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Subject Area: Political Theory
Subject Area: War and Peace
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER. - George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, vol. III (1775-1776) [1889]

Edition used:

The Writings of George Washington, collected and edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1889). Vol. III (1775-1776).

Part of: The Writings of George Washington, 14 vols.

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TO MAJOR-GENERAL SCHUYLER.

Camp atCambridge, 28 July, 1775.

Dear Sir,

I wrote you yesterday by way of New York, and in two hours afterwards was favored with yours of the 15th and 18th instant, with their respective enclosures. I was extremely glad to find your first apprehensions of an incursion by the Indians in some degree removed by the later advices. At the same time, I think it is evident from the spirit and tenor of Colonel Johnson’s letter, that no art or influence will be left untried by him to engage them in such an enterprise. Should he once prevail upon them to dip their hands in blood, mutual hostilities will most probably ensue, and they may be led to take a more decisive part. All accounts I think agree, that the Canadians are very averse to engage in this unnatural contest; but I am persuaded you will not abate in the least your vigilance to expedite every movement in that quarter, notwithstanding their present pacific appearances.1

I am much easier with respect to the public interest since your arrival at Ticonderoga, as I am persuaded those abilities and that zeal for the common welfare, which have led your country to repose such confidence in you, will be fully exerted. From my own experience I can easily judge of your difficulties to introduce order and discipline into troops, who have from their infancy imbibed ideas of the most contrary kind. It would be far beyond the compass of a letter, for me to describe the situation of things here on my arrival. Perhaps you will only be able to judge of it from my assuring you, that mine must be a portrait at full length of what you have had a miniature. Confusion and disorder reigned in every department, which, in a little time, must have ended either in the separation of the army, or fatal contests with one another. The better genius of America has prevailed, and most happily the ministerial troops have not availed themselves of their advantages, till I trust the opportunity is in a great measure past over. The arrangement of the general officers in Massachusetts and Connecticut has been very unpopular, indeed I may say injudicious. It is returned to the Congress for further consideration, and has much retarded my plan of discipline. However, we mend every day, and I flatter myself that in a little time we shall work up these raw materials into a good manufacture. I must recommend to you, what I endeavor to practise myself, patience and perseverance. As to your operations, my dear Sir, I can suggest nothing, which your own good judgment will not either anticipate, or control, from your immediate view of things, and the instructions of the Continental Congress.1

The express from hence to England, with the account of the commencement of hostilities at Lexington, has returned. It was far from making the impression generally expected here. Stocks fell but one and a half per cent. General Gage’s account had not arrived, and the ministry affected to treat it as a fiction. Parliament had been prorogued two days, but it was reported that it would be immediately recalled. Our enemy continues strongly posted about a mile from us, both at Bunker’s Hill and Roxbury, but we are not able to get any information of their future intentions. Part of the riflemen are come in, and the rest daily expected.

I did not expect your returns would be very complete at first; but I must beg your attention to reforming them as soon as possible; and I beg leave to add, that I would have you scrutinize with exactness into the application of provisions and stores. I have the utmost reason to suspect irregularities and impositions here. You will be fortunate if the contagion does not reach you. General Lee has removed about four miles from me, but I will take the first opportunity to make your kind wishes known to him. Col. R [eed] and Major M [ifflin] join me in the best wishes for your health and success. I am, &c.1

[1 ]“One striking circumstance upon the first view of it [Lee’s letter] is that the rebels are more alarmed at the report of engaging the Indians than at any other measure. And I humbly think this letter alone shows the expediency of diligently preparing and employing that engine.”—Burgoyne to Lord North, in Fonblanque’s Political and Military Episodes, p. 178.

“The steps which you say the rebels have taken for calling in the assistance of the Indians, leave no room to hesitate upon the propriety of our pursuing the same measure. For this purpose I inclose to you a letter to Colonel Johnson, containing His Majesty’s commands for engaging a body of Indians.”—Lord Dartmouth to General Gage, August, 1775. The letter referred to is probably that printed in Documents relating to the Colonial History of New York, viii., 596. A journal of Johnson’s transactions with the Indians from May to November, 1775, is printed in the same collection, p. 658.

[1 ]“The unhappy controversy which has subsisted between the officers at Ticonderoga relative to the command, has, I am informed, thrown every thing into vast confusion: troops have been dismissed, others refused to serve, if this or that man commands.; the sloop is without either captain or pilot, both of which are dismissed or come away. . . . A very considerable waste or embezzlement [of provisions] has occurred.”—Schuyler to the President of Congress, 11 July, 1775. “Unfortunately not one earthly thing has been done to enable me to move hence. I have neither boats sufficient, nor any materials prepared for building them. The stores I ordered from New York are not yet arrived: I have therefore not a nail, no pitch, no oakum, and want a variety of articles indispensably necessary . . . An almost equal scarcity of ammunition subsists, no powder having yet come to hand; not a gun carriage for the few proper guns we have, and as yet very little provision; two hundred troops less than by my last return, these badly, very badly, armed indeed, and one poor armorer to repair their guns.”—Schuyler to Congress, 21 July, 1775.

[1 ]Gage was at this time considering the expediency of removing his force to New York, regarding Boston as “the most disadvantageous place for all operations, particularly when there is no diversion of the rebel forces, but all are collected into one point. Was this army in New York, that Province might, to all appearance be more easily reduced, and the friends of government be able to raise forces to join the troops.”—Gage to Earl of Dartmouth, 24 July, 1775.

So the ministry were beginning to look to New York as the proper center for operations, not only for military reasons, but also to recover the attachment and fidelity of that province.—Earl of Dartmouth to Governor Tryon, 1 July, 1775, and to Gen. Gage, 2 August, 1775. Washington suspected such a movement was on foot as early as August 10th, and warned the New York Congress.