The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice.
• Book V.: Of Legislative and Executive Power
• Chap. I.: Introduction
• Chap. II.: Of Education, the Education of a Prince.
• Chap. III.: Private Life of a Prince.
• Chap. IV.: Of a Virtuous Despotism.
• Chap. V.: Of Courts and Ministers.
• Chap. VI.: Of Subjects.
• Chap. VII.: Of Elective Monarchy.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Limited Monarchy.
• Chap. IX.: Of a President With Regal Powers.
• Chap. X.: Of Hereditary Distinction.
• Chap. XI.: Moral Effects of Aristocracy.
• Chap. XII.: Of Titles.
• Chap. XIII.: Of the Aristocratical Character.
• Chap. XIV.: General Features of Democracy.
• Chap. XV.: Of Political Imposture.
• Chap. XVI.: Of the Causes of War.
• Chap. XVII.: Of the Object of War.
• Chap. XVIII.: Of the Conduct of War.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Military Establishments and Treaties.
• Chap. XX.: Of Democracy As Connected With the Transactions of War.
• Chap. XXI.: Of the Composition of Government
• Chap. XXII.: Of the Future History of Political Societies
• Chap. XXIII.: Of National Assemblies
• Chap. XXIV.: Of the Dissolution of Government
• An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice
• Book VI.: Of Opinion Considered As a Subject of Political Institution.
• Chap. I: General Effects of the Political Superintendence of Opinion.
• Chap. II.: Of Religious Establishments
• Chap. III.: Of the Suppression of Erroneous Opinion In Religion and Government.
• Chap. IV.: Of Tests.
• Chap. V.: Of Oaths.
• Chap. VI.: Of Libels.
• Chap. VII.: Of Constitutions.
• Chap. VIII.: Of National Education.
• Chap. IX.: Of Pensions and Salaries.
• Chap. X.: Of the Modes of Deciding a Question On the Part of the Community.
• An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice.
• Book VII.: Of Legislative and Executive Power
• Chap. I.: Limitations of the Doctrine of Punishment Which Result From the Principles of Morality.
• Chap. II.: General Disadvantages of Coercion.
• Chap. III.: Of the Purposes of Coercion.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Application of Coercion.
• Chap. V.: Of Coercion Considered As a Temporary Expedient.
• Chap. VI.: Scale of Coercion.
• Chap. VII.: Of Evidence.
• Chap. VIII.: Of Law.
• Chap. IX.: Of Pardons.
• An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice.
• Book VIII.: Of Property.
• Chap. I.: Genuine System of Property Delineated.
• Chap. II.: Benefits Arising From the Genuine System of Property.
• Chap. III.: Of the Objection to This System From the Admirable Effects of Luxury.
• Chap. IV.: Of the Objection to This System From the Allurements of Sloth.
• Chap. V.: Of the Objection to This System From the Impossibility of Its Being Rendered Permanent.
• Chap. VI.: Of the Objection to This System From the Inflexibility of Its Restrictions.
• Chap. VII.: Of the Objection to This System From the Principle of Population.
• Chap. VIII.: Of the Means of Introducing the Genuine System of Property.
• Errata.
• Vol. I.
• Vol. II.
• Direction to the Binder.

CHAP. XVII.

of the object of war.

Let us pass from the causes to the objects of war. Asbook v. chap. xvii. The repelling an invader. defence is the only legitimate cause, the object pursued, reasoning from this principle, will be circumscribed within very narrow limits. It can extend no farther than the repelling the enemy from our borders. It is perhaps desirable that, in addition to this, he should afford some proof that he does not propose immediately to renew his invasion; but this, though desirable, affords no sufficient apology for the continuance of hostilities. Declarations of war and treaties of peace are inventions of a barbarous age, and would never have grown into established usages, if war had customarily gone no farther than to the limits of defence.

It will hereafter appear that what has been termed the criminalNot reformation:book v. chap. xvii. justice of nations within themselves, has only two legitimate objects, restraint and reformation. Neither of these objects applies to the case of war between independent states; and therefore ideas of criminal justice are altogether foreign to this subject. War, as we have already seen, perhaps never originates on the offending side in the sentiments of a nation, but of a comparatively small number of individuals: and, if it were otherwise, it is not in a reciprocation of hostilities that good sense would teach us to look for the means of reform.

not restraint: Restraint appears to be sometimes necessary with respect to the offenders that exist in the midst of a community, because it is the property of such offenders to assault us with unexpected violence; but nations cannot move with such secrecy as to make an unforeseen attack an object of considerable apprehension. The only effectual means of restraint in this last case is by disabling, impoverishing and depopulating the country of our adversaries; and, if we recollected that they were men as well as ourselves, and the great mass of them innocent of the quarrel against us, we should be little likely to consider these expedients with complacency.

not indemnification. Nothing can be a sufficient object of war that is not a sufficient cause for beginning it. Indemnification is another object of war which the same mode of reasoning will not fail to condemn. The true culprits can never be discovered, and the attempt would only serve to confound the innocent and the guilty: not to mention that, nations book v. chap. xvii. having no common umpire, the reverting, in the conclusion of every war, to the justice of the original quarrel and the indemnification to which the parties were entitled, would be a means of rendering the controversy endless. The question respecting the justifiable objects of war would be liable to few difficulties, if we laid it down as a maxim, that, as often as the principle or object of a war already in existence was changed, this was to be considered as equivalent to the commencement of a new war. This maxim impartially applied would not fail to condemn objects of prevention, indemnification and restraint.

The celebrated topic of the balance of power is a mixed consideration,Reflections on the balance of power. having sometimes been proposed as the cause for beginning a war, and sometimes as an object to be pursued in a war already begun. A war, undertaken to maintain the balance of power, may be either of defence, as to protect a people who are oppressed, or of prevention to counteract new acquisitions, or to reduce the magnitude of old possessions. We shall be in little danger of error however, if we pronounce wars undertaken to maintain the balance of power to be universally unjust. If any people be oppressed, it is our duty, as we have already said, as far as our ability extends, to fly to their succour. But it would be well if in such cases we called our interference by the name which justice prescribes, and sought against the injustice, and not the power. All hostilities against a neighbouring people, because they are powerful, or because we impute to them evil book v. chap. xvii. designs which they have not yet begun to carry in execution, are an enormous violation of every principle of morality. If one nation chuse to be governed by the sovereign or an individual allied to the sovereign of another, as seems to have been the case of the people of Spain upon the extinction of the elder branch of the house of Austria, we may endeavour to enlighten them on the subject of government and imbue them with principles of liberty, but it is an execrable piece of tyranny to tell them, “You shall exchange the despot you love for the despot you hate, on account of certain remote consequences we apprehend from the accession of the former.” The pretence of the balance of power has in a multitude of instances served as a veil to the intrigue of courts, but it would be easy to show that the present independence of the different states of Europe has in no instance been materially supported by the wars undertaken for that purpose. The fascination of a people desiring to become the appendage of a splendid despotism can rarely occur, and might perhaps easily be counteracted by peaceable means and the dissemination of a few of the most obvious truths. The defence of a people struggling with oppression must always be just, with this single limitation, that the entering into it without urgent need on their part, would unnecessarily spread the calamities of war, and diminish those energies, the exertion of which would contribute to their virtue and happiness. Add to this, that the object itself, the independence of the different states of Europe, is of an equivocal nature. The despotism, which at present prevails among them, is certainly not so excellent as to make us very anxiousbook v. chap. xvii. for its preservation. The press is an engine of so admirable a nature for the destruction of despotism, as to elude the sagacity perhaps of the most vigilant police; and the internal checks upon freedom in a mighty empire and distant provinces, can scarcely be expected to be equally active with those of a petty tyrant. The reasoning will surely be good with respect to war, which has already been employed upon the subject of government, that an instrument, evil in its own nature, ought never to be selected as the means of promoting our purpose, in any case in which selection can be practised.