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• Errata—vol. VIII.
• Chrestomathia: Being a Collection of Papers, Explanatory of the Design of an Institution, Proposed to Be Set On Foot Under the Name of the Chrestomathic Day School, Or Chrestomathic School, For the Extension of the New System of Instruction to the High
• Introduction By the Editor.
• First Preface to the First Edition.
• Second Preface to the First Edition.
• Chrestomathic (a) Instruction Tables. Table I.
• Chrestomathic Instruction Tables. Table II.
• Appendix. No. I.
• Appendix.—no. II.
• Appendix.—no. III.
• Appendix.—no. IV.: Essay On Nomenclature and Classification. *
• Appendix.—no. V.: Sources of Motion.
• Appendix.—no. VI.
• Appendix.—no. VII.
• Appendix.—no. VIII.
• Appendix No. IX.
• A Fragment On Ontology; Now First Published, From the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham.
• Note By the Editor.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Classification of Entities.
• Chapter II.: Fictitious Entities Classified.
• Essay On Logic: Now First Published, From the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham.
• Note By the Editor.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Logic—what ?
• Chapter II.: Logic, Its Characteristics.
• Chapter III.: Præcognita: Or, Preliminary and General Indications Concerning Logic, According to the Aristotelians.
• Chapter IV.: Of Aristotle’s Predicaments and Postpredicaments.
• Chapter V. *: Mode of Discussion.
• Chapter VI.: Relation of Logic to the Business of Human Life In General, and Therein to Arts and Sciences, I. E. to Disciplines.
• Chapter VII.: Clearness In Discourse, How to Produce It? and Hence of Exposition.
• Chapter VIII.: Of Division.
• Chapter IX.: Of Methodization, Otherwise Termed Arrangement. † ‡
• Chapter X.: Of the Art of Invention.
• Appendix.—a.: Phenomena of the Human Mind.
• Appendix B. Division of Art and Science. †
• Essay On Language; Now First Published, From the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham.
• Note By the Editor.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Modes Or Forms of Which Discourse Or Language Has Been Found Susceptible, Viz. Audible, Visible, and Their Respective Substitutes.
• Chapter II.: Uses of Language.
• Chapter III.: Operations Which, In the Character of an Art, Are Performable In Relation to Discourse, Or Language In General.
• Chapter IV.: Properties Desirable In a Language.
• Chapter V.: Of Improvement Considered As Applicable to Language, Or the Means By Which, In So Far As the Particular Language Employed By an Individual Admits of the Possession of Them, the Properties Desirable In Language May, On Each Occasion, Be Secured
• Chapter VI.: Analytical View of the Matter of Thought and Internal Action; Correspondent View of the Matter of Language.
• Fragments On Universal Grammar; Now First Published, From the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Definitions.
• Chapter II.: Uses of Universal Grammar.
• Chapter III.: Of the Parts of Speech.
• Chapter IV.: Of the Noun-substantive.
• Chapter V.: Of the Adjective.
• Chapter VI.: Of Pronouns. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Verbs.
• Chapter VIII.: Of Government and Concord.
• Chapter IX.: Of Prepositions, Adverbs, and Conjunctions.
• Chapter X.: Of Interjections.
• Tracts On Poor Laws and Pauper Management.
• Note By the Editor On the Tracts On Poor Laws.
• Situation and Relief of the Poor.
• Observations On the Pauper Population Table Hereunto Annexed.
• Outline of the Non-adult Value Table.
• Outline of a Work Entitled Pauper Management Improved.
• Book I.: Political Arrangements.
• Book II.: Plan of Management.
• Book III.: Collateral Benefits.
• Book IV.: Pauper Comforts.
• Observations On the Poor Bill. Introduced By the Rt. Hon. William Pitt (feb, 1797). : Chapter I. Introduction
• Chapter II.: 1. Under-ability, Or Supplemental-wages Clause.
• Chapter III.: 2. Family-relief, Or Extra-children Clause.
• Chapter IV.: 3. Cow-money Clause.
• Chapter V.: 4. Relief-extension, Or Opulence-relief Clause.
• Chapter VI.: 5. Apprenticeship Clause.
• Three Tracts Relative to Spanish and Portuguese Affairs; With a Continual Eye to English Ones.
• Advertisement For Tract the First and Second; of This Second * Publication, Namely, On the Then Proposed Spanish House of Lords. ( Anno 1820.)
• Tract, No. I.: Letter to the Spanish Nation On a Then ( Anno 1820) Proposed House of Lords.
• Advertisement to Tract the Second.
• Tract, No. II.: Observations On Judge Advocate Hermosa’s Panegyric On Judicial Delays; On the Occasion of the Impunity As Yet Given By Him to the Loyal Authors of the Cadiz Massacre, a Counterpart to the Manchester Massacre; Explaining, Moreover, the Effe
• Advertisement to Tract the Third.
• Tract, No. III.: Letter to the Portuguese Nation, On Antiquated Constitutions; On the Spanish Constitution Considered As a Whole, and On Certain Defects Observable In It; In Particular, the Immutability-enacting, Or Infallibility-assuming, the Non-re-elig
• Letters to Count Toreno, On the Proposed Penal Code, Delivered In By the Legislation Committee of the Spanish Cortes, April 25th, 1821.
• Advertisement.
• Letter I.
• Letter II.: On the Course Taken By the Legislative Committee, to Prevent, Otherwise Than By Punishment Eo Nomine, the Free Examination of Their Proposed Penal Code.
• Letter III.
• Letter IV.
• Letter V.
• Letter VI.
• Letter VII.
• Supplemental Advertisement.
• Securities Against Misrule, Adapted to a Mahommedan State, and Prepared With Particular Reference to Tripoli In Barbary.
• Note By the Editor.
• Chapter I.: Preliminary Explanations.
• Chapter II.: Public Opinion the Sole Remedy—parallel Between the Public-opinion Tribunal and the Official Judicatories.
• Chapter III.: Notification and Publication In Reference to Securities.
• Chap. IV.: The Securities In Detail.
• Part I.: Securities In Favour of the Nation Considered In the Aggregate.
• Part II.: Securities In Favour of Individuals.
• Chapter V.: Hopes of Success For Any Project Having Such Securities For Its End.

APPENDIX B. DIVISION OF ART AND SCIENCE.†

Section I.

Generals or Particulars, Abstractions or Concretions,—which first?

In the field of Eudæmonics and Pantognosy, the field of abstractions or the field of concretions,—to which of these two compartments shall the surveying eye apply itself?

In the whole human race, considered at all periods of its history, the knowledge of particulars has preceded that of generals. Abstraction, a branch of Logic, is an art that has been learned by slow degrees.

But, when general conceptions have once been attained, the communication of them is performed with much more despatch, even to the most unfurnished and uninformed minds, than that of particulars; i. e. in a given time, much more knowledge may be communicated by the use of more general terms in company with less general terms, than by the use of less general terms alone.

True it is, without the use of particular terms, and even according to the nature of the subject, i. e. as it belongs to somatics or psychology, no clear knowledge can be conveyed by general ones, but by a single individual or species, exhibited in the character of a specimen or sample, for the explanation and illustration of a generic term, the exhibition of all the other individuals or particulars contained in the genus of which it is the name, may be saved.

With these explanations, from particulars to generals, may be stated as the actual order of learning or acquisition; but from generals to particulars, the most convenient and extensively efficient order of teaching or communicating instruction.

Condillac was a French Abbé. In his youth he had served an apprenticeship to the Greek statuary, so well known to the Dilettanti by the name of Pygmalion. In his workshop, he had learned that secret, which, to statuaries, is what the philosopher’s stone is to chemists,—the art of giving life to clay or marble. Pygmalion’s practical object in the animating of his statue, was, as everybody knows, the pleasure of teaching it to speak,—more appositely, the teaching her the art of love. Condillac being an abbé, and moreover a man of an independent mind, and an original cast of character—a philosopher by trade—determined, instead of making himself the servile copyist of his master, to teach logic to his statue instead of love.‡

In this view, instead of cramming her all at once with the five senses—not to speak of the sixth sense, which, how necessary soever to the purpose of the Greek, would have been quite foreign to the new purpose of this Frenchman—he found it necessary to proceed upon a more economical plan, and to begin, at least, with furnishing them to her one by one.

For matter for one of her first exercises, he took Aristotle’s logic in hand, and proposed to himself to teach her the ten predicaments, and by means of the ten predicaments, proposed to himself to teach her the nature of those fictitious entities called abstractions.

When it came to the point, he found that Aristotle’s list was not quite so well made up as it might have been, and doubtless would have been, had the ingenious Greek had the advantage of consulting with Locke and a few others.

In teaching her these predicaments, his plan was to begin with those, if any such there were, the nature of which could be taught without taking into consideration any other.

In all new courses of experiment, there is commonly a good deal of fumbling. Of the crude conception that occurred to him, and the unsuccessful trials that took place in consequence, mention need not be made; of a few of those by which it appeared that more or less light was thrown upon the subject, a short and plain account will suffice for the present purpose.

1. He gave her the sense of smelling;—he presented her with a rose. In the way of logic, nothing was taught her by the experiment. She learned the smell of the rose, and liked it very well; but she knew not what it came from,—whether from a rose-tree, from otto of roses, or from the esprit de rose.

2. Equally limited was the science she made herself mistress of when endued with the sense of taste. A slice of pine-apple was no less agreeable to her than the rose had been; but all she learnt from it was the taste of pine-apples.

3. He gave her the sense of sight, and now for the first time he gave her schooling. Smelling and tasting were no better than child’s play.

The first thing he presented to her view was a round spot. Nothing was to be learned from the round spot.

With a little alteration, the round spot was converted into a triangle, and by this triangle was furnished the first lesson she learned in the art of logic. The triangle happened to be an equilateral one, not but that any other might have done nearly as well. Being a triangle, it had three points or corners. Look there, says he, at those points; in that place on the left, one,—in that on the right a second,—above them both, a third. Here you have numbers one, two, three.

But when the predicament of number was thus made sensible to her, the predicament of figure was made sensible to her at the same time; for by these three points the triangle had its bounds, and by these bounds its figure was determined.

To make the matter the clearer, he presented to her, by the side of this triangular spot, the round one. From this round one, viewed by itself, nothing had been to be learned. A figure it had; but being so perfectly uniform, and presenting to view but one number, it had not presented her with any such idea as that of figure, no more than the smell of the rose, or the taste of the pine-apple had done. But now being placed by the side of the triangle, and her eye passing continually from the one to the other, the difference between the one and the other was so often presented to her, and, by the contrast, her ideas of figure became every moment more and more distinct, as well as from the first moment more extensive.

By knowing what number was, she already had some notion of what arithmetic is; and by knowing what figure is, she had, moreover, some notion of what geometry is. He would have been glad to have given her a correspondent notion of what algebra is; but this he found impossible till she had become more or less acquainted with the use of language.

Arithmetic has for its subject number, directly and independently expressed, viz. the several modifications of it, all of them expressed by so many determinate absolute and appropriate names.

Algebra has for its subject number and numbers, but these expressed in every instance, not by any determinate and absolute names, but by names indicative, in each instance, of some relation borne by the object in question to some determinate number or numbers, which sooner or later may be presented to view by their respective names, but which as yet are not presented to view.

Section II.

Field occupied by Art and Science.

Entering upon the field of mesology, we shall find science occupying a compartment, over a portion only of which, and that comparatively a small one, it is in the power of art to follow it; always excepted that space and quantity of art, which being employed, and that of necessity, in the acquisition of the science, is therefore inseparably attached to it.

Contributory to well-being, human well-being, and its opposite, are, or may be, for they have been supposed to be, all beings of which we have any notion, as well as all with which we have any acquaintance. If so it be, then so it is that with that portion of the field of eudæmonics which is occupied by mesology; the whole field of ontology,—a word more in use in former days than at present, and employed to signify the science of being in general, is coincident.*

For the designation of the general term science, considered as applying to this or that particular portion of the field of science by some persons, and on some occasions, the termination logy, and by others the termination gnosy, is preferred. On other occasions, or by some persons, to give compactness to the appellation, both are discarded, and the termination cs,† as designative of an adjective, of which the substantive is subintellected, is preferred.‡ These terminations are all taken from the Greek, the language without which scarcely any new names could, by our barbarism-sprung language, be framed: and consequently scarcely any new views of things taken or expressed, nor, in so far as former ones are either incorrect or incomplete, any true and adequate ones be so much as formed.

Somatology, somatognosy, or somatics;*psychology, psychognosy, or psychics,† —to one or other of these denominations will every branch of science, which has for its subject the field of, to us, perceptible existence, the class, to us, of perceptible beings, be found referable.

Physioplastic, anthropoplastic, by one or other of these appellatives will the condition of all beings by which any part of the field of Somatics is seen to be occupied, be found referable; physioplastic, the state in which, being found in the bosom, they are supposed to have been formed by the hands, of nature; anthropoplastic, the state into which, after having been torn from the bosom of nature, they have been brought by human labour.

The labour or course of the operations by which, under the hands of man, forms are given to bodies different in any respect from those into which they are cast by nature, may be considered at two different stages or points of time: viz. 1. The stage during which, with a view to the advancement whether of art or science, or of both in one, trials are made of the different forms into which they may be cast, of the different properties immediately or eventually conducive to man’s well-being, they may be discovered or made to possess, and of the different points of view in which, for that purpose, they may be contemplated and subjected to examination. 2. The stage at which, by the light of a more or less considerable mass of knowledge, derived from such trials, means having been found of casting them into such and such useful forms, and thereby enduing them with such and such useful properties, the casting them into these forms, and enduing them with these properties, has become the regular and extensive result of an established course of practice.

In their physioplastic state, in the state in which, fashioned by the hand of nature, they are found in the bosom of nature, bodies form the contents and subject of that portion of the field of Somatics which is so commonly but so improperly designated by the appellation of Natural History, and which the term Physiology having, by a narrower application, been unfitted for this use, may more aptly and expressively, it should seem, be designated by the term Physiognosy.

In so far as they are considered as forming the subject of these preliminary trials and examinations which, as above, serve as the foundations for those ulterior operations by which they are rendered subservient to general use, they form the contents of that portion of the field of Somatics which also, very generally, but not the less inappropriately, has been termed sometimes Natural Philosophy, sometimes Experimental Philosophy, but which neither unaptly nor unexpressively, may, it is supposed, be termed Empiric Somatology.‡

The further we advance, the more clearly do the convenience of an apposite nomenclature and systematic arrangement, and the inconvenience of inapposite nomenclature and unsystematic arrangement become perceptible.

Somatics being the name given to the stem, by the two adjuncts physioplastic and anthropoplastic, a designation which is correct, and to every one to whom the import attached to those adjuncts in the original language is familiar, an intelligible one is presented. By a person whose ignorance of all particulars contained in the respective fields of human science, should be as great as that of any person can be, the import of the two names, and accordingly the nature of the two branches of science would nevertheless be conceived and understood, so he were but apprized of the import of the Greek words correspondent to the word nature and the word man.

So much for the apposite and systematic nomenclature and arrangement, now as to the inapposite and unsystematic. Of the two composing the inapposite appellative employed to designate physioplastic somatics, the word natural, in so far as it went, was apposite and expressive. But when applied to designate the anthropoplastic branch of somatics, instead of being apposite and leading to truth, it leads of itself to error. What it gives you to understand is, that under the branch of science to which it thus gives name, in the observation made on the bodies which are the subjects of it, the state to which the consideration is confined is that into which they have been brought by the hands of nature, whereas the truth is, that the state in which alone they constitute, in a direct way, the subject of anthropoplastic somatology, is the state into which they have been brought, or are capable of being brought by the hand of man.

True it is, that in anthropoplastic somatics, without more or less regard paid to physioplastic somatics, that is, to the bodies which are constituted its subjects, and that too in the state in which they are its subjects, nothing could be done; for it is to physioplastic somatology that anthropoplastic somatology is indebted for all its subjects, for all the materials which it can have to work upon. But from this no such consequences follow as that, in any part, anthropoplastic and physioplastic are the same. By architecture, stone and wood are employed; but architecture is not, on this account, one and the same branch of art and science either with mineralogy or with botany.

When upon taking a further step, we come to the word philosophy, the misrepresentation, instead of receiving any correction is rendered still more flagrant. Instead of a state of, or acquisition made by the understanding, and that alone, that which the term philosophy was originally employed to designate, and which, even now, it ceases not to convey to those who are more or less acquainted with the language from which it has been borrowed, is a state of the affections, a sentiment or affection of love and good-liking. Of good-liking in relation to what?—not to this branch of somatics in contradistinction to the other, nor yet to somatics in contradistinction to any other branch of science; no, nor so much as to science in contradistinction to anything else. To what then?—Why, even to wisdom. And what is wisdom?—A term of wide and imperfectly determined import, employed not so much to designate science as to designate an habitually correct state of the judgment, or judicial faculty, to whatsoever subjects, considered as applied, but more particularly, to such as are regarded as standing distinguished, in respect of their importance, in the highest degree.

As in its original import, this term Natural Philosophy is scarcely expressive of any idea which it is employed to express; hence it is, that, from the first to the last, in relation to this or that less extensive branch of science, a question may be,—does it belong to Natural History, or does it belong to Natural Philosophy? whereas, under the terms physioplastic somatology, and anthropoplastic somatology, a clear line of demarkation between the two sciences, thus designated, is drawn at one stroke, and all such questions are nipped in the bud.

Instead of physioplastic and anthropoplastic,—had the words pushpin and trapball been to the same extent, and for the same length of time, employed for the designation of the two branches of art and science, for the designation of which the terms Natural History and Natural Philosophy still continue to be employed, the change, instead of being for the worse, would have been rather for the better. By the word trapball, no person would have been tempted to regard as belonging to physioplastics what belongs to anthropoplastics; whereas, of the term Natural Philosophy, when thus applied, the tendency to produce this sort of misconception is, as hath just been seen, not inconsiderable. A word is not the more inconvenient, but the less inconvenient the less liable it is to lead men to confound with any object those objects from which it is most material that it should be distinguished.

The attention which it applies to its subjects somatology may either apply indiscriminately to all the properties observable in them, or confine itself to any one or more of them to the exclusion of the rest; in the first case, ageledodiascopic, or, for shortness, ageledoscopic,—in the other case, choristodiascopic, or, for shortness, choristoscopic, are the names by which it may respectively be distinguished.

Vacuity, rest, time, figure, quantity,—all these form so many distinguishable subjects of choristoscopic somatics.

Of vacuity it may seem that it belongs not to the properties of body. But, be the body what it may, and be the place which, at the time in question, it occupies what it may, it may as easily be conceived to be absent from as present at, and in that place. To be either in or out of any given place is, therefore, among the properties of body; for, if there were no such being as a body, there would be no such distinction as that between place and place.

It is only by abstraction that the idea of rest can be formed any more than that of body: it has for its ground the idea of place. It is the absence of motion, and of motion itself no idea can be formed but what has for its ground the idea of place.

Take at any time into consideration any body, considering it with reference to the place which, at that same time, it occupies; but, from that same place conceive it removed, and into that same place suppose no other body or portion of matter introduced. In this way, and no other, is formed the idea of a vacuum or portion of unoccupied space.

In so far as human observation has been able to apply itself to the subject, absolute motion is at all times among the inherent inseparable properties of every distinct body, and, in so far, of every particle of matter. But of relative motion, motion as between any two bodies or particles of matter considered in relation to one another, examples, real or apparent, may, upon the surface of this our globe be found in abundance.

Of relative motion, or its negation relative rest, no idea can, it should seem, be formed, otherwise than by the help of the idea of time. Two distinct bodies, in so far as in the course of a given length of time, the distance that intervenes between them is observed to be, or appears to be, different, are observed to have been one or both in motion with reference to each other,—to have been, one or other, or both of them, in a state of relative motion;—in so far as no difference in respect of the amount of the distance between them has been observed, or is supposed to be observable, they are regarded as having been in a state of rest.

The idea of time is derived, says the common phrase, from the succession of ideas. Of this definition the misfortune is, that, in the explanation given of the object, the object undertaken to be explained, is itself introduced under a disguise.

It may, perhaps, be said to be derived from the diversity between ideas. To a mind to which an idea, and no more, was present, one smell, for example, or one taste or one sound, no such idea could, it should seem, present itself as an idea of time.

Condillac, in his Traité des Sensations, took a statue, and, having taken a leaf out of the book of Pygmalion, endowed it successively, as we have seen, with the several senses, at first one by one, afterwards in such groups as it occurred to him to collect them into for that purpose. Neither from any one smell, nor from any one taste, nor from any one sound, nor from any one feeling, supposing it diffused all over its body, could this statue of his, form, it should seem, any such idea as that of time. From a single object of sight, perhaps yes; viz. supposing the object of sight spacious enough to present different parts, subtending, though it were ever so small an angle, coloured or not coloured, the surface would present distinguishable parts; and, during one portion of time, supposing the attention of his statue applied to one part—during another portion of time to another, here, it should seem, would be ground sufficient for her building on it an idea of time.

To our statue thus borrowed from the ingenious Abbé Condillac, neither by one smell, nor by one taste, nor by one sound, nor by one feeling, whether universal or local, could the idea of number be suggested. But correspondent to any one of those senses, suppose two sensations, then it is that the idea of number presents itself, or, at least, is capable of presenting itself to her mind. What, if at all times, she had one sensation of each kind and no more,—still it should seem no idea of number; coalescing, the whole assemblage of sensations would form, altogether, no more than one.

In regard to the sense of sight, whether it presented her or not with the idea of number, would depend, it should seem, on the figure of the surface by which the angle formed by the pencil of rays, on entrance into the eye was subtended. Suppose it circular, no difference anywhere, no number; suppose it triangular,—here would be three points, by each of which a different idea might be produced, and thence the number three.

Of figure, the idea is not derivable but through that of number. It may be received, 1. From sight; 2. From feeling. Witness the blind.

Of quantity, the idea may be derived, 1. From number without figure; 2. From figure without consideration of number; but the idea of figure cannot be derived without that of number.

Of these eight abstractions, six, viz. 1. Place; 2. Motion; (viz. relative motion;) 3. Time; 4. Number; 5. Figure; 6. Quantity;—in a word, all but vacuity or void space and rest, have furnished so many distinguishable branches of science,—branches, let us say, of Choristoscopic Somatology, each of them already furnished with a separate name, how far soever from being uniformly apposite and expressive.

I.

Sciences having for their Subject the Predicament of Place.

Topography, a term confined in its customary application to small portions of the surface of our earth, though, with equal original propriety, applicable to any portion or portions of the whole universe.

Chorography, a term not much in use, but, when in use, applied to portions larger than Topography is commonly applied to.

Geography, a term exclusively and necessarily as its etymology shows, confined to this our earth, and subject to that limitation, applicable to any portions, so they be not so small as that the propriety of the application shall find on the part of Topography a ground or pretence for disputing it.

By Uranography, or, still better, by Uranognosy, rather than Astronomy, may that branch of Topography, taken in its largest sense, which remains after the substraction of Geography be designated. Uranognosy rather than Uranography; because, while on our earth the situations of its several parts, with relation to each other when measured upon a large scale, are never observed to undergo any considerable change, those of the bodies of which the whole universe is composed, are, as far as observation or indication may be depended upon,—are all, with relation to each other, in a state of constant relative motion; and, accordingly, their relative situations undergoing continual change.

Uranognosy, or even Uranography, in preference to Astronomy, because, by the word Astronomy, a needless separation is made of the bodies which, whilst some perceptibly, others imperceptibly, are continually moving in their boundless field.

II.

Sciences having for their subject the Predicament of Motion.

Had it happened to this Predicament to have been customarily taken for the subject of contemplation in its whole extent, i. e. under all the applications capable of being made of it to particulars, Kineciology, or Kinematology, or some such word, might have been the name allotted to it.

Taken in its whole extent, however, it presented not any such identity or unity of interest as to give occasion to a portion of science having exactly those same dimensions.

In the case, however, in which the motion is considered as receiving its direction from the hand of man, whether its origin be or be not derived from that source, it has received principally from the pens of French philosophers a name of its own, viz. La Dynamique,—with an English termination, Dynamics. Δυναμις is the Greek word for power, and it is by direction given to motion, that is, to matter in a state of relative motion, that mechanical power is produced and employed.

Of the field of Dynamics, a great, but scarcely a determinate, portion is occupied by Mechanics, taken in the narrowest sense in which it is commonly employed.

When motion, considered in the case in which it has its origin in volition, in animal volition, is excepted, motion in every other case has for its cause or shape that to which the name of attraction has, since the time of Newton, been applied, or its opposite and antagonist, repulsion.

In other words, to one or other of these heads, or both together, will be found referable every motion which, for the purpose of Technology, has been employed or regarded as capable of being employed in addition to, and in aid of, animal force in the character of a primum mobile.

It is by the balance between the several modifications of attraction on the one hand,* and of repulsion† on the other, that the relative situation of the particles of the several bodies, one amongst another, and thence the weight and texture of those bodies respectively are determined.

III.

Sciences, having for their Subject the Predicament of Time.

By chronology, events, in so far as a persuasion, more or less intense or decided in affirmation of their existence, has been suggested by appropriate evidence, are presented to our view; events, considered as the word itself imparts with reference to time, with which is also commonly connected a reference to place.

In so far as in addition to the events themselves, nakedly considered, intimation is given of accompanying circumstances, in so far as they have appeared material, and therein and therewith of the real or supposed causes and anti-causes, instruments, agents and counter-agents, principal and accessory, chronology takes the name of history.

According as it takes for its subject the transactions of political states, or other aggregate bodies of men, history is either aggregate, commonly termed general or individual, i. e. if taking for its subject what has been supposed to have been done and experienced by this or that individual. For the designation of individual history, the appellation commonly employed is the Greek-sprung word biography; literally, the delineation of life.

IV.

Sciences, having for their Subjects the Predicaments of Number, Figure, and Quantity.

Among the three predicaments respectively designated by these three names, the nature and intimacy of the relation that has place, has already been brought to view. Of figure, the modifications are scarcely conceivable, nor, accordingly, clearly expressible, otherwise than by means of number; whilst quantity is a predicament including both, and, therefore, still more abstract than either.

By the Greek-sprung word posology, the science of quantity, may, it is believed, and if so, now for the first time, not inappositely be distinguished.

Melomorphic, or say, morphoscopic, and amelomorphic, having regard to figure, and not having regard to figure; to the one or other of these denominations will the whole contents of the field of posology be found referable.

Of posology, the melomorphic, or morphoscopic branch has found in the word geometry, (measurement of the earth,) a denomination altogether familiar, but far from being co-extensively expressive. In the practice of measuring the earth may be found the origin of this branch of art and science, as well as one of its great uses. But besides the earth, it is, moreover, employed in the measuring of the rest of the visible universe. Not unfrequently, in the measuring of imaginary and unexemplified extension, i. e. in the measuring of nothing at all; and it is when thus employed, that those, by whom it is cultivated, seem most proud of it.

Oristic, and aoristic, or more expressively, oristicosemeiotic and aoristicosemeiotic, determinately and indeterminately expressed—to one or other of these denominations, will the whole contents of the field of amelomorphic posology be found referable.

Of amelomorphic posology, the oristicosemeiotic branch has always had an appellative, no less apposite and expressive, than familiar in the word arithmetic, i. e. the art and science which has numbers for its subject,—the art of applying numbers to use, including the science of the properties of numbers, the aoristicosemeiotic, in the Arabic-sprung word algebra, an appellative not much less familiar, but altogether inapposite and unexpressive.

For the designation of the branch of art and science, for the designation of which the word posology has been as above proposed, the word familiarly employed, is, as every one knows, the word mathematics,—a word not altogether inapposite, but, in an enormous degree, uncommensurably expressive. For in its original language, of what is it that the word is expressive? of everything that is ever learned, neither more nor less. But for this abuse, in the designation of the class of intellectual exercises, by which a lesson is got, the adjunct mathematic would, in consideration of its familiarity, have been employed. But in the constantly erroneous conception, of which, in consequence of the abusive extension thus given to it, it could not have failed of being productive, an exclusive negative was found opposed to the use of it.

Applied and unapplied.—According to another principle or source of division, may the field of posology, taken in its whole extent as above sketched, be divided.

Instead of applied, mixed, instead of unapplied, pure, are the terms in familiar use.

In so far as by pure, neither more nor less is expressed or suggested than with reference to some correspondent object unapplied to, and thence unmixed with, it is simply and coextensively synonymous with unapplied, and in so far not pregnant with error and delusion.

But here steps in imagination; and forasmuch as in their physioplastic state, most objects are found in a state of combination with others, and all objects have a tendency to combination with others, while, at the same time, for many useful purposes, it is necessary to have them in a state as free from combination as possible, (whether to the end that they may be applied to use in that state, or that for the purpose of being applied to use, they may be made to enter into new combinations;) and, whereas, the bringing them into, or keeping them in, that state, is very commonly a work of more or less considerable difficulty, as well as labour and expense; thence it is, that to this fundamental idea of the absence of combination, imagination, by means of the association of ideas, has attached the accessory sentiment of approbation, which, being indiscriminating, has given to its application an extent more or less outstretching that which, by the precept of utility, would have been marked out for it; inasmuch, that through no inconsiderable part of the extent given to the application of it, the word pure is synonymous to useless.

V. Of Space and Rest.—Of these predicaments,—of these supremely abstract and comprehensive appellatives, two have been mentioned, viz. void space or vacuity, and rest, (i. e. relative rest, absolute, there being none, of which, in any instance, the existence is either known or probable,) which are not of the number of those which have become the subjects of so many correspondent branches of art and science.

Of the exceptions thus constituted, (to the general rule,) the cause seems not unobvious: presenting no variety, no change, neither of them is a source of use, nor, on any other account, an object of curiosity.

Pathematology, by this name may be designated the science of psychology, in so far as pleasure or pain are taken for the subjects of it,—applied to pleasure, it will receive the specific name of Edonology,—applied to pain, that of Odynology.

But for pre-established associations, pathology, as equally apposite, would, in respect of brevity, have furnished a preferable name. The appellative, however, has been employed by the art and science of medicine, and after being shorn of a great part of its import, confined to a corner of the field occupied by that science.

Pleasure and pain being the only objects possessed of intrinsic and independent value, simple perceptions, perceptions, if any such there were, altogether unconnected with either pleasure or pain, would have no claim to attention, would not, in fact, engage attention, would not be comprehended within any part of the field of art and science.

In general pathematic feelings, i. e. pleasure or pain, and apathematic feelings, i. e. simple perceptions considered in so far as separable from pleasures and pains, are experienced together,—are simultaneously concomitant. But although instances are not wanting in which as on the one hand perceptions might be found unaccompanied with pleasure or pain, so also, on the other hand, if not pleasure, pain at any rate, unaccompanied with any perception distinguishable from itself.

But abundant are the instances in which a simple perception, which has neither pleasure nor pain for its contemporary adjunct, may, through the medium of attention, reflection, volition and transitive action, reckon feelings of both sorts in abundance among its consequences; and hence it is that, except for clearness of intellection, the distinction between pathematic and apathematic perception becomes void of practical use.

Simple perception, simple remembrance, enjoyment, i. e. sensation of pleasure;—sufferance, i. e. sensation of pain,—attention, reflection, examination, judgment or opinion or judicial determination, volition, volitional determination, internal action, external action,—all these, on one and the same occasion, indeed on most occasions, all these several accidents are taking place at the same time; but, in the way of abstraction, for the purpose of science, any one of them, every one of them, may be, and has been, detached from the rest, and held up to view, and subjected to examination by itself. So many of these incidents as are capable of being distinguished from each other, so many compartments or separate fields are included within the vast all-comprehensive field of psychology.

In the production of the events of which it is the scene, the state of the mind is either active or purely passive—purely passive in so far as the will bears no part in the production of them—active in so far as in the production of them, the will has had a perceptible and efficient share.

When in the production of the result the will has had a perceptible and efficient share, the field in which that result has had place has either been confined within the precincts of the mind itself, or has extended beyond those precincts;—in the first case, the act to which the will has given birth, and in the production of which its efficiency has consisted, may be, and actually has been, termed an intransitive act, in the other case a transitive one.

In so far as the will is concerned in the production of any result, the field of the corresponding branch of science which takes cognizance of such result, may be termed the field of Thelematology.

In so far as either the will has borne no part in the production of the result in question, or the field of its operation has been confined within the precincts of the mind,—the field of the corresponding branch of science may be termed the field of noology. Passive, or purely passive noology, when in the production of the result the will has had no share:—active, in so far as in the production of the impression made and correspondent change produced in the mind, the will has borne a share.

Thelematology, or thelematognosy, has pathematology for its basis. It is by the eventual expectation of pleasure or pain that in every case the will, and thereby the agency, internal only, or internal and external together, are determined. It is by the idea of pleasure or of exemption from pain, considered as about to result from the proposed act, that the volition in pursuance of which the act is performed, and consequently the act itself, is produced.

In the character of ends, and in the character of means, in that double character it is that pleasures and pains or their respective negatives are continually presenting themselves, not pain itself, but its negative, i. e. exemption from pain is the end; but in the character of a means, pain itself operates, as well as its negative—pain itself as well as pleasure.

What dynamics is to somatology, the practical branch of thelematology, or the art of giving direction to volition, and thereby to action, is to psychognosy or psychology,—it may be termed psychological dynamics.

From somatology and psychology taken together, eudæmonics, or the art of applying life to the maximization of wellbeing, derives its knowledge of the phenomena belonging to human existence considered as applicable to that its purpose. In the one word Deontology may be comprehended the knowledge, in so far as by art it is attainable, of the course by which, on each occasion, those means may, with most advantage, be rendered conducive to that common end.

In the field of Deontology, as thus explained, will be found included the several fields of Ethics, meaning private Ethics or morals, internal government and international law.

If on ground so thorny and so slippery inquiry could be warranted in expressing itself with that intensity of persuasion, that fulness of assurance which is included in the import of the word knowledge, the field of deontognosy would be the more expressive denomination for the designation of the field of this branch of art and science. In that case, Deontognosy would be the knowledge of what, on every occasion, is by the person in question proper* to be done.

Were it not for the extent thus given to Deontology, upon a great part, not to say the greatest part of what has been advanced and written on the subject of Ethics, of government and of international law taken together, an exclusion would be put.

Of Deontology, the field is either private or public, and for the division of the science itself these adjuncts may accordingly be made to serve.

Intransitive and transitive, to one or other of these denominations will the whole contents of the field of private deontology be found referable. Intransitive, in so far as that individual, and no other, whose agency is, on the occasion in question, the object of consideration, the person for whose guidance the inquiry is made, is the party whose wellbeing is taken into consideration and included in the account. Transitive, in so far as in the account in question, the wellbeing of any other individual or individuals, is considered.

National and international, to one or other of these denominations will whatsoever belongs to the subject of public deontology be found referable: national, in so far as in the consideration of the effects of the act or course of conduct which is in contemplation, in the list of the persons whose wellbeing is taken into account, all the members, rulers, and subjects, taken together, of the political state in question, all these, but no others, are taken into this account. International or universal, in so far as the wellbeing of the members of all other political states taken together, or of this or that individual member of such foreign political state, is taken into the account.

When, in so far as the person in question is considered as occupying the situation of a member of the ruling few, the art and science of deontology will coincide with the art and science of government, within the field of which art and science is included the art and science of legislation, together with what remains of the field of government after abstraction made of the field of legislation,—which remainder may be designated, as it commonly appears to be, by the appellation of the field of administration.

As, for its end to pathematology,—so it is to thelematology, and thence to psychical dynamics that deontology looks for its means.

Section III.

Uses of the foregoing Divisions.

To what purpose all this ramification, all these divisions, subdivisions, and sub-subdivisions, to what purpose all this neology? The words which to everybody are so familiar, of which the application is so easy, why seek to disturb the possession they have so long held of the field of art and science?

Answer,—to enable you, whomsoever it may concern, should you ever happen to be in the humour, not only to complete an all-comprehensive view of the field of art and science, but also an observation of the mutual relation and connexion of its several compartments, and their respective contents; at the same time to show in what way those contents are respectively of a nature to be regarded as interesting, and as such, as qualifying the whole system to make an adequate return, for any such labour as any person may feel himself disposed to employ in the examination of it.

This view, this observation, the assemblage of names in use,—so long as they are employed to the exclusion of a connected and consistent system of nomenclature, such as the foregoing has endeavoured to render itself,—will not suffer to be taken.

In the first place, as to the principle or source of division. The point of view in which it places the whole field is not merely the most interesting in which it is capable of being placed, but the only one to which in itself the appellation of interesting can with propriety be applied. Unless in so far as it means conducive to wellbeing—to the maximization of the aggregate mass of pleasure—to the minimization of the aggregate mass of pain, the word interesting is devoid of meaning.

In the next place, as to the denominations, divisions, and subdivisions, and the names given to the results.

It is only by a correspondent set of apposite names, that the relations that have place between different objects can be instructively and conveniently expressed, and thereby as far as by general words can be done, the nature, the true and distinctive nature, of those several objects made known.

By the most and all-comprehensive term of every system, those properties are expressed which are common to all the individual objects which are understood to be designated by, and comprehended in, the import of that universal appellative. Divide that aggregate into two parts, taking care at the same time that, in one or other of those parts, every individual comprehended in the whole shall be included,—by the names respectively given to those two parts, whatsoever properties are peculiar to the contents of each in contradistinction to the contents of the other, are designated. But in so far as, in addition to all those properties which it has in common with other objects, those which are peculiar to itself are known and understood, the nature of the object, be it what it may, is understood.

In addition to that vast assemblage of common properties which is designated by the universal name, the greater the number of the divisions and subdivisions which are thus made,—while to the two lesser aggregates forming the result of each act of division, apposite denominations, expressive of a property by which the contents of each of the two compartments are distinguished from those of the other, are attached,—the greater the number of those successive acts of division, the more clearly each one of the individual objects contained under them is rendered distinguishable from every other, with which, but for the distinctions thus brought to view, it might have been in danger of being confounded.

Such is the use of apposite names, now observe the inconvenience produced by inapposite ones.

Of their inappositeness, the consequence is, that, in conjunction with the ideas which they are employed and intended to present to view, they are continually presenting to view others which are quite different, and which, in so far as on the occasion in question, they are annexed to the words in question, are productive of constant confusion and frequent error.

True it is that originally, i. e. antecedently to established associations, neither appositeness, nor, consequently, inappositeness, are among the properties of language. For giving expression to any idea, any and every combination of sounds or figures, is as apposite as any other. But in so far as between ideas on the one part, and sounds or visible signs on the other, associations have already been formed, then in so far it is that inappositeness as well as appositeness has place: with relation to the idea which for the first time it is employed or about to be employed to designate, a term is apposite when, in virtue of the family connexions with which it is already provided, it has a tendency, upon the first mention, to dispose the mind to ascribe to it properties, whatsoever they may be, by which that object is distinguished from other objects: it is inapposite, in as far as in virtue, and by means of such its connexion, its tendency is to dispose the mind to ascribe to it, instead of the properties which are thus peculiar to it, others which it is not possessed of, or at any rate which are not peculiar to it. Thus of appositeness on the part of the appellative, on the part of the mind to which it presents itself, correct at least, if not complete conception, is at first sight the natural result: of inappositeness, conception always more or less incomplete, and frequently altogether incorrect and erroneous.

In the above analytical sketch, the dichotomous, bifurcate, two-pronged plan of division is that which it may have been observed, has all along been endeavoured to be employed. The ground and reason of this choice are as follows.*

In the instance here brought forward on the occasion of the first divisional operation, the dividend taken in hand was the aggregate composed of all bodies whatsoever. By the first operation performed on it as above, it was divided into two condivident portions, to one of which all bodies in which the property of life is to be found were referred, to the other all bodies in which that property is not to be found.

Take then any individual body for example. It being referred to the aggregate, distinguished by the adjunct animated, if that adjunct be with truth and propriety applied to it, what we learn thereby is, that it is possessed of all those properties the aggregate of which is designated by the term life.

Proceed now and perform an ulterior, viz. the next ulterior divisional operation. Taking for the dividend that one of the two condivident portions for the designation of which, on the occasion of the first divisional operation, the word animated was employed. For the principle or source of division, take, on this occasion, the property designated by the word sensation; on this, as on the former occasion, dividing the aggregate into two portions or heaps, throw into the first heap all such individuals in which this ulterior property is to be found, leaving for the second heap all those in which it is not to be found.

In this way, to the information which concerning the individual or species in question is conveyed, by referring it to the several appellatives, body and animated body, may be added this further information, conveyed by the referring it to the ulterior additional appellative, sensitive animated body, or to omit the intermediate adjunct as unnecessary, (since if the divisional process have been rightly carried on, i. e. upon the exhaustive plan as here described, then if the object in question be sensitive it cannot but be animated,) to the shorter appellative sensitive body.

Thus much for theory. But the sort of information thus conveyed does it end in theory? Is it inapplicable to practice? If so it were it would be useless; if so it had been deemed, no such labour as has here been bestowed upon the endeavour to render it intelligible would have been expended upon it. But far indeed is it from being devoid of use. Correspondent to, and in every considerate mind determined by, the properties which it is found to possess, is the manner in which the object, be it what it may, requires to be, and will be dealt with.

In one of his newly visited, and at the same time conquered countries, Alexander was one day taking a walk in a wood. Aristotle was in his company. Pointing to something on the ground, which had caught his attention,—“What is that?” said the monarch. “A leaf,” answered the philosopher. “A leaf, say you? why, you sec it moves.” “Indeed, and so it does. It is not a leaf, it is an animal; it is a particular species of insect,—the leaf-caterpillar. I must deal with it accordingly, if it be the pleasure of your majesty to have it kept.” A little further on,—“There is another odd thing,” cried the conqueror; “that stick, it seems to be, that is just by you. Do so much as pick it up.” “Gladly,” replied the naturalist, “had I durst. That stick, as it seemed to you, was a serpent, and one of the most deadly sort; I have crushed it and killed it, or by this time it would have killed me.”

Take any object at pleasure, and at the same time take any property at pleasure, to that same object either that same property does belong, or it does not. This property belongs to that object,—this property does not belong to that object. The two propositions are, with reference to each other, termed contradictory ones. To whatsoever object applied, both of them cannot be true; one or other of them is sure to be so.

Hence may be seen the convenience of that plan of division, according to which, in one or other of the two compartments or condivident portions into which, at each step, the dividend is divided, every particular contained under the name of the dividend is sure to be found. If the dividend thus assumed be that one object by which the whole field of art and science is occupied and covered, proportioned to the number of operations which, under this plan of division, can be performed with truth, the nature of everything contained in that field is gradually developed; and in proportion as it is developed, clearly and thoroughly expressed and made known.

This being the case, the consequence is, that in so far as the observations, in pursuance of which the properties in question have been ascribed to the object in question, are correct, truth will be the property of every proposition by which an object is referred, to any one of the heaps and correspondent compartments thus formed. At every step, be the individual or other particular object what it may, so it does but belong to the universal, all comprehensive aggregate, which stands at the top of the system, to one or other of the heaps or compartments thus formed, it cannot but belong, and at the same time it cannot belong to both of them. Hence it is, that so long as the divisional process proceeds upon this plan,—so long it is that of the whole contents of the universal, all-comprehensive aggregate, no one item is omitted; which, in other words, is as much as to say, that the plan of division is all-comprehensive and exhaustive; that the whole stock of materials contained under the appellative by which the universal aggregate is designated, is all along exhausted to furnish the matter on which the operations are successively performed.

Instead of bifurcate, two-pronged, suppose the plan of division, for example, trifurcate, three-pronged. So long as it remains in this state, the test of all-comprehensiveness, as above, not being applied to it, so long it is, that whether it be all-comprehensive, whether the whole stock of the matters contained in the dividend be, or be not, lodged in these three condivident portions, and in that way the dividend compartment drained and exhausted of its matter, remains unindicated. If the conditions necessary, as above, to the rendering the division all along exhaustive, have been fulfilled, then so it is, that in itself, and in truth, exhaustive it will be; but in this case, though by the supposition it be exhaustive, yet this is more than it will be shown to be, and, in so far as seeing depends upon showing, seen to be.

Minerals, vegetables, animals.—Here of the all-comprehensive aggregate, designated by the word bodies, we have three condivident portions, which are the result of a division of the three-pronged kind,—minerals, vegetables, and animals, subjects of so many kingdoms, formed by some logician when in a poetic mood for the containing of them. Now, so it does happen, that by these several appellatives taken together, all individual bodies whatsoever are designated, and thereby, in the allotment thus made of subjects to and for the three kingdoms, the population of the whole empire, out of which portions were taken to people the dominions of these same three kingdoms, was and is exhausted. Of this exhaustion, the proof may be afforded, and has been afforded, by the application of the test of exhaustiveness, as above described and exemplified. But this is more than either is announced by the name thus given to them, or would be announced in and by any tabular view, in which, without any intimation given of the two dichotomous divisional operations, of which these three compartments are the results, they were exhibited in the character of so many portions of the all-comprehensive aggregate, into which, by one and the same operation, that aggregate had been divided.

So, again, with regard to indication given of properties distinctive, as well as of properties aggregative; points of difference, as well as points of similitude; that minerals, while agreeing with vegetables in being bodies, disagree with them in not being endued with life; that vegetables, while agreeing with animals in being endued with life, disagree with them in not being endued with sensation. All this, from one source or other, we know, or upon a moment’s instruction may be made to know,—such of us as are acquainted with the application made of these general names to individuals; but of this, by the names themselves, no intimation is conveyed. By the term vegetable, what is indicated is,—that vegetables possess a species of life, viz. the vegetable species of life, but that, in addition to this faculty, the other faculty of sensation is not possessed by them. Of this property, (life, viz.,) though equally belonging to them, no indication, useful and instructive as it would be, viz. by serving to distinguish them from animals, to prevent their being regarded as possessed of a property, of which they are not in truth possessed, is afforded.

This example, though, of any that could have been found, it is, by reason of its familiarity, the fittest for conveying, in relation to the plan of division and arrangement in question, a clear and adequate conception, is, by that very reason, the least fit for giving, at least to a cursory view, an adequate conception of its utility; that which, when applied to other subjects, it is so exclusively qualified for making known, being, in this instance universally known without it.

The further the operation is continued, in other words, the number of steps taken, in and by the performance of it, the longer and more complex would be the names thus given to the continually lesser and lesser aggregates, which, by this division, are obtained. In a synoptic table, an instrument designed for the eye rather than the ear, this inconvenience may, under favour of a well-adapted language, remain for some time almost imperceptible; but in a running discourse, a discourse designed for the ear, as well as the eye, it would probably become intolerable. In ordinary discourse, therefore, at the second, if not at the very first, operation, the necessity will be felt of substituting, in the instance of each aggregate, in place of the two-worded appellative exhibited by the table, a single-worded one. Thus, in English, to the two-worded appellative material substance, on the occasion of the first division made of the import of the universal appellative body: a fortiori to the three-worded appellative living material substance,—a single-worded appellative, so it were that the English language (as do the Greek* and Latin† languages) afforded one;—a fortiori, again on the occasion of a second division to the three-worded appellative, insensitive living body, or the four-worded appellative, insensitive living corporeal substance, will require to be substituted another single-worded appellative, such as plant or vegetable, and so in the case of the opposite result of this same division, viz. animal.

On this occasion the logician finds himself under the obligation of employing the same sort of expedient as, on a similar occasion, is wont to be employed by the algebraist, who to a heap of a’s, b’s, and c’s, mixed up with a heap of x’s, y’s, and z’s, forms to himself, in the shape of a single s, a concise and most commodious substitute.

At every step taken in the track of exhaustive division, the condivident aggregates, or two prongs which are the result when added to the divided aggregate which forms the stem, exhibit a definition, and that of the regular kind, a definition per genus et differentiam of the two aggregates thus brought to view.

Thus, in the Porphyrian tree, the two terms living and lifeless, present, when added to the term body, the definition of any term in the import of which the import of either of the two terms respectively employed for the designation of them shall be included.

True it is, that in relation to this instrument of instruction, thus much must be confessed, viz.

1. That it is an instrument, for the due handling of which no small quantity of mental labour, coupled with no slight portion of knowledge, and no small degree of correctness on the part of the judgment, are necessary.

2. That in respect of the stock which it requires of those qualities of which they being, when separately taken, so rare, are, when in conjunction, consequently so much more so, the number of the divisional operations employed, and consequently the number of aggregates, one within another, which are the result, must perforce receive a pretty early limitation.

3. That in so far as error creeps in, instead of the true and clear instruction which it is in its nature to convey, false instruction and confusion will be conveyed by it.

4. That such error will be liable and apt to be the result, wheresoever, previously to the fixation of the two condivident appellatives, the test of exhaustiveness, as above described, is omitted to be applied to the result of the division which has been made.

5. That though, if it were possible for every race of individuals, or even for every individual object comprehended in the aggregate in question, to be included in the view given of the contents, our acquaintance with the contents would be by so much the more perfect, and the table thereby so much the more useful, yet it is to a comparatively very small number of divisions, and thence to a correspondently very small number of articles constituting the results of these divisions, that the usefulness, and even that the practical application of this useful instrument will unavoidably be found confined.

6. That accordingly, the faculty of making use of it with advantage, will be found confined in its application to the largest aggregates which the nature of things affords, as well as to a small number of the steps which, in the course of the divisional plan, might, by possibility be made. The greater the labour, the complexity, and nicety, of the operation, the fewer the occasions on which, with an effect advantageous upon the whole, it can be employed.

But of these observations, what is the result with regard to this instrument? Much the same as with regard to gold,—not that it is of no use—not that it is of no value; but that the getting it for use is an affair of no small difficulty, and that, accordingly, of the whole number of occasions on which a man would be the better for employing it, and would accordingly be glad to employ it if he could, it is but in a small part that he is able to employ it.

7. That though to maximize the instructiveness of the partition, it is necessary to render it demonstratively and manifestly bifurcate, in which case, at each operation, the numbers of parts into which the whole aggregate is divided, will be no more than two, yet to the number of the directions in which, or sources of division from which, the whole may thus be successively divided, there is no limit. In the direction of the sections, at right angles to that direction,—at any angle other than a right angle,—in any one or more of these ways may an orange be divided, yet in each instance into two, and but two parts, and thus far even into equal ones, not to speak of the infinity of the modes into which it may be divided into two unequal ones.

Of this diversified plan of bifurcate and exhaustive division, this division from several sources,—the use is to reach such general terms as the usage of language has established, and therewith exhibit the several relations which the objects respectively designated by them, bear to each other, viz. in so far as the aggregates which they respectively serve to designate, have been so made up, that, if the course of the division were confined to one direction, the nature of the case would not admit of any such course being carried on upon the bifurcate and exhaustive plan, as would take them in.

ESSAY ON LANGUAGE; NOW FIRST PUBLISHED, FROM THE MANUSCRIPTS OF JEREMY BENTHAM.

[† ] Many of the subjects of this Appendix will be found discussed more at length in Chrestomathia, appendix.—Ed.

[‡ ] Like so many other histories of modern date, the present is a history partly of what, in the way in question, the hero actually did, partly of what he might have done. What he actually did, may be seen in a little work, in one or two small 12mo volumes, entitled, Traité des Sensations. It is not known to have ever been translated into English, though on the subject of logic it contains a quantity of information not derivable from any other source.

[* ] See the tract on Ontology in this volume, with its division of entities into real and fictitious,—perceptible and inferential.

[† ] See Chrestomathia, supra, p. 82.

[‡ ] Examples: Mathematics, dynamics, therapeutics, asthetics, tactics.

[* ] From the Greek word for body, viz. σωμα.

[† ] From the Greek word for soul, viz. Ψυχη.

[‡ ] See the inaptness of the terms Natural History and Natural Philosophy discussed above, p. 68, et seq. An exposition in somewhat similar terms follows in the MS. of the text.—Ed.

[* ] Attraction of gravitation, attraction of cohesion, and chemical attraction,—electrical, and galvanical, and magnetical included.

[† ] Repulsion exhibited in the clusters of bodies, whether in a solid, liquid, or gaseous state. Ditto, produced in all these several cases by the addition of caloric.

[* ] Of this word proper, with its conjugate propriety, and its quasi-conjugate unfit, the use made has for its causes, efficient as well as rational, the desire of including whatsoever has been advanced on the subject, without as well as with regard to the effect producible in respect of wellbeing, by the course of conduct which on the several occasions has, under the notion of its propriety, been prescribed or recommended.

[* ] Here follow general reasons for preferring the dichotomous mode of division, similar to those which will be found at length, supra, p. 102, et seq. These are omitted; but the continuation, though containing some repetitions, is valuable as a more minute practical illustration than the author elsewhere gives of the application of the system. Table V., attached to Chrestomathia, exemplifies the dichotomous division; and the Porphyrian Tree, referred to in the text, is exemplified in Table IV.—Ed.

[* ][Editor: illegible word].

[† ] Vivus.