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CHAPTER VII.: OF VERBS. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 8 (Chrestomathia, Essays on Logic and Grammar, Tracts on Poor Laws, Tracts on Spanish Affairs) 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). In 11 vols. Volume 8.
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A verb is the name of a quality exhibited as momentary, having place on the particular occasion in question, coupled with intimations of the dependency or independency of its existence, and of the several modifications of time in which its existence is represented as being placed.
A verb is either simple or complex. There is but one simple verb, and that is the verb-substantive,—the word of which the function is to designate existence, as ascribed to any subject.
By the addition of a word, expressive of absence or negation, it is rendered significative of non-existence.
In comparison with this, every other verb may be termed complex. For, in the signification of it is involved the signification of some adjective, in which, as above-mentioned, is already involved the import of some quality, coupled with the existence of some entity in the character of a subject in which that quality is to be found.
A verb, whether simple or complex, may be considered either with or without the several modifications of which it is susceptible—in a modified or in an unmodified state.
These modifications are either absolute or relative: 1. Absolute modifications are present, past, or future, with reference to an indeterminate point of time; 2. Relative modifications being such with reference respectively to some determinate point of time considered as present, past, or future, coupled also with the intimation of the state of existence, either active or passive on the part of the subject, i. e. the entity, real or fictitious in which the quality exhibited by the verb is considered and represented as existing.
For the explanation of these modifications, let us, were it only in consideration of its simplicity, begin with the simple verb,—the verb substantive.
A verb is the sign of existence. The modifications essential to a verb are those which are essential to existence, considered in that limited point of view in which alone the human faculties enable us to consider it. Of these modifications there are two sources:—1. Difference in respect of time; and 2. The difference between absolute and conditional existence, say rather between the case in which existence, as applied to any subject, is regarded by the speaker as absolute, i. e. certain, and that in which it is regarded by him as conditional, i. e. as uncertain, depending upon this or that event or state of things, the existence of which is regarded as a condition to its existence.†
A verb is equally capable of existing, and being considered, in an unmodified as in a modified state.
1. As to those modifications of which time is the source.
No event or state of things can have existed but it must have existed in some portion or other of the field of time.
But in speaking of it as having existed, it is not necessary that of the portion of time in which it is regarded as having existed, any intimation shall be made.
2. Next, as to those modifications of which the difference between certainty and uncertainty, absoluteness and conditionality is the source. By the speaker in question, of the event or state of things in question, though in itself either existent or non-existent, the existence may have been regarded as certain, or it may have been regarded as conditional. But it is not necessary that of the point of view in which in this respect it has been contemplated by him, any intimation shall, in his discourse, have been conveyed.
By persons, understand the several words or parts of words which are employed in making known, of which of those human beings, namely, a person speaking, (styled the first person;) a person spoken to, (styled the second person;) or a person spoken of, (styled a third person;)—what is said, is designed to be understood.
In the language of grammarians, persons are words representative of human beings bearing the above relations.
In English, these relations are expressed by pronoun-substantives without inflection.
The relation of number is expressed in English by pronouns, without inflection, except in the second person singular, to which the plural is almost always substituted.*
The plural number supposes abstraction made, it implies the existence of a certain class. Thou and he do not compose a class; we not necessarily, where the persons are certain, yet it frequently does; we means I the speaker and some class I belongs to; you, ye, the person spoken to and some class of persons you belongs to.
Of Tenses or Designations of Time.
By the denomination of tenses are designated some words or parts of words which, when added to the word expressive of the principal, or say radical, idea, are designative of the ideas of so many distinguishable accessory modifications of relative time, in which the motion or state of things is meant to be spoken of as having place.
In the mind of every man, on every occasion, time naturally divides it self into three portions—the present, the past, and the future.† The designation of these three portions, respectively, is the only mode of designation that can be termed simple.
But whatsoever portion of time is now past, was at one time present, and at that time had its past and its future.
Moreover, whatsoever portion of time is now future,‡ will, should it ever have place, be present, and then like a portion of present time, it will have its past and also its future.
As time flows on, the absolute portions of time of which these names are designative, are continually upon the change—at every instant different from what they are at every other.
Of one of these portions of time, all language is essentially and necessarily designative, and that is the present, the portion of time that has place while the discourse is going on. Why necessarily?—Answer. Because a thing, and the only thing immediately and necessarily expressed by language is the state of mind that has place in the instance of him who is thus using it.
Past and future, manifestly and constantly, are words of reference, and even present may be such.
Hence, out of these three simple modes of designation arise seven compound ones,—making, in the whole, ten.
1. Simply present,—I am.
2. Simply past,—past without reference, I struck, I did strike.
3. Simply future.
4. Present, with reference to a portion of time past,—I was.
5. Present, with reference to a portion of time considered as future.
6. Past, with reference to present time,—I have been.
7. Past, with reference to a portion of time past,—I had been.
8. Past, with reference to a portion of time considered as future,—I shall have been.
9. Future, with reference to a portion of time past,—I was about to be; I have been about to be; I had been about to be.
10. Future, with reference to a portion of time considered as future,—I shall be about to be.
But of whatsoever is considered as having place in these several portions of time respectively, the existence may be considered as absolute, or as conditional.
Adding to these absolute tenses so many conditional ones, we have thus twenty different designations applicable to so many differently considered portions of time.
Whatsoever be the species of action, and whatsoever be the portion of time, in which, by the representation given of it, it is placed,—if, in the nature of it, it was susceptible of continuance, and if, for the purpose for which it is brought to view, it be required that such its continuance be brought to view,—it is a matter of no small convenience when the structure of the language is such as admits of the bringing the fact of such continuance decidedly and distinctly to view.
Of the existence of this feature of convenience, the English language affords an exemplification; of its non-existence, the French.
I am now walking to Charing Cross; I was walking yesterday in the Park; I shall be walking to-morrow in the Park.
Many are the occasions in which the importance of an action depends on its continuance. If the structure of the language admit of it, the bringing to view this continuance is, on an occasion of this sort, frequently a great beauty,—the not being able to do so, a great defect.
The French language admits not of the giving, in this manner, continuance to any portion of time, nor, therefore, in a word, to any action.
In a translation made from that language into English, the advantage thus attached to the English is apt to be overlooked; and the word employed in the English being, in this respect, the literal translation of the French word, the poverty and unexpressiveness of the French language is thus transferred into the English.
This designation of continuance may be applied to, or withholden from, any one of the above-mentioned designations of time: to the before-mentioned twenty distinguishable designations of time, adding twenty others, we have thus forty for the grand total.
Under the particular structure of the English language the future tense, including its modifications as above, admits of an additional modification almost, if not altogether, peculiar to itself.
In consequence of this modification, it requires to be distinguished into two species,—1. The simply predictive future; 2. The dominative future.
The simply predictive future is that which it has in common with other languages in general.
The dominative future is that which is peculiar, or almost peculiar to it, as above.
The future may be termed dominative, where the event predicted is spoken of as being the result of the power and will of him who speaks.
The dominative future may be termed imperative, when the event so predicted is spoken of as being an action about to be performed by a person, or persons, to whom the discourse is addressed.
In the absolute mode or form, for the giving expression to these two modifications of the future tense, the two words will and shall are employed with their respective conjugates; but, in the performance of this function, they make a mutual exchange of their significations in a manner which, to persons who are not perfectly familiarized to it by incessant use, is to a high degree perplexing.
For expressing an opinion affirming the absolute futurity of the event spoken of, we thus see that the English language has two auxiliary words, viz. will and shall.
1. In one thing, they both agree, viz. in that an event being, by other words in the sentence, brought to view, they both of them are expressive of an opinion on the part of the speaker that that event will take place; and that absolutely, no other event, or state of things, having place, on the existence of which, in the character of a condition, the event in question is dependent.
2. Another point in which they agree is, that, over and above the futurity of the event, as above, each of them, to the expression of an opinion to that effect, adds the expression of an opinion that, when it does take effect, it will have the will of the speaker for its cause.
The particular in which they differ is this: viz. the intimation thus given of the dependency of the event in question upon the will of him who speaks, does not, in the two cases, apply to the same persons.
When the purpose is, that this dependency should be considered as having place,—if the event in question be an act to be performed by the speaker, in which case the verb employed by him is in the first person, will is the futurity-denoting auxiliary verb to be employed, as I will read.
For this same purpose, if the event be either a mere event, or the act of a person or persons other than the speaker, the futurity-denoting verb employed must be the verb shall.
When employed in conjunction with the sign of the first person plural, viz. we, no such intimation is given.
Of the six descriptions of persons in conjunction with the signs of which this verb, as well as every other verb, is capable of being employed; viz. the first, second, and third person in the singular number, and the same in the plural number,* one there is, viz. that indicated by the first person plural, concerning which it is not possible, in the nature of the case, that the strength of the assurance expressed should be equal in strength to the strength of the assurance expressed by the first person singular. Say, for example, we will read. For affirming my assurance of the futurity of the act, in so far as it is an act of my own that is in question, the first person—I will read—serves correctly and completely; but if, in conjunction with an act of my own, I apply the same sign of futurity to the respective acts of a set of persons with whom I consider myself as associated, it is impossible that, in relation to the description of the persons whose will in the result is represented, it should convey the same idea as that which it conveys when applied to the first person singular, viz. my own person alone. Let it be supposed that, in the instance of those other persons, I may, so far as concerns their acts, their external conduct, and that, at a future time, be as well assured as I can be of my own; still, in regard to the state of their will,—of their internal and secret inclinations, and that too at the very moment of uttering the discourse in question,—no such equal assurance is possible in the nature of the case. In this case, therefore, the import of the word is attended with a sort of ambiguity and indeterminateness with which it is not attended in any other of the six cases.
With respect to any set of persons whatsoever, an intimation which, by the use of one of these words it is in my power to express, is, that in so far as concerns the act which the principal verb is employed to designate, viz. the act of reading, their conduct is dependent upon my will; but, in this case, the class of persons in which, by my mode of speaking of them, I place them, must be that which, in grammatical language, is termed the third person plural, as above; that is, in other words, in speaking of them I must say, They shall read.
Here occurs another question. Supposing my design to be to represent the act, or other event in question, as depending upon their joint wills, for an import to this effect, by means of either of the two auxiliary verbs in question, shall and will, or by any other words, does the language afford any and what phrase? The answer is in the negative. By the phrase they will read, the import will not be conveyed. By that phrase an import that is not conveyed is, that their reading is regarded by me as dependent on my will; but neither is any such import conveyed by it, as that it will be dependent on the will of all of them together, or of any one of them. The event spoken of may, according to the description thus given of it, have alike for its cause either an act produced by a concurrent determination of their own respective wills, or a state of things in the production of which no part has been brought about by the will of any one of them.
The imports, for the expressing of which these two auxiliary futurity-denoting verbal particles afford the means, are simply two.
1. That the result which is meant to be represented, as about to have place, and for the designation of which the principal verb is employed, is meant to be represented as dependent upon the will of him who speaks.
2. That that same result is not meant to be represented as thus dependent.
In both these cases, to carry into effect the intention in question, viz. in so far as, in the nature of the case it is capable of being carried into effect, through all the six persons for the designation of which language in general has furnished expressions, both these auxiliary and futurity-denoting verbs are necessary.
But for the giving expression to these two opposite imports respectively, a course that will not serve is the course which, in general, is the only course which, for such purposes, can be made to serve; viz. the employing in one of the two cases throughout all six persons, one of these two words, and in the other case the other.
No; but for the giving expression to these two opposite meanings in the instance of each of them, both these words require to be employed, viz. as applied to some of the six descriptions of persons, the one of them; as applied to others of those same six descriptions of persons, the other.
For placing all this matter in what it is believed will be found a clear light, the following two scales of phrases, by one of which one of the two imports is meant to be expressed,—and by the other of them the other, will it is hoped, be found to serve.
Case I.— Case in which the event is meant to be represented by me (the speaker) as dependent upon my will, this may be called the imperative, or dominative, or tyrannically predictive future.
Here, in the singular number, the measure of power, of the existence of which intimation is given, is greater than in the plural it is possible to be. Be the power of him who speaks ever so great, there exists not any person of the state of whose will he can have an assurance altogether so perfect as that of the state of his own will.
In both numbers, when the dominative future is imperative, the measure of power expressed by it is greater; indeed, with strict propriety, it may be said to be infinitely greater, than that which is expressed by the formal modification styled hitherto, by grammarians, the imperative mood.
Employing the imperative mood, addressing myself to any person, and saying, Speak thou, or Speak, all that I give intimation of is, that it is my desire that he should speak. Employing the dominative and imperative future saying, Thou shalt speak, besides giving intimation of the existence of a desire on my part that he should speak, I moreover give intimation of a persuasion on my part that so irresistible is the influence exercised by my will on his, that the fulfilment of it is an event that cannot but take place. Such, beyond doubt, will be his conduct, and that conduct will have had for its cause, either on his part the knowledge of my will, or else my agency in some other mode.
Case II.— Case in which the event is not meant to be represented by me (the speaker) as dependent upon my will. This may be termed the simply predictive future.
What remains is, employing successively through all six descriptions of persons, the same one of the two futurity-denoting words in question, to subjoin to it on the occasion of its application to those several descriptions of persons respectively, an intimation of that one of the two imports in question, of which it is expressive. In this case the explanation given is the same as that given in the others, the only difference is that which regards the order in which the particulars are brought to view.
Case I.In which will is the word employed.
Case II.In which shall is the word employed.
In a jest-book story, the mode in which a foreigner is apt to make a mistake in the application of these two words, is presented in a half-disastrous, half-ludicrous, point of view. The stranger has fallen into the water, and he cries out to the bystanders, “Help! help! I will be drowned! Nobody shall save me!”*
Should and would appear, at first sight, as derived from and corresponding to shall and will respectively, and thence to one another. But this correspondence is far from being so perfect as at first sight might be expected.
1. Should has two perfectly distinct senses, viz. the conditional, and what may be termed the moral. 1. The conditional; as, if I should move, I should fall. 2. The moral, or monitory; as, You should take heed, lest you should fall. Here, in the first clause, the word should is moral, monitory,—importing that, in the opinion of the speaker, the performance of the act designated by the principal verb, is the object of moral duty or obligation, at any rate, of prudence, considered as choosing and employing means to the attainment of ends, good being included under that notion.
1. Preceptive in respect of probity, i. e. designative of what is conducive to general welfare; as—
In whatever you do for the furtherance of your own interest, you should never be disregardful of the effect it may have on the interest of others.
2. Moral, in respect of prudence, abstracted from the consideration of the end aimed at, consisting in the choice of means considered with reference to the probability they present of contributing to the attainment of the ends; as—
In whatever course you take for the furtherance of your own interest, you should never appear to be regardless of the effect it may have upon the interest of others.
So, in matters where morality is out of the question,—if you wish to hit a mark, you should be sure to take good aim.
Of Proper Moods, or Moods properly so called.
The existence predicated may be either absolute or conditional,*i. e. certain or uncertain.
The mood employed in the giving expression to the absolute mode of predication is, by the Latin grammarians, termed the indicative: in this the action is stated as being real. The mood employed in giving expression to the conditional mode, is the potential:† in this the action is stated as being imaginary or fictitious, feigned for the purpose of discourse.
The absolute mood is the simple, the most natural, and most usually employed.
The conditional mood is expressed by adjuncts, some belonging to verbs, some being conjunctions.
The Greek subjunctive is either indicative or potential, i. e. absolute or conditional.
The following are the modes of conditionality, and the modifications applied to the import of may and can, by the addition of the negative not.
I may strike, perhaps, if I will. May signifies liberty and power, but coupled with uncertainty as to the question whether it will be exerted or not. Present liberty-asserting, uncertainty-asserting.
As applied to an event not considered as subject to human will, to the will of any person in question, may signifies uncertainty in regard to the fact of its taking place.
I can, &c.—Present power-asserting,—perhaps, is here scarcely applicable.
I might (perhaps) strike.—Conditional liberty-asserting.
I could (perhaps) strike.—Conditional power-asserting.
I would strike.—Conditional volition, or desire-asserting.
N.B.—Would, and more particularly would not, have also an absolute sense. When Eurybiades struck, Themistocles would not strike; i. e. he chose to abstain from striking.
VI. Ought to.
I ought to strike.—Moral obligation-asserting present or future, absolute or conditional.
I must strike.—Present necessity-asserting.
I should strike.—Present necessity-asserting, with an obscure intimation of imperation. Low moral obligation-asserting.
IX. May not.
I may not strike. May here imports futurity, perhaps is here applicable.
I cannot strike. Can here imports present time, perhaps is not here applicable.
The use of the categorical or absolute senses must, in the order of invention, have come before and served as a basis of the conditional. The language of brutes is, throughout, absolute; conditionality embracing,—a prospect taken of the future through the medium of the past and present, is an object, to the surveying of which no eye inferior to the human is competent.
Of Improper Moods, or Moods improperly so called.
Absoluteness and Conditionality:—Under the name of moods, these are the two modes of designation actually established by ancient use for the designation of time. Of the forms that occur in language, these are the only two to which the term mood can with propriety be applied, not but that in itself, for any one thing, any one term is just as applicable as any other; but that, after its having been applied to this purpose, to apply it to others so widely different and separate from it; in that it is that the impropriety consists.
Of these improper moods, the usage of language affords two examples:—
One is, that which by the Latin and Greek grammarians is so improperly termed the imperative. The optative, a term applied by them in certain cases to another mood, would for this, it will be seen, have been the more proper adjunct, supposing the term mood properly applied.
The other is a form which may be termed the causal mood, in the Hebrew tongue, it is exemplified, and is denominated Hithpahel. In the Scottish dialect of the English language, though there is no denomination for it, it is exemplified in the phrase, he caused make. So also in French, il fit faire.
What by the Latinists is termed the imperative form, seems to be improperly put upon the same line with, and designated by the same name, as those other forms which, as above, are termed moods.
That which it expresses is, in all cases, the existence of a will, an act of volition, to a certain effect on the part of the speaker or writer. To the designation of this will the term imperative, considered as applied to all the modifications of which the expression of that will is susceptible, is in a remarkable degree defective; and, by reason of that deficiency, improper, improper in no fewer than three out of four cases.
Be the case what it may, such will, so expressed, will have for its object either some event, or some state of things. In speaking of this event, or state of things, either some person will be considered in the light of a person by whose will and consequent agency it will or would be made to take place or not; if not, the will expressed is of that sort which is called a wish, and the mood by which expression is given to it has been termed the optative.
In the other case, the person in consequence of whose agency it is supposed that the event, or state of things in question would be made to take place, is either the person to whom the discourse is addressed, or some other person; in this latter case, likewise, the mood comes under the same denomination, the optative.
When the person by whose agency it is supposed that the event, or state of things in question would be produced, is a person to whom the discourse is addressed, the relation borne to him, in the order of power, by him who speaks, may either be that of a superior, that of an equal, or that of an inferior. It is in that case alone in which the relation borne by him, as above, is that of a superior, nor in that, but when the superiority is so decided and acknowledged as to give to the expression of his wish, so denoted, the character and denomination of a command, that the term imperative can with propriety be applied to it.
It is when the person by whose agency it is desired that the event, or state of things in question should be produced is the Almighty, that the imperfection and absurdity of this denomination presents itself in a striking point of view. Grant us, O Lord! Hear us, O Lord! Taken in themselves, and without a thought bestowed upon the grammarians by whom a common appellation has been bestowed upon these forms, there is nothing to which any such idea as that of impropriety appears to attach itself. But when to such a form of speech, when to any form of speech, addressed to a person conceived to be in such a situation, any such appellation as that of imperative is applied, then it is that the impropriety—and that rising to a degree of absurdity, involving a virtual contradiction in terms, may be seen to manifest itself beyond dispute.
Such as it is, under the restrictions above brought to view, the form of speech brought to view under its trivial name, the imperative mood, may be termed the imperative mood.
All this while, there exists a form of speech which, though not termed imperative, is not only imperative, but more strongly and pointedly and forcibly imperative, than that which alone hath, as yet, been ever styled imperative. I speak of that which may be termed the imperative future, a form of speech which requires to be placed in contradistinction to that other, which may be termed the predictive, or simply the predictive future.
This is the form of speech which, in the English language, is in some cases designated by the word shall, as when a man says, thou shalt, or you shall.*
Go to school again to-morrow; you shall go to school again to-morrow. In and by these forms of speech, the mode of optation properly termed imperation, is plainly enough expressed; but neither is it less undeniably manifest that, by the latter, the form in which the command is expressed is much more forcible than in the former. Speaking to a child of mine, and using the first-mentioned of these forms, all that I give him to understand is, that, at the time in question, it is my will, my desire, that he should repair to the place in question. Of the expected efficacy of the will or desire thus notified, I say nothing; but if I say, to-morrow you shall go to school, that which I give intimation of is, not only that such is my will and desire, but that, in my own persuasion, such will be the effect of the notification made of such my will and desire, so strong, so irresistible, the force and influence of the command so notified, that upon, and in consequence of the notification so made of it, obedience, that obedience in and by which the wish and desire will have received its accomplishment, cannot but take place.
In English, the mood termed imperative, is expressed in the singular by the simple omission, or non-apposition, of the pro-nominal sign of personal relation. In the plural, the expressed pro-nominal sign is inserted, or not, according as on the occasion in question, it is or is not needed; when inserted, the pronoun is put after the verb, and thus the imperative is distinguished from the indicative.
The imperative mood, as being the expression of want and desire, is probably of very early invention. It is implied and involved in the use of the vocative case of the noun. Addressed to an individual, the name being a proper one, imports no abstraction, as a common name does, whether the article a or the be prefixed to it.
The subjunctive mood serves to mark the connexion given to the name of the action, with a proposition indicative of the time which is the object of reference in the indication of the time of it.
The infinitive mood is synonymous to that verbal noun which is the name of the correspondent action; and in Greek is accordingly declined with the article το; the variation of termination being confined to the article. This is the ground-work of the whole verb.
Voice has place in that case alone in which the verb being transitive, the proposition of which it forms a part is complex.*
Of the instances in which we have occasion to speak of motion,—in some the motion is with relation to our organs and means of observation, boundless, in others bounded.
The instance in which it is boundless is that of the celestial bodies, the planet on which we live, taken in its totality, included. In these instances, we learn not where the motion had its beginning, nor where, nor even whether anywhere, it will have an end.
But for the most part, in the instance in which we have occasion to speak of motion, the motion is bounded. Viewing it as it goes on, we either know, or have the means of learning, where it actually began, and of conjecturing, with more or less probability of success, where it will have an end.
Of the instances in which the motion in question has, or is considered as having, both a known beginning and a known end, in some its beginning and end are spoken of as having place in different bodies, in others, as having place in the same body. When it is considered as having place in different bodies, the verb which is employed in the designation of its commencement, according to the grammarians of antiquity, is said to be in the active voice. The verb which is employed in the designation of its termination, is said to be in the passive voice.
The verb at large, considered independently of the action of time, and conditionality and unconditionality, involves in its signification that of some quality, active, passive, or neutral, coupled, as in the case of the adjective, with the intimation of some subject in which it is to be found.
In so far as the quality indicated by the verb is an active quality, the verb is said to be a verb active, and to be in the active voice.
In so far as the quality indicated by the verb is passive, the verb is said to be a verb passive, and to be in the passive voice.
The passive voice has more of complication and refinement than the active. It involves the consideration and expression of causation; it brings to view an effect actually produced. It is, therefore, probably of later invention than the active.
Of the Participle.†
The participle is an adjective. It agrees with most of the parts of the verb in so much, as to that signification which it has in common with the adjective, it superadds the designation of some portion of time.
[† ] By the word uncertain, though according to our forms of speech, spoken of as a quality belonging to the event or state of things which is the object or subject of consideration, no really existing object corresponds other than the state of the mind by which that event or state of things is contemplated. Take any conceivable state of things at pleasure,—either it exists or it does not exist, between its existence and non-existence there is no medium; suppose it to exist, all uncertainty is out of the question, suppose it not to exist, all uncertainty is equally out of the question.
[* ] By this means, at the expense of an absurdity, simplicity is attained.
[† ]Present, the subject of perception; past, of recollection; future, of expectation.
[‡ ] All future time is essentially uncertain, conditional, for at no one instant do we know for certain that there will be anything in any other; that there will be another instant.
[* ]1. The person, if but one, who is speaking.
2. The person, if but one, who is spoken to.
3. The person or thing, if but one, who is spoken of.
4. The speaker, with the addition of the persons with whom he represents himself as associated.
5. The persons whom, in a number greater than one, he considers himself as speaking to.
6. The persons or the things, or the persons and things, which he considers himself as speaking of.
[* ]N. B.—The person on whose will, by the simple use of the portions of the auxiliary verbs shall and will, as above, it is in the power of him who speaks or writes, to represent the event or state of things in question as being dependent, is only himself. He cannot, in this way, represent it as being dependent upon the will either of a person spoken to, or of a person spoken of.
[* ] Absolute, Aristotelice, categorical; conditional, Aristotelice, hypothetical.
[† ] Note here the mood termed subjunctive; in Greek, it has a different termination from that of the potential,—in Latin it has not.
[* ] See shall and will considered at greater length above, p. 251. That portion of the MS. bears a date at a considerable interval from that of the present portion.—Ed.
[* ] Of a proposition, whatsoever there is of complexity, is always in the predicate; the subject is always simple, excepting that complexity which consists in plurality,—when the subject is in the plural number.
When the verb is in the first person, being a neuter or non-active verb, the proposition may be a complex one, but if it be in the second or third person, the proposition is always a complex one.
[† ] See note * to p. 348.
[‡ ] The following, which is merely an initiatory fragment, is all that has been found in the MSS. in relation to this department, which, to judge from his memoranda, the author intended to discuss at considerable length.—Ed.