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• Introduction
• A Note On the Texts
• English Editions of the Law of Nations
• Three Essays By Vattel
• Acknowledgments
• The Law of Nations
• Advertisement
• Preface
• Preliminaries Idea and General Principles of the Law of Nations.
• Book I: Of Nations Considered In Themselves
• Chapter I: Of Nations Or Sovereign States.
• Chapter II: General Principles of the Duties of a Nation Towards Itself.
• Chapter III: Of the Constitution of a State, and the Duties and Rights of the Nation In This Respect.
• Chapter IV: Of the Sovereign, His Obligations, and His Rights.
• Chapter V: Of States Elective, Successive Or Hereditary, and of Those Called Patrimonial.
• Chapter VI: Principal Objects of a Good Government; and First to Provide For the Necessities of the Nation.
• Chapter VII: Of the Cultivation of the Soil.
• Chapter VIII: Of Commerce.
• Chapter IX: Of the Care of the Public Ways of Communication, and the Right of Toll.
• Chapter X: Of Money and Exchange.
• Chapter XI: Second Object of a Good Government,—to Procure the True Happiness of the Nation.
• Chapter XII: Of Piety and Religion.
• Chapter XIII: Of Justice and Polity.
• Chapter XIV: The Third Object of a Good Government,—to Fortify Itself Against External Attacks.
• Chapter XV: Of the Glory of a Nation.
• Chapter XVI: Of the Protection Sought By a Nation, and Its Voluntary Submission to a Foreign Power.
• Chapter XVII: How a Nation May Separate Itself From the State of Which It Is a Member, Or Renounce Its Allegiance to Its Sovereign When It Is Not Protected.
• Chapter XVIII: Of the Establishment of a Nation In a Country.
• Chapter XIX: Of Our Native Country, and Several Things That Relate to It.
• Chapter XX: Of Public, Common, and Private Property.
• Chapter XXI: Of the Alienation of the Public Property, Or the Domain, and That of a Part of the State.
• Chapter XXII: Of Rivers, Streams, and Lakes.
• Chapter XXIII: Of the Sea.
• Book II: Of a Nation Considered In Its Relations to Others
• Chapter I: Of the Common Duties of a Nation Towards Others, Or of the Offices of Humanity Between Nations.
• Chapter II: Of the Mutual Commerce Between Nations.
• Chapter III: Of the Dignity and Equality of Nations,—of Titles,—and Other Marks of Honour.
• Chapter IV: Of the Right to Security, and the Effects of the Sovereignty and Independence of Nations.
• Chapter V: Of the Observance of Justice Between Nations.
• Chapter VI: Of the Concern a Nation May Have In the Actions of Her Citizens.
• Chapter VII: Effects of the Domain, Between Nations.
• Chapter VIII: Rules With Respect to Foreigners.
• Chapter IX: Of the Rights Retained By All Nations After the Introduction of Domain and Property.
• Chapter X: How a Nation Is to Use Her Right of Domain, In Order to Discharge Her Duties Towards Other Nations, With Respect to the Innocent Use of Things.
• Chapter XI: Of Usucaption and Prescription Among Nations.
• Chapter XII: Of Treaties of Alliance, and Other Public Treaties.
• Chapter XIII: Of the Dissolution and Renewal of Treaties.
• Chapter XIV: Of Other Public Conventions,—of Those That Are Made By Subordinate Powers,—particularly of the Agreement Called In Latin Sponsio,—and of Conventions of Sovereigns With Private Persons.
• Chapter XV: Of the Faith of Treaties.
• Chapter XVI: Of Securities Given For the Observance of Treaties.
• Chapter XVII: Of the Interpretation of Treaties.
• Chapter XVIII: Of the Mode of Terminating Disputes Between Nations.
• Book III: Of War
• Chapter I: Of War,—its Different Kinds,— and the Right of Making War.
• Chapter II: Of the Instruments of War,—the Raising of Troops, &c.—their Commanders, Or the Subordinate Powers In War.
• Chapter III: Of the Just Causes of War.
• Chapter IV: Of the Declaration of War,— and of War In Due Form.
• Chapter V: Of the Enemy, and of Things Belonging to the Enemy.
• Chapter VI: Of the Enemy’s Allies—of Warlike Associations— of Auxiliaries and Subsidies.
• Chapter VII: Of Neutrality—and the Passage of Troops Through a Neutral Country.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Rights of Nations In War,—and First, of What We Have a Right to Do, and What We Are Allowed to Do, to the Enemy’s Person In a Just War.
• Chapter IX: Of the Right of War, With Regard to Things Belonging to the Enemy.
• Chapter X: Of Faith Between Enemies,—of Stratagems, Artifices In War, Spies, and Some Other Practices.
• Chapter XI: Of the Sovereign Who Wages an Unjust War.
• Chapter XII: Of the Voluntary Law of Nations, As It Regards the Effects of Regular Warfare, Independently of the Justice of the Cause.
• Chapter XIII: Of Acquisitions By War, and Particularly of Conquests.
• Chapter XIV: Of the Right of Postliminium.
• Chapter XV: Of the Right of Private Persons In War.
• Chapter XVI: Of Various Conventions Made During the Course of the War.
• Chapter XVII: Of Safe-conducts and Passports,—with Questions On the Ransom of Prisoners of War.
• Chapter XVIII: Of Civil War.
• Book IV: Of the Restoration of Peace; and of Embassies
• Chapter I: Of Peace, and the Obligation to Cultivate It.
• Chapter II: Treaties of Peace.
• Chapter III: Of the Execution of the Treaty of Peace.
• Chapter IV: Of the Observance and Breach of the Treaty of Peace.
• Chapter V: Of the Right of Embassy, Or the Right of Sending and Receiving Public Ministers.
• Chapter VI: Of the Several Orders of Public Ministers,—of the Representative Character,—and of the Honours Due to Ministers.
• Chapter VII: Of the Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of Embassadors and Other Public Ministers.
• Chapter VIII: Of the Judge of Embassadors In Civil Cases.
• Chapter IX: Of the Embassador’s House and Domestics.
• Additional Essays
• Essay On the Foundation of Natural Law and On the First Principle of the Obligation Men Find Themselves Under to Observe Laws 1
• Dissertation On This Question: “can Natural Law Bring Society to Perfection Without the Assistance of Political Laws?”
• Dialogue Between the Prince of ****and His Confidant, On Certain Essential Elements of Public Administration
• Biographical Sketches of Authors Referred to By Vattel

CHAPTER III

Of the Execution of the Treaty of Peace.

§24. When the obligation of the treaty commences.A treaty of peace becomes obligatory on the contracting parties from the moment of its conclusion,—the moment it has passed through all the necessary forms; and they are bound to have it carried into execution without delay.* From that instant all hostilities must cease, unless a particular day has been specified for the commencement of the peace. But this treaty does not bind the subjects until it is duly notified to them. The case is the same in this instance, as in that of a truce (Book II. §239). If it should happen that military men, acting within the extent of their functions and pursuant to the rules of their duty, commit any acts of hostility before they have authentic information of the treaty of peace, it is a misfortune, for which they are not punishable: but the sovereign, on whom the treaty of peace is already obligatory, is bound to order and enforce the restitution of all captures made subsequent to its conclusion: he has no right whatever to retain them.

§25. Publication of the peace.And in order to prevent those unhappy accidents, by which many innocent persons may lose their lives, public notice of the peace is to be given without delay, at least to the troops. But at present, as the body of the people cannot of themselves undertake any act of hostility, and do not personally engage in the war, the solemn proclamation of the peace may be deferred, provided that care be taken to put a stop to all hostilities; which is easily done by means of the generals who direct the operations, or by proclaiming an armistice at the head of the armies. The peace of 1735, between the emperor and France,6 was not proclaimed till long after. The proclamation was postponed till the treaty was digested at leisure,—the most important points having been already adjusted in the preliminaries. The publication of the peace replaces the two nations in the state they were in before the war. It again opens a free intercourse between them, and reinstates the subjects on both sides in the enjoyment of those mutual privileges which the state of war had suspended. On the publication, the treaty becomes a law to the subjects; and they are thenceforward bound to conform to the regulations stipulated therein. If, for instance, the treaty imports that one of the two nations shall abstain from a particular branch of commerce, every subject of that nation, from the time of the treaty’s being made public, is obliged to renounce that commerce.

§26. Time of the execution.When no particular time has been assigned for the execution of the treaty, and the performance of the several articles, common sense dictates that every point should be carried into effect as soon as possible: and it was, no doubt, in this light that the contracting parties understood the matter. The faith of treaties equally forbids all neglect, tardiness, and studied delays, in the execution of them.

§27. A lawful excuse to be admitted.But in this affair, as in every other, a legitimate excuse, founded on a real and insurmountable obstacle, is to be admitted; for nobody is bound to perform impossibilities. The obstacle, when it does not arise from any fault on the side of the promising party, vacates a promise which cannot be made good by an equivalent, and of which the performance cannot be deferred to another time. If the promise can be fulfilled on another occasion, a suitable prolongation of the term must be allowed. Suppose one of the contracting nations has, by the treaty of peace, promised the other a body of auxiliary troops: she will not be bound to furnish them, if she happen to stand in urgent need of them for her own defence. Suppose she has promised a certain yearly quantity of corn: it cannot be demanded at a time when she herself labours under a scarcity of provisions: but, on the return of plenty, she is bound to make good the quantity in arrear, if required.

§28. The promise is void when the party to whom it was made, has himself hindered the performance of it.It is further held as a maxim, that the promiser is absolved from his promise, when, after he has made his preparations for performing it according to the tenor of his engagement, he is prevented from fulfilling it, by the party himself to whom it was made. The promisee is deemed to dispense with the fulfilment of a promise, of which he himself obstructs the execution. Let us therefore add, that if he who had promised a thing by a treaty of peace, was ready to perform it at the time agreed on, or immediately and at a proper time if there was no fixed term,—and the other party would not admit of it, the promiser is discharged from his promise: for the promisee, not having reserved to himself a right to regulate the performance of it at his own pleasure, is accounted to renounce it by not accepting of it in proper season and at the time for which the promise was made. Should he desire that the performance be deferred till another time, the promiser is in honour bound to consent to the prolongation, unless he can shew, by very good reasons, that the promise would then become more inconvenient to him.

§29. Cessationof contributions.To levy contributions is an act of hostility which ought to cease as soon as peace is concluded (§24). Those which are already promised, but not yet paid, are a debt actually due; and, as such, the payment may be insisted on. But, in order to obviate all difficulty, it is proper that the contracting parties should clearly and minutely explain their intentions respecting matters of this nature: and they are generally careful to do so.

§30. Products of the thing restored or ceded.The fruits and profits of those things which are restored by a treaty of peace are due from the instant appointed for carrying it into execution: and if no particular period has been assigned, they are due from the moment when the restitution of the things themselves was agreed to: but those which were already received or become payable before the conclusion of the peace, are not comprised in the restitution; for the fruits and profits belong to the owner of the soil; and, in the case in question, possession is accounted a lawful title. For the same reason, in making a cession of the soil, we do not include in that cession the rents and profits antecedently due. This Augustus justly maintained against Sextus Pompey,7 who, on receiving a grant of the Peloponnesus, claimed the imposts of the preceding years.*

§31. In what condition things are to be restored.Those things, of which the restitution is, without further explanation, simply stipulated in the treaty of peace, are to be restored in the same state in which they were when taken: for the word “restitution” naturally implies that every thing should be replaced in its former condition. Thus, the restitution of a thing is to be accompanied with that of all the rights which were annexed to it when taken. But this rule must not be extended to comprise those changes which may have been the natural consequences and effects of the war itself, and of its operations. A town is to be restored in the condition it was in when taken, as far as it still remains in that condition, at the conclusion of the peace. But if the town has been rased or dismantled during the war, that damage was done by the right of arms, and is buried in oblivion by the act of amnesty. We are under no obligation to repair the ravages that have been committed in a country which we restore at the peace: we restore it in its existing state. But, as it would be a flagrant perfidy to ravage that country after the conclusion of the peace, the case is the same with respect to a town whose fortifications have escaped the devastation of war: to dismantle it previous to the restoration, would be a violation of good-faith and honour. If the captor has repaired the breaches, and put the place in the same state it was in before the siege, he is bound to restore it in that state. If he has added any new works, he may indeed demolish these: but if he has razed the ancient fortifications, and constructed others on a new plan, it will be necessary to come to a particular agreement respecting this improvement, or accurately to define in what condition the place shall be restored. Indeed this last precaution should in every case be adopted, in order to obviate all dispute and difficulty. In drawing up an instrument solely intended for the restoration of peace, it should be the object of the parties to leave, if possible, no ambiguity whatever,—nothing which may have a tendency to rekindle the flames of war. I am well aware, however, that this is not the practice of those who value themselves now-a-days on their superior abilities in negotiation: on the contrary, they study to introduce obscure or ambiguous clauses into a treaty of peace, in order to furnish their sovereign with a pretext for broaching a new quarrel, and taking up arms again on the first favourable opportunity. How contrary such pitiful finesse is to the faith of treaties, we have already observed (Book II. §231): it is a disparagement of that candour and magnanimity which should beam forth in all the actions of a great prince.

§32. The interpretation of a treaty of peace is to be against the superior party.But, as it is extremely difficult wholly to avoid ambiguity in a treaty, though worded with the greatest care and the most honourable intentions,—and to obviate every doubt which may arise in the application of its several clauses to particular cases,—recourse must often be had to the rules of interpretation. We have already devoted an entire chapter to the exposition of those important rules:* wherefore, instead of entering at present into tedious repetitions, we shall confine ourselves to a few rules more particularly adapted to the special case before us,—the interpretation of treaties of peace. 1. In case of doubt, the interpretation goes against him who prescribed the terms of the treaty: for as it was in some measure dictated by him, it was his own fault if he neglected to express himself more clearly: and by extending or restricting the signification of the expressions to that meaning which is least favourable to him, we either do him no injury, or we only do him that to which he has wilfully exposed himself; whereas, by adopting a contrary mode of interpretation, we would incur the risk of converting vague or ambiguous terms into so many snares to entrap the weaker party in the contract, who has been obliged to subscribe to what the stronger had dictated.

§33. Names of ceded countries.2. The names of countries ceded by treaty are to be understood according to the usage prevailing at the time among skilful and intelligent men: for it is not to be presumed that weak or ignorant persons should be intrusted with so important a concern as that of concluding a treaty of peace; and the articles of a contract are to be understood of what the contracting parties most probably had in contemplation, since the object in contemplation is the motive and ground of every contract.

§34. Restoration not to be understood of those who have voluntarily given themselves up.3. The treaty of peace naturally and of itself relates only to the war which it terminates. It is, therefore, in such relation only, that its vague clauses are to be understood. Thus the simple stipulation of restoring things to their former condition does not relate to changes which have not been occasioned by the war itself: consequently this general clause cannot oblige either of the parties to set at liberty a free people who have voluntarily given themselves up to him during the war. And as a people, when abandoned by their sovereign, become free, and may provide for their own safety in whatever manner they think most advisable (Book I. §202)—if such people, during the course of the war, have voluntarily, and without military compulsion, submitted and given themselves up to the enemy of their former sovereign, the general promise of restoring conquests shall not extend to them. It were an unavailing plea, to allege that the party who requires all things to be replaced on their former footing, may have an interest in the independence of the former of those people, and that he evidently has a very great one in the restoration of the latter. If he wished to obtain things which the general clause does not of itself comprise, he should have clearly and specifically expressed his intentions relative to them. Stipulations of every kind may be inserted in a treaty of peace: but if they bear no relation to the war which it is the view of the contracting parties to bring to a conclusion, they must be very expressly specified; for the treaty is naturally understood to relate only to its own particular object.

[* ] It is an essential point, to neglect none of the formalities which can ensure the execution of the treaty, and prevent new disputes. Accordingly, care must be taken to have it duly recorded in all the proper offices and courts. M. Van Beuningen, writing to the Grand Pensionary De Witt in 1662, thus observes—“The articles and conditions of this alliance contain various matters of different natures, the majority of which fall under the cognisance of the privy council,—several, under that of the admiralty,—others, under that of the civil tribunals, the parliaments, &c.—escheatage, for instance, which comes under the cognisance of the chambre des comptes [exchequer]. Thus the treaty must be recorded in all those different places.” This advice was followed; and the states general required that the treaty concluded the same year should be recorded in all the parliaments of the kingdom. See the king’s reply on this subject, in his letter to the count D’Estrades, page 399. [[Note added in 1773/1797 editions.

[6. ] Louis XV of France supported Stanislaw Leszcyński’s compaign to return to the Polish throne, inaugurating the War of the Polish Succession (1733–38) against Emperor Charles VI and Russia.

[7. ] Sextus Pompey, also known as Magnus Pius, the youngest son of Pompey the Great, led the opposition to the Second Triumvirate of Octavian, Marc Antony, and Lepidus, before being executed without trial in 35 bc

[* ] Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. v. quoted by Grotius, lib. ii. cap. 20, §22 [[Law of War and Peace.

[* ] Book II. Chap. XVII.