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Appendix C: The Spanish Question JULY 1837 - John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXXI - Miscellaneous Writings 
The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXXI - Miscellaneous Writings, ed. John M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989).
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The Spanish Question
London and Westminster Review, V & XXVII (July 1837), 165-94. Headed: Art. VIII. / Spain. By Henry David Inglis, Esq. [1795-1835], 2 vols. Second Edition. [London:] Whittaker & Co. [1837.] / Sketches in Spain. By Captain Samuel Edward Cook [1787-1856]. [London:] T. & W. Boone . / [Anon.,] Policy of England towards Spain. [London:] Ridgway . / [William Walton (1784-1857),] Reply to the Anglo-Christian Pamphlet, Entitled Policy of England towards Spain. [London:] Hatchard . / [John Richardson (1796-1852),] Movements of the British Legion [(1836), 2nd ed. London: Simpkin, Marshall;] Macrone [; Wilson, 1837]. / The Basque Provinces. By Edward Bell Stephens, 2 vols., unpublished [London: Whittaker, 1837]. / The Andalusian Sketch-Book. [Probably The Andalusian Annual, ed. Michael Burke Honan, 2nd ed.] London. Macrone, 1837. / Sketches of the War for Constitutional Liberty in Spain and Portugal; interspersed with Scenes and Occurrences Abroad and at Home. By Charles Shaw, Esq. [1795-1871], K.C.T.S., and Colonel Portuguese Service, late Brig.-Gen. in the Service of the Queen of Spain, 2 vols., with Portraits of Admiral Napier and General Evans. Colburn: London, 1837. / Shaw’s Memoirs, unpublished. [Issued with the previous work as Personal Memoirs and Correspondence of Colonel Charles Shaw, K.C.T.S., etc., of the Portuguese Service, and Late Brigadier-General, in the British Auxiliary Legion of Spain; comprising A Narrative of the War for Constitutional Liberty in Portugal and Spain, from its Commencement in 1831 to the Dissolution of the British Legion in 1837, 2 vols. (London: Colburn, 1837).] Signed: “T.E.” Listed in Mill’s bibliography as “Part of the article on Spanish affairs in the same number of the same review” as his review of Carlyle’s French Revolution
(MacMinn, p. 49).
buccaneers and slave-dealers were the first to discover that there was a geographical distribution of moralities as well as of animals; they found that common honesty, like its emblem, the common house-dog, degenerated sadly as it approached the line; that piracy and kidnapping flourished in the same temperature as beasts of prey and venomous reptiles. Their charts regulated their morals; every observation to determine their latitude was a lesson in ethics, and the sun’s altitude gave an accurate measure of the height to which it was lawful to extend their violence. Of late years moral geography has been permitted to fall a little into oblivion; the world even seemed disposed to believe that the essence of principle is its universality; that virtue and vice depend neither upon parallels nor meridians; and that Humboldt’s isothermal lines mark temperature only,1 and do not convey the slightest information respecting a nation’s capacity for justice and freedom. Thanks to those eminent philosophers, Mr. Maclean and Mr. Grove Price,2 this spreading delusion is on the point of being dispelled; the philosophical discoveries of the slavers and buccaneers will be worthily supported by our modern Conservatives, ever steady advocates of
These sages and their followers have established, that in all countries north of the fiftieth degree of northern latitude, Popery is an abomination, whose endurance calls loudly to heaven for vengeance, and municipal institutions nuisances that ought to be abated; but when we pass to the south of that mystic line, the horror of Popery changes into a profound respect for his Catholic Majesty, a sincere veneration for that ancient conservative institution, the Inquisition, and a burning zeal that would consign liberal gainsayers to an auto-da-fé.4 Some ascribe this apparent discrepancy to the delight of these gentlemen in abstractions; their zeal is for the church, any church, quocumque modo church; the church, which in their minds is a more abstract idea than even that of a lord mayor without a gold chain and fur robe (which was so puzzling to Martinus Scriblerus),5 seeing that it includes not the notions of religion, creed, or discipline. And this theory derives some confirmation from a recent version of some of these philosophers’ speeches into tolerable rhyme, and plainer reason than these gentlemen ordinarily use:
But this explanation, though it may show why Popery may be a blessing in Spain, and a curse in Ireland, throws no light on the second point, municipal institutions; it leaves us still to guess why west of us all local privileges and local self-government should be swept away, while south of us the fueros of the Biscayans, however useless to themselves or pernicious to the rest of Spain, must be supported even at the hazard of placing the Peninsula beyond the pale of civilization. Our first theory therefore claims the preference,—that Messrs. Maclean and Price (with their followers, the Inglises, Goulburns, Peels, Hardinges, and unchanged* Burdetts), have revived the neglected science of moral geography, to the great edification and advantage of the present and all future generations; that they have given to its principles a strength, a permanence, and an extension not contemplated by the original authors, and that they may therefore claim rather to be its founders than its revivers. Sumite superbiam quaesitam meritis.7
Whatever other reflections may be justly excited by the late debates on Spanish affairs,8 we cannot help congratulating our country on the extraordinary growth of the philanthropic virtues which was exhibited on the Tory benches, and the near prospect of the conversion in particular of some of our military senators to quakerism. The morality of warfare has been discussed with an ethical rigour, and at the same time a sentimental eloquence, which would not have disgraced the classic shades of the Academy. Hear how wisely and philosophically our military Plato, Sir Henry Hardinge, discusses this delicate point of morals:
There was another mode of viewing this subject—namely, as affecting the moral character of this country, which, in his opinion, was a matter of high consideration. It remained a matter of deep consideration for the inhabitants of this Christian country whether his Majesty’s Ministers and that House should allow men, the natives of this country, to become accustomed to shed the blood of their brother men in a quarrel in which they were not interested. It was a matter of deep consideration whether, by such proceedings as those he alluded to, they should train up our countrymen to scenes of bloodshed and murder, which had never been approached in any modern warfare.9
So many of our half-pay officers have exchanged general orders for holy orders that the church militant is no longer a questionable phrase among us, and this piece of sermonizing may probably be designed to announce the gallant officer as a candidate for the mitre. The late Archbishop of Cashel10 began life as a midshipman in the navy, at a time when Lord Gambier had not commenced his efforts to substitute psalms for oaths, and tracts for cards,11 and when the name of temperance societies was unknown to our sailors; yet in his instance the quarterdeck was found to supply as good a system of preparatory education as the universities, and the cockpit sent forth a prelate that would not have disgraced the cloister. Here assuredly is a precedent which will more than justify Sir Henry’s elevation; the camp is as good a school for clerical instruction as a man-of-war, and a dean has informed us, that
To our extract from this probationary sermon we must add the commentary of another eminent moralist, Lord Mahon, especially as he gives us history to aid philosophy, and illustrates “wise saws” by “modern instances”:13
In the debate last evening one principal point under discussion was how far historical precedent could be adduced to justify the present policy of Great Britain. Upon that point he believed scarcely any precedent had been adduced except from the dark ages of our history, when it was not unusual for men to engage in war in the service of foreign powers, without any regard to the interests of their sovereign or country in its issue. At that time soldiers of this character were termed mercenaries, a term which he would not apply to the British Legion in Spain, because he was aware that the spirit of that term had been misunderstood by many persons, and he did not at all mean to insinuate that the persons who formed part of that legion were actuated—as the expression was supposed to imply—by none but mercenary motives. So far from intending any imputation of this kind, he believed that the intentions of those individuals were honourable; and so believing, he would be the last person to cast a stigma upon them in their absence. But he did say this—that looking at the position in which Great Britain was placed, this legion stood in a situation in which British soldiers ought not to stand—a position for which he could only find a parallel in the mercenaries he had alluded to in the darker ages of our history. When we thus revived one of the features in our ancient and less civilized history, we could hardly be surprised to see the laws against witchcraft, and the old penal code, which were scarcely less barbarous, called also into existence. He hoped that in future the progress of our advancing civilization would be marked by humanity, and a respect for human life.14
The abstract moral question, how far the trade of a soldier is consistent with the duties of a man and a Christian, is here very unnecessarily mooted. We have no objection to anything which can possibly be said in denunciation of medicines, if we can first get rid of diseases. We are quite ready to join in the cry of “No prisons,” when the thieves shall all be converted to the faith of “No thieving;” but when the cry comes from the friends and partisans of the thieves, we like it not. War may be stigmatized universally, and we are quite ready to give our vote for its abolition in a universal congress of mankind: but while the enemies of freedom are allowed to levy their vassals, embattle their slaves, and organize their dupes, assuredly the friends of freedom have a right to employ their own thews and sinews to check the onward flow of barbarism and tyranny.15
But Lord Mahon asks for modern precedents; this worthy aspirant to the honours of the Historical Muse can find no parallel to the service of the British Legion, save in the darker periods of our history:—The reign of Queen Elizabeth is not wont to be accounted such, nor are Sir Philip Sidney and Sir Horatio Vere generally reckoned among “mercenaries” and “buccaneers.”16 There are, indeed, some more modern transactions which Lord Mahon may have had in his eye:—It is not very long since Indian savages were taken into British pay to butcher our brethren in America; and history of no very ancient date records, that the emissaries of an English king17 were seen in the soldier-market of every petty German despot, bargaining as coolly as carcase-butchers in a shambles, for Hessians, Hanoverians, Brunswickers, and Saxons, to crush men fighting for privileges dearer and more valuable than the Biscayan fueros, because they were the rights of mankind, and not those of a petty province. If General Evans18 be a mercenary for accepting pay from Queen Isabella, what name must be given to George III, paying blood-money and head-money to margraves and landgraves for the hire of their subjects? We do not like moral maxims which go just so far, and no farther, than suits the interest of the moralizer.
Mr. Walton puts the objection in a much more tangible shape, and with him we readily join issue:
Among men, acts must be estimated not merely by their moral turpitude, but by their effect on society, and what can be more generally mischievous, what better calculated to put everything under the yoke of violence, than to propagate opinions by the sword, and apply to politics, what formerly prevailed in religious matters, the fanatical bloody spirit of forcible proselytism? My gallant countryman knows by experience the miseries of war, and can be really think himself justified in inflicting them on the numerous Spaniards who happen to differ from him on points of internal Spanish policy? What would become of society, if every political enthusiast, not satisfied with oppressing our patience by tedious harangues, should force his foolish fancies on our acceptance by military violence?19
Against such doctrine as this we have not a word to say: whoever excites civil war, whoever rebels against an established government, unless he has so plainly the majority with him that he succeeds almost without a struggle, acts under a terrible responsibility. But we beg to inform Mr. Walton that the Legion went to assist not rebels, but an established government; not to excite but to suppress a civil war. Mr. Walton should preach to his friend Don Carlos. A sermon against thieving should not be addressed to the thief-catcher, but to the thief.*
The doctrine, that the soldiers and officers of the Legion fought in a quarrel in which they were not interested, and in the issue of which “the interests of their sovereign or country” were not involved, is false at both points. Without entering into the niceties of the case, there was not one among them who did not know that he was fighting for free institutions against despotism; for Reformers against Tories, at home and abroad. Such a quarrel is not one in which Englishmen or Irishmen are not “interested.” And as to the indifference of the Spanish contest to “the interests of their sovereign and country,” it was a contest in which both sovereign and country had found sufficient inducements either of interest, or of duty, for binding themselves by treaty to a direct and positive co-operation. It may be meant to assert, though the intention is disclaimed, that the officers and soldiers of the Legion sold their services for pay, without caring for the justice of the cause. Among so large a body this must no doubt be true of no inconsiderable proportion; but so it is of all military bodies; for instance, of those who have entered the British army as officers or soldiers at any period during the last hundred years. The Legion at least knew what they were hired to fight for; but those who enter the British army are hired (we say it not invidiously, but to express what no one will deny, that they enter it from the ordinary motives from which men engage in any other profession,) they are hired, we say, to fight, they know not for what; certainly, in any of our wars since Queen Anne’s time,20 for no good: perhaps to fight against, not for, the cause of free institutions. The good Major Cartwright21 laid down his commission rather than fight against the Americans; how few, in the British army, have shown similar virtue; yet how many, both in the American and in the French war, must have felt that the cause they were in arms against was that which ought to prevail! The Tory moralist, who deems these honourable men, and General Evans and his followers adventurers, must be a very pretty illustration of the doctrine of Helvetius, that our notions of virtue are corollaries from our notions of our own interests.22
But a more complicated question than the morality of the Legion’s conduct is the value of its services. There is no use in disguising our belief that the friends of liberty in Spain and England have been disappointed by the general results of the expedition, and that the successes of our countrymen have neither been so early nor so decisive as had been expected. It was clearly the knowledge of this feeling that animated the supporters of Sir Henry Hardinge’s motion.23 The time chosen for the debate was the moment when temporary failure was likely to produce temporary unpopularity. This point was eloquently urged by Mr. Ward:
He asked them, why was not the policy of the Government with regard to Spain made the subject of complaint during the present session till now? He asked in what material point the line of policy pursued in consequence of the quadruple alliance24 was changed, so as to cause the present motion? (Cheers.) There were precisely the same grounds for the motion. (Cheers.) They had been threatened with it during the whole of the recess—(cheers); they had heard nothing but denunciations of the policy of the Noble Lord (Palmerston) from every organ of the Conservatives. They had been told up to the first day of the session of the expensive mode of intervention, of the neglect of British interests, and of the incapacity of the Noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. What was the result of all this? It happened that three days before the meeting of Parliament intelligence was received of a victory gained by the combined forces of the Queen of Spain and the British Legion. And so great was the reaction which attended the receipt of this intelligence, and so great was the interest excited in the public mind by the gallantry of our fellow-countrymen in Spain, that the Right Hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth, feeling that the moment was very unpropitious for such a discussion, quelled some little symptoms of insubordination, and availed himself of the very first opportunity that the forms of the House allowed to express his admiration of the conduct and gallantry of the brave men who had successfully defended Bilbao.25 (Cheers.) The Hon. Member for Sandwich (Mr. Grove Price)26 and the Hon. and Learned Member for Oxford (Mr. Maclean), of whose devotion to the cause of absolutism there could not be the least doubt, submitted in silence to the course pursued by the Right Hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth. He would ask, what prevented the Hon. and Gallant Officer (Sir H. Hardinge) from bringing forward this motion on that occasion, and what encouraged him to do so now? (Loud cheers.) The simple fact was, that success no longer beamed so decisively on the cause of liberty in the Peninsula. (Great and continued cheering.) This was the first time that he had heard in the British House of Parliament that a fair ground for abandoning an ally was that he was unfortunate. (Loud cheers.) He had heard often the opposite argument used. He had heard the misfortunes of those with whom we were in alliance stated, and never unsuccessfully, as a plea for additional struggles and exertion on our part. (Cheers.) It was reserved for the Hon. and Gallant Officer (Sir H. Hardinge) to reverse this, and to make the want of success a plea for shamefully abandoning the engagements to which we were solemnly bound by treaty.27
But though success has nothing to do with the policy of the quadruple treaty, it is a very important element in the Spanish controversy; for if the British Legion be useless, if its presence in the Peninsula does not very materially promote the Queen’s cause, it is doing incalculable mischief to the cause it was embodied to serve. The Duke of Wellington’s reasoning on this head is conclusive, and his speech, when the question was deliberated in the Lords, points out errors of system, the more to be lamented as they cannot be denied.28
Military criticism by a person at a distance from the scene of operations is equally difficult and ungracious. Before questioning the prudence of the conduct of General Evans, or the wisdom of his operations, we must be acquainted with the circumstances of his position. According to his adversaries, the materials of the British Legion were the worst possible. Mr. Walton, and he is more temperate in his description than the majority of the Carlist writers, says, “that the privates were the lowest and vilest of our urban rabble, refined or still further debased (for I know not which term to choose) by a mixture of Irish peasants. Among them might be here and there scattered a disbanded soldier.”29 The soldiers were certainly undisciplined, and were therefore likely to evince little patience in suffering, and to lose subordination under the smart of disappointment. Did these raw recruits, on their landing, find comfortable quarters, proper rations, and regular pay? On the contrary, all parties confess that they had to endure more privations and misery than those which disorganised the veterans of Wellington in his retreat from Burgos. It is highly creditable to the perseverance and fortitude of General Evans, that under such circumstances he has been able to keep his men together as a military body at all; and in every examination of his conduct, this great difficulty must be allowed to have its full weight. It is also uncertain how far his actions have been controlled by Spanish orders, influenced by Spanish counsels, or misled by Spanish promises of co-operation. But, after having made every fair allowance for the difficulties of the position in which General Evans was placed, the disappointments he experienced, and the frequent failure of the promises on which he relied, we must reluctantly confess that his strategetic skill seems far inferior to his perseverance, fortitude, and spirit. The Duke of Wellington’s criticisms on the movements of the legion appear to be too well founded:
After a certain period,—he believed, as soon as the original money was expended,—the corps was sent down to join the other troops in the neighbourhood of Vittoria. They remained there during the winters of 1835 and 1836, struggling with every possible distress! but a crisis was approaching—it became necessary that Great Britain should take a more active part in the war—that something should be done to produce some effect in a certain place called the Stock Exchange. Accordingly this corps, towards the spring of the year, was brought to Santander and St. Sebastian, and employed in the relief of the blockade which had been maintained for some time by Guibelalde.30 It was then found absolutely necessary to raise this blockade, and the British squadron, under the command of a most active and able officer,31 for whom he (the Duke of Wellington) entertained the highest respect, employed their 68-pounders, and forced in the works of the Carlist line on 6th of May. What was the effect? The blockade was still maintained a little further off, out of the reach of the fire of the British fleet, and there it had remained up to the present time. Excepting this, he defied the noble lord32 to show any single advantage which had been gained of any description from that day to this. The whole distance that the blockade had been removed was one mile. General Evans might have left the Carlists in their original position without any inconvenience whatever being felt by the town, because he (the Duke of Wellington) happened to know that the communication by sea could not have been prevented, even if the whole British fleet had been blockading the places, instead of being stationed there to give facility to the communication. The whole inconvenience felt by the town from the position the Carlists had taken up was, neither more nor less than, that some ladies and gentlemen were prevented taking the waters. He would say further, that his firm belief was, that the connexion between the legion and the fleet had been injurious to the military affairs of the Queen of Spain. That was his decided opinion, from what he knew of the nature of the country, and more particularly from the position which was the strength of Don Carlos. There was one point which military men perfectly understood, and that was, that if great corps were to act together, there must be a communication between them. If there were no communication, then the attempt at co-operation would in all probability lead to such disasters as had occurred at Hernani; and it was to him most surprising that General Evans, who appeared an able man, and deserving of the confidence of his Majesty’s Government, and the Queen of Spain, with the experience he had had, of the difficulty of carrying on communications in that country, should not have felt the danger of his position, and placed himself in communication with the corps with which he was co-operating, instead of being at a distance from his Majesty’s fleet.33
Indeed the best tacticians disapprove of his entire plan of operations, both in conception and execution; they say, “that he had no business to go to Vittoria; being there, he had no business to come back; he had no business in Bilbao, which is a dangerous position for an army; he failed at Fontarabia in his first attack for want of coup d’oeil and promptness,” and his recent success scarcely atones for his error. He appears indeed to have made every attack, and fought every action, till within the last three months, without any object in view except the immediate battle. Hence all his proceedings are desultory, all his actions isolated, his victories unproductive of permanent result, and not unfrequently followed by rout or retreat. This defect appears especially conspicuous in his only positive disaster, at Hernani, which was principally occasioned by the General’s not rightly considering his position; he fought his way with great energy and determination to the heights overlooking Hernani, but when these were attained he seems to have regarded the future as a matter of little import. Major Richardson not unjustly remarks,
Surely the experience of the past, at that very same Hernani, ought to have satisfied the Lieutenant-General that an attempt would be made to turn his flanks and gain his rear the moment a forward movement was made upon the town. This is the Carlist system of warfare; and favoured as they are by the hilly and wooded character of the country, nothing is more easy of accomplishment. It was precisely in this manner they attempted and had very nearly succeeded in turning us during the reconnoissance upon Hernani in 1835.34
The circumstances of the battle have been stated with tolerable accuracy by Lord Alvanley:
On the 1st of March the general had under him a combined force of 13,000 men, besides the aid of 400 British marines and 20 guns. On the 15th they had taken the heights above Hernani: his position was on those heights. On his right his position was very strong, and on his left was the village of Astigarraga, which was not occupied. As he (Lord Alvanley) understood the attack upon Hernani, it was this. It was commenced about nine in the morning; the troops were very much fatigued by the operations of the two or three preceding days. About half past eleven a column of about 4,000 Carlists, who had advanced by forced marches to the action, attacked the rear of General Evans, by the bridge of Astigarraga, of which they took possession. The Carlist force marched steadily forward, and the consequence was that the army under General Evans retired before their pursuers in the greatest disorder. So little, however, were the Carlists aware of the retreat, that it was at first taken to be a ruse de guerre, and had they pursued the flying force with vigour they would have gained a greater victory. When the Carlists were upon the heights, the soldiers under the English general they distinctly saw, like an undisciplined mob, rushing onwards towards the outer works of St. Sebastian. It was but justice, however, to add, that from the general to the lowest officer, every effort was made by them to quell the panic which had seized the troops, but without effect—and every means they could devise was resorted to, in order to retrieve what had been thus just lost. Undoubtedly it might be asked where was the reserve which ought to have been kept? It appeared that no reserve had been made.35
The panic was the simple result of surprise; the Carlists appear to have pushed their battalions across the bridges of the Uramea almost without interruption, and nearly the first intimation of their presence was the impetuous and unexpected attempt to turn the extreme left, where General Chichester’s36 brigade was stationed. But the Carlist reinforcement did not arrive until nine o’clock, there was therefore sufficient time to secure the heights, which are strong and well wooded, by abattis and field-works. General Evans should have remembered that his was the accessary, not the principal army, and he should, therefore, have taken measures to secure and defend the advantages he had gained until he could communicate with the principal army (Espartero’s),37 and ascertained its true position. This communication might have been made in two or three days by sea, and in a less time by land, if General Evans had been sufficiently prudent to establish any secret channels of intelligence. The subsequent conduct of the legion has sufficiently retrieved its character from the imputation of cowardice, to which it was exposed by the panic at Hernani; but even yet we are unable to perceive in the General’s movements any proof of his having formed a fixed and comprehensive plan for his campaign.
Able strategists, acquainted with the country which is the seat of war, are of opinion that the true line of operations by General Evans would have been along the French frontier of St. Sebastian; establishing strong fortified points as he moved, until the communication with Pampeluna was secure. He would thus have cut off the Carlists from their French succours and resources; he would have been able to obtain from France supplies of provisions and the munitions of war for his own men; the enemy would have been forced to attack him in his chosen position, instead of his being compelled to attack them on the ground which they had previously selected as most favourable to their operations. To the employment of the greater part of the Queen’s forces in this quarter there is one apparent objection of some moment,—the road to Madrid would have been left open, and the Carlists would have had an opportunity of making a dash on the capital. But this might have been obviated by having one compact, well-equipped field corps, constantly concentrated near the Ebro, ready to move under a good commander, and meet the Carlists whenever they attempted to make a push in that direction.
But here another and rather a difficult question presents itself; have the Spaniards a good commander? Espartero certainly is not such, or he would never have attacked at Bilbao on the side he did; nor, having gained his battle there, would he have suffered the enemy to rally after their defeat, when a vigorous pursuit would have destroyed them as a military body. Narvaez shewed both talent and energy, but he is in disgrace;38 the rest are men incapable of acting without instruction, which they will not submit to receive. It is not necessary to attribute the failures of Cordova, Sarsfield, and others, to treachery; the experience of the Peninsular war has taught us that Spanish armies make a great figure on paper, and rarely anywhere else. When closely examined, their numbers begin to illustrate the theory of vanishing fractions; their equipments bring to mind the Irish metaphor of being “clothed with nakedness,” and their capacity of motion, described as that of the hare, scarcely equals the tortoise. Things have not altered for the better since the days of Sir John Moore,39 and Spanish emblazonment must be always taken with, what the heralds call, an abatement.
General Evans has now quitted the legion, and in a farewell address has given a summary of its history,40 to which we know of no parallel but that of the celebrated King of France, who,
The strictures of Richardson, Shaw, and Hall, on the conduct of the legion,42 are not half so severe as the implied censures of the commander himself; his enumeration of its services merely recites battles without an object, and victories without a result; the logical blunder of argument in a vicious circle, receives the stratagetic exemplication of movement in a vicious circle; nothing is proved by the one, nothing accomplished by the other. Carlos, we are told, has abandoned Biscay; the Queen’s troops are close upon his track; his ruin, nay, his capture, is certain. Two days elapse, and, lo, Carlos is in Catalonia, the cradle of fanaticism; the British Legion, without officers or organization; Espartero gone to look for the Carlists “round about Estella:” Oraa43 opening a passage for the factious from Barbastro, in obedience to his country’s proverb, “build a silver bridge for thine enemy;” and Baron de Meer taking care, if possible, not to hurt the cause to which he is openly opposed, and secretly attached.44 In fact, the Spanish army, like the British Horse-guards,45 is independent of the reforming government, and hence, every liberal movement is paralysed, and faction allowed to gather its chief strength from the culpable weakness and contemptible cowardice of its adversaries.
Into the disputes between General Evans and his officers we have no wish to enter: whether he has succumbed to the Spanish ministry, and sacrificed the claims of his followers to please the Court of Madrid; whether they have expected too much, and betrayed their disappointment by acts of insubordination, are questions it would not be fair to discuss on ex parte evidence, though there is sufficient variance in the charges made against the discipline of the General, for us to see that some of them, at least, have been coloured by passion and prejudice, and that the character of others might be materially altered by explanation. But this scarcely concerns the public, and has no connection whatever with the object of our article. That object requires that we should here take our leave of General Evans and the Legion, and pass to a subject of greater moment,—the conduct of our own Government with reference to the Spanish contest; the principles of foreign policy properly applicable to the case, and how far the Quadruple Treaty, and the measures which have been taken in execution of it, are in conformity to those sound principles.
An opinion has been advanced, and ably supported, by one of the most distinguished advocates of the popular cause in Parliament, Mr. Roebuck, which condemns altogether any interference of one country in the internal commotions of another; and holds, that England should meddle with other nations only when other nations meddle with her, by impeding her commerce, or plundering the property of her people.46
We cannot subscribe to this doctrine; nor can we help regretting that a man of so much eminence among that section of the popular party in England, with whom alone the friends of freedom throughout Europe can be expected to sympathize, should have published to all Europe an opinion so calculated to alienate that sympathy; or confirm the opinion already so deeply rooted of our selfishness as a nation, by seeming to shew that the only party among us who might have been deemed an exception to that selfishness, is not so; an opinion, moreover, so contrary to the spirit of the present times, which is not less than in the time of the Reformation, a spirit of mutual helpfulness, a sense of common interest, among persons of congenial opinions in all nations.
Nevertheless, all rational friends of popular institutions should be ready, whenever necessary, to express, in their most emphatic terms, their adherence to as much as is true of Mr. Roebuck’s proposition; namely, the condemnation of wars of propagandism. Self-defence justifies much: Revolutionary France, standing at bay against all the despots in Europe, had the amplest justification for invoking, in the name of universal liberty, the aid of every disturbed spirit in Europe, who might respond to the call. But if the despots would have let France alone, France would not have been justified in raising, merely for the promotion of free institutions, a war of opinion against the despots. The attempt to establish freedom by foreign bayonets is a solecism in terms. A government which requires the support of foreign armies cannot be a free government. If a government has not a majority of the people, or at least a majority of those among the people who care for politics, on its side; if those who will fight for it, are not a stronger party than those who will fight against it, then it can only have the name of a popular government; not being able to support itself by the majority, it must support itself by keeping down the majority, it must be a despotism in the name of freedom; like the Directorial Government of France, which decimated its representative bodies, and sent all opposition journalists to Cayenne, in defence of Liberty and the Revolution.47 There is a party of really sincere patriots on the continent of Europe, who look back to the Convention as their model,48 and avowedly seek to govern for the interest of the majority by the agency of a patriotic and energetic minority: but we have no faith in the government of a few, even when they speak in the name of the many, nor do we believe in the stability of representative institutions when the people, who are to be represented by them, do not care sufficiently about them to fight for them. Nobody will long enjoy freedom when it is necessary for another to assert it for him.
We hold it, therefore, as an inviolable principle that an enslaved people should be left to work out their own deliverance. But of this principle it is a necessary part, that if unaided, they shall also be unhindered. If free nations look on inactive, despots must do so too. Non-interference is not a principle at all unless it be adopted as a universal principle. If freedom cannot be established by foreign force, it does not, therefore, follow, that by foreign force it should be allowed to be crushed.
If it were possible, as it will be in time, that the powers of Europe should, by agreement among themselves, adopt a common rule for the regulation of wars of political opinion, as they have already adopted so many for the regulation of their private quarrels, it is easy to see what the purport of the agreement should be. When a struggle breaks out anywhere between the despotic and the democratic principles, the powers should never interfere singly; when they interfere at all, it should be jointly, as a general European police. When the two parties are so unequal in strength that one can easily prevail, and keep the other down, things should be allowed to take their course. If parties are nearly balanced, and general anarchy or protracted civil war, is likely to ensue, the powers should interfere collectively, and force the combatants to lay down their arms and come to a compromise, and should send their own troops against the party that refused to do it. This is no idle speculation: it has been twice done within ten years: once in Greece; and again, in Holland and Belgium. Much contemptuous sarcasm was expended some years ago upon the conference and its several hundred protocols.49 Doubtless these were much more ridiculous than as many pitched battles, but a trifle more humane. We regard those ridiculed protocols as constituting the most important step in European civilization, which has been taken for generations past. They were a sign that with the growth of humanity, and also the interests of commerce and the arts of peace, war, long the sport of despots, had become such an object of fear and detestation to the governments of Europe, both free and despotic, that they would not suffer it to exist in the smallest corner of Europe, if it could be prevented; rather should the jarring interests of constitutional and despotic monarchies, which, in other days, would have admitted of no compromise, be discussed quietly over a table, and adjust themselves by talk, as they best could, that so all might combine and send a kind of European Constabulary to Antwerp to part the combatants, and handcuff the more obstinate fellow of the two, who would not submit and have the cause tried by a sort of European Sessions of the Peace. Is this a small thing, does the reader think, in the history of European civilization? It is simply the first step towards getting rid of war; a beginning towards doing for public wars what was done for private wars when tribunals were established to adjudicate the quarrels from which those wars arose, and a police to execute the decision.
The case of Don Carlos and the Queen of Spain is parallel to that of Greece, and to that of Holland and Belgium; exactly the kind of dispute which might be, and ought to be, put down by European interference. Other prospect of its termination there seems none; neither party, according to all appearances, can hope to subdue the other; neither will hear of any proposition for a peaceful settlement; the exasperation must grow, must become more and more furious, until human beings are changed into savage beasts, all kinds of raging passions being kindled, not only between the actual combatants, but among all persons throughout Spain who find their means of subsistence rendered precarious, and their hopes of a settled government blighted by Carlists or traitors, or Moderates or Exaltados, or whatever persons they happen to consider responsible for the protraction of the struggle. If ever there was a call demanding a similar intervention to that which took place at Antwerp, this does. But intervention of the same sort, and by the same parties, there cannot now be.
For we have been speaking only of what would be desirable if all the powers of Europe could agree that no one of them should interfere singly; that the principle of not interfering, except by common consent, and the joint act of all Europe, should be adopted and enforced by all other nations, against any power which might choose to infringe it. But this principle (we need hardly say) has not been adopted. Russia has interfered in Poland, Austria (a still more unequivocal case) in Modena and the Papal dominions. In these circumstances, England and France had two courses open to them. One was to enforce non-interference, and go to war with Russia, unless she withdrew from Poland; with Austria, unless she withdrew from all parts of Italy, not included in her own possessions. This would have been in itself the most eligible course, most conformable to the principles of sound international moralists; but as it would have implied a European war and its attendant evils, evils far greater than any good which could have been done to Poland or Italy, we think this course was very rightly avoided. Another course remained for adoption: As Austria and Russia had been suffered to interfere, unopposed, in the internal affairs of independent states in the East of Europe, so might England and France assume the power of interfering, to the exclusion of the despotic powers in the West of Europe; and the right to do, singly, whatever might with propriety be done, in Spain and Portugal, by a Congress of all Europe. This course was adopted, and its result was the Quadruple Treaty. The Quadruple Alliance was formed when Don Carlos and Don Miguel were both in Portugal; it was an agreement between the guardians of the young Queens to save them from the machinations of their uncles, and was ratified by the Kings of France and England,50 on the very reasonable ground that the restoration of tranquillity to the Peninsula was necessary to preserve the peace of Europe. The design of the treaty is very clearly expressed in the preamble:
Her Majesty the Queen-Regent of Spain, during the minority of her daughter, Isabella II, Queen of Spain, and his Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent of the kingdoms of Portugal and the Algarves, in the name of Queen Donna Maria II, intimately convinced that the interest of the two Crowns imperiously demand the immediate and vigorous exertion of their mutual efforts for terminating hostilities, which heretofore had for their object the overthrow of her Portuguese Majesty’s throne, and now afford countenance and support to discontented subjects of the kingdom of Spain: their said Majesties, desirous at once to secure the means of restoring peace and internal prosperity to their dominions, and to establish on a reciprocal and solid basis the bonds of future amity between the two states, have agreed to unite their forces, for the purpose of obliging the Infante Don Carlos of Spain, and the Infante Don Miguel of Portugal, to evacuate the territories of the latter kingdom.51
The official answer of the British King, when appealed to, declares the design of the ratifying powers,
The two latter Sovereigns, taking into consideration the interest with which the safety of the Spanish Monarchy must always inspire them, and animated with the most ardent desire for the restoration of peace both to the Peninsula and Europe, and his Britannic Majesty taking into further consideration the special obligations which result from his ancient alliance with Portugal, have consented to act as parties to the said treaty.52
Before the ratification was completed, this treaty produced a decisive effect; Don Miguel abandoned Portugal, and Carlos, surrounded by Don Pedro’s troops, had no means of escape but by seeking refuge on board a British ship of war. He was received without any stipulations on either side, and he at least has had no reason to complain that his confidence was violated. There are circumstances to be explained respecting the residence of Don Carlos in London, which we fear would not bear a very rigid scrutiny. It is not in our power to remove the veil by which they are covered, but there are some grounds for suspicion that the refusal of Carlos to resign his pretensions on assurance of protection and a pension, was encouraged, if not dictated, by some members of an anti-national party in Great Britain. In the meantime the rebellion burst forth in the Northern provinces; it was instigated by the monks, it was supported by the organized bands of smugglers, it was recruited from the neighbouring districts, which abound with idle and discontented peasants, habituated to a wandering life from the continued disorganization of Spain. The folly of Castanon, who published a proclamation,53 abolishing the fueros without any instructions direct or implied from the government, gave the insurgents a pretext for their rebellion, and furnished them with a popular war-cry, a matter of vast importance in a civil war. Carlos secretly escaped from England, passed through France undetected, we are not quite sure that we can say, unsuspected, and appeared in the midst of the insurgents, where his presence gave unity to their desultory operations. This was an unforeseen case; it did not, therefore, come within the letter of the Quadruple Treaty, but it manifestly is included in its spirit. Spain and Portugal are both included in the words of the preamble; Carlos was assuredly more likely to disturb the tranquillity of the Peninsula in Biscay than Portugal, and it must be remembered that, but for the timely protection afforded him by a British vessel, his opportunities of doing mischief would have been brought to an abrupt termination. The additional articles were, in fact, nothing more than an adaptation of the original treaty to altered circumstances; and the new stipulations were strictly limited by the circumstances; no one article has been pointed out which does not of necessity arise from the new position taken by the Pretender. But though many of the conservative orators adhered to the policy of the Quadruple Treaty, which the Duke of Wellington himself had sanctioned during his late brief tenure of office, they insisted that the present ministers had gone beyond their engagements, by permitting the marines to serve on land, and by directing Lord John Hay to take every opportunity of co-operating with the Queen’s forces. If the British naval force did not co-operate with the royalists, what would be the meaning of his “Britannic Majesty acting as a party to the Quadruple Treaty?” The additional article binds us to aid the Queen with military stores and a naval force;54 but how is the naval force to be employed? A blockade without a declaration of war every publicist knows would be clearly illegal. Blockade is a belligerent right that can only be exercised by principals, the attempt to enforce it by auxiliaries is contrary to the law of nations and the law of England. As Carlos has no fleet, assistance by a naval force could not possibly mean that we should attack a non-existent navy; the limits of our obligations must consequently be measured by the mode in which a naval force is usually employed along a line of coast in co-operation with a land force. Now, in every such conjuncture recorded in English history, the employment of marine forces on shore went to a greater extent than the aid given to the Queen’s armies by Lord John Hay.*
The Quadruple Treaty was a well-aimed attempt to put down, in its early stages, a civil war, which threatened, if not so put down, to become that scourge to the Peninsula, and deformity in the sight of Europe, which, in spite of the interference, it has since become. The occasion is now more urgent, and the interference, which has hitherto taken place, not sufficient. What follows? That the Quadruple Treaty was wrong? No: but that something much more decisive, something going the full length of what was done between Holland and Belgium, would now be justifiable; and advisable, if it can be done consistently with the general peace of Europe.
We are ignorant whether such a joint interference, by France and England, as would enable them to put down the civil war, and constitute them judges of the concessions to be made to the insurgent provinces, would be consented to by France; or if consented to, would be possible without provoking a war with the other powers of Europe. That evil would far outweigh the good which, in this instance, would be obtained by hazarding it. We pretend not to decide the question, for we are in ignorance of some of the material circumstances; but we would impress, with all the energy in our power, upon those with whom the decision depends, that an interference, of the kind we have suggested, is the only satisfactory denoûement which seems possible to the present anarchy in the Peninsula, that it should be attempted at the very earliest moment at which it would be practicable, without a civil war: and that anything short of this, however required by the faith of treaties already concluded, is now of proved inefficacy, and is a mere paltering with the difficulties of the case.
Before we close this article, it is perhaps advisable to add a few remarks on the substantial merits of the quarrel to which the civil war owes its origin. For every part of the Spanish question has been made a subject of angry controversy; and most (though, to their credit be it said, not all) of the Tory writers55 and orators, have not been ashamed to contend, that the Spanish liberals are fighting, not for, but against, both liberty and legitimacy; trampling upon the one, as embodied in the fueros of the Basque provinces, and the other, as incarnated in the worthy author of the Durango decree.
The latter point at least is speedily disposed of. Carlos’s pretended right rests upon the Salic law, which had never the force of law in Spain. The Salic law was not the ancient rule of succession, it was first introduced by the Bourbon, Philip V, the great grandfather of Don Carlos. Females could always succeed in Castille, Leon, and Portugal; it was by a marriage with the heiress of Navarre that a King of France obtained a claim to that kingdom,56 and though females were excluded in Arragon, yet it was through a Princess57 that its inheritance passed to the Counts of Catalonia. It was by the right of female succession that the house of Austria reigned in Spain; it was by the same right that the Bourbons themselves occupied the throne. It formed a part of the Partidas,58 or system of constitutional law, which Philip swore to observe on his succession to the throne.
The Salic law could only be established in two ways, by the old forms of the constitution, or by the despotic will of the sovereign. If the advocates of Don Carlos take their stand on the former ground, the answer is, that the forms as well as the substance of the constitution were violated when Philip V established his law of agnation,59 and that, conscious of its invalidity, he did not register it in the form usual with similar acts; while again, if we pass over the Cortes of 178960 as secret and irregular, we have the Cortes of Cadiz in 1812,61 representing the nation and acting in the name of the King, which abolished the decree of Philip, restored the ancient law de Partidas, and re-established the right of female succession to the crown. Finally, the decree of Ferdinand, constituting his daughter his successor,62 was just as regularly sanctioned by a Cortes as Philip’s law of agnation. If, on the other hand, the Sovereign’s will be regarded as despotic in Spain, the question is at an end, for Carlos must confess that Ferdinand had a right to rule the succession as he liked; and this view seems to have been taken by the King’s confessor and his minister Calomarde,63 when, during his dangerous illness at La Granja in 1832, they seduced him to sign a new will, settling the crown on Don Carlos. Ferdinand’s recovery disconcerted their plan, but their effort plainly shows that the partisans of Don Carlos at that time felt that the Salic law was a very weak support to their favourite’s claims. If Carlos appeals to the constitution, the question is decided against him; the will of the Sovereign is against him; and what is of far more importance than either, a majority of the nation is against him.
Greatly as circumstances have changed since 1830, Inglis’s account of Spain in that year contains the most accurate information respecting the state of public opinion in the Peninsula that is yet available to English readers.* The only correction to be made in his estimate of parties is the addition of the Moderates to the Liberals, and the alienation from the Carlists of a portion of the Castilian peasantry. He is a less picturesque writer than Lord Carnarvon,64 but his weakness of colouring is more than compensated by his accuracy of outline; above all, he is impartial, for though a liberal in sentiment, he carried the fear of being warped by prejudice to such an excess, that he not unfrequently seems to have given the weight of his authority to the opposite side. Experience, however, has proved the truth of his statements respecting Spain and Ireland, the two unfortunate countries whose destinies have been the plague of parties and the bane of politicians. An author publicly praised by Lord Aberdeen65 must assuredly be received as a fair witness by the Conservatives, and his evidence is highly valuable on that part of the Spanish question connected with the province, which is the principal seat of war, the peculiar situation of Biscay, and the nature of the fueros, or privileges enjoyed by its inhabitants. Are the fueros valuable in themselves, or are they mere empty flatteries to national pride? Is their preservation consistent with the establishment of constitutional freedom throughout the Peninsula? Are they cherished by the Biscayans themselves? The latter point again resolves itself into the double enquiry, are the fueros popular with all the Biscayans, or only with a part? and what part?
We need not go very deep into history to discover the value of a name as the watchword of party in civil warfare; the possessive pronoun has cost the English nation too large a sum for any doubt to exist respecting its price; the phrase our colonies in America, and our kingdom of Ireland, repeated by every English peasant, as if the mystic pronoun conferred on him some unknown advantage of ownership, has cost us millions of debt, the total loss of one country, and not a little difficulty in the preservation of the other. Now, in some particulars, “our fueros” are just as worthless to the Biscayans, as “our colonies” were to the English peasants; the King of Spain, for instance, is only lord of Biscay, just as the Queen of England is only a Duchess in Lancashire and a Countess in Cheshire. Our palatine counties have suffered the nominal distinction to fall into oblivion, but the Biscayans attach some importance to a difference of title which flatters and fosters the feelings of independence. It was one of the errors of the constitutionalists to disregard these prejudices in favour of forms, childish perhaps, but not injurious, and in their love of conformity, to abolish those playthings which delight children of a larger growth, and serve to keep them from mischief. With the vulgar and the ignorant, exclusive possession of anything greatly enhances its imaginary worth; had the fueros been common to all the provinces of the Peninsula, they would lose the greater part of their fictitious value, and even now the gallant defence made by the citizens of Bilbao proves that, though they have not lost their hold over the minds of the peasants in the interior, they are more justly appreciated by the mercantile classes. But in the present state of the contest, the abolition of the Basque privileges can scarcely be considered as staked on the issue; it is rather desired to extend such of them as are advantageous to all the inhabitants of the Spanish Peninsula. This no doubt will be offensive to the pride of some Biscayans, for the same reason that Catholic Emancipation was odious to the Irish Orangemen; they will no longer be able to triumph in the degradation of their neighbours. From the earliest ages despots have found supporters by using the argument of the affectionate parent—“Take your physic, Tommy, and you shall have the dog to kick;” but liberals presume to think that Tommy might be cured in a better way.
No objection exists to the retention of any fueros which merely gratify hereditary pride; those that are really useful elements of government have been adopted in the Spanish Constitution, but there are some useless to the Biscayans themselves, but prejudicial to the rest of the community, which artful men have succeeded in blending with those that are innocent and advantageous. The provinces have the privilege of importing foreign goods, free of duty, but they are not permitted to transmit them to the rest of Spain; custom-houses are placed upon the frontiers of Castille; and the same system of prevention and of smuggling necessarily result, which are found on the Swiss and Belgian frontiers of France. Mr. Inglis records a circumstance which proves that the Basques are not the only persons interested in the maintenance of this anomaly:
I had been told that on entering Old Castille we should be subjected to a rigorous Custom-house search; but in Spain, such matters always depend upon circumstances. A Colonel in the Spanish service chanced to occupy a seat in the diligence; and no Custom-house officer in Spain dare to put a person holding a military commission to a moment’s inconvenience. The consequence was, that in place of being detained three hours upon the bridge, until every packet should be lowered and opened, the Colonel merely thrust his arm out of the window; and the Custom-house officers, seeing around his wrist the proofs of his military rank, doffed their caps, and stood back; and the diligence passed on.66
The demi-official pamphlet entitled The Policy of England towards Spain, declares that the question of the fueros “resolves itself into the highly unromantic one of a tariff.”67 But though unromantic, it is essentially connected with the commercial prosperity of the country; the anomalies of a double financial system have proved ruinous to the trade of the Basque as well as the Castilian provinces; they have rendered smuggling a regular hereditary profession; they have been the chief cause of the dilapidation of the public finances, and the low estimation of private commerce; but they have been profitable to corrupt officials, to a set of desperadoes long at enmity with law; in fine, to the greater part of those who form the strength of the army of Don Carlos. Their effect on the general prosperity of Biscay is very well described in the pamphlet to which we have alluded:
The Basque Provinces, in short, as a necessary consequence of their privileges, have long been treated, with respect to commerce, as a foreign nation by the rest of Spain. They were forbidden to trade with the Americans—Spanish colonial goods were not allowed to be imported direct to their ports—their vessels were looked upon as foreign, and the Basques, moreover, were placed upon the same footing as foreigners with respect to those productions of Spain which are absolutely necessary to them for their own consumption: while their own productions, being treated as foreign, were subject to enormous duties upon entering Castille.
The consequences of such a state of things may be easily conceived; they are the same as exist in some other countries at this moment. The sea-port towns and the manufacturers are hostile to a system which destroys foreign trade and excludes their productions from a profitable market, while the inland people and those who dwell upon the frontier are violent in support of the system, which necessarily creates the enormous smuggling trade by which they have enriched themselves.
There accordingly exists throughout the exempted provinces every variety of opinion respecting their privileges, some desiring to be altogether assimilated to the rest of Spain, others claiming to be put upon a commercial equality with the neighbouring provinces; while a third, and the most numerous party, not venturing to put forward their real motives against any change of a commercial system which is manifestly injurious to their country, clamour for the absolute maintenance of the privileges, and under the mask of patriotism advocate their right to fill their own pockets by smuggling.68
We should have the same controversy in kind, though not in degree, were our own government to equalize the spirit-duties in England and Ireland; and we saw some examples of it when free trade in silk was under discussion.69 The gains of contraband traffic are always sweeter than those of honest trade; the peasants along the frontiers of Castille have found smuggling lucrative, and they fight for a sovereign who promises to perpetuate it along with the other abuses of the old system; the citizens of Bilbao find the fueros ruinous to their commerce, and therefore they contend for a government that holds out some promise of reformation. This point is ably stated in the pamphlet from which we have quoted:
But if the Basques are fighting for their privileges, what is it that the town of Bilbao has been fighting against? Can we have a greater proof that it is fanaticism, and not fueros that maintains the cause of Don Carlos than the heroic conduct of Bilbao in its different sieges, though this once flourishing and most loyal town may be supposed to have as much interest as any other part of the country in the maintenance of Biscayan privileges? And yet Bilbao has resisted all the forces of Don Carlos, commanded by his best officers and aided by foreign engineers, being an open town without fortifications, and, as a military position, pronounced indefensible. It has held out contrary to all the rules of art, solely by the native valour and resolution of its inhabitants, who, wonderful to relate, have resolved rather to perish amidst the ruins of their houses than yield to the generous champion of their country’s privileges; and is not this single fact enough to sweep away all the nonsense which is talked about privileges and fueros?70
Before the present contest began, Bilbao contained citizens anxious for the regeneration of their country. Mr. Inglis declares,
I heard several of the most respectable inhabitants of Bilbao express openly much dissatisfaction at the political debasement of Spain, and breathe ardent wishes for the diffusion of intellectual and religious light; but they added, what my own knowledge has since fully confirmed, that I should not find in any other part of Spain the same enlightened views as I had found in Biscay.71
From the character of the Biscayan provinces, we naturally turn to the character of the new Spanish government. Is it such as to afford the lovers of freedom good and reasonable grounds for hope, that the success of the Christinos will lead to the permanent establishment of good institutions in the Peninsula? We cannot maintain the affirmative without some great and even disheartening qualifications. Isabella has shewn some of that jealousy towards free institutions which characterizes the policy of Louis Philippe; her Estatuto Real was little better than a mockery; her acceptance of the Constitution was more than reluctant.72 But the great consolation is, that the Queen and the Apostolicals have gone too far in hostility to admit of their differences being reconciled; her safety is so completely identified with the triumph of the constitutionalists, that we see no reason to fear her imitating the treachery of her late husband. Adolphe de Bourgoing, a steady partisan of Don Carlos, describes her as clever and ambitious,* and he mentions some anecdotes of her management of her husband which seem to justify his opinion:
Naturally diffident, Ferdinand VII feared that his Queen would not intermeddle in the affairs of the State. That young Princess did not care to show any desire of taking an active part in politics. A Neapolitan, and remarkable for her tact, she accustomed her husband, by the tenderness of her care, and the constancy of her caresses, to feel uneasy when absent from her side. She at first used to withdraw at the precise moment he received his Ministers, affecting great reserve and a perfect indifference to political affairs; but she took care that her apartment should be in the immediate vicinity of the Council Chamber. She, for a time, permitted the King to remain alone, but soon, complaining that her solitude was wearisome, and that she could not endure his absence, she declared that she could not be so long separated from him. Thenceforth she used to come into the council-chamber, pretending to say some tender things to him, as if she feared that he had been wearied by grave and tedious discussion; when she retired she left the door of his room open, and thus apparently apart, without being really absent, she took an active share in all the ministerial deliberations. Finally, she came and openly took her seat in the council, declaring that she could not endure separation from her well-beloved husband and king. From participating in the deliberations, she finally proceeded to directing them altogether, at least her voice was always potential and decisive.
Mr. Inglis testifies to the influence she thus acquired over the mind of Ferdinand; his affection even burst forth in “a right merry and conceited jest,” and as it is the first and last we have seen recorded of this monarch, we shall extract the anecdote:
I happened to be walking one day in the Balle de Alcala, when the royal carriage drove up to the door of the Cabinet of Natural History, and being close by, I stopped to see the King and Queen. The King stepped from the carriage first; he then lifted from the carriage a large poodle dog, and then the Queen followed, whom, contrary no doubt to royal etiquette, his Majesty did not hand, but lifted and placed on the pavement; and then turning to the crowd who surrounded the carriage, he said to them, “Pesa menos el matrimoni;” which means, matrimony is a lighter burden than the dog,—a very tolerable jeu d’esprit to have come from Ferdinand VII.73
From all that we have been able to learn, the personal character of the Queen does not seem to justify a very high degree of confidence in her sincerity or her firmness. Let us now look to those by whom she is surrounded. The most casual reader of the debates in the Cortes must feel convinced, that there is very little statesmanlike talent in the leading public men of Spain; too many of them remind us of Churchill’s censure of Mossop, they
Arguelles, Galliano, Mendizabel, and Valdez, have, however, shewn a fair share of skill in the business of politics;75 the last especially is an able financier; but still we cannot hide from ourselves, that the Liberals show a want of practical acquirements, which must long expose them to great inconvenience, and perhaps not unfrequently endanger their cause. But before giving full scope to censure, it is only fair to take into account the paucity of individuals, in the subordinate and working departments of the government, untainted by corrupt practices. A country to which we have referred more than once in the course of this article affords sad proof of the difficulties that beset the progress of reformation, when ancient and profitable abuses have made the whole body of inferior functionaries interested in the maintenance of corruption. It is now notorious that intrigues against Lord Grey’s government were formed every day in the Castle of Dublin, that underlings were combined to baffle the designs of their superiors, and that by their machinations Tory rule was perpetuated under a Reform ministry.76 Liberality in political opinion is apt to be connected with exalted views of human nature, and the zealous philanthropist rarely makes the abatements in his estimate of humanity, necessarily required by the effects of misrule and the habits produced by the practice of corruption. The Spanish patriots are not the only Liberals who have suffered from neglecting St. Paul’s advice, “Despise not the day of small things.”77
Our chief ground for hope, however, is in the Spanish people: Captain Cook, who had better opportunities of estimating the real nature of public opinion than most travellers have enjoyed, declares,
The Queen’s party comprises, almost without exception, every man of talent or information in Spain. Nearly all the nobility, all the military men of rank and station, and nearly all the others; every man and woman in the country who is at par, and all above it. In fact, almost every one who can read or write; no inconsiderable number even of the clergy and amongst the constituted bodies. In short, all the mind of Spain is arrayed in favour of the present government, not because it was the will or interest of the late King to change the succession, but because it is the real law of the country, and that it is a question of good or bad government. . . . So widely spread was the feeling in favour of the change of system (in 1833), that of a most extended acquaintance I had through the country in every station of life, from the highest downwards, of every profession and calling, I should be puzzled now to point out a single male or female who was a Carlist.78
We have a striking verification of this testimony from Don Carlos himself; he has found that Absolutism is no longer, even in Biscay, a good gathering cry, and he has attempted to revive his waning popularity by the promise of a Constitution!
We have no fear, therefore, of the success of the Carlists; our fear is of a prolonged civil war, growing disorganization in the country, and such a dispersion of all the elements of peaceful society as shall render a stable government for many years to come an impossility in the Peninsula. It is to prevent these evils, that we invoke the early interference of England and France, for a peaceful termination of the struggle.
General Shaw’s Memoirs have reached us as this article was going through the press. Restricted as we are in space and in time, it is impossible to bestow on them more than a few cursory observations. His letters, published as they were written, may be taken as the testimony of a witness favourable to General Evans; and their evidence fully confirms our opinion that though a gallant soldier, the commander of the British Legion is deficient in foresight, in energy, and in prudence; that, in short, he wants the qualities necessary to ensure a successful campaign—a far different thing from a successful battle. He left England without having appreciated the difficulties of the position he was to occupy. Like our Ministers in the late war, he seems to have placed implicit confidence in Spanish boasts; and if he escaped such a calamity as the retreat to Corunna, it must be attributed rather to the stupidity of the Carlists than to the merits of the Christinos or their auxiliaries. Accustomed to have “great means at their command,”79 engineering in a small way was not much to the taste of the British officers, and they neglected what Don Pedro80 used to call “substitutions,” which, however despicable in the eyes of a martinet, must ever be of importance in desultory warfare. Notwithstanding the “voluminous staff”81 appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, there was from the beginning a confusion and want of system which would have been ruinous, if the Legionaries had not proved themselves superior in character and conduct to the regular British troops in the retreat from Burgos. One instance of the dangerous unsteadiness at head-quarters must be noticed:
While at Velorado a circumstance occurred which gave me a great deal of uneasiness, and which was the cause, perhaps, more than any other circumstance, of interfering with discipline, because it hurt that respect for the “dignity of office,” without which no subordination can exist. On the 25th of November I got an official letter from the Adjutant-General, finishing, “Sergeant-Major Dwyer, 4th Regiment, having been promoted to the rank of acting Adjutant and Ensign in the 7th Regiment, you will please to order him into head-quarters, and to report himself at this office with as little delay as possible.” On getting this letter I instantly sent for Dwyer to my quarters, ordered him, to his astonishment, to cut off his stripes as sergeant-major, then took him by the hand and wished him joy, and regretted that I could not ask him to dine with me, as he must start for Briviesca immediately.—He was of course proud and gratified, and away he went. His situation in the 4th Regiment was immediately filled up; and, two days afterwards, he came into my quarters weeping, to say he was sent back to his regiment as a sergeant, and that he was ashamed to show his face among his old comrades after such a disgrace. He seemed, as far as I had been able to judge, a good soldier; and, to prove that I had nothing to do with this, I read to him his official appointment, and advised him to take his disappointment, as I had done about the generalship, and all would be right. But, no; I saw his spirit was broken.*
The best criticism on the proceedings of the Legion and its commander is a prophecy; it is contained in a letter from Colonel W. Napier, the fearless author of the History of the Peninsular War,82 addressed to General Shaw’s brother, and dated Bath, 28th September, 1835:
What you say of Evans’s situation does not surprise me. I have always looked to Spanish hospitals as the ultimate bivouac of his auxiliaries. While Evans remains in towns near the sea coast, and the enemy will face him in the field, I have little doubt that he will get the best of this squabble as soon as his men are disciplined. He is bold and prompt; though I do not much approve of his ensconcing himself in Bilbao, which I told him before he went, he would find a bad position. He should rather keep to St. Sebastian, and move to the French frontier, from whence he can, if he has money, get his supplies cheaply and securely, and yet operate upon the rear of the Carlists; for instance, I would rather have made a forced march from St. Sebastian by Mondragon upon Durango, and so have fallen from the high ground upon the rear of the Carlists, than have moved out of Bilbao to meet them from the low ground. I suppose, however, his men are still too much of a mob to try such a march. What he will do when he has to take the field permanently I cannot conceive.
Ten thousand men are an army; an army to move must have mules and convoys; will the Spaniards, who cannot pay their own men, pay his? Then will come the disputes and jealousies of his Spanish generals. Nous verrons!
I remain, dear Sir, etc.
We have no wish, even if we had time, to enter into all the details of mismanagement described by General Shaw; the besetting sin of the expedition was an obstinate adherence to British regulation, which the peculiar nature of the Spanish service rendered wholly inapplicable. Money, munitions of war, means of transport, were not to be had when the moment arrived that rendered them all necessary; while general orders, issued as if in mockery, prescribed the most minute regulations respecting food and sleep, when each man had nothing but his length of damp earth or handsomely cut stone for his bed, and the heartiest curses of the commissariat for his supper. In short, too many officers went out as if they were only going “to play at soldiery,” and when they discovered the difference between mimic display and stern realities, they were found wanting in the qualities of manly endurance which their position so peremptorily required.
[1 ]Friedrich Wilhelm Heinrich Alexander, Freiherr von Humboldt (1769-1859), devised the first chart indicating equal temperatures.
[2 ]See Donald Maclean (1800-74), Speech on the Affairs of Spain (18 Apr., 1837), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 37, cols. 1394-1411; and Samuel Grove Price (1793-1839), Speech on Spain (10 Mar., 1837), ibid., cols. 249-56.
[3 ]William Wordsworth (1770-1850), “Rob Roy’s Grave” (1807), in Poetical Works, 5 vols. (London: Longman, et al., 1827), Vol. III, p. 26 (ll. 37-40).
[4 ]The “Spanish Question” involved both Spain and Portugal. In the former, Ferdinand VII (1784-1833) had in 1830 revoked the Salic law (introduced in 1713 by Philip V [1683-1746]) of exclusive male succession to make his young daughter Isabella (1830-1904) queen, with his wife, Maria Christina de Bourbon (1806-78) as regent. This settlement was disputed by Ferdinand’s brother, Don Carlos Maria Isidro de Bourbon (1788-1855). His challenge failed, partly through the intervention of a British force, and a more democratic constitution was forced on Maria Christina in 1837.
[5 ]Alexander Pope (1688-1744), et al., Memoirs of the Extraordinary Life, Works, and Discoveries of Martinus Scriblerus (1741), in Works, ed. Joseph Warton, et al., 10 vols. (London: Priestley, 1822-25), Vol. VI, p. 111.
[6 ]Not identified; probably written by White for the occasion. The catch-phrase, “The church is in danger,” originated in a debate in the House of Commons in 1704; see Cobbett, Parliamentary History, Vol. VI, cols. 479-511.
[* ]An old joke slightly varied supplies a better epithet than that which has been applied to himself by the once popular baronet:
[The doggerel has not been located; for the claim, see Francis Burdett (1770-1844), Speech to a Deputation of the Electors of Westminster, The Times, 6 May, 1837, p. 6. The other M.P.s referred to are Henry David Inglis, Henry Goulburn (1784-1856), Robert Peel (1788-1850), and Henry Hardinge (1785-1856).]
[7 ]Horace (65-8 ), Odes, in Odes and Epodes (Latin and English), trans. C.E. Bennett (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 278 (III, xxx, 14-15).
[8 ]See PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 37, cols. 223-86 (10 Mar., 1837), cols. 1329-1460 (17 and 18 Apr., 1837); Vol. 38, cols. 1-170 (19 and 21 Apr., 1837).
[9 ]Hardinge’s speech (ibid., Vol. 37, cols. 1329-53; 17 Apr.) is reported in the Morning Chronicle, 18 Apr., p. 2, from which the quotation appears to be taken.
[10 ]Charles Brodrick (1761-1822).
[11 ]James Gambier (1756-1833), an admiral of the fleet with limited sea-faring experience, had tried to apply his strict Methodist views in the navy.
[12 ]Jonathan Swift, “The Grand Question Debated” (1732), in Works, ed. Walter Scott, 19 vols. (Edinburgh: Constable; London: White, et al., Dublin: Cumming, 1814), Vol. XV, p. 154.
[13 ]William Shakespeare, As You Like It, II, vii, 156; in The Riverside Shakespeare, p. 382.
[14 ]Philip Henry Stanhope (1805-75), Viscount Mahon, Speech on the Affairs of Spain (18 Apr., 1837), reported in the Morning Chronicle, 19 Apr., p. 3.
[15 ]The phrase “thews and sinews” appears to have originated with Walter Scott (1771-1832); see Rob Roy, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: Constable, 1818), Vol. I, p. 60 (Chap. iii).
[16 ]Elizabeth I (1533-1603), reigned 1558-1603; Philip Sidney (1554-86) and Horace Vere (1565-1635) were famed for their military valour.
[17 ]George III (1738-1820).
[18 ]George de Lacy Evans (1787-1890), leader of the British Legion in Spain, who was also M.P. for Westminster.
[19 ]Walton, A Reply, p. 148.
[* ]Nothing was more surprising in the late debate than the anxiety exhibited by some of the Conservative orators for the morals of the Legion! It was feared that they would be contaminated by the pernicious examples of Spanish cruelty daily before their eyes; their tender sympathies would be blunted, their generous hearts hardened, and all the noble feelings with which they were suddenly invested in one of Lord Francis Egerton’s fits of poetic enthusiasm, would have disappeared like Goethe’s spirit in his lordship’s translation of the Faust! [Faust: A Drama, by Goethe, and Schiller’s Song of the Bell, trans. Francis Leveson Gower (later Egerton; 1800-57) (London: Murray, 1823). Faust, by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), appeared in German in 1808 (Pt. I) and 1833 (Pt. 2).] We should like to know, from these soft-hearted moralists, when they first discovered that war was a trade not likely to foster the growth of humanity, and at what period the soldiers of the Legion, long described as the vilest outcasts, became objects of such virtuous care. We do not attempt to hide our detestation of the barbarities that have been perpetrated in the Spanish contest, but, as Lord Palmerston justly said, “Unfortunately, history told them that in all times, whether in peace or in war, the character of the Spanish nation was more cruel and bloodthirsty than that of any other nation in Europe. Let them look to their conquest of America—to all the wars that had taken place in Spain—from the war of Succession down even to 1815, and they would see that their conduct was stained by atrocities which inflicted a deeper disgrace on humanity than the conduct of any other nation on earth. One of the effects of the regeneration of Spain, through the force of constitutional government, was, that, by generating a public opinion they would improve the Spanish character, and put an end to atrocities like these.” [Temple, Speech on the Affairs of Spain (19 Apr., 1837), reported in the Morning Chronicle, 20 Apr., p. 2.] But the Conservatives may take comfort; the legionaries have not been brutalized: at Irun and Fontarabia they exhibited a degree of forbearance and moderation, which could scarcely have been expected after the publication of the Durango degree. [See Don Carlos, “Royal Decree” (20 June, 1824), The Times, 2 July, 1835, p. 6.]
[Standard, 28 Mar., 1837, p. 2; the concluding quotation is from Walter Scott, The Vision of Don Frederick: A Poem (Edinburgh: Ballantyne, 1811), p. 41 (Canto XLII, ll. 8-9).]
[20 ]Anne (1665-1714), reigned 1702-14.
[21 ]John Cartwright (1740-1824), the ultra-Radical.
[22 ]Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-71), De l’esprit (Paris: Durand, 1758), e.g., pp. 53-5.
[23 ]Hardinge, Motion on the Affairs of Spain (17 Apr., 1837), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 37, cols. 1352-3.
[24 ]See “Treaty between His Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, the King of the French, and the Duke of Braganza, Regent of Portugal,” PP, 1834, LI, 299-309.
[25 ]Peel, Speech on the Address in Answer to the King’s Speech (31 Jan., 1837), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 36, cols. 50-6.
[26 ]Samuel Grove Price (1793-1839).
[27 ]Henry George Ward (1797-1860), Speech on the Affairs of Spain (18 Apr., 1837), reported in the Morning Chronicle, 19 Apr., p. 3.
[28 ]Arthur Wellesley (1769-1852), Duke of Wellington, Speech on Spain (21 Apr., 1837), reported in the Morning Chronicle, 22 Apr., pp. 1-2.
[29 ]Walton, A Reply, p. 138.
[30 ]Bartolomé Guibelalde, “commandante general” of the Carlists 1836-38.
[31 ]Lord John Hay (1793-1851).
[32 ]William Lamb (1779-1848), Lord Melbourne.
[33 ]Wellesley, speech of 21 Apr., pp. 1-2.
[34 ]Richardson, Movements of the British Legion, pp. 312-13.
[35 ]William Arden (1789-1849), Lord Alvanley, Speech on Spain (21 Apr., 1837), reported in the Morning Chronicle, 22 Apr., p. 1.
[36 ]Lieutenant-General Charles Chichester (1795-1847).
[37 ]Baldomero Espartero (1792-1879), commander of the Spanish troops.
[38 ]Ramon Maria Narvaez (1800-68), in charge of the “Army of the Centre,” had been successful against the Carlists near Acros in November 1836, but when a brigade of his army defected to the revolutionary forces he was unable to capitalize on the victory; consequently he lost control of the army.
[39 ]The British General (1761-1809) famed for his campaign in the Peninsula during the Napoleonic wars.
[40 ]Reported in the Morning Chronicle, 17 June, 1837, p. 3.
[41 ]Cf. the version of the satire on Henri IV (1553-1610) in The Oxford Dictionary of Nursery Rhymes, ed. Iona and Peter Opie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 176.
[42 ]Richardson, Movements of the British Legion; Shaw, Personal Memoirs; Herbert Byng Hall (1805-83), Spain; and the Seat of War in Spain (London: Colburn, 1837).
[43 ]Marcelino Oráa y Lecumberri (1788-1851) was a general in Narvaez’ army. The invading army of Don Carlos crossed the river Arga and defeated Oraá’s forces at Barbastro on 1 June, 1837.
[44 ]Baron Ramon De Meer (b. 1787), Viceroy of Navarre and commander of the army of Catalonia.
[45 ]I.e., the British Army command.
[46 ]Roebuck, Speech on the Affairs of Spain (19 Apr., 1837), PD, 3rd ser., Vol. 38, cols. 18-23.
[47 ]Loi concernant les mesures de salut public prises relativement à la conspiration royale (19 fructidor, an V [5 Sept., 1797]), Bull, 142, No. 1400, Bulletin des lois de la république française, 2nd ser., Vol. IV, pp. 7-10; and Loi qui ordonne la déportation des journalistes royaux (22 fructidor, an V [8 Sept., 1797]), Bull. 143, No. 1405, ibid., pp. 12-14.
[48 ]I.e., the French National Convention, elected by a wide suffrage, which sat from 20 Sept., 1792, until 26 Oct., 1795, governing through its committees.
[49 ]See Protocols of the Conferences [of 4 Nov., 1830, and 1 Oct., 1832] Held at London, between the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, PP, 1833, XLII, 1-551. The earlier agreements were, as regards Greece, the Anglo-Russian protocol of 4 Apr., 1826, and the subsequent Treaty of London, 6 July, 1827, which France also signed; and, as regards Belgium, the agreement amongst England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, at the London Conference of December 1830, with the subsequent protocol of 20 Jan., 1831, and the treaty of 5 Nov., 1831.
[50 ]Louis Philippe (1773-1850) and William IV (1765-1837).
[51 ]Cf. the wording in “Treaty between His Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, the King of the French, and the Duke of Braganza, Regent of Portugal,” PP, 1834, LI, 300.
[52 ]Ibid., pp. 300-2.
[53 ]General Federico Castanon y Lorenzana (1770-1836); his proclamation is in Carmelo de Echegaray, Compendio de las instituciones forales de Guipúzcoa (San Sebastian: Disputación de Guipúzcoa, 1925), pp. 292-3.
[54 ]See Art. III of “Treaty between His Majesty,” pp. 304-6.
[* ]The example of the French Government has indeed been quoted [by Hardinge, speech of 17 Apr., 1837, col. 1349; and by Maclean, speech of 18 Apr., 1837, cols. 1399-1400, and 1408] in condemnation of the conduct pursued by the British ministry; undoubtedly Louis Philippe has taken a very different view from our ministers, of the obligations of the Quadruple Treaty; but M. Thiers has concentrated into a brief space all that need be said to characterize the spirit in which their obligations have been interpreted, and fulfilled by a man who can endure anything rather than institutions arising from popular movements, although to them he owes his throne. “Look at the Treaty,” said M. Thiers; “Portugal gave an army, England a naval force, and France gave nothing but promises. These promises evidently meant succour. If they were given and meant succour, then to refuse it was to break the Treaty. If the promises were given and meant nothing, then the French Government has meanly sought to dupe England and Europe.” [Louis Adolphe Thiers (1797-1866), Speech in the Chamber of Deputies (14 Jan., 1837), reported in the Morning Chronicle, 17 Jan., p. 2.]
[55 ]See, e.g., Archibald Alison (1792-1867), “The Spanish Contest,” Blackwood’s Magazine, XLI (May 1837), 573-99, esp. 577.
[56 ]Jeanne of France and Navarre (1273-1305) and Philip IV (1268-1314).
[57 ]Petronilla (1137-64) married Raymond Berenger IV, Count of Barcelona, who ruled Catalonia.
[58 ]Las siete partidas del rey Alfonso, 3 vols. (Madrid: La imprenta real, 1807), Vol. II, pp. 132-3 (Part II, Title xv, Law 2).
[59 ]Auto-acordado of May 1713.
[60 ]See Pragmatica-Sancion en Fuerza de Ley Decretada por el Señor Rey Don Carlos a peticion de las cortes del año de 1789, y Mandada publicar por S.M. Peinante para la Observancia Perpetua de la Ley Segunda, Título quince, partida segunda, que establece la sucesion regular en la corona de España (Madrid: Imprenta real, 1830). In it Charles IV overturned the Salic law of Philip V.
[61 ]See Constitución política de la monarquía Española. Promulgada en Cadiz á 19 de marzo de 1812 (Cadiz: Imprenta real, 1812), Title IV, c. II, Art. 177.
[62 ]See Pragmatica, n 60 above.
[63 ]Francisco Tadeo Calomarde (1773-1842).
[* ]A new edition of this interesting work has just been published, with an additional chapter on the recent changes in Spain, which is both an accurate and impartial resumé of recent events in Spanish history. [“Introduction,” Vol. I, pp. xiii-xliv.] We have learned with pleasure that the travels in the footsteps of Don Quixote, prepared for the press by the author a little before his lamented decease, will be published in the course of the year. From the specimens that appeared in one of the Magazines, we doubt not that this will be joyous news to the admirers of the hero of Cervantes. [For Inglis’ travels in the path of the hero of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra’s The History and Adventures of the Renowned Don Quixote, see “Recent Rambles in the Footsteps of Don Quixote,” Englishman’s Magazine, I (Apr., May, June, and Aug., 1831), 84-90, 208-16, 328-35, and 592-601; republished as Rambles in the Footsteps of Don Quixote (London: Whittaker, 1837).]
[64 ]Henry John George Herbert (1800-49), Earl of Carnarvon, Portugal and Gallicia, with a Review of the Social and Political State of the Basque Provinces: and a Few Remarks on Recent Events in Spain, 2 vols. (London: Murray, 1836).
[65 ]The praise of Inglis by George Hamilton Gordon (1784-1860), Lord Aberdeen, minister under Wellington and Peel, has not been located.
[66 ]Inglis, Spain, Vol. I, p. 45.
[67 ]Anon., The Policy of England towards Spain, p. 24.
[68 ]Ibid., pp. 22-3.
[69 ]See PD, new ser., Vol. 14, cols. 733-859 (23-24 Feb., 1826).
[70 ]Anon., The Policy of England towards Spain, pp. 26-7.
[71 ]Inglis, Spain, Vol. I, p. 20.
[72 ]Estatuto real para la convocación de las Cortes Generales del Reino (10 Apr., 1834) (Madrid: De Burgos, 1834); Constitución de la monarquía española (8 Jan., 1837) (Madrid: n.p., 1837).
[* ][Adolphe de Bourgoing,] L’Espagne: souvenirs de 1823 et 1833 [(Paris: Dufart, 1834), pp. 299-300].
[73 ]Inglis, Spain, Vol. I, p. 97.
[74 ]Cf. Charles Churchill (1731-64), The Rosciad (London: Flexney, 1761), pp. 20-1 (ll. 521-2), attacking the actor, Henry Mossop (1729-73).
[75 ]Liberal politicians, exiled after their share in the government of 1820-23, who returned after the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833: Agustin Argüelles (1776-1844), António Alcala Galiano (1789-1865), Juan Alvarez Mendizabel (1790-1853), and José Lúcio Travassos Valdez (1787-1862).
[76 ]The ministry of Charles Grey (1764-1845), formed 16 Nov., 1830, broke up in 9 July, 1834, because of difficulties over Ireland: Dublin Castle was the government centre in Ireland.
[77 ]Not St. Paul, but Zechariah, 4:10.
[78 ]Cook, Sketches in Spain, Vol. I, pp. 330-1.
[79 ]Shaw, Personal Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 451.
[80 ]I.e., Pedro IV of Portugal.
[81 ]Shaw, Personal Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 452.
[* ][Ibid., pp. 456n-7n.] Dwyer afterwards deserted near to Vittoria, taking with him eleven of the Grenadiers of the 4th regiment fully equipped and armed, and became an officer of Don Carlos, and was very active and successful in getting more of the Legion to follow him.
[82 ]William Francis Patrick Napier (1785-1860), History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, 6 vols. (London: Murray, 1828-40).
[83 ]Letter to T. George Shaw (28 Sept., 1835), in Shaw, Personal Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 460.