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• Pamphlets of Lysander Spooner, Volume Ii
• Our Mechanical Industry, &c.
• Chapter I.: Losses In Our Mechanical Industry Resulting From Our Reliance Upon Gold and Silver As the Basis of Our Currency and Credit.
• Articles of Association of the Spooner Copyright Company For Massachusetts.
• Considerations For Bankers.
• Chapter I.: Explanation of the Author’s New System of Paper Currency.
• Chapter II.: The Author’s System Cannot Be Prohibited By the States.
• Chapter III.: The Author’s System Cannot Be Taxed, Either By the United States, Or the States.
• Chapter IV.: The State Governments Cannot Control, Or In Any Manner Interfere With, the Author’s System.
• Chapter V.: Unconstitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts of Congress.
• Chapter VI.: Unconstitutionality of the National Bank Act.
• Chapter VII.: Exchanges Under the Author’s System.
• Appendix.: the Author’s Copyright.
• Thomas Drew Vs. John M. Clark.
• A New Banking System the Needful Capital For Rebuilding the Burnt District.
• Chapter I.: A New Banking System.
• Chapter II.: Specie Payments.
• Chapter III.: No Inflation of Prices.
• Chapter IV.: Security of the System.
• Chapter V.: The System As a Credit System.
• Chapter VI.: Amount of Currency Needed.
• Chapter VII.: Importance of the System to Massachusetts.
• Chapter VIII.: The True Character of the “national” System.
• Chapter IX.: Amasa Walker’s Opinion of the Author’s System
• Vices Are Not Crimes. a Vindication of Moral Liberty.
• Our Financiers: Their Ignorance, Usurpations, and Frauds.
• The Law of Prices: a Demonstration of the Necessity For an Indefinite Increase of Money.
• Gold and Silver As Standards of Value: the Flagrant Cheat In Regard to Them.
• Universal Wealth.
• Revolution: a Reply to “dunraven.”
• Letter to Scientists and Inventors.

CHAPTER II.

THE AUTHOR’S SYSTEM CANNOT BE PROHIBITED BY THE STATES.

The author holds his system by a copyright on the Articles of Association, that will be needed by the banking companies. His system, therefore, stands on the same principle with patents and copyrights. And the use of it can no more be prohibited by the State governments, than can the use of a patented machine, or the publication of a copyrighted book.

The Constitution of the United States expressly gives to Congress “power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” And the laws passed by Congress, in pursuance of this power, are “the supreme law of the land, * * * any thing in the laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

If the State governments could prohibit the use of an invention, or the publication of a book, which the United States patent or copyright laws have secured to an inventor or author, the whole “power of Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts,” by patent and copyright laws, could be defeated by the States.

Some persons may imagine that, whatever may be the right secured to inventors, by patents, the right secured to authors, by copyrights, is only a right to publish their ideas; leaving the State governments still free to prohibit the practical use of the ideas themselves. But this is a mistake. Of what avail would be the publication of ideas, if they could not be used? How utterly ridiculous and futile would be the idea of securing to the people a mere knowledge of “science and useful arts,” with no right, on their part, to apply them to the purposes of life. How could Congress “promote the progress of science and useful arts,” if the people were forbidden to practise them? The right secured, therefore, is not a mere right of publication, but also a right of use.

The objects of patents and copyrights are identical, viz.: to secure to inventors and authors, and through them to the people — against all adverse legislation by the States — the practical enjoyment and use of the ideas patented and copyrighted.

Copyrights, it must be observed, are not granted, as some may suppose, for mere words — for the words of all books were the common property of mankind before the books were copyrighted; and they remain common property afterwards. The copyright, therefore, is for the ideas, and only for the ideas, which the words are used to convey, or describe.

In copyrights, therefore, equally as in patents, the right secured is the right to ideas; that is, to those ideas that are original with the authors of the books copyrighted. And the right thus secured to ideas, is the right, on the part of the author, not only to reduce those ideas to practical use himself, but also to sell them to others for practical use.

If the right, secured to authors by copyrights, were simply a right to publish their ideas, but not to use them, nor sell them to others to be used, the most important knowledge, conveyed by books, might remain practically forbidden treasures, if the State governments should choose to forbid their use.

These conclusions are natural and obvious enough; but as the point is one of great importance, it may be excusable to enforce it still further.

The ground here taken, then, is, that a State government has no more constitutional power to prohibit the practical use of any knowledge conveyed by a copyrighted book, than it has to prohibit the publication or sale of the book itself.

The sole object of the copyright laws are to encourage the production of ideas for the enjoyment and use of the people; to secure to the people the right to enjoy and use those ideas; and to secure to authors compensation for their ideas. All these objects would be defeated, if the States could interfere to prevent the use of the ideas thus produced; because if the ideas could not be used, there would be no sale for the books; and consequently authors would get no pay for writing them; and would have no sufficient motive to write or print them.

It is an axiom in law, that where the means are secured, the end is secured; that the means are secured solely for the sake of the end. It would be as great an absurdity in law, as in business, to secure the means, and not the end; to plant the seed, and abandon the crop; to incur the expense, and neglect the profits. What an absurdity, for example, would it be for the law to secure a man in the possession of his farm, but not in his right to cultivate it, and enjoy the fruits. What an absurdity would it be for the law to secure men in the possession of steam engines, but not in the right to use them. But these would be no greater absurdities than it would be for the law to secure to the people a knowledge of “science and useful arts,” but not the right to use them.

The sole object of the law in securing to all men the possession of their property of all kinds, is simply that they may use it, and have the benefit of it. And the sole object of the laws, that secure to the people knowledge — which is but a species of property, and a most valuable kind of property — is that they may use it, and promote their happiness and welfare by using it.

An illustration of the principle, that where the means are secured, the end is secured, is seen in the constitutional provision that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” This provision does not secure to the people a mere naked “right to keep and bear arms” — for that right would be of no practical value to them. But it secures the right also to use them in any and every way that is naturally and intrinsically just and lawful; for that is the only end the people can have in view in “keeping and bearing arms.”

On the same principle, too, if the Constitution had declared that “the right of the people to buy and keep food should not be infringed,” it would thus have guaranteed to them, not merely “the right to buy and keep food,” but also the right to eat the food thus bought and kept; because the eating would be the only end that could be had in view in buying and keeping food.

Another illustration of the same principle is found in the constitutional provision that “Congress shall have power to coin money, and fix the standard of weights and measures.” Have the States any power to forbid the people to buy and sell the money coined by the United States? Or to forbid the people to use the standard weights and measures fixed by the United States? Certainly not. Although the Constitution does not say it in express words, it does say, by necessary implication, that the money, coined by the United States, may be freely bought and sold by the people (because that is one of the ends for which the money is coined); and that the standard weights and measures, fixed by the United States, may be freely used by the people (for that is one of the ends for which the standard of weights and measures was fixed); and that the States can neither forbid the use of the weights and measures, nor the buying or selling of the coin.

The sole object of books is to convey knowledge. If the knowledge cannot be used, of what use are the books themselves?

If a State government can prohibit the use of the knowledge conveyed in a copyrighted book, it might just as well prohibit the buying or reading of the book. The object of the book would be no more defeated in one case than in the other.

This power of “promoting the progress of science and useful arts,” by means of patent and copyright laws, was given to Congress principally, if not solely, because it was feared that the State governments might, in some cases, be unfavorable to that end. But if the States can now prohibit the use of the knowledge conveyed by books, they have that very power of obstructing “the progress of science and useful arts,” which the Constitution intended to take from them.

Furthermore, it is the theory of the courts that the nation purchases the ideas of authors and inventors; that it purchases them solely for the use of the people; and that it pays authors and inventors for their ideas, by giving them certain exclusive rights over them for a term of years.* By this theory, the ideas themselves are supposed to become the property of the nation, from the times when the patents or copyrights are granted; or from the times when the ideas are put upon the government records, in the patent office, or elsewhere. Now, suppose the United States government had been authorized, by the Constitution, to purchase the same ideas, and pay the money for them, instead of paying for them by giving the authors and inventors certain monoplies in the use of them. Could a State, in that case, have prohibited the practical use of the ideas, which the government had thus bought, and paid the nation’s money for, solely for the use of the people? Clearly not. Suppose the United States government had been authorized (by the Constitution) to buy, and pay the money for, Morse’s invention of the telegraph, for the use of the people. Could a State have prohibited the use of the invention, which the nation had thus bought for the use of the people, and paid the people’s money for? Certainly not.

Suppose the United States government (being authorized by the Constitution), had bought books on agriculture, for the use of the people, and paid the nation’s money for them—(instead of paying for them by copyrights, as it does now)—books on the chemical nature and treatment of soils, books on the various plants which the people wish to cultivate, and the various animals which the people wish to rear. Could a State have forbidden the people to read those books? Or to practically apply the knowledge conveyed by them? Clearly not. The idea would be preposterous. The principle that the United States Constitution, in securing to the people those means of agricultural progress, had, by necessary implication, secured to them the right to use those means against all interference by the States, would have been a complete answer to any such pretence on the part of the States.

We might as well say that a State has a right to forbid the people to use the post office, which the United States government has provided for their benefit, as to say that a State has a right to forbid the people to use any “science or useful art,” which the United States government has bought for their benefit.

Any other principle than this would authorize the States to prohibit the practical use of all ideas patented and copyrighted by the United States; and thus utterly defeat the power given to Congress “to promote the progress of science and useful arts,” by means of patents and copyright laws.

It is to be borne in mind that the people of a single State are not the only ones interested in the practical use of patented and copyrighted ideas within that State.

If, for example, the cotton growing States were to prohibit the use of Whitney’s patented cotton gin within those States, the people of all the other States, that manufacture or wear cotton goods, would be made the poorer by the act. If Louisiana were to prohibit the use of Fulton’s patented steamboat within her limits, a great blow would be struck at the commerce and industry of the whole Mississippi valley. If Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin, were to prohibit the use of McCormick’s patented reaper within those States, the price of grain would be affected throughout the whole country. If Massachusetts were to prohibit the use of patented sewing machines, the prices of boots, shoes, and all other clothing, manufactured within the State, for the people of other States, would be enhanced. If New York were to prohibit the use of Hoe’s patented printing press within that State, all the commercial intelligence that radiates from the city of New York, would be delayed, and made more expensive; and the commerce of the whole country would be injured. For these reasons no State can be permitted to prohibit, within her limits, the use of any of the “sciences and useful arts,” which may be patented or copyrighted by the United States.

The same reasons apply to currency. If New York, for example, were to prohibit all but a metallic currency within her limits, the commerce of the whole country, so far as it is carried on within the city or State of New York, would be disturbed, obstructed, and injured. The industry of the whole country would be discouraged to a corresponding degree; and the whole country would be made the poorer. On the other hand, if the best systems of credit and currency, that can be invented, are allowed free course in the city and State of New York, that city and State can do very much, by the use of such credit and currency, to facilitate the commerce, and consequently to develop the industry, of every State in the Union. Even, therefore, if it were admitted that the State of New York might deprive her own citizens of useful inventions in currency and credit, it cannot be permitted to her to dictate in regard to the currency and credit used in the commerce of the whole country within her limits. She is not an independent nation in regard to commerce; and consequently not in regard to credit or currency.

The principle of the United States Constitution, in regard to ideas patented and copyrighted, or in regard to “the progress of science and useful arts,” is, that authors, inventors, and people, shall have the free right to experiment with, and practically test, all ideas for themselves, without asking permission of the several State legislatures. It presumes that they (authors, inventors, and people) are competent to determine, after experiment, what inventions are practically valuable to them, and what worthless.

How preposterous would be the principle—as a political or economical one—that all the ideas, which authors and inventors may originate, in “science and useful arts,” must be submitted to, and approved by, the several State legislatures, (who are utterly incompetent to judge of either their truth or utility,) before the authors and inventors can be permitted to demonstrate their truth or utility to the people, or the people be permitted to adopt them. Such a principle would be manifestly absurd, ridiculous, destructive of men’s natural rights, and destructive of all “progress in science and useful arts.” It would be a tyranny that no people on earth could endure. On such a principle, not even an almanac could be published, or a new rat trap used, within any State, until the legislature of the State should have solemnly sat upon it, and given it the sanction of their profound wisdom, or profound ignorance. If any thing of this nature were to be tolerated in this country, it would plainly be most proper and expedient that Congress, as the legislature for the whole country, should take the matter in hand, and decide, for the whole country, upon the truth and utility of all new ideas offered for public adoption; instead of referring them to the several State legislatures. But Congress knows that they are utterly incompetent to any such task; and, therefore, they leave the whole matter—as the Constitution intended they should—to be determined by the authors, inventors, and people interested. And if this is the principle of the Constitution in regard to all other ideas in “science and useful arts,” it is equally the principle of the Constitution in regard to currency (other than legal tender) and credit; for the Constitution makes no discrimination between inventions and ideas on these latter subjects, and those in relation to other matters (as we shall more fully see in subsequent chapters). The Constitution knows but one law for all new ideas in “science and useful arts.” And that law is that authors and inventors may come freely face to face with the people, and test all ideas to their mutual satisfaction; leaving the people free to adopt or reject at their own discretion.

If there be any one of the “useful arts,” to which the foregoing principles ought to be applied, banking is preëminently that one. (By banking is here meant the art of representing by paper—for loans and currency—other values than those existing in coin.) Banking is the art of arts. It is the art upon which nearly all other arts depend mainly for their efficiency; as experience has demonstrated continually for the last hundred years. Directly or indirectly it furnishes both the tools and materials for nearly every trade. Directly or indirectly it creates the demand for, and furnishes the supply of, every marketable commodity. For the want of such adequate credit and currency as banking is capable of supplying, all other arts, especially the mechanic arts, are at all times greatly crippled, and at frequent intervals paralyzed; the natural and normal demand for manufactured commodities suspended, and their prices struck down; the rich made poor, and the poor driven into idleness and destitution. The industry of almost any people—even of those among whom the mechanic arts have already made the greatest progress—would probably be doubled in value by such a diversity of production, such an increase of machinery, such uninterrupted activity, and such stability in prices, as an adequate system of banking would introduce. And the wealth thus produced would be far more equally and equitably distributed than wealth is now.

The imperfection or inadequacy of all former systems of banking is a thing on all hands confessed. There is no art, in which there is greater need of invention. Consequently there is none, in which invention is better entitled to all the protection which the constitutional power of Congress “to promote the progress of science and useful arts” can give.

For the reasons that have now been given, the right to use practically the author’s system of banking, is absolutely secured to him and his assigns, by the United States copyright; and, as has already been said, can no more be prohibited by the State governments, than can the use of a patented machine, or the publication of a copyrighted book.

By what has been said, it is not meant that the patent or copyright laws of Congress are designed, or can be used, to shield a person in the commission of any acts that are fraudulent, or intrinsically criminal; but only that they are a protection for the free use of all ideas, that are patented and copyrighted by the United States, and that are, naturally and intrinsically, innocent and lawful.

That the author’s system of banking is, naturally and intrinsically, innocent and lawful—as clearly so as any other system of banking that was ever invented—no one will dispute. The honest use of the system, therefore, cannot be prohibited by the States. But any frauds or crimes, committed under color of using the system, may be punished like any other frauds or crimes.

The same principles, of course, apply to any and every other system of banking, which is, naturally and intrinsically, innocent and lawful, and which men may invent, and choose to experiment with, and put in practice. Men have the same natural and constitutional rights to invent, experiment with, and get patented or copyrighted, and put in practice, new systems of banking, as they have to invent, experiment with, get patented, and put in operation, new churns and washing machines. And the only restraints, that can constitutionally be imposed upon them, by the State governments, are, that the natural “obligation of their contracts” must be enforced, and they must commit no frauds nor crimes.*

[* ] I do not say that the theory of the courts, as given in the text, is the true theory. I think it is not. I think the true theory is one much more favorable, not only to authors and inventors, but also to the public. But the theory given in the text is the one that prevails in the courts, not only of this country, but of England, and, so far as I know, of most or all other countries in which patents and copyrights are granted. And whether true or false, the theory is likely to prevail, I apprehend, for a long time to come. But I think the true theory is that authors and inventors have the same natural and Common Law right of property, and consequently the same perpetual right of property, in their ideas, the products of their mental labor, that other men have in material things, the products of their manual labor; and that governments have no more right to forbid the sale or use of one of these two kinds of property, than they have to prohibit the sale or use of the other. Under this latter theory, authors and inventors would be stimulated much more than they are now to the production of valuable ideas; and the public would be enlightened and enriched in a proportionally greater degree.

[* ] It will be seen in a subsequent chapter (the 4th) that the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly declared “that the States have no power, by taxation, or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control” the use of ideas patented by the United States. And the same principle obviously applied to ideas copyrighted; for ideas copyrighted are intrinsically of the same nature with those patented; and are placed by the Constitution upon the same ground. In the case of Wheaton vs Peters, the Supreme Court of the United States held in argument (though that was not the point to be decided) that a copyright was of the same nature as a patent. (8 Peters’ Rep., pp. 657-8.)

The only difference between patents and copyrights is one of form, and not of substance; and has reference to the mode of securing compensation to the authors of the ideas patented and copyrighted, rather than to the right of the people to use those ideas. In both cases alike, the people have the right to use the ideas, with the consent of the authors. And, on the theory, that now prevails with the courts, (but which, as I have before said, I do not admit to be the true theory,) the people have the right, without the consent of the authors, to use patented and copyrighted ideas in any and every possible way, except in those particular modes that are reserved or granted, as an “exclusive right” to the authors, to compensate them for the ideas themselves.

The obvious constitutional duty of Congress is to secure, for limited times, to both authors and inventors, all “the exclusive rights” to their respective ideas, that can be made practically valuable to them. And such was the obvious intention of Congress in enacting the existing copyright laws; (although such may not, perhaps, be the legal effect of those laws in all possible cases.)

Thus the patent laws secure to the inventor of a machine, and to his assigns, “the exclusive right to make, use, and vend to others to be used,” a machine of that kind, or one embodying any of the original ideas incorporated in it. But the ideas, embodied in the machine, may be written about, and printed, without the consent of the inventor, and used in any possible way, except in making or using a machine; which latter is supposed to be the only way in which the ideas can be made practically valuable to him. The copyright laws, on the other hand, secure to an author and his assigns the sole right of making and selling copies of his book, or any part of it that is original with himself. But other persons may use the ideas, without his consent, in any manner they can, without making or selling a copy of the book, or any part of it; which latter are supposed to be—and in most cases are—the only rights that can be made practically valuable to the author. In some cases, however, as in the case of dramatic compositions, the copyright laws secure to the authors and their assigns, not only the exclusive right of making copies of the pieces, but also the exclusive right of performing them in public.

As the copyright laws of Congress now stand, and are now interpreted by the courts, the ideas embodied in the author’s banking system, could be used, in defiance of his copyright, if it were practically possible for such a banking company to have a legal existence, and carry on the business of banking, without having any Articles of Association similar, in whole or in part, to those he has copyrighted. But as neither of those things would be practically possible, and as he and his assigns have the exclusive right secured to them of making copies, either in whole, or in part, of the Articles of Association, his copyright gives him a legal control over the system.

The system is undoubtedly a legitimate subject of patent; for banking is as much an “art” as is the spinning or weaving of wool or cotton. But the copyright accomplishes all that a patent could; and is, in some respects, preferable.