Front Page Titles (by Subject) APPENDIX.—A.: PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND. - The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 8 (Chrestomathia, Essays on Logic and Grammar, Tracts on Poor Laws, Tracts on Spanish Affairs)
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APPENDIX.—A.: PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 8 (Chrestomathia, Essays on Logic and Grammar, Tracts on Poor Laws, Tracts on Spanish Affairs) 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). In 11 vols. Volume 8.
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PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND.
Analytical View of the Phenomena of the Human Mind.
The whole structure of the mind may be considered as included in two faculties, viz. the perceptive and the appetitive.
To the perceptive belong all mental experiences,—simple experiences;—to the appetitive all mental operations and their results.
In the perceptive faculty the judicial may, in a certain point of view, be considered as included.
To the head of experiences may be referred the following phenomena.
1.Apathematic perceptions;—perceptions as they have place in the case in which they do not consist of, nor are attended with, any distinguishable pain or pleasure.
2.Pathematic perceptions;—perceptions as they have place in the case where they consist of, or are attended with, sensations or feelings either of pain or pleasure, i. e. are attended with pains or painful perceptions, or pleasures or pleasurable perceptions.
Pathematic, or apathematic perceptions, may be distinguished into judgment-not-involving, and judgment-involving.
A judgment-involving perception is the perception of a relation, i. e. of the existence of a relation between some two objects.
One of the relations most frequently exemplified in this way, is the relation of cause and effect.
Between a judgment-involving, and a judgment-not-involving, perception, the differential character is this:—In so far as an experience or act of the judicial faculty is not involved in the perception in question, it is not susceptible of error,—in so far as any such experience or act is involved, it is susceptible of error.
The case of a judgment-involving perception is exemplified in, and by, every one of the five senses.
1. I open my eyes,—I see something before me,—it seems to me that it is a distant hill; but in fact it is a cloud. Here is a misjudgment, here is error. But that I see something, i. e. that on the retina of my eyes an image is depicted, in this is no error.
2. I hear a sound,—to me it seems the voice of a man at a distance, but in fact it is the cry of an owl.
3. I am sitting in the dark,—a piece of drapery is presented to me;—I am asked what it is, I pronounce it silk-velvet; but in fact it is cotton-velvet.
4. Left in the dark, a plate of boiled vegetables is placed before me,—I am asked what it is—it tastes like spinach, but in fact it is beet leaves.
5. Still in the dark, a flower is presented to me,—I am asked what it is—it smells to me like a pink, but in fact it is a carnation.
In the production of that state of mind in which a perception whether judgment-involving, or judgment-not-involving, has place, objects exterior to the body have, or have not, borne a part. In the first case, the perception may be termed a perception ab extra, or say derivative;—in the other case, a perception purely ab intra, or say indigenous.
Of derivative perceptions, the above five are each of them so many exemplifications.
Of indigenous perceptions, a sense of dilatation in the stomach, a sense of increased or diminished heat, are exemplifications,—in all or in each of which cases, the perception may be apathematic or pathematic,—and, if pathematic, accompanied either with pain or pleasure.
Operations—Results of the Exercise of the Appetitive Faculty.
Every operation of the mind, and thence every operation of the body, is the result of an exercise of the will, or volitional faculty. The volitional is a branch of the appetitive faculty, i. e. that faculty in which desire, in all its several modifications, has place.
Desire has for its object either pleasure or pain, or, what is commonly the case, a mixture of both, in ever varying and unascertainable proportions.
The desire which has pleasure for its object, is the desire of the presence of such pleasure. Desire which has pain for its object, is the desire of the absence of such pain.
I see an apple, I conceive a desire to eat, and thence to possess that apple;—if not being either hungry or thirsty, my desire is, notwithstanding, excited by the supposed agreeable flavour of the apple, pleasure, and pleasure alone, viz. the presence of that pleasure, such as it is, is the object of my desire. If being either hungry or thirsty, or both, and that to a degree of uneasiness, pain, viz. the absence of that same uneasiness is moreover the object.
A desire then has, in every case, an internal object, viz. the corresponding pleasure, and in so far as that object has for its expected source an object exterior to the body, an external object.
A desire having pleasure alone, i. e. presence of pleasure for its internal object, has place, in so far as, from the presence or productiveness of the supposed source, pleasure is regarded as about to be eventually experienced.
A desire having pain alone, i. e. absence of pain for its internal object, has place in so far as, from the presence or productiveness of the supposed source, pain is regarded as being eventually about to be experienced.
A desire having pleasure and pain taken together for its internal object, has place, in so far as, while from the presence or productiveness of the supposed source, pleasure is regarded as being eventually about to be experienced, pain is, at the same time, experienced from the reflection of the actual absence of that same source;—or in so far as, while from the presence of the supposed source, pain is regarded as being eventually about to be experienced, pleasure is at the same time experienced from the reflection of the actual absence of that same source.
If the desire, being a desire having pleasure for its object, be, to a certain degree intense, in this case, so long as it remains unsatisfied, it has a certain degree of pain for its inseparable accompaniment, viz. the pain of non-possession, or say privation, produced by the absence of the source, and the consequent non-satisfaction of the desire.
If the desire be a desire having pain for its object, i. e. the absence of pain from this or that particular source, in this case, if the desire be to a certain degree intense, it has for its inseparable accompaniment, a persuasion more or less intense of the probability of a state of things, in which pain will be experienced.
Considered as having produced, or as being with more or less probability of success, operating towards the production of the result, (viz. presence of pleasure, or absence of pain,) which is the object of it, a desire is termed a motive.
In so far as the production of the state of things which is the immediate object of the desire, is considered as following immediately and certainly upon the existence of the desire an act of the will is said to take place,—the faculty by which this effect is considered as produced, is termed the volitional, or volitive faculty, or, in one word, the will.
The volitional faculty is, therefore, a branch of the appetitive.
But no act of the will can take place but in consequence of a correspondent desire; in consequence of the action of a desire in the character of a motive.
Also, no desire can have place, unless when the idea of pleasure or pain, in some shape or degree, has place. Minute, it is true, minute in the extreme is the quantity of pleasure or pain requisite and sufficient to the formation of a desire; but still it is not the less true,—take away all pleasure and all pain, and you have no desire.*
Pleasure and pain, considered in themselves, belong to the perceptive faculty, i. e. to the pathematic branch of it.
But pleasure and pain considered as operating, as above, in the production of desires, operating, as above, in the character of motives, and thus producing volition, action, internal or external, corporeal, or purely mental, belong to the appetitive faculty.
Pleasure and pain compose, therefore, as it were, the bond of union and channel of communication between the two faculties.
Attention is the result of an act of the will; of an exercise of the volitional branch of the appetitive faculty.
In so far as attention has place; in so far as attention is applied, either to the direction, or to the observation of an experience, the experience is converted into an operation; or, at any rate, in the field of thought, that place which would otherwise have been the field of an experience and nothing more, becomes now the field of an experience, and of a correspondent operation at the same time,—an operation having for its subject the object which was the source or seat of the experience.
In some instances, language affords not as yet any word, or words, by which the difference between the presence or absence of attention, in relation to the effect in question, is denoted.
Here the word judgment,—act of the judgment,—is the locution employed, as well in the case of those instantaneous and involuntary judgments, which, as above are commonly confounded with simple perception, and those attentive and elaborate judgments which are pronounced in the senate, on the bench, or in the laboratory of the chemist, or at the library-table of the logician.
Without attention, the memory is but the seat of a mere passive experience, which is termed remembrance. In consequence of an exertion or exercise of the will, importing attention applied to the purpose of searching out and bringing from the storehouse of the mind the impression in question, it becomes the seat and subject of an operation termed recollection.
Enumeration of the Mental Faculties.
Of a set of fictitious entities, to give a list, neither the correctness nor the completeness of which shall be exempt from dispute or doubt, cannot be a very easy task. Of the following articles, neither the perceptibility, (meaning that sort of perceptibility of which these sorts of fictitious entities are susceptible,) neither the perceptibility nor the mutual distinctness, say rather, distinguishability, seems much exposed to dispute.*
* 1.Perception; or say, perceptive faculty, alias simple apprehension.
* 2.Judgment; or say, judicial faculty.
* 3.Memory; or say, retentive faculty: this is either, 1. Passive; or 2. Active, i. e. recollective.
* 4.Deduction; or say, ratiocinative or deductive faculty that by which a number of judgments, i. e. acts of the Judicial faculty are deduced, one from another.
5.Abstraction; or say, abstractive faculty.
* 6.Imagination; or say, imaginative faculty, whereby a number of abstracted ideas, results or products of the exercise of the abstractive faculty, are compounded and put together.
7.Invention; or say, inventive faculty: whereby, out of a number of the products of the abstractive faculty, such compounds are formed as are new, i. e. were never produced before. Invention is imagination directed in its exercise to the attainment of some particular end.
8.Methodization; or say, arrangement, or the exercise of what may be termed the tactic faculty. It may be employed in the service of any one or more of the several faculties above-mentioned.
9.Attention; or say, the attentive faculty. The exercise of this faculty seems to be the result of an exercise of the will, of a special application made of the power of that faculty, to the purpose of attaching to their work, with different degrees of force, and for different lengths of time, any one or more of the several distinguishable faculties above-mentioned.
10.Observation. In this are included perception, memory, judgment, and commonly ratiocination, set, and kept at work, by attention, and directed commonly in their exercise, to the accomplishment of some particular end.
* 11.Communication; or say, the communicative faculty: a faculty which may have for its subject the results or products of the exercise of any one or more of the several faculties above-mentioned. Speaking, writing, and pantomime, i. e. discourse by gestures, or otherwise by deportment, are so many modes in and by which it is exercised.
Communication, on the one part supposes receipt, or say reception, on the other. In so far as to the exercise of the art of reception, attention on the part of the receiver is considered as necessary, the receiver is styled a learner.
Reflection is attention, considered as carried backwards, and applied to objects considered as presented and kept in view by the memory.
12.Comparison is attention, considered as applied alternately, and as nearly as possible simultaneously, to the two, or greater number of objects which are the subjects of it. For the purpose of giving direction to an exercise of the judicial faculty, the operation by which this faculty is exercised can scarcely, it is believed, be performed for a continuance, and with advantage, on more than two objects at a time; at any rate, to the purpose of noting points of resemblance and difference for the purpose of distributing an aggregate into parcels which are to be compared with one another, it is necessary to proceed, in the first instance, by dividing it, as it were, at one stroke. If, for any such purpose, objects in any number greater than two are compared with one another, the attention finds it necessary to divide the three, for this purpose, into two parcels, some one of the three objects forming one parcel, and the two remaining ones together another. Thus, in the case of physical motion, between any two objects, alternate motion is a sort of operation in itself extremely simple, produced with little difficulty, of which the exemplifications are numerous and frequently occurring, and which has, accordingly, received a name, viz. vibration; but, between any greater number, though it were so small as three, in nature no such alternate motion is to be found anywhere exemplified, nor could it, without a highly complicated system of machines, be produced: of this difference, a sort of exemplification seems even to be afforded by the very word between. Between, i. e. by twain, means by parcels consisting each of no more than two articles, as in the phrase, where it is said, let comparison be made between these two articles. Here, in this case, the comparison is understood to be perfectly made, or, at any rate, to be capable of being perfectly made.
But if the number of articles to be compared be greater than two, in this case the word between cannot, with propriety, he employed. Instead of it the language affords no word less improper than the word among. But a comparison made among three or more articles does not present itself in the character of a perfect one. It seems as if the comparison ought to be made either between any two leaving out the others, or between any one of them taken singly on the one part, and the other two formed into one parcel on the other part; in a word, where the word among, is used in this case, besides that the number of the objects in question is left indeterminate, the operation itself is not the same sort of operation as where the word between is employed.
Change the expression ever so often, still the difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of keeping under equal consideration for any considerable length of time any greater number of objects than two, presses itself into view. You may, indeed, say, compare together the objects A, B, and C; but, then, as in the case where the preposition, among, is employed, the comparison has the air of a confused, partial, and indeterminate one. But then, in each of these cases, so it is that, for the purpose of the comparison, the three articles are, in the first place, made up into one aggregate, and, in the next place, that aggregate is divided into two, and no more than two, parcels.
13. Synthesis or combination.
16. Analysis, i. e. division, viz. logical or anological analysis.
[* ] In the production of volition, a desire operating in the character of a motive is either certainly or not certainly effective; if certainly effective, an act of the will is the consequence. The cause of my own act is always my own desire; and in this sense my will is free. But the cause of that desire, what is it? In some cases I know what it is; in others not. When I know not what it is, how is my will free? The action of it is in so far dependent upon an unknown cause external to myself.
When I make my choice amongst a multitude of antagonizing desires, what is the cause of that choice?
[* ] Of those which are here distinguished by an * mention is made in D’Alembert’s Table, these and no others.
[* ] Respecting these five last-mentioned faculties, no further notice appears to have been taken in the MSS.—Ed.