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Front Page arrow Titles (by Subject) arrow DEFINITION XV: The affections of a voluntary action are the modes through which it is denominated or defined in a certain manner. - Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence

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DEFINITION XV: The affections of a voluntary action are the modes through which it is denominated or defined in a certain manner. - Samuel von Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence [1660]

Edition used:

Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, translated by William Abbott Oldfather, 1931. Revised by Thomas Behme. Edited and with an Introduction by Thomas Behme (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2009).

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


DEFINITION XV

The affections of a voluntary action are the modes through which it is denominated or defined in a certain manner.

  • Precisely what are the affections of actions?
  • What is a necessary action, and what a licit one?

1.Affections are directly regarded in the actions themselves, just as the effects are regarded directly either in the objects, or in the agent himself. Now those affections are either denominative, or else determinative, or, in other words, estimative. The former are the qualities by which actions are called necessary or unnecessary, licit or illicit, good or bad, just or unjust. You might express them by the single word competency, which is regarded, either from the point of view of the subject, from whom the action proceeds, and so the same are necessary, licit, and good; or else from the point of view of the object in which they terminate, and so they are just. The latter are the quantities and estimates of actions, and have no special designation. We shall here add a few observations on the necessary and the licit; the others we shall take up separately.

2. That is a necessary action which one to whom a law or a command of a superior has been given is altogether bound to do by that law or command. The opposite of this is not so much a forbidden action, which is prohibited by laws from taking place, but even a licit action, which the laws neither order nor forbid, but the undertaking or neglect of which has been left to the agent’s free choice alone. Here it is to be observed, as we have already noted above, that certain actions which have been prohibited neither by divine nor by civil law can be called perfectly licit; certain others, which, though forbidden by divine laws, the civil law permits, to the extent that it imposes no penalty upon them in a human court of law, can be called imperfectly licit. From this it is easy to gather by inference what an illicit action is.