragraph] 27. Further, in no part of the organism have we any apprehension, any immediate knowledge, of extension (881)
238.23 magnitude;”] magnitude; perception noting only the fact given in sensation, and sensation affording no standard, by which to measure the dimensions given in one sentient part with those given in another. (882)
238.26 “As] For, as (882)
238.32 that.] that.* [4-sentence footnote omitted] (882)
239.9 “that] His philosophy, if that of Natural Realism, founded in the common sense of mankind, make it incumbent on him to shew, that (842)
239.10 called up or suggested] ‘called up or suggested,’ (842)
239.11 on the occasion] on occasion (842)
239.12 we have] we really have (842)
239.12-13 as by nature we believe we have] [not in italics] (842)
255n.11 “has] For this field [of vision] has (920)
255n.13 indefinitely,”] indefinitely. (920)
255n.16 “we] But in vision, where every affection is an affection of colour, we (920)
296n.2 “Volition] The purport of the sixth argument is not given, as Hume, notwithstanding the usual want of precision in his language, certainly intended it;—which was to this effect:—Volition (866n)
296n.19 determined.”] determined? (867n)
311n.3 “Though] [paragraph] In reference to both Cohesion and Gravity, I may notice, that though (852)
311n.4 external] internal (852)
311n.5-6 we . . . force] [not in italics] (852)
311n.10 de facto] [not in italics] (853)
362n.2 “A] [paragraph] 10.—A (809)
362n.2 object] object (809)
362n.3 act] act (809)
362n.5 mediate] (mediate) (809)
362n.7 object] object (809)
362n.8 act] act (809)
362n.10-11 producing process] producing process (809)
423n.8 “remains] [paragraph] Repulsion (to take them [Gravity, Cohesion, Inertia, Repulsion] backwards)—a resistance to the approximation and contact of other matter—we come only by a late and learned experience to view as an attribute of body, and of the elements of body; nay, so far is it from being a character essential in our notion of matter, it remains (852)
423n.10 “As] For as (852)
423n.11-424n.1 action . . . action] notion . . . notion (852)
447.21 “many] I should indeed hardly have deemed that it required an articulate statement, were it not that, in point of fact, many (749)
447.23 these] their (749)
447.24 all their] their whole (749)
447.24-5 these same philosophers were (strange to say) not disposed to admit;”] these data the same philosophers were (strange to say!) not disposed to admit. (749)
— “Foot-notes to Reid,” in The Works of Thomas Reid. Ed. William Hamilton. Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart; London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1846.
note: the references and quotations derive from footnotes provided by Hamilton in this ed. of Reid’s Works. “Foot-note to Reid” is JSM’s usual reference, and we have adopted it throughout, regularizing a few slightly different forms. See also Hamilton’s “Dissertations on Reid,” above.
quoted: 21, 21-2, 26n, 112n, 129n, 138n, 172, 173, 236n, 302, 322, 323n, 373, 421n, 424, 442n, 443, 444, 463n, 500
referred to: 29-30, 76n, 307n, 356n, 442, 448, 468
21.28 what they are in themselves,] “what they are in themselves,” (313n)
21.29 relative notion] “relative notion,” (313n)
21.30-1 absolutely and in themselves] absolutely and in themselves (313n)
21.31 out of relation] out of relation (313n)
21.33-4 qualities or phænomena] qualities or phænomena (323n)
21.34-22.1 in relation to our faculties] in relation to our faculties (323n)
26n.7-8 objective . . . subjective] objective . . . subjective (313n)
26n.9-10 perception . . . primary] perception . . . primary (313n)
112n.29 “It] But it (590n)
112n.30-2 than . . . other] [not in italics] (590n)
129n.5 “In] For, in (442n)
129n.7 consciousness] consciousness (442n)
138n.1 principle,” . . . “has] principle has (300n)
138n.2-6 other. . . . It . . . speculations. . . . And yet . . . itself.] other; and yet . . . itself. To trace the influence of this assumption would be, in fact, in a certain sort, to write the history of philosophy; for, though this influence has never yet been historically developed, it . . . speculations. [JSM has moved latter half of first sentence to the end of the quotation] (300n)
172.16 extension] extension (129n)
173.5 “appears] This paragraph appears (310n)
236n.5 “perception of externality”] In the case of Cheselden—that in which the blindness previous to the recovery of sight was most perfect, and, therefore, the most instructive upon record—the patient, though he had little or no perception of distance, i.e. of the degree of externality, had still a perception of that externality absolutely. (177n)
236n.7-11 “to touch . . . skin.” . . . “a . . . organ,” . . . “as . . . eyes.”] The objects, he said, seemed to “touch his eyes, as what he felt did his skin;” but they did not appear to him as if in his eyes, far less as a mere affection of the organ. (177n) [JSM has altered the order of the elements of the sentence]
302.25 “that the opposing parties are really at one.”] The opposite parties are substantially at one. (412n)
322.17 “the words Conception, Concept, Notion] The words Conception, Concept, Notion (360n)
322.18 in imagination] in the imagination (360n)
323n.6 “the . . . notion,”] By verbal definition, is meant the more accurate determination of the signification of a word; by real, the . . . notion. (691n)
373.5 “because . . . contradiction.”] Of the former [“the reality of the phænomenon”], scepticism is impossible, because . . . contradiction. (713)
421n.7 “In] For, in (236n)
421n.7 et veræ sint] “et veræ sint” (236n)
424.28-30 “an exposition of the contradictions involved in our notion of motion,” . . . “fallacy has not yet been detected.“] The fallacy of Zeno’s exposition of the contradictions involved in our notion of motion, has not yet been detected. (102n)
442n.6 “Is] But is (602n)
442n.7 agent] [not in italics] (602n)
442n.10 cause . . . motive] cause . . . motive (602n)
442n.10-11 rational . . . cause] rational . . . cause (602n)
443.24 are at] are thus at (602n)
443.36 Liberty.”] Liberty; to say nothing of many contradictories, neither of which can be thought, but one of which must, on the laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, necessarily be. (602n)
444.7 influence to action,] “influence to action,” (608n)
444.25 comprehensible] comprehensible (610n)
444.27-8 “But,” . . . “was] But was (611n)
444.30 dispositions, and tendencies] dispositions, tendencies (611n)
444.37 in] in (611n)
444.38 to the notion] to notion (611n)
463n.6-7 “it . . . cause.”] [see quotation at 442n.6-11 and its collation]
500.1 was] were (309n)
— Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. Ed. Henry Longueville Mansel and John Veitch. 4 vols. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1859-60.
quoted: 16-17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 31, 48, 61, 62, 65, 76, 76n-7n, 79, 80-1, 82-3, 84, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 118n, 119, 119-20, 120, 120-1, 121, 122, 123n, 126-8, 128, 130, 130n, 131, 133, 134n, 136, 137n, 138n, 142, 143, 147n, 149, 150, 150-1, 151, 152, 158, 158-9, 159, 160-1, 161, 162, 162n-3n, 166, 176, 188-9, 193, 223, 223-4, 224, 228, 228-9, 230, 251n, 252, 252-3, 253-4, 254, 256, 260, 272, 272n, 273, 273n, 274, 274n, 275, 276n, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 281n, 286, 286-7, 287, 287-8, 289, 290, 291, 291-2, 292, 293, 293n, 294, 295, 296, 297n, 302, 303, 304-5, 305, 305-6, 306-7, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311-12, 315-16, 319, 319-20, 320n, 321, 321-2, 322, 323n, 324, 325, 325-6, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 330-1, 331, 332, 335, 336n, 338, 342, 346, 348, 349, 349n-50n, 350, 351, 352, 352-3, 353, 354, 357, 358, 358n-9n, 361, 362, 364, 368, 369n, 372, 372n, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 379, 380, 382, 383n, 384, 385, 391-2, 392, 393, 393n, 399n-400n, 403, 404-5, 407, 407-8, 408, 410, 411-12, 416, 421, 422, 424, 427n-8n, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 437-8, 438, 440, 440n, 442, 445, 445n, 464, 487, 490n, 491n, 494n, 496n, 499, 501, 503, 503n
referred to: cviii, 3, 30n, 78, 86n, 89, 113, 134, 153n, 161, 163, 168, 174, 174n, 283, 286n, 316n, 337n, 356, 365, 378, 392n, 400n-1n, 409, 413, 418, 422n, 437, 448, 473n, 481, 486, 488, 491, 494, 495, 502-3
16.25 “now] [paragraph] But the meaning of these terms will be best illustrated by now (I, 136)
17.24 said] says (I, 138)
18.4 “had] But were the number of our faculties coextensive with the modes of being,—had (I, 153)
20.4 “analogous to our faculties,”] [JSM gives two references] [paragraph] In regard to the first assertion, it is evident that nothing exists for us, except in so far as it is known to us, and that nothing is known to us, except certain properties or modes of existence, which are relative or analogous to our faculties. (I, 141)] We know, and can know, nothing absolutely and in itself: all that we know is existence in certain special forms or modes, and these, likewise, only in so far as they may be analogous to our faculties. (I, 153)
20.9 “possess] We may suppose existence to have a thousand modes;—but these thousand modes are all to us as zero, unless we possess (I, 153)
21.22 “In] In this proposition, the term relative is opposed to the term absolute; and, therefore, in (I, 136-7)
21.23 nothing] [not in italics] (I, 137)
21.24 without . . . faculties] [not in italics] (I, 137)
22.19 “From] [paragraph] From (I, 148)
22.20 said,” . . . “you] said, you (I, 148)
22.22 absolutely in] absolutely and in (I, 148)
22.24 faculties.”] faculties; [sentence continues and is completed with passage quoted at 22.29-31] (I, 148)
22.30 assented] presented (I, 148)
22.31 those] these (I, 148)
23.3 [paragraph] In] [no paragraph] In (I, 146)
23.22 itself. I] itself.α [footnote omitted] [paragraph] I (I, 147)
31.27-8 “that . . . qualities,” . . . “the phænomena . . . inhere.”] [see 17 above] (I, 137, 138)
61.7 [paragraph] “The] [paragraph] 2°, That the (II, App. iii, 530)
62.23 “great axiom”] [see 16 above] (I, 136)
65.3-5 “by . . . believed,”] [see 61 above] (II, App. iii, 531)
76.8 else.”] else; but to do this of the infinite is to think the infinite as finite, which is contradictory and absurd. (III, 102)
76.11-12 “to conceive the possibility” . . . “conceiving . . . reason.”] When I say that a thing may be, of which I cannot conceive the possibility, (that is, by conceiving . . . reason), I only say that thought is limited; but, within its limits, I do not deny, I do not subvert, its truth. (III, 100)
79.8-9 conceive the proposition that A is not] enounce the proposition, A is not (III, 113)
80.8 “All] For if we take a comprehensive view of the phænomena of thought, we shall find that all (III, 100)
80.8 think . . . lies] think, that is, all that is within the jurisdiction of the law of Reason and Consequent, lies (III, 100)
80.10 one] the one (III, 100)
80.15 unthinkable . . . we] unthinkable, and, on the hypothesis in question, all, therefore, equally impossible, we (III, 101)
80.17 Extension may] Extension, then, may (III, 101)
80.18 contradictions] contradictories (III, 101)
80.19 and circumference] a circumference (III, 101)
81.19 inconceivable . . . .] [ellipsis indicates 6-sentence omission] (III, 103)
81.20 “It] But to return whence we have been carried, it (III, 103)
81.23 we] if we (III, 103)
81.24-5 admitted. . . . [paragraph] It] admitted, the hypothesis is manifestly false, that proposes the subjective or formal law of Reason and Consequent as the criterion of real or objective possibility. [paragraph] It (III, 103)
81.30 opposites,”] opposites, they again afford a similar refutation of the hypothesis in question. (III, 104)
82.38-83.1 “we . . . absurd.”] [see 76, 80 above] (III, 102)
110.24 “the recognition . . . its own acts or affections;”] Consciousness is thus, on the one hand, the recognition . . . its acts and affections;—in other words, the self-affirmation, that certain modifications are known by me, and that these modifications are mine. (I, 193)
110.25 “all] In this all (I, 201)
111.3 is palpably] is, therefore, palpably (I, 212)
111.5 that I . . . what I] that I . . . what I (I, 212)
111.17 my own] my (I, 228)
111.21 It] [paragraph] It (I, 228)
111.38-9 “not only false,” but “involves . . . terms.”] [paragraph] I proceed, therefore, to show that Dr. Reid’s assertion of memory being an immediate knowledge of the past, is not only false, but that it involves . . . terms.α [footnote:] αCompare Discussions, p. 50.—Ed. (I, 218)
111.40 “exists only in the now;”] Every act, and consequently every act of knowledge, exists only as it now exists; and as it exists only in the now, it can be cognisant only of a now-existent object. (I, 219)
112.6-7 been. . . . All] been. I remember an event I saw, —the landing of George IV. at Leith. This remembrance is only a consciousness of certain imaginations, involving the conviction that these imaginations now represent ideally what I formerly really experienced. All (I, 220-1)
112.8 belief. . . . So] [ellipsis indicates 13-sentence omission] (I, 220-1)
112.8 far is] far, therefore, is (I, 221)
112.11-12 past. . . . We] past. [ellipsis indicates that JSM moves back 3 sentences (the last of which he omits)] But, though in memory we must admit the reality of the representation and belief, as facts of consciousness, we (I, 220-1)
112.14 delusion:”] delusion. (I, 221)
112.27-30 organ:” . . . “It] organ.β [footnote:] βOn this point, see Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects—Ancient Logics and Metaphysics, p. 153. Cf. Of the External Senses, p. 289, (edit. 1800.)—Ed. [text:] In fact, if we look alternately with each, we have a different object in our right, and a different object in our left, eye. It (II, 153)
112.36 phænomena] phænomenon (II, 154)
114.11-12 “accompanied . . . been.”] [see 112 above] (I, 219)
114.14 “contained”] This [Hamilton’s definition of consciousness] being admitted, and professing, as we do, to prove that consciousness is the one generic faculty of knowledge, we, consequently, must maintain that all knowledge is immediate, and only of the actual or present,—in other words, that what is called mediate knowledge, knowledge of the past, knowledge of the absent, knowledge of the non-actual or possible, is either no knowledge at all, or only a knowledge contained in, and evolved out of, an immediate knowledge of what is now existent and actually present to the mind. (I, 217-18)
115.15-16 “the . . . affections,”] [see 110 above] (I, 193)
116.41 “in . . . existence.”] But, on the other hand, consciousness is not to be viewed as anything different from these modifications themselves, but is, in . . . existence, or of their existence within the sphere of intelligence. (I, 193)
117.6 “the] Consciousness is thus, on the one hand, the recognition by the mind or ego of its acts and affections;—in other words, the (I, 193)
117.8-9 “is . . . from” the “modifications themselves.”] [see entry for 116.41 above] (I, 193)
117.12-15 “consciousness and knowledge” . . . “are] Thus, in the present instance, consciousness and knowledge are (I, 194-5)
117.17 establishment. . . . Though] establishment. Knowledge is a relation, and every relation supposes two terms. Thus, in the relation in question, there is, on the one hand, a subject of knowledge,—that is, the knowing mind,—and on the other, there is an object of knowledge,—that is, the thing known; and the knowledge itself is the relation between these two terms. Now though (I, 195)
117.24 permanent] prominent (I, 195)
118n.13 “The] Here the (I, 194)
119.2-3 “a process of reasoning,”] [see 112 above] (II, 153)
119.15 is palpably] is, therefore, palpably (I, 212)
119.17-18 relative. The knowledge . . . object.”] relative. [JSM moves back a page and a half] The whole question, therefore, turns upon the proof or disproof of this principle,—for if it can be shown that the knowledge . . . object, it follows that it is impossible to make consciousness conversant about the intellectual operations to the exclusion of their objects. (I, 211)
119.18-19 “It . . . object,”] [see entry for 119.17-18 above] (I, 211)
119.30-5 “that I can know that [I believe] without knowing what I [believe]—or that I can know the [belief] without knowing what the [belief] is about: for example, that I am conscious of [remembering a past event] without being conscious of [the past event remembered]; that I am conscious of [believing in God], without being conscious [of the God believed in].”] They [Reid and Stewart] maintain that I can know that I know, without knowing what I know,—or that I can know the knowledge without knowing what the knowledge is about; for example, that I am conscious of perceiving a book without being conscious of the book perceived,—that I am conscious of remembering its contents without being conscious of these contents remembered,—and so forth. (I, 212)
119.35-120.2 “an . . . knowledge” . . . “only . . . object,” . . . “manifest” . . . “that . . . correlative.”] [see 111 above] (I, 228)
120.33-4 “we may be . . . know,” and that “it] We may, however, be . . . know, and it (IV, 70)
120.35-6 and modern] and in modern (IV, 70)
120.37 belief,”] belief. (IV, 70)
120.37 “But] [paragraph] But (IV, 73)
121.3 “The] [paragraph] The (IV, 73)
121.4 so] in so (IV, 73)
122.8 “The] Now, the (IV, 73)
122.8 object” . . . “is] object is (IV, 73)
123n.23-4 “one . . . solution.”] [see 121 above] (IV, 73)
126.18 is that] is thus,—that (I, 271)
126.24 them.] them.α [footnote:] αSee Reid’s Works, Note A, p. 743, et seq.—Ed. (I, 271)
127.15 Stewart. . . . [paragraph] With] Stewart.α [ellipsis indicates omission of footnote and 5-sentence quotation from Stewart] [paragraph] With (I, 273)
128.5 not-self.”] not-self.α [footnote referring to Buffier omitted] (I, 175)
128.7 “it] It (I, 276)
128.10 veracity.”] veracity.α [footnote:] αSee Reid’s Works, pp. 743-754, et seq.—Ed. (I, 276)
128.25-6 “the . . . affections.” [see entry for 110.24 above] (I, 193)
130.13-14 “given . . . consciousness” . . . “to . . . evidence.”] [paragraph] Under this first law [of Parcimony], let it, therefore, be laid down, in the first place, that by a fact of consciousness properly so called, is meant a primary and universal fact of our intellectual being; and, in the second, that such facts are of two kinds,—1°, The facts given . . . consciousness itself; and, 2°, The facts which consciousness does not at once give, but to . . . evidence. (I, 275)
130.15 “the veracity of consciousness,”] Philosophy is only a systematic evolution of the contents of consciousness, by the instrumentality of consciousness; it, therefore, necessarily supposes, in both respects, the veracity of consciousness. (I, 276-7)
130n.6-7 “is . . . certainty.] ‘The Criterion of truth is . . . certainty.’ [Hamilton is quoting himself] (IV, 69)
131.6 “nearly . . . philosophers”] [see 127 above] (I, 272)
133.33-4 “to . . . evidence.”] [see 130 above] (I, 275)
134n.3-6 “Religious disbelief . . . connexion.” . . . “must ever be a matter” . . . “of regret,” . . . “reprobation.”] I would, therefore, earnestly request of you to bear in mind, that religious disbelief . . . connection; and that while the one must ever be a matter of reprobation and regret, the other is in itself deserving of applause. (I, App. i, 394)
136.17 “Errors” . . . “intelligence as] Errors may, however, arise either from overlooking the laws or necessary principles which it does contain; or by attributing to it [intelligence], as (IV, 137)
137n.11 “Nothing,” . . . “can] Nothing can (II, 129)
137n.17 organ. . . . Through] organ; and that is true which Democritus of old asserted, that all our senses are only modifications of touch.α [footnote:] αSee below, vol. ii, lect. xxvii, p. 152.—Ed. [text:] Through (II, 130)
137n.18 retina.”] retina; what we add to this perception must not be taken into account. (II, 130)
138n.11 “I] [paragraph] I (IV, 95)
138n.17 “relevation” . . . “naturally clear,”] But admitting all this, I am still bold enough to maintain, that consciousness affords not merely the only revelation, and only criterion of philosophy, but that this revelation is naturally clear,—this criterion, in itself, unerring. (I, 266)
142.1 “There] In the second place, there (IV, 92)
142.4 knowledge. . . . To] knowledge. Now, from both of these considerations, it is evident that to (IV, 92)
142.35 “that] [paragraph] The First of these rules [“which afford the exclusive conditions of psychological legitimacy”] is,—That (I, 268)
143.2 “reduce it to a generalization from experience.”] Whenever, therefore, in our analysis of the intellectual phænomena, we arrive at an element which we cannot reduce to a generalisation from experience, but which lies at the root of all experience, and which we cannot, therefore, resolve into any higher principle,—this we properly call a fact of consciousness. (I, 270)
143.3 “character of necessity.”] [paragraph] But, in the second place, this, its character of ultimate priority, supposes its character of necessity. (I, 270)
147n.7-11 “Whenever . . . consciousness.”] [see entry for 143.2 above] (I, 270)
147n.12-14 [no paragraph] “A . . . belief”] [paragraph] A . . . belief. (I, 271)
149.4-6 “No philosopher . . . consciousness.”] [paragraph] But, though this be too evident to admit of doubt, and though no philosopher . . . consciousness, we find, nevertheless, that its testimony has been silently overlooked, and systems established upon principles in direct hostility to the primary data of intelligence. (I, 277)
149.6-8 “that . . . dependent.”] [beginning of Lecture XVI] On the principle, which no one has yet been found bold enough formally to deny, and which, indeed, requires only to be understood to be acknowledged,—viz. that . . . dependent,—it is manifest, at once and without further reasoning, that no philosophical theory can pretend to truth except that single theory which comprehends and develops the fact of consciousness on which it founds, without retrenchment, distortion, or addition. (I, 285)
149.10 “the] [paragraph] From these examples, the truth of the position I maintain is manifest,—that a fact of consciousness can only be rejected on the supposition of falsity, and that, the falsity of one fact of consciousness being admitted, the (I, 283)
149.27 and obey] and to obey (I, 284)
150.8 “We] [no paragraph] I shall commence with this great fact to which I have already alluded,—that we (I, 288)
150.8-9 perception,” . . . “of] perception of (I, 288)
150.18 Such] [paragraph] Such (I, 288)
150.20 of our own] of their own (I, 288)
150.20-1 minds.” [paragraph] We] minds. [JSM moves ahead 4 pages] [no paragraph] We (I, 288, 292)
150.22 quality] duality [treated as typographical error in this edition] (I, 292)
150.33-7 consciousness.” . . . [paragraph] “Philosophers] consciousness. [no paragraph] Philosophers (I, 292)
151.1 integrity.] integrity.α [footnote:] αSee the Author’s Suppl. Disser. to Reid’s Works, Note C.—Ed. (I, 293)
151.4 philosopher] philosopherβ [footnote:] βThis philosopher is doubtless Peter Poiret. John Sergeant is subsequently referred to by Sir W. Hamilton, as holding a similar doctrine in a paradoxical form. See below, vol. ii. pp. 92, 124.—Ed (I, 293)
151.6 As] [no paragraph] As (I, 293)
151.9-11 Dualism.” . . . [paragraph] “In] Dualism. [paragraph] In (I, 293)
151.14 rejection] rejections (I, 293)
151.15 shown that] shown you, that (I, 293)
151.16-20 impossible.” . . . “But] impossible. But (I, 293)
151.24 deception;” . . . “that] deception,—that (I, 293)
151.32 manifestation] manifestations (I, 294)
151.35 philosophy. . . . But] philosophy, for Oken’s deduction of the universe from the original nothing,α [footnote:] αSee Oken’s Physiophilosophy, translated for the Ray Society by Tulk, § 31-43.—Ed. [text:]—the nothing being equivalent to the Absolute or God, is only the paradoxical foundation of a system of realism; and, in ancient philosophy, we know too little of the book of Gorgias the Sophist, entitled Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἢ περὶ φύσεως,β [footnote:] βSee Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii. 65.—Ed. [text:]—Concerning Nature or the Non-Existent,—to be able to affirm whether it were maintained by him as a dogmatic and bona fide doctrine. But (I, 294)
151.38 result.”] result.γ [footnote:] γSee a remarkable passage in the Bestimmung des Menschen, p. 174, (Werke, vol. ii. p. 245), translated by Sir W. Hamilton, Reid’s Works, p. 129.—Ed. (I, 294)
152.9 “that] They [philosophical Unitarians or Monists] reject, however, the evidence of consciousness to their antithesis in existence, and maintain that (I, 296)
152.16 “are] “The Dualists, of whom we are now first speaking, are (I, 295)
152.38 dualist] dualistα [3-sentence footnote concerning Aristotle’s opinion omitted] (I, 296)
152.43 Descartes.”] Descartes.β [footnote:] βSee the Author’s Discussions, p. 57 seq.—Ed. (I, 296)
158.24 “that] [beginning of Lecture XXIV] In my last Lecture, having concluded the review of Reid’s Historical Account of Opinions on Perception, and of Brown’s attack upon that account, I proceeded to the question,—Is Reid’s own doctrine of perception a scheme of Natural Realism, that is, did he accept in its integrity the datum of consciousness,—that we are immediately cognitive both of the phænomena of matter and of the phænomena of mind; or did he, like Brown, and the greater number of more recent philosophers, as Brown assumes, hold only the finer form of the representative hypothesis, which supposes that (II, 86)
158.28 non-self.”] not-self? (II, 86)
158.31 You will remark,” . . . “that] [no paragraph] You will remark, likewise, that (II, 106)
158.36 our] an (II, 106)
158.36 the phænomenon] his [Brown’s] phænomenon (II, 106)
159.1 are conscious] are there conscious (II, 106)
159.5-8 exists.” . . . “Nor] exists. [no paragraph] Nor (II, 106)
159.13 “Mark] [paragraph] But mark (II, 138)
160.27 Every] [no paragraph] Every (I, 219)
160.28 Now] now (I, 219)
160.28-9 object. But] object. Memory is an act,—an act of knowledge; it can, therefore, be cognisant only of a now-existent object. But (I, 219)
160.32 true one, it] true, it (I, 219)
160.34-6 a . . . been] [not in italics] (I, 219)
160.38-9 a . . . experienced] [not in italics] (I, 219)
160.43-4 Of . . . nothing] [not in italics] (I, 220)
161.1-2 as . . . modification] [not in italics] (I, 220)
161.5-6 only . . . knowledge] [not in italics] (I, 220)
162.12-13 which . . . perceive] [not in italics] (II, 154)
162n.11 “Real truth is the] [paragraph] Real truth is, therefore, the (IV, 67)
163n.1-2 new.” . . . “But] new. But (IV, 67)
163n.11-15 itself.” . . . “All] itself. All (IV, 68)
163n.16 lie:”] lie,—a supposition which is not, without the strongest evidence, to be admitted; and the argument is as competent against the sceptic in our present condition, as it would be were we endowed with any other conceivable form of Acquisitive and Cognitive Faculties. (IV, 68)
166.1 “we . . . representation:”] [see 159 above] (II, 106)
176.23-4 “The object,” . . . “is in this case given] In the latter case, the object, which may be called the subject-object, is given (II, 432)
193.22-4 “religious . . . connexion] [see entry for 134n.3-6 above] (I, App. i, 394)
223.20-1 “a . . . scholar,”] [paragraph] This doctrine [that vision is exclusively responsible for the perception of extension and figure] is maintained among others by Platner,—a . . . scholar. (II, 173)
223.30 exteriority; in] exteriority, (oertliches Auseinanderseyn), in (II, 174)
223.34 time . . . space] [not in italics] (II, 174)
223.36 to another] to some other (II, 174)
223.41 kinds] [not in italics] (II, 174)
224.1 differences] difference (II, 175)
228.32 conceiving] perceiving (II, 167) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
229.3 figure. These] figure. [paragraph] These (II, 168)
229.5-6 discussion”. . . . “And] discussion. And (II, 168)
230.32-3 “It is not,” . . . “all] And here you will observe, it is not all (II, 160)
251n.13 “Those] This law may be thus enounced,—Those (II, 238)
252.1 “whether] Of these [“the vital interests of philosophy”] the first that I shall touch upon, is the problem;—Whether (II, 144)
252.34 one into] into one (II, 147) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
253.18 into mind] into the mind (II, 148) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
253.42 “ingenious” . . . “has] [paragraph] the same conclusion is attained, through a somewhat different process, by Mr James Mill, in his ingenious Analysis of the Phænomena of the Human Mind. This author, following Hartley and Priestley, has (II, 146)
254.3-5 laws,” . . . “account . . . principle.”] laws. According to Mr Mill, the necessity under which we lie of thinking that one contradictory excludes another,—that a thing cannot at once be and not be, is only the result of association and custom.β [footnote:] βChap. iii. p. 75.—Ed. [text:] It is not, therefore, to be marvelled at, that he should account . . . principle; and this he accordingly does.γ [footnote:] γChap. iii. p. 68.—Ed. (II, 146)
256.4 “in] [paragraph] Now in opposition to this doctrine [James Mill’s law of association], nothing appears to me clearer than the first alternative,—and that, in (II, 149)
256.7-8 “If . . . doctrine” . . . “were] [no paragraph] If . . . doctrine were (II, 149)
256.15 perception] perceptions (II, 149) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
256.23 results] result (II, 149) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
256.28 constituted] constituent (II, 150) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
260.18 experience.”] experience; our whole empirical knowledge is, therefore, a merely accidental possession of the mind. (IV, 74)
272.4 “Whether] The question I refer to is, Whether (I, 338)
272.7-9 “the . . . absurd;”] This is the most general expression of a problem which has hardly been mentioned, far less mooted, in this country; and when it has attracted a passing notice, the . . . absurd. (I, 338)
272n.2 “Every act . . . consciousness”] You will recollect that, when treating of Consciousness in general, I stated to you that consciousness necessarily involves a judgment; and as every act . . . consciousness, every act of mind, consequently, involves a judgment.α [footnote omitted] (II, 277)
272n.7-8 “We must . . . it” . . . “can] We may say of the mental state of perception too, in his [Reid’s] own language, as indeed we must . . . it can (II, 73)
273n.5 “This is certainly,” . . . “an] That, in the interval, when out of consciousness, these cognitions do continue to subsist in the mind, is certainly an (II, 209)
273n.10-11 “an . . . self-active powers] But the mental activity, the act of knowledge, of which I now speak, is more than this; it is an . . . self-active power (II, 211-12) [Hamilton is quoting from Schmid]
274n.3 “Every . . . can be neither] To explain, therefore, the disappearance of our mental activities, it is only requisite to explain their weakening or enfeeblement,—which may be attempted in the following way:—Every . . . can neither be (II, 213) [Hamilton is quoting from Schmid]
274n.15-16 “Mind, howbeit . . . independence.”] Nor can it be argued, that the limitations to which the Retentive, or rather the Reproductive, Faculty is subjected in its energies, in consequence of its bodily relations, prove the absolute dependence of memory on organisation, and legitimate the explanation of this faculty by corporeal agencies; for the incompetency of this inference can be shown from the contradiction in which it stands to the general laws of mind, which, howbeit . . . independence.”α [footnote:] αH. Schmid, Versuch einer Metaphysik [p. 235-6.—Ed.] (II, 217-18) [conclusion of Hamilton’s quotation from Schmid]
274.1 contains systems] contains certain systems (I, 339)
274.9-13 extinguished.” . . . “in . . . of actually] extinguished. For example, there are cases in . . . of accurately (I, 340)
275.4 “mental] [paragraph] The problem, then, in regard to this class is,—Are there, in ordinary, mental (I, 347)
275.7-8 “that . . . of;”] [paragraph] In the question proposed, I am not only strongly inclined to the affirmative,—nay, I do not hesitate to maintain, that . . . of,—that our whole knowledge, in fact, is made up of the unknown and incognisable. (I, 348)
275.9 “the] And without dealing in any general speculation, I shall at once descend to the special evidence which appears to me, not merely to warrant, but to necessitate the conclusion, that the (I, 349)
275.15-18 “they are . . . zero.” . . . “must . . . unperceived,” . . . “When] They are . . . zero. But it is evident, that each half must . . . unperceived; for as the perceived whole is nothing but the union of the unperceived halves, so the perception,—the perceived affection itself of which we are conscious,—is only the sum of two modifications, each of which severally eludes our consciousness. When (I, 350)
275.29-31 When . . . sea, “this] When . . . sea,—what are the constituents of the total perception of which we are conscious? This (I, 351)
275.32 something. . . . If] something. The noise of the sea is the complement of the noise of its several waves;—/ποντίων τε κυμάτων/Ἀνηριθμον γέλασμα.α [footnote:] αÆschylus, Prometheus, l. 89.—Ed. [text:] and if (I, 351)
276n.1 “In] As, to take an example from vision,—in the external perception of a stationary object, a certain space,—an expanse of surface, is necessary to the minimum visible, in other words, an object of sight cannot come into consciousness unless it be of a certain size; in like manner, in (I, 369)
276n.4 consciousness.”] consciousness; and as time is divisible ad infinitum, whatever minimum be taken, there must be admitted to be, beyond the cognisance of consciousness, intervals of time, in which, if mental agencies be performed, these will be latent to consciousness. (I, 369-70)
276n.4-6 “It cannot . . . sensation.”] Taking, then, their difference in degree, and supposing that the degree of the impression determines the degree of the sensation, it cannot . . . sensation: but this is undeniable, that, above a certain limit, perception declines, in proportion as sensation rises. (II, 101-2)
277.7 It] [no paragraph] Now it (I, 352)
277.28 immediately] mediately (I, 353) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
278.4 “our acquired dexterities and habits.”] [paragraph] Let us now turn to another class of phænomena, which in like manner are capable of an adequate explanation only on the theory I have advanced;—I mean the operations resulting from our Acquired Dexterities and Habits. (I, 355)
278.21-2 “violates . . . consciousness.” “Consciousness] But, in the second place, it [assuming a state of consciousness not remembered] violates . . . consciousness. Consciousness (I, 354)
278.24 “Of] But of (I, 355)
278.26 ideas of A] ideas A (I, 355) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
279.11-12 mind,” . . . “that] mind, that (I, 368)
279.13 memory. Vivid] memory. Memory and consciousness are thus in the direct ratio of each other. On the one hand, looking from cause to effect,—vivid (I, 368-9)
279.14 memory.”] memory; no consciousness, no memory: and, on the other, looking from effect to cause,—long memory, vivid consciousness; short memory, faint consciousness; no memory, no consciousness. (I, 369)
280.25-31 “would . . . conclusions:” . . . “serious meditation” . . . “without . . . fatigue:” . . . “each . . . process.”] In the present instance, its [Stewart’s doctrine of real but forgotten consciousness] admission would . . . conclusions. Take the case of a person reading. Now, all of you must have experienced, if ever under the necessity of reading aloud, that, if the matter be uninteresting, your thoughts, while you are going on in the performance of your task, are wholly abstracted from the book and its subject, and you are perhaps deeply occupied in a train of serious meditation. Here the process of reading is performed without interruption, and with the most punctual accuracy; and, at the same time, the process of meditation is carried on without . . . fatigue. Now this, on Mr Stewart’s doctrine, would seem impossible, for what does his theory suppose? It supposes that separate acts of concentrated consciousness or attention, are bestowed on each . . . process. (I, 360)
280.37-8 “concentrated consciousness or attention,”] [see entry for 280.25-31 above] (I, 360)
281n.9 restricted] astricted (II, 258) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
281n.14 our nature] their nature (II, 258)
281.12-14 “the . . . each;”] This law is, that the . . . each, and consequently the less vivid and distinct will be the information it obtains of the several objects.β [footnote omitted] (I, 237)
281.17-18 “the train of serious meditation”] [see entry for 280.25-31 above] (I, 360)
286.2 “some philosophers who, instead] Nor is this superfluous, for we shall find that some philosophers, instead (II, 376)
286.9-10 “When we . . . aware,” . . . “of] αWhen [footnote:] αCf. Discussions, p. 609.—Ed. [text:] we . . . aware of (II, 377)
286.10 exist] be (II, 377)
286.11 does this] does the (II, 377)
286.11 that it has a cause] that it has a cause (II, 377)
286.20 reverti,”] reverti,”β [footnote:] βPersius, iii. 84. [Cf. Rixner, Geschichte der Philosophie, v. i. p. 83, § 62.] (II, 377)
286.24 as] an (II, 377)
286.25 and an alkali] and alkali (II, 377) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
287.1 Put] But (II, 377)
287.2 those] these (II, 377)
287.3 constituents, either] constituents, and these constituents again of simpler elements, either (II, 378)
287.6-7 to the] to their (II, 378) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
287.10 interit,”] interit,”α [footnote:] αOvid, Met. xv. 165.—Ed. (II, 378)
287.17-18 “not . . . mind,”] [paragraph] The eighth [doctrine regarding the principle of causality] and last opinion is that which regards the judgment of causality as derived; and derives it not . . . mind; in a word, from the principle of the Conditioned. (II, 397)
287.31 “We are . . . construe in] In short, we are . . . construe it in (II, 405)
287.35 the world] a world (II, 405)
287.39-288.1 Can . . . alone] [not in italics] (II, 406)
288.8 retraction] retractation (II, 406) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
289.34-5 “complement of existence”] [see 286 above] (II, 377)
290.2-3 “law of the Conditioned,”] The law of mind, that all that is positively inconceivable, lies in the interval between two inconceivable extremes, and which, however palpable when stated, has never been generalised, as far as I know, by any philosopher, I call the Law or Principle of the Conditioned. (II, 404)
291.21-2 “professes . . . explanation evacuates] Brown professes . . . explanation, he evacuates (II, 384)
291.37-8 “concurring . . . effect.”] [paragraph] But, in the second place, as every effect is only produced by the concurrence of at least two causes, (and by cause, be it observed, I mean everything without which the effect could not be realised), and as these concurring . . . effect, it follows, that the lower we descend in the series of causes, the moe complex will be the product; and that the higher we ascend, it will be the more simple. (I, 59)
291.38-292.2 “an effect” is “nothing . . . which constitutes] [paragraph] Considering philosophy, in the first place, in relation to its first end,—the discovery of causes,—we have seen that causes, (taking that term as synonymous for all without which the effect would not be), are only the coefficients of the effect; an effect being nothing . . . which constitute (I, 97)
292.2 “An effect] [paragraph] But all the causes or coefficient powers being brought into reciprocal relation, the salt is the result; for an effect (II, 540)
292.3 entities;” “causes] entities,—concauses or coefficient powers. In thought, causes and effects are thus, pro tanto, tautological: an effect always pre-existed potentially in its causes; and causes (II, 540)
292.9 “Considering] Now, considering (I, 59)
292.10-11 There are, first . . . secondly . . . thirdly] These are, first, . . . secondly . . . thirdly (I, 59)
292.21 “concause”] [see entries for 292.2 and 292.3 above] (II, 540)
292.22 last,” . . . “as] last, as (I, 97)
292.27-8 “as . . . be;”] [see entry for 291.38-292.2 above] (I, 97)
293.13 “Philosophy] [paragraph] Philosophy (I, 60)
293.17-19 view” . . . “and . . . complete] view, and . . . complete (I, 60)
293n.1-2 “The lower . . . simple.”] [see entry for 291.37-8 above] (I, 59)
295.13 “attempts] It [the doctrine under discussion] attempts (II, 396)
295.14-16 “Listen,” . . . “to] Listen to (II, 397)
295.18 which] that (II, 397)
295.23 consequently we exclude] consequently exclude (II, 397)
295.29-30 opinion,” . . . “is] opinion is (II, 397)
295.37 “not] And what is this relation? Not (II, 391)
295.38-9 in volition] in a volition (II, 391)
295.41-296.2 world.” [paragraph] . . . “This] world. [paragraph] αThis [footnote:] αSee Reid’s Works, p. 866. Discuss., p. 612.—Ed. (II, 391)
296.12 actually] absolutely (II, 392)
296.14 determination] determinations (II, 392)
296.16-17 the volition] volition (II, 392)
297n.1 “quality of necessity and universality.”] Admitting that causation were cognisable, and that perception and self-consciousness were competent to its apprehension, still as these faculties could only take note of individual causations, we should be wholly unable, out of such empirical acts, to evolve the quality of necessity and universality, by which this notion is distinguished. (II, 392)
302.20 “that . . . one.”] In the discussion of this question [“whether we can form an adequate idea of that which is denoted by an abstract . . . term”], I shall pursue the following order: first of all, I shall state to you the arguments of the Nominalists,—of those who hold, that we are unable to form an idea corresponding to the abstract and general term; in the second place, I shall state to you the arguments of the Conceptualists,—of those who maintain that we are so competent; and, in the last, I shall show you that . . . one, and that the whole controversy has originated in the imperfection and ambiguity of our philosophical nomenclature. (II, 296)
302.33 “The] [paragraph] The (II, 287)
302.38 body.” [paragraph] . . . “individual abstract notions;” . . . “Abstract General Notions.” . . . “when] body. [no paragraph] But had we only individual abstract notions, what would be our knowledge? We should be cognisant only of qualities viewed apart from their subjects; (and of separate phænomena there exist none in nature); and as these qualities are also separate from each other, we should have no knowledge of their mutual relations.α [footnote:] αWe should also be overwhelmed with their number.—Jotting. [text:] [paragraph] It is necessary, therefore, that we should form Abstract General notions. This is done when (II, 288)
303.7 notion] action (II, 288)
303.25 twofold quantity] twofold kind of quantity (II, 289)
303.34-5 Extension of a notion; the latter, the internal quantity, is called its Comprehension or Intension. . . . The] Extension of a notion, (quantitas ambitus); the latter, the internal quantity, is called its Comprehension or Intension, (quantitas complexus). [ellipsis indicates omission of 3 sentences and lengthy Greek footnote] The (II, 289-90)
303.37 extension.”] extension.β [footnote omitted] (II, 290)
303.44 “not only true but self-evident.” . . . “irrefragable”] This opinion [that there are no general notions], which, after Hobbes, has been in this country maintained, among others, by Berkeley,β Hume,γ Adam Smith,δ Campbell,α and Stewart,β [footnotes identifying specific passages from works of these philosophers omitted] appears to me not only true but self-evident. [paragraph] No one has stated the case of the nominalists more clearly than Bishop Berkeley, and as his whole argument is, as far as it goes, irrefragable, I beg your attention to the following extract from his Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge.γ [footnote:] γSections vii. viii. x. Works, i. 5 et seq., 4to edit. Cf. Encyclopædia Britannica, art. Metaphysics, vol. xiv. p. 622, 7th edit.—Ed. (II, 297-8)
304.28 whatever] whatsoever (II, 299)
304.30 abstracting their ideas] abstracting their ideas (II, 299)
304.34 part] parts (II, 299)
304.42 whatsoever.] whatsoever.α [footnote:] αThis argumentation is employed by Derodon, Logica, [pars ii c. vi §16. Opera, p. 236.—Ed.], and others. (II, 300)
304.42 am] own (II, 300)
305.15 “point of similarity”] Now it is the points of similarity thus discovered and identified in the unity of consciousness, which constitute Concepts or Notions. (III, 125)
305.16 “is not] It [a concept or notion] is, therefore, not (III, 128)
305.19 expresses. . . . The] expresses. [ellipsis indicates 1-paragraph omission] [paragraph] But the (III, 128)
305.38-306.1 Presentation . . . Phantasy,” that “our] And here I again stated what a Concept or Notion is in itself, and in contrast to a Presentation . . . Phantasy. Our (III, 131)
306.4 mediate, indeterminate] mediate, relative, indeterminate (III, 131)
306.6-7 object. . . . [paragraph] Formed by comparison,” concepts “express] object. [ellipsis indicates 2 3/4-page omission] [no paragraph] Formed by comparison, they (III, 131, 134)
306.11 as actually] as so actually (III, 134)
306.30 horse] horse (III, 135)
306.35 in] on (III, 135)
307.17 “the employment] This [“that concepts are mere words, and that there is nothing general in thought itself”] is not indeed held in reality by any philosopher; for no philosopher has ever denied that we are capable of apprehending relations, and in particular the relation of similarity and difference; so that the whole controversy between the conceptualist and nominalist originates in the ambiguous employment (III, 136)
307.19-20 relation,” . . . “cannot] relation cannot (II, 312)
307.24 given.”] given; and accordingly this has been done wherever a philosophical nomenclature of the slightest pretensions to perfection has been formed. (II, 312)
307.28 faculties.”] faculties.α [footnote:] αSee the Author’s note, Reid’s Works, p. 412; and Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 296 et seq.—Ed. (III, 136)
308.13 “As the . . . comparison,” a concept “necessarily] [entire paragraph indented] ¶XXII.—2°, A concept or notion, as the . . . comparison, necessarily (III, 128)
308.14-15 “a . . . imagination.”] [see 271 above] (II, 312)
308.18 “a . . . attributes,”] [see 305 above] (III, 129)
308.20 “common circumstance”] [see 303 above] (II, 298)
308.25-6 “the . . . objects,”] [see 307 above] (II, 312)
309.2-3 “In the formation,” . . . “of] This, by way of preface, being understood, I showed that, in the formation of (III, 132)
309.12 the object] its object (III, 132)
309.19 process. But] process; but (III, 132)
310.13 [paragraph] The] [entire paragraph indented] ¶XXIII. The (III, 137)
311.12 “Language,” . . . “is] Language is (III, 138)
311.16-18 it.” . . . “is] it. Speech is thus not the mother, but the godmother, of knowledge. But though, in general, we must hold that language, as the product and correlative of thought, must be viewed as posterior to the act of thinking itself; on the other hand, it must be admitted, that we could never have risen above the very lowest degrees in the scale of thought, without the aid of signs. A sign is (III, 138)
311.19 beyond. A] beyond. [paragraph] A (III, 138)
312.1 arrested. . . . Admitting] arrested. Thus it is, that the higher exertions of the higher faculty of Understanding,—the classification of the objects presented and represented by the subsidiary powers in the formation of a hierarchy of notions, the connection of these notions into judgments, the inference of one judgment from another, and, in general, all our consciousness of the relations of the universal to the particular, consequently all science strictly so denominated, and every inductive knowledge of the past and future from the laws of nature:—not only these, but all ascent from the sphere of sense to the sphere of moral and religious intelligence, are, as experience proves, if not altogether impossible without a language, at least possible to a very low degree. [paragraph] Admitting (II, 139)
315.42-316.1 “realized in thought,” . . . “elicited into consciousness.”] [see 306 above] (III, 135, 134)
319.7 “As . . . the fictitious] [entire paragraph indented] ¶XXX. As . . . the factitious (III, 171)
319.33-6 “For . . . part, especially . . . thought, to] [no paragraph] Speaking of the analysis of complex notions, he [Leibniz] says—“For . . . part, however, especially . . . thought, for the sake of brevity, to (III, 181)
319.38 thousand sides] thousand equal sides (III, 181)
319.39 or thousand] a thousand (III, 181)
320.1 mode] kind (III, 181)
320n.12-14 “the symbolical notions of the understanding,” . . . “the . . . Imagination.”] consequence of the establishment of this distinction by Leibnitz, that a peculiar expression, (Begriff, conceptus), was appropriated to the symbolical notions of the Understanding, in contrast to the . . . Imagination, which last also were furnished with the distinctive appellations of intuitions, (Anschauungen, intuitus). (III, 183)
321.21 “A Concept,” . . . “is] [paragraph] The conceiving an object is, therefore, its recognition mediately through a concept; and a Concept is (III, 122)
321.25 “abusive employment”] This abusive employment has, however, not been so frequent in reference to this term [notion] as to the term conception; but it must be acknowledged, that nothing can be imagined more vague and vacillating than the meaning attached to notion in the writings of all British philosophers, without exception. (III, 121)
321.26 are sometimes] are also sometimes (III, 126)
321.28 general.”] general; while the other cognitive modifications to which they are opposed,—perceptions and imaginations,—have, in like manner, their essence in their individuality. (III, 126)
321.29-33 “If I . . . of Sophroniscus, as Athenian, as philosopher, as pugnosed . . . my notion or concept] If, for example, I . . . of Sophroniscus, as Athenian, as philosopher, as pugnosed . . . my notion or concept (III, 78)
321.35 individual.] individual.β [footnote:] βKrug, ibid. [Logik], § 29.—Ed. (III, 146)
321.36 “It] Now, it (III, 148)
322.9 here is] is here (III, 148)
322.12-14 “If a . . . is . . . not a proper abstract] [paragraph] Thus, it is manifest, that, as Definition is the analysis of a complex concept into its component parts or attributes, if a concept be simple, that is, if it contain in it only a single attribute, it must be indefinable; and again, that as Division is the analysis of a higher or more general concept into others lower and less general, if a . . . is indivisible, is, in fact, not a proper or abstract (III, 152)
323n.20-3 “a concept . . . be clear . . . discriminate” . . . “what . . . notions:”] “A concept . . . be clear . . . discriminate what . . . notions; whereas if the degree of consciousness be so remiss that this and other concepts run into each other, in that case, the notion is said to be obscure. (III, 160-1) [Hamilton is quoting from Esser]
323n.23-5 “notions absolutely clear” are “notions whose objects” . . . “possibly . . . unknown.”] But, on the other hand, of notions absolutely clear, that is, notions whose objects cannot possibly . . . unknown,—of such notions a limited intelligence is possessed of very few, and, consequently, our human concepts are, properly, only a mixture of the opposite qualities;—clear or obscure as applied to them, meaning only that the one quality or the other is the preponderant. (III, 161) [Hamilton is quoting from Esser]
324.21 “To judge,” . . . “is] [entire paragraph indented] ¶XLVI. To judge, (κρίνειν,α [footnote:] αThe verb κρίνειν, to judge, and still more the substantive, κρίσις, judgment, are rarely used by the Greeks,—(never by Aristotle)—as technical terms of Logic or of Psychology. [text:] judicare) is (III, 225)
324.24-5 a Judgment; considered . . . a Proposition or Predication.”] a Judgment, (λόγος ἀποφανός, judicium); considered . . . a Proposition or Predication, (ἀπόϕανσις, πρότασις,α [footnote omitted] διάστημα, propositio, prædicatio, pronunciatum, enunciatio, effatum, profatum, axiomaβ). [footnote:] βBy Stoics and Ramists. (III, 226)
325.1 “Concepts, in] [entire paragraph indented] ¶XLII. Considered under their Comprehension, concepts, again, in (III, 213)
325.4-5 notions.” . . . “1°.] notions, (τὸ ἀντικεῖσϑαι, oppositio). This is twofold;—1°, (III, 213)
325.5 Opposition] Opposition (III, 214)
325.6 Repugnance; and] Repugnance, (τὸ ἀντιϕατικῶς ἀντικεῖσϑαι, ἀντίϕασις, oppositio immediata sive contradictoria, repugnantia); and, (III, 214)
325.6 Opposition. The] Opposition, (τὸ ἐναντίως ἀντικεῖσϑαι, ἐναντιότης, oppositio mediata vel contraria). The (III, 214)
325.7 abolishes directly] abolishes, (tolit), directly (III, 214)
325.8 establishes; the] establishes, (ponit); the (III, 214)
325.10 else.”] else.α [footnote:] α[Cf. Drobisch, Logik, p. 17, § 25 seq.] (III, 214)
325.17 “Identity] [paragraph] “Identity (III, 214)
325.21 although themselves] although in themselves (III, 214)
325.22 conflicting] conflictive (III, 214)
325.32 “When] But when (III, 226)
325.39 judgment.] Judgment.α [footnote:] αCf. Krug, Logik, § 61. (III, 227)
326.12 “we] This process, as you remember, is called Determination;—a very appropriate expression, inasmuch as by each character or attribute which we add on, we (III, 194)
326.22-9 other,” . . . “But if . . . unity; we judge that polar . . . notion electrical . . . is electrical . . . of polarity.] other; but if . . . unity,—we judge that polar . . . notion electrical . . . is electrical . . . of polarity. (III, 227) [JSM has added italics except as indicated]
326.32-3 the . . . other] [not in italics] (III, 229)
327.7-8 “capable . . . thought.”] [see 325 above] (III, 227)
328.22 “presentations of phantasy.”] [see entry for 305.38-306.1 above] (III, 131)
329.33 “individual things”] [see 324 above] (III, 226)
329.36-8 “the . . . other.”] [see 326 above] (III, 229)
330.20 another. It] another. This fourth condition is in truth only a necessary consequence of the third,—for it is impossible to discriminate without judging,—discrimination, or contradistinction, being in fact only the denying one thing of another. It (I, 204)
330.22-3 general” . . . “have] general have (I, 204)
330.26 object?] object?α [footnote:] αSee Reid’s Works, pp. 243, 414, with the Editor’s Notes.—Ed. (I, 205)
330.32 judgment.] judgment.α [footnote omitted] (II, 277)
330.39 so and . . . so and] so or . . . so or (II, 278)
331.3 judgment and] judgment or (II, 278)
331.3-6 so . . . process] [not in italics] (II, 278)
331.6 process.”] process itself. (II, 278)
331.17 “Both] These three degrees [Concepts, Judgments, Reasonings] are all in fact, strictly, only modifications of the second, as both (III, 117)
331.19 expressed. A] expressed. By anticipation:—A (III, 117)
331.20-1 it . . . word] [not in italics] (III, 117)
331.23-4 a . . . judgment] [not in italics] (III, 117)
332.10 “Water rusts iron:”] [see 325 above] (III, 227)
335.20-1 “The exposition . . . its Definition:”] [paragraph] Again; you will observe the two following distinctions: the first,—the exposition . . . its Definition; (a simple notion cannot, therefore, be defined); the second,—the exposition of the Extension of a notion is called its Division; (an individual notion cannot be divided.) (III, 143)
335.21-3 “Definition is . . . attributes.”] [paragraph] Thus, it is manifest, that, as Definition is . . . attributes, if a concept be simple, that is, if it contain in it only a single attribute, it must be indefinable; and again, that as Division is the analysis of a higher or more general concept into others lower and less general, if a concept be an individual, that is, only a bundle of individual qualities, it is indivisible, is, in fact, not a proper or abstract concept at all, but only a concrete representation of Imagination. (III, 151-2)
336n.7 “which] The essential qualities of a thing are those aptitudes, those manners of existence and action, which (I, 150)
338.3-5 “two . . . and predicate,” . . . “the . . . other,” . . . “either] We may, therefore, articulately define a judgment or proposition to be the product of that act in which we pronounce, that, of two . . . and as predicate, the . . . other, either (III, 229)
338.7 If] [no paragraph] If (III, 231)
338.9 proposition. . . . The] proposition. [paragraph] This distinction of propositions is founded on the distinction of the two quantities of concepts,—their Comprehension and their Extension. The (III, 232)
338.20 or] as (III, 232)
338.22 or] [not in italics] (III, 232)
338.32-3 syllogisms] syllogism (III, 233)
342.7 “Reasoning] [entire paragraph indented] ¶LIII.—Reasoning (III, 274)
342.10 those] these (III, 274) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
342.11-12 “the self-evident . . . whole.”] Let ABC denote the three circles [diagram of circles omitted]. Now, ex hypothesi, we know, and only know, that A contains B, and that B contains C; but as it is a self-evident . . . whole, we cannot, with our knowledge that B contains C, and is contained in A, avoid recognising that C is contained in A. (III, 271)
342.12 “Without] [paragraph] But to speak of the process in general:—without the power of reasoning we should have been limited in our knowledge, (if knowledge of such a limitation would deserve the name of knowledge at all), I say without (III, 277)
346.3 “given . . . intuition.”] [see 342 above] (III, 277)
348.7 “the] [paragraph indented] ¶III. What is Logic? Answer—Logic is the (III, 4)
348.18 “the discrimination of] But in the third place, the discrimination itself of (III, 11)
348.21 Politics, and] Politics, Religion, and (III, 11)
348.22 wrong.] wrong.α [footnote:] αCompare Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. p. 115 et seq.—Ed. (III, 11)
348.23 But . . . were] But in the fourth place, were (III, 11)
349.10-13 “apparently . . . applied,” . . . “the . . . usage,” . . . “rational . . . trace.”] [paragraph] The question, therefore, still remains, Is this restriction of the term art to certain of the practical sciences the . . . usage, or is it founded on any rational . . . trace? The former alternative seems to be the common belief; for no one, in so far as I know, has endeavoured to account for the apparently . . . applied. (I, 116) [JSM has reversed sentence order]
349.16-17 “a habit productive,” . . . “a habit practical,”] [paragraph] Now Aristotle, in formally defining art, defines it as a habit productive, and not as a habit practical, ἕξις ποιητικὴ μετὰ λόγου;—and, though he has not always himself adhered strictly to this limitation, his definition was adopted by his followers, and the term in its application to the practical sciences, (the term practical being here used in its generic meaning), came to be exclusively confined to those whose end did not result in mere action or energy. (I, 118)
349.17-19 “not . . . criticism:” . . . “vindicate,”] This distinction [see entry directly above] is not . . . criticism, and I am not here to vindicate its correctness. (I, 118)
349.20-1 “mechanical” . . . “beneath their notice,”] The mechanical dexterities were beneath their notice; and these were accordingly left to receive their appellations from those who knew nothing of the Aristotelic proprieties. (I, 119)
349n.5 “In] [paragraph] In (I, 117)
349n.16 energy. Now] energy.α [Greek footnote omitted] [paragraph] Now (I, 118)
349n.21 genuine] generic (I, 118)
350.5 “incongruity] But that they [“art and practical science”] are not employed as synonymous expressions is, as we have seen, shown by the incongruity (I, 116)
350n.1 consequently practical, not productive] consequently practical, not productive (I, 118) [treated as a typographical error in this edition]
350n.4 forth.”] forth.β [Latin footnote omitted] (I, 118)
352.14-15 “the Laws of Thought as Thought.”] [see 348 above] (III, 4)
352.15 head,” . . . “divides] head naturally divides (III, 12)
352.29-31 thing through or under . . . in or under] thing through or under . . . in or under (III, 14)
352.37 reduce it under] [not in italics] (III, 14)
352.40-353.1 “the . . . coming under] [paragraph] To answer this question [“What is meant by Thought as Thought?”], let us remember what has just been said of the act constitutive of thought,—viz. that it is the . . . coming under (III, 15)
353.4-5 “the . . . attribute;”] I attempted to make you vaguely apprehend what is the essential characteristic of thought,—viz. the . . . attribute. (III, 21)
353.5 “the] Logic, as we have seen, is exclusively conversant about thought,—about thought considered strictly as the operation of Comparison or the faculty of Relations; and thought, in this restricted signification, is the (III, 40)
353.6-7 the . . . conceptions] [not in italics] (III, 40)
353.7-8 “Thought is . . . thing through . . . notion through] Logic, we have seen, is exclusively conversant about thought strictly so denominated, and thought proper, we have seen, is the cognition of one object of thought by another, in or under which it is mentally included,—in other words, thought is . . . thing through . . . notion through (III, 42-3)
354.18 “that] Now, when I said that Logic was conversant about thought considered merely as thought, I meant simply to say, that (III, 15)
354.35 “We] “In this process we (III, 15)
354.36-7 old established] old and established (III, 15)
354.38 the thought] this thought (III, 15)
358.14 “When] But when (III, 78)
358.24-6 and . . . the whole . . . applied.”] and as the whole . . . applied, their consideration in general constitutes the first chapter in an orderly system of the science. (III, 79)
358n.19-20 “necessary and universal facts,” “the . . . governed,”] [paragraph] If, again, we analyse the mental phænomena with the view of discovering and considering, not contingent appearances, but the necessary and universal facts,—i.e. the . . . governed, to the end that we may obtain a criterion by which to judge or to explain their procedures and manifestations,—we have a science which we may call the Nomology of Mind,—nomological psychology. (I, 122)
359n.2 “the Laws of Memory,”] Mnemonic, or the science of the laws of Memory, has been elaborated at least in numerous treatises; but the name Anamnestic, the art of Recollection or Reminiscence, might be equally well applied to it. (I, 122-3)
359n.2-3 “the Laws of Association,”] The laws of the Representative faculty,—that is, the laws of Association, have not yet been elevated into a separate nomological science. (I, 123)
359n.3 “the laws which govern our capacities of enjoyment,”] [paragraph] The Nomology of our Feelings, or the science of the laws which govern our capacities of enjoyment, in relation to the end which they propose,—i.e. the Pleasurable,—has obtained no precise name in our language. (I, 123)
361.5 [paragraph] “Logic] [entire paragraph indented] ¶X. Logic (III, 73)
361.24 “The] [no paragraph] The (III, 73)
368.20 “If] For, to speak first of the latter [Material Logic]:—if (IV, App. i, 232)
368.32 “In] [no paragraph] In (IV, 138)
369n.3 “competent.”] [paragraph] The second condition required is, That a competent number of the partial objects from which the induction departs should have been observed, for otherwise the comprehension of other objects under the total judgment would be rash.α [footnote omitted] (IV, 169)
369n.13-17 “if a . . . class . . . attribute, . . . this . . . class;” . . . “if . . . two . . . characters . . . they . . . is, they . . . class.”] [entire paragraph indented] ¶CVIII. If we have uniformly observed, that a . . . class (genus or species) . . . attribute, we are disposed to conclude that this . . . class. This conclusion is properly called an Inference of Induction. Again, if we have observed that two . . . characters, we are disposed to conclude that they . . . is, that they . . . class (genus or species). (IV, 165-6)
372.7-12 “the Law of Reason and Consequent,” . . . “Principle of Sufficient Reason.” . . . “The Conditions of the Thinkable:”] [entire paragraph indented] ¶XIII. The Fundamental Laws of Thought or the conditions of the thinkable, as commonly received, are four:—1. The Law of Identity; 2. The Law of Contradiction; 3. The Law of Exclusion or of Excluded Middle; and, 4. The Law of Reason and Consequent, or of Sufficient Reason. (III, 79)
372n.6 “the laws of Thinking in a strict sense.”] [paragraph] Laws of Thought are of two kinds:—1°. The laws of the Thinkable,—Identity, Contradiction, &c. 2°. The laws of Thinking in a strict sense—viz. laws of Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning. (IV, App. iv, 244-5)
373.27 “principle of all logical affirmation”] [paragraph] The logical importance of the law of Identity lies in this,—that it is the principle of all logical affirmation and definition. (III, 80)
374.2 “expressed . . . A,”] It is expressed . . . A; and by A is denoted every logical thing, every product of our thinking faculty,—concept, judgment, reasoning, &c.α [footnote:] α[Schulze, Logik, §17. Gerlach, Logik, §37.] Cf. Krug, Logik, §17.—Ed. (III, 79-80)
375.4 “The] [entire paragraph indented] ¶XVIII. The (III, 114)
376.27-8 “This law,” . . . “is the . . . distinction,”] [paragraph] The logical import of this law lies in its being the . . . distinction. (III, 82)
376.28 “is] This law is (III, 81)
376.30 not] not (III, 81)
376.30 or] or (III, 81)
376.30 o:”] O. (III, 81)
376.33-6 “as . . . non-repugnantia.”] [paragraph] Now, in the first place, in regard to the name of this law, it may be observed that, as . . . non-repugnantia.α [footnote:] αCompare Krug, Logik, §18.—Ed. (III, 82)
379.7-8 “the principle of disjunctive judgments.”] [paragraph] The law of Excluded Middle is the principle of Disjunctive Judgments, that is, of judgments in which a plurality of judgments are contained, and which stand in such a reciprocal relation that the affirmation of one is the denial of the other. (III, 84)
379.17 “D is either B, or C, or A.”] [Hamilton is quoting from Krug] [paragraph] “Disjunctive judgments are those in which the condition qualifying the relation between the subject and predicate, lies proximately in the predicate, as in the proposition, D is either B, or C, or A. (III, 239)
380.23-4 “Whatever,” . . . “violates] The difference in their result [that of the laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle as opposed to that of the law of Reason and Consequent] consists in this,—Whatever violates (III, 98)
380.32 those] these (IV, 65)
380.36-7 “which we are able to violate:”] By law of thought, or by logical necessity, we do not, therefore, mean a physical law, such as the law of gravitation, but a general precept which we are able certainly to violate, but which if we do not obey, our whole process of thinking is suicidal or absolutely null. (III, 78-9)
382.15 the three] the first three (III, 99)
382.17 itself. When] itself. [paragraph] When (III, 99)
382.20-3 done.” . . . “But] done. But (III, 99)
382.24 does it] does this (III, 99)
383n.6-9 “If I,” . . . “have . . . restricted.”] If I have . . . restricted; and that within those bounds, (the Conditioned), natural thought is neither fallible nor mendacious—/“Neque decipitur, nec decipit umquam.” (I, App. i, 402)
383n.9-10 “In generating . . . laws. . . . Reason] On the contrary, I have endeavoured to show that Reason,—that Consciousness within its legitimate limits, is always veracious,—that in generating . . . laws,—that Consciousness, in fact, is never spontaneously false, and that Reason (II, App. iv, 543)
383n.12-13 “It is . . . result. . . . The] [paragraph] On the contrary, my doctrine holds, 1°, That Space and Time, as given, are real forms of thought and conditions of things; 2°, That Intelligence,—Reason,—within its legitimate limits, is legitimate; within this sphere it never deceives; and it is . . . results;—“Ne sapiamus ultra facultates.” The (I, App. i, 403)
384.8 “I] When I say that a thing may be, of which I cannot conceive the possibility, (that is, by conceiving it as the consequent of a certain reason), I (III, 100)
384.10 “solely] It is not, therefore, in any absolute harmony of mere thought that truth consists, but solely (III, 107) [Hamilton is quoting from Esser]
385.10 “with the doubtful exception of Aristotle,”] But as all logicians, with the doubtful exception of Aristotle, have limited their consideration to that process of reasoning given in the quantity of extension, to the exclusion of that given in the quantity of comprehension, it will be proper, in order to avoid misapprehension, to place some of the distinctions expressed in this paragraph in a still more explicit contrast. (III, 297)
385.10-11 “have . . . Comprehension”] But as logicians have . . . Comprehension, they have, consequently, not perceived the proper application of the former canon [“Prædicatum prædicati est etiam prædicatum subjecti”]; which, therefore, remained in their systems either a mere hors d’æuvre, or else was only forced into an unnatural connection with the principle of the syllogism of extension. (III, 303-4)
385.11-13 “have marvellously . . . comprehension:”] I further showed that logicians had in simple syllogisms marvellously . . . comprehension: and that all their rules were exclusively relative to the reasoning which proceeds in the quantity of extension. (III, 378)
385.14 “relieved] Thus is relieved (IV, App. v, 250)
391.18-392.1 “every . . . quantity.”] [paragraph] After what I have already stated in regard to the nature of these opposite quantities, under the doctrine of Concepts and Judgments,α [footnote:] αSee above, p. 140 et seq.—Ed. [text:] and after the illustrations I have given you of the possibility of conducting any reasoning in either of these quantities at will,β [footnote:] βSee above, p. 272 et seq.—Ed. [text:]—every . . . quantity,—it will be here needless to enlarge upon the nature of this distinction in general. (III, 287)
392.5-7 “Every . . . agent,”] Every . . . agent. (III, 270)
392.10-12 “Man . . . agent,”] Man . . . agent. (III, 273)
392.15 “the] [paragraph] It is thus manifest, that, though worthy of notice in a system of Logic, the (III, 399)
392.19-21 “can . . . order,”] They [logicians] ought at least to have made the student of Logic aware, that a syllogism can . . . order. (III, 397)
392.21 “a] [paragraph] This is the regular succession of sumption, subsumption, and conclusion, in a syllogism of extension; and as all that can be said, on the present question, of the one quantity, is appilcable, mutatis mutandis, to the other, it will be needless to show articulately that a (III, 397)
393.1 “In] [paragraph] It is only necessary further to observe, that in (III, 274)
393n.2-3 “altogether . . . Extension”] [paragraph] Now, if in the case of simple syllogisms, it be marvellous that logicians should have altogether overlooked the possibility of a reasoning in comprehension, it is doubly marvellous that, with this their prepossession, they should, in the case of the Sorites, have altogether . . . extension. (III, 378-9)
393n.5-6 “a monster undeserving of toleration,”] In fact, the logicians, in consequence of their exclusive recognition of the reasoning in extension, were not in possession of the means of showing, that this figure is a monster undeserving of toleration, far less of countenance and favour. (III, 424)
399n.16-17 “all triangles are trilateral” . . . “All triangles are all trilateral:”] [paragraph] For example; if I think that the notion triangle contains the notion trilateral, and again that the notion trilateral contains the notion triangle; in other words, if I think that each of these is inclusively and exclusively applicable to the other; I formally say, and, if I speak as I think, must say—All triangle is all trilateral. On the other hand,—if I only think that all triangles are trilateral, but do not think all trilaterals to be triangular, and yet say,—All triangle is all trilateral, the proposition, though materially true, is formally false. (IV, App. v, 292)
400n.16 “ordinary . . . Predicate as] [paragraph] 2°, But, in fact, ordinary . . . Predicate so (IV, App. v, 259)
400n.18 “Virtue is the only nobility;”] [paragraph] For example, by the limitative designations, alone or only, we say,—God alone is good, which is euivalent to saying,—God is all good, that is, God is all that is good; Virtue is the only nobility, that is, Virtue is all noble, that is, all that is noble.β [footnote omitted] (IV, App. v, 260)
400n.18 “Of animals man alone is rational,”] [paragraph] Of animals man alone is rational; that is, Man is all rational animal. (IV, App. v, 261)
403.28-30 “taken . . . of words.”] The result [of Hamilton’s reconsideration of De Morgan’s syllogism] was the opinion, that these two quantifications should be taken . . . of moods.α [footnote:] αExtract from A Letter to A. de Morgan, Esq., from Sir W. Hamilton, p. 41.—Ed. (IV, App. vi, 355)
404.29 [paragraph] “Logic] [no paragraph] I have frequently inculcated on you that Logic (III, 450)
405.9 its] the (III, 450)
405.11 have given] have seen given (III, 451)
405.12-14 Aristotle . . . European] Aristotle . . . European (III, 451)
405.25 than as a] than a (III, 451)
405.25-6 certain hypothetical] certain given (III, 451) [probably JSM’s eye skipped down several lines to where the other wording appears]
405.32 expressions.”] expressions.α [footnote:] αCf. Esser, Logik, §109.—Ed. (III, 451)
407.10 “the] [paragraph] The other genus of truth,—(the end which the Real Sciences propose),—is the (IV, 66)
407.12 “harmony] Logical truth is the harmony (IV, 65)
407.16-17 “evolved out of” . . . “Logical] I do not mean by this, that the antecedent should be necessarily true, or that the consequent be really contained in it; it is sufficient that the antecedent be assumed as true, and that the consequent be, in conformity to the laws of thought, evolved out of it as its part or equation. This last is called Logical (II, 343)
407.33 “One . . . philosophers,” . . . “defining] [no paragraph] “One party of philosophers defining (III, 106) [Hamilton is quoting from Esser]
407.36 knowledge.] knowledge.α [footnote:] αSee Kant, Logik, Einleitung, vii.; Krug, Logik, §22; Fries, Logik, §42.—Ed. (III, 106)
408.18 existence.”] existence.”α [footnote:]α Esser, Logik, p. 65-6.—Ed. (III, 107)
408.23-5 “Two opposite doctrines,” . . . “have . . . Logic;”] Yet among modern, nay recent, philosophers, two opposite doctrines have . . . Logic. (III, 106)
408.26 “inaccuracy”] [paragraph] The preceding inaccuracy is, however, of little moment compared with the heresy of another class of philosophers, to whose observations on this point I can, however, only allude. (III, 107)
410.17 “is not always possible.”] In the second place, this conversion is not always possible, and, therefore, it is never necessary. (III, 342)
411.36-7 “Opposition of Notions,” . . . “is] The confliction constitutes the Opposition of notions, (τὸ ἀντικεῖσϑαι, oppositio). This is (III, 213)
411.40 media] mediata (III, 214)
412.2 else.] else.α [footnote:] α[Cf. Drobisch, Logik, p. 17, §25 seq.] (III, 214)
412.5 “To] [paragraph] “To (III, 214) [Hamilton is quoting from Krug]
416.19 “stands . . . unrefutable.”] [paragraph] 4°, On this [Synthetic] order the objection of petitio principii stands . . . unrefutable, against Logic.α [footnote omitted] (IV, App. x, 401)
421.13 “a] According to these laws [of matter], things related,—connected, must act and be acted on; but a (II, App. i, 522)
421.18 “the] Therefore the (II, App. i, 522)
421.22-3 Democritus. According . . . erroneous to . . . distant objects] Democritus. [paragraph] According . . . erroneous, in the first place, to . . . distant, &c. objects (II, App. i, 522)
422.6-7 “There is . . . any part] [paragraph] Now, in the first place, there is . . . any one part (II, 127)
422.9 part,] part,α [footnote in Greek and Latin omitted] (II, 127)
422.10 opinion. . . . Even] opinion. [ellipsis indicates 3-sentence omission] We have no right, however, to say that it [the soul] is limited to any one part of the organism; for even (II, 128)
424.17 is,” . . . “on] is on (II, 373)
424.20 that motion] that the possibility of motion (II, 373)
427n.1 “Contradictions . . . Conditioned] [used by Hamilton as heading b., dated July, 1852, within Appendix iii, which is titled “The Conditioned”] (II, App. iii, 527)
427n.6 now] now (II, App. iii, 527)
427n.9 in] into (II, App. iii, 527)
427n.12 quantities (extensions, protensions, intensions)] [Hamilton places quantities above a brace under which appears extensions, protensions, intensions] (II, App. iii, 527)
427n.14 ergo, &c.] ergo. [sic] (II, App. iii, 528)
427n.26 least.] least.α [footnote omitted] (II, App. iii, 528)
427n.34-5 unextended.] inextended.β [footnote omitted] (II, App. iii, 528)
427n.40 foot.] foot.γ [footnote omitted] (II, App. iii, 528)
428n.4 sides;] sidesδ; [footnote omitted] (II, App. iii, 528)
428n.4 long.] long.ε [footnote omitted] (II, App. iii, 528)
428n.6 signs” [sides?] “must] signs must (II, App. iii, 529)
428n.7 extended.] extended.α [footnote omitted] (II, App. iii, 529)
430.12-13 “the . . . Pain . . . the] [paragraph] In my last Lecture [xli], I stated the grounds on which it is expedient to consider the phænomena of Feeling prior to discussing those of Conation;—but before entering on the consideration of the several feelings, and before stating under what heads, and in what order, these are to be arranged, I think it proper, in the first place, to take up the general question,—What are the . . . Pain; for pleasure and pain are the phænomena which constitute the essential attribute of feeling, under all its modifications? [paragraph] In the consideration of this question, I shall pursue the following order:—I shall, first of all, state the abstract Theory of Pleasure and Pain, in other words, enounce the (II, 434)
431.6-7 “Pleasure,” . . . “is . . . conscious.] [paragraph] Pleasure is . . . conscious.α [footnote omitted] (II, 440)
431.9 “concomitant;”] [paragraph] IV. The energy of each power of conscious existence having, as its reflex or concomitant, an appropriate pleasure or pain, and no pain or pleasure being competent to man, except as the concomitant of some determinate energy of life, the all-important question arises,—What is the general law under which these counter-phænomena arise, in all their special manifestations? (II, 436)
431.30 “The] [paragraph] In explanation of this paragraph, and of those which are to follow, I may observe, that the (II, 435)
431.34-5 reaction.” . . . “Be] reaction. Be (II, 435)
431.38 conscious.] conscious.β [footnote:] βHere a written interpolation,—Occupation, exercise, perhaps better [expressions than energy, as applying equally to all mental processes, whether active or passive.] See below, p. 466.—Ed. (II, 435)
432.18-20 “It has been stated,” . . . “that] Now, it has been stated, that (II, 477)
432.20 exercised] exerted (II, 477)
433.3 “Every] [no paragraph] Touching the term spontaneous, every (II, 441)
433.11-12 springs.—Again . . . stipulates that the conditions] springs. [paragraph] Again . . . stipulates that the power should not be checked in the spring it would thus spontaneously make to its maximum of energy, that is, it is supposed that the conditions (II, 441)
434.8 “When] But when (II, 494)
434.12-13 ignorance.” . . . “But] ignorance. But (II, 495)
435.10 “When] “But when (II, 452) [Hamilton is translating Aristotle]
437.21 “through which our] [paragraph] But, though mind, considered in itself, be the noblest object of speculation which the created universe presents to the curiosity of man, it is under a certain relation that I would now attempt to illustrate its utility; for mind rises to its highest dignity when viewed as the object through which, and through which alone, our (I, 25)
437.22-5 God.” . . . [paragraph] “The Deity,” . . . “is] God. [no paragraph] The Deity is (I, 25)
438.30 “Now] [paragraph] Now (I, 32)
438.33 agents. . . . But] agents. This being undeniable, it is further evident, that, should we ever be convinced that we are not moral agents, we should likewise be convinced that there exists no moral order in the universe, and no supreme intelligence by which that moral order is established, sustained, and regulated. [paragraph] Theology is thus again wholly dependent on Psychology; for, with the proof of the moral nature of man, stands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity. [paragraph] But (I, 32-3)
440.19 “brute necessity”] For if, as the materialist maintains, the only intelligence of which we have any experience be a consequent of matter,—on this hypothesis, he not only cannot assume this order to be reversed in the relations of an intelligence beyond his observation, but, if he argue logically, he must positively conclude, that, as in man, so in the universe, the phænomena of intelligence or design are only in their last analysis the products of a brute necessity. (I, 31)
440n.1-2 “The atheist who holds matter or necessity . . . is.”] Neither is this notion [of a God] completed by adding to a first cause the attribute of Omnipotence, for the atheist who holds matter or necessity . . . is, does not convert his blind force into a God, by merely affirming it to be all-powerful. (I, 26-7)
440n.2 “Those who] Those, accordingly, who (I, 133)
440n.4 fate.”] fate—must regard the application of the terms Physiology and Physics to the doctrine of the mind as either singularly inappropriate, or as significant of a false hypothesis in regard to the character of the thinking principle. (I, 133)
445.1 “every] For though an unconquerable feeling compels us to recognise ourselves as accountable, and therefore free, agents, still, when we attempt to realise in thought how the fact of our liberty can be, we soon find that this altogether transcends our understanding, and that every (I, 33-4)
445.3 necessity,”] necessity. (I, 34)
445n.3 “Voluntary] On the other hand, however, we cannot possibly conceive the existence of a voluntary activity independently of all feeling; for voluntary (I, 188)
464.3 “the] [paragraph] In the world of sense, illusive appearances hover around us like evil spirits; unreal dreams mingle themselves with real knowledge; the accustomed assumes the character of certainty; and the (III, 47)
487.11 philosophy;”] philosophy:”α [footnote:] αMetaphysics, book i.2, 9. Compare Plato, Theætetus, p. 155.—Ed. (I, 37)
487.25 heavens.”] heavens.”β [footnote:] βJacobi, Werke, vol. ii p. 52-54. Quoted in Discussions, p. 312.—Ed. (I, 37)
490n.4-6 “attend . . . time,” . . . “that . . . impossible.”] [paragraph] The doctrine that the mind can attend . . . time, would, in fact, involve the conclusion that . . . impossible; but comparison and discrimination being possible, this possibility disproves the truth of the counter proposition. (I, 252)
491n.2-3 “past . . . perceived;”] We must, therefore, compare the past . . . perceived. (I, 244)
491n.16-17 “instead . . . masses.”] On the contrary, I showed that, instead . . . masses; that, though our capacity of attention be very limited in regard to the number of objects on which a faculty can be simultaneously directed, yet that these objects may be large or small. (II, 327)
491n.18-19 “an act of will or desire,”] This remark [“that attention is a voluntary act”] might have led him [Reid] to the observation, that attention is not a separate faculty, or a faculty of intelligence at all, but merely an act of will or desire, subordinate to a certain law of intelligence. (I, 237)
491n.19-20 “a mere vital and irresistible act.”] The first [degree of attention], a mere vital and irresistible act; the second, an act determined by desire, which, though involuntary, may be resisted by our will; the third, an act determined by a deliberate volition. (I, 248)
494n.1-2 “Ontology, or Metaphysics Proper;” “the science conversant about inferences . . . manifestations;”] Now, the science conversant about all such inferences . . . manifestations, is called Ontology, or Metaphysics Proper. (I, 125)
494n.11-12 “a concept . . . be clear when . . . as to enable us . . . it” . . . “as . . . others:”] [entire paragraph indented] A concept . . . be clear, (clara), when . . . as enables us . . . it as . . . others; and obscure, (obscura), when the degree of consciousness is insufficient to accomplish this. (III, 158)
496n.10-11 “Synthesis without . . . all. . . . A] On the other [hand], synthesis without . . . all. Both [synthesis and analysis], therefore, are absolutely necessary to philosophy, and both are, in philosophy, as much parts of the same method as, in the animal body, inspiration and expiration are of the same vital function. But though these operations are each requisite to the other, yet were we to distinguish and compare what ought to be considered as conjoined, it is to analysis that the preference must be accorded. An analysis is always valuable; for though now without a synthesis, this synthesis may at any time be added; whereas a (I, 99)
496n.28 “reconstruction”] This mental reconstruction is, therefore, the final, the consummative procedure of philosophy, and it is familiarly known by the Greek term Synthesis. (I, 98)
499.15-16 “its . . . regarded it more] [paragraph] It is needless to attempt a refutation of this hypothesis [of the pre-established harmony], which its . . . regarded more (I, 304)
501.33 “a] You degrade the Divinity, he [Leibniz] subjoined; you [the Cartesians] make him act like a (I, 303) [Hamilton is quoting Leibniz]
503.12.13 “The intellect is . . . activity.”] [paragraph] “The intellect,” says Aristotle, in one passage, “is . . . activity;”γ [footnote:] γ Said of moral knowledge, Eth. Nic. i. 3: Τέλος οὐ γνῶσις, ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. Cf. ibid. i.7, 13; i.8, 9; ix.7, 4; xi.9, 7, 1. Met., xi.7: ‘Η νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή.—Ed. [text:] and in another, “The arts and sciences are powers, but every power exists only for the sake of action; the end of philosophy, therefore, is not knowledge, but the energy conversant about knowledge.”δ [footnote omitted] (I, 12) [cf. 503n]
503n.1-2 “Speculative truth . . . and held . . . activity”] [paragraph] In speculative knowledge, on the other hand, there may indeed, at first sight, seem greater difficulty; but further reflection will prove that speculative truth . . . and is only held . . . activity: “Sordet cognita veritas” is a shrewd aphorism of Seneca. (I, 10)
503n.2-3 “speculative truth” . . . “only . . . activity.”] [paragraph] But if speculative truth itself be only . . . activity, those studies which determine the faculties to a more vigorous exertion, will, in every liberal sense, be better entitled, absolutely, to the name of useful, than those which, with a greater complement of more certain facts, awaken them to a less intense, and consequently to a less improving exercise. (I, 13)
— “Notes to the Above Letter,” Edinburgh Review, LXIII (April, 1836), 272-5.
note: this is Hamilton’s reply to Whewell’s letter, “To the Editor of the Edinburgh Review” (q.v.), which was prompted by Hamilton’s “Study of Mathematics—University of Cambridge” (q.v.); all three reprinted in Hamilton’s Discussions at 263-325, 326-8, 329-40.
referred to: 477
— “Study of Mathematics—University of Cambridge,” Edinburgh Review, LXII (Jan., 1836), 409-55.
note: see also Hamilton, “Notes to the Above Letter,” and Whewell’s letter, “To the Editor of the Edinburgh Review”; all three reprinted in Hamilton’s Discussions at 263-325, 326-8, 329-40.
referred to: 470-1, 477, 482
Hartley, David. Referred to: 9, 17, 250, 487, 493n
— Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations. 2 pts. Bath: Leake and Frederick; London: Hitch and Austen, 1749.
note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College. Concerning the reference at 283, where JSM says that Hartley had cited the colour-wheel experiment before James Mill or Hamilton, it may be noted that Hartley is actually quoting Newton’s Optics.
referred to: 278, 278n, 283, 363
Haywood, Francis, trans. Critick of Pure Reason translated from the original of Immanuel Kant. 2nd ed., with notes and explanation of terms. London: Pickering, 1848.
note: JSM’s page references are to this ed., which is in his library, Somerville College. See also Kant.
referred to: 154n
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich.
note: the reference at 152 is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 19, 33n, 65, 68, 95, 98, 152, 486
— Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ed. Carl Ludwig Michelet, in Werke. 20 vols. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1834-54, XIII-XV.
note: the quotation is of Mansel’s translation of Hegel.
Heuck, A. “Bemerkungen über ein vierzehnjähriges Mädchen ohne Extremitäten,” Neue Notizen aus dem Gebiete der Natur- und Heilkunde, VII.1 (July, 1838), cols. 1-5.
note: the periodical was edited by Ludwig Friedrich von Froriep and Dr. Robert Froriep. JSM, who takes the reference from McCosh (who translates from Schopenhauer, where the original is cited), refers, following McCosh, to “Frorieps” rather than Heuck. Eva Lauk is the fourteen-year-old quadraplegic described.
referred to: 248
Hobbes, Thomas. “Of Liberty and Necessity,” Discourse III of Tripos, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. Ed. William Molesworth. 11 vols. London: Bohn, 1839-45, IV, 229-78.
referred to: 441n
— “Physics, or the Phenomena of Nature,” Part IV of Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, Concerning Body, in ibid., I, 387-532.
referred to: 51
Hooke, Robert.Micrographia. London: Martyn and Allestry, 1665.
note: the quotations are simply uses of the term “experimentum crucis,” which Mill, like most other philosophers (including Hume, and following Newton), attributes elsewhere to Bacon, whose parallel term is actually “instantia crucis”; see Bacon, Novum Organum, 294.
quoted: 222, 237
note: the reference at 151 is in a quotation from, and that at 448 derives from, Hamilton.
referred to: cvii, 1, 6, 134, 151, 183, 217n, 294, 296, 297, 448, 493n, 498n
— An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. 2 vols. Edinburgh: Cadell, 1793, II, 17-183.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. Until 1758 entitled Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding. The quotations at 135 are from, and the second reference at 498n-9n is to, “Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy” (Section xii of the Inquiry); the first quotation at 165n is from “Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding” (Section iv); the second quotation at 166n is from “Sceptical Solution of these Doubts” (Section v); the reference at 299 is to “Of the Idea of Necessary Connection” (Section vii); and the first reference at 498n-9n is to the work as a whole.
quoted: 135, 165n-6n
referred to: 299, 498n-9n
135.8-11 “universal . . . men.” . . . “is soon . . . philosophy.”] But this universal . . . men is soon . . . philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. (169)
135.24-5 “blind . . . nature.”] It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind . . . nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. (169)
165n.41 “It may be a subject worthy curiosity] It may therefore be a subject worthy of curiosity (39)
166n.1 or the records of our memory.”] [not in italics] (39)
166n.1-2 “all reasonings] All reasonings (39)
166n.3 alone can we go] alone, we can go (39)
166n.4 memory] memory (39)
166n.8 “where . . . memory and senses”] Now, I assert, that this belief, where . . . memory or senses, is one of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. (68)
“Inquirer, An.” See Phillipps, Lucy March.
Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich.David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. Ein Gespräch, in Werke. 6 vols. Leipzig: Fleischer, 1812-25, II, 1-310.
note: the quotation is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 488
Johnson, Samuel.London, A Poem: in Imitation of the Third Satire of Juvenal, in The Works of Samuel Johnson. 14 vols. London: Buckland, Rivington, et al., 1787-88, I, 319-30.
note: the reference, which is based only on a linguistic resemblance, is given because Bain, in his John Stuart Mill (122n), says: “Grote thought that the phrase [“to hell I will go”] was an echo of something occurring in Ben Jonson; when a military captain’s implicit obedience is crowned by the illustration—‘Tell him to go to hell, to hell he will go’. I have never got any clue to the place.” Bain’s “Ben Jonson” may be a mistaken echo of Grote; in any case, the context in Samuel Johnson is not appropriate: “No gainful trade their industry can ’scape, / They sing, they dance, clean shoes, or cure a clap: / All sciences a fasting Monsieur knows, / And, bid him go to hell, to hell he goes.” (324; 113-16)
referred to: 103
— See also Boswell, Life of Johnson.
Jouffroy, Théodore.Mélanges philosophiques. 2nd ed. Paris: Ladrange, 1838.
note: the reference is to Hamilton’s reliance on Jouffroy’s “Du sommeil” (Part IV of “Psychologie”), in Mélanges, 290-312 (of which Hamilton quotes 290-302); Mansel and Veitch (Lectures, I, 324n) give the reference to the 2nd ed.
referred to: 491
note: the references at 41, 175 are in quotations from Hamilton; that at 88n is in a self-quotation; those at 208n, 241 are in quotations from Mahaffy.
referred to: 1, 9, 10, 23, 25, 27, 29, 29n, 39n, 41, 56, 66, 88n, 143, 143n, 147n-8n, 154, 175, 179, 207, 207n-8n, 241, 313n, 320n, 334, 355, 364, 449n, 466n, 485, 493n
— Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft, in Sämmtliche Werke. Ed. Karl Rosenkranz and Friedrich Schubert. 14 vols. in 12. Leipzig: Voss, 1838-40, VIII, 105-318.
note: this ed. used because JSM refers to it at 154n.
referred to: 488
— Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, in ibid., II.
note: see also Haywood.
referred to: 27n, 135, 154n, 260, 360, 374n
— Logic, in Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können und Logic, in ibid., III.
referred to: 356, 369n
— Metaphysik der Sitten, in ibid., IX, ix-366.
referred to: 467
Keckermannus, Bartholomæus.Systema Logicae, Tribus Libris Adornatum. Geneva: de la Rouiere, 1611.
note: JSM’s spelling is Keckermann. A copy of this ed. is in the London Library, and may have been part of the donation by JSM of his father’s books.
referred to: 415
note: the reference at 487 is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 474, 487
note: the reference derives from McCosh.
referred to: 225n
Krug, Wilhelm Traugott. Referred to: 175, 327, 415
— Logik. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Königsberg: Unzer, 1819.
note: the quotations and references derive from Hamilton’s Lectures, the editors of which use this ed. of Krug’s Logik.
quoted: 325, 412
referred to: 286n, 337n, 356, 379, 410, 494, 494n
Laplace, Pierre Simon de.
note: the reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 487
Lauk, Eva. Referred to: 248-9; see also Heuck.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von. Referred to: cvii, 152, 295, 320, 440, 485, 499
— Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal. Amsterdam: Troyel, 1710.
referred to: 372, 419, 499-500, 502
500.32-3 par la nature des créatures] Et elles ont cela par leur nature & par la nature des créatures raisonnables; avant que Dieu décerne de les créer. (347)
— Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis, in Opera Philosophica. Ed. Johann Eduard Erdmann. Berlin: Eichler, 1840, 79-81.
note: the quotation is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 320, 320n
319.34 (non simul intuemur)] Plerumque autem, præsertim in analysi longiore, non totam simul naturam rei intuemur, sed rerum loco signis utimur, quorum explicationem in præsenti aliqua cogitatione compendii causa solemus prætermittere, scientes, aut credentes nos eam habere in potestate: ita cum chiliogonum, seu polygonum mille æqualium laterum cogito, non semper naturam lateris, et æqualitatis, et millenarii (seu cubi a denario) considero, sed vocabulis istis (quorum sensus obscure saltem, atque imperfecte menti obversatur) in animo utor loco idearum, quas de iis habeo, quoniam memini me significationem istorum vocabulorum habere, explicationem autem nunc judicio necessariam non esse; qualem cogitationem cæcam, vel etiam symbolicam appellare soleo, qua et in Algebra, et in Arithmetica utimur, imo fere ubique: (79-80)
— La Monadologie, in ibid., 705-12.
referred to: 500, 502
— Troisième Éclaircissement, in ibid., 134-6.
note: the indirect quotation is in a quotation from Hamilton, who cites this edition.
Lewes, George Henry.Aristotle: A Chapter from the History of Science, including analyses of Aristotle’s scientific writings. London: Smith, Elder, 1864.
note: the references at 14, 152 and the second reference at 28n are in quotations from Hamilton; that at 169 is in a quotation from Reid.
referred to: 1, 14, 15, 28n, 110, 139, 152, 155, 169, 362, 449n, 493n
— Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in Works. New ed. 10 vols. London: Tegg, Sharpe, Offor, Robinson, and Evans, 1823, I-III.
note: the indirect quotation at 28n is in a quotation from Mansel; the quotation at 141 is summary (Locke uses “original,” not “origin”), and so is not collated; the reference at 201 is in a quotation from McCosh.
quoted: 141, 448n
referred to: 28n, 201, 302, 324, 373
448n.1 “Does it not require” . . . “some] For example, does it not require some (III, 27)
Lucretius Carus, Titus.
note: the notion of species sensibiles is mistakenly attributed to Lucretius; it originated in Artistotle’s On the Soul (q.v.).
referred to: 15
Luther, Martin. Referred to: 440
McCosh, James.An Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill’s Philosophy, being a Defence of Fundamental Truth. London: Macmillan, 1866.
quoted: 63n-4n, 72n-3n, 73n, 146n, 201, 216n, 225n, 231n-2n, 237n, 246, 246n, 261n, 284n, 317n, 338n, 391n
referred to: ciii, 72n, 75n, 166n, 208n-9n, 217n, 240, 242n, 244, 247, 262n, 269, 337n, 374n-5n
63n.9-10 word belief,” . . . “is] word “belief” is (36)
64n.2 distinguish primitive faith from primitive knowledge,] distinguish “primitive faith” from “primitive knowledge,” (36-7)
73n.17 “I] Now I (210)
73n.28 each other] another (211)
73n.29 further] farther (211)
73n.29-30 than another.] than another (see supra, pp. 160-8). (211)
146n.30 “the alleged] Not because of any supposed intuition or necessary truth,—I am not aware that they ever appealed to such; not even because of a strong association: but because the alleged (240)
146n.32 downwards.”] downwards, and thus, and not on any a priori grounds, did they argue that there could not be antipodes, as persons so situated would fall away into a lower space. (240-1)
201.18 powers by] powers (specially mentioned by Locke, Essay, B. II. c. ii. §23) by (118)
201.18 thus] “thus (118) [McCosh is quoting from JSM]
216n.18 “elaborated] At this point Mr. Mill hands us over to his friend Professor Bain, who, in The Senses and the Intellect, has elaborated (121)
216n.19 Mill’s Logic;”] Mill’s Logic. (121)
216n.29-31 “as . . . things,”] But he was led by the influence of this teacher to regard it as . . . things; and to adopt his favourite method of procedure, which is by deduction from an hypothesis, which he endeavours to show explains all the phenomena. (8)
216n.31 “the influence”] [see entry above]
225n.24 “a] Those born blind cannot have the visual idea of space, but they have, he says, a (143n)
231n.3-4 case,” . . . “is] case is (163)
231n.5-6 (Phil. Trans. of Roy. Soc. 1841). The] (Phil. Trans. of Roy. Soc. 1841), and I shall quote from it at considerable length. The (163)
231n.9 light, a sheet] light, “a sheet (163) [McCosh is quoting from Franz]
231n.12-13 denominations,” . . . vertical. “ ‘The] denominations.” “The (164) [McCosh is quoting from Franz]
231n.16 cube . . . sphere] cube . . . sphere (164)
231n.17 was] were (164)
231n.18 quadrangular . . . circular] quadrangular . . . circular (164)
231n.19 square . . . disc] square . . . disc (164)
231n.25 quadrates.” . . . “A] quadrates. A (164)
231n.26 plain” . . . “triangle] plain triangle (164)
231n.30-1 it; in fact, said he, I must give it up.] it, ‘in fact,’ said he, ‘I must give it up.’ (165)
232n.5-6 the object.” . . . “When] the objects. When (165)
237n.10 “This case] The case (151n)
246.6 “if] From a very early age, and long before they give any evidence of knowing distance beyond their bodies, or having any other acquired perceptions, children will indicate that they know at least vaguely the seat of the pain felt by them—if (150)
246.7-8 “any acquired perceptions”] [see entry above]
246.14-15 “Müller,” . . . “has collected . . . cases,”] Müller has collected . . . cases (Ib., pp. 746, 747). (148) [“Ib.” refers to Müller’s Physiology]
246.16 “a student] “A student (148) [McCosh is quoting from Müller]
261n.24-5 “that . . . judgment”] Association may help us to form a reasonable judgment—and it is a happy circumstance when it does so; but whether we are or are not so aided, we should be taught that . . . judgment, in which we look to the nature of things as the same can be discovered by us. (214)
261n.25 “to] But it is a still higher end of the highest education to raise us above all hereditary and casual association of times or circumstances, and to constrain us to (214-15)
284n.10 discover,” . . . “no] discover no (185)
284n.11 sensations.”] sensations, or that two remembered sensations will ever be anything else than two remembered sensations. (185-6)
317n.1 “I think] I also think (276)
338n.1 “mere] This cannot be said of the second class, or those in which we compare mere (294)
338n.4 “has] I urge, further, in opposition to the doctrine, that in those propositions in which the terms are abstract, the predicate, properly speaking, has (333)
391n.2 “in] In (292)
391n.4 “the] In not a few propositions the (293)
391n.5 the crocodile is a reptile,] ‘the crocodile is a reptile,’ (293)
391n.9 “the] The (293)
391n.16 “proceed . . . things;”] The “tendency” to do this must surely proceed . . . things; and the possibility of doing it surely implies an intimate relation between the Comprehension and the Extension. (293)
391n.20-1 “so . . . Comprehension,”] I have granted that, so . . . Comprehension. (303)
391n.21-2 “different . . . Extension,”] But it seems to me to be different . . . Extension. (303)
— “Mill’s Reply to his Critics,” The British and Foreign Evangelical Review, XVII (April, 1868), 332-62.
quoted: 209n, 247, 248, 284n, 285n
referred to: cvii, 74n, 75n, 208n, 248n-9n, 262n
209n.5-6 “power . . . idea,” . . . “empirical theory;”] If he take the other alternative, then he is giving to the mind the power . . . idea—a view utterly inconsistent with his own empirical theory, and the very view of Leibnitz, who makes intellectus ipse a source of ideas. (343-4)
209n.16 “mental laws, say the] Do they come in obedience to mental laws, say, to the (345)
209n.22 “obliged”] He is now replying to me (p. 248), is obliged to talk of one group of possibilities of sensations, “destroying or modifying another such group;” and this certainly not by laws acting independently of any discoverable cause in the series which constitutes mind. (346-7)
247.17 “normally”] According to that illustrious physiologist, we localise our affections received by the senses; and the law of our nature is, that in touch or feeling, we place the sensation at the spot where the nerve normally terminates. (350)
248.8-10 “should . . . this,” . . . “might] According to the association theory, the affection should . . . this, according to Mr Mill, might (351)
248.20 “Eva] According to this theory, a person born without arms or legs could have no idea of space; but Schopenhauer has brought forward the case of Eva (352)
248.25 as they.”] as they.* [footnote:]* My attention was called to this case by Mr Bleeck, in his Mr J. S. Mill’s Psychological Theory. It is quoted by Schopenhauer in his Die Welt als Wille, vol. ii. c. 4, and is taken from Frorieps Neue Notizen aus dem Gebiete der Natur, July 1838. (353)
248.27-8 “that . . . extension,”] In my Examination of Mill, I endeavoured to meet this by psychological considerations, and shewed that . . . extension, could not give us the idea of extension. (352)
284n.21 “a wheel] Now, it so happens that I had produced the ring when a boy, by a lighted piece of paper; in my college days, I had seen the experiment of the seven colours; and, in my mature life, I have seen a wheel (354)
285n.5-6 “the power . . . belief.”] It relates to the power . . . belief,—in fact, to take the place of judgment or the comparison of things. (353)
Mahaffy, John Pentland, intro. and trans. Kuno Fischer. A Commentary on Kant’s Critick of Pure Reason. London: Longmans, Green, 1866.
note: the reference at 27n is to the Introduction, Pt. IV, “The Variations between the First and Second Editions of the Critick, and the Idealism of Kant,” and to Appendix C, which includes commentary on those variations.
quoted: 145n, 146n, 207n-8n, 225n, 240-1, 244, 266n
referred to: civ, 27n, 242, 243, 263n
145n.7 “There] Yet there (viii)
145n.8 kind. We] kind. [1-paragraph omission] We (viii)
207n.17 you,” . . . “conscious] you conscious (lvi)
225n.5 originally] originally (xxi)
240.21 passage” . . . “will] passage (pp. 222, seq.) which follows will (xviii)
240.33-5 Abbott. (Sight and Touch, chap. v.) More] Abbott, “Sight and Touch,” chap. v. More (xviii)
241.1 space . . . time] space . . . time (xviii-xix)
241.16-17 that . . . time.] that . . . time.* [footnote omitted] (xix)
241.23 passage . . . “We] passage in p. 225: “we (xix)
241.28 changes] changes (xx)
241.28 move] move (xx)
241.31 Mill.”] Mill himself (p. 230.). (xx)
266n.11 child,” . . . “who] child who (xxvii)
266n.13 result. . . . Most] [ellipsis indicates 6-sentence omission] (xxvii-xxviii)
Maine de Biran, Marie François Pierre Gonthier.Nouvelles Considérations sur les rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme. Ed. Victor Cousin. Paris: Ladrange, 1834.
note: the reference derives from Hamilton.
referred to: 237
Malebranche, Nicholas de. Referred to: 152
— Recherche de la vérité, in Œuvres. Ed. Jules Simon. 2 vols. Paris: Charpentier, 1842, II.
referred to: 204n
Malthus, Thomas Robert. Referred to: 110n
Mansel, Henry Longueville. Referred to: 30n, 52, 57, 89-90, 207, 262, 465-6
— The Limits of Religious Thought. 4th ed. London: Murray, 1859.
note: this is the ed. cited by JSM.
quoted: 47, 91, 91n, 92, 92n-3n, 93, 93n, 94n-5n, 95, 95-6, 96, 97n-8n, 98, 101, 103
referred to: 34n, 35n, 45n, 94, 97, 99n, 100, 102, 107n-8n, 383n
47.5 that,” asked Hegel, “which] that,” says Hegel, “which (30)
91.7 “such . . . Nature”] At present I am concerned only with its pretensions to such . . . Nature as can constitute the foundation of a Rational Theology. (29)
91.8-9 “to conceive . . . is.” . . . “conceive] To conceive . . . is, we must conceive (30)
91.17 Absolute] Absolute (30)
91.18 Being.”] Being [note omitted]. (30)
92.10 “a] A (31)
92.14 involves] implies (31)
92.14 relation.”] relation [note omitted]. (31)
93.1-2 “supposing the . . . cause,”] Supposing the . . . cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. (32)
93.3 “volition] The act of causation must therefore be voluntary; and volition (32)
93.8 “conscious of itself,”] The Absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious, provided it is only conscious of itself [note omitted]. (32)
93n.25 as . . . existence] as . . . existence (200)
94n.19 “if] If (34)
95n.1 perfect] [not in italics] (35)
95n.2 its original perfection.”] [not in italics; note omitted] (35)
95n.5 exhausting . . . being] [not in italics] (38)
95n.7 Absolute.”] Absolute; and we are involved in the self-contradictory assumption of a limited universe, which yet can neither contain a limit in itself, nor be limited by anything beyond itself. (38)
95.3 “nothing . . . reality,”] The metaphysical representation of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing . . . reality [note omitted]. (30)
95.6 “all . . . included.”] “What kind of an Absolute Being is that,” says Hegel, “which does not contain in itself all . . . included?” [note omitted] (30)
95.7 infinite,” . . . “must] infinite must (31)
95.15-16 “a whole composed of parts,” or “a . . . attributes,” or a “conscious . . . object.] Not only is the Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else; but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself; as a whole, for instance, composed of parts, or as a . . . attributes, or as a conscious . . . object [note omitted]. (33)
95.19 relatives.] relatives [note omitted]. (33)
95.22 matter.] matter [note omitted]. (33)
96.2 multiplicity.”] multiplicity [note omitted]. (33)
96.19-20 “that . . . inconceivable,” it “consequently] By the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that . . . inconceivable; and which consequently (30)
96.23 “cannot] [paragraph] The Infinite, as contemplated by this philosophy, cannot (30)
96.32 “the] But the (48)
96.33 anything general] anything in general (48)
96.37 limitation.] limitation [note omitted]. (48)
97n.25 infinite. . . . And] infinite. We cannot, therefore, start from any abstract assumption of the divine infinity, to reason downwards to any object of human thought. And (60)
98n.1 thoughts] thought (60)
98.4 “the . . . Absolute” . . . “in . . . only” . . . “our] [paragraph] What we have hitherto been examining, be it remembered, is not the . . . Absolute in . . . only our (39)
98.7 Being.”] Being,—a belief which appears forced upon us, as the complement of our consciousness of the relative and the finite. (45)
101.24 “that] We may suppose the existence in man of a special faculty of knowledge, of which God is the immediate object,—a kind of religious sense or reason, by which the Divine attributes are apprehended in their own nature [note omitted]: or we may maintain that (26)
101.27 God,”] God [note omitted]. (26)
101.29 “the] The latter [notion concerning means to convey a knowledge of God] is the method of the (26)
101.33 “all the excellences of] On the other hand, we meet with an opposite style of criticism, which reasons somewhat as follows: All the excellences, it contends, of (28)
101.38 character.”] character [note omitted]. (28)
103.12-13 “the . . . conceiving”] [see 101 above] (xiii)
— The Philosophy of the Conditioned: comprising some remarks on Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy and on Mr. J. S. Mill’s Examination of that Philosophy. London and New York: Strahan, 1866.
note: first published as: “The Philosophy of the Conditioned: Sir William Hamilton and John Stuart Mill,” Contemporary Review, I (Jan. and Feb., 1866), 31-49, 185-219.
quoted: 24, 27, 28n, 29, 34n, 40, 45n, 46n, 50n, 52n, 57n, 58n, 64n, 76n, 77n, 85n, 93n-4n, 94n, 97n, 98n-9n, 99n, 104n-5n, 106n, 107n, 123n, 493n
referred to: ciii, cv, cvi, cvii, 22n, 25, 26, 28, 30, 30n, 32n, 38n, 49n, 56, 92n, 124n
24.28-30 “reacts . . . recipient,”] The assertion that all our knowledge is relative,—in other words, that we know things only under such conditions as the laws of our cognitive faculties impose upon us,—is a statement which looks at first sight like a truism, but which really contains an answer to a very important question,—Have we reason to believe that the laws of our cognitive faculties impose any conditions at all?—that the mind in any way reacts . . . recipient? (63-4)
27.4 “objects” . . . “things in themselves.”] Having thus quietly assumed that “things in themselves” are identical with “objects,” and “relations” with “impressions on the human mind,” Mr. Mill bases his whole criticism on this tacit petitio principii. (79n) [JSM reverses phrasal order; the quotation derives from Hamilton]
27.4-7 “Objective existence” . . . “does . . . and a phenomenon . . . as an object] It is simply that objective existence does . . . and that a phenomenon . . . as an object (82-3)
28n.2-7 “If, indeed,” . . . “Hamilton . . . no, he . . . possunt.’ ”] If, indeed, Hamilton . . . no,* [footnote:] *Essay, ii. 8, §23. [text:] he . . . possunt.”* [footnote:] *Reid’s Works, p. 839. (83-4)
29.5 “out . . . time”] “A direct intuition of things in themselves,” according to Kant and Hamilton, is an intuition of things out . . . time.” (77-8)
34n.10 “pseudo-concept . . . Infinite,”] Hence it is not to be wondered at—nay, it is a natural consequence of this doctrine,—that our positive conception of God as a Person cannot be included under this pseudo-concept . . . Infinite. (93)
40.21-2 “Out . . . completed” . . . “self-existent] If meant as a statement of Hamilton’s use of the term, it is incorrect: absolute, in Hamilton’s philosophy, does not mean simply “completed,” but “out . . . completed;” i.e., self-existent. (104)
46n.4 Apparent.”] Apparent.* [footnote:] *Republic, Book v, p. 479. (109)
50n.1 “indefinitely increasable.”] Can any man suppose that, when the Divine attributes are spoken of as infinite, it is meant that they are indefinitely increasable?* [footnote omitted] (114)
52n.4 “pseudo-infinite.”] Whereas Mr. Mill, by laying down the maxim that the meaning of the abstract must be sought in the concrete, quietly assumes that this pseudo-infinite is a proper predicate of God, to be tested by its applicability to the subject, and that what Hamilton says of this infinite cannot be true unless it is also true of God. (93)
52n.17-18 “the unconditionally limited,”] Can Mr. Mill possibly be ignorant that all these attributes are relations; that the Absolute in Hamilton’s sense, “the unconditionally limited,” is not predicable of God at all; and that when divines and philosophers speak of the absolute nature of God, they mean a nature in which there is no distinction of attributes at all? (106)
57n.2 unconditioned” . . . “God] unconditioned, God (17)
57n.8-9 “one . . . depends,”] This is Materialism, which has then to address itself to the further problem, to reduce the various phenomena of matter to some one . . . depends. (7)
58n.9-10 “Hamilton . . . maintains . . . absolute and infinite . . . relative and finite.”] Hamilton maintains . . . “absolute” and “infinite” . . . “relative” and “finite;” for “correlatives suggest each other,” and the “knowledge of contradictories is one;” but he denies that a concrete thing or object can be positively conceived as absolute or infinite. (110)
64n.18 intuition.”] intuition; but to show this in the various instances would require a longer dissertation than our present limits will allow. (126n)
64n.22 “When] But when (126n)
77n.6-7 “To . . . possible,” . . . “we . . . possible; but we] It must be remembered that, to . . . possible, we . . . possible but that we (36n)
85n.1-2 “exhaust any finite number, by] Simply because of a conventional arrangement, by which a single digit, according to its position, can express, by one mark, tens, hundreds, thousands, &c., of units; and thus can exhaust the sum by (134)
85n.3 “exhaust the infinite.”] But how can such a process exhaust the infinite? (134)
93n.37-94n.1 relation” . . . “and] relation, and (117)
94n.7-10 with undertaking . . . impossibility of conceiving a . . . wise (i.e. . . . existence out . . . relation.”] with “undertaking . . . impossibility” of conceiving “a . . . wise”* [footnote:] *Examination, p. 95. [text:] (i.e. . . . existence “out . . . relation.” (153-4)
97n.3 “Is . . . higher perfection?”] To the first part of this objection we reply by simply asking, “Is . . . ‘higher perfection?’ ” (158)
99n.13-15 saying, I . . . existence?”] saying, “I . . . existence?” (163)
99n.34-5 “the . . . itself,” . . . “simple, . . . itself,”] It must therefore be conceivable as the . . . itself; and as simple, . . . itself. (100)
99n.36-40 “we . . . that” . . . “own . . . subject,” . . . “only . . . other,”] We . . . that His own . . . subject; but we can conceive Him only . . . other.* [footnote omitted] (28)
104n.3 “Mr. Mansel asserts] Mr. Mansel, as we have said, asserts (164)
105n.15 child. . . . We] child. [ellipsis indicates 1-page omission] We will not pause to comment on the temper and taste of this declamation; we (167-8)
105n.16-17 it certainly is, . . . fellow creatures] it constantly is, . . . “fellow creatures,” (168)
105n.20-1 a good father . . . a good son? . . . as good,] a good father . . . a good son? . . . as good, (169)
106n.32 “We] But as regards the former part, we (172)
107n.26 “The . . . Rationalist] Now the . . . “Rationalist” (175)
123n.1-2 “Hamilton,” . . . “maintains] Hamilton maintains (129n)
493n.1-3 “Sir W. Hamilton . . . paper.”] Either Sir W. Hamilton . . . paper, or the blunders are Mr. Mill’s own. (181)
— Prolegomena Logica. An Inquiry into the Psychological Character of Logical Processes. Oxford: Graham; London: Whittaker, 1851.
quoted: 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 297, 298, 300, 308, 308n, 312-13, 313-14, 318, 322, 332n, 337n, 355, 366, 448n, 465, 468
referred to: 195n, 269, 271, 299, 312, 313n, 316n, 317, 320, 323, 334, 356n, 360, 360-1, 364, 365, 367, 370, 371, 376, 409n, 448, 467, 469
262.13-15 observed,” . . . “that] observed, that (90)
262.17 itself.] itself.* [footnote omitted] (90)
262.18 ideas;] ideas*; [footnote omitted] (90)
262.20-2 other . . . only.] [not in italics] (90-1)
263.4 a hundred] 100 (97)
263.5 experiences] experience (97)
263.6 have] has (97)
263.7 ninety-nine] 99 (97)
263.8 hundredth] 100th (97)
265.1 “experience] Experience (99)
265.4 lines:”] ones. (100)
266.24-5 only,” . . . “conceive . . . presentation;”] only conceive . . . presentation; and all our past presentations have been given under the law of succession. (112n)
267.5 conceive,” . . . “a] conceive a (149)
267.8 nevertheless] notwithstanding (149)
267.16 “while] Both are necessary, inasmuch as, while (150)
267.16-17 and circumstances] [not in italics] (150)
297.10-12 “is . . . volitions.”] Our clearest notion of efficiency is . . . volitions*. [footnote:] *See Reid, Active Powers, Essay i. ch. v. (140)
297.13 “an interesting] Thus interpreted, the principle in question stands on precisely the same footing as that of substance;—an interesting (142)
298.6 “we should] And if we were asked, why these two alternatives alone are admissible, we should (148)
298.6 Because . . . itself] “because . . . itself” (148)
298.6 But why] Now why (148)
300.9-10 “natural tendency of men” . . . “to . . . themselves,”] Thus interpreted, the principle in question stands on precisely the same footing as that of substance;—an interesting illustration of the universal tendency of men to . . . themselves, even where the identification tends to the destruction of all clear thinking;—furnishing a psychological explanation of a form of speech which has prevailed and will continue to prevail among all people in all times;—but not properly to be called a necessary truth, nor capable of any scientific application; inasmuch as, in any such application, it may be true or false, without our being able to determine which, as the object of which it treats never comes within the reach of our faculties. (142)
308.11-12 “cannot . . . imagination”] From this neglect of individual characteristics arises the first distinguishing feature of a concept; viz. that it cannot . . . imagination*. [footnote:] *Cf. Hamilton on Reid, p. 360. (15)
308n.2-4 “In . . . intuition.”] To clear up the point at issue, it will be necessary to bear in mind two facts which have just been noticed; viz. firstly, that in . . . intuition; and, secondly, that all concepts are formed by means of signs which have previously been representative of individual objects only. (29-30)
312.15-16 “without . . . symbols” . . . “beyond . . . imagination.] This characteristic cannot indeed be determined à priori, from the mere notion of the concept as universal, but it may be proved to a moral certainty à posteriori, by the inability of which in practice every man is conscious, of advancing, without . . . symbols, beyond . . . imagination. (15)
312.17 individuals.] individuals*. [footnote omitted] (16)
312.29 successively . . . simultaneously] [in italics] (16)
313.33 “Observe] To solve this dilemma, we need not call in aid the curious hypothesis of Condillac, who held that the dependence of thought on sensation (and by implication on language) was a consequence of the fall of Adam: we need only observe (19)
313.38 class.] class*. [footnote omitted] (20)
314.8 sight? . . . All] sight? [ellipsis indicates 9-page omission] To clear up the point at issue, it will be necessary to bear in mind two facts which have just been noticed; viz. firstly, that in every complete act of conception, the attributes forming the concept are contemplated as coexisting in a possible object of intuition; and, secondly, that all (29)
314.9 only. . . . Similarities] [ellipsis indicates 5-sentence omission] (30)
314.10 differences:] differences*; [footnote omitted] (31)
318.26-7 “We can,” . . . “and] On the other hand, throughout Berkeley’s dissertation, too little notice is taken of the important fact, that we can, and (31)
318.28 individualization. . . . I] individualization. But this is done, not in any mere act of conception, but only in the more complex operations of thought in which such act is presupposed. I (31)
318.31-2 The . . . signified] [not in italics] (31-2)
322.21-2 “the . . . concepts.”] The . . . concepts: the true singular proposition in Logic is not one in which the concept is materially limited to an individual by extralogical considerations, but one in which it is formally so limited by a sign of individuality. (63)
322.22-3 “The man” .h. . “as] But the man, as (62)
322.25 Cæsar . . . Pompey,] “Cæsar . . . Pompey,” (62)
332n.23-4 “may . . . This is here.”] The result of every such act may . . . “this is here.” (53)
332n.27 “But] Every operation of thought is a judgment, in the psychological sense of the term: but (54)
332n.30 other. . . . The] other. The former cannot be distinguished as true or false, inasmuch as the object is thereby only judged to be present at the moment when we are conscious of it as affecting us in a certain manner; and this consciousness is necessarily true. The latter is true or false, according as the relations thought as existing between certain concepts are actually found in the objects represented by those concepts or not. The (54-5)
337n.20 other is] other set is (59)
337n.33 “must . . . attributes”] Every notion, that is to say, as a condition of its conceivability, must . . . attributes, in consequence of which it is capable of subordination to a higher notion: and it must contain a limited number only of attributes, in consequence of which lower notions may be subordinated to it. (184-5)
337n.34 “for] For (185)
337n.36-7 are never] are thus never (185)
337n.37 object:”] object. (185)
355.7 distinction between] distinction adopted between (226)
355.9 Matter] Matter (226)
355.11 Form] Form (226)
355.14 it.”] it*. [footnote omitted] (226)
366.29 “accepts] Thus it accepts (265) [see next entry]
366.32 themselves . . . leaving] [ellipsis indicates that JSM has altered the order of the sentences; see previous entry] It is competent to test the validity of all such products, in so far as they comply or not with the conditions of pure thought; leaving (265)
448n.16 “In] In this sense, motives addressed to the will are not causes; for, in (152)
465.12 “by] But if they would consider that by (298)
465.12 necessarily] necessarily (298)
465.14 does] does (299)
465.16 case. No] case; they probably would not find this doctrine either contrary to their experience or revolting to their feelings. And no (299)
465.18 this” . . . “is] this, we might add, is (299)
468.22 “but] The strongest motive prevails; but (302)
— “Supplementary Remarks on Mr. Mill’s Criticism of Sir William Hamilton,” Contemporary Review, VI (Sept., 1867), 18-31.
quoted: 77n, 103n, 107n
referred to: cvi-cvii, 29n, 35n, 50n, 74n, 85n, 93n
77n.10 “mentally] When I say, “to conceive a thing as possible,” I mean mentally (27)
103n.3 “the phenomena] Mr Mill, on the other hand, declares that he will call no being good who is not what he means when he applies the epithet to his fellow creatures; and as his only means of judging are by the phenomena through which such a being is manifested, the declaration can only mean that he will call no being good, the phenomena (30)
107n.8 “if power] For if power (30n)
Masson, David.Recent British Philosophy: A review, with criticisms; including some comments on Mr. Mill’s answer to Sir William Hamilton. London and Cambridge: Macmillan, 1865.
note: the “substance” of the work was delivered as lectures at the Royal Institution, 21, 23, and 28 March, 1865. A second ed. appeared in 1867. The quotation at 207 is indirect.
quoted: 207, 492n
referred to: vi, 30, 498n
207.14 organic union] It [the notion of Mind or Self] includes an organic union somehow of the present with the non-present, the identity somehow, in one conscious organism, of the was, the is, and the is to be. (335)
492n.7 “Try him] Throw that [his strength, nerve, and felicity of style] aside, and try him (308)
492n.12 discussion? . . . Let] discussion. Throw this aside too, and let (308)
492n.12 W.] William (309)
note: the reference, in a quotation from Hamilton, derives from Baillet.
referred to: 483
Mervoyer, Pierre Maurice.Etude sur l’association des idées. Paris: Durand, 1864.
referred to: 250n
Mill, James. Referred to: 9, 116, 217n, 299, 493n
— Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. 2 vols. London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1829.
note: at 252-3 JSM would appear to be quoting directly from his father, although Hamilton quotes the same passage; one of the references at 256 is in a quotation from Hamilton.
quoted: 115-16, 252-3, 282
referred to: 67, 199, 253-4, 255, 256, 257, 259, 283
116.2 say that I] say I (I, 170)
116.31 Generical marks] genericalmarks (I, 172)
252.24-5 “Where . . . ideas,” . . . “have] 8. [Mill’s eighth observation on the law of association] Where . . . ideas have (I, 68)
252.32 single] simple (I, 68)
252.36-7 compounded. . . . [paragraph] It] [ellipsis indicates 5-paragraph omission] (I, 69-70)
253.2 is, of concomitance] is, concomitance (I, 71)
253.11 Some] 9. [Mill’s ninth observation on the law of association] Some (I, 71)
253.13 we may make] we make (I, 72)
253.33-4 “The . . . another, or] [paragraph] The . . . another idea, or (I, 75)
282.12 “under an . . . to:”] That this is no argument against the existence of those feelings, will be made apparent, by the subsequent explanation of other phenomena, in which the existence of certain feelings, and an . . . to them, are out of dispute. (33)
Mill, John Stuart.Auguste Compte and Positivism (1865). In Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, Collected Works, X, 261-368.
note: the reference is, more specifically, to 265-9.
referred to: 217n
— “Bailey on Berkeley’s Theory of Vision,” in Essays on Philosophy and the Classics, Collected Works, XI, 245-69.
note: reprinted from Dissertations and Discussions, II, 84-114; originally in Westminster Review, XXXVIII (Oct., 1842), 318-36.
referred to: 256n
— “Coleridge,” in Collected Works, X, 117-63.
note: reprinted from Dissertations and Discussions, I, 393-466; originally in London and Westminster Review, XXXIII (March, 1840), 257-302.
referred to: 208n-9n.
— “Grote’s Plato,” in Essays on Philosophy and the Classics, Collected Works, XI, 375-440.
note: reprinted from Dissertations and Discussions, III, 275-379; originally in Edinburgh Review, CXXIII (April, 1866), 297-364.
referred to: 46n
— On Liberty (1859). In Essays on Politics and Society, Collected Works, XVIII, 213-310.
referred to: 459n
— A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (1848; 8th ed., 1872). Collected Works, VII and VIII.
note: though the references generally predate the 8th ed. (the copy-text for the Collected Works), most of them are to arguments contained in all editions, and so the version in Collected Works (which gives all variant readings) is cited; the reference at 75n is specifically to the 6th ed. (1865). The quotations at 450n are taken from Alexander, q.v.; that at 465 is taken from Mansel. The reference at 324 is editorial, calling attention to a parallel passage.
quoted: 450n, 465
referred to: cviii, 68, 75n, 216n, 216n-17n, 262n, 271, 300, 324, 369n, 390, 416, 439n
450n.26 “practical feeling of Free Will”] The metaphysical theory of free will, as held by philosophers, (for the practical feeling of it, common in a greater or less degree to all mankind, is in no way inconsistent with the contrary theory,) was invented because the supposed alternative of admitting human actions to be necessary, was deemed inconsistent with every one’s instinctive consciousness, as well as humiliating to the pride and even degrading to the moral nature of man. (VIII, 836)
450n.26-7 “a feeling . . . of,”] [paragraph] And indeed, if we examine closely, we shall find that this feeling, of our being able to modify our own character if we wish, is itself the feeling . . . of. (VIII, 841)
— Utilitarianism (1861). In Collected Works, X, 203-59.
referred to: 460n
Milton, John.Paradise Lost, in The Poetical Works of Mr. John Milton. London: Tonson, 1695, 1-343.
note: the quotation at 42 is in a quotation from Hamilton.
quoted: 42, 198, 488
42.16 “Won from the cold and formless Infinite.”] Or hear’st thou rather pure Ethereal Stream, / Whose Fountain who shall tell? before the Sun, / Before the Heav’ns thou wert, and at the voice / Of God as with a Mantle didst invest / The rising world of waters dark and deep, / Won from the void and formless infinite. (62; III, 7-12)
198.23 “hanging self-balanced” on its own “centre”] Thus God the Heav’n created, thus the Earth, / Matter unform’d and void: Darkness profound / Cover’d th’ Abyss: but on the watry calm / His brooding wings the Spirit of God outspread, / And vital virtue infus’d, and vital warmth / Throughout the fluid Mass, but downward purg’d / The black tartareous cold infernal dregs / Adverse to life: then founded, then conglob’d / Like things to like, the rest to several place / Disparted, and between spun out the Air, / And Earth self-balanc’d on her Centre hung. (186; VII, 232-42)
488.18-19 “cycle on epicycle, orb on orb?”] To ask or search I blame thee not, for Heav’n / Is as the Book of God before thee set, / Wherein to reade his wondrous Works and learn / His Seasons, Hours, or Days, or Months, or Years: / This to attain, whether Heav’n move or Earth, / Imports not, if thou reck’n right, the rest / From Man or Angel the great Architect / Did wisely to conceal, and not divulge / His secrets to be scann’d by them who ought / Rather admire; or if they list to try / Conjecture, he his Fabrick of the Heav’ns / Hath left to their disputes, perhaps to move / His laughter at their quaint Opinions wide / Hereafter, when they come to model Heav’n / And calculate the Stars, how they will wield / The mighty frame, how build, unbuild, contrive / To save appearances, how gird the Sphere / With Centrick and Eccentrick scribl’d o’er, / Cycle and Epicycle, Orb in Orb: (201-2; VIII, 66-84)
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de. Referred to: 358n
Müller, Johannes Peter.Elements of Physiology. Trans. with notes, William Baly. London: Taylor and Walton, 1837.
note: JSM takes the quotations and the reference (which is to a section added by Baly) from McCosh.
quoted: 246, 246-7
246.16 “a student] [paragraph] d. [4th of 9 cases cited] A student
Nefftzer, Auguste. “La Vie de Jésus par M. Ernest Renan,” Revue Germanique et Française, XXVII (Sept., 1863), 181-4.
note: the reference at 152 is in a quotation from Hamilton; that at 297 in a quotation from Mansel.
referred to: 92, 152, 297, 434, 449n, 487, 488
— Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Opera quae exstant omnia. Ed. Samuel Horsley. 5 vols. London: Nichols, 1779-85, II-III.
note: this ed. is used for ease of reference. The so-called “Jesuit’s Edition” (Geneva: Barillot, 1739-42) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The references at 191, 420 are to Newton’s theory of gravity; that at 476 is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 191, 420, 476
421n.1-3 “Causas rerum naturalium non plures admitti debere quam quæ et veræ sint, et earum phænomenis explicandis sufficiant.”] Causas rerum naturalium non plures admitti debere, quàm quæ & veræ sint, & earum phænomenis explicandis sufficiant. [Regula I of Regulæ Philosophandi] (III, 2)
Nicole, Pierre. See Arnauld, and Baynes.
Nunneley, Thomas.On the Organs of Vision: Their Anatomy and Physiology. London: Churchill, 1858.
note: the quotations are taken by JSM from Fraser, q.v. Fraser also reprints the relevant passage in his ed. of Berkeley’s Works, I, 446-8. Nunneley identifies his subject only as “a fine and most intelligent boy, nine years of age,” who lived in “a very large manufacturing village, about sixteen miles from Leeds.” (31)
quoted: 232n-3n, 236n-7n
232n.32 “at] He could at (32)
232n.33-4 in the shapes of objects,” . . . “were . . . same visible figure,” . . . “it was] in their shapes; though he could not in the least say which was the cube, and which the sphere, he saw they were . . . same figure. It was (32)
232n.34-5 till they had been many times] until they had many times been (32)
232n.35 by sight] by the eye (32)
232n.37 judgments] perception (32)
232n.38 could tell] could or would tell (32)
232n.38 eye] eyes (32)
232n.39 in] into (32)
232n.39 hands. Even] hands; even (32)
236n.17 “said] The boy said (32)
237n.1 walked carefully] walked most carefully (32)
237n.1 up] out (32)
Occam. See Ockham, William of.
Ockham, William of.
note: the quotation is mistakenly attributed by Hamilton to Ockham. See Ponce.
O’Hanlon, Hugh Francis.A Criticism of John Stuart Mill’s Pure Idealism; and an attempt to shew that, if logically carried out, it is pure nihilism. Oxford and London: Parker, 1866.
note: the passages quoted on 203n, 203n-4n are from an intended letter to Mill (dated 5 Dec., 1866), printed on pp. 12-15 of the pamphlet, in reply to a letter (not extant? O’Hanlon says received 5/12/66) in which Mill asked whether O’Hanlon had published his views, as given in a letter to Mill of Nov., 1865.
quoted: 203n, 203n-4n, 205n, 206n-7n
referred to: civ, 204n
203n.4 absence. . . . If the] absence. [ellipsis indicates 1¼-page omission] But if so, if the (12, 14)
203n.5 any] my (14)
203n.7 ground. If] ground. [paragraph] If (14)
203n.7 the fire] “the fire” (14)
203n.8 any] my (14)
203n.9-10 modifications . . . absent.”] “modifications . . . absent.” [i.e., the quotation marks occur because O’Hanlon is quoting JSM] (14)
203n.21 “Conceding the] [paragraph] Again, conceding the (14)
205n.5 “the] In drawing this conclusion, in extending to C [the group of permanent possibilities of sensation I call my friend Smith], which so closely resembles B [the group of sensations and of permanent possibilities of sensation I call my body], my experience of B, I, according to Mr. Mill, do but extend the (7)
205n.7 “The] [paragraph] I. [of four points] The (7)
205n.7 (a)] [paragraph](a.) (7)
205n.8 (b)] [paragraph] (b.) (8)
206n.33 “A] [paragraph] A (8)
206n.39 me, combined] me, or rather in a greater degree, combined (9)
206n.39-40 manner. Yet] manner. [paragraph] Yet (9)
Ovid.Metamorphoses (Latin and English). Trans. Frank Justus Miller. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1916.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The quotation is in a quotation from Hamilton.
287.10 “Omnia mutantur; nihil interit,”] omnia mutantur, nihil interit: errat et illinc / huc venit, hinc illuc, et quoslibet occupat artus / spiritus eque feris humana in corpora transit / inque feras noster, nec tempore deperit ullo, / utque novis facilis signatur cera figurio / nec manet ut fuerat nec formas servat easdem, / sed tamen ipsa eadem est, animam sic semper eandem / esse, sed in varias doceo migrare figuras. (II, 376; XV, 165-72)
Owen, Robert. Referred to: 453
Paley, William.Natural Theology: or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected from the Appearances of Nature. London: Faulder, 1802.
referred to: 192
— A View of the Evidences of Christianity in Three Parts. 3 vols. London: Faulder, 1794.
referred to: 192
Pasteur, Louis. Referred to: 280
Persius (Aulus Persius Flaccus). Satires, in Juvenal and Persius (Latin and English). Trans. G. G. Ramsay. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1920, 310-400.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The quotation is in a quotation from Hamilton.
286.20 “Ex nihilo nihil, in . . . reverti,”] non ego curo / esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones / obstipo capite et figentes lumine terram / murmura cum secum et rabiosa silentia rodunt / atque exporrecto trutinantur verba labello, / aegroti veteris meditantes somnia, gigni / de nihilo nihilum, in . . . reverti. (350-2; III, 78-84)
Phillipps, Lucy F. March (“An Inquirer”). The Battle of the Two Philosophies. By an Inquirer. London: Longmans, Green, 1866.
note: Lucy F. March Phillips is identified as the author of the Battle of the Two Philosophies, inter alia, on the title page of her Lectures on the Cumulative Evidences of Divine Revelation (Cambridge: Deighton Bell; London: Bell and Sons, 1883).
quoted: 46n-7n, 124, 141n, 147n, 447n, 451-2, 452n, 458n-9n, 466n, 492n
referred to: ciii, 38n, 49n, 441n, 493n
124n.3-4 “a very intricate point;”] The charge then is, that in examining the phenomena of knowledge and belief, Sir W. Hamilton ascertained a real distinction existing between them; that in working out the consequences of this distinction he met with a difficulty he had not at first noted; that he had occasion in the course of a lecture on logic to point out this difficulty, but could not then go into it, because his pupils were unprepared for its investigation, and a lecture on logic was not the proper place for an irrelevant discussion on a very intricate point. (32-3)
124n.15-16 “continual . . . discrepancies,”] So also when Mr. Mill charges Sir W. Hamilton with, indeed proves against him continual . . . discrepancies, it would not be difficult to show, both from history and reason, that all sound philosophy, whilst thus incomplete, must be liable to the objection of inconsistency. (7)
141n.5-6 “contrary to all analogy” . . . “that consciousness . . . education.”] It is wholly contrary to all analogy, and therefore to all primâ facie probability, that consciousness . . . education. (52)
147n.3-5 “at the root of all experience;” . . . “that no experience . . . us.”] Lastly, we must show “that it lies at the root of all experience,” i.e. that no experience . . . us.* [footnote:] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 268-270. (54)
447n.1-2 “gratuitously . . . foreknowledge.”] The fourth vice is gratuitously . . . foreknowledge; or even with our being able to judge what men will do, and with there being any such uniformity of volitions as may suffice for statistical averages. (45)
451.25-452.1 “if the temptation . . . made:”] Afterwards, I am as distinctly conscious of having made an effort; and if the temptation . . . made. (43)
452.2 is wholly] is necessarily, or in fact, wholly (44)
452.3 effort. . . . When] effort: if these desires are equally balanced, they mutually destroy each other, and then no effort is possible; if one is ever so little stronger than the other, no effort is necessary. When (44)
452.4 up, no . . . scales.] up—it is Mr. Mill’s own illustration—no . . . scales, and any such effort would be that factor in the result, which Mr. Mill is bound to exclude. (44)
458n.7-459n.2 “well . . . opinion, because . . . subject,”] But we cannot but think it a pity, when a well . . . opinion is thrown aside, not from its internal failure, but because . . . subject. (50)
459n.15-19 “If . . . right.’ . . . And] Again: if . . . right.” By increasing its attractions, you necessarily increase my desire for it. And (49)
459n.20 deserve. . . . For children] deserve; the stronger my evil desire is, the greater the reward that is to counterbalance it must be; if your first reward is insufficient, you must increase it till its attractions exceed those of the unlawful pleasure. In the case of offenders against society, it might not be prudent thus to strengthen their too feeble virtue by rewards. But it would be quite just; and for children (49)
466n.6-7 “how . . . circumstances.”] How . . . circumstances, Mr. Mill omits to say. (46n)
492n.20-3 “that . . . think.”] One great ground of censure is, that Sir W. Hamilton has done so little, and left that little so incomplete; but Mr. Mill wholly ignores that . . . think; a work which Plato considered the only work worthy to be called philosophical. (6-7)
Pindar.Olympian Odes, in The Odes of Pindar Including Principal Fragments (Greek and English). Trans. John Sandys. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946, 1-149.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference.
Platner, Ernst.Philosophische Aphorismen nebst einigen Anleitungen zur philosophischen Geschichte. 2 vols. Leipzig: Schwickertschen Verlage, 1793, 1800.
note: the quotation at 223-4 (partly repeated at 236) is from Hamilton’s translation of the passage in Lectures (q.v. for the collation); all the references derive from Hamilton, including those that include reference to Mahaffy and McCosh. Platner does not identify the blind person described.
referred to: 224-5, 225n, 227, 229, 237, 238
Plato. Referred to: 502
— Apology, in Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phædo, Phædrus (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1917, 68-144.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference.
referred to: 129-30
— Phædrus, in ibid., 412-578.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference.
referred to: 2-3
— Republic (Greek and English). Trans. Paul Shorey. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The reference at 45n derives from Mansel; that at 46n is in a quotation from Mansel.
referred to: 45n, 46n, 457n
— Sophist, in Theætetus, Sophist (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1921, 264-458.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference.
— Timæus, in Timæus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles (Greek and English). Trans. R. G. Bury. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1929, 16-252.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference.
referred to: 419
Plotinus.Operum philosophicorum omnium libri LIV. in sex enneades distributi. Basel: Lecythus, 1580.
referred to: 39-40
Plutarch.Life of Cæsar, in Lives (Greek and English). Trans. Bernadotte Perin. 11 vols. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914-26, VII, 442-608.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference.
referred to: 281
Poiret, Peter. Referred to: 151
Ponce, John. Annotation in Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia. Ed. Luke Wadding, John Ponce, et al. 12 vols. Lyons: Durand, 1639, VII, 723.
note: Mill, following Hamilton (who apparently originated the error), attributes the phrase to William of Ockham; for a full, spirited, and apparently still authoritative discussion of the matter, including the attribution to Ponce, see W. M. Thorburn, “The Myth of Occam’s Razor,” Mind, XXVII (July, 1918), 345-53.
Ptolemy. Referred to: 333
Ravaillac, François. Referred to: 461, 462n
Régis, Rey. See Cazillac.
note: the references at 151, 153n, and the last at 168, are in quotations from Hamilton.
referred to: 1, 62, 109, 110, 111, 113, 119, 123, 128, 137, 137n, 138, 143, 151, 153n, 155, 157, 168, 169, 175, 183, 196, 197, 216, 239, 250, 257, 493n
— The Works of Thomas Reid, Collected, with Selections from his Unpublished Letters. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations by Sir William Hamilton. Prefixed, Stewart’s Account of the Life and Writings of Reid, with Notes by the Editor. Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart; London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1846.
note: see Hamilton, “Dissertations on Reid” and “Foot-notes to Reid”; and individual works by Reid, below.
— Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, in ibid., 509-679.
note: in this ed., Hamilton includes the original page numbers, which we have omitted in the collations.
quoted: 356n, 440, 444
referred to: 468
356n.8 theologians.”] Theologians; but Mr. Hume seems not to have attended to it, or to have thought it to be words without any meaning. (650)
440.2-3 “far . . . inference,” “can . . . from”] [paragraph] Those, therefore, who reason justly from this system of materialism, will easily perceive that the doctrine of necessity is so far . . . inference, that it can . . . from it. (635)
444.21 “Is] [paragraph] Is (610)
— Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in ibid., 215-508.
note: in this edition, Hamilton includes the original page numbers, which we have omitted in the collations.
quoted: 69n, 111, 112, 137n, 172, 172-3, 173, 174, 323, 328
referred to: 75, 113, 162, 190, 257, 498n
69n.1 “To conceive, to imagine, to apprehend] Let it be observed, therefore, that to conceive, to imagine, to apprehend (223)
69n.4 false. But] false. [paragraph] But (223)
69n.4 these] those (223)
69n.5 cannot be] cannot easily be (223)
69n.6 ambiguity. . . . When] ambiguity. Politeness and good-breeding lead men, on most occasions, to express their opinions with modesty, especially when they differ from others whom they ought to respect. Therefore, when (223)
69n.11-12 it. Thus] it. [paragraph] Thus (223)
69n.15 opinion. . . . When] opinion. This ambiguity ought to be attended to, that we may not impose upon ourselves or others in the use of them. The ambiguity is indeed remedied, in a great measure, by their construction. When (223)
69n.16 accusative case] accusative case (223)
69n.18 infinitive mood] infinitive mood (223)
69n.20 they] the words (223)
111.37-8 “immediate knowledge of the past,”] [paragraph] It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things past. (339)
112.24-5 “when . . . object,”] But the difficulty is to make his [Berkeley’s] opinion coincide with the notions of the vulgar, who are firmly persuaded that the very identical objects which they perceive, continue to exist when they do not perceive them; and who are no less firmly persuaded that, when . . . object. (284)
137n.4-6 “The vulgar . . . and are] [see collation at 112.24-5 above] (284)
172.31-2 The one is the sign] [not in italics] (312)
172.34 perceive them by means] [not in italics] (311)
172.37 conclude] [not in italics] (310)
173.7-8 the . . . it] [not in italics] (315)
173.8 forgot. . . . The] [ellipsis indicates 4-sentence omission] (315)
173.8-9 The sensations . . . qualities . . . carry] [paragraph] Let him again touch the pointed body gently, so as to give him no pain; and now you can hardly persuade him that he feels anything but the figure and hardness of the body: so difficult it is to attend to the sensations . . . qualities, when they are neither pleasant nor painful. They carry (315)
173.10 Nature . . . signs] [not in italics] (315)
173.12-13 If . . . follows] [not in italics] (320)
173.16 the sign] [not in italics] (332)
173.16-17 brought . . . sign] [not in italics] (332)
173.17 sign. In] sign. [paragraph] In (332)
173.17 the . . . sensations] [not in italics] (332)
173.18-19 The . . . perceived] [not in italics] (332)
173.20 nature. Thus] nature. [paragraph] Thus (332)
173.22 it . . . followed] [not in italics] (332)
174.16 “If we] [paragraph] If, therefore, we (258)
174.18 First] First (258)
174.19 Secondly] Secondly (258)
174.20 Thirdly] Thirdly (258)
174.25 “This] [paragraph] I observed, Thirdly, That this (259)
174.27 perceive.”] perceive; we ask no argument for the existence of the object, but that we perceive it; perception commands our belief upon its own authority, and disdains to rest its authority upon any reasoning whatsoever. (259)
323.5 “Most] [paragraph] It will be true that most (404)
328.7 “I give] That I may avoid disputes about the meaning of words, I wish the reader to understand, that I give (415)
328.8 what is true . . . what is false] [not in italics] (415)
— Inquiry into the Human Mind, in ibid., 93-211.
quoted: 72n, 169, 170, 171
referred to: 74n, 172, 175, 234n, 257, 356, 421
72n.24 “every] [paragraph] Prop. 1. Every (148)
72n.24-5 itself,” . . . “any] itself. [3-paragraph (each 1-sentence long) omission] [paragraph] 5. Any (148)
72n.25 points.”] points, and mutually bisect each other. (148)
72n.27-9 “that . . . place.” . . . “have . . . sense,” . . . “no . . . all, since they would often] [paragraph] “It is to be observed, that every Idomenian firmly believes, that . . . place. For this they have . . . sense, and they can no . . . all. They often (151)
169.23 “class of natural signs which . . . though] A third class of natural signs comprehends those which, though (122)
169.26 “I] [paragraph] I (122)
169.29 our] any (122)
169.31 “when] When (137)
170.4 “I] But I (111)
170.6 exist. . . . And] exist; that memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past; and that our sensations and thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind, and the belief of its existence, and of its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is, that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature, suggests to us the notion of a cause, and compels our belief of its existence. And (111)
170.6 manner, certain] manner, as shall be shewn when we come to the sense of touch, certain (111)
170.8 motion.”] motion, which are nowise like to sensations, although they have been hitherto confounded with them. (111)
170.9 “By] I see nothing left, but to conclude, that, by (121)
170.11 words, this] words, that this (121)
170.19 “Extension] [paragraph] Extension (123)
170.19-20 us . . . by] us, by (123)
170.29 “The feelings] [paragraph] What hath imposed upon philosophers in this matter is, that the feelings (124)
171.1 he feels it hard] he feels it hard (125)
171.5 force. There] force. [paragraph] There (125)
171.6 it. . . . The hardness] it. In order to compare these, we must view them separately, and then consider by what tie they are connected, and wherein they resemble one another. The hardness (125)
171.15 “There] [paragraph] Now, there (188)
171.16-17 original . . . constitution] original . . . constitution (188)
171.17 custom] custom (188)
171.17 reasoning. Our] reasoning. [paragraph] Our (188)
171.18 ways. . . . In] ways, our acquired perceptions in the second, and all that reason discovers of the course of nature, in the third. In (188)
171.20 placed.] placed—as hath been already explained in the fifth chapter of this inquiry. (188)
171.21 “In] [paragraph] In (194)
171.24 signified. . . . The] signified. [paragraph] We have distinguished our perceptions into original and acquired; and language, into natural and artificial. Between acquired perception and artificial language, there is a great analogy; but still a greater between original perception and natural language. [paragraph] The (194-5)
171.24 perceptions] perception (195)
171.28 sign] signs (195)
171.29 creates] create (195)
171.30 “It] Thus, it (195)
Réville, Albert. “De la liberté et du progrès à propos des anciens et des modernes,” Revue Germanique et Française, XXVII (Sept., 1863), 5-37.
458n.1 “La liberté] J’entends par là que la liberté (21)
Ricardo, David. Referred to: 110n
St. Anselm.Proslogion seu Alloquium de Dei Existentia, in Opera Omnia, Vols. CLVIII-CLIX of Jacques Paul Migné, ed., Patrologiæ cursus completus, Series latina. Paris: Migné, 1853-54, CLVIII, cols. 223-42.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The quotation is in a quotation from Hamilton. See also St. Augustine.
61.18 Crede ut intelligas] Neque enim quæro intelligere, ut credam; sed credo, ut intelligam. (227)
note: the quotation, which is in a quotation from Hamilton, is mistakenly attributed by him to St. Augustine, whom he calls St. Austin.
— De Utilitate credendi ad Honoratum liber unus, in Opera Omnia, Vols. XXXII-XLVII of Jacques Paul Migné, ed., Patrologiæ cursus completus, Series latina. Paris: Migné, 1841-49, XLII, cols. 65-92.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The quotation at 61 appears also in Retractiones, ibid., XXXII, col. 607 (Lib. I, Cap. xiv). As Mill quotes Hamilton’s translation of this passage, no collation is given. In conjunction with this passage, Hamilton also cites passages from Abelard (mistakenly) and St. Anselm; in fact, both passages are to be found together in St. Augustine, Sermo XLIII, ibid., XXXVIII, col. 258 (Cap. vii).
St. Austin. See St. Augustine.
Sanchez, Francisco.Minerva, sive De Causis Latinæ linguæ commentarius, cui accedunt animadversiones & notæ. Ed. Caspar Schoppe and Jacobus Perizonius. Franeker: Strickius, 1687.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 476
Sanctius. See Sanchez.
Sanderson, Robert.Logicæ Artis Compendium. 2nd ed. Oxford: Lichfield and Short, 1618.
note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College. JSM’s spelling is Saunderson.
414.5 contraria] Contraria, (52)
414.7 susceptibili.”] susceptibili: ut Calor & Frigus. (52)
Saunderson. See Sanderson.
Scheibler, Christoph.Opera Philosophica. 2 vols. Frankfurt: Wustii, 1665.
note: JSM’s spelling, Schiebler, is treated as a typographical error.
referred to: 400n
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von.
note: the reference at 52n is in a quotation from Bolton; that at 152 is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 19, 33n, 42, 52n, 56n, 68, 152, 486, 495
Schmid, Heinrich.Versuch einer Metaphysik der inneren Natur. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1834.
note: JSM quotes from Hamilton’s translation in Lectures, q.v. for the collation.
quoted: 273n, 274n
referred to: 251n
note: identified by Müller (the authority quoted by McCosh, from whom JSM quotes) only as a student from Aix.
referred to: 246
Schopenhauer, Arthur.Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. 2 vols. in 1. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1844.
note: JSM uses McCosh’s translation of the passage (though he may have located it himself; see his comment following the quotation; McCosh gives the reference only as Vol. II, Chap. iv), which Schopenhauer takes from Dr. A. Heuck, q.v.
Sextus Empiricus.Against the Logicians II, in Sextus Empiricus (Greek and English). Trans. R. G. Bury. 4 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1933-49, II, 240-488.
note: this work is often referred to as Against the Mathematicians VIII.
referred to: 39-40
— Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in ibid., I.
note: since the reference is simply to characters in the play, no ed. is cited.
referred to: 408-9
— Twelfth Night.
note: the quotation is indirect. The comparative passage is taken from the Variorum Edition of Horace H. Furness.
464.8 ginger is hot in the mouth:] Toby. Dost thus think that because thou art vertuous, there / shall be no more cakes and ale? / Clown. Yes, by S. Anne, and Ginger shall be hotte y’th / mouth too. (II, iii, 113-16)
Smith, Henry Boynton. “Mill’s Examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy,” American Presbyterian and Theological Review, IV (Jan., 1866), 126-62.
quoted: 58n, 187n
referred to: civ
58n.20-1 “about . . . entities,” . . . “simply] In particular, he justly insists upon it, that the alleged difficulties and contradictions vanish so soon as we cease to talk about . . . entities, and consider them simply (134)
187n.20-2 “an . . . consequence.”] [paragraph] 6. It is partly implied in what precedes, but is also worthy of distinct notice, that Mr. Mill in all his reasonings on this point assumes an . . . consequence, which he elsewhere as emphatically denies. (157)
Smith, Samuel.Additus ad Logicam. 7th ed. Oxford: Hall, 1656.
note: the copy of this ed. in the London Library (bound with Edward Brerewood, Elementa Logicæ [Oxford: Hall, 1657]) is autographed “J. Mill” on the title-page, and was presumably given by JSM with other of his father’s books.
414.28 “Contraria] [paragraph] Contraria (56)
414.30 natura. Ad] naturâ. [paragraph] Ad (56)
414.32 positiva.”] positiva; tertiò ut se invicem expellant, nisi alterum eorum insit à natura: sic calor & frigus in aquâ, in pariete albedo & nigredo contrariantur. (56)
Smith, William Henry. “J. S. Mill on Our Belief in the External World,” Blackwood’s Magazine, XCIX (Jan., 1866), 20-45.
quoted: 201n, 244, 244n
referred to: civ, 240
201n.2-3 by which they [Things] act upon each other] by which they act upon each other (28)
244.18 felt nowhere] felt nowhere (26)
244.23 “that . . . will get our pains into our bodies] But we insist on this, that . . . will get our pains into our bodies (27)
244.26 other. . . . Many] [ellipsis indicates 3-sentence omission] (27)
244.27 acquired perception.] “acquired perception.” (27)
244n.1-2 “measure itself”] It follows, therefore, that a muscular sensation, by its greater or less endurance, measures itself—measures its own greater or less endurance. (32)
note: the reference at 45n derives from Mansel, that at 484 derives from Hamilton.
referred to: 45n, 129-30, 484, 502
Sophocles.Œdipus the King, Œdipus at Colonus.
note: since the reference is general, no ed. is cited.
referred to: 465
Spencer, Herbert. Referred to: 51, 143n, 216n
— First Principles. London: Williams and Norgate, 1862.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The passages cited are illustrative only.
referred to: 10
— “Mill versus Hamilton—The Test of Truth,” Fortnightly Review, I (15 July, 1865), 531-50.
quoted: 144n, 145n, 381n
referred to: cv, 143n,
144n.5 “the more] The hypothesis that the more (548)
144n.5-6 among” . . . “states] among his states (548)
144n.7 his consciousness:”] his consciousness, furnishes him with solutions of numerous facts of consciousness: not, however, of all, if he assumes that his adjustment of inner to outer relations has resulted from his own experiences alone. (548)
144n.24-5 “I find . . . consciousness”] Of this difference I can give no further evidence than that I am conscious of it, and find . . . consciousness. (538-9)
144n.37-8 “only . . . experiences,” . . . “on what] On the other hand, the reply that this truth is known only . . . experiences, suggests the query—On what (549)
144n.39 memory,”] memory, and its validity is determined solely through the trustworthiness of memory. (549)
144n.39-40 “the . . . memory” . . . “immediate consciousness”] Is it then that the . . . memory is less open to doubt than the immediate consciousness that two quantities must be unequal if they differ from a third quantity in unequal degrees? (549)
145n.28 “the net . . . time,”] Considering that I have avowed a general agreement with Mr. Mill, in the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience, and have defended the test of inconceivableness on the very ground that it “expresses the net . . . time” (Principles of Psychology, pp. 22, 23)—considering that, so far from asserting the distinction quoted from Sir W. Hamilton, I have aimed to abolish such distinction—considering that I have endeavoured to show how all our conceptions, even down to those on Space and Time, are “acquired”—considering that I have sought to interpret forms of thought (and by implication all intuitions) as products of organized and inherited experiences (Principles of Psychology, p. 579)—I am taken aback at finding myself classed as in the above paragraph. (536)
145n.36 ice] ice (543)
145n.37 cold] cold (543)
— Principles of Psychology. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1855.
227.40 This symbolic] We have seen that a set of retinal elements may be excited simultaneously, as well as serially; that so, a quasi single state of consciousness becomes the equivalent of a series of states; that a relation between what we call coexistent positions thus represents a relation of successive positions; that this symbolic (224)
227.41 and by] and that, by (224)
Spinoza, Baruch. Referred to: 485
Stephen, James Fitzjames. “Mr. Mansel’s Metaphysics,” in Essays by a Barrister. London: Smith, Elder, 1862, 320-35.
note: the essays were reprinted from the Saturday Review.
referred to: 72n, 266
71n.14 “Consider] Let Mr. Mansel consider (333)
72n.13 he had ever seen] he ever saw (334)
72n.20 exist.”] exist; and Mr. Mansel rests his conclusion, that straight lines could not under any circumstances enclose a space, on the impossibility of conceiving that they should do so. (334)
note: the reference at 127 and the second at 256 are in quotations from Hamilton.
referred to: 110, 119, 127, 143, 155, 183, 196, 197, 216, 250, 252, 255, 256, 278n, 282, 421, 470, 490n, 491n, 493
— Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 3 vols. Vol. I, London: Strahan and Cadell; Edinburgh: Creech, 1792. Vol. II, Edinburgh: Constable; London: Cadell and Davies, 1814. Vol. III, London: Murray, 1827.
note: all the references are to Vol. I, Chap. ii, “Of Attention”; the quotation is from Vol. I, Chap. v, Part 2, §1, “Of the Influence of Casual Association on our Speculative Conclusions.”
referred to: 278, 280, 281
254.19-20 “In consequence,” . . . “of our always] The former of these words expresses (at least in the sense in which we commonly employ it) a sensation in the mind; the latter denotes a quality of an external object; so that there is, in fact, no more connexion between the two notions, than between those of pain and solidity* [footnote omitted]; and yet, in consequence of our always (I, 341)
254.23-5 “of very . . . connexion with one another.”] I. I formerly had occasion to mention several instances of very . . . connexion with each other. (I, 341)
— Philosophical Essays. Edinburgh: Creech, and Constable; London: Cadell and Davies, Murray, and Constable, Hunter, Park and Hunter, 1810.
note: the references, all to Essay First, Part I, Chap. i, are in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 127, 128
Stirling, James Hutchison.Sir William Hamilton, being the Philosophy of Perception; an Analysis. London: Longmans, Green, 1865.
quoted: cv, 27n, 131n
cv.22-3 a . . . disingenuousness”] I seem to myself to have discovered in Hamilton a . . . disingenuousness that, cruelly unjust to individuals, has probably caused the retardation of general British philosophy by, perhaps, a generation; and it is the remaining parts of my deduction that are, after all, the best fitted to demonstrate this, and establish grounds for any indignation which I may have been consequently led to express—though without the slightest ill-will, of which, indeed, however adverse to the mischievous vein concerned, I am entirely unconscious. (vii)
27n.18-19 “the second] I hold the second (30n)
131n.4 “It is] For the truth is even that which is viewed by Hamilton as an absurdity: in very truth there is a consciousness beyond consciousness; and it is (58)
Taine, Hippolyte.De l’Intelligence. 2 vols. Paris: Hachette, 1870.
referred to: 250n
note: the reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 152
Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques. Referred to: 100
Valentin, Gabriel Gustav. “Ueber die subjectiven Gefühle von Personen, welche mit mangelhaften Extremitäten geboren sind,” Repertorium für Anatomie und Physiologie, I (1836-37), 328-37.
note: the reference derives from McCosh, who takes it from an addition by Baly to Müller’s text.
referred to: 247
Veitch, John. Referred to: 30n
— Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons, 1869.
note: the third Appendix (referred to at 503n) is entitled “Sir William Hamilton on Hume, Leibnitz and Aristotle.”
referred to: cvii-cviii, 503n
Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro).Aeneid, in Works. Trans. H. Rushton Fairclough. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1916, I, 240-570; II, 2-364.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The quotation is in a quotation from Hamilton. Opera, ed. C. G. Heyne (London: Priestley, 1821), is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
17.26 “Rerumque . . . gaudet.”] Talia per clipeum Volcani, dona parentis, / miratur rerumque . . . gaudet, / attollens umero famamque et fata nepotum. (II, 110; VIII, 729-31)
Voltaire, François Marie Arouet.Micromégas, histoire philosophique, in Œuvres complètes. 66 vols. Paris: Renouard, 1817-25, XXXIX, 141-67.
note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 17-18
Wallis, John.Institutio Logicae, Ad communes usus accommodata. 3rd ed. Oxford: West, Crosley, Clements, and Peisley, 1702.
note: a copy of this ed., autographed “J. Mill” on the title-page, is in the London Library, presumably part of JSM’s donation of his father’s books.
415.2 “Contraria] [paragraph] Contraria (63)
415.2 quæ . . . distant] [in italics] (63)
415.2-3 calidum . . . nigrum] [in italics] (63)
415.3 contrariæ qualitatis] contrariæ qualitates (63)
Walpole, Horace. Referred to: 482
Ward, William George. “Mr. Mill’s Denial of Necessary Truth,” Dublin Review, XVII (Oct., 1871), 285-318.
quoted: 165n-6n, 267-8, 269, 269-70, 270, 271
referred to: cviii, 74n, 166n, 261n
165n.10 “an exception”] Yet here is a most pointed exception to the school’s general doctrine; and an exception which no phenomenist has made before. (309-10)
165n.14 position” . . . “is] position, his is (310)
165n.16 ne plus ultra] [not in italics] (310)
165n.23-4 “where the distinction lies between . . . intuitions”] There was an imperative claim on him, then, as he valued his philosophical character, to explain clearly and pointedly where the distinction lies between . . . intuitions. (310)
165n.28-9 “more favourably . . . trustworthiness”] To us it seems, that various classes of intuition are more favourably . . . trustworthiness, than is that class which Mr. Mill accepts. (310)
267.36 included] included (288)
268.3 triangularity . . . then] triangularity,—and if (as we established in our last number) the avouchment of my faculties corresponds infallibly with objective truth,—then (289)
268.6-7 “the . . . truth;”] All these are obvious and undeniable consequences of the fundamental proposition, that, by my very conception of a trilateral figure, I know its triangularity: and to admit therefore this fundamental proposition, is to admit that the . . . truth. (289)
269.6 “a] If, through my constant experience of triangular trilaterals, I am under a practical necessity of fancying that in every possible region of existence all trilaterals are triangular—much more, through my constant experience of uniformity in phenomenal succession, must I be under a (290)
269.29 “in] Mr. Mill’s whole reasoning turns on the phrase, “necessity of thought”; and yet he has used that phrase in (292)
269.29-34 A necessity of thought may . . . mean a . . . judgment. But . . . mean a . . . judgment.] A “necessity of thought” may . . . mean, “a . . . judgment.” But . . . mean, “a . . . judgment.” (292)
269.35 “that] Now we heartily agree with Mr. Mill, that (292)
269.35 necessity of thought] “necessity of thought” (292)
270.1 necessity of thought] “necessity of thought” (292)
270.2 circumstance. Yet] circumstance: yet (292)
270.3 necessity of thought] “necessity of thought” (292)
270.4 necessity of thought] “necessity of thought” (292)
270.20-1 “mere . . . account for] Most certainly therefore mere . . . account—as Mr. Mill thinks it does—for (299)
270.29-30 Omnipotence can] Omnipotence (if it exist)* [footnote:] *We must again remind our readers that, in this early stage of our argument with Mr. Mill, we are not at liberty to assume the existence of an Omnipotent Being. [text:] can (299)
270.31-2 habitually and unexceptionably] habitually and unexceptionably (299)
270.37 “holding] He [JSM] tells me, e.g., to fancy myself holding (298)
271.20-1 “power . . . experience” . . . “one . . . of geometrical forms,”] [paragraph] Then (2.) [Ward’s second criticism of a passage which he has quoted from JSM’s Logic]—whereas Mr. Mill purports to account for man’s power . . . experience—he based that power on “one . . . of geometrical forms.” (302) [the quoted passage is from JSM’s Logic]
— On Nature and Grace. A Theological Treatise. Book I: Philosophical Introduction. London: Burns and Lambert, 1860.
note: only Bk. I was published. JSM’s reference might be taken as general, but Chap. i, §1 is specially relevant (JSM’s views are discussed, 25-9).
referred to: 164n-5n
Washington, George. Referred to: 100
Weber, Ernst Heinrich. “Der Tastsinn und das Gemeingefühl,” in Rudolph Wagner, Handwörterbuch der Physiologie mit Rücksicht auf Physiologische Pathologie. 4 vols. Braunschweig: Bieweg, 1842-53, III, 481-588.
note: the reference is in a quotation from Mahaffy, who takes his reference from Abbott (who does not give a precise reference).
referred to: 240
Whately, Richard. Referred to: 497, 497n-8n
— Elements of Logic. Comprising the substance of the article in the Encylopædia Metropolitana: with additions, &c. London: Mawman, 1826.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. Concerning the references at 316n, it may be noted that against the relevant passage (Whately, 56n) JSM has written in the margin “[An] important truth [n]ot sufficiently [e]xplained & [d]eveloped.” Against the passage referred to at 354 JSM has pencilled lines in the margin. The quotation is not necessarily from Whately, but the related reference justifies its treatment as such.
referred to: 316n, 348, 349, 350, 352, 354, 359, 362, 426
410.7 D,”] D; but A is not B, therefore C is D. (113)
Whewell, William. Referred to: 143, 486
— An Elementary Treatise on Mechanics. Vol. I. Cambridge: Deighton: London: Whittaker, 1819.
note: no further volumes were published, though the volume was expanded and revised in later eds.
referred to: 496n
— History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Time. 3rd ed. 3 vols. London: Parker and Son, 1857.
note: formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College.
referred to: 68
— History of Scientific Ideas: being the First Part of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. 3rd ed. 2 vols. London: Parker and Son, 1858.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. This is the 3rd ed. of the Second Part of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (i.e., not the 3rd ed. of the History of Scientific Ideas); cf. Whewell’s Novum Organon Renovatum, which is the 3rd ed. of the First Part of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.
referred to: 68
— Novum Organon Renovatum: being the Second Part of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. 3rd ed. London: Parker and Son, 1858.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. This is the 3rd ed. of the Second Part of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (i.e., not the 3rd ed. of the Novum Organon Renovatum); cf. Whewell’s History of Scientific Ideas, which is the 3rd ed. of the First Part of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.
referred to: 68
— On the Philosophy of Discovery, chapters historical and critical; including the completion of the third edition of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. London: Parker and Son, 1860.
note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. Much of this work is an enlargement of Bk. XII (“Review of Opinions on the Nature of Knowledge, and the Means of Seeking it”) of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. Chap. xxii, “Mr. Mill’s Logic,” is a slightly modified version of Whewell’s Of Induction, with especial reference to Mr. J. Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (London: Parker, 1849).
referred to: 68
— Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics as a Part of a Liberal Education. Cambridge: Deighton, 1835.
referred to: 477
— “To the Editor of the Edinburgh Review,” Edinburgh Review, LXIII (April, 1836), 270-2.
note: this is a criticism of Hamilton’s “On the Study of Mathematics” (q.v.), which prompted Hamilton’s “Notes to the Above Letter” (q.v.); all three reprinted in Hamilton’s Discussions at 263-325, 326-8, 329-40.
referred to: 477
note: the reference derives from Hamilton. Mill, following Hamilton, uses the spelling Wolf.
referred to: 295
Wordsworth, Christopher.Memoirs of William Wordsworth. 2 vols. London: Moxon, 1851.
488.24 [paragraph] “Some] [no paragraph] Some
quoted: 488; see Wordsworth, Christopher.
Wundt, Wilhelm.Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung. Leipzig and Heidelberg: Winter’sche Verlagshandlung, 1862.
note: the reference derives from McCosh.
referred to: 247
Xenophon.Memorabilia, in Memorabilia and Œconomicus (Greek and English). Trans. E. C. Marchant. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1923, 2-358.
note: this ed. used for ease of reference. The reference is in a quotation from Hamilton.
referred to: 484
note: the references are in quotations, or derive, from Hamilton.
referred to: 424-6
[* ] Mahaffy, pp. xviii-xx. [The first square brackets are Mill’s. Mahaffy quotes from Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, 1st ed., pp. 113-17 (the same passage Mill quotes, pp. 216-19 above).]
[* ] The Senses and the Intellect, p. 203 (2nd ed.).
[† ] With regard to Mr. Abbott’s difficulties, the following is a specimen of them: “Let us suppose a blind man trying to get the notion of distance from the motion of his hand. He finds a certain sweep of the hand brings it into contact with a desk; the distance of which, therefore, is represented by that effort. But it requires a greater effort to reach the eyes or the nose; and distance being = locomotive effort, it is demonstrated that the nose extends beyond the desk. The top of the head must be conceived as more remote, and the back farthest of all.” [Sight and Touch, p. 70.] Mr. Abbott seems to suppose that a blind man’s permanent impression of the distance of objects from him, will be derived from his very first experiment; and denies him the common privilege belonging to all experience, of correcting and completing itself. If the nose is really nearer to his hand than the desk, will he not soon find a way of reaching the nearer object with less locomotive effort than the more distant? If it be said, that this can only be done by bending his arm, and that flexure of the arm is attended with more sense of effort than protension of it, the answer is that even if this were true, the effort is of a different kind; and the blind man would speedily distinguish between the two, and would learn that objects reached by his bended arm are nearer to his body, by all the other tests of proximity, than those which can only be reached with the arm extended. Dr. M‘Cosh falls into a fallacy of the same kind ([Examination,] p. 135.)
[* ] The writer in Blackwood thinks it absurd that the measure should “measure itself” ([Smith,] p. 32)—that muscular sensation, as a measure of distance, should be employed in measuring muscular sensation. But are not quantities usually measured by quantities of the same kind? A foot rule measures length by its own length. A bushel measures solid contents by its own contents. The tickings of a clock measure other successions by their own succession. A weight measures other weights by itself.
[† ] Ibid., pp. 26-7.
[* ] If distance and direction are explicable in the way I have pointed out, place and position follow by obvious consequence. If once it be admitted that impressions of touch can be cognised as at once simultaneous and separated by a series of muscular feelings, i.e. at once distant and simultaneous, and that this amounts to cognising them as in space; the position of these impressions among one another, which constitutes their place, will easily result from the different quantities of muscular sensation required for passing from one to the other, combined with the distinctive qualities of the muscular sensation dependent on what we call difference in the direction of the motion.
[† ] The Senses and the Intellect, 2nd ed., pp. 397-8.
[* ] M‘Cosh, [Examination,] p. 150.
[† ] Dr. M‘Cosh says (same page) “It is hard to believe that the instantaneous voluntary drawing back of a limb when wounded, and the shrinking of the frame when boiling liquid is poured down the throat, can proceed from an application of an observed law as to the seat of sensations.” The obvious solution of this difficulty is, that both the drawing back and the shrinking, when they take place in an extremely young infant, are purely automatic; a reflex action, produced, without the intervention of the will, by the irritation of the motor nerves: a solution quite conformable to physiology.
[‡ ] Ibid., p. 148. [McCosh is quoting Johannes Peter Müller, Elements of Physiology, trans. William Baly (London: Taylor and Walton, 1837), p. 695n.]
[* ] Ibid., p. 149. [Quoted from Müller, p. 697.]
[[*] ]McCosh, Examination, pp. 167-8, translating from Wilhelm Wundt, Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung (Leipzig and Heidelberg: Winter’sche Verlagshandlung, 1862), p. 60.
[[†] ]See Gabriel Gustav Valentin, “Ueber die subjectiven Gefühle von Personen, welche mit mangelhaften Extremitäten geboren sind,” Repertorium für Anatomie und Physiologie, I (1836-37), 328-37, esp. 330; McCosh (“Mill’s Reply,” pp. 351-2) takes the reference from an addition by William Baly to Müller’s text, p. 696.
[* ] [McCosh, “Mill’s Reply,” pp. 352-3, who takes the passage from Arthur Schopenhauer,] Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung [2 vols. (Leipzig; Brockhaus)], ed. 1844, Vol. II, p. 40. [Schopenhauer takes the case from A. Heuck, “Bemerkungen über ein vierzehnjähriges Mädchen ohne Extremitäten,” Neue Notizen aus dem Gebiete der Natur- und Heilkunde (ed. Ludwig Friedrich von Froriep and Robert Froriep), VII (July, 1838), cols. 1-5.
[[*] ]“Mr. Mill’s Denial of Necessary Truth,” pp. 288-9.
[[†] ]Cf. Alexander Bain, Logic, 2 pts. (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1870), Pt. II, pp. 168-70.
[* ] The belief, however, when grounded on the conception without a fresh appeal to experience—when got at, as Dr. Ward expresses it [p. 299], not by observation of external nature, but of our own mind—is only justified exactly so far as we are entitled to assume that the conception in our mind represents the facts of outward experience. Only if space itself is everywhere what we conceive it to be, can our conclusions from the conception be everywhere objectively true. The truths of geometry are valid wherever the constitution of space agrees with what it is within our means of observation. That space cannot anywhere be differently constituted, or that almighty power could not make a different constitution of it, we know not. This may serve as an answer to some other remarks of Dr. Ward (pp. 301-3), to which it would tax the reader’s patience too much to give a fuller reply.
[* ] [Ward,] p. 290.
[[*] ]See pp. 261n-2n above, and the section of Mill’s Logic there cited.
[† ] [McCosh,] Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill’s Philosophy, pp. 43-4.
[* ] [Ward,] p. 292.
[† ] Ibid., pp. 298-9.
[[*] ]Ibid., p. 298.
[* ] Ibid., p. 302. [The reference to Mill’s Logic is to Bk. II, Chap. v, §5, Collected Works, Vol. VII, p. 234.]
[[*] ]See System of Logic, Bk. II, Chap. vi, §2, Collected Works, Vol. VII, pp. 255-6.
[a-a][this fragmentary sentence, which may be cancelled by a vertical line, does not correspond to anything in the final text]
[b-b]67 There is, however,
[c-c]67 Sir W. Hamilton ascribed to
[e-e]67 The passages already quoted apply as much to attributes as to substances. “In saying that we know only the relative, I virtually assert that we know nothing absolute—nothing existing absolutely, that is, in and for itself, and without relation to us and our faculties.”†
[f-f]67 In the following passages he is speaking solely of attributes. “By
[g-g]67 relative.”* “We
[h-h]67 therefore, which Sir W. Hamilton recognises
[i-i]67 He affirms without reservation, that [presumably there was a further difference in this sentence between the draft and the final version]
[a-a]67 same regarded as
[b-b]67 Conformity to the standard of right has
[c-c]67 only be
[d-d]67 persons, though all
[f-f]67 : influences (temptations for example)
[g-g]67 upon another
[i-i]67 person. But
[j-j]67 there is an extreme limit to these gradations—the idea
[l-l]67 deflect in the minutest degree
[m-m]67 to be
[n-n]67 infinite, still appears
[o-o]67 the illustration nearest
[p-p]67 the discussion
[[*] ]Headed in Mill’s hand “p. 50”, i.e., of the 2nd ed.
[a-a]67 would be
[c-c]67 incapable of ever passing into relation. But
[f-f]67 relation whatever, except that of dependence,
[b-b]67 we are capable of thinking something
[c-c]67 Mr. Mansel may make his choice between the two opinions. I
[d-d]67 Space and in all Time
[e-e]67 must of course
[b-b]67 anything which, while it has never been presented in our experience, also contradictsour habitual associations:
[c-c]67 some possible
[e-e]67 incredibility, and
[f-f]67 explains, though it does not justify,
[g-g]67 endeavours to reduce
[h-h]67 [this sentence does not correspond to anything in the final text]
[[*] ]Headed in Mill’s hand “Note (a) continued.” In the printed version, Mill quotes part of the passage with which the fragment begins, but then departs totally from the wording of this draft.
[a-a]67 just what might have been expected, for I am far from agreeing with Platner that the notions of figure and distance come originally from sight.
[b-b]67 is not
[c-c]67 ; but, giving a prodigious number of simultaneous sensations in one glance, it greatly quickens all processes dependent on observation of the fact of simultaneousness. A
[d-d]67 by a more gradual
[[*] ]Headed in Mill’s hand “p. 560”, i.e., of the 2nd ed.
[a-a]67 been an invaluable protection against the mistakes of subsequent historians, and would have prodigiously abridged their labours