The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Essays On Politics and Society
• Thoughts On Parliamentary Reform 1859
• Recent Writers On Reform 1859
• Considerations On Representative Government 1861
• Editor’s Note
• Preface
• Chapter I: To What Extent Forms of Government Are a Matter of Choice
• Chapter II: The Criterion of a Good Form of Government
• Chapter III: That the Ideally Best Form of Government Is Representative Government
• Chapter IV: Under What Social Conditions Representative Government Is Inapplicable
• Chapter V: Of the Proper Functions of Representative Bodies
• Chapter VI: Of the Infirmities and Dangers to Which Representative Government Is Liable
• Chapter VII: Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority Only
• Chapter VIII: Of the Extension of the Suffrage
• Chapter IX: Should There Be Two Stages of Election?
• Chapter X: Of the Mode of Voting
• Chapter XI: Of the Duration of Parliaments
• Chapter XII: Ought Pledges to Be Required From Members of Parliament?
• Chapter XIII: Of a Second Chamber
• Chapter XIV: Of the Executive In a Representative Government
• Chapter XV: Of Local Representative Bodies
• Chapter XVI: Of Nationality, As Connected With Representative Government
• Chapter XVII: Of Federal Representative Governments
• Chapter XVIII: Of the Government of Dependencies By a Free State
• Centralisation 1862
• Appendices
• Appendix a Taylor’s Statesman (1837)
• Appendix B Appendix to Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. I (1859)
• Appendix C Jowett On Civil Service Examinations (1854)
• Appendix D Substantive Variants Between the People’s Edition and the Final Library Edition of On Liberty
• Appendix E Substantive Variants Between the People’s Edition and the Final Library Edition of Considerations On Representative Government
• Appendix F Bibliographic Index of Persons and Works Cited In the Essays, With Variants and Notes

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Taylor’s Statesman (1837)

the statesman is a short volume of essays, by the author of Philip van Artevelde:^[*] and whoever has read with the same feelings as ourselves that very beautiful poem, alike distinguished for noble sentiment, beauty of expression, and interest in the story as well as in the characters, cannot have turned without elevated expectations to a fresh production of the same hand. Van Artevelde himself, the hero of that poem, as he appears both in the acquisition and in the exercise of supreme authority over his fellow-citizens of Ghent, is indeed a splendid conception, evincing that Mr. Taylor had attentively studied the essential characteristics of an effective popular leader—a leader who performs what Xenophon calls “the divine work of ruling over willing men,”^[†] without any pre-established associations of rank or superstition, by the simple union of distinguished virtue and force of character. Assuredly this is a most interesting topic of contemplation, for every one who concerns himself at all about the larger interests of mankind, and Mr. Taylor has evidently bestowed upon it much deeper reflection than is common in the foundation of a modern poem. Both the text and the notes evince that the traits which form the striking character of his hero are not caught up at a hazard, merely as suitable themes for poetry, but that they are collected from an attentive perusal of history and its philosophical commentators.

A work, therefore, from the pen of Mr. Taylor, bearing the title of The Statesman, was calculated to raise considerable expectation. One might have imagined that it would be a delineation, in prose, and with reference to the circumstances of the present day, of the same idéal which the author had already exhibited in his political drama.

Such are the anticipations which the title of the present volume is calculated to suggest. But its contents will not fulfil these anticipations. Its merits are of another kind, and fall very short of the name bestowed upon it by the author.

A work fully corresponding, or even partially corresponding, to the full exigencies of so lofty a title as The Statesman, would indeed be among the most valuable contributions to modern politics and philosophy. To trace the greater lineaments of such a character, as it ought to exist, or must exist, in a state of society so complicated as that of England—to mark out the ends at which the statesman must aim, and the means whereby he must seek to accomplish them, if he would earn for himself any substantive name or lasting esteem—to shew how the powers of government may be most effectively employed to develope all the good tendencies of the age, and to subdue or mitigate its many corruptions—this, we say, would have been a task worthy of the highest intellect which our nation can afford; a statesman, such as Plato or Xenophon would have conceived, had they lived in the present time with the advantage of enlarged recorded experience, and with political phenomena open to their view, transcending both in extent and variety all which the ancient world could furnish. To execute this undertaking properly—of course it must have reference to some one given country and society—the highest powers of philosophical observation would indeed be required; that rare combination of accurate knowledge of fact, with comprehensive reasoning, which alone can enable an author to trace the virtues and the defects, the comforts and the miseries, of any given people, to their genuine sources and principles. M. de Tocqueville’s work on the Democracy of America, though there is much of it in which we do not concur, furnishes a valuable specimen of enquiries undertaken in this spirit: and the picture of a statesman, such as he ought to be in this country, would be the deduction from a similar analysis, applied to the social and political phenomena of England. We are well aware indeed that such contemplations are usually stigmatised as visionary and Utopian: but they seem to us indispensably necessary, if it were only to keep alive in the mind of a statesman—that which official details have so great a tendency to obliterate—the obligation of acting with a view to results distant as well as results immediate, and of following out some coherent system of operations. Above all, they are necessary, if we are impressed with a due conviction of that important fact, without which moral and political science would be little better than a dreary void—the progressiveness of human nature; and the vast influence of good or bad government, as an accelerating or retarding cause of it. The goal which a wise statesman will seek to attain is a distant one, and his voyage of unknown length: he may often be driven out of his course, or altogether stopped, by temporary obstacles: but if the entire chart of the ocean in which he is sailing be open before him, both the deviations and the delay will be understood for what they are, and submitted to only so far as the iron hand of necessity may require: the exigencies of every day will be carefully provided for, even to their minutest details, yet with that constant reference towards the ultimate scope of the voyage, for which the captain of the vessel is especially responsible.

Certain it is, that if any future author shall sit down to compose a work called The Statesman, in the spirit which we have described, he will not be able to borrow much from the character of any minister whom England has produced for the last two centuries. Perhaps there are some who will consider this as a compliment to the English character, as well as to the English government: we need not say that, in our opinion, it is among the heaviest of all reproaches both to the one and to the other. To lay down any large principles of political action—to have any pre-conceived ends, with a scheme of means for attaining them—has been a proceeding either repudiated with scorn by English statesmen, or at least foreign to all their intellectual habits. Starting as they do, and as they always have done, from the hypothesis of absolute perfection in existing institutions, it is enough for them if they leave things in statu quo—if they provide for the pressing exigency of the day, with little or no thought for the morrow. Hence, during the last half century prior to 1830, while the individual energy of Englishmen has effected such miracles in the arts, in civilization, and in the acquisition of wealth, the proceedings of the government present only the spectacle of inglorious nullity, without the smallest evidence of superior wisdom or reach of thought—without any one lasting bequest to fix the eye and esteem of posterity. Yet during this same period there have been memorable evidences of statesmanlike activity in the countries around us: the Code Napoleon in France; the Federal Constitution in the United States of North America, deliberately planned and systematically reasoned out by its authors, freely accepted and faithfully obeyed by the people; while in Prussia, the condition of the entire population has been changed, by the abolition of glebe-servitude, the creation of municipal communities, and the universal diffusion of education,—all emanating from the direct scheme and unwearied interference of the government. What is there in the conduct of the English government, during the same interval, to attest either comprehensive design or forward beneficence?

If there be one quality more than another for the possession of which the mass of English citizens are distinguished, it is commercial activity, expertness in money-getting, and in turning their capital to account. It might reasonably be expected, therefore, that the public finances of such a nation would be administered with peculiar skill: yet when we look back upon the proceedings of the last war, in which financial affairs were not only of pressing importance, but conducted on the largest scale, how slender are the proofs of penetration and foresight on the part of the managing statesmen! Are we not now suffering under an unnatural increase of the national debt, arising out of the delusive trick of keeping up a sinking fund without any real surplus revenue? Have we not been deprived of the greatest of all facilities for diminishing the charge of the national debt during time of peace, by the practice of borrowing loans in stock at a low denomination of interest, and thus swelling the nominal amount of the capital funded? Look at the suspension of cash-payments by the Bank of England in 1797; did not the government of the day mainly contribute to bring on that calamitous event (the seeds of all the subsequent perilous disputes respecting currency), by the immense loans borrowed from the Bank Directors, and not repaid, in spite of the urgent remonstrances of the latter, who were thus stript of their principal means of controlling the amount of circulation? If such has been the improvidence of English statesmen, on their own ground of finance, in sacrificing future consequences to the convenience of the moment, can we wonder that they have left no monuments behind them in the shape of legislative amendment or improved institutions?

We are ready indeed to admit, that since the passing of the Reform Act, this utter apathy respecting legislative measures of permanent result has ceased to be in so great a degree the characteristic of English statesmen. Such is the first fruit of the newly acquired power of the people. Nor is it practicable under the prevailing keenness and activity of public discussion, that any minister can safely avoid attempting the settlement of important national grievances, from time to time, on some principles or other.

It is a considerable step thus to have roused the English statesman from absolute lethargy: nor ought we to forget that the great provocative cause of it—popular demand—in spite of all the obstructions and diversions which can be thrown in its way, is likely to increase rather than diminish for the future. But still this is not all. Public opinion may compel the minister to propose some measure or other; but it can hardly compel him, against his own inclination, to propose either a large measure or a wise one. He may think it sufficient just to stave off the loudest objectors, without concerning himself in any way about the substance or principle of the mischief: and whether he does so or not, will depend partly upon the reach of his own understanding, partly upon the idea which he has formed to himself of the obligations attached to his post. Hence the immense importance of keeping up the standard of duty in the mind of the statesman—of impressing on him the conviction that nothing except what is founded on large, sound, and comprehensive principles, can possibly either deserve or obtain lasting fame. There is so much in the daily life of an English minister which tends to extinguish all ideas of improvement, and to keep him buried under a load of routine, (not to mention the sinister interests under which he still lives and moves)—that if any sense of distant obligation, or any relish for lasting and critical esteem, is to be preserved in his mind, inspiring and instructive books are among the few aids to be reckoned upon for the purpose.

For the reasons which we have assigned, we think that a work really corresponding to the title of the Statesman, and applied to the present social and political state of England, would have been of signal utility; and we may be permitted to regret that, so far as regards the volume before us, the task still remains unperformed.

Mr. Taylor’s book does not fulfil, and does not even attempt to fulfil, the promise of its title; which title in fact has no connexion with the design of the work, and must have been a very infelicitous after-thought. A more proper name would have been “Thoughts on Public Life,” or “Reflections, Moral and Prudential, on a Political Career;” and the chapters should not have been called chapters, that is, parts of a whole, but essay first, essay second, and so on.

Mr. Taylor had a specific object, which he partially explains to us in his preface. He complains that writers on government and society have in general attended too much to scientific analysis, and too little to things in combined existence—that “while the structure of communities, and the nature of political powers and institutions have been extensively investigated, the art of exercising political functions, which might seem to be no unimportant part of political science, has occupied hardly any place in their speculations.” (P. vi.) He remarks that those who have been practised in political affairs have written upon politics much better than philosophers, and he quotes Bacon, Burke, Machiavel, and Tacitus, as illustrations of this superiority. But these writers, he says, “still leave unattempted the formation of any coherent body of administrative doctrine.” (P. x.) This deficiency, Mr. Taylor tells us, it would have been the height of his wish to supply, if he could have commanded leisure for the enterprise. Unfortunately he has not had leisure for any thing more than a few desultory disquisitions, tending towards the same point.

In the conclusion—which is in reality a second part of the preface—we find the reasons why the author thinks it peculiarly important at the present season to draw the attention of the public to questions of administrative government.

The foregoing extracts exhibit the general scope and origin of Mr. Taylor’s work. We are very far from concurring in the estimate which he forms of the value of analytical writers on politics; though, as we also fully admit the importance of studying Machiavel and Tacitus, we are not curious in measuring whether one class of authors be a little above or a little below the other in the scale of utility. It is one thing to be master of general principles, and to be able to reason from them under assumed hypothetical circumstances: it is another thing to possess the talent of justly appreciating actual circumstances, so as to regulate the application of principles to any given case. A man may possess the former who is totally destitute of the latter; but there cannot well be a first-rate statesman or administrator who does not combine the two, any more than there can be a first-rate physician who does not unite a comprehensive acquaintance with the principles of physiology and pathology, to enlarged experience and an expert eye for observation. “A coherent body of administrative doctrine,” as we understand the meaning of the words, is not to be deduced from the authors whom Mr. Taylor extols. A statesman’s skill in the contentious part of his business, the gaining of adherents and the struggling with rivals, may be improved by the insight which their writings afford into the passions and dispositions of men both individually and in masses—but not his knowledge of the business of administration properly so called, as we see it exemplified in the admirable life of a statesman like Turgot. Take the Poor-Law Commissioners, to whom so important a branch of the national administration is confided: suppose them seeking to prepare for themselves a stock of administrative doctrine, we doubt whether they would derive any special aid either from Bacon or Burke; but we are sure that they would find many parts of Mr. Bentham’s works eminently conducive to their purpose—who comes, nevertheless, under the class set aside by Mr. Taylor as “analytical.”

Nor do we concur in the opinion expressed by Mr. Taylor, that the progress of administrative reforms is retarded by the popular demand for constitutional reforms. We know that there are other countries in which much has been done in the former and little or nothing in the latter: but it is our clear opinion that in England increased responsibility to the people is the most effective way of creating in the minds of our administrators such dispositions as will insure the advance of administrative reforms. There might indeed be some force in Mr. Taylor’s argument, if the fact were as he thinks, that “constitutional reforms have been carried far enough to make it the interest of a government to engage in administrative reforms.” But is this so? Suppose those popular feelings, in which the demand for farther constitutional reform originates, to be extinguished among the constituencies, what would be the result? We should have the Tories restored to power without delay; and how many grains of administrative reform should we obtain from them? We doubt not that they would meditate attentively on the subjects of some of Mr. Taylor’s chapters—On the Arts of Rising—On the Getting and Keeping of Adherents—Concerning Rank as a Qualification for High Office—On the Administration of Patronage—Concerning the Amusements of a Statesman; but they would adjourn to the Greek Calends his “Reform of the Executive,” and they would skip over altogether his chapter “On the Conscience of a Statesman.”

Mr. Taylor conceives that “the greatest want of the people, though the least felt, is that of moral, religious, and intellectual instruction.” [P. 265.] Let us ask, by whom this want is most felt, and by whom least? Much, by the people themselves; most of all, by the most popular-minded public men, whose influence would be increased by the increase of popular control, and who would thus be better enabled to provide for the supply of the want than they are now; least of all by the aristocratical classes in this country, whose passive instruments English statesmen have hitherto been, and from whose paralyzing grasp the executive government is yet but half extricated. If this first and greatest of all popular wants is ever destined to be supplied, it will be by a government emanating from keener popular control, and more deeply impressed with the necessity of rendering the people worthy to exercise control, than any which England has yet seen.

Although, however, we do not participate in Mr. Taylor’s wish to draw away the attention of the public from constitutional reform, we are well pleased to see it invited towards administrative reform; and to this end, the first of all requisites is an improvement in the character, the abilities, and, most of all, the purposes, of administrators. Mr. Taylor’s first chapter treats of the education of youth for a civil career, for which, as he complains, no special provision is now made, nor any definite course marked out. After remarking that historical studies, in this point of view, have been rated above their comparative value, he says,

These are just recommendations; but if the study of political economy be useful, as most assuredly it is in a very high degree, surely the philosophy of the human mind and the philosophy of politics are no less so. Why should Mr. Taylor depreciate analysis in the latter, and extol it in the former? If the exceptions which he takes in his Preface against the analytical writers on government be of any avail, are they not equally applicable against political economy?—nay, have they not been actually advanced against it, almost in the precise terms employed by Mr. Taylor, a thousand and a thousand times over? The scheme of science is one and the same in every department of human thought and action to which analysis can be applied: deny its utility in any one, and you virtually disallow it in all.

It is somewhat surprising to us also that Mr. Taylor takes no notice whatever of classical studies. If there be any one vocation of active life to which classical studies belong with the most exact pertinence and speciality, it is that of a statesman; not merely from the consummate perfection of the ancient compositions in themselves, and the exquisite sense of what is appropriate and beautiful which they are thus calculated to create; though this too is of signal value, even if we consider statesmanship as a mere craft for individual advancement. But if it be true that the statesman exists not for himself merely, but for the public whom he serves—if the interests of that public require that the sense of obligation should in his case be peculiarly exalted, seeing that the circumstances around him tend for the most part to deaden and debase it—then, the study of the best works of classical antiquity comes recommended by still higher considerations; for the public obligations stood in the foreground of all the ancient morality; the idea of the commonwealth, as the supreme object of his duty and solicitude, attracted to itself the strongest emotions in the bosom of every virtuous man.

Now this tone of thought, when caught up and idealized by poets, orators, and philosophers, goes far to kindle and sustain that sense of enlarged patriotism which the details of a statesman’s life are perpetually tending to supplant; at least it does as much as books can do towards that end, and much more in our opinion than modern books are at all calculated to do: for although the fulfilment of duties between man and man, and the forbearance from individual injury are carried now to a higher pitch than they were in antiquity, yet the ties which bind each individual to the community at large are comparatively far less seen and felt: they are neither recognizable in modern literature, nor in modern actual life; and hence the statesman comes to look upon himself as engaged only in one out of a variety of profit-seeking occupations, subject to no higher laws than those prescribed by the etiquette of the profession which he has chosen.

We shall now quote some of the most important of our author’s counsels to statesmen, beginning with a chapter of which the title is the marrow of a whole treatise. “A Statesman’s most pregnant function lies in the choice and use of instruments.” [Chap. ii, p. 13.]

On this indifference of English public men to the value of intellectual ability, in comparison with some slight atom of trouble to themselves, hear our author in another place:

Well does Mr. Taylor continue:

There being no sufficient amount of ability in the executive, and no sufficient desire to supply this want on the part of those on whom the task of supplying it would devolve, the following is the mode in which, according to our author, the ability which is neither had nor wished for, is done without. We do not think the tricks of mediocrity in high place were ever so pungently characterized in so few words. Mark how it is hit off to the life:

Far other is our author’s conception of what is due to a nation from those who voluntarily undertake the sacred trust of guarding those of its interests on which all others are dependent.

The truth and wisdom of these remarks must strike every one who has been largely conversant with public business, and whose conscience has not been seared by the exercise of irresponsible power, nor his intellect enslaved to habits of routine. A security against bad measures worth all others put together, and essential to the complete efficacy of every other, is the obligation of writing down the reasons of whatever is done. Our vast empire in India is governed upon this system. There is not an act of that government, from the greatest to the most trivial, the grounds of which are not extant upon the face of recorded documents, communicated generally to the parties interested, and always to the controlling authorities in England. The same system is largely acted upon by the home authorities in their own proceedings; and the result is a degree both of purity and wisdom in the conduct of Indian affairs, far enough from perfect, though progressively and constantly improving, but such as, we will venture to say, never were exemplified in circumstances of similar difficulty by any government upon earth, and such as no earthly expedient could have rendered possible, except that of compelling the grounds of every proceeding to be registered “upon the face,” as our author says, “of producible documents.” [P. 51.]

Mr. Taylor next animadverts upon that quality of our public men, which, most of all, deprives them of all title to the name of statesmen; their never thinking it any business of theirs to originate improvements, nor to bestir themselves for any purpose whatever, except what is forced upon them by “pressure from without:”^[*]

The sequel of the passage is truly admirable:

Mr. Taylor’s suggestions for remedying these evils, or rather, for rendering it possible that they should be remedied, are contained in his chapter “On the Reform of the Executive.”

He begins by describing what the constitution of a government office is, and the number as well as description of the persons who fill it. First, the minister: next, one or more political and parliamentary subordinates (under-secretaries of state, lords of the Treasury and Admiralty, &c.): thirdly, an officer of similar rank, not in Parliament, and permanent in the office, without reference to changes of ministry: fourthly, a private secretary, who comes and goes with his principal: fifthly, about twenty clerks, divided into three or four degrees of subordination.

Mr. Taylor delivers a strong opinion that this establishment is altogether insufficient for the public purposes which it ought to answer, and which it might, if enlarged, be made to answer.

The duties of councillor and legislator, he thinks, are quite sufficient to occupy all the time and energies of the minister himself, who ought to be relieved from all the office-business, in so far as regards the actual transaction and superintendence of it; retaining only that general familiarity with what is done, which may render him competent to explain or defend it in the House of Commons or in the Cabinet. The parliamentary assistant ought also to enjoy a similar exemption during the session of Parliament. Further, he thinks, that

We fear that Mr. Taylor’s suggestions of enlargement in the official establishment will be only of partial efficacy in rectifying that which is “fatally amiss” in the idea of English statesmanship and in the working of English administration.

We should indeed entertain greater hopes from his proposal, if we could believe that it was only the absorption of the minister’s time which had hitherto stood in the way of administrative improvement. But is this the fact? The hindrance, we fear, is far more deeply seated, and more difficult to be removed.

Were we indeed to assume that the new persons introduced into the office would be of the superior character and dispositions which Mr. Taylor contemplates, and that their influence would be predominant in determining its proceedings, we should anticipate considerable improvement in matters of administration. But neither of these two essential conditions appears to us likely to be realized; for who are the persons in whose hands the appointment of the new under-secretaries would naturally be vested? The reader has seen the opinion Mr. Taylor himself entertains of their indifference to the value of pre-eminent mental endowments. They are not surely persons who would be disposed—we speak with no particular reference to the present cabinet—to seek out distinguished capacities such as Mr. Taylor’s description prefigures; scarcely even to sustain or countenance such men, when pointed out to them either by public celebrity or by accidental causes.

Again, admitting that perfectly appropriate individuals were discovered and appointed, would they be allowed to exercise any predominant influence over official proceedings? Would they not be more likely to sink down to the pre-existing official level, than to elevate others to their own? The head of the office, who represents it both in the Cabinet and in Parliament would still remain as he is now, in possession of supreme and undiminished ascendancy. There is nothing in the scheme to render him more favourable to improvement than he is now: nor is it conceivable that improvement should ever be realized to any conspicuous extent, if he continued averse, or even backward in it.

For these and other reasons, we are far from expecting that the mere enlargement of the official establishment, in the way that Mr. Taylor recommends, would produce any considerable effects in the way of amended administration. It may be very true, as he contends, that the establishment as at present constituted is inadequate, and that if we assume ever so great a regeneration in the characters of the men composing it, they would still be too much loaded with the drudgery of details to discharge the higher functions effectively. Still, the change of spirit and purpose, in the bosoms of official leaders, would be the great victory to be achieved, and the main cause on which all the good to be done by the office, whether fully or sparingly mounted, must depend.

Mr. Taylor seems to think that it would be easy to distinguish administrative measures from the measures of political parties. However practicable it may be in the abstract to frame a classification in which the two shall stand pointedly apart, we doubt the possibility of causing such a distinction to be practically adhered to in England. If there be any one object which might reasonably have been expected to unite the favourable wishes of contending parties, it is the education of the people, and the cares of government for its universal diffusion: the more so, as we know that both Prussia and the United States of America, though differing as much as possible in respect of political constitution, have yet been alike distinguished for the solicitude of both governments to render education universal among the people. If we look at the manner in which this important question has been dealt with by the aristocracy and the Tories in England, we shall find that they have uniformly set themselves, as a party, in opposition to popular education; and that they have never been induced to acquiesce in it even partially, except as a means of rendering the people subservient to their own political church. To draw a measure within the sphere of political conflict, it is sufficient if one powerful party in the state choose so to deal with it: and when we remark the sectarian acrimony which has been displayed in opposition to such a cause as the education of the people, what hope can we indulge that administrative improvements of any kind will be discussed and opposed simply on their own specific merits?

However the case may be in other countries, it seems to us that in England political improvement and administrative improvement must emanate from the same hands and the same impulses. The friends of the former may not always be equally zealous friends of the latter; but the opponents of the former will always be the most vehement opponents of the latter, if it be undertaken on any considerable scale. Nothing but strong popular sympathy, which can only be earned in the present day by statesmen who are at least believed to be friendly to political reforms, will impart either boldness for projecting large administrative reforms, or power for accomplishing them. In truth, we think that the secret of the general degeneracy of English administration is, to a great degree, the working out in detail of the sinister political purposes which have animated English statesmen in the gross. Are not the vices, the prejudices, and the negligence, of our colonial management deducible chiefly from the corrupt use which our aristocracy has always proposed to make of the colonies for their own patronage and emolument? Suppose the additional under-secretaries proposed by Mr. Taylor to be attached to the Colonial Office—would it be possible for them to accomplish any perceptible improvement in that branch of administration, if they were tied down still to extract from the colonies the same amount of jobs and appointments as heretofore for the benefit of the aristocracy? It is only by political improvement that the general spirit and purposes of English administrators can be amended: when this is done, we are sensible that much remains for administrative ability to accomplish; but we think it chimerical to expect that those who are by the supposition averse or indifferent to the larger ends involved in political improvement, will be earnest in accomplishing the comparatively smaller objects included in administrative details.^*

We do full justice to the spirit in which this chapter of Mr. Taylor’s volume is conceived, nor do we express any opinion unfavourable to such an extension of the executive as he recommends; but we are bound to state our belief that it will not change the spirit of official proceedings to the extent that he anticipates; and we must again repeat that the prosecution of administrative reforms apart from political reforms, seems to us, as a general rule, altogether hopeless in England.

In another place (p. 210) Mr. Taylor says:

This is a just and forcible paragraph. But we think that the excuse here offered on behalf of “the Government and its servants,” as if their spontaneous activity was chilled by a prevalent “opinion,” is something more creditable than history has proved them to deserve. Has it not been the fashion for “the Government and its servants,” up to the last year or two at the least, to denounce in unmeasured language every one who was forward in pointing out imperfections in the law, and to put forth all their ingenuity for the purpose of screening or denying the reality of abuse, instead of preventing or redressing it? Let the inestimable labours of Mr. Hume, and the incessant repulses which he has experienced, serve as a reply.

If then it be true that opinion tends to circumscribe unduly the functions of the executive, it is at least equally true that this boundary, how narrow and miserable soever, has been fully coextensive with the wishes and ideas of official persons themselves. We admit, however, with Mr. Taylor, that such an opinion has prevailed. The class from whom statesmen are usually taken have been but too well disposed to encourage the idea that the business of the executive was to be assimilated as much as possible to that of a private counting-house, in respect of the duties to be performed—that regularity in answering letters and applications, and plausibility in eluding parliamentary inquiry was the highest excellence attainable in their craft: above all, that anything which touched, however remotely, on the verge of theory was alike insane and pernicious. Popular-minded men, on the other hand, having observed—what has been uniformly the fact up to the last few years—that the efforts and purposes of English statesmen have been directed to exalt the aristocracy and keep down the people, have thought themselves fortunate if they could only restrict the sphere of such pernicious agency. Not being able to render the executive beneficent, they have been content to see it inert and languid. Thus the opinion has gained ground, among persons of opposite political sentiments, that it is a virtue in the executive to do nothing, and to let things take their own course. Of late, since the passing of the Reform Act, the popular masses have begun to take an altered measure of what the dispositions of the executive ought to be, and to conceive new hopes from its wakefulness and its activity. And we think that if a statesman of the present day does not discharge with tolerable zeal the important duties which this chapter of Mr. Taylor’s work points out, it will be much more owing to his own reluctance, than to any bridle put upon him by opinion from without.

Chapter the tenth, on the Conscience of a Statesman, is one of the best in the volume.

After illustrating “the mismeasurements of a conscience tender to weakness,” our author proceeds:

The concluding paragraph is excellent:

The mental quality here indicated is of the highest importance, and we maintain that the best and most effectual method of imparting it is that training in analytical philosophy which Mr. Taylor’s preface tends so much to depreciate. If a man is to be qualified for “foreseeing distant consequences or comprehending wide ones,” he must be taught to distinguish the constant from the accidental sequences in human affairs—he must be familiarised with those larger classifications which alone serve as a basis for propositions extensively true and applicable,—his mind must be imbued with principles in their pure and uncombined state, and initiated in the art of applying them to real life, by previously reasoning from them in hypothetical cases. Such lessons form the only discipline for guarding the statesman against the exclusive surrender of his mind to what is near and present, and for enabling him to look both backward to causes and forward to results. If by any inherent acuteness of his own he should fall naturally into the same track in which analysis would have placed him, this is a mere fortunate accident, forming an exception to the ordinary rules of probability.

The chapter on this subject might be much enlarged, and there is one topic in particular which might have been insisted on with advantage. The feeling of obligation as it now exists, towards different individuals and different classes in the same community, is lamentably unequal. The comfort and suffering of one man, on the foreknowledge of which all rational sense of obligation towards him is based, counts in general estimation for something infinitely more than that of another man in a different rank or position. The great mass of our labouring population have no representatives in Parliament, and cannot be said to have any political station whatever; while the distribution of what may be called social dignity is more unequal in England than in any other civilized country of Europe, and the feeling of communion and brotherhood between man and man more artificially graduated according to the niceties of the scale of wealth. Assuming perfect rectitude of intentions on the part of a statesman, it is hardly possible that his moral calculations should not be more or less vitiated by the impurities of such an atmosphere. In laying his grounds for public measures, or in establishing administrative regulations, he will be almost unconsciously led to under-estimate the interests of the poorer multitude, and to give undue preponderance to those of the few who are clustered around him—whose pains and pleasures he has been accustomed to identify with his own, and whose complaints he readily anticipates even before they actually assail him. Some taint of this kind seems to us almost unavoidable, in a statesman who presides over such a society as ours, even though he be well intentioned, and perfectly free from the grosser corruption of oligarchical immorality; and warnings against it would find an appropriate place in any work professing to guide or rectify his conscience.

We question much, however, whether a conscience, such as Mr. Taylor would wish to create in his Statesman, will ever be found in one who has practised the Arts of Rising as they are described in his fourteenth chapter. These arts, he remarks [p. 92], “have commonly some mixture of baseness;” and we cannot say that they are divested of that quality in his description of them.

We pass to chapter the sixteenth—On the Ethics of Politics; a very important subject, which is not very successfully handled. Mr. Taylor takes a distinction between private and public life, in regard to the observance of the rules of morality. He admits that the primary test of right and wrong is, the balance of all the consequences of an act; and he thinks that, judging by this test, exceptions to the ordinary rules of morality are occasionally admissible in public life, but never under any circumstances justifiable in private life. He says,

Mr. Taylor seems to be somewhat ashamed of having gone so far as to admit the possibility of exceptions to the ordinary rules of morality in public life, and he shelters himself by displaying an extremity of rigour in regard to private life. We think his doctrine altogether untenable, and inconsistent with itself. If a man believes that the rules of morality derive their entire authority from a certain simple feeling called the moral sense, he puts the consideration of the consequences of acts altogether out of the question, and no exception to a moral rule, arising out of such consequences, can ever find a place in his system. But if we once admit as the supreme test of right and wrong in an act, the balance of all its consequences, by what approach to omniscience can we pretend to predict that such balance must always be on one side, in every conceivable diversity of cases? How can we foreknow individual circumstances in such manner as to assure ourselves that in no imaginable incident of private life can the specific evil of telling truth outweigh the general evil of telling falsehood? To admit the balance of consequences as a test of right and wrong, necessarily implies the possibility of exceptions to any derivative rule of morality which may be deduced from that test. If evil will arise in any specific case from our telling truth, we are forbidden by a law of morality from doing that evil: we are forbidden by another law of morality from telling falsehood. Here then are two laws of morality in conflict, and we cannot satisfy both of them. What is to be done but to resort to the primary test of all right and wrong, and to make a specific calculation of the good or evil consequences, as fully and impartially as we can? The evil of departing from a well-known and salutary rule is indeed one momentous item on that side of the account; but to treat it as equal to infinity, and as necessarily superseding the measurement of any finite quantities of evil on the opposite side, appears to us to be the most fatal of all mistakes in ethical theory.

When, after reading these remarks of Mr. Taylor on the morality of private life, we pass to what he says on that of public life, we are forcibly struck by the contrast. Considering that he thinks the law of truth-telling so inexorable, that the maximum of private evil can never in any case justify a deviation from it, we are surprised to find him speaking without disapprobation of the very questionable practice of forensic advocacy as now conducted, involving, as it does, not merely simulation on the part of the advocate himself, but the greatest exertions of ingenuity on his part to entrap the honest witness into falsehood, as well as to bolster up the deception of the mendacious witness. Then again Mr. Taylor seems to treat the manifestation of any dissent among the members of a plural cabinet as an evil sufficient to overbalance at once the obligations of veracity in public life. Even admitting, which we by no means do, that there is on the whole a balance of advantage in favour of this simulated unanimity, the contrary system is surely, to say the least of it, exceedingly practicable; and we shall find no difficulty in producing abundant cases of private life, wherein the specific evil to be weighed against the general obligation of veracity is infinitely greater than the inconvenience of a cabinet being known and avowed to be partially and occasionally dissentient.

It seems to us that all the reasons by which Mr. Taylor establishes the necessity of recognising exceptional cases to general rules of morality in public life are no less applicable to prove the like necessity in private life. There is no generic distinction between the two departments; though it may happen that the cases requiring specific calculation of good and evil are more numerous in public life, because the acts of the statesman are liable to affect directly large masses of men, while those of a private individual seldom directly reach any one beyond his own circle. The real difficulty is, in both cases, that which Mr. Taylor states it to be in regard to public life only—“in discriminating the cases of exemption: in the delimitation of those bounds within which a statesman’s dispensation should be confined.” (P. 116.) We must remark, however, that the use of such words as exemption, or dispensation, leads to a most erroneous conception of the case; for the necessity of weighing specific mischief against the evil of departure from a general rule, is in reality the heaviest of all obligations which can possibly be imposed either upon a statesman or upon a private individual; and moral acting would be rendered easier, instead of more difficult, if it could be reduced in every case to a blindfold obedience to some one pre-established rule. Unfortunately this cannot be done, because the moral rules are perpetually liable to clash with one another, and actually do so clash in all those exceptional cases now under consideration, so as to leave us no resource except in a direct appeal to the supreme authority from whence all moral rules are derived.

We know that those who hold this doctrine are accused of licensing immorality, and we admit that the process not only carries with it a serious responsibility, but will be ill performed if there enter into it either bad faith or want of intelligence. But is not the same thing true of the difficult conjunctures in every man’s daily walk or profession—in trade, in navigation, in medical practice? And do we really assist a virtuous man in these moral emergencies, by enjoining him to shut his eyes to all the evil on one side of the question? It is rather curious to remark, that the charge against the philosophical moralists, who maintain the necessity of resorting to specific calculation in certain exceptional cases, is the direct reverse of the reproach which is addressed to philosophers in other departments of science. In other sciences, philosophers are censured for attending exclusively to classes, and despising individuals—for looking only to essential qualities, and neglecting altogether what is accidental or particular to the case before them—for a barbarous readiness to inflict any amount of specific evil, if it be necessary in the carrying out of their theories. In moral philosophy, the analytical writers incur the opposite imputation. Because they maintain the necessity of specific calculation in certain exceptional cases, they are treated as if they annihilated all moral rules—as if the individual action was everything, and the class of actions nothing, in their estimation—as if they suffered themselves to be absorbed by that which is accidental and special to the case before them, and were incapable of fully appreciating the more comprehensive considerations on the other side. Philosophy commands that in dealing with any particular case, the whole of the circumstances, without exception, should be taken into view, essential as well as accidental: and if a man wilfully overlooks the latter, when they are pregnant with mischievous consequences, he cannot discharge himself from moral responsibility by pleading that he had the general rule in his favour. What should we say to a physician, who communicated an agonising piece of family intelligence, in reply to the inquiry of our sick friend, at a moment when the slightest aggravation of malady threatened to place him beyond all hope of recovery? In a case like this, surely there is no man of common sense or virtue, who would think for a moment of sheltering himself under the inexorable law of veracity, and refusing to entertain any thought of the irreparable specific mischief on the other side.

We have gone to considerable length in pointing out the fallacy of that distinction which Mr. Taylor takes between public life and private life, in regard to the moral rules, because we think that such a distinction is not favourable to the genuine morality of either. Much more remains to be said on the subject: but we have already reached the utmost limit which we can allow it to occupy.

In Chapter the nineteenth, On Ambition, it is remarked, “that where there are large powers with little ambition, nature has given the machinery without the vis motrix. Hardly anything will call a man’s mind into full activity, if ambition be wanting: where it is least forthcoming as a substantive and waking passion, there are various indirect adjuncts of other passions whereby it may be quickened—such as love, philanthropy, timidity, friendship in particular cases.” (Pp. 132-3.) We doubt much whether ambition be so necessary as Mr. Taylor imagines to develope the maximum of mental powers, though it may be necessary to induce a man to undergo the fatigue, disgust, and anxiety inseparable from a training for high office in this country. Those statesmen in modern history, who have done the greatest honour to the character, such men as Turgot, Washington, Jefferson, have been, for the most part, men but moderately animated by ambitious feelings. And we may add, that Plato lays it down as a part of his idea of a perfect ruler,^* that the unwillingness to exercise power is a necessary concomitant of those dispositions and capacities which enable a ruler to exercise it with the full measure of benefit to the governed. He considered that an eagerness to possess power was a strong presumptive proof of the absence of any superior fitness for exercising it. Ambition alone may be able to call forth the efforts necessary for crushing a man’s rivals, and defending his power against assaults from without; but we question whether any high degree of it will ever co-exist, except by accident, with the nobler purposes of a statesman.

We dissent equally from the distinction which Mr. Taylor draws in the following passage between the state of mind suitable for the statesman, and that appropriate to the philosopher:

This, without much further explanation, appears to us both unsound and dangerous doctrine.

We are at a loss to conceive why, in describing the ideal perfection of a character like the statesman, we should enjoin either a leaning to, or a leaning from, prescription. Both the one and the other are defects, greater or less as the case may be: the grand and paramount interest is that of truth, which suffers by both of them. It is not the business of a philosopher to appear as standing counsel against received opinions; nor to strike out ingenious paradoxes: his task is to expose error, though it may happen to be accredited—to elicit and sustain truth, known or unknown, neglected or obnoxious. Sir Richard Phillips is the only physical philosopher of the present day who has called in question the Newtonian theory: we do not know that this leaning from prescription has ever obtained for him any peculiar compliment. On the other hand, it seems to us still more mischievous to number the leaning to prescription as among the virtues of a statesman; to treat him as the last man who ought to seek escape from the prejudices of his age. Surely this is not the light in which historical criticism views the statesmen of past times. A statesman of the fifteenth or sixteenth century, who had actively discountenanced the burning of heretics, would appear in the eyes of the present day a person deserving of superior admiration, precisely on account of his having dared to set a bad prescription aside. We cannot even concede so much to Mr. Taylor as to admit, that the leaning from prescription is a greater defect in a statesman than the leaning to it—if we are compelled to take our choice between the two, and if we compare them with reference to the supreme end, the public good—not with reference to the subordinate end, the personal ease and popularity of the individual. It is indeed necessary that he should take due account of the opinions and feelings prevalent around him, and that he should undertake nothing without having calculated beforehand this important element: but the accuracy of the calculation will not be assisted by any pre-existing bias in his own mind.

In chapter the ninth, Mr. Taylor examines how far the practice of granting personal interviews is convenient or useful to a statesman. He thinks that interviews seldom conduce to any good result, and are often the means of giving unjust preponderance to one side of a disputed case. We concur in most of his remarks on this head: but the most curious part of the chapter is the description which he gives, authenticated as it is by his own personal observation, of the incredible want of preparation in suitors or claimants, when they approach the minister at the appointed hour of interview:

We doubt whether an American citizen, who goes to submit a case for the consideration of the executive functionaries at Washington is at all beset by the flutter of indefinite expectation which is alleged thus to unman an ordinary English applicant in Downing-street. We suspect that the American knows better both what his government can do for him, and what it ought to do for him; a species of knowledge which Mr. Taylor’s testimony proves to be deplorably deficient amongst a class of the English community neither very poor nor very uneducated.

There are in Mr. Taylor’s volume several other matters on which we differ from him, and several on which to show how far we agree with him or not, would involve us in too long a discussion. We prefer to cite (it need not be at great length) some few miscellaneous remarks which present themselves in turning over the pages of the volume.

The following remark is original, and shows much knowledge of the world:

In the following, a fact often noticed, is, perhaps for the first time in print, philosophically explained.

That “universal mediocrity of mankind” by which Madame Roland was so much astonished when she first mixed in the world, and became an observer of its most admired characters,^[*] is, in truth, owing to nothing so much as to the fact, that not one man in a thousand feels any real interest in anything which he hears or sees, unless it somehow affects his own miserable vanities and worldlinesses. Let a person, of the most ordinary capacity, once acquire a sincere and lasting interest in anything, capable of affording exercise to the understanding, and see how that interest will call forth faculties never previously observed in him. This is one reason why periods of scepticism, though they may produce extraordinary individuals, are seldom rich, compared with other periods, in the general stock of persons of talent. For in an age of strong convictions, the second and third-rate talents, being combined with earnestness, grow up and attain full development, and fructify: but in an age of uncertainty, none but the very first order of intellects are able to lay for themselves so firm and solid a foundation of what they believe to be truth, as they can build upon afterwards in full self-reliance, and stake the repose of their consciences upon without anxiety. The people of second-rate talent feel sure of nothing, and therefore care for nothing, and by an inevitable chain of consequences, accomplish nothing.

In the following passage, the uses of imaginative culture to the perfection even of the thinking faculty, are strikingly sketched, though cursorily, and in a manner which will be intelligible only to those who already have the ideas intended to be conveyed:

On indecisiveness:

On another very common and very fatal weakness:

With the following passage, on faults of manner, we shall conclude:

What is here said of faults of manner, is true of all faults of taste. De gustibus non est disputandum is a maxim as faulty in its philosophy as in its Latinity. Tastes, indeed, where they are not positively noxious to other people, are not proper subjects of condemnation in themselves; but they may be indications of faults of character or of intellect, to any conceivable extent; for there is hardly anything which goes so far into the inmost depths of a man’s nature as his tastes. Most actions are the result of some one quality or deficiency only; but in determining the things which a man habitually takes pleasure in, every quality of his mind and heart has a share; his tastes are the aggregate result of his entire character, and are that by which, more than by all other symptoms, it is made outwardly manifest.

One word respecting the style of the Statesman. Both the phrases and the sentences indicate that close familiarity with the authors of the first half of the seventeenth century which enabled Mr. Taylor to impart such peculiar beauty to the versification of Philip van Artevelde, but which is not of equally happy effect in a prose volume. The perhaps unconscious and unintentional imitation of these models leads him occasionally into both obscurity and affectation.

Appendix B

Appendix to Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. I (1859)

from^athe^aprinciple of the necessity of identifying the interest of the government with that of the people, most of the practical maxims of a representative government are corollaries. All popular institutions are means towards rendering the identity of interest more complete. We say more complete, because (and this it is important to remark) perfectly complete it can never be. An approximation is all that is, in the nature of things, possible. By pushing to its utmost extent the accountability of governments to the people, you indeed take away from them the power of prosecuting their own interests at the expense of the people by force, but you leave to them the whole range and compass of fraud. An attorney is accountable to his client, and removable at his client’s pleasure; but we should scarcely say that his interest is identical with that of his client. When the accountability is perfect, the interest of rulers approximates more and more to identity with that of the people, in proportion as the people are more enlightened. The identity would be perfect, only if the people were so wise, that it should no longer be practicable to employ deceit as an instrument of government; a point of advancement only one stage below that at which they could do without government altogether; at least, without force, and penal sanctions, not (of course) without guidance and organized co-operation.

Identification of interest between the rulers and the ruled, being therefore, in a literal sense, impossible to be realized, ^bought not to^b be spoken of as a condition which a government must absolutely fulfil; but as an end to be incessantly aimed at, and approximated to as nearly as circumstances render possible, and as is compatible with the regard due to other ends. For ^cthis^c identity of interest, even if it were wholly attainable, not being the sole requisite of good government, expediency may require that we should sacrifice some portion of it, or (to speak more precisely) content ourselves with a somewhat less approximation to it than might possibly be attainable, for the sake of some other end.

The only end, liable occasionally to conflict with that which we have been insisting on, and at all comparable to it in importance—the only other condition essential to good government—is this: That it be government by a select body, not by the ^dpublic^d collectively: That political questions be not decided by an appeal, either direct or indirect, to the judgment or will of an uninstructed mass, whether of gentlemen or of clowns; but by the deliberately formed opinions of a comparatively few, specially educated for the task. This is an element of good government which has existed, in a greater or less degree, in some aristocracies, though unhappily not in our own; and has been the cause of whatever reputation for prudent and skilful administration those governments have enjoyed. It has seldom been found in any aristocracies but those which were avowedly such. Aristocracies in the guise of monarchies (such as those of England and France) have very generally been aristocracies of idlers; while the others (such as Rome, Venice, and Holland) might partially be considered as aristocracies of experienced and laborious men. ^eOf all modern governments, however^e , the one by which this excellence is possessed in the most eminent degree is the government of Prussia—a^f powerfully and ^gstrongly organized aristocracy of^g the most highly-educated men in the kingdom. The British government in India partakes (with considerable modifications) of the same character.

^hWhen^h this principle has been combined with other fortunate circumstances, and particularly (as in Prussia) with circumstances rendering the popularity of the government almost a necessary condition of its security, a very considerable degree of good government has occasionally been produced,ⁱ without any express accountability to the people. Such fortunate circumstances, however, are seldom to be reckoned upon. But though the principle of government by persons specially brought up to it will not suffice to produce good government, good government cannot be had without it; and the grand difficulty in politics will for a long time be, how best to conciliate the two great elements on which good government depends; to combine the greatest amount of the advantage derived from the independent judgment of a specially instructed ^jfew, with the greatest degree of the security for rectitude of purpose derived from rendering those few responsible to the many.

What is necessary, however, to make the two ends perfectly reconcilable, is a smaller matter than might at first sight be supposed. It is not necessary that the many^j should themselves be perfectly wise; it is sufficient if they be duly sensible of the value of superior wisdom. It is sufficient if they be aware, that the majority of political questions turn upon considerations of which they, and all persons not trained for the purpose, must necessarily be very imperfect judges; and that their judgment must in general be exercised rather upon the characters and talents of the persons whom they appoint to decide these questions for them, than upon the questions themselves. They would then select as their representatives those whom the general voice of the instructed pointed out as the most instructed; and would retain them, so long as no symptom was manifested in their conduct, of being under the influence of interests or of feelings at variance with the public welfare. This implies no greater wisdom in the people than the very ordinary wisdom, of knowing what things they are and are not sufficient judges of. If the bulk of any nation possess a fair share of this wisdom, the argument for universal suffrage, so far as respects that people, is irresistible; for the experience of ages, and especially of all great national emergencies, bears out the assertion, that whenever the multitude are really alive to the necessity of superior intellect, they rarely fail to distinguish those who possess it.

The idea of a rational democracy is, not that the people themselves govern, but that they have ^ksecurity^k for good government. This security they cannot have by any other means than by retaining in their own hands the ultimate control. If they renounce this, they give themselves up to tyranny. A governing class not accountable to the people are sure, in the main, to sacrifice the people to the pursuit of separate interests and inclinations of their own. Even their feelings of morality, even their ideas of excellence, have reference, not to the good of the people, but to their own good: their very virtues are class virtues—their noblest acts of patriotism and self-devotion are but the sacrifice of their private interests to the interests of their class. The heroic public virtue of a Leonidas was quite compatible with the existence of Helots. In no government will the interests of the people be the object, except where the people are able to dismiss their rulers as soon as the devotion of those rulers to the interests of the people becomes questionable. But this is the only ^lfit use to be made of popular power^l . Provided good intentions can be secured, the best government (need it be said?) must be the government of the wisest, and these must always be a few. The people ought to be the masters, but they are masters who must employ servants more skilful than themselves: like a ministry when they employ a military commander, or the military commander when he employs an army surgeon. When the minister ceases to confide in the commander, he dismisses him and appoints another; but he does not^m, if he is wise,^m send him instructions when and where to fight. He holds him responsible only for ⁿintentions and forⁿ results. The people must do the same. This does not render the control of the people nugatory. The control of a government over the commander of ^oan^o army is not nugatory. A man’s control over his physician is not nugatory, ^pthough^p he does not direct his physician what medicine to administer.^q

But in government, as in everything else, the danger is, lest those who can do whatever they will, may will to do more than is for their ultimate interest. The interest of the people is, to choose for their rulers the most instructed and the ablest persons who can be found; and having done so, to allow them to exercise their knowledge and ability for the good of the people^r, under the check of the freest discussion and the most unreserved censure, but with the least possible direct interference of their constituents^r —as long as it is the good of the people, and not some private end, that they are aiming at. A democracy thus administered would unite all the good qualities ever possessed by any government. Not only would its ends be good, but its means would be as well chosen as the wisdom of the age would allow; and the omnipotence of the majority would be exercised through the agency and ^saccording to the judgment^s of an enlightened minority, accountable to the majority in the last resort.

But it is not possible that the constitution of the democracy itself should provide adequate security for its being understood and administered in this spirit^t . This rests with the good sense of the people themselves. If the people can remove their rulers for one thing, they can for another. That ultimate control, without which they cannot have security for good government, may, if they please, be made the means of themselves interfering in the government, and making their legislators mere delegates for carrying into execution the preconceived judgment of the majority. If the people do this, they mistake their interest; and such a government, though better than most aristocracies, is not the kind of democracy which wise men desire.

^uSome persons, and persons too whose desire for enlightened government cannot be^vquestioned^v , do not take so serious a view of this perversion of the true idea of ^wan enlightened democracy^w . They say, it is well that the many should evoke all political questions to their own tribunal, and decide them according to their own judgment, because then philosophers will be compelled to enlighten the multitude, and render them capable of appreciating their more profound views. ^x No one can attach greater value than we do to this consequence of popular government, ^y so far as we believe it capable of being realized; and the argument would be irresistible, if, in order to instruct the people, all that is requisite were to will it; if it were only the discovery of political truths which required study and wisdom, and the ^zevidences^z of them when discovered could be made apparent at once to any person of common sense, as well educated as every individual in the community might and ought to be. But the fact is not so. Many of the truths of politics (in political economy, for instance) are the result of a concatenation of propositions, the very first steps of which no one who has not gone through a course of study is prepared to concede; there are others, to have a complete perception of which requires much meditation, and experience of human nature. How will philosophers bring these home to the perceptions of the multitude? Can they enable common sense to judge of science, or inexperience of experience? Every one who has even crossed the threshold of political philosophy knows, that on many of its questions the false view is greatly the most plausible; and a large portion of its truths are, and must always remain, to all but those who have specially studied them, paradoxes; as contrary, in appearance, to common sense, as the proposition that the earth moves round the sun. The multitude will never believe ^athose^a truths, until tendered to them from an authority in which they have as unlimited confidence as they have in the unanimous voice of astronomers on a question of astronomy.^b That they should have no such confidence at present is no discredit to them; for ^cwhere are the persons who are entitled to it?^c But we are well satisfied that it will be given, as soon as knowledge shall have made sufficient progress among the instructed classes themselves, to produce something like a general agreement in their opinions ^don the leading points of moral and political doctrine^d . Even now, on those points on which the instructed classes are agreed, the uninstructed have generally adopted their opinions.^u

Appendix C

Jowett on Civil Service Examinations (1854)

Dear Sir,

I think two objections are likely to be made to the report you were so good as to show me on the “Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service.” First, that it is impossible to be assured of the moral character of persons elected by examination into the public service; secondly, that it is impossible to carry on an examination in so great a variety of subjects as would be required, and with such numberless candidates; in other words that the scheme, however excellent, is not practicable.

I am convinced that neither of these objections has any real foundation.

I. For the moral character of the candidates I should trust partly to the examination itself. University experience abundantly shows that in more than nineteen cases out of twenty, men of attainments are also men of character. The perseverance and self-discipline necessary for the acquirement of any considerable amount of knowledge are a great security that a young man has not led a dissolute life.

But in addition I would suggest that there should be a system of inquiries and testimonials, which might be made considerably more efficient than testimonials for orders are at present. The analogy of insurance offices would afford the best model for carrying out such a system. I would propose:

1. That the candidate should give notice (as in the case of orders) of his intention to offer himself at least three months before the examination.

2. That he should at the same time send papers comprising a certificate of birth and baptism, with a precise statement of all the places of his education, whether at school or college, together with testimonials of his conduct for two years previously from the head of the school or college in which he was last a pupil, and also a statement of his present occupation and residence.

3. That he should give references—

• 1. To a medical man;
• 2. To a magistrate; or, in case of inferior situations, to two respectable householders;
• 3. To a clergyman or dissenting minister;

to all of whom carefully-drawn questions respecting the candidate in the form of an insurance office paper should be submitted; the answers to be confidential. To prevent the possible forgery of a character, an independent letter might be sent to a clergyman or magistrate in the district, with the view of his certifying to the existence and respectability of the references.

The scrutiny of the character and testimonials of the candidates ought to be quite separate from the examination. The rejection should be absolute and without reasons; whether it took place on medical or moral grounds would remain uncertain. In case of Parliamentary inquiry, however, a register of the reasons might be privately kept in the office.

With such or even a less amount of precaution the standard of character among public servants would surely be maintained as high as at present, or higher; as high certainly as the standard of character which can be ensured in persons admitted to holy orders.

Yours, very truly,

B. Jowett.

Balliol College, January 1854.

[Footnote to Mill’s “Reform of the Civil Service”^[*] ]

Mr. Mill has misunderstood the intention of Mr. Jowett’s recommendations, as will be seen from the following explanation which Mr. Jowett was invited to furnish. “I should object as strongly as Mr. Mill to the proposals contained in the paper relating to the examinations, if I understood them as he does.

“1. The certificate of baptism was not required as a religious test, but as affording the readiest means of identifying the candidate, and verifying his age. If, from whatever cause, it could not have been obtained, it must have been dispensed with.

“2. The reference to a clergyman or dissenting minister was equally without any religious or party object. They were supposed to be friends of the candidate, chosen by himself. They would not, therefore, have refused testimonials to moral character because they differed from him in religious opinions.

“3. Neither for the same reason would they have brought secret accusations against him. It was not proposed that any inquiries should be made of persons not indicated by the candidate himself. He could surely trust his own references. If he were a man of decent character, he would easily find friends willing to act in that capacity. If he were of bad character, the manner in which the proposal would work would be, by his being unable to find them. But it seemed hardly fair to subject them against their will to an altercation with him about the mode of their answers.

“If, however, such suspicions as Mr. Mill suggests were engendered by any degree of secresy or confidence, it would be far better that the inquiries should be entirely public. But there would then arise the fresh difficulty of casting a public stigma on the character of a young man for offences of which there would be no legal proof.

“The only reason for fixing on magistrates and ministers of religion, rather than any other known persons as the referees, was the necessity of adopting some general rule in a scheme so large as that proposed by the Report, instead of having to ascertain the respectability of each person who offered his testimony in favour of a candidate. Magistrates and ministers of religion appeared to be the most responsible class which could be selected, and sufficiently numerous not to be exclusive. The form of inquiries rather than testimonials was suggested, not with the view of instituting a minute investigation into the life and habits of the candidate, but only of avoiding the evasive and ambiguous use of language which has made testimonials a byword.

“I have made these remarks in justice to myself, though unwilling to obtrude the subjects discussed in the paper on examinations again on the attention of the public, and still more so to claim any authority for its suggestions as a part of the Report.

“My aim was to meet an objection at one time very strongly felt and strongly urged against the plan of Sir C. Trevelyan and Sir S. Northcote, that ‘it would fill the Public Offices with clever scamps.’ The various precautions enumerated are intended rather to show how completely such objections might be obviated than as necessary regulations to be precisely observed. Securities of this kind would be useful or mischievous according to the spirit in which they were enforced. In my own judgment a much less amount of precaution would be quite sufficient. The real and great precaution is the examination itself. Experience would probably show that hardly any other was required. I quite agree with Mr. Mill in thinking that any limitation not absolutely necessary would be in the highest degree injurious.”

Appendix D

Substantive Variants between the People’s Edition and the final Library Edition of On Liberty

the people’s edition ofOn Liberty (first published in 1865, with stereotyped reissues thereafter) agrees substantively with the 3rd Library Edition (1864), except in the readings given below, none of which appears in the 4th Library Edition (1869), the copy-text for the present edition. (In the two cases, 234^b-b and 243^d-d, where 1864 and 1869 differ, the People’s Edition agrees with 1864.) In the following list (which, as throughout this volume, includes changes in italicization as substantives), after the page and line references, the first reading is that of 1869; the second, after a bracket, is that of the People’s Edition, with the page and column reference to the latter in parentheses.

220.13 compel] compels (3b)

224.37 of man] of a man (6b)

239.38 and for attainments] and attainments (17b)

245.5 not with still] not still (21b)

251.19 to attain] to obtain (26a)

256.29-30 from the value of the moral] from the moral (29b)

260.33 is it] it is (33a)

265.25 conditions] condition (36a)

267.27 existed] exist (37b)

267.39 more] more (38a)

269.35-6 courage which it] courage it (39b)

272.12 is change] is a change (41b)

275.1-2 Improvements . . . promote] Improvement . . . promotes (43a)

276.21 going the] going to the (44a)

287.22 any number] a number (52a)

289.26 never can] can never (53b)

302.18 require] require (62b)

302.19 providing] providing (62b)

Appendix E

Substantive Variants between the People’s Edition and the final Library Edition of Considerations on Representative Government

the people’s edition ofConsiderations on Representative Government (first published in 1865, with stereotyped reissues thereafter) agrees substantively with the 3rd Library Edition (also 1865), except in the readings given below. The number of unique accidental readings (there are only two cases where the punctuation agrees uniquely with the 2nd Library Edition, and one where it agrees with the 1st) suggests that the People’s Edition was prepared from the 3rd edition (rather than from the 2nd), and not vice versa; therefore the following readings have some claim to authority, although in the present edition we have followed the policy of using the final Library Edition in Mill’s lifetime as copy-text. In the list below (which, as throughout this volume, includes changes in capitalization and italicization as substantives), after the page and line references, the first reading is that of the Library Edition of 1865; the second, after a bracket, is that of the People’s Edition, with the page and column reference to the latter in parentheses.

380.8 are] are (5a)

380.22 outside] outside (5b)

405.30 to truth] to the truth (23a)

411.13 into the consultation] into consultation (27a)

419.40 and its] and by its (33a)

430.1 Bills] bills (40b)

430.17 Legislation] legislation (40b)

437.14 a hereditary] an hereditary (45a)

450.14-15 a majority] the majority (54b)

472.27 uncertificated] uncertified (69b)

477.14 me, more] me, a chance of more (73a)

494.24-5 takes interest] takes an interest (85a)

513.2 have] has (97a)

526.26 provoke] promote (106a)

529.36 the examiner] an examiner (108b)

530.29 a minister] the minister (109a)

536.5 State] state (111a)

561.17 of government] of the government (130a)

572.32 duties] duty (138b)

Appendix F

Bibliographic Index of Persons and Works Cited in the Essays, with Variants and Notes

Mill, like most nineteenth-century authors, is cavalier in his approach to sources, seldom identifying them with sufficient care, and frequently quoting them inaccurately. This Appendix is intended to help correct these deficiencies, and to serve as an index of names and titles (which are consequently omitted in the Index proper). Included also, at the end of the Appendix, are references to parliamentary reports and evidence, which are entered in order of date under the heading “Parliamentary Papers,” and references to British statute law, which are entered in order of date under the heading “Statutes.” The material otherwise is arranged in alphabetical order, with an entry for each person or work quoted or referred to in the text proper and in Appendices A and B (those in the Appendices are given in italic type). In cases of simple reference only surnames are given.

The entries take the following form:

1. Identification: author, title, etc., in the usual bibliographic form.

2. Notes (if required) giving information about JSM’s use of the source, indication if the work is in his library, and any other relevant information.

3. A list of the places where the author or work is quoted, and a separate list of the places where there is reference only. Those works that are reviewed are so noted.

4. A list of substantive variants between JSM’s text and his source, in this form: Page and line reference to the present text. Reading in the present text] Reading in the source (page reference in the source).

The list of substantive variants also attempts to place quoted passages in their contexts by giving the beginnings and endings of sentences. Omissions of two sentences or less are given in full; only the length of other omissions is given. Translated material from the French is given in the original. When the style has been altered, the original form is retained in the entries.

Abdy, Edward Strutt.Journal of a Residence and Tour in the United States of North America, from April, 1833, to October, 1834. 3 vols. London: Murray, 1835.

reviewed: 93-115

quoted: 103, 111

103.19 ‘has been] has, in the latter country, been (II,130)

111.25 world, than among ourselves, while] world, while (I,13)

Aberdeen. See Gordon.

Acts. See Statutes.

Adams, John. Referred to: 109

note: the reference is in a quotation from E. Everett.

Adams, John Quincy. Referred to: 109

note: the reference is in a quotation from E. Everett.

Ade, George. Referred to: 496n. See Parliamentary Papers, “Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act” (1860).

Akbar (Moghul Emperor). Referred to: 224

Alcibiades. Referred to: 266, 460

Alexander the Great. Referred to: 532

Andræ. Referred to: 466n

Anon.Essays on Government. London: Wilson, 1839.

reviewed: 151-2

quoted: 151, 152

151.7 “in] Assuming this as a recognised truth,—an established axiom, and that the progressive state of man is the result of a special decree of the creator, throughout these essays, it is taken for granted to be a fixed principle in nature, that the successive changes which take place, are no more left to chance in (2)

151.10 laws as] laws established by providence as (2)

151.10 seasons.”] seasons; and setting out upon this principle, it is here intended to investigate what must be the necessary effect upon government, of an ignorant and barbarous people becoming generally educated and civilized. (2)

152.7 “Democracy] This, however, is an error; democracy (169)

Anon.Thoughts on the Ladies of the Aristocracy. See “Tomkins, Lydia.”

Anon. “Tours in America, by Latrobe, Abdy, &c.,” Quarterly Review, LIV (Sept., 1835), 392-413.

note: the Wellesley Index, II, says the article is possibly by John Wilson Croker.

referred to: 115

Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius. Referred to: 236-7

Aranda (Don Pedro Pablo Abarca de Boleo). Referred to: 382

Aristides (the Just). Referred to: 336, 494

note: the references are identical, the second being in a passage in which Mill quotes himself.

Aristophanes.The Knights, in Comediae cum commentariis et scholiis. 9 vols. Leipzig: Weidmann, 1794-1822.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 499

Aristotle. Referred to: 179, 235, 353

— Nicomachean Ethics.

note: as the reference is general, no edition is cited.

referred to: 143n

— Politics.

note: as the reference is general, no edition is cited.

referred to: 143n

— Rhetoric.

note: as the reference is general, no edition is cited.

referred to: 143n

Arnold of Brescia. Referred to: 238

Augustus. See Caesar, Augustus.

Aurelius. See Antoninus.

Austin, John. Referred to: 5n, 145n

— A Plea for the Constitution. 2nd ed. London: Murray, 1859.

reviewed: 343-70

quoted: 344, 345, 346, 346-7, 349-50, 350, 350-1, 352

344.27 “All] In short, all (6)

345.6 government . . . . The long] government. The harmonious action of the three branches of the Parliament, and the long (7)

345.7 work . . . has] work, is perhaps the most wonderful of all the phenomena presented by the history of political institutions. It has (7)

345.12 Parliamentary] parliamentary (7)

345.19 “talent for compromise.”] [see text, 345.3]

345.31-2 “the . . . House,”] [see text, 345.12-13]

346.13 “governed] With regard to the form of the sovereignty, the British Government is decidedly more democratical than any other assignable government which has governed (9)

346.15-16 “has . . . time.”] It must be remembered, however, that the solidity of the federal government, and the actual states’ governments has . . . time; whilst the singular natural advantages, economical and other, with which these states have hitherto been favoured, have enabled them to live and prosper with little government of any kind, and, therefore, to bear the evils of extreme democracy. (10)

346.17-19 “in spirit and effect,” . . . “the most democratical of . . . present.”] But if, in respect of its form, the British Government ranks with democracies, it is the most democratical in spirit and effect of . . . present. (10)

346.24 Governments] governments (10)

347.4-5 public business] public interests (13)

347.10 parliamentary] Parliamentary (13) [cf. 347^a-a]

347.10 country. From] country. [paragraph] From (13)

347.17 means . . . they] means, they are naturally superior to political adventurers in point of political morality: a natural superiority which they would continue to possess, although such adventures (as in the United States) are paid by the public for their Parliamentary services. As their incomes and social positions are independent of office, and are not dependent on seats in Parliament, they (13)

347.23 “gentlemanly honour”] [see text, 347.12]

349.34 ‘Would] A House of Commons representing the prejudices of the non-proprietory class, would not attempt the impossible task of governing the nation as a joint stock company; but they would (19)

349.39 commercial] economical (19)

350.4 minimum . . . maximum] minimum . . . maximum (19)

350.35-6 “insanity,” . . . “atrocious outbreak,”] We believe that they [English men of no property] are not infected with the theoretical and insane socialism which in 1848 played so disastrous a part in France and Germany: inciting to unprovoked and wanton revolution, depraving the minds and hearts of large portions of the population, striking the remainder with a despair of political improvement, and stopping the peaceful and hopeful progress which those countries were making previously to the atrocious outbreak. (18)

350.38-9 “give . . . Commons,”] From the probable evils of the introduction of universal suffrage, we proceed to those of any reform of Parliament which would give . . . Commons. (22)

350.42 these] those (23)

350.43-4 would probably] would be far inferior in character to the majority of the present House. It would probably (23)

351.14 dislike . . . . According] dislike. Unless they were skilled in election tactics, or were masters of popular eloquence and popular histrionic faculties, they would have but a poor chance of sitting in the House of Commons; and to men endowed with superior reason and knowledge, the acquisition of those arts and faculties would be next to impossible, though they were not withheld from acquiring them by self-respect and taste. [paragraph] According (23)

351.19 practice . . . the] practice, the Parliament would become incapable of corporate action. From being the organ and the collective wisdom of the entire electoral body, the (23-4)

351.23 action . . . . Now] action, and incapable of acting in unison with the other branches of the Parliament. Now, (24)

351.29-30 instructions. There] instructions. [paragraph] There (24)

351.31 Government . . . . The] Government. This tendency, so far as it takes effect, defeats the important and wise purposes for which the sovereign Parliament commits those functions to the Crown. The (24)

351.33 while] whilst (24)

351.42 ministers] Ministers (24)

351.48 “unchecked ascendancy”] [see text, 350.39]

352.17 “vestrymen.”] [see text, 351.38]

352.28-30 “The . . . views.”] But the only opinion or sentiment favourable to the constitution, which the great majority of a people can generally hold in common, is the sentiment of constitutionality; for the . . . views. (37)

352.29 Sovereign Government] sovereign government (37)

352.31 “in . . . itself,”] To a people in whom this feeling is deep and general, the constitution of their sovereign government, in . . . itself, is an object of love and veneration. (37)

— The Province of Jurisprudence determined. London: Murray, 1832.

referred to: 343

Ayrton. Referred to: 352

Bacon, Francis. Quoted: 627. Referred to: 17, 621, 623, 626

note: the quotation, which is in a quotation from Taylor, has not been located. The reference at 626 is in a quotation from Taylor.

— Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning. In The Works of Francis Bacon. 14 vols. Ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath. London: Longman, et al., 1857-74, IV, 273-V, 119.

note: for ease of reference this ed., which is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, is used.

quoted: 194

194.2 “sabbathless pursuit of wealth”] Moreover, although men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this incessant, restless, and as it were sabbathless pursuit of fortune leaves not the tribute which we owe to God of our time; who we see demands and separates for himself a tenth part of our substance, but a seventh of our time. (V, 77)

Baden, Grand Duke of. See Frederick I of Baden.

Bagehot, Walter.Parliamentary Reform. London: Chapman and Hall, [1859].

note: reprinted, with additions, from The National Review, VIII (Jan., 1859), 228-73.

referred to: 364

Bailey, Samuel.The Rationale of Political Representation. London: Hunter, 1835.

reviewed: 17-46

quoted: 19, 20-1, 21-2, 25-6, 28n-29n, 30, 33-4, 34, 34-5, 35-6, 36, 37, 37n, 38, 38-9, 39, 39-40, 41

referred to: 55n, 481

19.4-5 ‘That . . . interest] It is a principle of human nature, that . . . interests (68)

19.20-4 ‘it . . . rest; since, from . . . interest;’] But it . . . rest. [six-sentence omission] Now, as from . . . interest, it [as 19.25] (69, 70-1)

19.25 ‘It] it (71) [runs on from previous quotation]

19.25-6 to . . . identified.][no italics] (71)

19.26-7 which meets] which effects (71)

19.30-2 rendering . . . theirs.] [no italics] (71)

19.35 of a representative,] of representative, (71)

19.38-40 he . . . office.’] [no italics] (71)

20.19 ‘Nothing] As to the first, nothing (16)

21.30 ‘Far’] Burke, who delighted to penetrate to the principles of every question, who was continually sounding the depth of his own argument as he went along, far (30)

21.32 he considers] considers (30)

25.6 ‘the] It is impossible to determine the point with exactness without reference to actual experience; and the experience of our own country, in combination with the preceding considerations, if well weighed, will probably lead the mind to fix three years as the (203)

25.44 body. Here] body. [paragraph] Here (298)

30.21 all. It] all. [paragraph] It (231)

30.24 10001.] one thousand. (231)

34.11 ‘Large] The supreme legislative assembly is essentially, as already explained, a deliberative body; and it is acknowledged that large (160-1)

34.12 deliberation;’] deliberation. (161)

34.32 ‘This] In truth, this (193)

37.16 ‘maturity of years,’] But there is a qualification of even still greater importance than maturity of years; and that is, freedom from all other serious or momentous occupation—a qualification hitherto completely neglected. (181)

38.4 ‘in] In (180)

Barclay, John.Argenis. Paris: Buon, 1621.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Taylor.

quoted:635

Barrot, Camille Hyacinthe Odilon.De la Centralisation et de ses Effets. Paris: Dumineray, 1861.

reviewed: 581-613

quoted: 586

586.7-39 We . . . effects.] [translated from:] Nous ne voulons toucher en rien à cette belle unité française qu’un pouvoir fortement concentré a pu contribuer à constituer, mais que la liberté seule peut conserver et cimenter. Nous ne rejetons de la centralisation que son excès; or, à nos yeux, cet excès est dans toute centralisation qui, soit par la confusion des deux pouvoirs, soit par leur solidarité, dans un intérêt religieux ou dans un intérêt politique, porte une atteinte directe ou indirecte à la liberté des consciences et des cultes. Nous regardons également comme exagérée une centralisation qui, tantôt à titre de tutelle, tantôt à titre de police, soumettrait à son action préventive les droits collectifs ou même individuels des citoyens; qui, par exemple, sous le prétexte que les communes seraient incapables de faire leurs affaires, se chargerait de les faire elle-même par ses agents, désignerait leurs maires, leurs percepteurs, leurs maîtres d’école, leurs curés et bientôt leurs gardes-champêtres; ne permettrait à leurs conseils de s’assembler qu’avec sa permission; se réserverait de faire annuellement leurs budgets, et qui, même après la dépense votée et autorisée, prétendrait encore en régler l’exécution, en imposant à ces malheureuses communes qui paient, en définitive, ses plans, ses ingénieurs, ses architectes. Je tiens pour excessive une centralisation qui enlacerait presque tous les actes des citoyens dans la nécessité d’autorisations préalables, au point de ne leur permettre ni de prier Dieu, ni même de se mouvoir d’un lieu à un autre que sous son bon plaisir. Je n’hésite pas à déclarer abusive une centralisation qui, après avoir ainsi donné tout pouvoir aux agents de l’autorité sur les citoyens, refuserait à ceux-ci tout recours contre ces mêmes agents déclarés inviolables sous la protection d’un conseil d’État choisi par elle; une centralisation qui, à l’aide de conflits qu’elle élèverait et résoudrait selon sa volonté, dessaisirait la justice ordinaire et évoquerait la décision de toute cause dans laquelle elle se dirait intéressée. Je rejette enfin une centralisation dont les appétits toujours irrités et jamais satisfaits, menaceraient incessamment ce qui pourrait encore rester dans la société d’existences indépendantes; étendrait la main, tantôt sur les biens des hospices, tantôt sur ceux des communes, tantôt sur les grandes compagnies des chemins de fer et d’assurances. C’est cette centralisation qui finirait par réduir l’individu à l’état d’automate, que j’attaque et dont je vais essayer de décrire les funestes effets. (63-6)

Beaumarchais, Pierre-Augustine Caron de.La Folle Journée, ou Le Mariage de Figaro, in Œuvres complètes. 7 vols. Paris: Collin, 1809, II.

note: a two-volume Œuvres complètes was formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 427

427.15-16 Il fallait . . . obtint,] Le désespoir m’allait saisir; on pense à moi pour une place, mais par malheur j’y étais propre; il fallait . . . obtint. (II,276-7; Act V, Scene iii)

Beaumont, Gustave Auguste de La Bonnière de.Marie; ou, l’Esclavage aux États-Unis, tableau de mœurs américaines. 2 vols. 2nd ed. Paris: Gosselin, 1835.

reviewed: 93-115

quoted: 76, 102-3, 104n-105n, 111-12

102.33-103.13 ‘A . . . so.’ . . . ‘Because . . . faith.’] [translated from:] Peu de temps après mon arrivée en Amérique, comme j’entrais dans un salon où se trouvait réunie l’élite de la société de l’une des plus grandes villes de l’Union, un Français, fixé depuis long-temps dans ce pays, me dit; “Surtout n’allez pas mal parler des banqueroutiers.” Je suivis son avis et fis bien; car, parmi tous les riches personnages auxquels je fus présenté, il n’en était pas un seul qui n’eût failli une ou deux fois dans sa vie avant de faire fortune. [paragraph] Tous les Américains faisant le commerce, et tous ayant failli plus ou moins souvent, il suit de là qu’aux États-Unis ce n’est rien que de faire banqueroute. Dans une société où tout le monde commet le même délit, ce délit n’en est plus un. L’indulgence pour les banqueroutiers vient d’abord de ce que c’est le malheur commun; mais elle a surtout pour cause l’extrême facilité que trouve le failli à se relever. Si le failli était perdu à jamais, ou [sic] l’abandonnerait à sa misère; on est bien plus indulgent pour celui qui est malheureux quand on sait qu’il ne le sera pas toujours. [1-paragraph omission] [paragraph] De ce que les Américains sont indulgens pour la banqueroute, il ne s’ensuit pas qu’ils l’approuvent: “l’intérêt est le grand vice des Musulmans, et la libéralité est cependant la vertu qu’ils estiment davantage¹. [footnote:¹Chateaubriand, Itinéraire, t.2, p. 38.] De même ces marchands, qui violent sans cesse leurs engagemens, vantent et honorent la bonne foi. (I, 284-6)

104.n7-105.n11 ‘The . . . existence.’] [translated from:] L’Américain, dès l’âge le plus tendre, est livré aux affaires; à peine sait-il lire et écrire qu’il devient commerçant; le premier son qui frappe son oreille est celui de l’argent; la première voix qu’il entend, c’est celle de l’intérêt; il respire en naissant une atmosphère industrielle, et toutes ses premières impressions lui persuadent que la vie des affaires est la seule qui convienne à l’homme. [paragraph] Le sort de la jeune fille n’est point le même; son éducation morale dure jusqu’au jour où elle se marie. Elle acquiert des connaissances en histoire, en littérature; elle apprend, en général, une langue étrangère (ordinairement le français); elle sait un peu de musique. Sa vie est intellectuelle. [paragraph] Ce jeune homme et cette jeune fille si dissemblables s’unissent un jour par le mariage. Le premier, suivant le cours de ses habitudes, passe son temps à la banque ou dans son magasin; la seconde, qui tombe dans l’isolement le jour où elle prend un époux, compare la vie réelle qui lui est échue à l’existence qu’elle avait rêvée. Comme rien dans ce monde nouveau qui s’offre à elle ne parle à son cœur, elle se nourrit de chimères, et lit des romans. Ayant peu de bonheur, elle est très religieuse, et lit des sermons. Quand elle a des enfans, elle vit près d’eux, les soigne et les caresse. Ainsi se passent ses jours. Les soir, l’Américain rentre chez lui: soucieux, inquiet, accablé de fatigue; il apporte à sa femme le fruit de son travail, et rêve déjà aux spéculations du lendemain. Il demande le dîner, et ne profère plus une seule parole; sa femme ne sait rien des affaires qui le préoccupent; en présence de son mari, elle ne cesse pas d’être isolée. L’aspect de sa femme et de ses enfans n’arrache point l’Américain au monde positif, et il est si rare qu’il leur donne une marque de tendresse et d’affection, qu’on donne un sobriquet aux ménages dans lesquels le mari, après une absence, embrasse sa femme et ses enfans; on les appelle the kissing families. Aux yeux de l’Américain, la femme n’est pas une compagne, c’est une associée qui l’aide à dépenser, pour son bien-être et son comfort, l’argent gagné par lui dans le commerce. [paragraph] La vie sédentaire et retirée des femmes, aux États-Unis, explique, avec les rigueurs du climat, la faiblesse de leur complexion; elles ne sortent point du logis, ne prennent aucun exercice, vivent d’une nourriture légère; presque toutes ont un grand nombre d’enfans; il ne faut pas s’étonner si elles vieillissent si vite et meurent si jeunes. [paragraph] Telle est cette vie de contrastes, agitée, aventureuse, presque fébrile pour l’homme, triste et monotone pour la femme; elle s’écoule ainsi uniforme jusqu’au jour où le mari annonce à sa femme qu’ils ont fait banqueroute; alors il faut partir, et l’on va recommencer ailleurs la même existence. (I,268-9)

111.26-112.9 ‘The . . . answerable.’] [translated from:] L’instruction donnée aux enfans est purement utile: elle n’a point en vue le développement des hautes facultés de l’âme et de l’esprit: elle forme des hommes propres aux affaires de la vie sociale. [3-sentence omission] Tout le monde écrit et parle, non sans prétention, mais sans talent. [ellipsis indicates 8-page omission] Personne ne connaît, en Amérique, cette vie tout intellectuelle qui s’établit en dehors du monde positif, et se nourrit de rêveries, de spéculations, d’idéalités; cette existence immatérielle qui a horreur des affaires, pour laquelle la méditation est un besoin, la science un devoir, la création littéraire une jouissance délicieuse, et qui s’emparant à la fois des richesses antiques et des trésors modernes, prenant une feuille au laurier de Milton, comme à celui de Virgile, fait servir à sa fortune les gloires et les génies de tous les âges. [paragraph] On ignore dans ce pays l’existence du savant modeste qui, étranger aux mouvemens du monde politique et au trouble des passions cupides, se donne tout entier à l’étude, l’aime pour elle-même, et jouit dans le mystère de ses nobles loisirs. [1-paragraph omission] [paragraph] L’Europe qui admire Cooper croit que l’Amérique lui dresse des autels; il n’en est point ainsi. Le Walter Scott américain ne trouve dans son pays ni fortune, ni renommée. Il gagne moins avec ses livres qu’un marchand d’étoffes; donc celui-ci est au-dessus du marchand d’idées. Le raisonnment est sans réplique. (I,252-3, 261-3)

Benedict XIV (Pope). Referred to: 382

Bentham, Jeremy. Referred to: 7, 11-12, 36, 481, 527, 623

note: the reference at 623 is generally to “Bentham’s works” (before Bowring’s edition). For ease of reference, all citations below are to The Works of Jeremy Bentham. Ed. John Bowring. 11 vols. Edinburgh: Tait, 1843. The reference at 36 is actually to an (unlocated) indirect quotation which is in a quotation from Bailey.

— An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, in Works, VI, 1-218.

quoted: 294

294.40 “preappointed evidence”] By the term preappointed evidence, may be understood any evidence whatsoever, considered in so far as provision is made for the creation or preservation of it, antecedently to the existence of any right or obligation for the support of which it may happen to serve, or to the manifestation of any individual occasion for the production of it.(60) [See also Chap. xiv, and Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in Works, VI, 219-20, 508-85.]

— Leading Principles of the Constitutional Code, in Works, II, 267-74.

referred to: 390

— Letters to Lord Grenville on the Proposed Reform in the Administration of Civil Justice in Scotland, in Works, V, 1-53.

quoted: 521

521.20-1 “Boards” . . . “are screens.”] A board, my Lord, is a screen.(17)

— Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in Works, VI and VII.

note: the quotation is indirect.

quoted: 441

441.6 sinister interests] [a very common phrase in Bentham; see, e.g., VII, 385.]

Bible. Referred to: 397, 570

— New Testament. Referred to: 248, 254, 255, 397

— Old Testament. Referred to: 254, 397

— Acts.

note: the reference at 236 is to 7:57—8:4

quoted: 381

referred to: 236

381.34-5 “consenting . . . death,”] And Saul was consenting . . . death. (8:1)

— Colossians.

note: the reference is inferential.

referred to: 255

— Deuteronomy.

quoted: 441

441.34-5 “wax fat, and kick;”] But Jeshurun waxed fat, and kicked: thou art waxen fat, thou art grown thick, thou art covered with fatness; then he forsook God which made him, and lightly esteemed the Rock of his salvation. (32:15)

— Ecclesiastes.

quoted:630

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Taylor.

630.23-4 the golden bowl must be broken at the fountain, and the wheel broken at the cistern.] Or ever the silver cord be loosed, or the golden bowl be broken, or the pitcher be broken at the fountain, or the wheel broken at the cistern. (12:6)

— James. Referred to: 248

note: the reference is to 5:12.

— Luke. Referred to: 248

note: the reference is to 6:20-3.

— Matthew. Referred to: 236, 248-9

note: the reference at 236 is to 26:65, those at 248-9 to 19:24, 7:1, 5:34, 19:19, 5:40, 6:34, and 19:21.

— Psalms.

quoted: 58

58.21 have eyes and see not, ears and hear not,] They have mouths, but they speak not; eyes have they, but they see not;/They have ears, but they hear not; neither is there any breath in their mouths. (135:16-17; cf. ibid., 115:5-7)

Blackstone, William.Commentaries on the Laws of England. 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-69.

note: the 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1773) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 575

Blanc. Referred to: 466n

Bockh. See Boeckh.

Boeckh, August.The Public Economy of Athens. Trans. George Cornewall Lewis. 2 vols. London: Murray, 1828.

referred to: 3

Bonaparte. See Napoleon I.

Boott. Referred to: 109

note: the reference, to “a gentleman of this city” who erected a marble tablet on the grave of Henry Kirke White, is in a quotation from Everett.

Borgia. Referred to: 598

note: the reference is in a quotation from Dupont-White.

Boswell, James.Life of Johnson. Ed. George Birkbeck Hill and L.F. Powell. 6 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934-50.

note: this edition used for ease of reference; in JSM’s library, Somerville College, is the 2nd ed., 3 vols. (London: Dilly, 1793), where the quoted passage appears on II, 112 (cf. III, 258). The quotation is taken from Lewis.

quoted: 8

referred to: 237-8

8.19-20 “because he . . . justly,”] He has not a moral right [to think as he pleases]; for he . . . justly. (II,249; 7/5/73)

Breckenridge. Referred to: 484

Bright. Referred to: 488, 511

Brougham. Referred to: 108

note: the reference is in a quotation from E. Everett.

Buller. Referred to: 563

note: the reference is to Buller as a “joint author,” with Wakefield, of the Durham Report.

Bulwer (later Bulwer-Lytton), Edward George Earle Lytton.England and the English. 2 vols. London: Bentley, 1833.

note: see also under Mill, John Stuart, “Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy.”

referred to: 34

Burke, Edmund. Referred to: 351, 621, 623

note: the reference at 351 is in a quotation from Austin.

— Mr. Burke’s Speech on presenting to the House of Commons (on the eleventh of February, 1780) a plan for the better security of the independence of Parliament, and the oeconomical reformation of the Civil and other establishments, in The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke. 8 vols. London: Dodsley (Vols. I-III), Rivington (Vols. IV-VIII), 1792-1827, II, 175-267.

note: Vols. III, IV, and V were in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is in a quotation from Bailey.

quoted: 21-2

21.37 “I] To avoid, therefore, this minute care which produces the consequences of the most extensive neglect, and to oblige members of parliament to attend to public cares, and not to the servile offices of domestic management, I (217)

21.38 economize by] [in italics] (217)

22.1 nature of things] [no italics] (217)

22.2 the constitution of the human mind.”] [no italics] (217)

— A letter from Mr. Burke to John Farr and John Harris, Esqs. Sheriffs of the City of Bristol, on the Affairs of America (1777), in The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke. 8 vols. London: Dodsley (Vols. I-III), Rivington (Vols. IV-VIII), 1792-1827, II, 101-55.

note: Vols. III, IV, and V were in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is in a quotation from Bailey.

quoted: 21

21.35 on . . . man,] [no italics] (145)

21.37 end.”] end, as long as it was thought proper to adhere to it. (145)

Burns. Referred to: 101

Bussy. Referred to: 603

Caesar, Augustus. Referred to: 403, 443

Caesar, Julius. Referred to: 532

Caesar, Tiberius. Referred to: 403

Caiaphas. Referred to: 236

Calhoun, John Caldwell. “A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States,” in The Works of John C. Calhoun. 6 vols. Ed. Richard K. Cralle. Columbia, S.C.: General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, 1851-56, I, 109-406.

note: Vol. I is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, with a tipped-in printed sheet presenting the volume to JSM.

referred to: 558

Caligula. Referred to: 600

Calvin. Referred to: 249

Capet, Hugh. Referred to: 416

Capodistrias, Augustine. Referred to: 567ⁱ

Capodistrias, John. Referred to: 567ⁱ

Caracalla. Referred to: 597

Carey, Henry Charles.Principles of Social Science. 3 vols. London: Trübner, 1858.

note: the reference, from Carey, to the Report of the English Commissioners to the New York Exhibition is presumably to “New York Industrial Exhibition: General Report of the British Commissioners,” Parliamentary Papers, 1854, XXXVI, 1-467; however, the passage has not been located.

quoted: 468n

Carlyle, Thomas. “Boswell’s Life of Johnson,” Fraser’s Magazine, V (May, 1832), 359-413.

note: on 396-7 (just before the reference to the dying out of the age of booksellers), Carlyle notes that it had succeeded to the age of patronage, but does not attribute the comment on the death of patronage to Johnson.

referred to: 138. See also Johnson.

— “Memoirs of the Life of Scott,” London and Westminster Review, VI & XXVIII (Jan., 1838), 293-345.

note: republished by Carlyle as “Sir Walter Scott.”

quoted: 233

233.11-12 “destitute of faith, but terrified at scepticism”] The Genius of a rather singular age,—an age at once destitute of faith and terrified at scepticism, with little knowledge of its whereabout, with many sorrows to bear or front, and on the whole with a life to lead in these new circumstances,—had said to himself: What man shall be the temporary comforter, or were it but the spiritual comfit-maker, of this my poor singular age, to solace its dead tedium and manifold sorrows a little? (315)

— On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History. London: Fraser, 1841.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 269

Catherine II (of Russia). Referred to: 382

Cavendish. Referred to: 164n

Cecil, Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne. “The Theories of Parliamentary Reform,” in Oxford Essays. 4 vols. London: Parker, 1855-58, IV, 52-79.

referred to: 353-5

Charlemagne. Referred to: 224, 419

Charles II (of England). Referred to: 283

Charles V (Holy Roman Emperor). Referred to: 381

Charles X (of France). Referred to: 608

Châteaubriand, François René de. Referred to: 582

note: the reference is in a quotation from Odilon Barrot.

— Itinéraire de Paris à Jerusalem et de Jerusalem à Paris. 3 vols. Paris: Le Normand, 1811.

note: the quotation, which is indirect, is in a quotation from de Beaumont.

quoted: 103

103.10-11 Self-interest . . . esteem.] [translated from:] L’intérêt est le grand vice des Musulmans; et la libéralité est la vertu qu’ils estiment davantage. (II,44)

Chatham. See Pitt (the elder).

Chevalier, Michel.Lettres sur l’Amérique du Nord. 2 vols. Paris: Gosselin, 1836.

referred to: 177

Christ. See Jesus.

Cicero (Marcus Tullius). Referred to: 245

— Letters to Atticus (Latin and English). Trans. E. O. Winstedt. 3 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1912.

note: this edition used for ease of reference. The Elzevir edition of 1642 is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 251

251.28 “Socratici viri”] O Socrates et Socratici viri! numquam vobis gratiam referam. (III,230; xiv. 9)

— The Letters to his Friends (Latin and English). Trans. W. Glynn Williams. 3 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1927-29.

note: this edition used for ease of reference.

quoted: 164

161.14 novi homines] Plus tibi virtus tua dedit, quam fortuna abstulit, propterea quod adeptus es, quod non multi homines, novi, amisisti, quae plurimi homines nobilissimi. (I,403; V.18.i)

— De Senectute, in De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione (Latin and English). Trans. William Armistead Falconer. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1922.

note: this edition cited for ease of reference. This reference is merely illustrative; other classical authors, of course, use this phrase.

quoted: 577

577.31 Dî meliora] Bene Sophocles, cum ex eo quidam iam affecto aetate quaereret, utereturne rebus veneriis, “di meliora!” inquit; “ego vero istinc sicut a domino agresti ac furioso profugi.” (58; xiv.47)

Clabon, John Moxon. Referred to: 496n; see Parliamentary Papers, “Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act” (1860)

Clay, Henry. Referred to: 109

note: the reference is in a quotation from E. Everett.

Clay, William. Referred to: 352

Cleon. Referred to: 460

Cléron, Joseph Othenin Bernard de (Comte d’Haussonville). Lettre au Sénat. Paris: Dumineray, 1860.

referred to: 584

Clinton, Dewitt. Referred to: 111

note: the reference is in a quotation from E. Everett.

Clinton, Henry Pelham Fiennes Pelham. Referred to: 127

Clive. Referred to: 532

Cobden. Referred to: 511

Cochrane, Baillie. Speech on Civil Service Examinations. Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., Vol. 158, cols. 2061-6 (5 June, 1860).

note: the reference is presumably to Cochrane (see esp. cols. 2063-5), but Bentinck adduced other relevant questions (ibid., cols. 2075-6).

referred to: 531n

Colbert. Referred to: 410, 438, 602

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor.First Lay Sermon [The Statesman’s Manual]. 2nd ed., in On the Constitution of Church and State, and Lay Sermons. London: Pickering, 1839.

note: this edition, which is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, contains the 3rd edition of On Church and State and the 2nd edition of Lay Sermons.

quoted: 444

444.7-8 the man makes the motive, not the motive the man] Strange as this position [that the knowledge taught in the Scriptures produces the motives] will appear to such as forget that motives can be causes only in a secondary and improper sense, inasmuch as the man makes the motive, not the motives the man; yet all history bears evidence to its truth. (220)

— On the Constitution of Church and State According to the Ideas of Each, and Lay Sermons: I. The Statesman’s Manual. II. “Blessed are ye that sow beside all waters.” Ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge. London: Pickering, 1839.

note: this edition, in JSM’s library, Somerville College, is the one to which his references in “Coleridge” correspond (see Collected Works, X); it includes the 3rd edition of Church and State, and the 2nd edition of Lay Sermons. Also in JSM’s library is the 2nd edition of Church and State (London: Hurst, Chance, 1830). The entries for the Lay Sermons are given under First Lay Sermon and Second Lay Sermon.

quoted: 384

384.13 Permanence and Progression] Now, in every country of civilized men, acknowledging the rights of property, and by means of determined boundaries and common laws united into one people or nation, the two antagonist powers or opposite interests of the State, under which all other State interests are comprised, are those of permanence and of progression.^* [2-paragraph footnote] (24)

— “Pitt,” in James Gillman, The Life of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. London: Pickering, 1838, pp. 195-223.

note: reprinted from the Morning Post, 19 March, 1800; also appears in Coleridge’s Essays on His Own Times, A Second Series of the Friend (London: Pickering, 1850), II, 319-29. The indirect quotation occurs in a quotation from Bailey.

quoted: 30

30.26-7 shelter and weather-fend him from the elements of experience.] The influencer of his country and of his species was a young man, the creature of another’s predetermination, sheltered and weather-fended from all the elements of experience; a young man, whose feet had never wandered; whose very eye had never turned to the right or to the left; whose whole track had been as curveless as the motion of a fascinated reptile! (199)

— Second Lay Sermon [“Blessed are ye that sow beside all waters”]. 2nd ed., in On the Constitution of Church and State, and Lay Sermons. London: Pickering, 1839.

note: the same passage is used in both quotations, which are indirect. This edition, which is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, contains the 3rd edition of On Church and State and the 2nd edition of Lay Sermons.

quoted: 458, 572

458.11-12 votes were weighed as well as counted] Men, I still think, ought to be weighed not counted. Their worth ought to be the final estimate of their value. (409)

572.36-7 opinions may be weighed as well as counted] [as above]

Comte, Auguste.Système de politique positive, ou Traité de sociologie, instituant la Religion de l’humanité. 4 vols. Paris: Mathias, 1851-54.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. At 227^c-c Mill mistakenly refers to it as Traité de Politique Positive, another work by Comte.

referred to: 227

Constant. Referred to: 582

note: the reference is in an indirect quotation from Odilon Barrot.

Constantine. Referred to: 237

Cooper. Referred to: 112

note: the reference is in a quotation from de Beaumont.

Corrupt Practices Prevention Act. See under Statutes, 17 & 18 Victoria, c. 102 (1854).

Cosens, Frederick. Referred to: 496n; see Parliamentary Papers, “Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act” (1860).

Crawford, William. See under Parliamentary Papers, “Report of William Crawford” (1834).

Cyril Thornton. See Hamilton, Thomas.

Dante Alighieri.Inferno.

note: JSM is citing from memory, so no edition is given; the line quoted (Canto IV, 1.131) refers to Aristotle as “il maestro di color che sanno.” A copy of the translation of The Divine Comedy (London, 1849) by John A. Carlyle (Thomas’s brother) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 235

De Corbière. Referred to: 582

note: the reference is in an indirect quotation from Odilon Barrot.

D’Haussonville. See Cléron.

Demosthenes. Referred to: 245, 458

note: at 245 JSM refers to Cicero as the “greatest orator, save one [Demosthenes], of antiquity.”

— “Against Timocrates,” in Demosthenes against Meidias, Androtin, Aristocrates, Timocrates, Aristogeiton (Greek and English). Trans. J. H. Vince. London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935.

note: the reference (to 463; xxiv, 139) is inferential. This edition used for ease of reference.

referred to: 238

De Pressensé. Referred to: 584n, 611

Derby, 15th Earl of. See Stanley, Edward Henry.

De Tocqueville. See Tocqueville.

De Villèle. See Villèle.

Disraeli, Benjamin. Speech on the Representation of the People Bill (1860). Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., Vol. 157, cols. 839-58 (19 March, 1860).

note: the reference is to col. 854. The allusion to one of Russell’s Reform Bills is to that introduced 16 Feb., 1854.

referred to: 452

Doddington. Referred to: 78

Dolcino, Fra (of Novario). Referred to: 238

Dunoyer. Referred to: 583

Dupleix. Referred to: 603

Du Plessis, Armand Jean, Cardinal Duc de Richelieu. Referred to: 167, 416

— Maximes d’état ou Testament politique. 2 vols. Paris: Le Breton, 1764.

note: the quotation is from Deuteronomy, 32:15; the reference given (I,225) is merely to a comparable statement.

quoted: 441

Dupont-White, Charles Brook.La Centralisation: suite à L’Individu et L’État. Paris: Guillaumin, 1860.

reviewed: 581-613

quoted: 598, 599, 611, 612, 613

598.30-6 Suppose . . . out.] [translated from:] Supposez, il y a douze ou quinze ans, alors qu’il y avait une chambre de quatre cent cinquante députés, quarantecinq députés parisiens au lieu de douze—supposez-les (et l’hypothèse n’est pas violente), pensant et votant avec l’opposition comme ces douze députés étaient dans l’habitude de le faire—voici, selon toute apparence, ce qui serait advenu: Certaine majorité ne se serait pas faite, certain cabinet n’eût pas duré huit ans, certaine révolution n’eût pas éclaté avec toutes ses suites. (277-8)

599.37-8 de . . . pédagogie] Ce n’est plus de la tutelle, c’est de la pédagogie: et encore voit-on tous les jours des enfants de seize ans plus libres sous la main de leur tuteur que le maire de Bordeaux régenté et couronné du préfet de la Gironde. (86)

611.31-4 The laws . . . own.] [translated from:] Mais elle leur demande, en retour de ces largesses, qu’ils veuillent bien se tenir en paix, ne pas s’inquiéter les uns les autres, s’abstenir de propagande, et ne pas réveiller les passions d’autrefois dans un temps qui a les siennes et qui n’en demande pas davantage. (291)

612.28-37 The feudal . . . period.] [translated from:] Reculez de quelques siècles et regardez vivre le seigneur féodal: Ce petit souverain peut prendre une très haute idée de lui-même et s’élever à l’orgeuil, qui est le commencement de toute vertu. Sur un territoire où il abonde, il composera une classe; et cette classe créera pour l’éducation du pays un grand type capable de tout élever à sa suite. Il y aura toujours loin des sentiments aux conduites, des devises aux prouesses: Qu’importe? C’est déjà beaucoup d’exalter l’idéal dans une société. Il n’y survient plus une grande âme qui ne grandisse encore à l’escalade de ce modèle: d’un masque héroïque, il reste, il passe quelque chose dans les traits d’un peuple. Une lacune parmi les Russes est d’avoir été sans chevalerie. N’oublions pas que le sentiment de l’honneur est né du régime féodal; le duel est le plus beau titre de la société moderne. (15-16)

612.37 period. . . . Society] [the ellipsis indicates the break between the two passages]

612.37-9 Society . . . espèce.] [translated from:] Mais une société a beau eu être là, elle ne doit rien licencier de ce qui peut guinder notre indigente espèce. (112)

613.2-3 “Unity . . . intolerance”] [translated from:] L’unité, c’est l’intolérance, par autre chose. (188)

— L’Individu et l’État. 2me éd. Paris: Guillaumin, 1858.

reviewed: 581-613

quoted: 590-1, 593, 594, 596, 596-7, 597, 598, 607, 610, 611, 612

590.39-591.8 When . . . advantages. . . . Merely . . . attributions?] [translated from:] Quand l’État a fait justice de l’oppression légale il lui reste à prévenir l’exploitation naturelle. [paragraph] On s’est avisé de nos jours qu’il y a quelque chose de commun entre tous les hommes: le sens moral chez le plus stupide, la faillibilité chez le plus sage. D’où l’on a conclu que la loi ne doit pas subordonner et sacrifier les uns comme s’ils étaient de race inférieure aux autres, mais les traiter tous comme égaux en fait de justice de peines, d’impôts et d’admissibilité aux fonctions publiques: c’est ce qui s’appelle l’Égalité devant la loi. Mais ce ne peut être le dernier mot de la Civilisation, si grand qu’il soit. Comment oublier quelles différences laisse subsister d’un homme à l’autre ce fond de ressemblance qu’il y a entre tous les hommes? Comment perdre de vue que ces différences abandonées à elles-mêmes, livreraient toute faiblesse et toute ineptie à l’ascendant du plus fort, du plus habile, du plus persévérant; et que cette domination, de par la nature, serait aussi oppressive que celle qui s’exerçait jadis de par la loi. Or, qui corrigera l’abus des suprématies naturelles, si ce n’est l’État? Et comment l’État y parviendra-t-il, si ce n’est avec un surcroît de force et d’attributions? (54-5)

593.13-14 “Association . . . shareholders.”] [translated from:] L’association tourne aisément au monopole envers le public, à la dictature envers les associés. (350)

594.10-20 The . . . crises.] [translated from:] L’État peut défrayer certains besoins de l’Individu, culte, éducation, routes, justice; érigeant en services publics ceux du prêtre, de l’instituteur, du juge, de l’ingénieur. C’est un bienfait pour le pauvre; car il profite de ces services publics au prorata de ses besoins qui sont quasi les mêmes chez tout homme, et il ne contribue à leur dépense que selon ses facultés. [paragraph] L’État peut être bienfaisant comme mandataire gratuit, par exemple quand il reçoit les petites épargnes, en sert l’intérêt, et en restitue le montant à toute heure. On put juger, il y a quelques années, de l’éminence de ce service par les embarras où il jeta les finances publiques. [paragraph] Enfin, la bienfaisance de l’État est quelquefois le don même, la charité. Tel est le cas de certaines mesures permanentes, comme la subvention aux hospices, les secours divers à défaut de pensions, l’école primaire gratuite, etc., et de certaines mesures accidentelles qui ne font guère défaut dans les pays civilisés aux temps de disette, d’épidémie, d’inondation, de crises commerciales. (86)

596.10-22 It . . . part.] [translated from:] Ainsi, et ce point est capital, c’est principalement le caractère collectif d’un intérêt, qui en détourne les hommes. Ils ne font les choses qui les intéressent le plus, que si elles peuvent être menées à bien par leurs seuls efforts, et si le profit leur en appartient tout entier. Vous pouvez compter sur la puissance de l’egoïsme pour l’agriculture, car ici le succès relève uniquement de l’individu: tout est de lui seul et pour lui seul: telle culture, telle moisson. Quant à l’éclairage et au pavage d’une ville, si importantes que soient ces choses pour l’individu, comme il ne peut les faire à lui seul, comme il n’est pas assuré que chacun en fera autant que lui, comme son propre effort équivaut à zéro s’il n’est encadré dans l’effort de tous il n’en fera rien. Ainsi l’intérêt collectif est négligé par les hommes, encore qu’il comprenne le leur. La règle est ceci: L’Individu s’abstient des choses qui lui sont les plus avantageuses, quand ne pouvant les faire à lui seul, il ne peut contraindre les autres à en faire autant que lui. [footnote omitted] (267-8)

596.26-597.3 Love . . . necessity.] [translated from:] Ce n’est pas un mobile à l’usage de tous les hommes que l’amour du bien-être et l’impatience des privations. Ce sentiment ne peut naître dans certaines conditions tellement misérables, qu’elles aspirent à s’oublier seulement et non à s’améliorer. Il ne faut pas s’abuser sur les services que rend au Progrès cette loi de la nécessité. Elle ne développe que ce qui existe. Otez-la, et peut-être que les grandes qualités enfouies chez les êtres privilégiés ne verront pas le jour. Elle est favorable à la fécondation et à l’épanouissement de ces dons; mais c’est là toute sa vertu: ailleurs elle est sans force. Ne croyez pas qu’elle enseigne au commun des hommes l’audace at la prévoyance; loin de là, elle les jette ou les entretient dans l’incurie et l’abandon d’eux-mêmes. L’aiguillon des forts n’est pour le vulgaire qu’un principe de désespoir. On ne dira pas que l’éducation de la nécessité ait manqué au peuple d’Irlande ni aux sauvages de l’Amérique du Nord; nul besoin n’est plus âpre que le leur: vivre est pour eux un problème de chaque jour. Cependant à cette dure école, ni l’Irlandais, ni l’Iroquois n’ont appris la prévoyance. [ellipsis indicates a 5-sentence omission] [paragraph] Les Gouvernements, plus sages que les sectes, ont compris qu’ils devaient, non pas se charger du bien-être de l’Individu, mais lui en offrir certains moyens, en éveiller chez lui l’espérance, et le rapprocher du but, si ce n’est l’y mener. [paragraph] Seriez-vous en peine des effets produits par cette assistance sur les caractères vigoureux qui peuvent s’en passer? Craignez-vous par hasard qu’ils n’en soient énervés au grand dommage de la société? mais on peut imaginer tel degré de tutelle qui serait profitable au plus grand nombre sans être nuisible aux natures privilégiées. Il s’agit de trouver cette limite et de s’y tenir. C’est un point de législation et de gouvernement assez délicat; mais enfin la voie des compromis est celle de la vérité faite pour les hommes. Vous plairait-il d’user d’un principe seulement au lieu de concilier des principes divers? Concluez donc, si vous l’osez, à la suppression des hôpitaux, dernière et surtout légitime conséquence du principe Individualiste et des doctrines de la nécessité. (298-9)

597.10-11 “This . . . society.”] [translated from:] Ceci est la définition d’un caravansérail, de quelque chose comme Bade ou Hombourg, et non d’une société. (168)

597.34-6 “For . . . slavery.”] [translated from:] Qu’un maître affranchisse son esclave, c’est l’effet d’une certaine grandeur d’âme; mais il suffit à l’État du moindre sens moral pour abolir l’esclavage. (346)

598.2-3 “Even . . . himself.”] [translated from:] César Borgia ne souffrait dans ses États d’autre empoisonneur que lui-même. (308)

607.5 le véto et l’initiative.] Il faut s’arrêter dans cette voie, et peut-être au point que voici: déni de souveraineté, mais création de pouvoir parmi les communes, c’est-a-dire de veto et d’initiative. (81)

610.11-16 Consider . . . liberty?] [translated from:] Qu’on y songe un instant: Si la liberté est un principe d’élévation morale, c’est qu’elle signifie Pouvoir. L’homme libre trouve deux choses dans le pouvoir qu’il a sur lui-même, un espace nécessaire à ses facultés, et un sentiment qui le grandit à ses propres yeux. Mais alors, comment le pouvoir suprême, avec tout ce qu’il ouvre d’horizons et de carrières, avec tout ce qu’il éveille de sentiments, ne serait-il pas un principe d’exaltation analogue et supérieur à la liberté? (xxi-xxii)

611.3-8 The . . . world.] [translated from:] Or, qui a fait à la Grande-Bretagne tant de puissance et de prospérité [4-sentence omission] Cette fortune a deux causes entre autres, qui sont deux institutions, l’acte de navigation et la loi des pauvres—l’une en faveur de la marine britannique, et qui la protége contre la concurrence des marines étrangères, en fermant à celles-ci les ports de la Grande-Bretagne—l’autre, qui se résout en paix publique et en bas prix de la main d’œuvre, assurés à l’industrie anglaise. [ellipsis indicates an 8-paragraph omission] Il est donc vrai de le dire, l’industrie anglaise doit à la loi des pauvres la sécurité dont elle jouit, et surtout un taux des salaires qui lui permet de produire et de vendre à des prix inaccessibles pour ses concurrents, et victorieux sur presque tous les marchés du monde. (126, 129)

611.16-19 Why . . . intelligence?] [translated from:] D’où vient que la loi pénale est appliquée même au malfaiteur le plus ignare et le plus stupide? Parce qu’il est réputé la connaître. Et comment la connaîtrait-il, si ce n’est par ce rayon divin qui est le patrimoine de toute intelligence? (226)

612.8-13 In . . . perfection.] [translated from:] En général, les peuples qui arrivent les premiers à quelque grandeur religieuse ou politique, sont sujets à s’y éterniser; soit que les influences de race, de climat, de géographie capables de précipiter leur développement aient aussi bien la force de l’arrêter; soit que supérieurs d’abord à ce qui les entoure, ils y prennent l’illusion d’une excellence absolue, d’une perfection atteinte. (xxx)

612.16-18 The . . . Vedas.] [translated from:] La grande découverte occidentale ce n’est pas l’imprimerie, c’est la division du spirituel et du temporel: l’imprimerie toute seule n’eût servi qu’à multiplier des Coran et des Védas (xxix-xxx)

612.21-6 Whatever . . . progress.] [translated from:] Tout ce qui peut s’accumuler, se capitaliser, ne cesse de croître parmi les hommes, la richesse, la science et même la moralité. Mais la poésie, l’éloquence, la sculpture, sont-elles supérieures aujourd’hui à l’Illiade au Parthénon, à la tribune d’Athènes? [ellipsis indicates a 3-paragraph omission] En résumé, les éléments constitutifs ne changent pas plus dans l’espèce humaine que dans les autres espèces; mais certaines facultés de l’homme ont des produits susceptibles d’accumulation et de transmission: de là le Progrès, il vaudrait mieux dire de la société que de l’humanité, et le rôle toujours nécessaire des gouvernements. (360-1)

Durham. See Lambton, John George.

Durham Report. See under Parliamentary Papers, “Report on the Affairs of British North America” (1839).

Duveyrier, Charles.Lettres Politiques. 2 vols. Paris: Beck, 1843.

referred to: 200

— La Pairie dans ses rapports avec la situation politique; son principe, ses ressources, son avenir. Paris: Guyot, 1842.

quoted: 201

referred to: 202

201.4-19 “Every . . . services.”] [translated from:] En réalité, chaque peuple renferme et renfermera toujours probablement une administration et un public, c’est-à-dire deux sociétés: l’une dont l’intérêt commun est la loi suprême, où le principe de l’hérédité ne distribue pas les positions, qui classe les travailleurs d’après leur mérite, et les rétribue d’après leurs œuvres, et qui compense la modicité des salaires par leur fixité et surtout par l’honneur et la considération; l’autre, composée de propriétaires, de capitalistes, de maîtres et d’ouvriers, dont la loi suprême est celle de l’héritage, dont la règle principale de conduite est l’intérêt personnel, dont la concurrence et la lutte sont les élémens favoris.

Ces deux sociétés se servent mutuellement de contre-poids; elles agissent et réagissent continuellement l’une sur l’autre. La tendance du public est d’introduire dans l’administration le principe d’émulation qui lui manque; le penchant de l’administration, conforme à sa mission, est d’introduire de plus en plus dans la grande masse du public des élémens d’ordre et de prévoyance. Dans cette double direction, l’administration et le public se sont rendus et se rendent journellement des services réciproques. (12)

Edinburgh Review. Referred to: 20, 113

note: the reference at 20 (which is generally to articles on political economy in the Edinburgh Review) is in a quotation from Bailey; that at 113 is in a quotation from E. Everett.

“The Educational Franchise,” The Times, 19 Dec., 1857, 8.

note: the reference is to a memorial to Lord Palmerston, the gist of which, with a long list of signators, appears in The Times.

referred to: 325n-326n

Edward II (of England). Referred to: 437

Elizabeth I (of England). Referred to: 29n, 238, 437, 481

Epictetus.Discourses, in The Discourses as reported by Arrian, The Manual, and Fragments (Greek and English). Trans. W. A. Oldfather. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926, 1928.

note: this edition used for ease of reference. As a single word is quoted, no collation is given; the term appears at I,8 (I.i.10) and II,180 (III.xxiii.32).

quoted: 355

Essays on Government. See under Anon.

Euler. Referred to: 143

Everett, Alexander Hill. “Men and Manners in America,” North American Review, XXXVIII (Jan., 1834), 210-70.

note: JSM was using a reprint of this article (published London: Miller, 1834) which has not been found.

reviewed: 93-115

quoted: 108-9, 109-10

110.23 chance.’] chance.’* [footnote: *Spirit of Laws, Book 2. Chap. 2.]

Everett, Edward. “Prince Pückler Muscau and Mrs. Trollope,” North American Review, XXXVI (Jan., 1833), 1-48.

quoted: 107-8, 112-13

107.42 “We] But we (47)

113.1-2 responsible authority] responsible English authority (42)

Fawcett, Henry.Mr. Hare’s Reform Bill simplified and explained. Westminster: Printed by T. Brettnell, 1860.

referred to: 454

Federalist. See Hamilton, Alexander.

Fiévée. Referred to: 582

note: the reference is in an indirect quotation from Odilon Barrot.

Fox, Henry Richard Vassall. Referred to: 41

Fox, William Johnson. “The London Review. No II,” Monthly Repository, n.s. IX (Sept., 1835), 627-8.

note: in the passage referred to below, JSM identifies the author of the unsigned notice as the editor of the Monthly Repository. The reference to “Lydia Tomkins,” Thoughts on the Ladies of the Aristocracy (s.v.), in that passage probably derives from Fox’s mention of it in this notice.

referred to: 56n

Franklin. Referred to: 101, 468n

note: the reference at 468n is in a quotation from Carey.

Frederick I (Grand Duke of Baden). Referred to: 466n

Frederick II (of Prussia). Referred to: 42, 382

Freeman, Edward Augustus.History of Federal Government, from the foundation of the Achaian League to the disruption of the United States. Vol. I. Cambridge: Macmillan, 1863.

note: JSM mistakenly refers to the work as History of Federal Governments. No more volumes appeared.

referred to: 555n

Gallatin. Referred to: 111

Ganganelli. Referred to: 382

George Barnwell. See Lillo, George.

Gleichen. Referred to: 239

Gordon. Referred to: 318, 330

note: both references are to the Reform Bill introduced by Lord Aberdeen’s government; see under Parliamentary Papers, “A Bill further to amend the Laws relating to the Representation of the People” (1854).

Gresset, Jean Baptiste Louis.Le Méchant. 2nd ed. Paris: Jorry, 1748.

note: this edition was the earliest available to the editor.

quoted: 349

349.5 “les absents ont toujours tort”] Valere: Mais assez, ce me semble: / Nous étions élevés, accoûtumés ensemble, / Je la trouvois gentille, elle me plaisoit fort, / Mais Paris quérit tout, & les absens ont tort; / On m’a mandé souvent qu’elle étoit embellie; / Comment la trouvez-vous? (59; Act II, Scene vii)

Grote, George.A History of Greece. 12 vols. London: Murray, 1846-56.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College; each volume or set inscribed as a presentation copy.

referred to: 411

Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume. Referred to: 608

— Cours d’histoire moderne: Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe, depuis la chute de l’empire romain jusqu’à la révolution française. Paris: Pichon and Didier, 1828.

note: in Somerville College, without bookplate, but probably JSM’s, with “I” on spine; see the next entry, which has the same general title. JSM refers to the same passage as that cited at 197 in his “Guizot’s Essays and Lectures on History,” Edinburgh Review, LXXXII (Oct., 1845), 390-3. The leçons are separately paged.

referred to: 94, 197

— Cours d’histoire moderne: Histoire de la civilisation en France, depuis la chute de l’empire romain jusqu’en 1789. 5 vols. Paris: Pichon and Didier, 1829-32.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College, with “I” to “V” on spines: cf. the previous entry, which has the same general title.

referred to: 94

Gustavus Adolphus (of Sweden). Referred to: 437

Hacket. Referred to: 112

note: the reference is in a quotation from E. Everett.

Hamilton, Alexander, with John Jay, and James Madison.The Federalist. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1864.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The first complete edition appeared in 1788. The references are to “the authors of The Federalist.”

referred to: 555, 558

Hamilton, Charles.The Hedàya or Guide; A Commentary on the Mussulman Laws. 4 vols. London: Bensley, 1791.

note: JSM mistakenly attributes the quotation cited below to the Koran. It seems likely that he got the passage from Hamilton’s work, which is in his library, Somerville College.

quoted: 255-6

255.40-256.1 “A ruler who appoints any man to an office, when there is in his dominions another man better qualified for it, sins against God and against the State.”] It is incumbent on the Sultan to select for the office of Kâzee a person who is capable of discharging the duties of it, and passing decrees; and who is also in a superlative degree just and virtuous; for the prophet has said, “Whoever appointsa person to the discharge of any office, whilst there is another amongst his subjects more qualified for the same than the person so appointed, does surely commit an injury with respect to the rights ofGod,theProphet,and theMussulmans.” (II,615)

Hamilton, Thomas.Men and Manners in America. 2 vols. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1833.

note: the quotation is from E. Everett.

quoted: 110

referred to: 97, 108, 110

110.6 “retired] On the whole, I retired (II, 42)

110.6-7 interview he had with General Jackson, with] interview with (II, 42)

110.7 respect for] respect both for (II, 42)

— The Youth and Manhood of Cyril Thornton. 3 vols. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1827.

note: the reference at 110 is in a quotation from A. H. Everett.

referred to: 97, 110

Hamilton, William. “Study of Mathematics—University of Cambridge,” Edinburgh Review, LXII (Jan., 1836), 409-55.

referred to: 142n

Hare, Thomas.A Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1859.

note: the reference at 454n is to the second edition, 1861. The third edition, 1865, inscribed “From the Author,” is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

reviewed: 343-70

quoted: 367, 368, 369, 369-70

referred to: 339n, 452-66, 477, 481, 495-6, 518

367.23 “by . . . polling-place;”] It is proposed that the vote shall be given in the shape of a document, to be deliberately prepared and signed, and (except in some special cases, which will be the subject of a distinct chapter) personally delivered by . . . polling-place. (144-5)

369.8 “to] The charges, which it is absolutely necessary that a candidate should incur, ought not to exceed a sum sufficient to (126)

369.13 Exonerate] For this it is proposed to provide, by requiring a preliminary payment to the Registrar,* [footnote: *Clause VII., p. 113, ante. The sum there suggested is £50.] which shall exonerate (126)

369.30 One] The test of capacity should be one (309)

369.38 career. . . . The] career. He does not at that time of life require it from any regard to liberty or security, for the possession of the franchise by his seniors of the same class, having similar interests for themselves and their children, is a sufficient guard, and every day brings him nearer to the time when he may himself attain it. The (309)

369.9 the line of occupation] the fixed occupation (309)

370.3-5 “so . . . lot.”] There is nothing exclusive in such a rule when the standard is so . . . lot that cannot be provided for in a subject having so extensive a bearing as the suffrage. (313)

370.6-8 “it . . . apply” . . . “to . . . multitude”] It . . . apply an educational test to . . . multitude. (310)

370.9-14 “it may exclude . . . sense” . . . “it would operate . . . suitable.”] Any such test which might be applied may, moreover, exclude . . . sense; and it would especially operate . . . suited. (310-11)

Harris, James Howard. Letter to the Civil Service Commissioners (22/9/58), in Foreign Office Correspondence, in Appendix II of “Fourth Report of Her Majesty’s Civil Service Commissioners,” Parliamentary Papers, 1859, VIII, 203-4.

note: the whole correspondence (198-210) is relevant to Malmesbury’s ruling against a spelling examination for Foreign Office aspirants. In the Report of the Inquiry into the Civil Service Examinations (Parliamentary Papers, 1860, IX), some of the others who wished to denigrate a spelling test may be identified (e.g., Monckton Milnes, 28, and Clay, 36-7).

referred to: 531

Hawes. Referred to: 352

Helps, Arthur.The Spanish Conquest in America, and its relation to the history of slavery and to the government of the Colonies. 4 vols. London: Parker and Son, 1855-61.

referred to: 571

Henry III (of England). Referred to: 437

Henry IV (of France). Referred to: 437

Hill. Referred to: 439

Hinckes. Referred to: 567

Hobbes, Thomas. Referred to: 17

— Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. Ed. William Molesworth. London: Bohn, 1839, III.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Taylor. This edition, which is in JSM’s library, Somerville College, is used for consistency of reference, though the quotation antedates the edition.

quoted:645

645.34 “After] For after (89)

645.35 ’tis] it is (89)

645.36 other is] other, are (89)

Holland. See Fox, Henry Richard Vassall.

Holyoake. Referred to: 239

Homer.Iliad.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Dupont-White. As specific wording is not involved, no edition is cited. A two-volume edition in Greek of The Iliad and The Odyssey (Oxford, 1800) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 612

Hooker. Referred to: 626

note: the reference is in a quotation from Taylor.

Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus). Ars poetica, in Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica (Latin and English). Trans. H. Rushton Fairclough. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926.

note: the reference is in a quotation from Bailey; this edition used for ease of reference. JSM’s library, Somerville College, contains Opera (Glasgow: Mundell, 1796), in which the passage occurs on p. 538.

quoted: 33

33.24-5 Nec . . . nodus,] nec . . . nodus / inciderit, nec quarta loqui persona laboret. (466; 11.191-2)

— “Carmina Liber III, xxx,” in The Odes and Epodes (Latin and English). Trans. C. E. Bennett. London: Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1914.

note: this edition is used for ease of reference. Opera (Glasgow: Mundell, 1796) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 42

42.3-4 monumentum ære perennius] Exegi monumentum aere perennius / regalique situ pyramidum altius, / quod non imber edax, non Aquilo impotens / possit diruere aut innumerabilis / anorum series et fuga temporum. (278; 11.1-5)

— Epistles, in Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica (Latin and English). Trans. H. Rushton Fairclough. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1926.

note: this edition used for ease of reference. JSM’s library, Somerville College, contains Opera (Glasgow: Mundell, 1796).

quoted: 157

157.28-30 candidus imperti . . . his utere mecum.] Vive, vale! si quid novisti rectius istis, / candidus imperti; si nil, his utere mecum. (290; Epistle I,vi,67-8)

Horsley, Samuel.The Speeches in Parliament of Samuel Horsley. Ed. H. Horsley. Dundee: Chalmers, 1813.

note: the comment was made by Bishop Horsley in Committee of the House of Lords on the Treason Bill introduced by Lord Grenville on 6 November, 1795. On the third reading, 13 November, the remark was attacked by Lord Lauderdale, and defended by Horsley.

quoted: 469

469.29 “has no business with the laws except to obey them,”] all that the people had to do with the laws of the country was to obey them (167-8)

Humboldt, Carl Wilhelm von.The Sphere and Duties of Government. Trans. Joseph Coulthard. London: Chapman, 1854.

note: the quotation at 300 is indirect. This edition is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 215, 261, 300

referred to: 261-2, 274, 300-1, 304

215.2 argument unfolded] argument hitherto unfolded (65)

215.4 diversity.] diversity; but national education, since at least it presupposes the selection and appointment of some one instructor, must always promote a definite form of developement, however careful to avoid such an error. (65)

261.29 “the end of man] The true end of Man (11)

261.30 or] and (11)

261.32-6 whole;” . . . “towards . . . individuality of power and development;”] whole. [2-page omission] This individual vigour, then, and manifold diversity, combine themselves in originality; and hence, that on which the consummate grandeur of our nature ultimately depends,—that towards . . . Individuality of Power and Developement. (11, 13)

261.36-7 “freedom . . . situations;”] Now, it is clear (to apply these conclusions to the respective conditions for culture,—freedom, . . . situations), that, on the one hand, individual energy is essential to the perceived and perceiver, into which social unions may be resolved; and, on the other, a difference between them, neither so great as to prevent the one from comprehending the other, nor so inconsiderable as to exclude admiration for that which the other possesses, and the desire of assimilating it into the perceiver’s character. (13)

261.37-8 “individual . . . diversity,” . . . “originality.”] [see above, 261.32-6]

Hume, Joseph. Referred to: 634

Hume, David. “Of Commerce,” in Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. 2 vols. London: Cadell, 1793.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is in a quotation from Bailey.

quoted: 21

21.14-17 “Tis certain,” . . . “that . . . prevail] But however intricate they may seem, it is certain, that general principles, if just and sound, must always prevail (I,251)

Hyperbolus. Referred to: 460

An Introduction to the Latin Tongue, for the Use of Youth. A New Edition revised. Eton: Pote and Williams, 1806.

note: the text chosen is merely illustrative. The quoted phrase traditionally (from the sixteenth century) was used in Latin grammars as a rubric for the section on masculine nouns. (For the origins of these grammars, see C. G. Allen, “The Sources of ‘Lily’s Latin Grammar,’ ” The Library, 5th ser., IX [June, 1954], 85-100, where it is argued that “The Royal Grammar” is a better general title than “Lily’s.”)

quoted: 31

31.22 Propria quae maribus.] Propria quæ maribus tribuuntur, mascula dicas; / Ut sunt Divorum; Mars, Bacchus, Apollo: Virorum; / Ut, Cato, Virigilius: Fluviorum; ut, Tibris, Orontes: / Mensium; ut, October: Ventorum; ut, Libs, Notus, Austen. (63)

Irving, Washington. Referred to: 109

note: the reference is in a quotation from E. Everett.

— History of New York from the beginning of the world to the end of the Dutch Dynasty, by Diedrich Knickerbocker. London: Sharpe, 1821.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The reference is in a quotation from E. Everett.

referred to: 112

Jackson, Andrew. Referred to: 110

note: the reference is in a quotation from A. H. Everett.

— Proclamation by the President of the United States [10 Dec., 1832, relative to an ordinance passed in the State Convention of South Carolina, refusing to be bound by the revenue laws of the Congress of the United States]. London: Miller, 1833.

referred to: 77

James, Edwin. Referred to: 496n; see under Parliamentary Papers, “Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act” (1860).

Jay. Referred to: 110

note: the reference is in a quotation from A. H. Everett. See also under Hamilton, Alexander, The Federalist.

Jefferson. Referred to: 100, 109-11, 438, 641

note: the references at 109-10 are in a quotation from E. Everett.

Jesus. Referred to: 235, 236, 249, 255, 256

John (of England). Referred to: 437

Johnson, Samuel. See also Boswell, Life of Johnson; and Carlyle, “Boswell’s Life of Johnson.”

quoted: 8 referred to: 138, 237-8

Johnston. Referred to: 40

note: the reference is to the “honorable member for St. Andrew’s.”

Joseph II (Holy Roman Emperor). Referred to: 382

Jowett, Benjamin. Letter in “Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service,” in Parliamentary Papers, 1854, XXVII, 24-31.

note: reprinted above as Appendix C.

quoted: 210

210.10 “school or college”] 2. That he [the candidate] should at the same time send papers comprising a certificate of birth and baptism, with a precise statement of all the places of his education, whether at school or college, together with testimonials of his conduct for two years previously from the head of the school or college in which he was last a pupil, and also a statement of his present occupation and residence. (24)

210.16 “confidential”] 3. That he should give references—1. To a medical man; 2. To a magistrate; or, in case of inferior situations, to two respectable householders; 3. To a clergyman or dissenting minister; to all of whom carefully-drawn questions respecting the candidate in the form of an insurance office paper should be submitted; the answers to be confidential. (25)

210.17 “absolute and without reasons.”] The rejection should be absolute and without reasons; whether it took place on medical or moral grounds would remain uncertain.

Juvenal.Satires, in Juvenal and Persius (Latin and English). Trans. G. G. Ramsay. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1918.

note: this edition used for ease of reference. Two editions (London, 1744 and 1835) formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 426

426.23 quis custodiet custodes?] sed quis custodiet ipsos / custodes? (110; VI. 347-8: cf. 114; VI. O31-2)

Kant. Referred to: 304

Kenyon. Referred to: 127

King. Referred to: 319. See also, under Parliamentary Papers, “A Bill to Extend the franchise,” 21 Victoria (27 April, 1858).

“Knickerbocker, Diedrich.” See Irving.

Knox. Referred to: 249, 266

Koran. Referred to: 612. See also Charles Hamilton, The Hedàya or Guide.

note: the reference, from Dupont-White, being general, no edition is cited. At 255-6 JSM attributes, mistakenly, a quotation to the Koran; see the entry under Hamilton cited above.

Laboulaye. Referred to: 466n, 584n

La Bruyère, Jean de.Les Caractères ou les mœurs de ce siècle.

note: the reference, which is in a quotation from Tocqueville, is to Chap. xi, “Des grands.” As the reference is general, and the work is not in JSM’s library, no edition is cited; the work was first published (with La Bruyère’s Caractères de Théophraste) in Paris in 1688.

referred to: 81-2

Lambton, John George. See under Parliamentary Papers, “Report on the Affairs of British North America” (1839).

Landor, Walter Savage.Imaginary Conversations of Literary Men and Statesmen. 5 vols. London: Taylor and Hessey, 1824-29.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Taylor. The conversation is between Lord Brooke and Sir Philip Sidney, the latter being the speaker.

quoted:629

629.10-11 “I am,” . . . “a waiter at] I have known several such, and when I have innocently smiled at them, their countenances seemed to say, “I wish I could despise you: but alas! I am a runaway slave, and from the best of mistresses to the worst of masters; I serve at [rest of sentence also in italics] (I,26)

629.12 on] upon (I,26)

Lanfrey. Referred to: 584n

Lagrange. Referred to: 143

Laplace. Referred to: 143

Latrobe, Charles Joseph.The Rambler in North America: 1832-1833. 2 vols. London: Seeley and Burnside, 1835.

reviewed: 93-115

quoted: 114-15

114.25-6 Having . . . points] [no italics] (I,68)

115.5 unjust.—Hence] unjust. [paragraph] Hence (I,70)

Lavergne, Louis Gabriel Léonce Guilhaud de. “Royer-Collard, orateur et politique,” Revue des Deux Mondes, XXXV (1 Oct., 1861), 566-97.

note: Lavergne is quoting Royer-Collard.

quoted: 608

608.4-18 Who . . . force.] [translated from:] “Qui vote dans les collèges? Les électeurs sans doute? Non, c’est pour un très grand nombre le ministère. Le ministère vote par l’universalité des emplois et des salaires que l’état distribue, et qui, tous ou presque tous, directement ou indirectement, sont le prix de la docilité prouvée; il vote par l’universalité des affaires et des intérêts que la centralité lui soumet; il vote par tous ces établissemens, religieux, civils, militaires, scientifiques, que les localités ont à perdre ou qu’elles sollicitent; il vote par les routes, les ponts, les canaux, les hôtels de ville, car les besoins publics satisfaits sont des faveurs de l’administration, et pour les obtenir, les peuples, nouveaux courtisans, doivent plaire. En un mot, le ministère vote de tout le poids du gouvernement qu’il fait peser en entier sur chaque département, chaque commune, chaque profession, chaque particulier. Et quel est ce gouvernement? C’est le gouvernement impérial, qui n’a pas perdu un seul de ses cent mille bras, qui a puisé au contraire une nouvelle vigueur dans la lutte qu’il lui a fallu soutenir contre quelques formes de liberté, et qui retrouve toujours au besoin les instincts de son berceau, la force et la ruse. (586-7)

Leonidas. Referred to: 71, 651

Leopold II (Holy Roman Emperor). Referred to: 382

Lewis, George Cornewall. Referred to: 497n; see Parliamentary Papers, “Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act” (1860). See also Boeckh; and Mueller.

— An Examination of Some Passages in Dr. Whately’s Elements of Logic. Oxford: Parker; London: Murray, 1829.

referred to: 3

— Remarks on the Use and Abuse of some Political Terms. London: Fellowes, 1832.

reviewed: 3-13

quoted: 4-5, 8, 9, 11, 12

8.25 “mischievous,] But if it were argued, that justice, not law, ought to be administered in courts of justice; that no man can have a right to do that which is wrong; that in a kingdom the institutions ought to be monarchical, &c.; then the ambiguity is mischievous, (xv)

9.3 “claims] Sometimes, however, it is used to mean a claim recommended by the practice, analogy, or doctrines of the constitution, i.e. a constitutional right; and, sometimes, a claim (8)

9.3 policy;”] policy, i.e. a moral right. (8)

11.40 “seems] In this case, natural seems (182-3)

12.23 “that . . . laws;] This opinion is supported by the often quoted sentence of Tacitus, “that . . . laws;” (205)

Lewis, Thomas Frankland. Referred to: 3

Lieber, Francis.Reminiscences of an Intercourse with George Berthold Niebuhr, the historian of Rome. London: Bentley, 1835.

referred to: 97

— The Stranger in America. 2 vols. London: Bentley, 1835.

reviewed: 93-115

quoted: 101n, 103n, 106n, 113

106.n8 ‘regulators,’] regulators (I,16)

106.n9-10 justice. Of] justice; of (I,17)

113.9 Americans] American (II,77)

113.28 experience.*” Which] experience,” which (II,78)

Lillo, George.The London Merchant: or the History of George Barnwell. London: Gray, 1731.

referred to: 281

Lincoln. Referred to: 484

Livingston, Edward.A System of Penal Law for the United States of America: consisting of a code of crimes and punishments; a Code of procedure in criminal cases, a Code of prison discipline; and a Book of definitions. Prepared and presented to the House of Representatives of the United States, . . . Printed by order of the House of Representatives. Washington, printed by Gales & Seaton, 1828.

referred to: 77

Locke, John. Referred to: 7, 143, 304

— Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in Works. New Ed. 10 vols. London: Tegg, Sharpe, Offor, Robinson, Evans, 1823, IX, 1-205.

note: this edition is in JSM’s library, Somerville College. It is unlikely that JSM had a specific passage in mind when citing “principling” from Locke; the two passages referred to in the note on 141 (i.e., 29 and 148) show Locke’s use of “principle” as a verb in relevant contexts. (The passage in Locke on 90-1, where the word is not used, expresses the notion more fully, and may have significance for JSM’s own education.) A similar usage is in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I, Chap. iii.

quoted: 141

— Two Treatises on Government, in Works. New Ed. 10 vols. London: Tegg, Sharpe, Offor, Robinson, Evans, 1823, V, 209-485.

note: this edition is in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The passage referred to (Bk. II, Chap. ii, §14) actually is cited by Lewis.

referred to: 10

Lorimer, James.Political Progress not Necessarily Democratic: Or Relative Equality the True Foundation of Liberty. London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1857.

note: the quotation at 499n is indirect.

reviewed: 343-70

quoted: 353, 355-6, 357, 368, 499n

353.7-8 “final . . . governments;”] Whatever may be the variations in the earlier stages of the sequence, if the final result to which it points be trustworthy, it conveys to us this very pregnant fact, that the rule of the numerical majority is the degenerate form to which not only popular governments are prone, but that it is the final . . . governments whatsoever. (130-1)

353.16 “removing] If on the present occasion I have succeeded [sic] in removing (vii)

353.17-18 and showing] and thus by shewing (vii)

353.18 recognition,” to “pave the] recognition, have paved the (vii)

353.20 tread.”] tread, a good work will have been accomplished. (vii)

353.22 “The sum of influences should] On the contrary it is quite consistent with their views, and is indeed contemplated by both, that the sum of influence,* [*three-sentence footnote] instead of coinciding with, should (17)

355.23 and the] and still that the (17)

355.23 State] state (17)

355.24 individual, whatever] individual, we shall afterwards see that whatever (17)

355.30 utterance. But] utterance. [paragraph] But (18)

355.30 State] state (18)

355.31-2 indispensable,’] indispensable, and Savigny recognises it expressly, “Above all, individuals must be understood to constitute the state, not as such, but in their constitutional divisions.” (18)

355.33 The] It thus appears that the (49)

355.36 deals.] deals; and that the problem of reconciling liberty with order, without infringing on either, will be solved by such a development of the latter, as to enable it, in each particular case, to take complete and accurate cognisance of the claims of the former. (49)

355.37 The] It having been thus determined that the (226)

355.38 community.] community, the questions which fall next to be answered have reference to the form or forms of suffrage by which this may be adequately and permanently accomplished. (226)

356.8 acquired.] acquired. (227)

368.24 “inducement] By paying representatives you create an inducement (169)

368.25 affairs, the] affairs, and the (169)

368.25 would be] is (169)

Louis XI (of France). Referred to: 167

Louis XIV (of France). Referred to: 82, 83, 167, 416, 443

note: the references at 82 and 83 are in quotations from Tocqueville.

Louis XVIII (of France). Referred to: 582

Louis Napoleon. See Napoleon III.

Louis-Phillipe (of France). Referred to: 587, 599, 608

note: the reference at 599 is in an indirect quotation from Dupont-White.

Luther. Referred to: 238, 381

Lycurgus. Referred to: 42

note: the reference is to the laws of Lycurgus.

Lytton, Edward Bulwer. See Bulwer.

Lytton, Robert. See under Parliamentary Papers, “Report by Mr. Lytton” (1864).

Macaulay, Thomas Babington. “Mill’s Essay on Government,” Edinburgh Review, XLIX (March, 1829), 159-89.

note: the second reference at 20 is in a quotation from Bailey.

quoted: 20

referred to: 22

20.9-10 ‘beyond maxims] beyond those maxims (186)

20.12 it is not possible] we do not believe that it is possible (187)

20.24 “general rules] general rule (187)

Machiavelli. Referred to: 621, 622

note: “Machiavel” is the form used.

Mackintosh, Sir James.The History of England. 10 vols. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, & Green, 1830-40.

note: the same passage is cited in all three cases (and also in the Logic; see Collected Works, VII, 151-2). The exact quotation does not appear in this work, but the sense is given at I, 72 (and also in Mackintosh’s “Speech on the Annexation of Genoa,” in Miscellaneous Works, 3 vols. [London: Longman, Brown, Green, & Longmans, 1854], III, 351-2). JSM probably took it from Samuel Bailey, Rationale of Political Representation, 381-5, 428 (Note F), who discusses Mackintosh’s use of this image, and gives both the above references.

quoted: 41-2, 374, 380

Madison. Referred to: 100, 109, 111

note: the reference at 109 is in a quotation from A. H. Everett. See also under Hamilton, Alexander, The Federalist.

Mahomet. Referred to: 41, 416

note: the reference at 41 is to the laws of Mahomet.

Malmesbury (3rd Earl of). See Harris, James Howard.

Marcus Aurelius. See Antoninus.

Marshall, James Garth.Minorities and Majorities; their relative rights. A letter to the Lord John Russell, M.P. on Parliamentary Reform. London: Ridgway, 1853.

referred to: 330, 452

Marvell. Referred to: 500

note: JSM’s spelling is Marvel.

Mary (of England). Referred to: 238

Massey, William Nathaniel. Speech at Manchester, reported in “Mr. Massey, M.P., Upon the Indian Mutinies. (From the Manchester Examiner of yesterday.)” The Times, 14 Nov., 1857, p.4.

quoted: 240n-241n

240.n10 ‘Toleration] He was going to make a proposition which would perhaps startle them: he believed that toleration (4)

240.n12 Government, had] Government had been in a main degree instrumental—had (4)

240.n13-14 Christianity. . . . Toleration] Christianity. But they must not misunderstand him. Toleration (4)

241.n2-3 among . . . foundation] [no italics] (4)

241.n4 Christians . . . mediation.’] [no italics] (4)

241.n4 mediation.’] mediation; but to apply the word toleration to a people who worshipped miserable and bloodstained idols, whose religion was founded on principles shocking to humanity and disgraceful to human nature—to say that toleration was to be extended to such superstitions was, in his opinion, a gross abuse of the term. (4)

Maurice, John Frederick Denison.Eustace Conway: or, The Brother and Sister. 3 vols. London: Bentley, 1834.

quoted: 139-40

139.32 Treasury] treasury (II, 80)

140.1 whom] which (II, 80)

140.9 “we] “We (II, 81)

Medici. Referred to: 443

Meletus. Referred to: 235

note: the accuser (inter alia) of Socrates.

Men and Manners in America. See Hamilton, Thomas.

Mill, Harriet Hardy Taylor. Referred to: 216

Mill, James. “Aristocracy,” London Review, II (Jan., 1836), 283-306.

note: the reference is to “the first article of our present Number.”

referred to: 99

— “The Ballot—A Dialogue,” London Review, I (April, 1835), 201-53.

referred to: 25

— Elements of Political Economy. 3rd ed. London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1826.

note: the reference is general, so the final edition is cited.

referred to: 12

— A Fragment on Mackintosh: being strictures on some passages in the dissertation by Sir James Mackintosh, prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica. London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1835.

note: the 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1870) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 22

22.22-4 ‘It . . .ages’ . . . ‘pitiful objections.’] It . . . ages, from the pitiful objections of a man who, finding it stated in some quarter which he disliked, that identity of interests with the community is the best security the community can have for the good conduct of its rulers; gives out a proposition which has no bearing on the matter, and cries out, “There! I have demolished your best security: men sometimes mistake their true interest: therefore, the identity of the interests of the rulers with the interests of the community is not the best security for care of the interests of the community.” (288-9)

— (“F.F.”) The Article Government, reprinted from The Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica. London: Traveller Office, 1821.

note: the words in italic are taken from Lewis, who quotes the full sentence given in the collation, adding the italics.

quoted: 12

12.11 corruptive operation] Prudence is a more general characteristic of the people, without the advantages of fortune, than of the people who have been thoroughly subject to their corruptive operation. (31)

— The History of British India. 3rd ed. 6 vols. London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1826.

note: this edition is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 331n-332n, 332

331.n4 advantageous: there] advantageous. There (III, 451)

331.n13 acted on] acted upon (III, 451)

332.n9-10 security. . . . There] security. [4-sentence omission] There (III, 451-2)

332.11 “base . . . vote”] [see text, 332.n8]

Mill, John Stuart. “Austin’s Lectures on Jurisprudence,” Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine, IX (Dec., 1832), 343-8.

quoted: 134

134.26 food, and] food of all qualities, and (343)

134.33 What wonder] Who wonders (343) [cf. 134^j-j]

134.34 hardly a] no (343) [cf. 134^k-k]

— Autobiography. Ed. Jack Stillinger. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.

note: this ed., which gives the corrected text, is used for ease of reference. The reference is to JSM’s use of a phrase, “the astonishing pliability of our nature,” in “Civilization,” that closely parallels one, “the ‘extraordinary pliability of human nature’ ”, that he says, in the Autobiography (107), he “somewhere borrowed” from John Austin.

referred to: 145n

— “De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [I].”

note: i.e., the essay printed at 47-90 above. The changes are given as variants to the essays.

quoted: 174-5

referred to: 18n, 94, 99, 106, 108

— “De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [II].”

note: i.e., the essay printed at 153-204 above. The quotation is indirect, merely reproducing an illustrative image.

quoted: 380

— “Duveyrier’s Political Views of French Affairs,” Edinburgh Review, LXXXIII (Apr., 1846), 453-74.

note: the changes in the quotation are given as variants to the second article on Tocqueville. JSM says (200) that the article is a review of Duveyrier’s Lettres politiques; however, it also deals with Duveyrier’s La Pairie.

quoted: 201-4

— On Liberty.

note: i.e., the essay printed at 213-310 above.

referred to: 534n

— “Pledges,” Examiner (1 July, 1832), 417-18.

quoted: 41n

— “Pledges,” Examiner (15 July, 1832), 449-51.

referred to: 41n

— Principles of Political Economy. London: Parker, 1848. Collected Works, Vols. II and III. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.

referred to: 534n

— “Rationale of Representation.”

note: i.e., the essay printed at 15-46 above.

quoted: 54n

referred to: 71

54.n34 ‘which,] Into the reasons of any other kind, which may be given for the exclusion of women, we shall not enter; not because we think any of them valid, but because the subject (though in a philosophical treatise on representation it could not have been passed over in silence) is not one which, (29n above)

— “Recent Writers on Reform.”

note: i.e., the essay printed at 341-70 above. The concluding quotation from this essay in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform (see 339^k) is not there reproduced, as it appeared only in the pamphlet version of the latter; in Dissertations and Discussions, III, the two essays appeared one after the other, and so the quotation was unnecessary. The different readings of the quotation at 449n-500n and its original are given as variants to “Recent Writers on Reform” and Considerations on Representative Government.

quoted: 339n, 449n-500n

referred to: 339n

— “Reform of the Civil Service.”

note: i.e., the essay printed at 205-11 above.

referred to: 306

— “Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy,” App. B in Edward Bulwer Lytton, England and the English. London: Bentley, 1833, II, 321-44. In Collected Works, Vol. X. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969, 3-18.

note: the changes (mainly deletions of references to Bentham) are recorded as variants to the essay. Bulwer’s work is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 42-3

42.29 ‘How] He was not, I am persuaded, aware, how (II, 342; CW, X,17) [cf. 42^l-l]

42.36 one. The] one [3-sentence omission] The (II, 343; CW, X,17) [cf. 42^m]

— Speech “On the British Constitution,” printed in Autobiography. Ed. Harold J. Laski. London: Oxford University Press, 1924, 275-87.

note: the MS from which Laski printed his version has not been located, but a typescript of it has survived (in the possession of the Fabian Society). The passage has been collated against the typescript (indicated below by “T”) as well as against Laski’s printed version (indicated below by “L”); in the one place in the collation where the accidentals differ within a substantive change, the typescript is followed.

quoted: 44n-45n

44.n2-3 The goatish, sheepish, and swinish] The swinish, goatish and sheepish (T6; L282)

44.n3 “intellectual and virtuous.”] intellectual and virtuous. (T6; L282)

44.n4 by equal] by just and equal (T6; L282)

44.n4 those] these (T6; L282)

44.n4-5 to have the protection of] to be subject to (T6; L282)

44.n9-12 “You demand a representative government: nothing can be more reasonable—absolute monarchy is my abhorrence. But you must be just in your turn. It is not numbers that ought to be represented, but interests.] “Surely my friends you would not deny to others the advantage which you seek to partake of yourselves. The only true representation is representation by classes. (T6; L282)

44.n13 great interests of the country] interests (T7; L282)

44.n14-16 represented. Would you, because you are the majority, allow no class to be represented except yourselves? My] represented. My (T7; L282)

44.n17-18 freedom; if you forthwith submit, he grants you his gracious pardon and a class representation.”] freedom: any other sort of representation he never will agree to, but a class representation he consents to grant.” (T7; L282)

44.n20 elect] choose (T7; L282)

44.n21 the crocodiles six crocodiles] the hyaenas six hyaenas (T7; L282)

44.n23 Parliament] parliament (T7; L282)

44.n25 a panegyric] a long panegyric (T7; L283)

44.n26-7 of a million of sheep] of 1,000 sheep (T7; L283)

44.n28 Tiger, who was at that time in opposition] Tiger happening to be in the opposition (T7; L283)

45.n1 enlarged] enlarged much (T7; L283)

45.n1 inveighed] inveighed bitterly (T7; L283)

45.n2 and moved] and ended by moving (T7; L283)

45.n2 Majesty] Majesty must (T7; L283)

45.n3 with half a million] with 999 (T7; L283)

45.n3 The Dogs] The dogs (T7; L283)

45.n4 Majesty’s] Majesty (T7; L283)

45.n5 but vehemently] but solemnly (T7; L283)

45.n6 remonstrance was received with a general howl] remonstrance had its natural effect (T7; L283)

45.n12 million of sheep] thousand sheep (T7; L283)

45.n12-13 a thousand geese a-year:] 100 ducks a year, and (T7; L283)

45.n13 the Panthers, Wolves] and the panthers, wolves (T7; L283)

45.n15-17 Even . . . table.’] [not in Source]

— “State of Society in America.”

note: i.e., the essay printed at 91-115 above.

referred to: 76n

— Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform. 2nd ed. London: Parker, 1859.

note: i.e., the essay printed at 311-39 above; the different readings in the quotations are given as variants to the essays.

quoted: 491-5, 495n-6n, 496-7, 498-9

referred to: 353, 356

—, with Joseph Blanco White. “Guizot’s Lectures on European Civilization,” London Review, II (Jan., 1836), 306-36.

referred to: 94

Milton, John.Artis Logicæ Plenior Institutio, ad Petri Rami Methodum concinnata. London: Printed by Spencer Hickman, 1672.

referred to: 4

note: JSM’s library, Somerville College, has (minus Vol. II) The Prose Works of John Milton, ed. Charles Symmons. 7 vols. (London: Johnson et al., 1806), which includes the Artis Logicæ in VI, 195-349.

— Paradise Lost, in The Poetical Works of Mr. John Milton. London: Tonson, 1695.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from Taylor.

quoted:629-30

629.47-630.1 ‘sagacious of his quarry from afar,’] So scented the grim Feature, and upturn’d/His Nostril wide into the murky Air,/Sagacious of his Quarry from so far. (166; X,279-81)

Mohl. Referred to: 466n

Molesworth. Referred to: 352, 566

Molière. Referred to: 82

note: the reference is in a quotation from Tocqueville.

Monroe. Referred to: 109, 111

note: the reference at 109 is in a quotation from E. Everett.

Monteagle. See Spring-Rice.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de. Referred to: 57

— De l’esprit des lois. 2 vols. Geneva: Barillot, 1748.

note: the quotation is in a quotation from E. Everett.

quoted: 110

110.19-23 ‘the . . . chance.’] [translated from:] Le Peuple est admirable pour choisir ceux à qui il doit confier quelque partie de son Autorité. [remainder of paragraph omitted] Si l’on pouvait douter de la capacité naturelle qu’a le Peuple pour discerner le mérite, il n’y auroit qu’à jetter les yeux sur cette suite continuelle de choix etonnans que firent les Athéniens & les Romains; ce qu’on attribuera pas sans doute au hasard. (I,14-15)

Moreau. Referred to: 103n

note: the reference is in a quotation from Lieber.

Moses. Referred to: 41

note: the reference is to the laws of Moses.

Mueller, Carl Otfried.The History and Antiquities of the Doric Race. Trans. by H. Tufnell and G. C. Lewis. 2 vols. Oxford: Murray, 1830.

referred to: 3

Muller. See Mueller.

Napier, William Francis Patrick.History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814. 6 vols. London: Murray, 1828-40.

referred to: 123

Napoleon I (of France). Referred to: 42, 123, 196, 601

Napoleon III (of France). Referred to: 228n, 327, 583, 601

note: the reference at 228n is by implication.

Nelson. Referred to: 209

Newcastle. See Clinton, Henry Pelham.

Newton. Referred to: 143

Nicholas II (of Russia). Referred to: 307

Nicias. Referred to: 460

Niebuhr. Referred to: 97

Northcote, Stafford Henry. See under Parliamentary Papers, “Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service” (1854).

Odilon Barrot. See Barrot.

Pakington, John. Speech on the Representation of the People Bill (1860). Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., Vol. 157, cols. 1034-47 (22 March, 1860).

note: the reference is to col. 1043; Pakington does not mention Disraeli in this passage, but expresses a contrary view to that expressed by Disraeli, ibid., col. 854 (19 March, 1860). The allusion to one of Russell’s Reform Bills is to that introduced 16 Feb., 1854.

referred to: 452n

Paley. Referred to: 143

Palmerston (3rd Viscount). See Temple; and “The Educational Franchise.”

Parsons. Referred to: 164n

Peel, Robert. Referred to: 438, 633

— Speech at Glasgow, 12 Jan., 1837, in The Times, 16 Jan., 1837, 4. (Quoted in the advertisement pages of Reeve’s translation of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.)

note: JSM refers, apparently in error, to Peel’s “Tamworth Oration.” There are substantive variants between the version in The Times and that in the advertisement pages of Reeve’s translation, but not in the words JSM quotes.

quoted: 156

156.15 “earnestly requested the perusal”] Let me earnestly advise your perusal, if you have not yet read the work [Democracy in America], of a most able and intelligent native of France, who has made the institutions of the United States the peculiar object of his consideration. (4)

— “Speech delivered at the Mansion House” (23 Dec., 1834), in Speeches by the Right Honourable Sir Robert Peel, Bart., during his Administration, 1834-1835. 2nd ed. London: Roake and Varty, 1835, 9-15.

note: the citation is merely illustrative of the current use of the phrase.

quoted:628

628.43 “pressure from without:”] We hate the pressure from without—[loud and protracted cheering drowned the conclusion of the sentence.] (11)

— Speech at Tamworth, 4 Sept., 1835, in The Times, 5 Sept., 1835, p.4, cols. 1-3.

referred to: 105-6

Pericles. Referred to: 266, 438, 460

Perier, Casimir. Quoted: 4

note: the quotation has not been located.

Peter I (of Russia). Referred to: 419

Peter Leopold. See Leopold II.

Phillips. Referred to: 642

Phinn, Thomas. Referred to: 496n; see Parliamentary Papers, “Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act” (1860).

Pigott, Gillery. Quoted: 497n; see under Parliamentary Papers, “Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act” (1860).

Pitt (the elder). Referred to: 438

Pittacus. Referred to: 403

Plato. Referred to: 7, 235, 618

— Dialogues. Referred to: 251

note: the reference being general, no edition is cited. Opera omnia, ed. Immanuel Bekker, 11 vols. (London: Priestley, 1826) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

— Apology, in Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; New York: Macmillan, 1914.

note: this edition used for ease of reference. The reference is to 24^b-c. Opera omnia, ed. Immanuel Bekker, 11 vols. (London: Priestley, 1826) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College. JSM translated the Apology for the Monthly Repository, IX (1835), 112-21, 169-78.

referred to: 235

— Gorgias, in Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias (Greek and English). Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1925.

note: this edition used for ease of reference. The reference is to 513^a-c. Opera omnia, ed. Immanuel Bekker, 11 vols. (London: Priestley, 1826) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College. JSM translated the Gorgias for the Monthly Repository, VIII (1834), 691-710, 802-15, 829-42.

referred to: 508

— Phaedrus. See Plato, Theaetetus.

note: JSM’s reference is erroneous.

— Republic (Greek and English). Trans. Paul Shorey. 2 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1930, 1935.

note: this edition used for ease of reference. The first quotation is inferentially attributed; Plato (II, 352; ix.2 [576^a]) uses the singular form (τυραννικὴ ϕυσις The references at 484 and 498, as well as the quotation at 641n, are to the same matter (also referred to, without mention of Plato, at 400), touched on by Plato at II, 142 (520^d), 144 (521^a), I, 74 (346^a), 80 (347^c-d). Opera omnia, ed. Immanuel Bekker, 11 vols. (London: Priestley, 1826) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

quoted: 610, 641n

referred to: 484, 498

— Theaetetus, in Theaetetus and Sophist (Greek and English). Trans. H. N. Fowler. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1921.

note: JSM erroneously attributes the passage to the Phaedrus. This edition used for ease of reference. The reference is to 149^a-b (cf. 161^e). Opera omnia, ed. Immanuel Bekker, 11 vols. (London: Priestley, 1826) is in JSM’s library, Somerville College.

referred to: 6

Polignac. Referred to: 608

note: the reference is to the Polignac government.

Polybius. Referred to: 353

Pombal. Referred to: 382

Pooley. Referred to: 239

Poor Laws. See under Statutes, 4 & 5 William IV, c. 76.

Pope, Alexander.An Essay on Man, in Works. New ed. Ed. Joseph Warton, et al. 9 vols. and Supplementary Vol. London: Priestley, 1822 (Supp. Vol., London: Hearne, 1825), III, 1-160.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is in a quotation from Taylor.

quoted:622

622.12-3 For forms of government let fools contest,/Whiche’er is best administered is best.] For Forms of Government let fools contest;/Whate’er is best administer’d is best:/For Modes of Faith let graceless zealots fight;/His can’t be wrong whose life is in the right:/In Faith and Hope the world will disagree,/But all Mankind’s concern is Charity:/All must be false that thwart this one great End;/And all of God, that bless Mankind or mend. (III,115-18; Epistle III, ll. 303-10)

Pope, Samuel. Letter to Lord Stanley (26 Sept., 1856), in “Lord Stanley, M.P. and the United Kingdom Alliance,” The Times, 2 Oct., 1856, 8-9.

note: the full title of the Association, established in 1853, was The United Kingdom Alliance for the Legislative Suppression of the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors.

quoted: 288

288.2-5 ‘deeply . . . persecution,’ . . . ‘broad . . . barrier’. . . . ‘All] In common with your Lordship, I should deeply . . . persecution, and a broad . . . barrier presents itself to my mind as a natural limit. All (9, col.2)

288.16 ‘I claim,] I do not claim the right to legislate for moral evil; I do claim, (9, col.3)

Prévost-Paradol, Lucien Anatole [“Lucien Sorel”]. Les Anciens Partis. Paris: Dumineray, 1860.

referred to: 584-5

Quarterly Review. Referred to: 112. See also Anon. “Tours in America.”

note: the reference is in a quotation from E. Everett.

Reform Act (Bill) of 1832. See under Statutes, 2 & 3 William IV, c. 45.

Reform Bill of 1852. See under Parliamentary Papers, “A Bill to Extend the Right of voting” (1852).

Reform Bill of 1854. See under Parliamentary Papers, “A Bill further to amend the Laws relating to the Representation of the People” (1854).

Reform Bill of 1859. See under Parliamentary Papers, “A Bill to Amend the Laws relating to the Representation of the People” (1859).

Rémusat, Charles François Marie de.Politique libérale, ou Fragments pour servir à la défense de la révolution française. Paris: Lévy frères, 1860.

note: the passage cited (423-4) does not exactly correspond to JSM’s indirect quotation.

quoted: 545

Revue des Deux Mondes. Referred to: 584. See also Lavergne.

Revue Nationale. Referred to: 584

Richard II (of England). Referred to: 437

Richelieu. See Du Plessis.

Roebuck. Referred to: 563n

Roland de la Platière, Marie-Jeanne (née Phlipon). “Notices historiques sur la Révolution,” in Mémoires de Madame Roland; avec une notice sur sa vie, des notes et des éclaircissemens historiques. Ed. St. A. Berville and J. F. Barrière. 2 vols. Paris: Baudoin, 1820.

quoted:644

644.33 “universal mediocrity of mankind”] [translated from:] La chose qui m’ait le plus surprise depuis que l’élévation de mon mari m’eut donné la faculté de connaître beaucoup de personnes, et particulièrement celles employées dans les grandes affaires, c’est l’universelle médiocrité; elle passe tout ce que l’imagination peut se représenter, et cela dans tous les degrés, depuis le commis qui n’a besoin que d’un esprit juste pour bien saisir une question, de méthode pour la traiter, d’un peu de style pour rédiger des lettres, jusqu’au ministre chargé du gouvernement, au militaire qui doit commander les armees, et à l’ambassadeur fait pour négocier. (I,389)

“Roscommon, Francis”. Letters for the Press; on the Feelings, Passions, Manners and Pursuits of Men. London: Wilson, 1832.

note: the quotation is taken by JSM from Bailey.

quoted: 41

41.4 When] Hence, when (82)

Rosse. See Parsons.

Rousseau. Referred to: 7, 10, 155, 253

Royer-Collard, Albert Paul. Referred to: 582

note: the reference is in an indirect quotation from Odilon Barrot.

— Speech in the French National Assembly. See Lavergne.

note: JSM quotes Royer-Collard’s speech from Lavergne, “Royer-Collard, orateur et politique.”

quoted: 608

Russell. Referred to: 316-17, 318, 347, 352, 452

note: the reference at 347 is to “two noblemen advanced in years” (i.e., Russell and Palmerston); that at 452 is to Russell’s Reform Bill of 1854, q.v. under Parliamentary Papers, “A Bill further to amend the Laws relating to the Representation of the People” (1854).

St. Etienne, Rabaut. Quoted: 613

note: the quotation is taken from Scott’s Life of Napoleon, q.v.

St. Paul. Referred to: 236, 255, 381

note: the reference at 381 is to “the Apostle of the Gentiles.”

St. Stephen. Referred to: 381

note: the reference is to “the proto-martyr.”

Salvador, Joseph.Histoire des institutions de Moïse et du peuple hébreu. 3 vols. Paris: Ponthieu, 1828.

referred to: 397

Saul. See St. Paul.

Savonarola. Referred to: 238

Scott, Walter. Referred to: 108, 112

note: the reference at 108 is in a quotation from A. H. Everett; that at 112 is in a quotation from de Beaumont.

— The Heart of Midlothian, in Tales of my Landlord, 2nd series, collected and arranged by Jedediah Cleishbotham, Schoolmaster and Parish-clerk of Gandercleugh. 4 vols. Edinburgh: Constable, 1818.

quoted: 375

375.38 “are aye growing” while men “are sleeping.”] Jock, when ye hae naething else to do, ye may be aye sticking in a tree; it will be growing, Jock, when ye’re sleeping. (I,194)

— The Life of Napoleon Buonaparte, Emperor of the French, with a preliminary view of the French Revolution. 9 vols. Edinburgh: Cadell; London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, & Green, 1827.

quoted: 613

613.8-11 “One God, one France, one King, one Chamber,” was . . . commentary, “one mouth, one nose, one ear, and one eye.”] “One God,” exclaimed Rabaut St. Etienne, “one Nation, one King, and one Chamber.” This advocate for unity at once and uniformity, would scarce have been listened to if he had added, “one nose, one tongue, one arm, and one eye”; but his first concatenation of unities formed a phrase; and an imposing phrase, which sounds well, and can easily be repeated, has immense force in a revolution. (I,178)

Sévigné, Marie de Rabutin-Chantal, Marquise de.Lettres. Ed. Gérard-Gailly. 3 vols. Paris: Gallimard, 1953-57.

note: the reference is to a citation by Tocqueville; this edition used for ease of reference.

referred to: 181

Shakespeare, William.Hamlet.

note: the comparative passage is taken from the Variorum Edition of Horace H. Furness.

quoted: 103n

103.n3-4 “germane to the matter”] The phrase would be more germane to the matter if we could carry cannon by our sides; I would it might be hangers till then. (V,ii,152-4)

Shirreff, Patrick.A Tour through North America, together with a comprehensive view of the Canadas and United States, as adapted for agricultural emigration. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1835.

referred to: 113n

Smith. Referred to: 290

note: the reference is to Mormonism’s “prophet and founder.”

Socrates. Referred to: 6, 235, 241, 251

Solon. Referred to: 42, 403

note: the reference at 42 is to the laws of Solon.

“Sorel, Lucien.” See Prévost-Paradol.

Spring-Rice, Thomas. Speech in the House of Lords. Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., Vol. 131, col. 650 (13 March, 1854).

note: the quotation is indirect.

quoted: 208

Stanley, Edward Henry. Letters to the Secretary of the United Kingdom Alliance, in “Lord Stanley, M.P., and The United Kingdom Alliance,” The Times, 2 Oct., 1856, 9-10.

note: see also Pope, Samuel.

referred to: 287

Stephenson. Referred to: 468n

note: the reference is in a quotation from Carey.

Sterling, John. “Simonides,” in Essays and Tales. Ed. Julius Charles Hare. 2 vols. London: Parker, 1848, I, 188-251. (First published in London and Westminster Review, XXXII [Dec., 1838], 99-136.)

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College, with “Mrs. Taylor” on the flyleaf of Vol. I.

quoted: 266

266.1-2 “Pagan self-assertion” . . . “Christian self-denial.”] This assertion is only limited, and not overthrown, by the consideration that, when, after many centuries of dark struggle, faith had at last grown into harmony with life,—or, in other words, when, by a process long and painful in proportion to the value of the result. Christian self-denial and Pagan self-assertion had attained an equipoise, strengthening and elevating each other,—then was realized, in being and action, in men and their works, in Raffaelle and Shakspere, in De Sales and Melanchthon, a still higher and sublimer ideal than had been divined by Phidias, Sophocles, and Plato. (I,190)

Sulla. Referred to: 191

note: the identification is inferential, the reference being to the first Roman military dictator.

Sully. Referred to: 438

Swift, Jonathan.Gulliver’s Travels, in Works, XII. Ed. Walter Scott. Edinburgh: Constable, 1814.

note: this ed. in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation, which is indirect, and partly disguised by 473^g-g, is from Voyage IV (“A Voyage to the Country of the Houyhnhnms”), Chap. iii. (As the phrase recurs in Swift, no page reference is given.) In Swift, saying “the thing which was not” is equivalent to lying or expressing falsehood.

quoted: 473

473.26 a thing which is not] the thing which was not [cf. 473^g-g]

Tacitus. Referred to: 621, 622

— The Annals, in The Histories and The Annals (Latin and English). Trans. Clifford Moore and John Jackson. 4 vols. London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1925-37.

note: this edition used for ease of reference. Two editions (Leyden: Elzevir, 1640; and Amsterdam: Elzevir, 1672-73) formerly in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation at 12 is in a quotation from Lewis.

quoted: 12, 289

12.24 in corruptissima . . . leges;] Iamque non modo in commune, sed in singulos homines latæ quæstiones, et corruptissima . . . leges. (II,566; III,xxviii)

289.27 “Deorum injuriæ Diis curæ.”] Ius iurandum perinde æstimandum quam si Iovem fefellisset: deorum iniurias diis curæ. (II,368; I,lxxiii)

Taylor, Henry.Philip van Artevelde; a dramatic romance in two parts. London: Moxon, 1834.

referred to:617, 647

— The Statesman. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green, & Longman, 1836.

note: in JSM’s library, Somerville College, inscribed “From the author.” Many of the passages quoted in the review are marked in the Somerville copy by vertical lines in the margin and/or slash marks in the text; also JSM indicates added italics (see the collation below).

reviewed:617-47

quoted:621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 626-7, 627, 627-8, 628, 629, 629-30, 631, 634, 635, 635-6, 636, 637, 637-8, 639, 641, 641-2, 643, 644, 645, 645-6, 646

621.30 “while] And whilst (vi)

621.31 institutions have been] institutions were thus (vi)

621.33-4 in their speculations.”] in the speculations of its professors. (vi)

621.37 “still leave unattempted] But although the works of these three politicians, to whose names that of Tacitus is, as far as I know, the only one which could be properly associated, contain numerous civil precepts applicable to the administration as well as to the constitution of governments, they leave still unattempted (ix-x)

622.31 the government] a government (265)

623.41-2 “the greatest want of the people, though the least felt, is . . . instruction.”] Suppose, for example, the case of a people who felt the want of good laws in general, but whose greatest want, though the least felt, was . . . instruction: and suppose them living under a form of government so imperfect as not to make it the interest of their rulers to supply their wants. (265)

626.21 No] In short, no (17)

627.18-27 By . . . cognizable:] [no italics] [in the margin of his copy, JSM has written all in Italics] (152)

628.38 “upon the face,” . . . “of producible documents.”] Every step of his procedure, and every ground upon which he rests every step, should appear upon the face of producible documents. (51)

629.12 bone on] bone upon [as in Source] (157)

629.35 “He] [follows directly on 629.33] (158)

629.39-41 by . . . do;] [no italics] [in the margin of his copy, JSM has written Ital] (159)

629.42-4 how . . . met;] [no italics] [in the margin of his copy, JSM has written Ital] (159)

630.4 mind. This] mind. [paragraph] This (160)

630.22 moral] mortal (161)

631.5 Whatever] But to a free and balanced understanding I would freely say, that whatever (162)

631.5 they are many] [no italics] (162)

631.5-6 is indispensable that] is in the first place indispensable to a reform of the executive government of this country, that (162)

631.6 with public] with a particular department of public (162)

631.7-8 these should] these four or six should (162)

634.8 “With] But with (210)

634.9-10 government . . . government] Government . . . Government (210)

634.10-11 defect of law] [no italics] [underlined by JSM in his copy] (210)

634.13 government] Government (210).

634.26 “the . . . servants,”] [see text above, 634.9-10]

634.27 “opinion”] [see text above, 634.8]

635.21 conscience: for] conscience. For (60)

635.n1 T. Barclaii] J. Barclaii (61) [treated as typographical error]

636.1-2 Conscience . . . others;] [no italics] [underlined by JSM in his copy] (63)

636.4 in contrary] in the contrary (63)

636.13-15 not . . . ears,] [no italics] [underlined by JSM in his copy] (64)

636.18-19 for . . . reaches.] [no italics] [underlined by JSM in his copy] (65)

637.26 “have . . . baseness;”] The arts of rising, properly so called, have . . . baseness—more or less according as the aid from natural endowments is less or more. (92)

637.38 rules. Let] rules. The evil consequences involved in a departure from any such rule in any case, will always overbalance the ostensible good consequences; so that on the whole it is truly an act of evil consequence, or a doing of evil. The maxim means then, “Do not for the sake of certain good consequences, though they be perhaps the only ones directly perceivable, an act which, as being a departure from a general rule of morality, must be evil upon the balance of consequences.” [paragraph] Let (111-12)

637.38 principle, and] principle thus understood, and (112)

637.39 life. The] life. [paragraph] The (112)

638.4-5 aye . . . no,] “Aye” . . . “No,” (112)

638.5 “no”] “No” (112)

639.34 “in] The real difficulty lies (as I conceive) in (116)

641.5 “that where] Where (132)

641.6 ambition, nature has] ambition (which will happen sometimes, though seldom) nature may be said to have fallen short of her purposes; for she has (132)

641.8 wanting: where] wanting; but where (132)

641.10-11 quickened—such as love, philanthropy, timidity, friendship in particular cases.”] quickened. Love may be a provocative, if advancement in life be a facility to the courtship. Philanthropy leads to it; for who can do good to mankind without power? Timidity is driven to it; for, as Mucianus said, “Confugiendum est ad imperium.”^* [footnote:^*Tacitus, Hist., ii. 76.] Friendship suggests it; for a man gratifies his friends when he advances himself. (132-3)

641.31 “The] And the (36)

641.32 is unfavourable] is also unfavourable (36)

643.14 thought he] thought that he (54)

644.17 “If] But if (30)

644.19 implicitly; for] implicitly. For (30)

644.29 nature] Nature (31)

645.37 pusillanimity.”] pusillanimity.”^*[footnote:^*Leviathan, part i. chap.ii] (145)

Temple. Referred to: 326n, 347

note: the reference at 347 is to “two noblemen advanced in years” (i.e., Palmerston and Russell).

Tertullian.Apology (Latin and English), in Apology and De Spectaculis (trans. T. R. Glover) and Minucius Felix (trans. G. H. Rendall). London: Heinemann; New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1931.

note: this edition cited for ease of reference.

quoted: 249

249.21-2 “See how these Christians love one another”] “Look,” they say, “how they love one another” (for themselves hate one another); “and how they are ready to die for each other” (for themselves will be readier to kill each other). (177; xxxix.7)

Themistocles. Referred to: 419, 438, 458

Theramenes. Referred to: 460

Thiers. Referred to: 584

note: the reference is to “writers of M. Thiers’ school.”

Thirlwall, Connop.A Letter to the Rev. Thomas Turton, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, and Dean of Peterborough, on the Admission of Dissenters to Academical Degrees. Cambridge: Deighton; London: Rivington, 1834.

referred to: 142

Thoughts on the Ladies of the Aristocracy. See “Tomkins, Lydia.”

Tiberius. See Caesar, Tiberius.

Tocqueville, Alexis Clérel de.L’Ancien régime et la révolution. Paris: Lévy, 1856.

note: autograph copy in JSM’s library, Somerville College. The quotation is indirect.

quoted: 274

— De la Démocratie en Amérique. 2 vols. 2nd ed. Paris: Gosselin, 1835. Seconde Partie. 2 vols. Paris: Gosselin, 1840.

— Democracy in America. Trans. Henry Reeve. Vols. I and II. London: Saunders and Otley, 1835. Vols. III and IV. London: Saunders and Otley, 1840.

note: autograph copies of the French edition in JSM’s library, Somerville College. In the references, the two volumes of the Seconde Partie are given as III and IV to avoid confusion and to correspond to the Reeve edition. Where JSM used Reeve (see 49n and 162^q above), his version as well as the original has been collated (evidently only the first volume of the Reeve translation was available to JSM when he wrote his first review).

reviewed: 49-90 (the first two volumes, and Reeve’s translation of Vol. I), 153-204 (all four volumes, with Reeve’s translation of them)

quoted: 49, 51-2, 52-3, 54, 58-60, 60-1, 61-3, 64-5, 67, 67-8, 68-70, 74, 74-5, 76, 77, 81-2, 82-3, 84, 87-8, 88-9, 89-90, 111, 126, 156, 159-62, 170-1, 172-3, 175, 179, 180, 181, 183-4, 185, 186-7, 187-8, 189-90, 193, 200, 219

referred to: 18n, 94, 96, 97, 102, 106, 108, 109, 112, 113, 468, 557, 582-3, 618

49.6 it gives] by giving (I,xiii)

49.6 character] tenour (I,xiii)

49.7 it imparts] by imparting (I,xiii)

49.8 governed. I] governed. [paragraph] I (I,xiii)

49.10 private] civil (I,xiii)

49.10 government] Government (I,xiii)

49.14 conditions was] conditions is (I,xiv)

49.16 and imagined] where I imagined (I,xiv)

49.17 discerned there also] discerned (I,xiv)

49.18-20 conditions, though . . . them; and] conditions, is daily progressing towards those extreme limits which it seems to have reached in the United States; and (I,xiv)

49.21 From that moment I conceived] [paragraph] I hence conceived (I,xiv)

49.3-22 Amongst . . . reader.] [translated from:] Parmi les objets nouveaux qui, pendant mon séjour aux États-Unis, ont attiré mon attention, aucun n’a plus vivement frappé mes regards que l’égalité des conditions. Je découvris, sans peine, l’influence prodigieuse qu’exerce ce premier fait sur la marche de la société; il donne à l’esprit public une certaine direction, un certain tour aux lois; aux gouvernans des maximes nouvelles, et des habitudes particulières aux gouvernés. [paragraph] Bientôt je reconnus que ce même fait étend son influence fort au-delà des mœurs politiques et des lois, et qu’il n’obtient pas moins d’empire sur la société civile que sur le gouvernement : il crée des opinions, fait naître des sentimens, suggère des usages, et modifie tout ce qu’il ne produit pas. [paragraph] Ainsi donc, à mesure que j’étudiais la société américaine, je voyais de plus en plus, dans l’égalité des conditions, le fait générateur dont chaque fait particulier semblait descendre, et je le retrouvais sans cesse devant moi comme un point central où toutes mes observations venaient aboutir. [paragraph] Alors je reportais ma pensée vers notre hémisphère, et il me sembla que j’y distinguais quelque chose d’analogue au spectacle que m’offrait le Nouveau-Monde. Je vis l’égalité des conditions qui, sans y avoir atteint comme aux États-Unis ses limites extrêmes, s’en rapprochait chaque jour davantage, et cette même démocratie, qui régnait sur les sociétés américaines, me parut en Europe s’avancer rapidement vers le pouvoir. [paragraph] De ce moment j’ai conçu l’idée du livre qu’on va lire. (I,3-4)

51.26 fearful] most alarming (I, xxii)

51.27 forward] along (I,xxii)

51.31 reanimate] warm (I,xxii)

51.32 regulate] direct (I,xxii)

51.32-3 for its inexperience a knowledge of business] a knowledge of business for its inexperience (I,xxii)

51.33 and for its blind instincts an . . . interests;] and an . . . interests for its blind propensities; (I,xxii)

51.35 with circumstances and characters.] with the occurrences and the actors of the age. (I,xxii)

51.39-40 us toward an unseen abyss.] us backwards toward the gulf. (I,xxii)

51.43-4 thought of making any preparation for it,] had any forethought for its exigencies, (I,xxiii)

51.44 in spite of their resistance,] without their consent (I,xxiii)

52.2 Democracy] The people (I,xxiii)

52.2-3 untutored instincts] wild propensities (I,xxiii)

52.4-5 aught of society but its vices and its miseries] aught but the vices and wretchedness of society (I,xxiii)

52.6-7 then servilely] was then (I,xxiii)

52.7 smallest wish] caprices (I,xxiii)

52.9 annihilating it] annihilating its power (I,xxiii)

52.9-10 bad tendencies. No] vices; no (I,xxiii)

52.10 the sole thought was of excluding] but all were bent on excluding (I,xxiii)

52.11 government] Government (I,xxiii)

52.13 material] [no italics] (I,xxiii)

52.14 habits] customs (I,xxiii)

52.15 severed from whatever would lessen] but without the conditions which lessen (I,xxiv)

52.17 are yet] are (I,xxiv)

52.17 might] may (I,xxiv)

51.26-52.18 The . . . confer.] [translated from:] Les peuples chrétiens me paraissent offrir de nos jours un effrayant spectacle; le mouvement qui les emporte est déjà assez fort, pour qu’on ne puisse le suspendre, et il n’est pas encore assez rapide pour qu’on désespère de le diriger : leur sort est entre leurs mains; mais bientôt il leur échappe. [paragraph] Instruire la démocratie, ranimer, s’il se peut, ses croyances, purifier ses mœurs, régler ses mouvemens; substituer peu à peu la science des affaires à son inexpérience, la connaissance de ses vrais intérêts à ses aveugles instincts; adapter son gouvernement aux temps et aux lieux, le modifier suivant les circonstances et les hommes : tel est le premier des devoirs imposés de nos jours à ceux qui dirigent la société. [paragraph] Il faut une science politique nouvelle à un monde tout nouveau. [paragraph] Mais c’est à quoi nous ne songeons guère : placés au milieu d’un fleuve rapide, nous fixons obstinément les yeux vers quelques débris qu’on aperçoit encore sur le rivage, tandis que le courant nous entraîne et nous pousse à reculons vers des abîmes. [paragraph] Il n’y a pas de peuples de l’Europe chez lesquels la grande révolution sociale que je viens de décrire ait fait de plus rapides progrès que parmi nous; mais elle y a toujours marché au hasard. [paragraph] Jamais les chefs de l’État n’ont pensé à rien préparer d’avance pour elle; elle s’est faite malgré eux ou à leur insu. Les classes les plus puissantes, les plus intelligentes et les plus morales de la nation n’ont point cherché à s’emparer d’elle, afin de la diriger. La démocratie a donc été abandonnée à ses instincts sauvages; elle a grandi comme ces enfans privés des soins paternels, qui s’élevent d’eux-mêmes dans les rues de nos villes et qui ne connaissent de la société que ses vices et ses misères. On semblait encore ignorer son existence, quand elle s’est emparée à l’improviste du pouvoir. Chacun alors s’est soumis avec servilité à ses moindres désirs; on l’a adorée comme l’image de la force; quand ensuite elle se fut affaiblie par ses propres excès, les législateurs conçurent le projet imprudent de la détruire au lieu de chercher à l’instruire et à la corriger, et, sans vouloir lui apprendre à gouverner, ils ne songèrent qu’à la repousser du gouvernement. [paragraph] Il en est résulté que la révolution démocratique s’est opérée dans le matériel de la société, sans qu’il se fît dans les lois, les idées, les habitudes et les mœurs, le changement qui eût été nécessaire pour rendre cette révolution utile. Ainsi nous avons la démocratie, moins ce qui doit atténuer ses vices et faire ressortir ses avantages naturels; et voyant déjà les maux qu’elle entraîne, nous ignorons encores les biens qu’elle peut donner. (I,10-12)

52.26 several] several different (I,xxiv)

52.26-7 which cannot easily be appreciated or conceived in our times.] which can now scarcely be appreciated or conceived. (I,xxiv)

52.28 set insurmountable barriers] was an insurmountable barrier (I,xxiv)

52.30-1 from . . . inspired, a . . . power.] a . . . power from . . . inspired. (I,xxiv)

52.32 Although lifted so high] High as they were placed (I, xxiv)

52.32 nevertheless, took] could not but take (I,xxiv)

52.33 kindly] benevolent (I,xxiv)

52.34 poor man . . . equal] poor . . . equals (I,xxiv)

52.34-5 over his destiny as a trust which Providence had confided to their care.] over the destiny of those whose welfare Providence had entrusted to their care. (I,xxiv)

52.36 state of society] social condition (I,xxiv)

52.37 their own] its own (I,xxiv)

52.37-8 ever becoming the rivals of their chiefs] ever ranking with its chiefs (I,xxv)

52.38 accepted their benefits] received benefits from them (I,xxv)

52.38 They felt] It grew (I,xxv)

52.39 and submitted] and it submitted (I,xxv)

52.40 oppressions,] exactions (I,xxv)

52.40 as to] as to the (I,xxv)

52.40-1 Usages and manners had] Custom, and the manners of the time, had (I,xxv)

52.43 him of] him of the (I,xxv)

52.46 a sort of mutual good-will might arise between] a mutual exchange of good-will took place between (I,xxv)

52.47 favoured] gifted (I,xxv)

52.49-53.1 It is not by . . . power or by . . . obedience that men are debased; it is] Men are not corrupted by . . . power or debased by . . . obedience; but (I,xxv)

53.1 illegitimate] illegal (I,xxv)

53.2 unjust] oppressive (I,xxv)

53.3 were] was (I,xxv)

53.4 elegances] elegance (I,xxvi)

53.4 intellect] wit (I,xxvi)

53.4 culture] religion (I,xxvi)

53.5 were] was (I,xxvi)

53.5 rudeness, and ignorance] and a rude ignorance (I,xxvi)

53.7 wild] independent (I,xxvi)

53.7 Society] The body of a State (I,xxvi)

53.8 possess stability, power, and, above all, glory] boast of its stability, its power, and, above all, of its glory (I,xxvi)

53.9 barriers] divisions (I,xxvi)

53.10 properties are broken down] property is divided (I,xxvi)

53.11 subdivided] held in common (I,xxvi)

53.12 more equally] equally (I,xxvi)

53.12 state of society] State (I,xxvi)

53.13-14 institutions and manners] the institutions and the manners of the nation (I,xxvi)

53.15 can now] can (I,xxvi)

53.15-16 all, regarding the law as emanating from themselves, would give it their attachment and their ready submission;] all men would profess an equal attachment and respect for the laws of which they are the common authors; (I,xxvi)

53.20 and feeling secure of retaining them,] which he is sure to retain, (I,xxvi)

53.22 their] its (I,xxvii)

53.23-4 to its burthens.] to satisfy its demands. (I,xxvii)

53.25 supply the place of] supply (I,xxvii)

53.27 state] State (I,xxvii)

53.28 be duly] be (I,xxvii)

53.29 towards improvement. If] forwards; if (I,xxvii)

53.30-1 enjoyments may be less intense, but comfort] the pleasures of enjoyment may be less excessive, but those of comfort (I,xxvii)

53.31 highly] perfectly (I,xxvii)

53.36 experience. Each] experience: each (I,xxviii)

53.36-7 individual, being equally weak, will feel an equal] individual will feel the same (I,xxviii)

53.37 fellow-citizens;] fellow-citizens to protect his own weakness; (I,xxviii)

53.37-8 that he can obtain their good offices only by giving his,] that if they are to assist, he must cooperate, (I,xxviii)

53.42 powerful] strong (I,xxviii)

53.43-4 they despair of being better,] it despairs of amelioration, (I,xxviii)

53.44 because they know that they are well.] because it is conscious of the advantages of its condition. (I,xxviii)

53.46 such of them as were so;] such as were useful and good; (I,xxviii)

52.24-53.48 While . . . afford.] [translated from:] Quand le pouvoir royal, appuyé sur l’aristocratie, gouvernait paisiblement les peuples de l’Europe, la société, au milieu de ses misères, jouissait de plusieurs genres de bonheur qu’on peut difficilement concevoir et apprécier de nos jours. [paragraph] La puissance de quelques sujets élevait des barrières insurmontables à la tyrannie du prince; et les rois se sentant d’ailleurs revêtus aux yeux de la foule d’un caractère presque divin, puisaient, dans le respect même qu’ils faisaient naître, la volonté de ne point abuser de leur pouvoir. [paragraph] Je conçois alors une société où tous, regardant la loi comme leur ouvrage, l’aimeraient et s’y soumettraient sans peine; où l’autorité du gouvernement étant respectée comme nécessaire et non comme divine, l’amour qu’on porterait au chef de l’État ne serait point une passion, mais un sentiment raisonné et tranquille. Chacun ayant des droits et étant assuré de conserver ces droits, il s’établirait entre toutes les classes une mâle confiance et une sorte de condescendance réciproque aussi éloignée de l’orgueil que de la bassesse. [paragraph] Instruit de ses vrais intérêts, le peuple comprendrait que, pour profiter des biens de la société, il faut se soumettre à ses charges. L’association libre des citoyens pourrait remplacer alors la puissance individuelle des nobles, et l’État serait à l’abri de la tyrannie et de la licence. [paragraph] Je comprends que, dans un État démocratique constitué de cette manière, la société ne sera point immobile; mais les mouvemens du corps social pourront y être réglés et progressifs. Si l’on y rencontre moins d’éclat qu’au sein d’une aristocratie, on y trouvera moins de misères; les jouissances y seront moins extrêmes et le bien-être plus général; les sciences moins grandes et l’ignorance plus rare; les sentimens moins énergiques et les habitudes plus douces; on y remarquera plus de vices et moins de crimes. [paragraph] A défaut de l’enthousiasme et de l’ardeur des croyances, les lumières et l’expérience obtiendront quelquefois des citoyens de grands sacrifices; chaque homme étant également faible sentira un égal besoin de ses semblables; et connaissant qu’il ne peut obtenir leur appui qu’à la condition de leur prêter son concours, il découvrira sans peine que pour lui l’intérêt particulier se confond avec l’intérêt général. [paragraph] La nation prise en corps sera moins brillante, moins glorieuse, moins forte peut-être; mais la majorité des citoyens y jouira d’un sort plus prospère, et le peuple s’y montrera paisible, non qu’il désespère d’être mieux, mais parce qu’il sait être bien. [paragraph] Si tout n’était pas bon et utile dans un semblable ordre de choses, la société du moins se serait approprié tout ce qu’il peut présenter d’utile et de bon, et les hommes, en abandonnant pour toujours les avantages sociaux que peut fournir l’aristocratie, auraient pris à la démocratie tous les biens que celle-ci peut leur offrir. (I,12-15)

54.6 But we—what have we] But here it may be asked what we have (I,xxviii)

54.7 abandoned? The] abandoned. [paragraph] The (I,xxviii)

54.9 have] has (I,xxix)

54.11 existences] beings (I,xxix)

54.12 the government has alone] it is the Government that has (I,xxix)

54.14-15 to the strength, sometimes oppressive, but often conservative, of a few, has succeeded the weakness of all.] the weakness of the whole community has therefore succeeded that influence of a small body of citizens, which, if it was sometimes oppressive, was often conservative. (I,xxix)

54.17 but the] but it would seem that the (I,xxix)

54.17 seems] is (I,xxix)

54.19 right] Right (I,xxix)

54.19 a stranger] insensible (I,xxix)

54.20 force is, in the eyes of both] Force affords to both (I,xxix)

54.21 resource] guarantee (I,xxix)

54.24-5 without having acquired the knowledge which enlightens it] without understanding the science which controls it (I,xxix)

54.25 selfishness] egotism (I,xxx)

54.26 is conscious of] relies upon (I,xxx)

54.27 and of its] and its (I,xxx)

54.27-8 but, on the contrary, because it believes itself weak and infirm, and fears that a] but because it knows its weakness and its infirmities; a (I,xxx)

54.28 life. Everybody] life; everybody (I,xxx)

54.29 regrets] regret (I,xxx)

54.30 no visible or permanent fruits.] nothing that is visible or permanent, like the passions of old men which terminate in impotence. (I,xxx)

54.32 the compensations naturally belonging to] any compensation from (I,xxx)

54.33 an aristocratic society,] an aristocracy, (I,xxx)

54.6-35 But we . . . them.] [translated from:] Mais nous, en quittant l’état social de nos aïeux, en jetant pêle-mêle derrière nous leurs institutions, leurs idées et leurs mœurs, qu’avons-nous pris à la place? [paragraph] Le prestige du pouvoir royal s’est évanoui, sans être remplacé par la majesté des lois; de nos jours, le peuple méprise l’autorité, mais il la craint, et la peur arrache de lui plus que ne donnaient jadis le respect et l’amour. [paragraph] J’aperçois que nous avons détruit les existences individuelles qui pouvaient lutter séparément contre la tyrannie; mais je vois le gouvernement qui hérite seul de toutes les prérogatives arrachées à des familles, à des corporations ou à des hommes; à la force quelquefois oppressive, mais souvent conservatrice, d’un petit nombre de citoyens, a donc succédé la faiblesse de tous. [paragraph] La division des fortunes a diminué la distance qui séparait le pauvre et le riche; mais en se rapprochant, ils semblent avoir trouvé des raisons nouvelles de se haïr, et jetant l’un sur l’autre des regards pleins de terreur et d’envie, ils se repoussent mutuellement du pouvoir; pour l’un comme pour l’autre, l’idée des droits n’existe point, et la force leur apparaît, à tous les deux, comme la seule raison du présent et l’unique garantie de l’avenir. [paragraph] Le pauvre a gardé la plupart des préjugés de ses pères, sans leurs croyances; leur ignorance, sans leurs vertus; il a admis, pour règle de ses actions, la doctrine de l’intérêt, sans en connaître la science, et son égoïsme est aussi dépourvu de lumières que l’était jadis son dévouement. [paragraph] La société est tranquille, non point parce qu’elle a la conscience de sa force et de son bien-être, mais au contraire parce qu’elle se croit faible et infirme; elle craint de mourir en faisant un effort; chacun sent le mal, mais nul n’a le courage et l’énergie nécessaire pour chercher le mieux; on a des désirs, des regrets, des chagrins et des joies qui ne produisent rien de visible ni de durable, semblables à des passions de vieillards qui n’aboutissent qu’à l’impuissance. [paragraph] Ainsi nous avons abandonné ce que l’état ancien pouvait présenter de bon, sans acquérir ce que l’état actuel pourrait offrir d’utile; nous avons détruit une société aristocratique, et, nous arrêtant complaisamment au milieu des débris de l’ancien édifice, nous semblons vouloir nous y fixer pour toujours. (I,15-17)

58.38 state] State (I,75)

59.1 governed] subject (I,75)

59.2 town-council;] corporation; but (I,75)

59.3 appointed] designated (I,75)

59.4 the mere execution of the laws.] the simple and ordinary executive business of the State. [footnote omitted] (I,75)

59.5 opposed to our habits,] different from our customs, (I,76)

59.7 functions] duties (I,76)

59.8-9 portion of the business of administration] proportion of administrative power (I,76)

59.10 the selectmen.] “the Selectmen.” [footnote omitted] (I,76)

59.11 state] State (I,76)

59.13 and which if they neglect they are personally responsible.] but which they can only neglect on their own responsibility. (I,76)

59.14 state] State (I,76)

59.16-17 left to be determined by the local authorities,] determined by the town-meeting, (I,76)

59.24 they state the exigency] they explain the urgency (I,77)

59.27 determines] marks out (I,77)

59.27 leaves] confides (I,77)

59.29 summoning] calling (I,77)

59.30 called upon] requested (I,77)

59.30 landed proprietors] citizens (I,77)

59.32 and retain] but they have (I,77)

59.33 meeting.] meeting. [footnote omitted] (I,77)

59.35 officers] magistrates (I,77)

59.38 to lend his personal aid to] to forward (I,78)

59.40-1 records the proceedings of the town-meetings, and keeps the register of births] records all the town votes, orders, grants, births (I,78)

59.42 administration] action (I,78)

59.43-4 for the superintendence of the schools and public] to attend to the schools and to public (I,78)

59.43 inspectors of roads,] road surveyors, (I,78)

59.45 There . . . subdivisions:] They . . . subdivided; and (I,78)

59.48 direct the efforts of the citizens] direct the citizens (I,78)

59.50 inspectors] sealers (I,78)

59.50 measures.] measures. [footnote omitted] (I,78)

60.2 under a pecuniary penalty,] on pain of being fined, (I,78)

60.5 public] its (I,78)

58.37-60.7 In . . . done.] [translated from:] Dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre, la majorité agit par représentant lorsqu’il faut traiter les affaires générales de l’État. Il était nécessaire qu’il en fût ainsi; mais dans la commune où l’action législative et gouvernementale est plus rapprochée des gouvernés, la loi de la représentation n’est point admise. Il n’y a point de conseil municipal; le corps des électeurs, après avoir nommé ses magistrats, les dirige lui-même dans tout ce qui n’est pas l’exécution pure et simple des lois de l’État. [footnote omitted] [paragraph] Cet ordre de choses est si contraire à nos idées, et tellement opposé à nos habitudes, qu’il est nécessaire de fournir ici quelques exemples pour qu’il soit possible de le bien comprendre. [paragraph] Les fonctions publiques sont extrêmement nombreuses et fort divisées dans la commune, comme nous le verrons plus bas; cependant la plus grande partie des pouvoirs administratifs est concentrée dans les mains d’un petit nombre d’individus élus chaque année et qu’on nomme les select-men [footnote omitted] [paragraph] Les lois générales de l’État ont imposé aux select-men un certain nombre d’obligations. Ils n’ont pas besoin de l’autorisation de leurs administrés pour les remplir, et ils ne peuvent s’y soustraire sans engager leur responsabilité personnelle. La loi de l’État les charge, par exemple, de former, dans leur commune, les listes électorales; s’ils omettent de le faire, ils se rendent coupables d’un délit. Mais, dans toutes les choses qui sont abandonnées à la direction du pouvoir communal, les select-men sont les exécuteurs des volontés populaires, comme parmi nous le maire est l’exécuteur des délibérations du conseil municipal. Le plus souvent ils agissent sous leur responsabilité privée, et ne font que suivre, dans la pratique, la conséquence des principes que la majorité a précédemment posés. Mais veulent-ils introduire un changement quelconque dans l’ordre établi; désirent-ils se livrer à une entreprise nouvelle, il leur faut remonter à la source de leur pouvoir. Je suppose qu’il s’agisse d’établir une école: les selectmen convoquent à certain jour, dans un lieu indiqué d’avance, la totalité des électeurs; là, ils exposent le besoin qui se fait sentir; ils font connaître les moyens d’y satisfaire, l’argent qu’il faut dépenser, le lieu qu’il convient de choisir. L’assemblée, consultée sur tous ces points, adopte le principe, fixe le lieu, vote l’impôt, et remet l’exécution de ses volontés dans les mains des select-men. [paragraph] Les select-men ont seuls le droit de convoquer la réunion communale (town-meeting), mais on peut les provoquer à le faire. Si dix propriétaires conçoivent un projet nouveau et veulent le soumettre à l’assentiment de la commune, ils réclament une convocation générale des habitans; les select-men sont obligés d’y souscrire, et ne conservent que le droit de présider l’assemblée [footnote omitted] [paragraph] Ces mœurs politiques, ces usages sociaux sont sans doute bien loin de nous. Je n’ai pas en ce moment la volonté de les juger ni de faire connaître les causes cachées qui les produisent et les vivifient; je me borne à les exposer. [paragraph] Les select-men sont élus tous les ans au mois d’avril ou de mai. L’assemblée communale choisit en même temps une foule d’autres magistrats municipaux [footnote omitted], préposés à certains détails administratifs importans. Les uns, sous le nom d’assesseurs, doivent établir l’impôt; les autres, sous celui de collecteurs, doivent le lever. Un officier, appelé constable, est chargé de faire la police, de veiller sur les lieux publics, et de tenir la main à l’exécution matérielle des lois. Un autre nommé le greffier de la commune, enregistre toutes les délibérations; il tient note des actes de l’état civil. Un caissier garde les fonds communaux. Ajoutez à ces fonctionnaires un surveillant des pauvres dont le devoir, fort difficile à remplir, est de faire exécuter la législation relative aux indigens; des commissaires des écoles, qui dirigent l’instruction publique; des inspecteurs des routes, qui se chargent de tous les détails de la grande et petite voirie, et vous aurez la liste des principaux agens de l’administration communale; mais la division des fonctions ne s’arrête point là: on trouve encore, parmi les officiers municipaux [footnote omitted], des commissaires de paroisses qui doivent régler les dépenses du culte; des inspecteurs de plusieurs genres, chargés, les uns, de diriger les efforts des citoyens en cas d’incendie; les autres, de veiller aux récoltes; ceux-ci, de lever provisoirement les difficultés qui peuvent naître relativement aux clôtures; ceux-là, de surveiller le mesurage du bois, ou d’inspecter les poids et mesures. [paragraph] On compte en tout dix-neuf fonctions principales dans la commune. Chaque habitant est contraint, sous peine d’amende, d’accepter ces différentes fonctions; mais aussi la plupart d’entre elles sont rétribuées, afin que les citoyens pauvres puissent y consacrer leur temps sans en souffrir de préjudice. Du reste, le système américain n’est point de donner un traitement fixe aux fonctionnaires. En général, chaque acte de leur ministère a un prix, et ils ne sont rémunérés qu’en proportion de ce qu’ils ont fait. (I,99-103)

60.24-61.19 The . . . surface.] [translated from:] La commune est la seule association qui soit si bien dans la nature, que partout où il y a des hommes réunis il se forme de soi-même une commune. [paragraph] La société communale existe donc chez tous les peuples, quels que soient leurs usages et leurs lois; c’est l’homme qui fait les royaumes et crée les républiques; la commune paraît sortir directement des mains de Dieu. Mais si la commune existe depuis qu’il y a des hommes, la liberté communale est chose rare et fragile. Un peuple peut toujours établir de grandes assemblées politiques, parce qu’il se trouve habituellement dans son sein un certain nombre d’hommes chez lesquels les lumières remplacent, jusqu’à un certain point, l’usage des affaires. La commune est composée d’élémens grossiers qui se refusent souvent à l’action du législateur. La difficulté de fonder l’indépendance des communes, au lieu de diminuer à mesure que les nations s’éclairent, augmente avec leur lumière. Une société très civilisée ne tolère qu’avec peine les essais de la liberté communale; elle se révolte à la vue de ses nombreux écarts, et désespère du succès avant d’avoir atteint le résultat final de l’expérience. [paragraph] Parmi toutes les libertés, celles des communes, qui s’établit si difficilement, est aussi la plus exposée aux invasions du pouvoir. Livrées à elle-mêmes, les institutions communales ne sauraient guère lutter contre un gouvernement entreprenant et fort; pour se défendre avec succès, il faut qu’elles aient pris tous leurs développemens et qu’elles se soient mêlées aux idées et aux habitudes nationales. Ainsi tant que la liberté communale n’est pas entrée dans les mœurs, il est facile de la détruire et elle ne peut entrer dans les mœurs qu’après avoir long-temps subsisté dans les lois. [paragraph] La liberté communale échappe donc, pour ainsi dire, à l’effort de l’homme. Aussi arrive-t-il rarement qu’elle soit créée; elle naît en quelque sorte d’elle-même. Elle se développe presque en secret au sein d’une société demibarbre [sic]. C’est l’action continue des lois et des mœurs, les circonstances et surtout le temps qui parviennent à la consolider. De toutes les nations du continent de l’Europe, on peut dire qu’il n’y en a pas une seule qui la connaisse. [paragraph] C’est pourtant dans la commune que réside la force des peuples libres. Les institutions communales sont à la liberté ce que les écoles primaires sont à la science; elles la mettent à la portée du peuple; elles lui en font goûter l’usage paisible et l’habituent à s’en servir. Sans institutions communales une nation peut se donner un gouvernement libre, mais elle n’a pas l’esprit de la liberté. Des passions passagères, des intérêts d’un moment, le hasard des circonstances, peuvent lui donner les formes extérieures de l’indépendance; mais le despotisme refoulé dans l’intérieur du corps social reparaît tôt ou tard à la surface. (I,95-7; cf. Reeve, I,71-3.)

61.26 power.] authority. (I,82)

61.29 would not] may not (I,82)

61.30-1 seldom attach themselves but where there is power.] generally lie on the side of authority. (I,82)

61.32 so much] only (I,82)

61.33 a free and powerful corporation] a social body (I,83)

61.34-6 and of which to influence the government is an object worth exerting himself for. [paragraph] In] and whose government claims and deserves the exercise of his sagacity. In (I,83)

61.36-7 regret even to governments themselves; for every] regret to those who are in power; every (I,83)

61.38 but nobody knows how to create it.] and yet nothing is more difficult to create. (I,83)

61.38-9 They fear that if the localities] If the municipal bodies (I,83)

61.40 and the state exposed to anarchy.] and the peace of the country endangered. (I,83)

61.40-1 deprive the locality of] without (I,83)

61.41-3 it may contain subjects, but it will have no citizens. [paragraph] Another] a town may contain good subjects, but it can have no active citizens. Another (I,83)

61.44 arousing strongly] arousing (I,83)

61.45 elective] elected (I,83)

62.1 state] State (I,83)

62.2-3 inducement to most men, sufficient to draw them away] inducement sufficient to draw men away (I,83)

62.3 centre of their private interests] circle of their interests (I,83)

62.5 these] these individuals (I,83)

62.7-8 federal offices of a high order are generally attained, as it were accidentally, by persons who have already distinguished themselves in] federal functionaries are generally men who have been favoured by fortune, or distinguished in (I,83)

62.9 Their attainment] Such (I,83)

62.9 of an ambitious life.] of the ambitious. (I,84)

62.9-12 In the township, therefore, in the centre of the ordinary relations of life, become concentrated the desire of public esteem, the thirst for the exercise of influence, and the taste . . . popularity;] But the township serves as a centre for the desire of public esteem, the want of exciting interests, and the taste . . . popularity, in the midst of the ordinary relations of life; (I,84)

62.17-18 to take a direct share in the government, there are innumerable functionaries] into action, the body politic is divided into innumerable functionaries and officers, (I,84)

62.22 while it] which (I,84)

62.23-4 obligations imposed by the township upon its members.] functions of the town officers. (I,84)

62.25-6 observance. [paragraph] In] observance. In (I,84)

62.26-7 every person is continually reminded that he belongs to the community; his connexion with it] the activity of the township is continually perceptible; it (I,84)

62.30-1 the state for the same reason which makes the mountaineer cling] his home, as the mountaineer clings (I,85)

62.31-3 because he finds in his country more marked features, a more decided physiognomy than elsewhere. [paragraph] The] because the characteristic features of his country are there more distinctly marked than elsewhere. The (I,85)

62.37 Besides, the] The (I,85)

62.39 the distinction of ranks does not exist even in memory;] no tradition exists of a distinction of ranks; (I,85)

62.40 community, therefore, is] community is (I,85)

62.40-1 and acts of injustice which injure] and the abuses which may injure (I,85)

62.43 yet so long as it contrives to go on, the fact] the fact (I,85)

62.44 governs, casts] governs, and that it acts, either ill or well, casts (I,85)

62.45-8 Besides, they have nothing to compare it with. England formerly ruled over the aggregation of . . . people always managed their own local affairs. The sovereignty of the people is, in the commune, not] No term of comparison disturbs the satisfaction of the citizen: England formerly governed the mass of . . . people was always sovereign in the township, where its rule is not (I,85)

62.50-63.2 powerful: he feels interested in it, because he takes part in its management: the prosperity he enjoys in it makes it an object of his attention: he centres in it his ambition and his hopes. He] free: his cooperation in its affairs ensures his attachment to its interest; the well-being it affords him secures his affection; and its welfare is the aim of his ambition and of his future exertions: he (I,85-6)

63.4-5 without which liberty can only take the shape of revolution;] which can alone ensure the steady progress of liberty; (I,86)

63.6 mutual play of concurrent authorities,] union or the balance of powers, (I,86)

61.25-63.8 The . . . rights.] [translated from:] En Amérique, non seulement il existe des institutions communales, mais encore un esprit communal qui les soutient et qui les vivifie. [paragraph] La commune de la Nouvelle-Angleterre réunit deux avantages qui, partout où ils se trouvent, excitent vivement l’intérêt des hommes, savoir: l’indépendance et la puissance. Elle agit, il est vrai, dans un cercle dont elle ne peut sortir; mais ses mouvemens y sont libres. Cette indépendance seule lui donnerait déjà une importance réelle, quand sa population et son étendue ne la lui assureraient pas. [paragraph] Il faut bien se persuader que les affections des hommes ne se portent en général que là ou il y a de la force. On ne voit pas l’amour de la patrie régner long-temps dans un pays conquis. L’habitant de la Nouvelle-Angleterre s’attache à sa commune, non pas tant parce qu’il y est né, que parce qu’il voit dans cette commune une corporation libre et forte dont il fait partie et qui mérite la peine qu’on cherche à la diriger. [paragraph] Il arrive souvent, en Europe, que les gouvernans eux-mêmes regrettent l’absence de l’esprit communal; car tout le monde convient que l’esprit communal est un grand élément d’ordre et de tranquillité publique; mais ils ne savent comment le produire. En rendant la commune forte et indépendante, ils craignent de partager la puissance sociale et d’exposer l’État à l’anarchie. Or, ôtez la force et l’indépendance de la commune, vous n’y trouverez jamais que des administrés et point de citoyens. [paragraph] Remarquez d’ailleurs un fait important: la commune de la Nouvelle-Angleterre est ainsi constituée qu’elle put servir de foyer à de vives affections, et en même temps il ne se trouve rien à côté d’elle qui attire fortement les passions ambitieuses du cœur humain. [paragraph] Les fonctionnaires du comté ne sont point élus et leur autorité est restreinte. L’État lui-même n’a qu’une importance secondaire, son existence est obscure et tranquille. Il y a peu d’hommes qui, pour obtenir le droit de l’administrer, consentent à s’éloigner du centre de leurs intérêts et à troubler leur existence. [paragraph] Le gouvernement fédéral confère de la puissance et de la gloire à ceux qui le dirigent; mais les hommes auxquels il est donné d’influer sur ses destinées sont en très petit nombre. La présidence est une haute magistrature à laquelle on ne parvient guère que dans un âge avancé; et quand on arrive aux autres fonctions fédérales d’un ordre élevé, c’est en quelque sorte par hasard et après qu’on s’est déjà rendu célèbre en suivant une autre carrière. L’ambition ne peut pas les prendre pour le but permanent de ses efforts. C’est dans la commune, au centre des relations ordinaires de la vie, que viennent se concentrer le désir de l’estime, le besoin d’intérêts réels, le goût du pouvoir et du bruit; ces passions qui troublent si souvent la société, changent de caractère lorsqu’elles peuvent s’exercer ainsi près du foyer domestique et en quelque sorte au sein de la famille. [paragraph] Voyez avec quel art, dans la commune américaine, on a eu soin, si je puis m’exprimer ainsi, d’éparpiller la puissance, afin d’intéresser plus de monde à la chose publique. Indépendamment des électeurs appelés de temps en temps à faire des actes de gouvernement, que de fonctions diverses, que de magistrats différens, qui tous, dans le cercle de leurs attributions, représentent la corporation puissante au nom de laquelle ils agissent! Combien d’hommes exploitent ainsi à leur profit la puissance communale et s’y intéressent pour eux-mêmes! [paragraph] Le système américain, en même temps qu’il partage le pouvoir municipal entre un grand nombre de citoyens, ne craint pas non plus de multiplier les devoirs communaux. Aux États-Unis on pense avec raison que l’amour de la patrie est une espèce de culte auquel les hommes s’attachent par les pratiques. [paragraph] De cette manière, la vie communale se fait en quelque sorte sentir à chaque instant; elle se manifeste chaque jour par l’accomplissement d’un devoir ou par l’exercise d’un droit. Cette existence politique imprime à la société un mouvement continuel, mais en même temps paisible, qui l’agite sans la troubler. [paragraph] Les Américains s’attachent à la cité par une raison analogue à celle qui fait aimer leur pays aux habitans des montagnes. Chez eux la patrie a des traits marqués et caractéristiques; elle a plus de physionomie qu’ailleurs. [paragraph] Les communes de la Nouvelle-Angleterre ont en général une existence heureuse. Leur gouvernement est de leur goût aussi bien que de leur choix. Au sein de la paix profonde et de la prospérité matérielle qui règnent en Amérique, les orages de la vie municipale sont peu nombreux. La direction des intérêts communaux est aisée. De plus, il y a long-temps que l’éducation politique du peuple est faite; ou plutôt il est arrivé tout instruit sur le sol qu’il occupe. Dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre, la division des rangs n’existe pas même en souvenir; il n’y a donc point de portion de la commune qui soit tentée d’opprimer l’autre, et les injustices, qui ne frappent que des individus isolés, se perdent dans le contentement général. Le gouvernement présentât-il des défauts, et certes il est facile d’en signaler, ils ne frappent point les regards, parce que le gouvernement émane réellement des gouvernés, et qu’il lui suffit de marcher, tant bien que mal, pour qu’une sorte d’orgueil paternel le protège. Ils n’ont rien d’ailleurs à quoi le comparer. L’Angleterre a jadis regné sur l’ensemble des colonies, mais le peuple a toujours dirigé les affaires communales. La souveraineté du peuple dans la commune est donc non seulement un état ancien, mais un état primitif. [paragraph]. L’habitant de la Nouvelle-Angleterre s’attache à sa commune, parce qu’elle est forte et indépendante; il s’y intéresse, parce qu’il concourt à la diriger; il l’aime, parce qu’il n’a pas à s’y plaindre de son sort: il place en elle son ambition et son avenir; il se mêle à chacun des incidens de la vie communale: dans cette sphère restreinte qui est à sa portée, il s’essaie à gouverner la société; il s’habitue aux formes sans lesquelles la liberté ne procède que par révolution, se pénètre de leur esprit, prend goût à l’ordre, comprend l’harmonie des pouvoirs, et rassemble enfin des idées claires et pratiques sur la nature de ses devoirs ainsi que sur l’étendue de ses droits. (I,107-11)

64.23-4 of the government in any country:] of authority in a nation: (I,89)

64.28 to establish political freedom] to lay the foundations of freedom (I,89)

64.29 the government] authority (I,89)

64.31 among] in (I,89)

64.32-3 all the power is intrusted which is necessary for the performance of the task specially imposed upon him.] the degree of power necessary for him to perform his duty is entrusted. (I,89)

64.35-6 power of government, thus divided, is indeed rendered] action of authority is indeed thus rendered (I,89)

64.36 destroyed.] totally suppressed. (I,89)

64.37-8 calm and considerate love] mature and dignified taste for (I,89)

64.38 and indefinite] or ill-defined (I,89)

64.39 its] but its (I,89)

64.40 to order and legality.] to whatever was lawful and orderly. (I,89)

64.43 else. No idea was] else; no idea was (I,90)

64.44 calling in question or limiting the rights or powers of society] attacking the principles, or of contesting the rights of society (I,90)

65.1 of those powers was divided among many hands,] of its authority was divided, (I,90)

64.23-65.4 There . . . free.] [translated from:] Il y a deux moyens de diminuer la force de l’autorité chez une nation: [paragraph] Le premier est d’affaiblir le pouvoir dans son principe même, en ôtant à la société le droit ou la faculté de se défendre en certains cas: affaiblir l’autorité de cette manière, c’est en général ce qu’on appelle en Europe fonder la liberté. [paragraph] Il est un second moyen de diminuer l’action de l’autorité: celui-ci ne consiste pas à dépouiller la société de quelques-uns de ses droits, ou à paralyser ses efforts, mais à diviser l’usage de ses forces entre plusieurs mains; à multiplier les fonctionnaires en attribuant à chacun d’eux tout le pouvoir dont il a besoin pour faire ce qu’on le destine à éxécuter. Il se rencontre des peuples que cette division des pouvoirs sociaux peut encore mener à l’anarchie; par elle-même, cependant, elle n’est point anarchique. En partageant ainsi l’autorité, on rend, il est vrai, son action moins irrésistible et moins dangereuse; mais on ne la détruit point. [paragraph] La révolution, aux États-Unis, a été produite par un goût mûr et réfléchi pour la liberté, et non par un instinct vague et indéfini d’indépendance. Elle ne s’est point appuyée sur des passions de désordre; mais, au contraire, elle a marché avec l’amour de l’ordre et de la légalité. [paragraph] Aux États-Unis donc on n’a point prétendu que l’homme dans un pays libre eût le droit de tout faire; on lui a au contraire imposé des obligations sociales plus variées qu’ailleurs; on n’a point en l’idée d’attaquer le pouvoir de la société dans son principe, et de lui contester ses droits; on s’est borné à le diviser dans son exercice. On a voulu arriver de cette manière à ce que l’autorité fût grande et le fonctionnaire petit, afin que la société continuât à être bien réglée et restât libre. (I,115-16)

67.6-7 is, that its function is that of an arbitrator.] is the duty of arbitration. (I,136)

67.7-8 To warrant the interference of a tribunal, there must be a dispute: before there can be a judgment, somebody must bring an action.] But rights must be contested in order to warrant the interference of a tribunal; and an action must be brought to obtain the decision of a judge. (I,136)

67.9 an enactment gives rise to no lawsuit,] a law is uncontested, (I,136)

67.17 case] point (I,137)

67.18-19 by showing that every other consequence of the principle will be annulled in a similar manner,] by passing a judgment which tends to reject all the inferences from that principle, and consequently to annul it, (I,137)

67.20-1 principle, and sets it aside, without] principle without (I,137)

67.21 quits] leaves (I,137)

67.23 part] influence (I,137)

67.25-6 until it is appealed to—until . . . it.] unless it is appealed to or until it has taken cognizance of an affair. (I,137)

67.26 universal] general (I,137)

67.28 is in its own] is by its (I,137)

67.28-9 it cannot act without an impulse from without.] it must be put in motion in order to produce a result. (I,137)

67.29-30 When a criminal is brought before it to be tried, it will convict and punish him; when called upon to redress a wrong,] When it is called upon to repress a crime, it punishes the criminal; when a wrong is to be redressed, (I,137)

67.32 inquire into facts,] examine its evidence (I,138)

67.33-4 take the initiative, and erect himself into a censor of] open proceedings, and usurp the censureship of (I,138)

67.34 to this] to the (I,138)

67.37 power. An] power; an (I,138)

67.38 he can only pronounce upon an individual case,] he is only conversant with special cases, (I,138)

67.3-40 The . . . court.] [translated from:] Les Américains ont conservé au pouvoir judiciaire tous les caractères auxquels on a coutume de le reconnaître. Ils l’ont exactement renfermé dans le cercle où il a l’habitude de se mouvoir. [paragraph] Le premier caractère de la puissance judiciaire, chez tous les peuples, est de servir d’arbitre. Pour qu’il y ait lieu à action, de la part des tribunaux, il faut qu’il y ait contestation. Pour qu’il y ait juge, il faut qu’il y ait procès. Tant qu’une loi ne donne pas lieu a une contestation, le pouvoir judiciaire n’a donc point occasion de s’en occuper. Elle existe, mais il ne la voit pas. Lorsqu’un juge, à propos d’un procès, attaque une loi relative à ce procès, il étend le cercle de ses attributions, mais il n’en sort pas, puisqu’il lui a fallu, en quelque sorte, juger la loi pour arriver à juger le procès. Lorsqu’il prononce sur une loi, sans partir d’un procès, il sort complètement de sa sphère et il pénètre dans celles du pouvoir législatif. [paragraph] Le second caractère de la puissance judiciaire est de prononcer sur des cas particuliers et non sur des principes généraux. Qu’un juge, en tranchant une question particulière, détruise un principe général, par la certitude où l’on est que, chacune des conséquences de ce même principe étant frappée de la même manière, le principe devient stérile, il reste dans le cercle naturel de son action. Mais que le juge attaque directement le principe général, et le détruise sans avoir en vue un cas particulier, il sort, du cercle où tous les peuples se sont accordés à l’enfermer. Il devient quelque chose de plus important, de plus utile peutêtre qu’un magistrat; mais il cesse de représenter le pouvoir judiciaire. [paragraph] Le troisième caractère de la puissance judiciaire est de ne pouvoir agir que quand on l’appelle, ou, suivant l’expression légale, quand elle est saisie. Ce caractère ne se rencontre point aussi généralement que les deux autres. Je crois cependant que, malgré les exceptions, on peut le considérer comme essentiel. De sa nature, le pouvoir judiciaire est sans action; il faut le mettre en mouvement pour qu’il se remue. On lui dénonce un crime, et il punit le coupable; on l’appelle à redresser une injustice, et il la redresse; on lui soumet un acte, et il l’interprète; mais il ne va pas de lui-même poursuivre les criminels, rechercher l’injustice et examiner les faits. Le pouvoir judiciaire ferait en quelque sorte violence à cette nature passive, s’il prenait de lui-même l’initiative et s’établissait en censeur des lois. [paragraph] Les Américains ont conservé au pouvoir judiciaire ces trois caractères distinctifs. Le juge américain ne peut prononcer que lorsqu’il y a litige. Il ne s’occupe jamais que d’un cas particulier; et, pour agir, il doit toujours attendre qu’on l’ait saisi. (I,164-6)

67.42 dangers] evils (I, 142)

67.43 by debarring them from the use of any except strictly judicial means.] by the obligation which has been imposed of attacking the laws through the courts of justice alone. (I,142)

67.44-5 in a sweeping and general way;] on the ground of theoretical generalities; (I,142)

67.45 to take the initiative, and to] to open an attack or to (I,142)

67.48-68.1 law, in an obscure proceeding, and in some particular application,] law, applied to some particular case in (I,142)

68.2 is partly] is (I,142)

68.2-3 is aimed directly only at] bears upon (I,142)

68.3-4 wounded, it is only as it were by accident.] slighted, it is only collaterally. (I,142)

68.6 the tribunals.] judicial functionaries. (I,142)

68.7-9 moreover, be readily understood that by leaving it to private interests to call the veto of the tribunals into action, and by closely uniting the attack upon the law with a suit against an individual, the laws are] readily be understood that by connecting the censureship of the laws with the private interests of members of the community, and by intimately uniting the prosecution of the law with the prosecution of an individual, the legislation is (I,142-3)

68.11 only in obedience to an exigency which is actually felt; it] whenever their evil consequences are most felt; and it (I,143)

68.13 be the] be at once the (I,143)

68.14-15 order. [paragraph] If] order. If (I,143)

68.25 being guilty of a denial of justice.] abdicating the duties of his post. (I,143)

68.27 censorship] censureship (I,144)

68.28 acts of the legislature] legislation (I,144)

68.29 indefinitely] indistinctly (I,144)

68.30 formal] exact (I,144)

68.31 is inclined to carry it into] cares to bring it before (I,144)

68.32-3 justice. [paragraph] The] justice. The (I,144)

68.35-6 dangerous. [paragraph] Even within] dangerous. Within (I,144)

67.41-68.39 The political . . . assemblies.] [translated from:] Les Américains ont donc confié à leurs tribunaux un immense pouvoir politique. Mais en les obligeant à n’attaquer les lois que par des moyens judiciaires, ils ont beaucoup diminué les dangers de ce pouvoir. [paragraph] Si le juge avait pu attaquer les lois d’une façon théorique et générale; s’il avait pu prendre l’initiative et censurer le législateur, il fût entré avec éclat sur la scène politique; devenu le champion ou l’adversaire d’un parti, il eût appelé toutes les passions qui divisent le pays à prendre part à la lutte. Mais quand le juge attaque une loi dans un débat obscur et sur une application particulière, il dérobe en partie l’importance de l’attaque aux regards du public. Son arrêt n’a pour but que de frapper un intérêt individuel; la loi ne se trouve blessée que par hasard. [paragraph] D’ailleurs, la loi ainsi censurée n’est pas détruite: sa force morale est diminuée, mais son effet matériel n’est point suspendu. Ce n’est que peu à peu, et sous les coups répétés de la jurisprudence, qu’enfin elle succombe. [paragraph] De plus on comprend sans peine qu’en chargeant l’intérêt particulier de provoquer la censure des lois, en liant intimement le procès fait à la loi au procès fait à un homme, on s’assure que la législation ne sera pas légèrement attaquée. Dans ce système, elle n’est plus exposée aux agressions journalières des partis. En signalant les fautes du législateur, on obéit à un besoin réel: on part d’un fait positif et appréciable, puisqu’il doit servir de base à un procès. [paragraph] Je ne sais si cette manière d’agir des tribunaux américains, en même temps qu’elle est la plus favorable à l’ordre public, n’est pas aussi la plus favorable à la liberté. [paragraph] Si le juge ne pouvait attaquer les législateurs que de front, il y a des temps où il craindrait de le faire; il en est d’autres où l’esprit de parti le pousserait chaque jour à l’oser. Ainsi il arriverait que les lois seraient attaquées quand le pouvoir dont elles émanent serait faible, et qu’on s’y soumettrait sans murmurer quand il serait fort. C’est-à-dire que souvent on attaquerait les lois lorsqu’il serait le plus utile de les respecter, et qu’on les respecterait quand il deviendrait facile d’opprimer en leur nom. [paragraph] Mais le juge américain est amené malgré lui sur le terrain de la politique. Il ne juge la loi que parce qu’il a à juger un procès, et il ne peut s’empêcher de juger le procès. La question politique qu’il doit résoudre se rattache à l’intérêt des plaideurs, et il ne saurait refuser de la trancher sans faire un déni de justice. C’est en remplissant les devoirs étroits imposés à la profession du magistrat, qu’il fait l’acte du citoyen. Il est vrai que, de cette manière, la censure judiciaire, exercée par les tribunaux sur la législation, ne peut s’étendre sans distinction à toutes les lois, car il en est qui ne peuvent jamais donner lieu à cette sorte de contestation nettement formulée qu’on nomme un procès. Et lorsqu’une pareille contestation est possible, on peut encore concevoir qu’il ne se rencontre personne qui veuille en saisir les tribunaux. [paragraph] Les Américains ont souvent senti cet inconvénient, mais ils ont laissé le remède incomplet, de peur de lui donner, dans tous les cas, une efficacité dangereuse. [paragraph] Resserré dans ces limites, le pouvoir accordé aux tribunaux américains, de prononcer sur l’inconstitutionnalité des lois, forme encore une des plus puissantes barrières qu’on ait jamais élevées contre la tyrannie des assemblées polititiques. (I,170-2)

68.46-70.43 We . . . it.] [translated from:] On doit distinguer soigneusement, dans les lois, le but qu’elles poursuivent, de la manière dont elles marchent vers ce but; leur bonté absolue, de celle qui n’est que relative. [paragraph] Je suppose que l’objet du législateur soit de favoriser les intérêts du petit nombre aux dépens de ceux du grand; ses dispositions sont combinées de façon à obtenir le résultat qu’il se propose dans le moins de temps et avec le moins d’efforts possibles. La loi sera bien faite, et son but mauvais; elle sera dangereuse en proportion de son efficacité même. [paragraph] Les lois de la démocratie tendent en général au bien du plus grand nombre; car elles émanent de la majorité de tous les citoyens, laquelle peut se tromper, mais ne saurait avoir un intérêt contraire à elle-même. [paragraph] Celles de l’aristocratie tendent, au contraire, à monopoliser, dans les mains du petit nombre, la richesse et le pouvoir; parce que l’aristocratie forme toujours de sa nature une minorité. [paragraph] On peut donc dire, d’une manière générale, que l’objet de la démocratie, dans sa législation, est plus utile à l’humanité que l’objet de l’aristocratie dans la sienne. [paragraph] Mais là finissent ses avantages. [paragraph] L’aristocratie est infiniment plus habile dans la science du législateur, que ne saurait l’être la démocratie. Maîtresse d’elle-même, elle n’est point sujette à des entraînemens passagers; elle a de longs desseins qu’elle sait mûrir jusqu’à ce que l’occasion favorable se présente. L’aristocratie procède savamment; elle connaît l’art de faire converger en même temps, vers un même point, la force collective de toutes ses lois. [paragraph] Il n’en est pas ainsi de la démocratie: ses lois sont presque toujours défectueuses ou intempestives. [paragraph] Les moyens de la démocratie sont donc plus imparfaits que ceux de l’aristocratie: souvent elle travaille, sans le vouloir, contre elle-même; mais son but est plus utile. [paragraph] Imaginez une société que la nature, ou sa constitution, ait organisée de manière à supporter l’action passagère de mauvaises lois, et qui puisse attendre, sans périr, le résultat de la tendance générale des lois, et vous concevrez que le gouvernement de la démocratie, malgré ses défauts, soit encore de tous le plus propre à faire prospérer cette société. [paragraph] C’est précisément là ce qui arrive aux États-Unis; je répète ici ce que j’ai déjà exprimé ailleurs: le grand privilège des Américains est de pouvoir faire des fautes réparables. [paragraph] Je dirai quelque chose d’analogue sur les fonctionnaires publics. [paragraph] Il est facile de voir que la démocratie américaine se trompe souvent dans le choix des hommes auxquels elle confie le pouvoir; mais il n’est pas aussi aisé de dire pourquoi l’État prospère en leurs mains. [paragraph] Remarquez d’abord que, si dans un État démocratique, les gouvernans sont moins honnêtes ou moins capables, les gouvernés sont plus éclairés et plus attentifs. [paragraph] Le peuple, dans les démocraties, occupé comme il l’est sans cesse de ses affaires, et jaloux de ses droits, empêche ses représentans de s’écarter d’une certaine ligne générale que son intérêt lui trace. [paragraph] Remarquez encore que, si le magistrat démocratique use plus mal qu’un autre du pouvoir, il le possède en général moins long-temps. [paragraph] Mais il y a une raison plus générale que celle-là, et plus satisfaisante. [paragraph] Il importe sans doute au bien des nations que les gouvernans aient des vertus ou des talens; mais ce qui, peut-être, leur importe encore davantage, c’est que les gouvernans n’aient pas d’intérêts contraires à la masse des gouvernés. Car, dans ces cas, les vertus pourraient devenir presques inutiles, et les talens funestes. [ellipsis indicates 2-paragraph omission] Ceux qu’on charge, aux États-Unis, de diriger les affaires du public, sont souvent inférieurs en capacité et en moralité aux hommes que l’aristocratie porterait au pouvoir. Mais leur intérêt se confond et s’identifie avec celui de la majorité de leurs concitoyens. Ils peuvent donc commettre de fréquentes infidélités et de graves erreurs; mais ils ne suivront jamais systématiquement une tendance hostile à cette majorité; et il ne saurait leur arriver d’imprimer au gouvernement une allure exclusive et dangereuse. [paragraph] La mauvaise administration d’un magistrat, sous la démocratie, est d’ailleurs un fait isolé qui n’a d’influence que pendant la courte durée de cette administration. La corruption et l’incapacité ne sont pas des intérêts communs, qui puissent lier entre eux les hommes d’une manière permanente. [paragraph] Un magistrat corrompu, ou incapable, ne combinera pas ses efforts avec un autre magistrat, par la seule raison que ce dernier est incapable et corrompu comme lui, et ces deux hommes ne travailleront jamais de concert à faire fleurir la corruption et l’incapacité chez leurs arrière-neveux. L’ambition et les manœuvres de l’un serviront, au contraire, a démasquer l’autre. Les vices du magistrat, dans les démocraties, lui sont en général tout personnels. [paragraph] Mais les hommes publics, sous le gouvernement de l’aristocratie, ont un intérêt de classe qui, s’il se confond quelquefois avec celui de la majorité, en reste souvent distinct. Cet intérêt forme entre eux un lien commun et durable; il les invite à unir et à combiner leurs efforts vers un but qui n’est pas toujours le bonheur du plus grand nombre; il ne lie pas seulement les gouvernans les uns aux autres, il les unit encore à une portion considérable de gouvernés; car beaucoup de citoyens, sans être revêtus d’aucun emploi, font partie de l’aristocratie. [paragraph] Le magistrat aristocratique rencontre donc un appui constant dans la société, en même temps qu’il en trouve un dans le gouvernement. [paragraph] Cet objet commun, qui dans les aristocraties unit les magistrats à l’intérêt d’une partie de leurs contemporains, les identifie encore et les soumet pour ainsi dire à celui des races futures. Ils travaillent pour l’avenir aussi bien que pour le présent. Le magistrat aristocratique est donc poussé tout à la fois vers un même point, par les passions des gouvernés, par les siennes propres, et je pourrais presque dire par les passions de sa postérité. [paragraph] Comment s’étonner, s’il ne résiste point? Aussi voit-on souvent, dans les aristocraties, l’esprit de classe entraîner ceux même qu’il ne corrompt pas, et faire qu’à leur insu ils accommodent peu à peu la société à leur usage, et la préparent pour leurs descendans. [ellipsis indicates 2-paragraph omission] Aux États-Unis, où les fonctionnaires publics n’ont point d’intérêts de classe à faire prévaloir, la marche générale et continue du gouvernement est bienfaisante, quoique les gouvernans soient souvent inhabiles, et quelquefois méprisables. [paragraph] Il y a donc, au fond des institutions démocratiques, une tendance cachée qui fait souvent concourir les hommes à la prospérité générale, malgré leurs vices ou leurs erreurs; tandis que dans les institutions aristocratiques, il se découvre quelquefois une pente secrète qui, en dépit des talens et des vertus, les entraîne à contribuer aux misères de leurs semblables. C’est ainsi qu’il peut arriver que, dans les gouvernemens aristocratiques, les hommes publics fassent le mal sans le vouloir, et que dans les démocraties ils produisent le bien sans en avoir la pensée. (II,108-14; cf. Reeve, II,114-20.)

74.4-10 A custom . . . meeting.] [translated from:] Il se répand de plus en plus, aux États-Unis, une coutume qui finira par rendre vaines les garanties du gouvernement représentatif: il arrive très fréquemment que les électeurs, en nommant un député, lui tracent un plan de conduite et lui imposent un certain nombre d’obligations positives dont il ne saurait nullement s’écarter. Au tumulte près, c’est comme si la majorité elle-même délibérait sur la place publique. (II,135-6; cf. Reeve, II,144-5).

74.14-75.42 Many . . . that.] [translated from:] Bien des gens, en Europe, croient sans le dire, ou disent sans le croire, qu’un des grands avantages du vote universel est d’appeler à la direction des affaires des hommes dignes de la confiance publique. Le peuple ne saurait gouverner lui-même, dit-on, mais il veut toujours sincèrement le bien de l’État, et son instinct ne manque guère de lui désigner ceux qu’un même désir anime et qui sont les plus capables de tenir en main le pouvoir. [paragraph] Pour moi, je dois le dire, ce que j’ai vu en Amérique ne m’autorise point à penser qu’il en soit ainsi. A mon arrivée aux États-Unis, je fus frappé de surprise en découvrant à quel point le mérite était commun parmi les gouvernés et combien il l’était peu chez les gouvernans. C’est un fait constant que, de nos jours, aux États-Unis, les hommes les plus remarquables sont rarement appelés aux fonctions publiques, et l’on est obligé de reconnaître qu’il en a été ainsi à mesure que la démocratie a dépassé toutes ses anciennes limites. Il est évident que la race des hommes d’État américains s’est singulièrement rapetissée depuis un demi-siècle. [paragraph] On peut indiquer plusieurs causes de ce phénomène. [paragraph] Il est impossible, quoi qu’on fasse, d’élever les lumières du peuple au dessus d’un certain niveau. On aura beau faciliter les abords des connaissances humaines, améliorer les méthodes d’enseignement et mettre la science à bon marché, on ne fera jamais que les hommes s’instruisent et développent leur intelligence sans y consacrer du temps. [paragraph] Le plus ou moins de facilité que rencontre le peuple à vivre sans travailler, forme donc la limite nécessaire de ses progrès intellectuels. Cette limite est placée plus loin dans certains pays, moins loin dans certains autres; mais pour qu’elle n’existât point, il faudrait que le peuple n’eût plus à s’occuper des soins matériels de la vie; c’est-à-dire qu’il ne fût plus le peuple. Il est donc aussi difficile de concevoir une société où tous les hommes soient très éclairés, qu’un État où tous les citoyens soient riches; ce sont là deux difficultés corrélatives. J’admettrai sans peine que la masse des citoyens veut très sincèrement le bien du pays; je vais même plus loin, et je dis que les classes inférieures de la société me semblent mêler, en général, à ce désir moins de combinaisons d’intérêt personnel que les classes élevées; mais ce qui leur manque toujours, plus ou moins, c’est l’art de juger des moyens tout en voulant sincèrement la fin. Quelle longue étude, que de notions diverses sont nécessaires pour se faire une idée exacte du caractère d’un seul homme! Les plus grands génies s’y égarent et la multitude y réussirait! Le peuple ne trouve jamais le temps et les moyens de se livrer à ce travail. Il lui faut toujours juger à la hâte et s’attacher au plus saillant des objets. De là vient que les charlatans de tout genre savent si bien le secret de lui plaire; tandis que, le plus souvent, ses véritables amis y échouent. [paragraph] Du reste, ce n’est pas toujours la capacité qui manque à la démocratie pour choisir les hommes de mérite, mais le désir et le goût. [paragraph] Il ne ne faut pas se dissimuler que les institutions démocratiques développent à un très haut degré le sentiment de l’envie dans le cœur humain. Ce n’est point tant parce qu’elles offrent à chacun des moyens de s’égaler aux autres, mais parce que ces moyens défaillent sans cesse à ceux qui les emploient. Les institutions démocratiques réveillent et flattent la passion de l’égalité sans pouvoir jamais la satisfaire entièrement. [3-sentence omission] Beaucoup de gens s’imaginent que cet instinct secret, qui porte chez nous les classes inférieures à écarter autant qu’elles le peuvent les supérieures de la direction des affaires, ne se découvre qu’en France. C’est une erreur. L’instinct dont je parle n’est point français, il est démocratique; les circonstances politiques ont pu lui donner un caractère particulier d’amertume, mais elles ne l’ont pas fait naître. [paragraph] Aux États-Unis, le peuple n’a point de haine pour les classes élevées de la société; mais il se sent peu de bienveillance pour elles, et les tient avec soin en dehors du pouvoir; il ne craint pas les grands talens, mais il les goûte peu. En général, on remarque que tout ce qui s’élève sans son appui obtient difficilement sa faveur. [ellipsis indicates 1-paragraph omission] Il m’est démontré que ceux qui regardent le vote universel comme une garantie de la bonté des choix se font une illusion complète. Le vote universel a d’autres avantages, mais non celui-là. (II,43-47; cf. Reeve, II,47-51)

76.3-13 Hence . . . it.] [translated from:] Il en résulte que, dans les temps de calme, les fonctions publiques offrent peu d’appât à l’ambition. Aux États-Unis, ce sont les gens modérés dans leurs désirs, qui s’engagent au milieu des détours de la politique. Les grands talens et les grandes passions s’écartent en général du pouvoir, afin de poursuivre la richesse; et il arrive souvent qu’on ne se charge de diriger la fortune de l’État que quand on se sent peu capable de conduire ses propres affaires. [paragraph] C’est à ces causes, autant qu’aux mauvais choix de la démocratie, qu’il faut attribuer le grand nombre d’hommes vulgaires qui occupent les fonctions publiques. Aux États-Unis, je ne sais si le peuple choisirait les hommes supérieurs qui brigueraient ses suffrages; mais il est certain que ceux-ci ne les briguent pas. (II,58-9; cf. Reeve, II,62-3)

77.10-27 In . . . prosper.] [translated from:] Dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre, où l’éducation et la liberté sont filles de la morale et de la religion; où la société, déjà ancienne et depuis long-temps assise, a pu se former des maximes et des habitudes, le peuple, en même temps qu’il échappe à toutes les supériorités que la richesse et la naissance ont jamais créées parmi les hommes, s’est habitué à respecter les supériorités intellectuelles et morales, et à s’y soumettre sans déplaisir. Aussi voit-on que la démocratie dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre fait de meilleurs choix que partout ailleurs. [paragraph] A mesure au contraire qu’on descend vers le midi, dans les États où le lien social est moins ancien et moins fort, où l’instruction s’est moins répandue et où les principes de la morale, de la religion et de la liberté se sont combinés d’une manière moins heureuse, on aperçoit que les talens et les vertus deviennent de plus en plus rares parmi les gouvernans. [paragraph] Lorsqu’on pénètre enfin dans les nouveaux États du sud-ouest, où le corps social, formé d’hier, ne présente encore qu’une agglomération d’aventuriers ou de spéculateurs, on est confondu de voir en quelles mains la puissance publique est remise, et l’on se demande par quelle force indépendante de la législation et des hommes l’État peut y croître et la société y prospérer. (II,49-50; cf. Reeve, II,53-4)

81.7-82.12 When . . . America.] [translated from:] Lorsqu’on vient à examiner quel est aux États-Unis l’exercice de la pensée, c’est alors qu’on aperçoit bien clairement à quel point la puissance de la majorité surpasse toutes les puissances que nous connaissons en Europe. [paragraph] La pensée est un pouvoir invisible et presque insaisissable, qui se joue de toutes les tyrannies. De nos jours, les souverains les plus absolus de l’Europe ne sauraient empêcher certaines pensées hostiles à leur autorité, de circuler sourdement dans leurs États et jusqu’au sein de leurs cours. Il n’en est pas de même en Amérique: tant que la majorité est douteuse, on parle; mais dès quelle s’est irrévocablement prononcée, chacun se tait; et amis comme ennemis semblent alors s’attacher de concert à son char. La raison en est simple; il n’y a pas de monarque si absolu qui puisse réunir dans sa main toutes les forces de la société, et vaincre les résistances comme peut le faire une majorité revêtue du droit de faire les lois et de les exécuter. [paragraph] Un roi d’ailleurs n’a qu’une puissance matérielle qui agit sur les actions et ne saurait atteindre les volontés; mais la majorité est revêtue d’une force tout à la fois matérielle et morale, qui agit sur la volonté autant que sur les actions, et qui empêche en même temps le fait et le désir de faire. [paragraph] Je ne connais pas de pays où il règne en général moins d’indépendance d’esprit et de véritable liberté de discussion qu’en Amérique. [paragraph] Il n’y a pas de théorie religieuse ou politique qu’on ne puisse prêcher librement dans les États constitutionnels de l’Europe, et qui ne pénètre dans les autres; car il n’est pas de pays en Europe tellement soumis à un seul pouvoir, que celui qui veut y dire la vérité n’y trouve un appui capable de le rassurer contre les résultats de son indépendance. S’il a le malheur de vivre sous un gouvernement absolu, il a souvent pour lui le peuple; s’il habite un pays libre; il peut au besoin s’abriter derrière l’autorité royale. La fraction aristocratique de la société le soutient dans les contrées démocratiques, et la démocratie dans les autres. Mais au sein d’une démocratie, organisée ainsi que celle des États-Unis, on ne rencontre qu’un seul pouvoir, un seul élément de force et de succès, et rien en dehors de lui. [paragraph] En Amérique, la majorité trace un cercle formidable autour de la pensée. Au dedans de ces limites, l’écrivain est libre, mais malheur à lui s’il ose en sortir. Ce n’est pas qu’il ait à craindre un auto-da-fé; mais il est en butte à des dégoûts de tous genres et à des persécutions de tous les jours. La carrière politique lui est fermée; il a offensé la seule puissance qui ait la faculté de l’ouvrir. On lui refuse tout, jusqu’à la gloire. Avant de publier ses opinions il croyait avoir des partisans; il lui semble qu’il n’en a plus, maintenant qu’il s’est découvert à tous; car ceux qui le blâment s’expriment hautement, et ceux qui pensent comme lui, sans avoir son courage, se taisent et s’éloignent. Il cède, il plie enfin sous l’effort de chaque jour, et rentre dans le silence, comme s’il éprouvait des remords d’avoir dit vrai. [ellipsis indicates 3-paragraph omission] Chez les nations les plus fières de l’ancien monde, on a publié des ouvrages destinés à peindre fidèlement les vices et les ridicules des contemporains; La Bruyère habitait le palais de Louis XIV quand il composa son chapitre sur les grands, et Molière critiquait la cour dans des pièces qu’il faisait représenter devant les courtisans. Mais la puissance qui domine aux États-Unis n’entend point ainsi qu’on la joue. Le plus léger reproche la blesse, la moindre vérité piquante l’effarouche; et il faut qu’on loue depuis les formes de son langage jusqu’à ses plus solides vertus. Aucun écrivain, quelle que soit sa renommée, ne peut échapper à cette obligation d’encenser ses concitoyens. La majorité vit donc dans une perpétuelle adoration d’elle-même; il n’y a que les étrangers ou l’expérience qui puissent faire arriver certaines vérités jusqu’aux oreilles des Américains. [paragraph] Si l’Amérique n’a pas encore eu de grands écrivains, nous ne devons pas en chercher ailleurs les raisons: il n’existe pas de génie littéraire sans liberté d’esprit, et il n’y a pas liberté d’esprit en Amérique. (II,149-53; cf. Reeve, II,158-63)

82.17-83.25 In . . . more?] [translated from:] Dans les pays libres, où chacun est plus ou moins appelé à donner son opinion sur les affaires de l’État; dans les républiques démocratiques, où la vie publique est incessamment mêlée à la vie privée, où le souverain est abordable de toutes parts, et où il ne s’agit que d’élever la voix pour arriver jusqu’à son oreille, on rencontre beaucoup plus de gens qui cherchent à spéculer sur ses faiblesses, et à vivre aux dépens de ses passions, que dans les monarchies absolues. Ce n’est pas que les hommes y soient naturellement pires qu’ailleurs, mais la tentation y est plus forte, et s’offre à plus de monde en même temps. Il en résulte un abaissement bien plus général dans les âmes. [paragraph] Les républiques démocratiques mettent l’esprit de cour à la portée du grand nombre, et le font pénétrer dans toutes les classes à la fois. C’est un des principaux reproches qu’on peut leur faire. [paragraph] Cela est surtout vrai dans les États démocratiques, organisés comme les républiques américaines, où la majorité possède un empire si absolu et si irrésistible, qu’il faut en quelque sorte renoncer à ses droits de citoyen, et pour ainsi dire à sa qualité d’homme, quand on veut s’écarter du chemin qu’elle a tracé. [paragraph] Parmi la foule immense qui, aux États-Unis, se presse dans la carrière politique, j’ai vu bien peu d’hommes qui montrassent cette virile candeur, cette mâle indépendance de la pensée, qui a souvent distingué les Américains dans les temps antérieurs, et qui, partout où on la trouve, forme comme le trait saillant des grands caractères. On dirait, au premier abord, qu’en Amérique les esprits ont tous été formés sur le même modèle, tant ils suivent exactement les mêmes voies. L’étranger rencontre, il est vrai, quelquefois des Américains qui s’écartent de la rigueur des formules; il arrive à ceux-là de déplorer le vice des lois, la versatilité de la démocratie, et son manque de lumières; ils vont même souvent jusqu’à remarquer les défauts qui altèrent le caractère national, et ils indiquent les moyens qu’on pourrait prendre pour les corriger; mais nul, excepté vous, ne les écoute, et vous, à qui ils confient ces pensées secrètes, vous n’êtes qu’un étranger, et vous passez. Ils vous livrent volontiers des vérités qui vous sont inutiles, et, descendus sur la place publique, ils tiennent un autre langage. [paragraph] Si ces lignes parviennent jamais en Amérique, je suis assuré de deux choses: la première, que les lecteurs élèveront tous la voix pour me condamner; la scconde que beaucoup d’entre eux m’absoudront au fond de leur conscience. [paragraph] J’ai entendu parler de la patrie aux États-Unis. J’ai rencontré du patriotisme véritable dans le peuple; j’en ai souvent cherché en vain dans ceux qui le dirigent. Ceci se comprend facilement par analogie: le despotisme déprave bien plus celui qui s’y soumet, que celui qui l’impose. Dans les monarchies absolues, le roi a souvent de grandes vertus; mais les courtisans sont toujours vils. [paragraph] Il est vrai que les courtisans, en Amérique, ne disent point Sire, et Votre Majesté, grande et capitale différence! Mais ils parlent sans cesse des lumières naturelles de leur maître; ils ne mettent point au concours la question de savoir quelle est celle des vertus du prince qui mérite le plus qu’on l’admire; car ils assurent qu’il possède toutes les vertus, sans les avoir acquises, et pour ainsi dire sans le vouloir; ils ne lui donnent pas leurs femmes et leurs filles pour qu’il daigne les élever au rang de ses maîtresses; mais en lui sacrifiant leurs opinions, ils se prostituent eux-mêmes. [paragraph] Les moralistes et les philosophes, en Amérique, ne sont pas obligés d’envelopper leurs opinions dans les voiles de l’allégorie; mais, avant de hasarder une vérité fâcheuse, ils disent: Nous savons que nous parlons à un peuple trop au-dessus des faiblesses humaines, pour ne pas toujours rester maître de lui-même. Nous ne tiendrions pas un semblable langage, si nous ne nous adressions à des hommes que leurs vertus et leurs lumières rendent seuls, parmi tous les autres, dignes de rester libres. [paragraph] Comment les flatteurs de Louis XIV pouvaient-ils mieux faire? (II,155-8; cf. Reeve, II,165-8)

84.11-44 The . . . government.] [translated from:] Mais ce ne sont pas seulement les fortunes qui sont égales en Amérique, l’égalité s’étend jusqu’à un certain point sur les intelligences elles-mêmes. [paragraph] Je ne pense pas qu’il y ait de pays dans le monde où, proportion gardée avec la population, il se trouve aussi peu d’ignorans et moins de savans qu’en Amérique. [paragraph] L’instruction primaire y est à la portée de chacun; l’instruction supérieure n’y est presque à la portée de personne. [paragraph] Ceci se comprend sans peine, et est pour ainsi dire le résultat nécessaire de ce que nous avons avancé plus haut. [paragraph] Presque tous les Américains ont de l’aisance; ils peuvent donc facilement se procurer les premiers élémens des connaissances humaines. [paragraph] En Amérique il y a peu de riches; presque tous les Américains ont donc besoin d’exercer une profession. Or, toute profession exige un apprentissage. Les Américains ne peuvent donc donner à la culture générale de l’intelligence que les premières années de la vie; à quinze ans, ils entrent dans une carrière; ainsi leur éducation finit le plus souvent à l’époque où la nôtre commence. Si elle se poursuit au-delà, elle ne se dirige plus que vers une matière spéciale et lucrative; on étudie une science comme on prend un métier, et l’on n’en saisit que les applications dont l’utilité présente est reconnue. [paragraph] En Amérique, la plupart des riches ont commencé par être pauvres; presque tous les oisifs ont été, dans leur jeunesse, des gens occupés; d’où il résulte que, quand on pourrait avoir le goût de l’étude, on n’a pas le temps de s’y livrer; et que quand on a acquis le temps de s’y livrer, on n’en a plus le goût. [paragraph] Il n’existe donc point en Amérique de classe dans laquelle le penchant des plaisirs intellectuels se transmette avec une aisance et des loisirs héréditaires, et qui tiennent en honneur les travaux de l’intelligence. Aussi la volonté de se livrer à ces trauvaux manque-t-elle aussi bien que le pouvoir. [paragraph] Il s’est établi en Amérique, dans les connaissances humaines, un certain niveau mitoyen. Tous les esprits s’en sont rapprochés, les uns en s’élevant, les autres en s’abaissant. [paragraph] Il se rencontre donc une multitude immense d’individus qui ont le même nombre de notions à peu près en matière de religion, d’histoire, de sciences, d’économie politique, de législation, de gouvernement. (I,84-5; cf. Reeve, I,59-60)

87.4-88.27 There . . . cupidity.] [translated from:] Il existe un amour de la patrie qui a principalement sa source dans ce sentiment irréfléchi, désintéressé et indéfinissable qui lie le cœur de l’homme aux lieux où l’homme a pris naissance. Cet amour instinctif se confond avec le goût des coutumes anciennes, avec le respect des aïeux et la mémoire du passé; ceux qui l’éprouvent chérissent leur pays comme on aime la maison paternelle. Ils aiment la tranquillité dont ils y jouissent; ils tiennent aux paisibles habitudes qu’ils y ont contractées; ils s’attachent aux souvenirs qu’elle leur présente, et trouvent même quelque douceur à y vivre dans l’obéissance. Souvent cet amour de la patrie est encore exalté par le zèle religieux, et alors on lui voit faire des prodiges. Lui-même est une sorte de religion; il ne raisonne point, il croit, il sent, il agit. Des peuples se sont rencontrés qui ont, en quelque façon, personnifié la patrie, et qui l’ont entrevue dans le prince. Ils ont donc transporté en lui une partie des sentimens dont le patriotisme se compose; ils se sont enorgueillis de ses triomphes, et ont été fiers de sa puissance. Il fut un temps, sous l’ancienne monarchie, où les Français éprouvaient une sorte de joie en se sentant livrés sans recours à l’arbitraire du monarque, et disaient avec orgueil: “Nous vivons sous le plus puissant roi du monde.” [paragraph] Comme toutes les passions irréfléchies, cet amour du pays pousse à de grands efforts passagers plutôt qu’à la continuité des efforts. Après avoir sauvé l’État en temps de crise, il le laisse souvent dépérir au sein de la paix. [paragraph] Lorsque les peuples sont encore simples dans leurs mœurs et fermes dans leur croyance; quand la société repose doucement sur un ordre de choses ancien, dont la légitimité n’est point contestée, on voit régner cet amour instinctif de la patrie. [paragraph] Il en est un autre plus rationnel que celui-là; moins généreux, moins ardent, peut-être, mais plus fécond et plus durable; celui-ci naît des lumières; il se développe à l’aide des lois, il croît avec l’exercice des droits, et il finit, en quelque sorte, par se confondre avec l’intérêt personnel. Un homme comprend l’influence qu’a le bien-être du pays sur le sien propre; il sait que la loi lui permet de contribuer à produire ce bien-être, et il s’intéresse à la prospérité de son pays, d’abord comme à une chose qui lui est utile, et ensuite comme à son ouvrage. Mais il arrive quelquefois, dans la vie des peuples, un moment où les coutumes anciennes sont changées, les mœurs détruites, les croyances ébranlées, le prestige des souvenirs évanoui, et où, cependant, les lumières sont restées incomplètes, et les droits politiques mal assurés ou restreints. Les hommes alors n’aperçoivent plus la patrie que sous un jour faible et douteux, ils ne la placent plus ni dans le sol, qui est devenu à leurs yeux une terre inanimée; ni dans les usages de leurs aïeux, qu’on leur a appris à regarder comme un joug; ni dans la religion dont ils doutent; ni dans les lois qu’ils ne font pas, ni dans le législateur qu’ils craignent et méprisent. Ils ne la voient donc nulle part, pas plus sous ses propres traits que sous aucun autre, et ils se retirent dans un égoïsme étroit et sans lumière. Ces hommes échappent aux préjugés sans reconnaître l’empire de la raison; ils n’ont ni le patriotisme instinctif de la monarchie, ni le patriotisme réfléchi de la république; mais ils se sont arrêtés entre les deux, au milieu de la confusion et des misères. [paragraph] Que faire en un pareil état? Reculer; mais les peuples ne reviennent pas plus aux sentimens de leur jeunesse, que les hommes aux goûts innocens de leur premier âge; ils peuvent les regretter, mais non les faire renaître. Il faut donc marcher en avant, et se hâter d’unir aux yeux du peuple l’intérêt individuel à à l’intérêt du pays: car l’amour désintéressé de la patrie fuit sans retour. [paragraph] Je suis assurément loin de prétendre que, pour arriver à ce résultat, on doive accorder tout-à-coup l’exercice des droits politiques à tous les hommes. Mais je dis que le plus puissant moyen, et peut-être le seul qui nous reste d’intéresser les hommes au sort de leur patrie, c’est de les faire participer à son gouvernement. De nos jours, l’esprit de cité me semble inséparable de l’exercice des droits politiques; et je pense que désormais on verra augmenter ou diminuer en Europe le nombre des citoyens, en proportion de l’extension de ces droits. [paragraph] D’où vient qu’aux États-Unis, où les habitans sont arrivés d’hier sur le sol qu’ils occupent, où ils n’y ont apporté ni usages, ni souvenirs; où ils s’y rencontrent pour la première fois sans se connaître; où, pour le dire en un mot, l’instinct de la patrie peut à peine exister; d’où vient que chacun s’intéresse aux affairs de sa commune, de son canton et de l’État tout entier comme aux siennes mêmes? c’est que chacun, dans sa sphère, prend une part active au gouvernement de la société. [paragraph] L’homme du peuple, aux-États-Unis, a compris l’influence qu’exerce la prosperité générale sur son bonheur, idée si simple et cependant si peu connue du peuple. De plus, il s’est accoutumé à regarder cette prospérité comme son ouvrage. Il voit donc dans la fortune publique la sienne propre, et il travaille au bien de l’État non seulement par devoir ou par orgueil, mais j’oserais presque dire par cupidité. (II,114-17; cf. Reeve, II, 121-5)

88.30-89.12 It . . . affection.] [translated from:] Il n’est pas toujours loisible d’appeler le peuple entier, soit directement, soit indirectement, à la confection de la loi; mais on ne saurait nier que, quand cela est praticable, la loi n’en acquière une grande autorité. Cette origine populaire, qui nuit souvent à la bonté et à la sagesse de la législation, contribue singulièrement à sa puissance. [paragraph] Il y a dans l’expression des volontés de tout un peuple une force prodigieuse. Quand elle se découvre au grand jour, l’imagination même de ceux qui voudraient lutter contre elle en est comme accablée. [paragraph] La vérité de ceci est bien connue des partis. [paragraph] Aussi les voit-on contester la majorité partout ou ils le peuvent. Quant elle leur manque parmi ceux qui ont voté, ils la placent parmi ceux qui se sont abstenus de voter; et, lorsque là encore elle vient à leur échapper, ils la retrouvent au sein de ceux qui n’avaient pas le droit de voter. [paragraph] Aux États-Unis, excepté les esclaves, les domestiques et les indigens nourris par les communes, il n’est personne qui ne soit électeur et qui à ce titre ne concoure indirectement à la loi. Ceux qui veulent attaquer les lois sont donc réduits à faire ostensiblement l’une de ces deux choses; ils doivent ou changer l’opinion de la nation, ou fouler aux pieds ses volontés. [paragraph] Ajoutez à cette première raison cette autre plus directe et plus puissante: qu’aux États-Unis, chacun trouve une sorte d’intérêt personnel à ce que tous obéissent aux lois; car celui qui aujourd’hui ne fait pas partie de la majorité, sera peut-être demain dans ses rangs; et ce respect qu’il professe maintenant pour les volontés du législateur, il aura bientôt occasion de l’exiger pour les siennes. Quelque fâcheuse que soit la loi, l’habitant des États-Unis s’y soumet donc sans peine, non-seulement comme à l’ouvrage du plus grand nombre, mais encore comme au sien propre; il la considère sous le point de vue d’un contrat, dans lequel il aurait été partie. [paragraph] On ne voit donc pas, aux États-Unis, une foule nombreuse et toujours turbulente, qui, regardant la loi comme un ennemi naturel, ne jette sur elle que des regards de crainte et de soupçons. Il est impossible, au contraire, de ne point apercevoir que toutes les classes montrent une grande confiance dans la législation qui régit le pays, et ressentent pour elle une sorte d’amour paternel. (II,123-5; cf. Reeve, II,131-2)

88.15-90.5 It . . . advantages.] [translated from:] Il est incontestable que le peuple dirige souvent fort mal les affaires publiques; mais le peuple ne saurait se mêler des affaires publiques sans que le cercle de ses idées ne vienne à s’étendre, et sans qu’on ne voie son esprit sortir de sa routine ordinaire. L’homme du peuple qui est appelé au gouvernement de la société conçoit une certaine estime de luimême. Comme il est alors une puissance, des intelligences très eclairées se mettent au service de la sienne. On s’adresse sans cesse à lui pour s’en faire un appui; et en cherchant à la tromper de mille manières différentes, on l’éclaire. En politique, il prend part à des entreprises qu’il n’a pas conçues, mais qui lui donnent le goût général des entreprises. On lui indique tous les jours de nouvelles améliorations à faire à la propriété commune, et il sent naître le désir d’améliorer celle qui lui est personnelle. Il n’est ni plus vertueux ni plus heureux, peut-être, mais plus éclairé et plus actif que ses devanciers. Je ne doute pas que les institutions démocratiques, jointes à la nature physique du pays, ne soient la cause, non pas directe, comme tant de gens le disent, mais la cause indirecte du prodigieux mouvement d’industrie qu’on remarque aux États-Unis. Ce ne sont pas les lois qui le font naître, mais le peuple apprend à le produire en faisant la loi. [paragraph] Lorsque les ennemis de la démocratie prétendent qu’un seul fait mieux ce dont il se charge que le gouvernement de tous, il me semble qu’ils ont raison. Le gouvernement d’un seul, en supposant de part et d’autre égalité de lumières, met plus de suite dans ses entreprises que la multitude; il montre plus de persévérance, plus d’idée d’ensemble, plus de perfection de détail, un discernement plus juste dans le choix des hommes. Ceux qui nient ces choses n’ont jamais vu de république démocratique, ou n’ont jugé que sur un petit nombre d’exemples. La démocratie, lors même que les circonstances locales et les dispositions du peuple lui permettent de se maintenir, ne présente pas le coup d’œil de la régularité administrative et de l’ordre méthodique dans le gouvernement; cela est vrai. La liberté démocratique n’exécute pas chacune de ses entreprises avec la même perfection que le despotisme intelligent. Souvent elle les abandonne avant d’en avoir retiré le fruit, ou en hasarde de dangereuses; mais à la longue elle produit plus que lui; elle fait moins bien chaque chose, mais elle fait plus de choses. Sous son empire, ce n’est pas surtout ce qu’exécute l’administration publique qui est grand, c’est ce qu’on exécute sans elle et en dehors d’elle. La démocratie ne donne pas au peuple le gouvernement le plus habile, mais elle fait ce que le gouvernement le plus habile est souvent impuissant à créer; elle répand, dans tout le corps social, une inquiète activité, une force surabondante, une énergie qui n’existent jamais sans elle, et qui, pour peu que les circonstances soient favorables, peuvent enfanter des merveilles. Là sont ses vrais avantages. (II,130-2; cf. Reeve, II,138-40)

111.22 ‘niveau mitoyen’] [see above, 84]

126.26-7 “Il . . . nouveau.”] [see above, 51-2]

160.4 extend] exert (I,xv)

160.5-6 government . . . church] Government . . . Church (I,xv)

160.12 their tribunals] the tribunals (I,xv) [cf. 160^g-g]

160.21 the arts] art (I,xvi)

160.21 knowledge] science (I,xvi)

160.22 became a] led to (I,xvi)

160.23 state] State (I,xvi)

160.28 through] by the (I,xvi)

160.30 crown] Crown (I,xvi)

160.32 inferior] lower (I,xvi)

160.33 lowering] repressing (I,xvii)

160.33-4 aristocracy. [paragraph] As] aristocracy. [paragraph omission] As (I,xvii)

160.39 fashion, the] fashion, and the (I,xvii)

160.42 a] the (I,xviii)

160.44 truth, every] truth, and every (I,xviii)

160.47 without respect of persons,] with an equal hand, (I,xviii)

160.47 of democracy] of the democracy (I,xviii) [cf.160^k]

161.2 bringing] throwing (I,xviii) [cf.161^l-l]

161.8 with] of (I,xviii)

161.9 corporate towns] communities (I,xviii)

161.12 established] organized (I,xix)

161.18 was happening] has happened (I,xix) [cf.161^m-m]

161.22 other.] other, and they will very shortly meet. (I,xix)

161.26 Everywhere the] The (I,xix)

161.26 have turned] have everywhere turned (I,xix)

161.34 and possesses] and it possesses (I,xx)

161.37 it be] it, then, be (I,xx)

161.40 bourgeois] citizen (I,xx) [cf.161^p-p]

161.41-2 weak? [paragraph] It] weak? [2-paragraph omission] It (I,xx-xxi)

161.44-5 events. [paragraph] The] events: I know, without a special revelation, that the planets move in the orbits traced by the Creator’s finger. [1-paragraph omission] The (I,xxi-xxii)

159.38-162.2 Let . . . longer.] [translated from:] Je me reporte pour un moment à ce qu’était la France il y a sept cents ans: je la trouve partagée entre un petit nombre de familles qui possèdent la terre et gouvernent les habitans; le droit de commander descend alors de générations en générations avec les héritages; les hommes n’ont qu’un seul moyen d’agir les uns sur les autres: la force; on ne découvre qu’une seule origine de la puissance, la propriété foncière. [paragraph] Mais voici le pouvoir politique du clergé qui vient à se fonder et bientôt à s’étendre. Le clergé ouvre ses rangs à tous, au pauvre et au riche, au roturier et au seigneur; l’égalité commence à pénétrer par l’Église au sein du gouvernement, et celui qui eût végété comme serf dans un éternel esclavage, se place comme prêtre au milieu des nobles et va souvent s’asseoir au-dessus des rois. [paragraph] La société devenant avec le temps plus civilisée et plus stable, les différens rapports entre les hommes deviennent plus compliqués et plus nombreux. Le besoin des lois civiles se fait vivement sentir. Alors naissent les légistes; ils sortent de l’enceinte obscure des tribunaux et du réduit poudreux des greffes, et ils vont siéger dans la cour du prince, à côté des barons féodaux couverts d’hermine et de fer. [paragraph] Les rois se ruinent dans les grandes entreprises; les nobles s’épuisent dans les guerres privées; les roturiers s’enrichissent dans le commerce. L’influence de l’argent commence à se faire sentir sur les affaires de l’État. Le négoce est une source nouvelle qui s’ouvre à la puissance, et les financiers deviennent un pouvoir politique qu’on méprise et qu’on flatte. [paragraph] Peu à peu, les lumières se répandent; on voit se réveiller le goût de la littérature et des arts; l’esprit devient alors un élément de succès; la science est un moyen de gouvernement; l’intelligence une force sociale; les lettrés arrivent aux affaires. [paragraph] A mesure cependant qu’il se découvre des routes nouvelles pour parvenir au pouvoir, on voit baisser la valeur de la naissance. Au xi^e siècle, la noblesse était d’un prix inestimable; on l’achète au xiii^e; le premier anoblissement a lieu en 1270, et l’égalité s’introduit enfin dans le gouvernement par l’aristocratie elle-même. [paragraph] Durant les sept cents ans qui viennent de s’écouler, il est arrivé quelquefois que, pour lutter contre l’autorité royale ou pour enlever le pouvoir à leurs rivaux, les nobles ont donné une puissance politique au peuple. [paragraph] Plus souvent encore, on a vu les rois faire participer au gouvernement les classes inférieures de l’État, afin d’abaisser l’aristocratie. [1-paragraph omission] Dès que les citoyens commencèrent à posséder la terre autrement que suivant la tenure féodale, et que la richesse, mobiliaire, étant connue, put à son tour créer l’influence et donner le pouvoir, on ne fit point de découvertes dans les arts, on n’introduisit plus de perfectionnemens dans le commerce et l’industrie, sans créer comme autant de nouveaux élémens d’égalité parmi les hommes. A partir de ce moment, tous les procédés qui se découvrent, tous les besoins qui viennent à naître, tous les désirs qui demandent à se satisfaire, sont des progrès vers le nivellement universel. Le goût du luxe, l’amour de la guerre, l’empire de la mode, les passions les plus superficielles du cœur humain comme les plus profondes, semblent travailler de concert à apauvrir les riches et à enrichir les pauvres. [paragraph] Depuis que les trauvaux de l’intelligence furent devenus des sources de force et de richesses, on dut considérer chaque développement de la science, chaque connaissance nouvelle, chaque idée neuve, comme un germe de puissance mis à la portée du peuple. La poésie, l’éloquence, la mémoire, les grâces de l’esprit, les feux de l’imagination, la profondeur de la pensée, tous ces dons que le Ciel répartit au hasard, profitèrent à la démocratie, et lors même qu’ils se trouvèrent dans la possession de ses adversaires, ils servirent encore sa cause en mettant en relief la grandeur naturelle de l’homme; ses conquêtes s’étendirent donc avec celles de la civilisation et des lumières, et la littérature fut un arsenal ouvert à tous, où les faibles et les pauvres vinrent chaque jour chercher des armes. [paragraph] Lorsqu’on parcourt les pages de notre histoire, on ne rencontre pas pour ainsi dire de grands évènemens qui, depuis sept cents ans, n’aient tourné au profit de l’égalité. [paragraph] Les croisades et les guerres des Anglais déciment les nobles et divisent leurs terres ; l’institution des communes introduit la liberté démocratique au sein de la monarchie féodale; la découverte des armes à feu égalise le vilain et le noble sur le champ de bataille; l’imprimerie offre des ressources égales à leur intelligence; la poste vient déposer la lumière sur le seuil de la cabane du pauvre comme à la porte des palais; le protestantisme soutient que tous les hommes sont également en état de trouver le chemin du ciel. L’Amérique, qui se découvre, présente à la fortune mille routes nouvelles, et délivre à d’obscurs aventuriers les richesses et le pouvoir. [paragraph] Si, à partir du xi^e siècle, vous examinez ce qui se passe en France de cinquante en cinquante années, au bout de chacune de ces périodes, vous ne manquerez point d’apercevoir qu’une double révolution s’est opérée dans l’état de la société. Le noble aura baissé dans l’échelle sociale, le roturier s’y sera élevé; l’un descend, l’autre monte. Chaque demi-siècle les rapproche, et bientôt ils vont se toucher. [paragraph] Et ceci n’est pas seulement particulier à la France. De quel côté que nous jetions nos regards, nous apercevons la même révolution qui se continue dans tout l’univers chrétien. [paragraph] Partout on a vu les divers incidens de la vie des peuples tourner au profit de la démocratie; tous les hommes l’ont aidée de leurs efforts : ceux qui avaient en vue de concourir à ses succès et ceux qui ne songeaient point à la servir; ceux qui ont combattu pour elle, et ceux mêmes qui se sont déclarés ses ennemis; tous ont été poussés pêle-mêle dans la même voie, et tous ont travaillé en commun, les uns malgré eux, les autres à leur insu, aveugles, instrumens dans les mains de Dieu. [paragraph] Le développement graduel de l’égalité des conditions est donc un fait providentiel, il en a les principaux caractères: il est universel, il est durable, il échappe chaque jour à la puissance humaine; tous les évènemens, comme tous les hommes, servent à son développement. [paragraph] Serait-il sage de croire qu’un mouvement social qui vient de si loin, pourra être suspendu par les efforts d’une génération? Pense-t-on qu’après avoir détruit la féodalité et vaincu les rois, la démocratie reculera devant les bourgeois et les riches? s’arrêtera-t-elle maintenant qu’elle est devenue si forte et ses adversaires si faibles? [2-paragraph omission] Il n’est pas nécessaire que Dieu parle lui-même pour que nous découvrions des signes certains de sa volonté; il suffit d’examiner quelle est la marche habituelle de la nature et la tendance continue des évènemens; je sais, sans que le Créateur élève la voix, que les astres suivent dans l’espace les courbes que son doigt a tracées. [paragraph] Si de longues observations et des méditations sincères amenaient les hommes de nos jours à reconnaître que le développement graduel et progressif de l’égalité est à la fois le passé et l’avenir de leur histoire, cette seule découverte donnerait à ce développement le caractère sacré de la volonté du souverain maître. Vouloir arrêter la démocratie paraîtrait alors lutter contre Dieu même, et il ne resterait aux nations qu’à s’accommoder à l’état social que leur impose la Providence. [continued as above, 51] (I,4-10)

170.32 people] lower orders (II,138)

170.34 occupations] acquirements (II,138) [cf.170^g-g]

170.36-7 power, minds more . . . own offer him their services.] authority, he can command the services of minds much more . . . own. (II,138)

170.37 claimants] applicants (II,138)

170.37-171.1 who need his support; and who, seeking to . . . ways, instruct him during the process.] who seek to . . . ways, but who instruct him by their deceit. (II,138) [cf.170^h-h]

171.2 a general taste for such undertakings.] a taste for undertakings of the kind. (II,138) [cf.171^i-i]

171.3 suggested to him] pointed out (II,138)

171.5 peculiarly] more peculiarly (II,139)

171.10-11 but it proceeds from habits acquired through participation in making the laws.] but the people learn how to promote it by the experience derived from legislation. (II,139)

171.12 Democracy] democracy (II,139)

171.13 functions] duties (II,139)

171.13 better] much better (II,139)

171.14 people at large] community (II,139)

171.15 equal degree] equality (II,139)

171.15-16 has more constancy, more preserverance, than] is more consistent, more perservering, and more accurate than (II,139)

171.16-17 multitude; more combination in its plans, and more perfection in its details; and is better] multitude, and it is much better (II,139)

171.18 this,] what I advance, (II,139)

171.18 have] have certainly (II,139)

171.19-20 only upon a few instances. It must be conceded that] upon very partial evidence. It is true that (II,139)

171.23-4 intelligent] adroit (II,139) [cf. 171^j-j]

171.26 greater results] more (II,140)

171.26-7 government. It . . . well, but it] government, and if it . . . well, it (II,140)

171.27-9 Not what is done by a democratic government, but what is done under a democratic government by private agency, is really great.] Under its sway, the transactions of the public administration are not nearly so important as what is done by private exertion. (II,140)

171.32 an] and an (II,140)

171.32 never seen elsewhere] inseparable from it (II,140)

170.31-171.34 It . . . democracy.] [cf. above, 88.15-90.5]

172.10 “support] Let us now imagine a community so organized by nature that it can support (II,115)

172.11 and can] and that it can (II,116)

172.11-12 the result of the general tendency of the laws,”] the general tendency of the legislation: we shall then be able to conceive that a democratic government, notwithstanding its defects, will be most fitted to conduce to the prosperity of this community. (II,116)

172.10-12 “support . . . laws,”] [translated from:] Imaginez une société que la nature, ou sa constitution, ait organisée de manière à supporter l’action passagère de mauvaises lois, et qui puisse attendre, sans périr, le résultat de la tendance générale des lois, et vous concevrez que le gouvernement de la démocratie, malgré ses défauts, soit encore de tous le plus propre à faire prospérer cette société. (II,109)

172.24 hostile to the] opposed to the will of the (II,118)

172.25 character] tendency (II,118)

172.26 is, moreover, a] is a (II,118)

172.27 the effects of which do not last beyond the] which only occurs during the (II,118)

172.28-9 which connect] which may connect (II,118) [cf.172^o]

172.31 corrupt and incapable like] as corrupt and incapable as (II,118)

172.32 promote or screen] promote (II,118)

172.32 or inaptitude] and inaptitude (II,118)

172.34 the magistrate] a magistrate (II,118)

172.35 those of his individual character.] peculiar to his own person. (II,118)

172.37 blended] confounded (II,118)

172.38 frequently] very frequently (II,119)

172.38 is a] is the (II,119)

172.39 and combine] and to combine (II,119)

172.40 towards attaining] in order to attain (II,119)

172.40 is not always the happiness] does not always ensure the greatest happiness (II,119)

172.41 it not only connects] it serves not only to connect (II,119)

172.41-2 authority with each other, but links them also] authority, but to unite them (II,119)

172.42 governed] community (II,119)

173.2-3 therefore, finds himself supported in his own natural tendencies by a portion of society itself, as] is therefore constantly supported by a portion of the community, as (II,119)

173.3 government] Government (II,119)

173.5 object] purposes (II,119)

173.7 it also with] it with that of (II,119)

173.7-8 generations of their order. They labour for ages to come as well as for their own time.] generations; their influence belongs to the future as much as to the present. (II,119)

173.8 thus urged] urged at the same time (II,119)

173.9 those who surround him,] the community, (II,119)

173.9 might almost say] may almost add (II,119)

173.10 Is it] Is it, then, (II,119)

173.10 should not resist?] does not resist such repeated impulses? (II,119)

173.10-13 And hence it is that the class spirit often hurries along with it those whom it does not corrupt, and makes them unintentionally fashion . . . particular ends, and pre-fashion it] And indeed aristocracies are often carried away by the spirit of their order without being corrupted by it; and they unconsciously fashion . . . ends, and prepare it (II,119) [cf.173^q-q]

173.13 descendants] own descendants (II,119)

172.19-173.13 The . . . descendants.] [cf. above, entry for 68.46-70.43]

179.1-2 “a useful study for doing otherwise and better.”] To evade the bondage of system and habit, of family-maxims, class-opinions, and, in some degree, of national prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a lesson used in doing otherwise and doing better; to seek the reason of things for oneself, and in oneself alone; to tend to results without being bound to means, and to aim at the substance through the form; such are the principal characteristics of what I shall call the philosophical method of the Americans. (III,2)

179.1-2 “a . . . better.”] [translated from:] Échapper à l’esprit de système, au joug des habitudes, aux maximes de familles, aux opinions de classe, et, jusqu’à un certain point, aux préjugés de nation; ne prendre la tradition que comme un renseignement et les faits présents que comme une utile étude pour faire autrement et mieux; chercher par soi-même et en soi seul la raison des choses; tendre au résultat sans se laisser enchaîner au moyen; et viser fond à travers la forme, tels sont les principaux traits qui caractérisent ce que j’appellerai la méthode philosophique des Américains. (III,2)

179.23 “Faith] The intellectual dominion of the greater number would probably be less absolute amongst a democratic people governed by a king than in the sphere of a pure democracy, but it will always be extremely absolute; and by whatever political laws men are governed in the ages of equality, it may be foreseen that faith (III,19)

179.24 “becomes in such countries a . . . religion,] will become a . . . religion there, (III,19)

179.25 prophet.”] ministering prophet. (III,19)

179.23-5 “Faith . . . prophet.”] [translated from:] Il est à croire que l’empire intellectuel du plus grand nombre serait moins absolu chez un peuple démocratique soumis à un roi qu’au sein d’une pure démocratie; mais il sera toujours très-absolu, et, quelles que soient les lois politiques qui régissent les hommes dans les siècles d’égalité, l’on peut prévoir que la foi dans l’opinion commune y deviendra une sorte de religion dont la majorité sera le prophète. (III,15)

180.11 infiniment plus nombreux] Ces riches ne seront point liés aussi étroitement entre eux que les membres de l’ancienne classe aristocratique; ils auront des instincts différents et ne possèderont presque jamais un loisir aussi assuré et aussi complet; mais ils seront infiniment plus nombreux que ne pouvaient l’être ceux qui composaient cette classe. (III,57-8; cf. Reeve, III,73)

180.23 “immense.”] The number of those who cultivate science, letters, and the arts, becomes immense. (III,75) [translated from:] Le nombre de ceux qui cultivent les sciences, les lettres et les arts, devient immense. (III,59)

181.8 “Il] Mais il (III,64; cf. Reeve, III,81)

183.7 does not] dares not (III,212)

183.12 selfishness is afraid of itself.] egotism fears its own self. (III,212)

183.17 to be forgetful of self.] to forget themselves. (III,212)

183.20 opportunities of] opportunities for (III,212)

183.20 oftener] the oftener (III,213) [cf. 183^z]

183.23 mutual] violent (III,213)

183.28 indifference. . . .] [ellipsis indicates 1½-paragraph omission] (III,213)

183.29-32 requires a . . . services and obscure good offices, a . . . disinterestedness.] a . . . services rendered and of obscure good deeds, a . . . disinterestedness, will be required. (III,215)

183.33 affections] affection (III,215)

183.34-6 and of those with whom they are in contact, perpetually draws men back to one another, in . . . them; and forces them to render each other mutual assistance.] and of their kindred, perpetually brings men together, and forces them to help one another, in . . . them. (III,215)

183.38-9 with them] with the lower classes (III,215)

183.40-1 democratic times a poor man’s attachment depends more on manner than on] democratic ages you attach a poor man to you more by your manner than by (III,215)

183.42 very magnitude] magnitude (III,215)

183.42-3 by setting the difference of conditions in a strong light,] which sets off the difference of conditions, (III,215)

183.44 irresistible . . . . This] irresistible: their affability carries men away, and even their want of polish is not always displeasing. This (III,216)

183.45 penetrate at once into] take root at once in (III,216)

184.7 are incessantly using] constantly use (III,216)

184.8 means of augmenting] truths which may augment (III,216)

184.8 when] if (III,216)

184.10 people. . . .] [ellipsis indicates 4-sentence omission] (III,216-17)

184.11 I] I must say that I (III,217)

184.12-13 a hundred times remarked that, in case of need, they hardly ever fail] remarked a hundred instances in which they hardly ever failed (III,217)

184.15-16 is a member of society] lives in society (III,217) [cf. 184^a-a]

184.16 at every] every (III,217) [cf. 184^b-b]

184.18 reason for disliking them] ground of animosity to them (III,217)

184.21 calculation] intentional (III,218)

183.7-184.28 When . . . freedom.] [translated from:] Quand le public gouverne, il n’y a pas d’homme qui ne sente le prix de la bienveillance publique et qui ne cherche à la captiver en s’attirant l’estime et l’affection de ceux au milieu desquels il doit vivre. [paragraph] Plusieurs des passions qui glacent les cœurs et les divisent sont alors obligées de se retirer au fond de l’âme et de s’y cacher. L’orgueil se dissimule; le mépris n’ose se faire jour. L’égoïsme a peur de lui-même. [paragraph] Sous un gouvernement libre, la plupart des fonctions publiques étant électives, les hommes que la hauteur de leur âme ou l’inquiétude de leurs désirs mettant à l’étroit dans la vie privée, sentent chaque jour qu’ils ne peuvent se passer de la population qui les environne. [paragraph] Il arrive alors que l’on songe à ses semblables par ambition, et que souvent on trouve en quelque sorte son intérêt à s’oublier soi-même. Je sais qu’on peut m’opposer ici toutes les intrigues qu’une élection fait naître; les moyens honteux dont les candidats se servent souvent et les calomnies que leurs ennemis répandent. Ce sont là des occasions de haine, et elles se représentent d’autant plus souvent que les élections deviennent plus fréquentes. [paragraph] Les maux sont grands sans doute, mais il sont passagers, tandis que les biens qui naissent avec eux demeurent. [paragraph] L’envie d’être élus peut porter momentanément certains hommes à se faire la guerre; mais ce même désir porte à la longue tous les hommes à se prêter un mutuel appui; et s’il arrive qu’une élection divise accidentellement deux amis, le système électoral rapproche d’une manière permanente une multitude de citoyens qui seraient toujours restés étrangers les uns aux autres. La liberté crée des haines particulières; mais le despotisme fait naître l’indifférence générale. [ellipsis indicates 5-paragraph omission] On peut, par une action d’éclat, captiver tout-à-coup la faveur d’un peuple; mais, pour gagner l’amour et le respect de la population qui vous entoure, il faut une longue succession de petits services rendus, de bons offices obscurs, une habitude constante de bienveillance et une réputation bien établie de désintéressement. [paragraph] Les libertés locales qui font qu’un grand nombre de citoyens mettent du prix à l’affection de leurs voisins et de leurs proches, ramènent donc sans cesse les hommes les uns vers les autres, en dépit des instincts qui les séparent, et les forcent à s’entr’aider. [paragraph] Aux États-Unis, les plus opulents citoyens ont bien soin de ne point s’isoler du peuple; au contraire, ils s’en rapprochent sans cesse, ils l’écoutent volontiers, et lui parlent tous les jours. Ils savent que les riches des démocraties ont toujours besoin des pauvres, et que dans les temps démocratiques on s’attache le pauvre par les manières plus que par les bienfaits. La grandeur même des bienfaits, qui met en lumière la différence des conditions, cause une irritation secrète à ceux qui en profitent; mais la simplicité des manières a des charmes presque irrésistibles: leur familiarité entraîne, et leur grossièreté même ne deplaît pas toujours. [paragraph] Ce n’est pas du premier coup que cette vérité pénètre dans l’esprit des riches. Ils y résistent d’ordinaire tant que dure la révolution démocratique, et ils ne l’admettent même point aussitôt après que cette révolution est accomplie. Ils consentent volontiers à faire du bien au peuple; mais ils veulent continuer à le tenir soigneusement à distance. Ils croient que cela suffit; ils se trompent. Ils se ruineraient ainsi sans réchauffer le cœur de la population qui les environne. Ce n’est pas le sacrifice de leur argent qu’elle demande; c’est celui de leur orgueil. [paragraph] On dirait qu’aux États-Unis il n’y a pas d’imagination qui ne s’épuise à inventer des moyens d’accroître la richesse et de satisfaire les besoins du public. Les habitants les plus éclairés de chaque canton se servent sans cesse de leurs lumières pour découvrir des secrets nouveaux propres à accroître la prospérité commune; et, lorsqu’ils en ont trouvé quelques-uns, ils se hâtent de les livrer à la foule. [ellipsis indicates 2-paragraph omission] Je dois dire que j’ai souvent vu des Américains faire de grands et véritable sacrifices à la chose publique, et j’ai remarqué cent fois qu’au besoin ils ne manquaient presque jamais de se prêter fidèle appui les uns aux autres. [paragraph] Les institutions libres que possèdent les habitants des États-Unis, et les droits politiques dont ils font tant d’usage, rappellent sans cesse et de mille manières, à chaque citoyen qu’il vit en société. Elles ramènent à tous moments son esprit vers cette idée, que le devoir aussi bien que l’intérêt des hommes est de se rendre utiles à leurs semblables; et comme il ne voit aucun sujet particulier de les haïr, puisqu’il n’est jamais ni leur esclave ni leur maître, son cœur penche aisément du côté de la bienveillance. On s’occupe d’abord de l’intérêt général par nécessité, et puis par choix; ce qui était calcul devient instinct; et, à force de travailler au bien de ses concitoyens, on prend enfin l’habitude et le goût de les servir. [paragraph] Beaucoup de gens en France considèrent l’égalité des conditions comme un premier mal, et la liberté politique comme un second. Quand ils sont obligés de subir l’une ils s’efforcent du moins d’échapper à l’autre. Et moi je dis que, pour combattre les maux que l’égalité peut produire, il n’y a qu’un remède efficace: c’est la liberté politique. (III,165-70)

185.10 enlightened self-interest] interest rightly understood (III,253)

185.11-12 impracticable efforts] excessive exertion (III,253)

185.13 adaptation] admirable conformity (III,253)

185.14 is its] is that (III,253)

185.15 it employs self-interest itself to correct self-interest,] the principle checks one personal interest by another, (III,253)

185.16 very] very same (III,253)

185.17 The doctrine of enlightened self-interest] The principle of interest rightly understood (III,253)

185.19 virtuous man] man virtuous (III,253)

185.19 multitude] number (III,253)

185.21 at once lead men] lead men straight (III,254)

185.21 by their] by the (III,254)

185.21 draws them gradually] gradually draws them (III,254)

185.22 “interest rightly understood”] [no quotation marks] (III,254)

185.24 That principle] The principle of interest rightly understood (III,254)

185.26 others] other men (III,254)

185.26 below that level] far below it (III,254)

185.26 upheld] restrained (III,254)

185.28 enlightened self-interest] interest rightly understood (III,254)

185.32 judge it] judge it to be (III,254)

185.32-3 necessary. [paragraph] No] [1-paragraph omission] (III,254)

185.34 impelling] inclining (III,255)

185.34 inclining] leading (III,255)

185.35 concentrate his affections on himself] be wrapped up in himself (III,255)

185.38 interest.] interest. If the members of a community, as they become more equal, become more ignorant and coarse, it is difficult to foresee to what pitch of stupid excesses their egotism may lead them; and no one can foretell into what disgrace and wretchedness they would plunge themselves, lest they should have to sacrifice something of their own well-being to the prosperity of their fellow-creatures. (III,255-6)

185.39 doctrine of self-interest,] system of interest, (III,256)

185.40 is self-evident in . . . parts;] is, in . . . parts, self-evident; (III,256)

185.41 instructed] educated (III,256)

185.41-2 Instruct them, then, at all hazards;] Educate, then, at any rate; (III,256)

185.43 flying] flitting (III,256)

185.44 instruction] education (III,256)

185.10-44 The . . . instruction.] [translated from:] L’intérêt bien entendu est une doctrine peu haute, mais claire et sûre. Elle ne cherche pas a [sic] atteindre de grands objets; mais elle atteint sans trop d’efforts tous ceux auxquels elle vise. Comme elle est à la portée de toutes les intelligences, chacun la saisit aisément et la retient sans peine. S’accommodant merveilleusement aux faiblesses des hommes, elle obtient facilement un grand empire, et il ne lui est point difficile de le conserver, parce qu’elle retourne l’intérêt personnel contre lui même [sic], et se sert, pour diriger les passions, de l’aiguillon qui les excite. [paragraph] La doctrine de l’intérêt bien entendu ne produit pas de grands dévouements, mais elle suggère chaque jour de petits sacrifices; à elle seule, elle ne saurait faire un homme vertueux, mais elle forme une multitude de citoyens, réglés, tempérants, modérés, prévoyants, maîtres d’eux-mêmes; et, si elle ne conduit pas directement à la vertu, par la volonté, elle en rapproche insensiblement par les habitudes. [paragraph] Si la doctrine de l’intérêt bien entendu venait à dominer entièrement le monde moral, les vertus extraordinaires seraient sans doute plus rares, mais je pense aussi qu’alors les grossières dépravations seraient moins communes. La doctrine de l’intérêt bien entendu empêche peut-être quelques hommes de monter fort au-dessus du niveau ordinaire de l’humanité; mais un grand nombre d’autres qui tombaient au-dessous la recontrent et s’y retiennent. Considérez quelques individus, elle les abaisse. Envisagez l’espèce, elle l’élève. [paragraph] Je ne craindrai pas de dire que la doctrine de l’intérêt bien entendu me semble, de toutes les théories philosophiques, la mieux appropriée aux besoins des hommes de notre temps, et que j’y vois la plus puissante garantie qui leur reste contre eux-mêmes. C’est donc principalement vers elles que l’esprit des moralistes de nos jours doit se tourner. Alors même qu’ils la jugeraient imparfaite il faudrait encore l’adopter comme nécessaire. [2-paragraph omission] Il n’y pas de pouvoir sur la terre qui puisse empêcher que l’égalité croissante des conditions ne porte l’esprit humain vers la recherche de l’utile, et ne dispose chaque citoyen à se resserrer en lui-même. [paragraph] Il faut donc s’attendre que l’intérêt individuel deviendra plus que jamais le principal, sinon l’unique mobile des actions des hommes; mais il reste à savoir comment chaque homme entendra son intérêt individuel. [paragraph] Si les citoyens en devenant égaux, restaient ignorants et grossiers il est difficile de prévoir jusqu’à quel stupide excès pourrait se porter leur égoïsme, et l’on ne saurait dire à l’avance dans quelles honteuses misères ils se plongeraient eux-mêmes, de peur de sacrifier quelque chose de leur bien-être à la prospérité de leurs semblables. [paragraph] Je ne crois point que la doctrine de l’intérêt, telle qu’on la prêche en Amérique, soit évidente dans toutes ses parties; mais elle renferme un grand nombre de vérités si évidentes, qu’il suffit d’éclairer les hommes pour qu’ils les voient. Eclairezles donc à tout prix; car le siècle des dévouements aveugles et des vertus instinctives fuit déjà loin de nous, et je vois s’approcher le temps où la liberté, la paix publique et l’ordre social lui-même ne pourront se passer des lumières. (III,197-9)

186.21 The] When, on the contrary, the distinctions of rank are confounded together and privileges are destroyed,—when hereditary property is subdivided, and education and freedom widely diffused, the (III,265)

186.24 for those] for these (III,265)

186.27 precious, so incomplete, and so] delightful, so imperfect, so (III,265)

186.28 inquire] were to inquire (III,265)

186.28 are at once] are (III,265)

186.30 can] could (III,265)

186.30 to them] to their condition (III,265)

186.32-3 and along with them it becomes preponderant.] with them it preponderates. (III,265)

186.36 longing towards] envy on (III,266)

186.36-7 not indulge . . . in those] not possess . . . of those (III,266)

186.40 the indulgences of riches,] physical gratifications, (III,266)

186.42 the stimulus of privation,] the sting of want, (III,266)

186.43 have long struggled with adverse fortune;] were long a prey to adverse fortunes; (III,266)

187.2 petty] small (III,266)

187.6 these] these men (III,266)

187.7-8 physical comfort has] well-being is now (III,267) [cf. 187^j-j]

186.21-187.9 The . . . course.] [translated from:] Lorsque, au contraire, les rangs sont confondus et les privilèges détruits, quand les patrimoines se divisent et que la lumière et la liberté se répandent, l’envie d’acquérir le bien-être se présente à l’imagination du pauvre, et la crainte de le perdre à l’esprit du riche. Il s’établit une multitude de fortunes médiocres. Ceux qui les possèdent ont assez de jouissances matérielles pour concevoir le goût de ces jouissances, et pas assez pour s’en contenter. Ils ne se les procurent jamais qu’avec effort et ne s’y livrent qu’en tremblant. [paragraph] Ils s’attachent donc sans cesse à poursuivre ou à retenir ces jouissances si précieuses, si incomplètes et si fugitives. [paragraph] Je cherche une passion qui soit naturelle à des hommes que l’obscurité de leur origine ou la médiocrité de leur fortune excitent et limitent, et je n’en trouve point de mieux appropriée que le goût du bien-être. La passion du bien-être matériel est essentiellement une passion de classe moyenne; elle grandit et s’étend avec cette classe; elle devient prépondérante avec elle. C’est de là qu’elle gagne les rangs supérieurs de la société et descend jusqu’au sein du peuple. [paragraph] Je n’ai pas rencontré, en Amérique, de si pauvre citoyen qui ne jetât un regard d’espérance et d’envie sur les jouissances des riches et dont l’imagination ne se saisît à l’avance des biens que le sort s’obstinait à lui refuser. [paragraph] D’un autre côté, je n’ai aperçu chez les riches des États-Unis ce superbe dédain pour le bien-être matériel qui se montre quelquefois jusque dans le sein des aristocraties les plus opulentes et les plus dissolues. [paragraph] La plupart de ces riches ont été pauvres, ils ont senti l’aiguillon du besoin, ils ont long-temps combattu une fortune ennemie, et, maintenant que la victoire est remportée, les passions qui ont accompagné la lutte lui survivent; ils restent comme enivrés au milieu de ces petites jouissances qu’ils ont poursuivies quarante ans. [paragraph] Ce n’est pas qu’aux États-Unis, comme ailleurs, il ne se rencontre un assez grand nombre de riches qui, tenant leurs biens par héritage; possèdent sans efforts une opulence qu’ils n’ont point acquise. Mais ceux-ci même ne se montrent pas moins attachés aux jouissances de la vie matérielle. L’amour du bien-être est devenu le goût national et dominant; le grand courant des passions humaines porte de ce côté, il entraîne tout dans son cours. (III,206-7)

187.13-14 “leading men away in search of forbidden enjoyments, but absorbing them in the pursuit of permitted ones.] The reproach I address to the principle of equality, is not that it leads men away in the pursuit of forbidden enjoyments, but that it absorbs them wholly in quest of those which are allowed. (III,272)

187.13-14 “leading . . . ones.] [translated from:] Ce que je reproche à l’égalité, ce n’est pas d’entraîner les hommes à la poursuite des jouissances défendues; c’est de les absorber entièrement dans la recherche des jouissances permises. (III,211)

187.15 This spirit is] It may even be (III,271)

187.15-17 This . . . another.”] [translated from:] Souvent même il vient à se combiner avec une sorte de moralité religieuse; on veut être le mieux possible en ce monde, sans renoncer aux chances de l’autre. (III,210-11)

187.25-6 is so] he is so (III,278)

187.28-9 gratifications. . . . [paragraph] At] [ellipsis indicates 1-paragraph omission] (III,278-9)

187.30 uneasy] restless (III,279)

187.30 spectacle is] spectacle itself is (III,279)

187.31 example] exemplification (III,279)

187.31-2 it . . . . [paragraph] When] [ellipsis indicates 3-paragraph omission] (III,279-80)

187.38 individually feeble. It] less able to realize them: it (III,281)

187.38 while] whilst (III,281)

187.39 restrained by their own weakness,] themselves powerless, (III,281)

188.1-2 they have now to encounter the competition of all. The] they have opened the door to universal competition: the (III,281) [cf. 188^m-m]

188.2 place] position (III,282)

188.3-4 to get on fast] to walk quick (III,282)

188.4 homogeneous] dense (III,282)

188.5 upon him.] him. (III,282)

188.5 wishes] propensities (III,282)

187.22-188.7 It . . . mind.] [translated from:] C’est une chose étrange de voir avec quelle sorte d’ardeur fébrile les Américains poursuivent le bien-être, et comme ils se montrent tourmentés sans cesse par une crainte vague de n’avoir pas choisi la route la plus courte qui peut y conduire. [paragraph] L’habitant des États-Unis s’attache aux biens de ce monde, comme s’il était assuré de ne point mourir, et il met tant de précipitation à saisir ceux qui passent à sa portée, qu’on dirait qu’il craint à chaque instant de cesser de vivre avant d’en avoir joui. Il les saisit tous, mais sans les étreindre, et il les laisse bientôt échapper de ses mains pour courir après des jouissances nouvelles. [ellipsis indicates 2-paragraph omission] On s’étonne d’abord en contemplant cette agitation singulière que font paraître tant d’hommes heureux, au sein même de leur abondance. Ce spectacle est pourtant aussi vieux que le monde; ce qui est nouveau c’est de voir tout un peuple qui le donne. [ellipsis indicates 5-paragraph omission] Quand toutes les prérogatives de naissance et de fortune sont détruites, que toutes les professions sont ouvertes à tous, et qu’on peut parvenir de soi-même au sommet de chacune d’elles une carrière immense et aisée semble s’ouvrir devant l’ambition des hommes, et ils se figurent volontiers qu’ils sont appelés à de grandes destinées. Mais c’est là une vue erronée que l’expérience corrige tous les jours. Cette même égalité qui permet à chaque citoyen de concevoir de vastes espérances, rend tous les citoyens individuellement faibles. Elle limite de tous côtés leurs forces, en même temps qu’elle permet à leurs désirs de s’étendre. [paragraph] Non-seulement ils sont impuissants par eux-mêmes, mais ils trouvent à chaque pas d’immenses obstacles qu’ils n’avaient point aperçus d’abord. [paragraph] Ils ont détruit les privilèges gênants de quelques-uns de leurs semblables; ils rencontrent la concurrence de tous. La borne a changé de forme plutôt que de place. Lorsque les hommes sont à peu près semblables et suivent une même route, il est bien difficile qu’aucun d’entre eux marche vite et perce à travers la foule uniforme qui l’environne et le presse. [paragraph] Cette opposition constante qui règne entre les instincts que fait naître l’égalité, et les moyens qu’elle fournit pour les satisfaire, tourmente et fatigue les âmes. (III,216-19)

189.8-9 comes to have] has (II,153)

189.9 is, to be equally] is to say, when it is equally (II,153-4)

189.10 it is either falling into a revolutionary state or into dissolution.”] it must either pass through a revolution, or fall into complete dissolution. (II,154)

189.8-10 “When . . . dissolution.”] [translated from:] Quand une société en vient à avoir réellement un gouvernement mixte, c’est-à-dire également partagé entre des principes contraires, elle entre en révolution ou elle se dissout. (II,144-5)

189.14 “checked] I am therefore of opinion that some one social power must always be made to predominate over the others; but I think that liberty is endangered when this power is checked (II,154)

189.14-15 “checked . . . vehemence.”] [translated from:] Je pense donc qu’il faut toujours placer quelque part un pouvoir social supérieur à tous les autres; mais je crois la liberté en péril lorsque ce pouvoir ne trouve devant lui aucun obstacle qui puisse retenir sa marche, et lui donner le temps de se modérer lui-même. (II,145)

189.22 democracy . . . is] democracy in Christendom, is (II,267)

189.22 our] the (II,267)

189.21-2 “The . . . time.”] [translated from:] L’organisation et l’établissement de la démocratie parmi les chrétiens est le grand problème politique de notre temps. (II,254)

189.33-4 of. [paragraph] In] [no paragraph] (IV,341)

189.35 weakness. The] weakness. The outlined society itself was not easily discernible, and constantly confounded with the different powers by which the community was ruled. The (IV,342)

189.38 to public.] to the interests of the public. (IV.342) [cf. 189^q]

190.4 The general character of old society was diversity;] In olden society everything was different: (IV,342) [cf. 190^r-r]

190.5 all things threaten] everything threatens (IV,342)

190.6 will be] will soon be (IV,342)

190.7 in the uniformity of the general aspect.] in the general aspect of the world. (IV,342)

190.10 of an] of a private (IV,343)

190.10 ought] ought always (IV,343)

190.12 immovable] settled (IV,343)

190.13 the ruling power] the government (IV,343)

190.14 secure] to secure (IV,343)

190.14 of their] of those (IV,343)

190.15 originality] original power (IV,343)

190.17 for the legislator in the age] of legislators in the ages (IV,343)

190.20 effect great things] make things great (IV,343)

190.21 value upon] value on (IV,343)

190.25 of citizens personally feeble and pusillanimous.] pusillanimous and enfeebled citizens. (IV,344)

189.31-190.25 I . . . pusillanimous.] [translated from:] Je terminerai par une idée générale qui renferme dans son sein non seulement toutes les idées particulières qui ont été exprimées dans ce présent chapitre, mais encore la plupart de celles que ce livre a pour but d’exposer. [paragraph] Dans les siècles d’aristocratie qui ont précédé le nôtre, il y avait des particulièrs très-puissants et une autorité sociale fort débile. L’image même de la société était obscure, et se perdait sans cesse au milieu de tous les pouvoirs différents qui régissaient les citoyens. Le principal effort des hommes de ces temps-là dut se porter à grandir et à fortifier le pouvoir social, à accroître et à assurer ses prérogatives et, au contraire à resserrer l’indépendance individuelle dans des bornes plus étroites, et à subordonner l’intérêt particulier à l’intérêt général. [paragraph] D’autres périls et d’autres soins attendent les hommes de nos jours. [paragraph] Chez la plupart des nations modernes, le souverain, quels que soient son origine, sa constitution et son nom, est devenu presque tout-puissant, et les particuliers tombent, de plus en plus, dans le dernier degré de la faiblesse et de la dépendance. [paragraph] Tout était différent dans les anciennes sociétés. L’unité et l’uniformité ne s’y rencontraient nulle part. Tout menace de devenir si semblable dans les nôtres que la figure particulière de chaque individu se perdra bientôt entièrement dans la physionomie commune. Nos pères étaient toujours prêts à abuser de cette idée que les droits particuliers sont respectables, et nous sommes naturellement portés à exagérer cette autre que l’intérêt d’un individu doit toujours plier devant l’intérêt de plusieurs. [paragraph] Le monde politique change; il faut désormais chercher de nouveaux remèdes à des maux nouveaux. [paragraph] Fixer au pouvoir social des limites étendues, mais visibles et immobiles; donner aux particuliers de certains droits, et leur garantir la jouissance incontestée de ces droits; conserver à l’individu le peu d’indépendance, de force et d’originalité qui lui restent; le relever à côté de la société et le soutenir en face d’elle; tel me paraît être le premier objet du législateur, dans l’âge où nous entrons. [paragraph] On dirait que les souverains de notre temps ne cherchent qu’à faire avec les hommes des choses grandes. Je voudrais qu’ils songeassent un peu plus à faire de grands hommes; qu’ils attachassent moins de prix à l’œuvre et plus à l’ouvrier, et qu’ils se souvinssent sans cesse qu’une nation ne peut rester long-temps forte quand chaque homme y est individuellement faible, et qu’on n’a point encore trouvé de formes sociales ni de combinaisons politiques qui puissent faire un peuple énergique en le composant de citoyens pusillanimes et mous. (IV,271-2)

193.33 “The . . . luxury,”] To mimic virtue is of every age; but the . . . luxury belongs more particularly to the ages of democracy. (III,100)

193.33 “The . . . luxury,”] [translated from:] La démocratie ne fait pas naître ce sentiment qui n’est que trop naturel au cœur de l’homme; mais elle l’applique aux choses matérielles; l’hypocrisie de la vertu est de tous les temps; celle du luxe appartient plus particulièrement aux siècles démocratiques. (III,78)

200.13 “tyranny of the majority.”] [see text above, 156]

219.35 “tyranny of the majority.”] [see previous entry]

“Tomkins, Lydia.” Thoughts on the Ladies of the Aristocracy, by Lydia Tomkins. London: Hodgsons, 1835.

note: see the note under Fox, William Johnson, “The London Review No. II.”

referred to: 56n

Trevelyan, Charles Edward. Referred to: 201; see also under Parliamentary Papers, “Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service” (1854).

Trollope, Frances.Domestic Manners of the Americans. 2 vols. London: Whittaker, Treacher, and Co., 1832.

note: the reference at 113n is in an indirect quotation from Shirreff.

referred to: 112, 113n

Truelove. Referred to: 239

Tufnell. Referred to: 3

note: see also Boeckh, and Mueller.

Turgot. Referred to: 623, 641

Tyler. Referred to: 166

Vauban. Referred to: 532

note: the reference is to “Vauban’s rules.”

Vedas. Referred to: 407, 612

note: the reference at 612 is in a quotation from Dupont-White.

Victoria (of England). Referred to: 370, 481

note: the reference (to her reign) at 370 is in a quotation from Hare.

Villèle. Referred to: 582, 608

note: the reference at 582 is in an indirect quotation from Odilon Barrot; those at 608 are to the Villèle ministry and government.

Voltaire. Referred to: 155

Wakefield, Edward Gibbon. Referred to: 563

note: the reference is to Wakefield as a “joint author,” with Buller, of the Durham Report.

— England and America; a comparison of the Social and Political State of both Nations. 2 vols. London: Bentley, 1833.

referred to: 100

Walpole. Referred to: 78

Washington. Referred to: 100, 109, 111, 438, 641

note: the reference at 109 is in a quotation from A. H. Everett.

Wason, Rigby. Referred to: 496n-7n; see under Parliamentary Papers, “Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act” (1860).

Watt. Referred to: 468n

note: the reference is in a quotation from Carey.

Webster. Referred to: 109, 111n

note: the reference at 109 is in a quotation from E. Everett.

Welford, Richard Griffiths. Referred to: 496n-7n; see under Parliamentary Papers, “Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act” (1860).

Wellesley. Referred to: 209, 532

Wellington. See Wellesley.

Whately. Referred to: 3

Whewell, William.Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics, as a Part of a Liberal Education. Cambridge: Deighton, 1835.

referred to: 142

White, Henry Kirke. Referred to: 109

note: the reference is in a quotation from A. H. Everett.

White, Joseph Blanco, with John Stuart Mill. “Guizot’s Lectures on European Civilization,” London Review, II (Jan., 1836), 306-36.

referred to: 94

William I (of Orange). Referred to: 419

William III (of England). Referred to: 419

William III (of Orange). See William III (of England).

Wordsworth. Referred to: 4n-5n

Xenophon. Referred to: 618

— Oeconomicus.

note: as no edition is cited or now in JSM’s library, none is here given; the quotation would appear to be a conflation of 21.5 and 21.12.

quoted:617

“Report of William Crawford, Esq., on the Penitentiaries of the United States, addressed to His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department,” Parliamentary Papers, 1834, XLVI, 349-669.

referred to: 106

“Report on the Affairs of British North America, from the Earl of Durham,” Parliamentary Papers, 1839, XVII.

referred to: 563. See also Lambton, Buller, and Wakefield.

“A Bill to Extend the Right of voting for Members of Parliament, and to amend the Laws relating to the Representation of the People in Parliament,” 15 Victoria (12 February, 1852), Parliamentary Papers, 1852, III, 353-96.

note: the Bill was not enacted. The reference is to Clause XVIII and Schedule B.

referred to: 316-17

“A Bill further to amend the Laws relating to the Representation of the People in England and Wales,” 17 Victoria (16 February, 1854), Parliamentary Papers, 1854, V, 375-418.

note: the references at 330 and 452 are to Clause XII (p. 377). The Bill was not enacted.

referred to: 313^a, 318, 330, 452

“Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, together with a letter from the Rev. B. Jowett,” Parliamentary Papers, 1854, XXVII, 1-31.

note: the Report was prepared by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan, who date it 23 Nov., 1853. The quotations are from Jowett’s letter, which appears on 24-31 of the “Report,” and is reprinted above in Appendix C.

quoted: 210 (for the collation, see Jowett, Letter)

referred to: 201, 207-11

“New York Industrial Exhibition: General Report of the British Commissioners,” Parliamentary Papers, 1854, XXXVI, 1-467. See Henry Carey, Principles of Social Science.

“A Bill to Extend the franchise in Counties in England and Wales, and to improve the Representation of the People in Respect of such franchise,” 21 Victoria (27 April, 1858), Parliamentary Papers, 1857-58, I, 561-4.

note: the Bill was not enacted. Locke King brought forward the proposal on several occasions in the 1850s; while approval of the specific clause was sometimes secured, none of the Bills in which it was incorporated was enacted. See, e.g., “A Bill to make the Franchise in Counties in England and Wales the same as that in Boroughs, by giving the right of voting to all Occupiers of Tenements of the annual Value of Ten Pounds,” 14 Victoria (7 March, 1851), Parliamentary Papers, 1851, II, 211-14.

referred to: 319

“A Bill to Amend the Laws relating to the Representation of the People in England and Wales, and to facilitate the Registration and Voting of Electors,” 22 Victoria (28 February, 1859), Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (Session 1), II, 649-715.

note: the Bill was not enacted.

referred to: 313, 319, 328

“Fourth Report of Her Majesty’s Civil Service Commissioners,” Parliamentary Papers, 1859, VIII. See Harris, James Howard.

“Report from the Select Committee on the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act (1854), &c.; together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index.” Parliamentary Papers, 1860, X.

note: the “several” witnesses mentioned in the first sentence of 496n were (with JSM’s page references in parentheses): Thomas Phinn (46), Edwin James (54-7), Rigby Wason (67), Frederick Cosens (123), John Moxon Clabon (198-202), and George Ade (208). The Chief Commissioner of the Wakefield Inquiry, who is quoted, was Gillery Pigott. By the “distinguished member of the Committee” JSM probably means Sir George Cornewall Lewis (see, e.g., 8, 46, 95, 169-70), though Sir George Grey expressed similar sentiments (e.g., 97, 201), and both were members of the Cabinet. The references in the concluding sentence of the note are to Richard Griffiths Welford (20, 277), and Rigby Wason (65-70).

quoted: 497n

497.n9-10 “If they . . . work. . . .] That [disqualifying a person guilty of bribery from holding any office] would have great effect; the fact of that being enacted in an Act of Parliament would have a great moral effect; if they . . . work, and I do not think that it would be necessary to prosecute in many cases. (32) [Evidence of Gillery Pigott.]

497.n10-12. I . . . opinion.”] Yes [one has to guard against the prospective payment of corrupt expenditure]; Mr. Hardy was suggesting when Mr. Vaughan was examined, that people do not look upon this as an offence against morality; I am quite of that opinion, though I think the feeling is growing that it is immoral; I . . . opinion. (26) [Evidence of Gillery Pigott.]

“Report of the Commissioners appointed to Inquire into the Existence of Corrupt Practices at Elections for the Borough of Wakefield; together with the Minutes of Evidence,” Parliamentary Papers, 1860, XXVII, 1-460.

referred to: 497n

“Report by Mr. Lytton, Her Majesty’s Secretary of Legation, on the Election of Representatives for the Rigsraad,” in “Reports of Her Majesty’s Secretaries of Embassy and Legation on the Manufactures, Commerce, &c., of the Countries in which they reside (No. 7). Denmark,” Parliamentary Papers, 1864, LXI, 578-99.

note: reprinted as an appendix to the pamphlet, Personal Representation. Speech of John Stuart Mill, Esq., M.P., delivered in the House of Commons, May 29, 1867. London: printed by Henderson, Rait, and Fenton, 1867.

referred to: 466n

STATUTES

BRITISH

43 Elizabeth, c. 2. An Act for the reliefe of the poore (1601).

referred to: 609

39 & 40 George III, c. 106. An Act to repeal an Act passed in the last Session of Parliament, intituled, An Act to prevent unlawful Combinations of Workmen; and to substitute other Provisions in lieu thereof (29 July, 1800).

note: this was the most important Act to prevent combinations of workmen. It was repealed by 5 George IV, c. 95 (21 June, 1824), and certain of its provisions reintroduced by 6 George IV, c. 129 (6 July, 1825).

referred to: 29

5 George IV, c. 74. An Act for ascertaining and establishing Uniformity of Weights and Measures (17 June, 1824).

referred to: 602

9 George IV, c. 60. An Act to amend the Laws relating to the Importation of Corn (15 July, 1828).

referred to: 199

2 & 3 William IV, c. 45. An Act to amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales (7 June, 1832).

referred to: 34, 37, 125, 194, 313, 314, 315, 343, 361, 620, 635

3 & 4 William IV, c. 96. An Act to apply the Sum of Six Millions out of the Consolidated Fund to the Service of the Year One thousand eight hundred and thirty-three, and to appropriate the Supplies granted in this Session of Parliament (29 August, 1833).

referred to: 609

3 & 4 William IV, c. 103. An Act to regulate the Labour of Children and young Persons in the Mills and Factories of the United Kingdom (29 August, 1833).

referred to: 592, 602

4 & 5 William IV, c. 76. An Act for the Amendment and better Administration of the Laws relating to the Poor in England and Wales (14 August, 1834).

note: see also 43 Elizabeth, c. 2. The references at 594 (one of which is in a quotation from Dupont-White) and at 611 are generally to the Poor Laws.

referred to: 64, 169, 540, 542, 594, 599, 606, 609, 611

5 & 6 William IV, c. 53. An Act to repeal an Act of the Ninth Year of His late Majesty, for regulating the Carriage of Passengers in Merchant Vessels from the United Kingdom to the British Possessions on the Continent and Islands of North America; and to make further Provision for regulating the Carriage of Passengers from the United Kingdom (31 August, 1835).

referred to: 592, 602, 611

6 & 7 William IV, c. 76. An Act to reduce the Duties on Newspapers, and to amend the Laws relating to the Duties on Newspapers and Advertisements (13 August, 1836).

note: JSM’s reference is, of course, predictive.

referred to: 135

5 & 6 Victoria, c. 99. An Act to prohibit the Employment of Women and Girls in Mines and Collieries, to regulate the Employment of Boys, and to make other Provisions relating to Persons working therein (10 August, 1842).

referred to: 592

7 & 8 Victoria, c. 15. An Act to amend the Laws relating to Labour in Factories (6 June, 1844).

referred to: 592, 602

11 & 12 Victoria, c. 63. An Act for promoting the Public Health (31 August, 1848).

referred to: 592, 602

12 & 13 Victoria, c. 29. An Act to amend the Laws in force for the Encouragement of British Shipping and Navigation (26 June, 1849).

note: the 1849 Act repealed those of 12 Charles II, c. 18 (1651), and 3 & 4 William IV, c. 54 (1833).

referred to: 611

13 & 14 Victoria, c. 23. An Act to repeal an Exception in an Act of the Twenty-Seventh Year of King Henry the Sixth concerning the Days whereon Fairs and Markets ought not to be kept (10 June, 1850).

note: other relevant acts include 11 & 12 Victoria, c. 49 (An Act for regulating the Sale of Beer and other Liquors on the Lord’s Day [14 August, 1848]); 17 & 18 Victoria, c. 79 (An Act for further regulating the Sale of Beer and other Liquors on the Lord’s Day [7 August, 1854]); and 18 & 19 Victoria, c. 118 (An Act to repeal the Act of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the Reign of her present Majesty for further regulating the Sale of Beer and other Liquors on the Lord’s Day, and to substitute other Provisions in lieu thereof [14 August, 1855]).

referred to: 288-9

13 & 14 Victoria, c. 93. An Act for improving the Condition of Masters, Mates, and Seamen, and maintaining Discipline, in the Merchant Service (14 August, 1850).

referred to: 592, 602

14 & 15 Victoria, c. 13. An Act to regulate the Sale of Arsenic (5 June, 1851).

referred to: 293-5

16 & 17 Victoria, c. 137. An Act for the better Administration of Charitable Trusts (20 August, 1853).

referred to: 599

17 & 18 Victoria, c. 81. An Act to make further Provision for the good Government and Extension of the University of Oxford, of the Colleges therein, and of the College of Saint Mary Winchester (7 August, 1854).

referred to: 143n

17 & 18 Victoria, c. 102. An Act to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to Bribery, Treating, and undue influence at Elections of Members of Parliament (10 August, 1854).

note: usually referred to as the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act.

referred to: 316, 333, 496n

19 & 20 Victoria, c. 88. An Act to make further Provision for the good Government and Extension of the University of Cambridge, of the Colleges therein, and of the College of King Henry the Sixth at Eton (29 July, 1856).

referred to: 143n

FRENCH

D.P. 41.3.116. Loi relative au travail des enfants employés dans les manufactures, usines ou ateliers (22 March, 1841).

referred to: 601n

[[*] ]

Henry Taylor, Philip van Artevelde; a dramatic romance in two parts (London: Moxon, 1834).

[[†] ]See Oeconomicus, 21.5 and 12.

[[*] ]Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, in Works, ed. Joseph Warton, et al., 10 vols. (London: Priestley [Vol. X, Hearne], 1822, 1825), Vol. III, p. 115 (Epistle III, ll. 303-4).

[[*] ]See, e.g., Robert Peel, “Speech delivered at the Mansion House” (23 Dec., 1834), in Speeches by the Right Honourable Sir Robert Peel, Bart., during his Administration, 1834-1835, 2nd ed. (London: Roake and Varty, 1835), p. 11.

[[*] ]Walter Savage Landor, Imaginary Conversations of Literary Men and Statesmen, 5 vols. (London: Taylor and Hessey, 1824-29), Vol. I, p. 26.

[[*] ]John Milton, Paradise Lost, in The Poetical Works (London: Tonson, 1695), p. 166 (X, 281).

[[†] ]Pp. 159-61. For the closing image, see Ecclesiastes, 12:6.

[* ]In confirmation of this opinion we may refer to one of Mr. Taylor’s chapters, which treats of Special Commissions, and Committees of either House of Parliament, as aids to the statesman in his work. Mr. Taylor gives, most justly, the preference to the former. There cannot be the smallest comparison between the two in point of efficiency. The facts collected in evidence before a committee of parliament are often extremely valuable: the report is generally meagre and nugatory. The special commission, if composed of persons properly selected, furnishes a full and exhaustive view of the whole subject: evils together with their remedies—facts with the inferences deducible from them. In truth, it seems to us that as matters now stand in England, there is no other way of exposing all the facts of the case methodically to view, in sequence and coherence with each other, and with satisfactory assurance that nothing material is omitted: there is scarcely any other way of laying a broad and firm foundation for large administrative measures. Now it may not be amiss to remark, in reference to Mr. Taylor’s ideas of disconnecting administrative reform from political reform, that there is hardly any subject on which the Tories in the House of Commons are more vehement, than in their denunciation of special commissions, as useless jobs and waste of the public money. Sir Robert Peel has more than once condemned them, as indefensible contrivances for saving the time and trouble of indolent members of parliament, and for accomplishing objects which might be easily attained by a committee of ordinary diligence upstairs. It will be found that the champions of political abuses are in the main constrained to take their stand on the status quo, entire as it exists; occasionally perhaps venturing to meddle with some small and isolated evil, but dreading the contagion of any large and systematic improvement, even in matters of simple administration.

[* ]J. Barclaii Argenis. [John Barclay, Argenis (Paris: Buon, 1621).]

[* ]Plato, Republic [Vol. II, p. 142 (520d)], vii. 5. Ἐν πόλει ἠ̑ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν, ταυτὴν ἄριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἐναντίους ἄρχοντας σχοῦσαν, ἐναντίως. The motive on which Plato relies for inducing the best men to accept of power, is the fear of its being exercised by worse men.

[[*] ]Jeanne-Marie Roland, “Notice historique sur la Revolution,” in Mémoires de Madame Roland, ed. St. A. Berville and J. F. Barrière, 2 vols. (Paris: Baudoin, 1820), Vol. I, p. 389.

[[*] ]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. William Molesworth (London: Bohn, 1839), Vol. III, p. 89.

[a-a]351 this

[b-b]351 must not

[c-c]351 the

[d-d]351 people

[e-e]351 But of all governments, ancient or modern

[f]351, 59 most

[g-g]351 skilfully organized aristocracy of all

[h-h]351 Where

[i]351 even

[j-j]351 Few . . . Few . . . Many . . . Many

[k-k]352security

[l-l]352 purpose for which it is good to intrust power to the people

[m-m]+67

[n-n]+59, 67

[o-o]352 its

[p-p]352 although

[q]352 He either obeys the prescription of his physician, or, if dissatisfied with him, takes another. In that consists his security. In that consists also the people’s security; and with that it is their wisdom to be satisfied.

[r-r]352 freely, or with the least possible control

[s-s]352 at the discretion

[t]352 , and not according to the erroneous notion of democracy

[u-u]352 [in footnote, which continues for five further sentences]

[v-v]352 doubted

[w-w]352 democracy as we do

[x]352 [paragraph]

[y]352 in

[z-z]352 evidence

[a-a]352 these

[b]352 [paragraph]

[c-c]352 show us the men who . . . it!

[d-d]+59, 67

[[*] ]See p. 210 above.