Front Page Titles (by Subject) DEFINITION XV: The affections of a voluntary action are the modes through which it is denominated or defined in a certain manner. - Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence
DEFINITION XV: The affections of a voluntary action are the modes through which it is denominated or defined in a certain manner. - Samuel von Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence 
Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, translated by William Abbott Oldfather, 1931. Revised by Thomas Behme. Edited and with an Introduction by Thomas Behme (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2009).
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- A Note On the Text
- The Elements of Universal Jurisprudence By Samuel Pufendorf Book I
- Definition I: By Human Actions Are Meant the Voluntary Actions of a Man In Communal Life Regarded Under the Imputation of Their Effects.
- Definition II: By the Object of Moral Actions Is Meant All That With Which They Deal.
- Definition III: Status Is a Suppositive Moral Entity In Which Positive Moral Objects, And, Above All, Persons, Are Said to Be.
- Definition IV: A Moral Person Is a Person Considered Under That Status Which He Has In Communal Life.
- Definition V: A Moral Thing Is a Thing Regarded In Respect of Its Pertinence to Persons.
- Definition VI: A Title Is a Moral Attribute By Which Distinctions Are Marked Among Persons In Communal Life According to Their Esteem and Status.
- Definition VII: Authority Is an Active Moral Power By Which Some Person Legitimately and With a Moral Effect Is Able to Perform a Voluntary Action.
- Definition VIII: Right Is an Active Moral Power, Belonging to a Person, to Receive Something From Another As a Matter of Necessity.
- Definition IX: Esteem Is the Value of Persons In Communal Life In Accordance With Which They Are Fit to Be Placed Upon an Equality With Other Persons, Or to Be Compared With Them, and to Be Rated Either Above Or Below Them.
- Definition X: Worth Is the Moral Quantity Or Value of Merchandise Or Things, and of Actions That Are Good For Man In Communal Life, In Accordance With Which They Are Fit to Be Compared One With Another.
- Definition XI: Principles of Human Action Are Those Things From Which It Springs and Upon Which It Depends, and By Which a Human Action Is Brought to Completion.
- Definition XII: Obligation Is an Operative Moral Quality By Which Some One Is Bound to Furnish, Allow, Or Endure Something.
- Definition XIII: A Law Is a Decree By Which a Superior Binds One Subject to Him to Direct His Actions According to the Command of the Superior.
- Definition XIV: Authority Is an Active Moral Power By Which Some Person Legitimately and With a Direct Moral Effect Can Perform an Action. 1
- Definition XV: The Affections of a Voluntary Action Are the Modes Through Which It Is Denominated Or Defined In a Certain Manner.
- Definition XVI: A Good Action Is One Which Agrees With Law; a Bad Action Is One Which Disagrees With the Same.
- Definition XVII: A Just Action Is One Which of Free Moral Choice Is Rightly Directed to That Person to Whom It Is Owed.
- Definition XVIII: The Quantity of Moral Actions Is the Estimative Measure By Which They Are Said to Be of a Certain Degree.
- Appendix to Definition Xviii In Which the Moral Sphere Is Explained
- Definition XIX: By the Effect of a Moral Action Is Meant That Which Is Produced By It.
- Definition XX: Merit Is an Estimative Moral Quality Resulting to a Man From an Action Which He Is Not Bound to Perform, In Accordance With Which There Is Owed Him an Equivalent Good On the Part of the One In Whose Favour That Action Was Undertaken.
- Definition XXI: Demerit Is an Estimative Moral Quality Resulting to a Man From a Bad Action Through Which He Is Under Obligation to Make Amends For the Injury Done to a Second Person Thereby.
- The Elements of Universal Jurisprudence By Samuel Pufendorf Book Ii
- Axiom I: Any Action Whatsoever That May Be Directed According to a Moral Norm, Which Is Within a Man’s Power to Do Or Not to Do, May Be Imputed to Him. And, On the Contrary: That Which Neither In Itself Nor In Its Cause Was Within a Man’s Power May Not
- Axiom II: Any Person Whatsoever Can Effectively, Or With the Obligation to Perform Them, Enjoin On Someone Subject to Himself Those Things to Which His Authority Over the Other Extends Itself.
- Observation I: A Man Can Judge Properly of Things Apprehended By the Power of His Intellect.
- Observation II: From an Internal Principle a Man Can Move Himself to Undertake Or to Leave Undone a Certain Action.
- Observation III: A Man Is Destined By Nature to Lead a Social Life With Men.
- Observation IV: Right Reason Dictates That a Man Should Care For Himself In Such a Way That Human Society Be Not Thrown Into Disorder.
- Observation V: The Law of Nature Alone Is Not Directly Sufficient to Preserve the Social Life of Man, But It Is Necessary That Sovereignties Be Established In Particular Societies.
The affections of a voluntary action are the modes through which it is denominated or defined in a certain manner.
- Precisely what are the affections of actions?
- What is a necessary action, and what a licit one?
1.Affections are directly regarded in the actions themselves, just as the effects are regarded directly either in the objects, or in the agent himself. Now those affections are either denominative, or else determinative, or, in other words, estimative. The former are the qualities by which actions are called necessary or unnecessary, licit or illicit, good or bad, just or unjust. You might express them by the single word competency, which is regarded, either from the point of view of the subject, from whom the action proceeds, and so the same are necessary, licit, and good; or else from the point of view of the object in which they terminate, and so they are just. The latter are the quantities and estimates of actions, and have no special designation. We shall here add a few observations on the necessary and the licit; the others we shall take up separately.
2. That is a necessary action which one to whom a law or a command of a superior has been given is altogether bound to do by that law or command. The opposite of this is not so much a forbidden action, which is prohibited by laws from taking place, but even a licit action, which the laws neither order nor forbid, but the undertaking or neglect of which has been left to the agent’s free choice alone. Here it is to be observed, as we have already noted above, that certain actions which have been prohibited neither by divine nor by civil law can be called perfectly licit; certain others, which, though forbidden by divine laws, the civil law permits, to the extent that it imposes no penalty upon them in a human court of law, can be called imperfectly licit. From this it is easy to gather by inference what an illicit action is.