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Remarks on This Chapter - Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law: Or, the Laws of Nature and Nations 
A Methodical System of Universal Law: Or, the Laws of Nature and Nations, with Supplements and a Discourse by George Turnbull. Translated from the Latin by George Turnbull, edited with an Introduction by Thomas Albert and Peter Schröder (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008).
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Remarks on This Chapter
Our Author hath treated very distinctly and fully of the duties of the simpler societies, as he very properly calls them. But because it is common in arguing about government, or the civil state, to which our author is now to proceed, especially among the defenders of absolute monarchy, to reason from the right of paternity, it will not be improper to consider domestic or family dominion in its natural causes. This will prepare the way for the consideration of civil government, or dominion in its natural causes; And it is the more necessary, because the defenders of absolute monarchy, in their reasonings to prove its jus divinum, from the right of paternity, or the government of families, conceal, as Mr. Harrington observes, one part of it. “For family government, says that excellent author (for it is from him, of his works p. 385. upon the foundations and superstructures of all kinds of government, I am now to transcribe) may be as necessarily popular in some cases, as monarchical in others. To shew now the nature of the monarchical family: Put the case a man has one thousand pounds a year, or thereabouts, he marries a wife, has children and servants depending upon him (at his good will) in the distribution of his estate for their livelihood. Suppose then that this estate comes to be spent or lost, where is the monarchy of this family? But if the master was no otherwise monarchical than by virtue of his estate, the foundation or balance of his empire consisted in the thousand pounds a year. That from these principles there may be also a popular family, is apparent: For suppose six or ten, having each three hundred pounds a year, or so, shall agree to dwell together as one family, can any one of them pretend to be lord and master of the same, or to dispose of the estates of all the rest? or do they not agree together upon such orders, to which they consent equally to submit? But if so, then certainly must the government of this family be a government of laws or orders, and not the government of one, or of some three or four of these men. Yet the one man in the monarchical family giving laws, and the many in the popular family doing no more, it may in this sense be indifferently said, That all laws are made by men; but it is plain, where the law is made by one man, then it may be unmade by one man; so that the man is not governed by the law, but the law by the man; which amounts to the government of the men, and not of the law: whereas the law being not to be made but by the many, no man is governed by another man, but by that only which is the common interest; by which means this amounts to a government of laws, and not of men. That the politicks may not be thought an unnecessary or difficult art, if these principles be less than obvious and undeniable, even to any woman that knows house-keeping, I confess I have no more to say. But in case what has been said be to all sorts and capacities evident, it may be referred to any one, whether without violence, or removing of property, a popular family can be made of the monarchical, or a monarchical family of the popular. Or whether that be practicable or possible, in a nation upon the like balance or foundation in property, which is not in a family. A family being but a smaller society or nation, and a nation but a greater society or family. That which is usually answered to this point is, That the six or ten thus agreeing to make one family, must have some steward, and to make such a steward in a nation, is to make a king. But this is to imagine, that the steward of a family is not answerable to the masters of it, or to them upon whose estates (and not upon his own) he defrays the whole charge: For otherwise, this stewardship cannot amount to dominion, but must come only to the true nature of magistracy, and indeed of annual magistracy, in a commonwealth; seeing that such accounts, in the year’s end at farthest, use to be calculated, and that the steward, body and estate, is answerable for the same to the proprietors or masters; who also have the undoubted right of constituting such another steward or stewards, as to them shall seem good, or of prolonging the office of the same.
“Now, where a nation is cast, by the unseen ways of providence, into a disorder of government, the duty of such particularly as are elected by the people, is not so much to regard what has been, as to provide for the supreme law, or for the safety of the people, which consists in the true art of law-giving. And the art of law-giving is of two kinds; the one (as I may say) false, and the other true. The first consists in the reduction of the balance to arbitrary superstructures, which requires violence, as being contrary to nature; the other in erecting necessary superstructures, that is, such as are conformable to the balance or foundation; which being purely natural, requires that all interposition of force be removed.”2
It is impossible to treat distinctly of family or of civil dominion, without considering it in its natural causes, or its natural generation. “The matter of all government is an estate or property. Hence, all government is founded upon an over-balance in propriety. And therefore, if one man hold the over-balance unto the whole people in propriety, his property causeth absolute monarchy: if the few hold the over-balance unto the whole people in propriety, their propriety causeth aristocracy, or mixed monarchy. If the whole people be neither over-balanced by the propriety of one, nor of a few, the propriety of the people, or of the many, causeth democracy, or popular government: The government of one against the balance is tyranny; the government of a few against the balance is oligarchy: the government of the many (or attempt of the people to govern) against the balance, is rebellion or anarchy; where the balance of propriety is equal, it causeth a state of war: To hold that government may be founded upon community, is to hold that there may be a castle in the air, or that what thing soever is as imaginable as what hath been in practice, must be as practicable as what hath been in practice. Hence it is true in general, that all government is in the direction of the balance.”3 All these truths, however much neglected by writers upon government, are of the greatest moment: They have the same relation to or connexion with theories about government, whether domestic or civil and national, whether consisting of one or many families, as the real laws of matter and motion have with theories in natural philosophy: For they are moral facts or principles upon which alone true theories in moral philosophy or politics can be built, as the other are the natural facts, laws or principles upon which alone true axioms in natural philosophy can be erected. They are all fully explained by the author already cited. And hence we may see, “That the division of a people into freemen and servants, is not constitutive, but naturally inherent in the balance. Freemen are such as have wherewithal to live of themselves, and servants such as have not: Nor, seeing all government is in the direction of the balance, is it possible for the superstructures of any to make more freemen than are such by the nature of the balance, or by their being able to live of themselves. All that could in this matter be done, even by Moses himself, is contained in this proviso, Lev. xxv. 29. If thy brother that dwells by thee be grown poor, and be sold to thee, thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond-servant, but as a hired servant, and a sojourner shall he be with thee, and shall serve thee to the year of jubilee: And then shall he depart from thee, both he and his children with him, and shall return to his own family, and to the possession of hisfathers shall he return. Yet the nature of riches being considered, this division into freemen and servants, is not properly constitutive but natural.” See Mr. Harrington’s works, the art of lawgiving, p. 436, 437. Compare p. 248.4 I shall only add upon this head, that the defenders of absolute monarchy can never draw any conclusions to serve their purpose, either from paternal government, or from the power of masters over their servants. For with regard to the former, what relation can be stricter than that between parents and children: There cannot be stronger obligations to subjection upon any than there are upon children: This relation and obligation is not the effect of consent, children being incapable of giving their consent, but is the effect of the necessity of nature, and in a peculiar sense, an authority or power of the author of nature’s appointment: Yet let it be remembered, that our Author, and all writers on the laws of nature and nations allow, that the obligations of children do not contradict the powerful law of self-preservation and self-defence, in cases in which life, or any thing dearer than life, is concerned. But if this be true, how can one imagine, that when the ruin of the public happiness, which is as it were the life of the community, is attempted, the same law of self-defence is of no force, and ought not to be regarded? Suppose the right of dominion over men secured by an over-balance in property, and withal of divine appointment, in any conceivable sense of these words, yet, if it be as sacred as the right of a father, it cannot extend beyond the right of a father, which does not extend to the destruction of the right of self-defence, or to command immoral actions without contradiction or resistance: Or if it be more sacred than the right of a father (could that greater sacredness be conceived) it cannot be more sacred than the law of nature, and the right of God to exact obedience to that law, and to forbid the transgression of it in obedience to whatever other authority, and so extend to the demolishing of all the natural rights and duties of mankind: Power, whatever be its title, or whatever be its foundation and security, if it be exerced contrary to the laws of nature, contrary to the law of justice and love, it is not right; it is power indeed, but guilty criminal power, which it is, it must be a crime not to resist to the utmost of one’s power, if the law of nature, i.e. the law of God be immutable, universally and indispensably obligatory upon all men.
With respect to the power of masters over servants, or slaves conquered by just war, it is likewise true that such a master is a lawful superior, and hath no equal in his family, yet hath his family, his servants, his slaves a right to defend themselves against him, should he endeavour to ruin or murder them; and such a master has no right to command any thing in the smallest degree contrary to the law of nature; but every one in his family hath a right, or more properly speaking, is obliged to reject and resist such orders to the utmost of his power. None can have a right to injure any one in making acquisitions of property or dominion, and none can have a right to exercise his acquired power, property or dominion, in an injurious way to others, tho’ part of their property or dominion; because tho’ dominion and property be not contrary but agreeable to the law of nature, yet the more considerable part of the law of nature consists in limitations upon the exercise of dominion and property, or in prescribing duties to those who have dominion and property, with regard to the use and exercise of it. And (as our Author hath often observed) where there is duty incumbent upon any one, there is, ipso facto, a right vested in some other, who is the object of that duty, to claim the fulfilment of it towards him. But we shall have occasion to return to this subject afterwards. And it is sufficient at present to have observed, 1. The natural cause or source of dominion. And, 2. That there are boundaries set by the law of nature to the acquisition and exercise of dominion, which boundaries are, with respect to subjects of dominion, rights belonging to, and vested unalienably in them, by the same law which sets these limitations to power and dominion, and by setting them to it, imposes certain indispensable duties upon the possessors of power and dominion. This must be, if the law of nature is not an empty sound, the supreme law, with regard to those who have dominion, whether as fathers, masters or kings (according to this definition of a King by Grotius, de jure belli & pacis, l. 1. c. 3. “Paterfamilias latifundia possidens, & neminem alia lege in suas terras recipiens quam ut ditioni suae, qui recipiantur, se subjiciant.” “A master of a family, who having large possessions, will not suffer any one to dwell in them on other terms than being subject to him.”) viz. the greater good of their children, servants, family, or subjects. This being fixed as the fundamental law, particular duties are easily deducible from it. And this must be the supreme law, or man is subject to no law, but may exerce his power as he pleases, i.e. in other words, either the greater good of the whole society is the law, or strength is free from all law, and may do what it can, and there is no such thing as unlawful exercise of power.
Of the origine of civil society, its constitution and qualities, or properties.
The civil state has been agreeable to almost every nation.Tho’, in the societies we have described, men might have lived very comfortably; yet some reason hath prevailed upon men to form themselves into those larger societies, which we call states or republics, and to prefer, almost by universal consent, the civil to the natural state; there is almost no nation so barbarous, in which we do not find some semblance of a civil state or republic.*
Whether it was by indigence of necessaries they were engaged to choose a civil state.Tho’ many, in their enquiries concerning the origine of civil society, have thought that men were compelled to it by the want of several necessaries (Plato de repub. l. 2.); yet this is the less probable; first, Because we have an account of something like civil society in Genesis iv. 17. when the world was not so populous as that there could be any want of necessaries. And next, because nothing hinders commerce from taking place where there is no civil government (§10); and, in fine, because there has been a much greater indigence of all things, since, civil government being established, luxury and wantonness began to spread and reign among mankind.*
If on the account of elegance and politeness.Again, it can hardly be imagined that elegance and politeness were the motives which induced men, in the primitive times of frugality, to prefer a civil to a natural state. For besides that, what is called elegance, is really vanity, and what is called politeness of manners, is truly but an affected complaisance and flattery (§11);* there is nothing to hinder men, in a state of nature, from improving their reason, and refining or polishing their manners. Nay, the examples of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who lived by themselves with their segregate families, and had not entred into civil society, sufficiently shew us, that men, living in a state of nature, may be quite free from all barbarity, and very decent and polite.
If for the security of justice.Equally groundless are other reasons for which men are imagined to have coalited into republics or civil states. For as to what some say of justice, that civil society was formed for the sake of it, (as Hesiod. Theog. v. 87),1 and others of interest, as if it had been done on that account, (as Aristotle, Ethic. 8. 11.)2 and what others say, of the instigation of nature, (as the same Aristotle, l. 1. & 2.)––All these reasons, we think, are of such a nature, that they might have contributed somewhat towards it, but could not have been the sole motives which determined men to commute a state of liberty and equality for a state of civil government and subjection.*
The real cause which moved men to form large civil societies was the fear of wicked profligate men.Wherefore, when the matter is fully and accurately considered, they appear to have hit upon the true cause, who maintain that the strength and violence of wicked men gave rise to the formation of civil states. For all men being equal and free in a state of nature (§5 and 6); but such being the temper and disposition of profligate men, that they have an insatiable lust of power and wealth; of robbing others of their possessions and rights, and bringing them under their yoke, it could not but happen that several heads of families, of this temper and genius, would unite their strength in order to subject others to them. And since a large society cannot but be unequal and rectoreal (§17), the consequence is, that such a band of robbers would choose a leader to themselves, and prescribe a certain form of government to him, according to which he was to rule and command them; and hence the origine of civil society or political states,* which are nothing else but a multitude of people united under a common head, upon certain conditions for their mutual security, and dependent on, or subjected to no other mortal.
This obliged the innocent to unite together in order to repel force by force.The justest heads of families could not find any other remedy against such consociations, but to repel force by force (§9). And a few not being sufficient to accomplish that end, necessity, and the malice of wicked men, forced other men to coalesce into large bodies; the consequence from which is, that just and good heads of families were obliged, through fear of violent and wicked men, to unite their forces, and joining together under a common head on certain conditions, to form a civil society or political state † (§103); whence we infer, that there would have been no republics in a state of integrity. See Becman. meditat. pol. 11. 5;3 and that it is trifling to obtrude upon us a state of innocence as the first principle of the law of nature and nations (l. 1. §74).
The double origine of civil society.Civil society is therefore of a two-fold origine; some were formed to oppress the innocent, and for violence; others were formed to repel force by force, and for common self-defence. The end of the former is most unjust; that of the latter just. Wherefore the former is rather a gang of robbers than a society; the latter is a lawful republic. But because things which have an unlawful beginning may be afterwards amended when the error is found out; and, on the contrary, things which had a very laudable commencement are often perverted; a band of thieves and robbers, having laid aside their oppression and violence, may become an excellent commonwealth; and a lawful republic, forsaking their humanity, may degenerate into a tribe of ruffians; yet in both the same end, viz. the security of the members is the end of consociation.*
The end of civil society is the security of its members.Since the common security of the members is the end of all civil societies (§105); but it is from the end of a society that we must judge of the means, and of the rights and duties of its members (§14); the consequence is, that they who unite into society, ought to do all, without which the common end, viz. security, cannot be obtained. Now, since the violence which is obstructive of public security, consists in the united force of wicked men (§103), it is necessary that others, who would secure themselves against such violence, should unite their strength; and therefore it is proper, that as many men should form themselves into a more large and compounded society, as may, with probability, be sufficient to repel, by just force, the unjust violence of injurious neighbours.*
A republic consists in a multitude of men.A state or republic does not consist, as Nicias says in Thucydides, 7. 14.* and Themistocles in Justin. hist. 2. 12. in a territory, in towns, in walls, in houses, but in men; nor is it requisite to constitute a civil state, that whole families, composed of persons of both sexes, be united; but it is sufficient, if many conjoin their forces and minds, so as to be able to conquer or outwit their enemies; though it cannot be denied, that a civil state would be but of one age, if not composed of such families, but of single persons, however great its numbers might be, Florus 1. 1.*
They must consent in the end and the means.Since a republic consists in the union of such a number, whose united force is not unequal to that of their neighbours (§105); but there can be no society without consent (§13); the consequence is, that civil states or republics are constituted by an intervening contract, whether some men voluntarily coalite into society, or whether their consent was at first extorted by violence, or whether some men acceded in either of these ways to a republic already formed; or whether, in fine, the descendants of such citizens are presumed, from their having been bred up in a society, as some time to succeed to their progenitors (§16) in it, to have consented to continue members of it.†
The first pact of those who voluntarily constitute a republic.Hence it is plain, that civil states, like other societies, are constituted or augmented either by voluntary consent, or by forced consent (§15). In the former case, the first and principal pact must be that by which all consent to constitute the same state or republic. And since every pact ought to be free, and may be made upon conditions, it is self-evident that he who does not consent, or whose terms are not agreed to, remains without that society, and is his own master.*
Their subsequent resolution.But since members of the same society must consent to the same end and means (§13), which consent cannot be expected in a great multitude, unless the society be rectoreal; therefore some governing power must be instituted, by the will of which the whole people is to be ruled (§18); and the consequence is, that this multitude ought to determine what the model of government ought to be;* and tho’ they be not obliged to stand to the resolutions of the rest, who consented to the future republic, only upon condition that a certain form of government in it should be agreed to, if another form please the people (§109); yet those who entred into the first pact without any conditions, ought to submit to the plurality of suffrages.
Another pact.A form of government being agreed upon, nothing remains to constitute a perfect civil society, but to nominate the person or persons a people would have to rule over them,† and to prescribe the form of government agreed upon in the former pact, to him or them; which prescription will then become, properly speaking, the fundamental law of the republic, (since things settled by pacts are called laws); and therefore it binds the governors, whether one or many, no less than the subjects; so that nothing is right that is done contrary to this primary law, or essential constitution of the society.
Whether the same pacts take place when society is constituted by persons under force.Thus does society arise as often as a people voluntarily forms it. But so often as a people, brought under dominion by a more powerful one, coalesces into the same republic with their conquerors, the first pact is undoubtedly a consent to form one common republic with them; because, if they did not consent, they would not accept the terms offered by their conquerors, but rather perish than put themselves under such a yoke. But such a people will hardly be consulted or hearkened to with regard to the form of government, nor in the choice of rulers, but to them will be left little more than the glory of obeying.*
So if the conqueror forces a new form of government upon the conquered.It sometimes happens, that a new form of government is obtruded upon a conquered people;* and the victorious people stipulates to themselves, that this new republic shall pay homage to them, as joined to their republic by an unequal covenant. In which case, the nature of the thing shews us, that the pacts we have described above (§109, 111), and the decree about a form of government, (§110), cannot take place; but the conquered people consents to all, not voluntarily, but by force.
All the members of a civil state ought to submit their wills to the supreme powers in it.But as all societies are understood to have one understanding and one will (§19); so the same must be said of a state or republic thus constituted. Now, as many associates cannot agree upon the same end and means (§17), unless that business be committed to some one, or some certain number; so in a state the same must be done.† But to do this, is the same as to submit one’s will to that of another; whence it is plain, that all the members of a republic ought to submit their wills to one or more; and therefore that he or they govern to whom the rest have submitted their will.
Hence arise either monarchical, aristocratical or democratical states.Hence it follows, that there can be no more but three regular forms of republics or civil states. For subjects must either submit their wills to one, many, or to the whole multitude. Now, when they submit their wills to the will of one physical person, hence arises monarchy, a kingdom or principality.* [fn517] But if to the will or decrees of many, thence arises aristocracy. And if to the whole people, that is, to what is decreed by the common suffrage of the whole people, then the form of government is popular, and called a democracy.
To which are opposites, tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy.But since whether one, many, or all govern, none presides over the republic by any other right but this, that the rest of the citizens have submitted their wills to such a governor or governors (§114); the consequence is, that those command unjustly; i.e. without right, to whom the members of a state have not submitted their will. Wherefore, if one such person command, monarchy becomes tyranny; if, instead of the senate of the nobles, a few usurp the supreme command, aristocracy degenerates into oligarchy; and if, instead of the whole people, a certain rabble, consisting of the very dregs of the people, manage all things at their pleasure, democracy degenerates into ochlocracy.* These vitious forms of government being very like to the regular ones, the latter easily degenerate into the former, as Polybius justly observes, and experience has abundantly confirmed. Polyb. hist. 6. 1.
What are mixed republics.Now, since these regular forms of government may be perverted into as many opposite vitious forms (§116), it is not to be wondered at, that there are very few states to be found which have chosen any one of these three, but that many have compounded all these forms into one,† or have so mingled two of them together, as that the one form might be a balance or check on the other. And since names are generally derived from the better or more eminent part; hence various kinds of kingdoms, aristocracies and democracies could not but arise, which it very little concerns us, whether they be called mixt or irregular republics. See Hert. element. prud. civ. 1. 2. 8. p. 2320 & seq.
What are systems of republics.Again, since whole societies may coalesce into a larger body (§17); hence it follows, that many republics may, each preserving its form of govern-ment and its independency intire, make a confederacy for acting with common consent for their common preservation and safety.* Such confederated republics were the Achaian ones; and such are called systems of republics.
A monarch has a right to any title of honour.Since monarchy is formed as often as all the subjects submit their will to one person (§115); the consequence is, that it is the same what title of honour he assume to himself, monarch, emperor, king, duke, or prince; and that having no superior, he may change his title, and take any other at his pleasure,* tho’ he cannot so easily force other kings or republics to acknowledge any new title he may take; and therefore it is more prudent for a prince, before he assumes to himself any new title or dignity, to know the sentiments of other kings and states about it, and expresly to stipulate to himself such new titles of honour.
[iw-1]He solely exerces all the rights of majesty.Hence it is evident that a monarch governs all by his will; and tho’ he may take counsel from persons of prudence and experience, yet their opinions are not suffrages but counsels; and that he acts at all times, and every where; so that it was justly said in the times of Hadrian the Roman em-peror, “Roma est, ubi imperator est,” where the Emperor is, there is Rome, Herod. hist. 1. 6. There is therefore no right of majesty which a prince may not exerce (§111); yea, a kingdom hardly deserves to be called a monarchy in which any other exerces any of the rights of majesty independently of the king.*
The difference between a monarch and a tyrant.But tho’ a monarch governs all by his will, (§120), yet he ought not to act otherwise than the end of the state, the security of its members requires (§105); whence it follows, that the security and happiness of the people ought to be the supreme law in a monarchy; and in this does it differ from tyranny, which refers all to its own security and advantage; and which being acquired by villainous practices, cannot be retained by good methods, and therefore is very little concerned about the public welfare, provided it can sustain and preserve itself.†
How the rights of majesty are exerced in aristocracy.Again, from the definition of aristocracy, we infer, that all the rights of majesty or sovereignty belong to the whole senate or college of nobles, and cannot be exerced but by the concurring consent of the whole senate. There must therefore be a certain place where they assemble to consult about the common affairs of the state; and likewise a certain appointed time, on which the ordinary senate is held, unless some unexpected emergencies demand the calling of a senate out of the ordinary course. Besides, because the consent of many can hardly be expected but by submission (§17); the consequence is, that even in aristocracy the smaller number ought to submit to the greater number; and therefore that the voice of the plurality should determine; but in an equality of voices, nothing can be done, unless he who presides give the deciding voice, or the case be such as that there is place for the Calculus Minervae.* Moreover, since the vitious form of government, that is the opposite of Aristocracy is called oligarchy (§116), and into it does aristocracy easily degenerate (ibidem); the very nature of the thing demands that no decree be valid, unless it be made when the greater part of the senate is present, e.g. two thirds.
How in democracy.It is the same in a democracy: For since in it whatever is decreed by the common voice of the whole people is the will of the whole republic or state (§115), it follows, that the sovereignty belongs to the people, and that they have the right to exerce all the rights of majesty. But since that cannot be done unless the people hold assemblies to consult about their affairs, it is evident, that here also a certain place and stated days must be fixed for the public assemblies; and that whatever is resolved by the plurality of peoples suffrages in tribes, in curiae, or singly, is valid. In fine, that a democracy may degenerate into an ochlocracy,* if the right of voting be allowed to the minority of the people, the rest being excluded or absent, is evident from the very definition of ochlocracy (§116).
How in mixed republics.But since mixed republics, as they are called, are sometimes the best, and were formed on purpose that one form might balance another, and keep it within due bounds (§107), it is plain, that all, or some of the rights of majesty, ought to be so shared in such states, either among the senators, or among the people, that one order cannot determine any thing without consulting the other, and not to be so divided, that one may act either without the knowledge, or against the will of the other. For, in this case, nothing can hinder a republic from springing up within a republic.*
How in systems of republics.As to systems of republics, since they are either constituted by the coalition of two kingdoms into one under a common head (§118), or by a confederacy between several independent states (ibid.) it is plain, in the former case, that unless they be distinct, perfect kingdoms, besides a common king, they ought to have a common senate, to which all the orders of both kingdoms are called proportionably to their strength. But, in the latter case, each state exercises by itself, at its own pleasure, all the immanent rights of sovereignty; and the transeunt rights, relative to their common security, ought to be exercised in a common council, composed of delegates from each, which is either perpetual or temporary; and in which all affairs concerning their common security are determined, the delegates having first consulted each his own state.†
There may be a great diversity of systems of republics.But because such confederacies chiefly depend upon the articles or terms of the agreement, there cannot but be a great diversity in this matter; and some will be more closely united, and others more laxly; some will have more, and some less in common. Thus some may have, by confederacy or treaty, a common treasury, a common mint, and a common armory, and others not. In fine; some may have a certain president, who is guardian of the confederacy, and takes the chair in the council and others may be confederated in a very different manner; and, in a word, neither the right of suffrage, nor the manner of contributing towards the common security, nor any of the other constitutions can be every where, or in all confederacies the same.
[2 ] Harrington, “The Art of Lawgiving” (1659), bk. I, “The Preface,” in The Political Works of James Harrington, 602–3.
[3 ] With the exception of the last sentence this is from Harrington, “The Rota or a Model of a Free State or Equal Commonwealth” (1660), in Harrington, Political Works, 808.
[4 ] Harrington, “The Art of Lawgiving,” bk. III, chap. 1, in Harrington, Political Works, 665–66. The edition Turnbull appears to be using is that edited by John Toland (The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington, Esq.). The reference to p. 248, therefore, is to bk. I, chap. 1 of “The Prerogative of Popular Government” and would correspond to pp. 409–10 in Pocock’s edition of Harrington’s political works.
[* ] They attest the truth of this who have visited the anciently unknown countries, northern and southern, having found in most of them either great multitudes subject to one king, or determining matters of common concernment to them by common consent. For what some authors have said of the Cafri, and the people inhabiting mount Caucasus, and of certain American Islanders, (see Hert. Elem. prud. civil. 1. 1. p.45. Becmann. geograph. 9. 8.) [[Hertius, Elementa prudentiae civilis; Johann Christoph Becmann (1641–1717), German historian and Protestant theologian, author of the Historia orbis terrarum, geographica et civilis these accounts seem to be given by persons who had not enquired very narrowly into the matter, and who thought they saw no vestige of civil government, where they saw no palaces and guards, nor nothing of the splendor and magnificence of a court. Petrus Kolbius, who lived long in that corner of Africa, says of the Cafri, that they were divided into seventeen provinces or nations, each of which had its own prince, whom they called Kouqui, and that every village had its prefect, called in their language Kralle, who had even the power of punishing criminals. As for public affairs, he adds, that all the prefects met together, and consulted in a common-council, in which the prince of the nation presided. I am afraid what Salust says of the Aborigines and Gaetuli, Catil. cap. 6. & Jugurth. c. 18; and Strabo of the Numidians, geograph. l. 17. p.1191. and Valerius Flaccus, Argonaut. l. 4. v. 102. Valerius Flaccus, Argonautica of the Bebricii, Pliny of the Troglodites, hist. nat. 5. 8. and in fine, Homer of the Sicilians, that all these accounts are equally groundless. The natural state of the Sicilians is elegantly described by Homer Odyss. l. 10. v. 112.Nec fora conciliis fervent, nec judice: tantumAntra colunt umbrosa: altisque in montibus aedesQuisque suos regit uxorem natosque, nec ulliIn commune vacat socias extendere curas.
Homer, Odyssey 9.112, ed. Stanford: “[Of the Cyclopes] They keep no meeting places for councils, nor for a court; they rather dwell in shady caves, their homes in the high mountains, and each man rules his own wife and children, and never calls partners in common to share his concerns.”
[* ] Thus we find Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who lived sometime in a natural state, (§92), tho’ they only applied themselves to husbandry, and feeding of cattle, to have lived very agreeably, and to have amassed great wealth, and to have wanted nothing, Gen. xxiv. 35. xxxiii. 11. And indeed, seeing families living separately and independently in very early times of the world, understood agriculture, and planting and dressing of vines, and were no strangers to gold and silver, and the more useful arts (Gen. xiii. 2. xxiv. 35.) what could men desire more, tho’ they lived in a state of nature, if luxury were unknown, and made none of its exorbitant demands to which nature is a stranger?
[* ] A proof of this is the mannerly polite speech of Abraham to Melchisedech, Gen. xiv. 22. and his uncommon hospitality to strangers, Gen. xviii. 2. and his conference with the sons of Heth, Gen. xxiii. 7. That Abraham had taught his servants to be most observant of decency and good manners, appears from that message carried by Eleaser to Nachor, Gen. xxiv. 22. Nor does that interview between Jacob, in his return from Mesopotamia with Esau, savour in the least of barbarity, in which they strove to outdo one another in civil words, presents, and other tokens of love and friendship. Besides, if it be true, which Joseph. antiq. Jud. 1. 9. says of Abraham, that he was skilled not only in numbers, but in astronomy; and what is said by others of skill in the interpretation of dreams being brought to great perfection in his family (Suidas Abraham. [[Suidas, Suidae lexicon, vol. 1, “Αβρααμ” & Justin. hist. 36), none can doubt but that the arts and sciences may be cultivated to a great degree of perfection in a state of nature, and therefore that there is no need of a civil state in order to gain that end.]]
[1 ] Hesiod, Theogony and Works and Days, line 87.
[2 ] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 8, chap. 11, in The Works of Aristotle, vol. 9.
[* ] For why might not the heads of segregate families have made laws, and distributed justice each in his own family, (§92)? Again, why might not the more simple societies have produced all the advantages of union, since in these every one was at liberty to acquire what he pleased, and there would be none of those tributes, taxes, imposts, upon persons or estates there, which now eat up the property and estates of subjects in civil governments? Let nature be as abhorrent of solitude, and let a state of solitude be as miserable as Pufendorff hath painted it out to be, yet we can never say, that Abraham, for example, lived in a solitary state, who besides a wife and a hand-maid, and many children by both, had such a numerous retinue of servants, that he could bring into the field three hundred and eighty servants born in his family, Gen. xiv. 13. However strong the natural propension of mankind to society may be, yet surely they were not immediately led by natural inclination to form those larger societies, in which there are many things very contrary to the natural dispositions of mankind, as Pufendorff hath shewn at great length in his 7th book, cap. 1. §4. of the law of nature, &c. It is however very certain, that in a civil state, if it be rightly constituted, justice is well administred, and all the public and private interests of mankind are wisely consulted and provided for; but those things are more properly called consequences of good civil government, than motive causes to the formation of it.
[* ] This is the most natural account of the rise of civil government, if we attend to reason and the nature of things. But ancient history sets it beyond all doubt that it was so. For that is found in the sacred writings. And these records assure us, that before the deluge, not the sons of God, as they are called, Gen. vi. 1. but the posterity of Cain, built the first city, Gen. iii. 17. For tho’ we should grant to the learned Jo. Clerc. comment. p.40. [[Jean le Clerc, Genesis sive Mosis prophetae liber primus that this city consisted but of a few little cottages, set about with a mound or green hedge (which is by no means certain or indisputable) yet a society of many families, without some form of civil government, can hardly be conceived. Moreover we are told, that after the deluge Nimrod the son of Chus, being mighty in possessions or territories, founded the kingdom of Babylon, i.e. began to oppress others, and force them to submit themselves to his command, Gen. x. 8. Nor is any more ancient kingdom mentioned by Moses, tho’ the names and transactions of several kingdoms and dynasties occur in the history of the time of Abraham, a few ages after. And who indeed can doubt that civil states were originally formed in this manner, i.e. by violent oppression, since this has so often happened in latter times? Hertius prud. civil. 1. 3. 4. p.77. & seq. has shewn by instances brought from universal history, that the most potent kingdoms took their rise from oppression and robbery.]]
[† ] They are not therefore in the wrong who assert that fear and force were the origine of civil society, as Bodin, de rep. 1. 6. 2. 6. [[Jean Bodin (1529/30–1596), French jurist and “absolutist”; see Bodin, Les six livres de la République, bk. I, chap. 6, p. 69: “La raison et lumière naturelle nous conduit à cela, de croire que la force et violence a donné source et origine aux Républiques.” Hobbes de cive. 1. Hobbes, On the Citizen 1.2, p. 24. nor they who say, that men formed civil societies for the sake of enjoying their properties with security, Cic. de off. 2. 21. nor those who maintain, that the imbecillity of segregate families, was the reason why men changed their natural liberty for civil government, as Grotius de jure belli & pacis, proleg. §19. & l. 1. c. 4. §7. For tho’ all these opinions seem to differ in words, yet they come to the same thing in effect.]]
[3 ] Becmann, Meditationes politicae.
[* ] Thus, tho’ certain piratical republics in Afric were formed rather to plunder and oppress, than merely for common safety, and therefore in this respect they differed very little from bands of robbers; yet they had likewise common security for their end, as well as lawful republics have; and for that reason, they put themselves in a state of defence against all external force; and were rigid in the distribution of justice,Ne vaga prosiliat fraenis natura remotis.
[[Horace, Satires II, 74: “Lest nature should spring forward when the reins are removed and go wandering.”
This then is the common end of all civil societies; but with this difference, that the former are not very sollicitous about virtue and equity, if that end be but obtained; whereas the latter proposes that end, in order that they, as the apostle expresses it, “may lead under kings, and all in authority, quiet and peaceable lives, with all godliness and honesty,” 1 Tim. 2. 2.]]
[* ] Hence it is an idle question, what number of persons constitutes a society? For tho’ Apuleius thought fifteen freemen might constitute a republic, Apol. p. 304 [[Apuleius, “Apology,” chap. 47, p. 71, in Apuleius: Rhetorical Works, and others have said three tolerably numerous families might make one, Val. Max. 4. 4. 8. 4. 6. 5. yet the authors of these opinions seem not to have had common security as the end of society in their view, since that end cannot be accomplished by fifteen persons joined together; but the number ought to be increased, in proportion to that of the enemy feared. Accordingly, all history shews us, that states were very small in their beginnings, or confined within the narrow limits of a small territory. Nor were there any larger ones in their neighbourhood, to make them afraid. But so soon as large empires were formed by oppressing and swallowing up their neighbours, lesser republics united either into one larger republic, or making a confederacy, became a system of republics, that they might be able to resist their mighty and powerful neighbours, as it happened in Greece after the Persian overthrow, and in Germany after the victories of Drusus and Germanicus.]]
[* ] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, vol. 4, bk. 7, chap. 77, p.159. Nicias was an Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War with Sparta.
[* ] That a republic may consist without a territory, without towns, walls, or houses, is plain from the example of the Hebrews, a most sacred republic, which wandered forty years in the deserts of Arabia, without any fixed habitation or abode, without houses or walls, till they were settled in the promised Palestine, Numb. xiv. And that a republic may consist without families, none will deny, who has considered the Papal monarchy, which hath been accurately described by Pufendorff and Thomasius. [[See Pufendorf, Des Freyherrn von Pufendorff politische Betrachtung der geistlichen Monarchie des Stuhls zu Rom. I shall not now appeal to the kingdom of the Amazons; all that is said of it having been called into doubt by many learned men. Whence it may be concluded, that it is a convenient number of men united by consent, that constitutes a republic; and that such a society does not become extinct, tho’ their territory may be occupied by others, while its members survive that loss, and are in a condition to contend with their enemies. Thus the republic of Athens still subsisted, tho’ Attica was entirely possessed by the Persians, while the fleet subsisted, into which Themistocles, with the whole body of the people, and every thing they could carry with them, had betaken himself, Nepos Themistoc. cap. 2. And therefore, Adimantus’s speech to him was very foolish, and his answer was excellent. The former said he had no right to pretend to give law or dispence justice, having no country. The other answered, that he had both a territory and a city much larger than theirs, while he had two hundred well armed and manned ships, an invasion from which none of the Greeks could resist, Herodot. hist. l. 8. p. 305. edit. Hen. Steph. Herodotus, Herodoti Halicarnassei historiae libri IX et de vita Homeri libellus.]]
[† ] Thus the inhabitants of Albania, and that medley of shepherds and thieves who attaching themselves to Romulus, built huts on the banks of the Tiber, from the beginning consented to form that republic. Dion. Halicar. antiq. l. 1. p. 72. [[Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, bk. I, chaps. 9 and 10. Thus the Sabines acceded voluntarily to the Romans, after they had formed themselves into a commonwealth, Liv. 1. 13. On the other hand, the Albans, their capital being destroyed, augmented the Roman state against their will, l. 1. 29. Nor was it ever doubted of, that the posterity of Roman citizens were Roman citizens, unless they either voluntarily abandoned their country, or being exiled, were forced much against their inclination to leave it.]]
[* ] This would hold, if any new republic were to be constituted at present by consent. But it happens rarely that any one stipulates for himself and his family in this manner in a republic already constituted. Yet we have an example in Ottanes of Persia, mentioned by Herodotus, hist. l. 3. p. 124. who, after the Magi, who had usurped the government were destroyed, when the Persian princes were assembled to consult together about a form of government, his opinion for a popular state not being approved, at last said: “Ye factious men, since some of us must be named king by lot, or by the election of the multitude, with the permission of the Persians, or some other way, I shall not oppose you, because I neither desire to be above you, nor will I be below any one of you. Upon this condition therefore do I give up my right of empire, that neither I, nor any of mine, ever be subject to any of you.” [[Herodotus, Histories 3.83 (see Herodotus, Histories, trans. Godley, vol. 2, p. 111).]]
[* ] They are much mistaken who affirm there never was any such pact. The Roman history alone sufficiently overthrows that assertion. For when that rabble of Alba, and herd of shepherds and robbers, who had enriched themselves by many depredations, had agreed to coalesce into one republic, Romulus having called an assembly, or convention, asked the people what form of government they would prefer. Dionysius Halicar. has fully described the whole affair, Antiq. Rom. l. 2. p. 80. where he tells us the answer of the people, which was to this purpose. “We do not stand in need of a new form of government nor will we change that approved by our ancestors, and handed down from them to us; but we will follow their sentiment who founded our present form of government, not without great prudence, and are content with the condition we are now in. For why should we find fault with it, since we have enjoyed under kings the goods of the highest estimation among mankind, liberty and empire over others. This is our opinion concerning our form of government.” [[Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, bk. II, chap. 4, p.325.]]
[† ] We find this order observed in the institution of the Roman republic, according to Dionysius Halicarn. For when the greater part of the Albans who had been inured to kingly government, had resolved to preserve that form of government, being then sollicitous to choose a king, they added: “And this honour we think is due to none so much as to you, as well on account of your virtue as your birth; but chiefly, because you have been the leader of this colony; and we have experienced in your conduct, in all your words and deeds, great prudence and valour.” In like manner, a little after, when the people was divided into curiae and tribes, and a hundred fathers were chosen to compose the council or senate of the republic, the administration of the republic was so divided, that the care of sacred things, the conservation of the laws and customs, the power of judging in crimes of the higher kinds, the right of proposing to the senate, and of assembling the people, was given to the king; to the senate the right of deciding whatever was propounded to them by the king, and passing the opinion of the majority into an act or decree; and to the people under the senate proposing, the right of creating magistrates, and giving the ultimate authority to laws, and of determining upon war or peace, if the king would permit. This is the fundamental law or constitution of this new government, as it is described most accurately by an author excellently versed in politics, and it lasted till the tyranny of Tarquinius. [[Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, bk. II, chap. 4, p. 325, and chap. 7, p.333ff.]]
[* ] Yet this whole matter depends upon the terms and conditions of the surrendry, which are commonly better or worse, according as the victory is more or less ambiguous. Thus, while the Sabines and the Romans disputed upon a very equal footing with regard to the event of war, they thought fit to put an end to it, by striking a league, the articles of which are recorded by Dionysius. “That Romulus and Tatius should reign at Rome with equal honour and power; that the city should preserve its name derived from the founder, and the citizens should be called Roman Citizens as before, but all should be called by the common appellation of Quirites, from the country of Tatius; that the right of Roman citizenship should be given to as many of the Sabines as should desire it, and that they should be admitted into tribes and curiae, with their sacred usages.” Such was this treaty of union, by which the Sabines were in some respect permitted to constitute the republic. [[Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, bk. II, chap. 46, p.445.]]
[* ] >It was the custom of the Athenians to obtrude upon those they conquered a popular state, and of the Lacedemonians to force an aristocracy upon all whom they conquered. The reasons of which are given by Xenophon, de republ. Athen. cap. 1. §14. and cap. 3. §10. tom. 3. But one is sufficient, p. 249. [[Xenophon, “Constitution of the Athenians,” in Xenophon, Scripta minora, 474–507. This piece is now believed to be by an unknown author. The Athenians established, and often renewed, after it had been overturned, a popular state among the Samians. But when they were subdued by Lysander the Lacedemonian, he set up a decarchy among them in the room of a democracy. What fortunes other states in Greece underwent, according as the Athenians or Lacedemonians had the empire of the sea, is well known. And that these things could not happen without force is perspicuous to every one.]]
[† ] Many cannot otherwise have the same will than by consent in the same will; or by submission of all to the same will. The first cannot be hoped for, as every one will immediately see, who hath considered the different tempers, turns, geniuses and dispositions of mankind. Hence Seneca, ep. 102. “Putas tu, posse sententiam unam esse omnium? non est unius una. Do you think all can have the same mind? no single person is of one mind.” Therefore the latter way remains, which is submission to the will of one or many. For as a ship, however well manned, would perish, did not all agree to commit their safety to one pilot, skilled in navigation, who is to exert his utmost to save the ship from storms and rocky seas: so it is impossible that so many myriads of men who have coalesced into one large society, should escape the civil tempests to which they are continually exposed, and obtain safety and security, unless they be governed by one or more common rulers. Arrian, diss. ep. 1. observes, “That good citizens submit their wills to the law and authority of the state.” [[Arrian, “Discourses of Epictetus,” bk. 1, chap. 12, sect. 7; see The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments, vol. 1.]]
[* ] Polybius Hist. 6. 2. distinguishes between μοναρχίαν and βασιλείαν, a monarchy and a kingdom. He thus differences them: “The first, monarchy, is constituted without any art, and by the force of nature: Kingdom follows it, and takes its origine from it, then, when art comes to make emendations.” [[Polybius, The Histories, vol. 3, bk. 6, chap. 2, sec. 4, p. 275. But since things, less or more polished, do not differ in species, we shall not here take notice of this difference.]]
[* ] This is observed by the most excellent politician Polybius, ibidem p. 629. “Therefore, there are six kinds of republics: The three we have just mentioned, which are in every body’s mouth, and three nearly allied to them, the domination of one, of a few, and of the mob; some by tyranny understand monarchy, because, as we said above, this author had distinguished between monarchy and a kingdom. But he himself adds a little after, ‘a kingdom, when it declines into the disease to which it is obnoxious, viz. a tyranny.’” [[Polybius, The Histories, vol. 3, bk. 6, chap. 2, sec. 4, p. 275. In these divisions and definitions, all the writers of morals or politics agree; and therefore, there is no need of dwelling long upon them. By whom have they not been repeated?]]
[† ] Polybius pronounces this the best form of government, hist. 1. 1. p. 628. “’Tis manifest, that a republic compounded of the three forms we have mentioned, is the best.” [[Polybius, The Histories, vol. 3, bk. 6, chap. 2, sec. 4, p. 273. And cap. 8. p. 638. he highly extols Lycurgus for not having founded a simple uniform republic, but for having, by mingling the good qualities of all the best republics, composed one, consisting of all of them blended together, and by that means so equally poised and balanced it, that it could not degenerate into any of the vicious forms we have mentioned, but was kept entire by various checks. Ibid., chap. 10, pp. 289–93. So Dionysius antiq. l. 2. p. 82. after having told us, that the Roman republic was constituted by Romulus much after the same manner, he adds, “This form of a republic I prefer to all others, as being equally fit for peace or war.” Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, bk. 2, chap. 7, p. 333. I pass by several testimonies to the same purpose by Cicero apud Non. Marcell. de verb. prop. 4. 292. Marcellus, Nonii Marcelli nova editio, chap. 4, 342: “De varia significatione sermonum, per literas”; a quotation from Cicero, De republica, arguing that the ideal state has a mixed constitution with monarchical, aristocratic, and popular elements, by Zeno apud Laert. 7. 131. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 7, sec. 131, pp. 235–37 and by Tacitus annal. 4. 33.]]
[* ] Pufendorff, singulari dissertat. de systematibus civitatum, to be found in the collection of his dissert. Acad. selectae, p. 210. & seq. [[Pufendorf, Dissertationes academicae selectiores and de jure naturae & gentium, 7. 5. 16. thinks systems of societies are formed when several separate kingdoms, either by convention, or by marriage, or by succession, or by conquest, come to have one king, but in such a manner that they do not become one kingdom, but are governed each by its own fundamental laws; or by a treaty of alliance. And Hertius elem. prud. civil. is of the same opinion, 1. 12. 6. & seq. But either one kingdom is so subjected to another, that it hath no share in the common government, as anciently the kingdoms of Macedonia, Syria and Egypt were subjected to the Romans; or each retains its own constitution, as now the German empire, Hungary and Bohemia; or they coalesce in such a manner as to compose one kingdom, as now England and Scotland, Poland and Lithuania. In the first case, the conquered kingdom is reduced into a province, and does not constitute one system with the other. Nor in the second case can two kingdoms be said to have coalited into a system, since they have nothing in common, but one prince who sustains two characters. There remains therefore the third case only, in which two kingdoms, or two bodies of people uniting their will and strength for common defence, constitute one larger society, and therefore are a system of republics, according to our definition. See G. G. Titius ad Pufendorff de offic. hom. & civ.]]
[* ] For since supreme powers live in a state of nature with regard to one another, which state is a state of liberty and equality (§4. 5. 6.) it follows, that monarch is equal to monarch, and nothing hinders any one from enjoying as much dignity in his own state as any other in his; and therefore any one may take any title to himself, to support which he finds himself equal. We have seen in our times two examples of it, to which even future ages will pay reverence, in Frederick I. King of Prussia, and Peter I. Emperor of Russia; the former of whom first took the title to himself of King, and the other of Emperor, and both of whom had these titles acknowledged to them afterwards by other Kings and Emperors. It is true Pope Clement XI. shewed his intolerable arrogance, when Frederick I. a prince worthy of immortal glory, took the title of King to himself, vainly pretending, that it depended on him alone to make Kings. But this doctrine, more becoming a Hildebrand [[Hildebrand was the original name of Pope Gregory VII (ca. 1020–85), the opponent of the emperor Henry IV in the investiture contest than Clement, and detested even by princes the most devoted to the Romish church, hath been sufficiently refuted by the worthy and learned chancellor of our university Jo. Petr. a Ludewig, who had formerly fully treated that controversy in several small treatises, de auspicio regio. Add to these a very elegant treatise by V. C. Everardus Otto, de titulo Imperatoris Russorum, inserted among his dissertat. juris publici & privati, part. 1. p. 135. Ludewig (praeses) and Lilienfeld (respondens), Dissertatio iuris gentium, de auspicio regum; Otto (1685–1756), De titulo imperatoris Russorum.]]
[* ] For the understanding and will, like that of one moral person, ought to be one (§114). Now, if any exerces any of the rights of majesty whatsoever, independently of the king, the whole republic would not have one understanding and will. Wherefore, it would not be one republic, but a republic within a republic. And to this we may apply what Homer says, Iliad. 2. “’Tis not good that many should rule: Let there be one emperor, one king.” [[Not clear to which passage in the Iliad this refers. Tho’ we are not ignorant that tyrants have often abused this maxim. See Sueton. Calig. cap. 22.]]
[† ] To this head belong all the tyrannical arts of which Aristotle hath treated most accurately, Polit. 5. 10. Tyrants, conscious to themselves of the public hatred, are fearful and suspicious; and therefore, being jealous of virtue, they oppress and bear it down, and cut off the heads of the more eminent and worthy, like poppies which overtop the rest: They bear hard upon the innocent, under the pretext of treason, the only crime of those who have no crime: They sow discord and animosities among their subjects: They extinguish all the light and splendor of useful literature: They prefer foreigners to natives: The latter they bereave of all dignities and riches, and reduce to the extremest misery: But how repugnant all this is to the end of civil society, and how unjust, is glaring. Polyb. hist. 2. 59. p. 202. “For the very name Tyrant, hath annexed to it all manner of wickedness and impiety, and includes in it all the injuriousness and criminality that is to be found amongst mankind.” [[Polybius, Histories, vol. 1, bk. 2, chap. 59, p.387.]]
[* ] The Calculus Minervae is, when in an equality of condemning and absolving voices, the pannel is acquitted. For when Orestes was tried for parricide, those who condemned him being superior to his absolvers by one voice only, Minerva is said to have added one to the latter, that in an equality of suffrages, he might be absolved. And this became afterwards almost an universal law, as Euripides makes Minerva foretel it should, in Iphigen. Taur. v. 1268. [[Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris, ll. 1471–72, in Euripides, Euripides, vol. 2: “[A]nd this shall be a law—The equal tale of votes acquits the accused.” See Boecler. dissert. singul. de calculo Minervae, and a dissertation by Henr. Cocceii de eo quod justum est circa numerum suffragiorum, & de calculo Minervae, cap. 7. where this learned author gives this natural reason for the practice, “That the first state of the person accused is changed by condemnation, and is continued by absolution; and therefore nothing is done: Wherefore, since the majority only can change a former state and introduce a new one, it follows, that in the case of equality nothing is done; and consequently, the first state of the person continues to take place, and he is absolved.” Boecler (praeses) and Forer (respondens), Isopsephia sive calculus Minervae; Cocceji (praeses) and Meyer (respondens), Disputatio juridica inauguralis . . . de calculo Minerva.]]
[* ] Then is the condition of the republic most miserable, especially if demagogues interpose their arts to stir up the people and promote faction, till one of them finds an opportunity of becoming tyrant; and the same happens that Phaedrus represents to have been the fate of Athens, Fab. 1. 2.Athenae quum florerent aequis legibus:Procax libertas civitatem miscuit,Fraenumque solvit pristinum licentia.Hinc, conspiratis factionum partibus,Arcem tyrannus occupat, Pisistratus.
[[Phaedrus, Fables 1.2, lines 1–5: In the days when Athens flourished under a democracy, freedom grown rank disturbed the civic calm and licence relaxed the reins of old-time discipline. Then diverse factions formed a common plot and soon a tyrant rose and seized the citadel, Pisistratus.”
Concerning the artifices of demagogues, see Hertius Elem. prud. civil. part. 2. §23. §24. p. 496. Johann Nikolaus Hertius, Elementa prudentiae civilis.]]
[* ] The Roman state became monstrous when it degenerated into such a condition that the mob, stirred up by the factious fury of the tribunes, made laws, condemned or absolved, and did every thing without consulting with the rest of the people; and the people neither made laws nor administred justice, nor determined concerning war or peace, without the populace. But when instead of the people a certain rabble or mob decides every thing as they please, the popular state is corrupted into an ochlocracy; and that the Roman state was then not very far from such a condition, is very evident.
[† ] Such of old was the Amphyctionian council, of which see Boecler. dissert. de Amphyct. and Ubbo Emmo vet. Graec. Tom. 3. p. 305. [[Boecler, Synedrion Amphyktyonikon; Emmo, Vetus Graecia. Of this we have an example at present in the most flourishing states of Holland and Switzerland, which are described by Jos. Simlerus Josias Simler (1530–76), Swiss Protestant theologian and historian, author of De Republica Helvetiorum libri duo, Sir Richard Temple Richard Temple (1711–79), English statesman, and other learned men; so that we need not say any thing of them.]]