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Of the Influence of Mores on Maintaining the Democratic Republic in the United States - Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition, vol. 2 [1835]

Edition used:

Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition of De la démocratie en Amérique, ed. Eduardo Nolla, translated from the French by James T. Schleifer. A Bilingual French-English editions, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010). Vol. 2.

Part of: Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition, 4 vols.

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


Of the Influence of Mores on Maintaining the Democratic Republic in the United States

I said above that I considered the mores as one of the great general causes to which maintaining the democratic republic in the United States can be attributed.

I understand the expression mores here in the sense that the ancients attached to the word mores; I apply it not only to mores strictly speaking, which could be called habits of the heart, but to the different notions that men possess, to the diverse opinions that are current among them, and to the ensemble of ideas from which the habits of the mind are formed.v

So by this word I understand the whole moral and intellectual state of a people. My goal is not to draw a picture of American mores; I limit myself at this moment to trying to find out what among them is favorable for maintaining the political institutions.

[v. ] “I understand by mores the whole of the dispositions that man brings to the government of society. Mores strictly speaking, enlightenment, habits, knowledge . . .” (YTC, CVh, 3, p. 58).

Melvin Richter (“The Uses of Theory: Tocqueville’s Adaptation of Montesquieu,” in Essays in Theory and History, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, pp. 90-91) remarks that Tocqueville, by the term mores, designates all that Montesquieu understood by general spirit: precedents, mores, habits, economy, style of thought, etc.—with the exception of laws, which he considers apart. But the explanation, which ascribes such a meaning to Tocqueville’s bad memory and imprecision of method, is difficult to accept. The distinction between laws and mores seems more understandable if you refer to Rousseau, who defines and understands mores in a fashion quite similar to that of Tocqueville. On this point as on others, Tocqueville read Montesquieu through Rousseau. See Du contrat social, book II, chapter XII, Œuvres complètes, Paris: Pléiade, 1964, III, pp. 393-94.