The Online Library of Liberty

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• Note.
• Part I: The Law of Intellectual Property.
• Chapter I.: The Law of Nature In Regard to Intellectual Property.
• Section I.: The Right of Property In Ideas to Be Proved By Analogy.
• Section II.: What Is Wealth?
• Section III.: What Is Property?
• Section IV.: What Is the Right of Property?
• Section V.: What Things Are Subjects of Property?
• Section VI.: How Is the Right of Property Acquired.
• Section VII.: What Is the Foundation of the Right of Property?
• Section VIII.: How Is the Right of Property Transferred?
• Section IX.: Conclusions From the Preceding Principles.
• Chapter II.: Objections Answered.
• Section I.: Objection First.
• Section II.: Objection Second.
• Section III.: Objection Third.
• Section IV.: Objection Fourth.
• Section V.: Objection Fifth.
• Section VI.: Objection Sixth.
• Section VII.: Objection Seventh.
• Section VIII.: Objection Eighth.
• Section IX.: Objection Ninth.
• Section X.: Objection Tenth.
• Section XI.: Objection Eleventh.
• Section XII.: Objection Twelfth.
• Section XIII.: Objection Thirteenth.
• Section XIV.: Objection Fourteenth.
• Section XV.: Objection Fifteenth.
• Chapter III.: Perpetuity and Descent of Intellectual Property.
• Section I.: Perpetuity of Intellectual Property.
• Section II.: Descent of Intellectual Property.
• Chapter IV.: The Sale of Ideas.
• Chapter V.: The Policy of Perpetuity In Intellectual Property.
• Part II: The Common Law of England. (vol. I)
• Chapter VI.: The Common Law of England Relative to Intellectual Property.
• Section I.: What Is the Common Law of England?
• Section II.: Why the Common Law Right of Property In Ideas Has Not Been More Fully Acknowledged.
• Section III.: Review of the Case of Millar Vs. Taylor.
• Section IV.: Review of the Case of Donaldson and Another, Vs. Becket and Another.

SECTION IX.

Conclusions from the Preceding Principles.

The conclusions, that follow from the principles now established, obviously are, that a man has a natural and absolute right—and if a natural and absolute, then necessarily a perpetual, right—of property, in the ideas, of which he is the discoverer or creator; that his right of property, in ideas, is intrinsically the same as, and stands on identically the same grounds with, his right of property in material things; that no distinction, of principle, exists between the two cases.

CHAPTER II.

OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

The objections that will be urged to the principles of the preceding chapter, are the following.