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CHAPTER VI.: RELATION OF LOGIC TO THE BUSINESS OF HUMAN LIFE IN GENERAL, AND THEREIN TO ARTS AND SCIENCES, i. e. TO DISCIPLINES. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 8 (Chrestomathia, Essays on Logic and Grammar, Tracts on Poor Laws, Tracts on Spanish Affairs) 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). In 11 vols. Volume 8.
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RELATION OF LOGIC TO THE BUSINESS OF HUMAN LIFE IN GENERAL, AND THEREIN TO ARTS AND SCIENCES, i. e. TO DISCIPLINES.
Distinction between Disciplines and Occupations at large, its indeterminateness. Disciplines are Arts or Sciences—Distinction between Art and Science, its indeterminateness.
By what is it that the exercise of arts, and the acquisition of sciences, are distinguished from occupations at large? By what is it that the field of art, and that of science, are distinguished from each other.
On these several topics, clear conceptions must be formed and entertained, or the view taken of the field of thought and action, on the one hand, and the relation borne to it by the art of logic, on the other hand, will be unsteady and confused.
On these several topics, clear conceptions must be formed and entertained, or it cannot be understood what an art is, what a science is.
On these several topics clear conceptions must be formed and entertained, or it cannot be understood what is the proper matter for a work bearing the name of an Encyclopedia; where its subject begins, and where it ends.
As often as the words arts and sciences are pronounced, a natural, and, it is believed, a very general, not to say universal, supposition is—that, in the first place, arts and sciences taken together, are different and distinguishable from whatever is neither art nor science; in the next place, that art and science are no less clearly different and distinguishable from each other.
A supposition to this effect, how could it fail either to have been found, or to have been generally entertained? Wheresoever a difference in name presents itself to view, a correspondent difference in nature is, of course, inferred. What can be more natural than such an inference, and, in general, more reasonable than such an inference? The marking of correspondent differences in nature is the very purpose for which differences in nomenclature were invented and established.
Thus much is, indeed, undeniable. Unfortunately, besides that, while distinctions in name, without correspondent differences in nature, are not without example, an inconvenience much more frequently exemplified is, that of the classes or aggregates, for the designation of which these names are employed, the limits are far from being determinate.
As yet, throughout the whole field of language, which is as much as to say, throughout the whole field of thought and action, imperfections such as these are to be found in but too great abundance; little by little, from industry, guided by discernment, they may however expect a cure. In so far as conceptions are already distinct, apt denominations will find the public mind already disposed and prepared to receive and employ them at the first word, and thus the imperfection will be remedied before the existence of it has been so much as noticed. But, where conceptions are still confused and discordant, the imperfections may still be capable of receiving a remedy at the hands of individual industry, but before men can be induced to receive and make use of the remedy, it will, in general, be necessary that the existence of the imperfection, with its attendant inconveniences, should first be held up to view.
The plain truth of the matter seems to be this,—between the field of art and science, and the remainder of the field of thought and action, there exists not any assignable difference; correspondent to these denominations, what there exists in the case, is a difference in the state of the mind of those by whom the part in question, of that field, is cultivated; where the nature of the case requires an operation to be performed, and of that operation the performance is regarded as requiring study, i. e. a certain degree of attention and a certain degree of labour, employed in fixing it; then it is, that in speaking of the operation done, the word science, or the word art, or both together, are employed.
In so far as, whether with or without, a view to further action, so it is that, in the receipt and collection of the ideas belonging to the subject, perceptible labour is employed, then it is that the word science is employed, and such portion, whatever it be, of the field of thought and action to which the labour is applied, is considered as a portion of the field of science. In so far as a determinate object, in the character of an end, being in view, operation in the particular direction, is recurred to for the attainment of that end,—that portion, be it what it may, of the field of thought and action to which the labour is applied, is considered as part and parcel of the field of art.
Of the Business of human Life in General; and hence of Arts, Sciences, and Disciplines.
An occupation, the performance of which is considered as not requiring study:—An occupation, the performance of which is considered as requiring study; i. e. a course of labour, viz. mental alone, or mental and bodily together, in the endeavour to perform it in a manner conducive to the end in view; under one or other of these descriptions may every sort of occupation, which was, is, or ever can be exercised by any human being, be comprised.
Occupations of the studious kind, consisting in the acquiring, or endeavouring to acquire, what is called knowledge; i. e. the obtaining correct conceptions and judgments in relation to the subject in question, but without action in any shape, except that which is exerted or employed in the attainment of those conceptions, and the formations of those judgments, may be called speculative.
The acquisition of science is the result or object of occupations of the speculative class; in the exercise of occupations, which consist in the performance of some operation, consists the exercise of art.
To the number of the Disciplines—the arts and sciences taken together—the nature of the case admits not of any fixed limit.
At any given period, suppose the actual number of them to be what it may; for adding to that number, the nature of things will always furnish two courses. One is logical decomposition, taking in hand any discipline that at present has a name, considering the name of it as a generic name, and giving a particular name to some species, now for the first time distinguished from all other species contained under that generic name, and now for the first time fitted out with a particular name for itself; the other is taking out of the waste field of ordinary and undenominated practice, a mode of operation, and transplanting it into the enclosed and cultivated field of disciplines, of arts and sciences.
Of things capable of being known, there is not anything that may not be considered as the subject of a science.
Of things capable of being done, there is not anything that may not be considered as the subject or object of an art.
Among things capable of being known, between such as are considered as subjects of science, and any which are considered as not being subjects of science, the only distinction that can be assigned is this,—viz. that in the one case the thing is supposed to be capable of being known without effort, exertion, study; in the other case not:—effort, viz. either when it is considered in and by itself, or when it is considered in respect of some relation to other things, without the knowledge of which relation it is regarded as not being, properly speaking, capable of being known,—the relation being such as is considered as not being capable of being known without effort.
But by this account of it, every such distinction, it is seen, cannot but be an indeterminate one. Efforts vary in degree down to 0; and on the occasion of the knowledge of that object, to the knowledge of which effort is, in the instance of this or that individual, necessary; in the instance of this or that other individual, no perceptible effort will be necessary.
In so far as among an assemblage of things there exists such a relation as has the effect of causing such assemblage to be considered as constituting a whole; if, in so far as in the case of the class of men in question, that whole be of such a nature, as that the knowledge of that whole, or any considerable portion of it is considered as requiring a considerable degree of effort for the obtaining of it, this whole will naturally be considered as constituting the object of a science.
And so in the case of anything which, by a man, has occasion to be done.
To a considerable extent, different assemblages of these noscenda and facienda; of these subjects or objects of disciplines, have received names,—separate and specific names. And in some of these instances, the discipline has been commonly spoken of and considered as a science; in others as an art.
Where the effort, considered as necessary to the knowing what is to be known, is considered as greater than the effort considered necessary to the knowing what is to be done, the discipline has been put upon the list of sciences; in the opposite case, upon the list of arts.
The use of these observations is to obviate perplexing doubts, and useless and interminable disputations; doubts and disputes, the effect of which is, so far and so long as they have place, to keep involved in clouds the whole field of intellection, including not only the whole field of art and science, but the whole field of ordinary life and conversation.
The several disciplines, being each of them a means of happiness or well-being, considered with relation to mankind taken in the aggregate, the thing to be desired with a view to their happiness, is, that the quantity of disciplines should at all times be as great as possible. Say for shortness,—subservient to the maximum of happiness, is the maximum of disciplines.
But each portion of discipline, requiring for the acquisition of it a corresponding portion of time, and various disciplines being of such a nature, that the acquisition of them requires, in the character of a condition precedent, and sine quâ non, the possession of a particular situation in life; such, that the number of those within whose reach the faculty of occupying it is comparatively inconsiderable; hence it is, that to no one individual is the possession of this maximum of disciplines at any point of time possible.
Relation to well-being, the most instructive Bond of Connexion to all Arts and Sciences.
Logic, say the Aristotelians, is the art by which the mind of man is conducted to the tabernacle of knowledge. Let us now add,—in its road to the temple of happiness.
In this route, then, happiness is the polar star by which our steps will be guided—the test to which the several portions of knowledge will be subjected—the standard by which their value will be tried.
By the relation which the respective disciplines bear to happiness, the relation they bear to each other will be indicated and brought to view;* and in this manner a new mode of training will be applied to the celebrated Encyclopedical tree, cultivated with so much ingenuity and success by Bacon and D’Alembert.
Handmaid, or rather governess, to each individual art and science, Logic beholds, comprehended within her all comprehensive domain, the particular domain of each.
Application of Logic to advancement in the other branches of Art and Science.
By one single memento, as much may be done towards advancement in all the several branches of art and science, as by everything put together that can follow it.
On the occasion of every art and science, place before you continually the use or uses capable of being made of it, always with reference to happiness, in so far as capable of being influenced by it. For shortness, say, Look out for the end in view. More shortly still, and for strengthening the impression, borrowing an ancient and foreign language—Aspice finem.
Only by attention to the end—only in so far as attention is paid to the end, can improvement, in any shape, be made. Only with reference to use, understand always to the augmentation of happiness, in some shape or other, has knowledge, how consummate soever, any claim to attention;—only by its subserviency to practice, has knowledge any use,—only by its subserviency to art, is science in any shape of any use.
By science, we mean knowledge considered in respect of the attention employed in, or requisite to, the attainment of it.
Such being the course recommended with a view to advancement (whether in respect of the mode of learning and teaching the art and science in its present state, or by giving extension to the quantity of knowledge possessed, and the success with which the art is practised at present,)—of this memento, what is the use and need?—whence does it arise? Answer, it arises from the fact,—that the course commonly pursued is a different one. It consists in proceeding in the track in which others have proceeded: eyes directed constantly to the investigation of that track: never turned directly to the end in view.
Blind imitation track,—goose track,—sheep track;—geese follow the first that starts—sheep follow the bell-wether.
The track that presents itself as leading to the end in view, is the track pointed out by reason,—the track that others have travelled in, or are supposed to have travelled in, is the track pointed out by custom.
Changing the metaphor,—let reason be fruitful, custom barren. So preached Bacon, but hitherto with comparatively small effect—with small effect in comparison with what the reasonableness of the instruction upon the face of it would lead us to expect. To preserve the image, the fruitfulness of reason, has been that of the Foumart,—of custom that of a Doerabbit.
So little frequented is this only reasonable course, that whoso, in the study of any science, or practice of the corresponding art, is seen to pursue, or suspected to pursue it, is in such sort, and to such a degree thereby distinguished from the general run of the cultivators of that same art and science, as to be regarded as standing alone, and affecting singularity; and as such, becomes the object of a mixture of contempt and jealousy and envy:—of contempt, in so far as this practice of his is regarded as indicative of folly,—of jealousy, in so far as his success, and thereby his chance of superiority with reference to the person thus occupied in making observation of him, is an object of apprehension,—of envy, in so far as it is a subject matter of conviction and belief. Innovation is the word, by the use and application of which, expression is given to the sentiment of displeasure towards the person in speaking of the practice. Of the practice, and by reason of it, the practiser, it is made known that they are sources and objects of a sentiment of displeasure in the breast of the person by whom the word innovation is thus applied.
[* ] See Chrestomathia, Table V., supra, p. 82 et seq.