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APPENDIX.—No. IV.: ESSAY ON NOMENCLATURE AND CLASSIFICATION. * - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 8 (Chrestomathia, Essays on Logic and Grammar, Tracts on Poor Laws, Tracts on Spanish Affairs) 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). In 11 vols. Volume 8.
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ESSAY ON NOMENCLATURE AND CLASSIFICATION.*
Nomenclature of the main Branches of Art and Science—its Imperfections—with proposed Remedies. Systematic Table, prefixed by D’Alembert to the French Encyclopedia—its Imperfections—Specimen of a new one.
Plan of this Essay.
Deplorable it surely is, and, to a first view at least, not less extraordinary, that, for some of the most extensive, and most frequently mentioned, divisions of the field of Art and Science, even at so advanced a stage as that to which the human mind has already reached in its travels on that field, no tolerably expressive denominations should be to be found in the appropriate part of language.
Of language:—meaning, of course, the one which is here made use of; and which will not be denied to be one of the best cultivated languages which the present time affords; nor, in this particular, will the present state of any other language be found, it is believed, much more favourable.
That this unaptness has really place in the language, that real and practical inconveniences are among the actual results of it, and that, although not perhaps completely susceptible, it is, however, not altogether unsusceptible, of a remedy: such are the positions which it is the object of the following pages to present to view.
But, on the part of the intellectual subject or object in question—viz., the nomenclature of the aggregate body of the arts and sciences, in other words, the system of Encyclopedical nomenclature—this unaptness, in what does it consist?—Answer. In this: viz., that the nomenclature in question is not, either in the degree in which it is desirable that it should be, or in the degree in which it is capable of being made to be, subservient to those useful purposes, to which an instrument of this sort is capable of being rendered subservient.
In respect of any such useful purposes, to what immediate cause will any such failure, on the part of the subject in question, be to be attributed?—Answer: To its being deficient, in respect of one or more of those properties, which, ere it can be in a complete degree rendered subservient to those same useful purposes, it is necessary that it should possess.
In so far as, in any degree, it fails of being possessed of those same properties, and thereby of being capable of being rendered subservient to those same purposes, it will be found chargeable with certain correspondent imperfections, or points of imperfection.
To these several imperfections, if in the correspondent purposes, there be anything capable of entitling them to any such appellation as that of useful, it cannot but be desirable, that correspondent remedies should be applied. What then are they respectively, those purposes, those properties, those imperfections, and, if any such there be, those remedies? To find such answers as can be found, for this string of connected questions, is the object of the ensuing pages.
To a disquisition of this sort, inserted in such a work as the present, one very obvious objection presents itself. This is—that it is too abstract and abstruse; too logical; too metaphysical; or by whatever other epithet, for the purpose of condemnation, it may happen to it to be designated—too abstruse for the generality of readers, even of those by whom a course of education of the literary cast, carried on upon any of the customary plans, has been completed.
For this objection, however, an answer—which (it is hoped) will be found neither in point of fact incorrect, nor in point of argument irrelevant—is in equal readiness; at the conclusion of the Chrestomathic course, it will not be too abstruse for the comprehension of a Chrestomathic scholar.
What is there in it that, even to these striplings, should render it too abstruse? Is it the nature of the subject? Those parts excepted, which respectively regard general Ontology and Pneumatology—subjects, which for reasons already intimated, it has been found necessary to forbear including in the course—no one of all the subjects touched upon in it can be pointed out, which will not have been rendered altogether familiar to their view.
Is it then the language, from which, for giving expression to some of the leading ideas, words have been borrowed? Not to speak of its being the language constantly and universally drawn upon for such purposes, long before the scholars are arrived at this concluding stage, this same language will, in their eyes, have been stripped of all its terrors. Of those appellatives, for which custom has concurred with abstract convenience in resorting to a dead and foreign language, the interpretation will here be found all along subjoined; and in this very interpretation may the scholars, long before the conclusion of the course, have found matter for one of their exercises. True it is, that, as there has so often been occasion to observe, a hard word—a word belonging to a family of words, of which no other member is as yet known, constitutes, in every field over which it hangs, a dark spot; a spot, to which no eye, among those in which it excites the notion which that word is employed to express, can turn itself, without giving entrance to sentiments of humiliation and disgust. But, at the time in question, to the eye of a Chrestomathic scholar, in no part of the whole expanse of the field occupied by this sketch, will there be any such thing as a dark spot: to the original darkness, light will, in every instance, have been made to succeed.
Such is the objection, and such the answer. Here, however, if not before, comes another question: Of such an exhibition where is the use? But, to a question of this sort, in the present instance at least, the answer will obtain a much better chance for being satisfactory, if postponed till after the thing itself has been brought to view, concerning which it is asked, what is the use of it?
Purposesto which a denomination given to a branch of Art and Science may be applied—viz., Ordinary and Systematic:Properties, desirable in it with a view to these purposes.
Ordinary and Systematic, applied to the purpose which, in the giving a denomination to a branch of art and science, has been in view, these adjuncts will, it is supposed, be found tolerably explanatory of themselves. Ordinary purpose, the presenting to view the contents of the particular branch which it denominates. Systematic, the purpose which is in view, where the denomination in question is one of a number of denominations, brought together in such manner as to exhibit to view certain relations, which the several branches so denominated, and thereby their respective contents, bear to each other: relations, for example, of agreement and diversity, or relations of dependence.
Accordingly, for the designation of the purpose, just described by the name of the ordinary purpose, the term non-systematic might, with equal propriety, be employed.
From the purposes to the accomplishment of which it is directed, follow the properties which it is desirable it should possess.
I. On the part of the denomination in question, for both the above-mentioned purposes, the two following properties may be stated as requisite.
1. Of the contents of the branch of art and sicence which it denominates, it should present to view—to the view of as many persons as possible—a conception as clear, correct, and complete, as by, and in the compass of, a single denomination,* can be afforded.
2. By this means, in relation to every less extensive branch of art and science that can be proposed, it should obviate the question—whether, within the compass of the more extensive, such less extensive branch is or is not included: it should obviate this question—i. e. in case of doubt, it should furnish the means of removing it, or, (what is better,) prevent the rise of any such doubts.
II. For the systematic purpose, the following is an additional property which presents itself as requisite.
It should (i. e. the denomination should) be so constructed, as, in and by its conjunction with other denominations, to display upon occasion, and that in as clear, correct, and complete a manner as possible, the several relations which it bears to the several other branches of art and science included in the same system: the relations, viz. in respect of identity of properties, on the part of the respectively contained particulars, on the one hand, and diversity of such properties on the other: that so, in the instance of every branch of art and science, comprehended in the system, it may, to the greatest extent possible, be apparent in what particulars they respectively agree with, and in what they differ from, each other.†
By these means, and by these alone—on these terms, and on these alone—is any conception that has been framed, delivered, received, or entertained of the whole system of arts and sciences, the whole encyclopædical system, as it is called, capable of being rendered a clear, correct, and complete one.
Thus, and in this way is shown, not only identity, in so far as identity, but diversity, in so far as diversity, has place. In this way, therefore, is performed, in regard to each branch of art and science, that, and more than that, which is performed by algebra, in regard to numbers. The wonders exhibited by that mysterious art, by what means is it that they are wrought? Only by showing, in each individual instance, the identity which has place, as between the import, conveyed at the outset by those extraordinary signs, which, as the instrument of its discoveries it employs, and some one or other of the always manifest imports, conveyed by those ordinary signs, of which common arithmetic makes use.
By the mutual lights, which these words are thus made to reflect upon the import of each other—by this means is, and by this means alone can be conveyed, in relation to the subject which they are employed to bring to view, the maximum of information: the greatest quantity of information capable of being brought to view, in and by the number of words thus employed:* the maximum of information in the minimum of space.
Imperfections incident to a denomination of this sort: viz. 1. Unexpressiveness; 2. Misexpressiveness.
Correspondent to the properties, which it is desirable that a denomination attached to any branch of art and science should possess, are the imperfections of which it is susceptible. An imperfection will be imputable to it, in so far as, by failing to possess any one or more of the above-mentioned properties, it fails of being applicable with advantage to one or more of the above-mentioned purposes.
Imperfections, exhibited by this or that one, of the several denominations, considered by itself; imperfections, exhibited by the whole assemblage of them taken together, considered as a whole—to one or other of these heads will all such imperfections, it is believed, be found referable.
Unexpressiveness and Misexpressiveness—to one or other of these two heads, it is believed, will be found referable all such imperfections, of which any such denomination, taken singly, and considered by itself, will be found susceptible.
The purposes, to which it is desirable that a denomination of the sort in question should be capable of being made subservient, have just been brought to view: in so far as it simply fails of being subservient to those purposes, it is unexpressive, simply unexpressive.
Of the name, employed for the designation of any branch of art and science, the design and use is, to convey a conception, as correct and complete as by so narrow an instrument can be conveyed, of the nature, and, to that end, thereby of the subject, or subject-matter, of that same art and science: and this, in such sort as, when and as often as, in relation to any subject that happens to be proposed, a question shall arise, whether it does or does not belong to the branch in question, to suggest a true and clear answer, either on the affirmative or on the negative side.
If, instead of simply failing to convey any such instructive conception, it does indeed present a conception, but that conception altogether foreign to the subject, and thereby, in so far as it is actually entertained, erroneous and delusive, then it is, that, instead of being negatively and simply unexpressive, it is positively misexpressive.
Be the subject in its own nature what it may—and, on the other hand, the name applied to it, what any one will—true it is, that, in the course of time, the name, how completely unexpressive so ever, and even misexpressive, will become expressive.
To this observation no denial, or so much as doubt, can be opposed; and hence it is that, by names in the highest degree, not merely unexpressive but misexpressive, the functions of names are performed, the purposes which are in view in the use of names to a certain degree answered.
If the misexpressive name in question be a name, by which, when first brought to a man’s view, the branch of art and science in question is presented—much more if it be the only name by which it is ever presented to him—on this supposition, a question (it must be confessed) altogether natural is, of this supposed original misexpressiveness, what, if any, is the inconvenience? At first mention (continues the argument) true it is, that the conception it presented was, by the supposition, an erroneous one: but moreover by another part of the supposition, the conception which has at the long run come to be conveyed by it, conveyed to the very person in question, is a correct one: for, by this name it is, that whatsoever conception he has cause to entertain of the subject, has been conveyed to him; and, in point of fact, by names originally as unexpressive as can easily be imagined, have conceptions no less correct than those which have been conveyed by the most expressive names, actually, as it will be easy to show, been conveyed.
Plausible as it is, to the objection opposed by this question, an answer, which it is believed will be found no less plain and clear, than decisive and satisfactory, presents itself.
1. In the first place, by the supposition, a length of time there is, during which, instead of the subject, of which it is desirable that it should convey the conception, the subject which it actually presents is a different one. So long as this state of things continues, every proposition, in the composition of which the misexpressive name in question has a place, is a self-contradictory one. So long then as this self-contradictoriness, and the confusion, of which it is essentially productive, continues, so long the inconvenience, nor is it an inconsiderable one, continues to be felt: and it is only after a lapse of time, more or less considerable, that, the new conception having at length in a manner wormed out the original one, the inconvenience ceases to be felt.
2. In the next place, of the sort of name in question, another use, it has been already observed, is, to obviate doubts in relation to the extent of the field belonging to the branch of art and science in question: i. e. whether such or such a less extensive district, in whatsoever manner designated, especially if it be a newly discovered, or newly distinguished district, be included in it. In this case, by what rule or mark shall the answer be guided and determined? By the name, considered in itself, i. e. considered in its original import merely, no true light, but instead of it a false light, is afforded; and, as to the light afforded by mere usage, by the supposition, no light of this sort hath as yet begun to show itself.
Attached to the use made of misexpressive names, here then are two inconveniences; two distinguishable and undeniable inconveniences, which will be found to have place, in so far as, for the designation of any of the leading branches of art and science, any such improper and unfortunately chosen denominations continue to be employed.
Natural History, Natural Philosophy.—It will presently be seen, in how flagrant a degree both these denominations, both of them names, by which two main branches of art and science are wont to be designated, names in constant and almost universal use, are misexpressive.
By this imperfection, if any credit be to be given either to experience or to report, the amount of the inconvenience produced is by no means inconsiderable. Great is the length of time, during which it is not without extreme difficulty, nor till after great perplexity, that, in the mind of the beginner, especially if he be a very young beginner, the connexion between the misexpressive general name, and any of the particular matters meant to be designated by it; viz. the subordinate branches included under it, or any of the subjects appertaining respectively to those branches, can be formed.
So likewise as to the other inconveniences: to this likewise the like observation will be found applying with equal truth. This or that less extensive branch, is it to Natural Philosophy that it belongs, or to any, and what other more extensive head? No criterion, no source of guidance, being to be found in the name itself—viz., in its original import—mere accident determines. But in the instance of different persons, the determinations made by accident are different. Accordingly that less extensive branch, (Chemistry for example,) which in the view and language of some persons, is a branch of Natural Philosophy, in the view and language of other persons, is not a branch of it.
Thus it is that, the boundaries of the main compartments being indistinct, the conception entertained of the whole field of art and science is, in the instance of every mind, more or less inadequate, and either indeterminate or erroneous.
Thus much as to the imperfections, incident to the denomination of any branch of art and science, considered by itself. Now as to such imperfections, as do not apply but to the case, where the whole multitude of them, or a considerable part of that multitude, are collected together, and considered together, in the character of an aggregate.
As often as they are thus considered in conjunction and with reference to one another, the purpose for which they are thus considered may be termed a scientific, or Encyclopedical purpose; and with reference to this extraordinary purpose, all others may be distinguished by the appellation of ordinary.
In so far as it is to an Encyclopedical purpose that these several objects, the several branches of art and science, are considered, it is for the purpose of obtaining and communicating a view, as clear, correct, and complete as possible, of the whole field of thought and action, and therein of the whole field of art and science; and, to this purpose, a view of the several characters, i. e. characteristic circumstances, by which the several component branches of that ideal whole, are on the one hand assimilated to, on the other hand distinguished from, each other.
Learners and teachers (shall we say) or Teachers and learners? for, on the occasion of the mention now to be made of them, it seems not altogether easy to say, which of these two correspondent classes should be put foremost. Be this as it may, to the situation of both these two correspondent and contrasted classes it is, that in the framing of a sketch for the purpose in question, in a word, for the framing of an Encyclopedical sketch, the attention of the operator should be directed. As far as any separation can in practice be made, it is by the situation of learners that the principal demand for attention is presented: for all teachers must in the first place have been learners; nor, at any subsequent period can teachers exist without learners; whereas learners may exist, and, in so far as individuals are self-taught, do exist, without teachers; and, where both classes have place together, and at the same time remain distinct from one another, the class of learners may, and naturally will, be much more numerous than the class of teachers.
Nor will the class of persons, to whom, in the character of learners, an apposite and expressive system of Encyclopedical nomenclature may be of use, be found to be so narrow as might at first sight be imagined. To any one, whose subsequent pursuits were destined to be confined within the limits of ever so narrow a branch of the field, if not the whole, various other parts of such a system will be found, of which a conception more or less detailed will not be found to be altogether useless. Of no one part can a man’s conception fail of being the stronger and the clearer, the stronger and clearer his conception is of such or such other parts, which, by means of those properties, whereby they are respectively assimilated to it, and contrasted with it, contribute to reflect light upon it, and by this means place it in the clearer point of view.
To this class (to speak more particularly) will be seen to belong all those persons, by whom the benefit of the proposed system or course of Chrestomathic education will have been partaken of. With few if any exceptions, initiated, as they will be, in every useful branch of art and science,—strange would be the inconsistency, were any such determination taken, as that of forbearing to present to their view those relations of mutual agreement and distinction, by means of which these several branches receive each of them light from, and reflect it upon, every other. For, it is thus, and thus alone, that the mind can be endowed with, and rendered conscious of, that animating vigour, by means of which it feels itself able, with an assurance of success and mastery, to enter and operate with effect, upon any and every part of it, towards which the course of its pursuits may at any time happen to be directed.
But, on the proposed plan, along with the class of learners will be augmented the class of teachers: and that in a much larger proportion, than any which till of late has been in view. For, in the instance of every one of the branches of science thus taught, so it is that, by a very considerable proportion of the class of learners, the function of teachers will, even before their own term of learning is in respect of that same branch fully expired, be taken in hand and exercised: so that, to the extent of this large portion of the whole number of learners, the only line of separation between the two classes, is that which will have been drawn by the hand of Time.
Of the imperfections, of which a system of nomenclature for the various branches of art and science may be seen to be susceptible, when considered with a view to none but the ordinary purposes, as above explained, a conception may presently be formed, and has accordingly been already endeavoured to be conveyed. But, of the imperfections, of which the like system may be seen to be susceptible, when considered with reference to Encyclopedical purposes, as above explained,—no conception can be formed, till a conception has been formed of the particular form, which it is necessary a system of this sort should be made to wear, in order to possess—and that in the highest possible degree of perfection—those properties, a general intimation of which has just been given: viz. that in which, in relation to each branch, are brought to view the circumstances, in respect of which it agrees with, and those in respect of which it disagrees with, every other.
Of a system of this sort will here be given a general idea; and that followed by an exemplification, which, though particular, will be a very extensive one,—not embracing merely, but outstretching, the whole of the proposed field of Chrestomathic education. But, in the meantime, that the nature and existence of the demand, for a reform of some sort, in the nomenclature employed upon the subject, may be the more distinctly perceptible,—an exemplification will be given of its inaptitude, even with reference to the purposes, above distinguished by the name of ordinary purposes:—viz. in the instance of those names which are in most frequent use.
Inaptness of the appellatives Natural History, Natural Philosophy, and Mathematics.
1. The branch of art and science for the designation of which the compound appellation Natural History is as yet the only one in use, is that which has for its subject matter, in general, including bodies of all sorts, considered in respect of those modifications, which are found exemplified by it, before any operation has been performed upon it by human art, under the direction of human science:* or in other words, (if, for familiarity’s sake, notwithstanding the unapt floridness of the expression, it should be deemed advisable to employ, as usual, the name of the well-known fictitious personage, Nature,) in the condition in which it has been found placed by the hands of Nature—uncontrolled and unassisted Nature.
Of these bodies—i. e. of matter, in all such of its forms with which we have in any way or degree any acquaintance,—the aggregate is composed in the first place of our Earth, in the next place of all the other bodies, of which our World is composed: of our Earth in the first place, no others being of any importance to us, otherwise than with reference to that, “in which we live, and move, and have our being.”
Of this earth of our’s, the matter is either in the form of matter altogether lifeless; matter endowed with life, but without feeling; or matter endowed with life and feeling both. In and by the several appellatives, Mineralogy, Botany, and Zoology, all of them single-worded—all of them in familiar use,—the primary divisions of the branch of art and science here in question, are aptly enough expressed. And if, for the designation of that remaining branch of the art and science in question, which has for its subject the remainder of those modifications of matter with which we have any acquaintance, the term Uranology, as above,† or even the term Astronomy, be employed,—in either case, to the nomenclature thus bestowed upon these primary branches of the stock of art and science in question, no considerable objection presents itself as opposable.
Not so in the case of the whole aggregate, of which these are the divisions. Of the two words,—the first an adjective, the other a substantive,—of which the compound appellation Natural History is formed,—it found, at the time of its formation, the substantive History already appropriated to the designation of a branch of learning, having for its subject those states of persons and things of all sorts, and those events of all sorts, that have been known or supposed to have had place in times past: present time either being altogether excluded, or its history being but as it were a point, in comparison with the time of history which it closes. Adding the word natural, say Natural History, the result is, that, for the import, designated by this appellative, antecedently to the establishment of that usage from which it has received an import so widely different, we have this, viz. the natural account of those states of persons and things, and so forth, and of those events, and so forth, which had place in times past.
Now, with what propriety, to any one of the above-mentioned so aptly denominated divisions, of the branch of art and science itself thus unaptly denominated,—with what propriety, to Mineralogy, to Botany, to Zoology,—can the term Natural History, consideration had of its original and proper import as thus developed, be applied?
II. The branch of art and science, for the designation of which the compound appellation Natural Philosophy is in use, is that which has, for its subject, matter in general, considered in respect of such modifications as it has been made, or may be expected to be made, to undergo, by human art, under the guidance of human science: with the addition, perhaps, of such properties, as, by means of changes made in it by the application of that same mental instrument, have been discovered to have been already belonging to it.
Taken by itself, Philosophy is the love of wisdom. Adding the word natural, say Natural Philosophy, and, for the import designated by this appellation, antecedently to the arbitrary usage, established in this case as in that other,—we have this, viz. the natural love of wisdom.
That either in the study of Mechanics, or in that of Chemistry, or in the study of any of those particular branches of art and science, which are formed by the application of these general and theoretical branches to the various practical ones to which they are subservient, is there any want of capacity to afford gratification to an affection so laudable as that of the love of wisdom,—is not here by any means meant to be asserted, or so much as insinuated. But, not to speak of Oratory, Poetry, or any of the Fine Arts,—in the study of the art and science of Legislation, or in the study of the art and science of which Private Morals is the subject, is there any less room for the manifestation of the love of wisdom, or of wisdom itself, than in the study of machines, or in that of the various methods of compounding, decompounding, and recompounding, the matter, of which stones, plants, and animals, are respectively composed?
III. The branch of art and science, for the designation of which the term Mathematics is in use, is that which has for its subject quantity in general, considered with or without relation to form or figure: quantity in general, that is to say, as well matter as void space, they being considered respectively in relation to quantity, with or without relation to figure: void space—that is, space considered as void, or rather without consideration had of its contents: for, as to any determinate portion of space, determined by determinate boundaries,—and, within those boundaries not containing any the least particle of matter whatsoever,—an example of any such object would not, it is believed, be very easy to find.
Taken in its original import, Mathematics denotes anything that is learnt, or considered as capable of being learnt. It therefore is—or at least in that its original import was, capable of being, with no less propriety, employed in the designation of any one of those existing, or those about to exist, branches of art and science, comprehended or not, in the most comprehensive and copious Encyclopedia,—than in the designation of the particular branch, to which, by long and learned usage, it has thus, in these later times, become appropriated:—of the art of legislation, or the art of push-pin, no less than of Geometry and Algebra.
Upon all the above-mentioned three denominations, will not only the imperfection of inexpressiveness, but, in the instance of the two first of them, that of misexpressiveness, be found chargeable.
Running on in perpetual contradiction to the original import, a false account of the subject is the account, which the two appellations, Natural Philosophy and Mathematics, are, both of them, continually giving of it.
But, though in all these instances the proposition involved in the appellative is equally false, yet the falsehood so involved is not, in all these instances, equally pregnant with practical inconvenience.
In the instance of Mathematics, no very considerable practical inconvenience seems observable.
To such persons as are altogether unacquainted with the primary general import of the word, it conveys not any import at variance with that which, in the instance in question, it has acquired from particular usage; and, even to the eyes of persons acquainted with such its primary import, that general import has to such a degree been covered as it were, and by degrees even pushed aside, by the particular import attached to it by particular usage, as to be scarcely ever in use to present itself.
In the case of Natural Philosophy, the inconvenient effects of unexpressiveness, coupled as it is with misexpressiveness, have manifested themselves in a manner much more conspicuous and incontestable. To the same branch of art and science to which some attach the name of Natural Philosophy, others attach the name of Experimental Philosophy. In the present instance, both these terms being, as above, misapplied, are they—in the modern import of the former of them,—are they, or are they not, synonymous with each other? In relation to the subject to which they respectively apply, no intimation being given by either of these appellatives,—this being the case, to a question to the above effect, who shall undertake to furnish an answer?—thus much being pretty clear, viz., that for no such answer are any data afforded by the primary import of either of these appellatives.
Astronomy—though, properly speaking, it should in part be considered as referable to Natural History (viz., in so far as it consists in simple observations, unaccompanied with those observations and calculations, which, as in the case of Chronological Geography and Uranological Chronology,* are applicable, and actually applied, to practical use,) seems commonly to be considered as referable to Natural Philosophy, and to that alone. Be it so; but is it then referable to Experimental Philosophy? The light that issues from them, yes; but the stars themselves, are they, like the star-fish named from them, are they taken, can they be taken, for the subjects of experiment?
Chemistry, this branch of art and science does it, or does it not, belong to the domain of Natural Philosophy? Yes, say some; for, under that appellation they include it. No, say others; for, under that appellation they do not include it.
Belonging, or not belonging, to Natural Philosophy, does it not at any rate belong to Experimental Philosophy? In the whole of Chemistry, not to say any more, taken from beginning to end, is not there full as much of experiment as in any part of Mechanics?
Once more, does it, or does it not, belong to Natural Philosophy? On any such ground as that of reason and analogy, the question is manifestly unanswerable, and any dispute produced by it interminable. Why? Because, while one of these names—viz., Natural Philosophy, is not only unexpressive but misexpressive, the other, Chemistry, is also unexpressive. By Chemistry—an Arabian word, of which the origin has always been covered by a cloud—no intimation whatever, either of the subject-matter, of the sort of operator, or of the nature of any operations performed, is afforded.
By some Institutionalists, Chemistry, as above observed, is not considered as included in Natural Philosophy. Why? Because, before Chemistry had begun to find teachers, before any more than a few scattered fragments of the art and science could be so much as said to have existence, Natural Philosophy had, for a long time, been in use to be taught. Therefore, when Chemistry came to be taught, this new branch was considered as a branch of art or science, wholly distinct and independent, not included in that old one.
Cause or Origin of this Inaptitude.
Of the thus extensively prevailing inadequacy, should the source be asked for, it may be found, it is believed, at no great depth beneath the surface. It may be descried in the difference between the respective extents of the several divisions of the field of art and science,—i. e., of the respective masses of their contents,—in the state in which they now present themselves to view, as compared with the extents respectively possessed by them when, for the first time, the degree of cultivation, which they had respectively received, suggested the convenience of employing a certain name, for the purpose of binding together in the mind such of their contents, with which at that time an acquaintance, more or less correct and extensive, had been formed. In each instance, numerous, insulated, and dispersed, must have been the particular observations and experiments made, before it occurred to any one to give to the aggregate assemblage of them a common name of any kind, and thus to bind together the contents of that aggregate by one common tie. Even when this instrument of connexion and elucidation came at length to be employed, it would at first be either altogether uncharacteristic of the objects which it served to designate, or, if amongst them there were any, at all, to which it bore any such natural relation, the number of them would, in comparison with the number of those to which it bore not any such relation, be very small.
Take, for instance, that branch of art and science which still bears the name of Electricity. Of the word Electricity, the root or basis is a Greek word, which signifies amber: had it been from the Latin that the word had been derived, it would have been Amberism. Why Electricity or Amberism? Only because, of such a multitude of sorts of substances as that by which, at present, upon the subjecting them to the same sort of operation (viz., rubbing,) the same appearances (viz., the causing light bodies first to move towards them, and then to recede from them) are exhibited, amber happened to be the first, in which the existence of this property was observed.
Even Magnetism, though to the purpose of calling to view, by means of its original signification, the phenomena, for the designation of which it has now for a long time been employed,—though to this purpose it is so much less inadequate than Electricity, has had its original boundaries far outstretched by observations made at various later dates. By the import originally attached to it, the intimation given is, that the properties, of which it takes cognizance, belong exclusively to the naturally existing mineral, termed, in Greek and Latin, Magnes, and, in English, the Loadstone.
Since those days the same properties have, however, been found to be capable of being given to iron,—a simple metallic substance, which is but one of two or more ingredients of which the loadstone is composed,—and to belong naturally to nickel, another metallic substance, which, with the exception of this property, and those that are common to all metals, has not been found to have anything in common with either of those two other substances.
In the instance of these two branches of art and science—both of them included in the domain so unexpressively denominated by the compound appellative Natural Philosophy—we have two names, which, however imperfectly, are still in a certain degree characteristic and expressive; designative of a portion, though not of the whole, of the contents of the branch of art and science which they are respectively employed to denominate. In the instance of Galvanism, the sign is altogether uncharacteristic, with relation to every one of the objects which it is employed to signify. By an Italian of the name of Galvani, within the memory of multitudes now living, observation was made of certain phenomena, in which no analogy to any other class of phenomena was for some time discovered. No other object, to which they could be said to bear any particular relation, being known,—at the same time that the person, by whose sagacity and ingenuity they had been in part observed, and in part discovered, being known,—it was from him they took their name. The phenomena observed or discovered by Galvani, and presently, for shortness, Galvanism, was the name given to them by the Natural Philosophers of that day.
This imperfection is not peculiar to the physical branch of art and science:—in a large proportion it is shared with it by the ethical.
From like causes proceed everywhere like effects. Hence, in the field of Government, the multitude of Offices, by the names of which not any the slightest intimation is conveyed of the nature of the operations performed by the possessors.*
Course to be taken for framing the most perfect and instructive System of Encyclopedical Nomenclature that the Nature of the Case admits of.
The nature of the subjects themselves, and the nature of the words or terms employed in giving to the aggregate mass of them, in all its diversifications, a system of nomenclature, and, by means of such nomenclature, a set of divisions, and thereby a scheme of distribution and arrangement—on these two circumstances, it is believed, will the aptitude of the work, with reference to its purposes, be found to depend.
I. As to the subject, for the particular purpose here in question, it is only in so far as concerns its primary and most extensive divisions, that an acquaintance with it will be found to be very material: with its details no other acquaintance will be found necessary, than that, by the want of which a man might be led into misconceptions concerning the general nature of the compartments and divisions in which they are comprehended: viz. in such sort, as, by means of some ill-chosen appellative, to ascribe to this or that one of the contents, this or that property, of which in reality it is not possessed.
In the choice made of the words, will be found to be included, two intimately connected indeed, but perfectly distinguishable particulars: viz. in the first place, the choice of such appellatives—single-worded and many-worded together—as, by the extent respectively belonging to them, shall be suited to the purpose of giving expression to all such divisions or parts of the subject, or aggregate, as, at each step in the progress of the division, shall be proposed to be marked out; in the next place, the tongue or language, of which choice shall have been made, for the furnishing the assortment of words required for the supply of that demand.
1. As to the extent covered by the respective appellatives, it will, in the ensuing sketch at least, for all but the last step taken in the course, be such as, when they are arranged one after another, in appropriate order, will be seen to give to the mode or scheme of division marked out by them, the character of an exhaustive one, and that, in respect of the number of the parts produced by each act of ideal division of the aggregate, considered for that purpose as a divisible whole,—the sort of scheme, which has been styled sometimes, from the Greek, dichotomous; sometimes, from the Latin, bifurcate; literally rendered in English by the word two-pronged, as applied to a fork: for, as will be seen, it is in and by this mode, and this alone, that all the purposes, which, on this occasion are of a nature to afford a practical use, can be accomplished. As to the considerations by which the choice made in favour of this mode was produced, a view of them will presently be given: but, that they may be the more clearly apprehended, it has been deemed advisable to bring to view, in the first instance, an exemplification of the sort of work to which they will have to make reference.*
Small, it is true, is the number of steps to which, accompanied with a correspondent system of nomenclature, this transcendently instructive and useful scheme of division can, consistently with any net balance on the side of advantage, be pursued: the number of words being so great, and not only the labour necessary to the forming of such a system, but even the labour of following it up when made, being such, as, after a comparatively small number of steps taken in this career, to threaten to become intolerable. But, against the carrying it on to whatever length it is capable of being followed up to with clear advantage, every impracticability, that may be found to attach upon an ulterior pursuit of it, will not be found to oppose any reasonable objection: and a task, for which neither the mind of the writer, nor the mind of the reader, may be ripe at one period, may find both minds sufficiently prepared for it, at a more advanced point in the line of time.
As to the language, the Greek presents itself as being, upon the whole, beyond comparison, the best adapted to this purpose: and this so clearly, as to be the only one which, on this occasion, there can be any use in holding up to view.
Reason and Custom—Reason, in this instance, the parent of Custom—join in the affording of this assurance. Of all known languages, the Greek is assuredly, in its structure, the most plastic and most manageable. To such a purpose as the present, upon a scale of any extent, it is the only language which it has been customary for men to draw upon for this purpose: customary, not only in the English language, but in the language of every other nation forming a part of the European system: or, in a word, as, to this purpose, may be said for shortness, and without any very material injustice, in the language of every well-instructed nation upon earth.
Of the sort of work proposed to be executed, the subject has already been brought to view, and its limits marked out, it is hoped, with that degree of precision which the nature of the case admits of: viz. of the whole field of thought and action, that part which constitutes the field of art and science: the field itself, or, what comes to the same thing, (both expressions being necessarily figurative, names of fictitious entities,) the aggregate of its contents.†
Of the division to be made of this field, or, (what comes to the same thing,) the distribution to be made of its contents, where shall we look for the source?—the primary source, by the choice of which the choice of all ulterior sources, should any such be added, will naturally be influenced at least, if not determined? Where, but in the different natures of different parts of this field—of different portions of its contents?—in a word, in the nature of the subject—the common subject of all these branches of art and science—and in the different natures of the several different parts of that subject, on which these several branches have to operate? So far as it is from this source that the division is made—the principle of division deduced—correspondent to each branch of the subject is the branch of art and science, by which it is operated upon: and, conversely, correspondent to each branch of art and science is that branch of the subject on which it operates.
In the preface, written by D’Alembert, and prefixed to the French Encyclopædia, under the title of Systême figuré des Connoissances Humaines—Figured System of Human Knowledge,* a systematic Table or Map is given, accompanied with a paper, entitled, Explication détaillée du Systême des Connoissances Humaines.
In that sketch, what is the declared subject of the work?—Art and Science in conjunction?—No: but sciences alone, to the exclusion of arts; for surely, under the French word connoissances, arts are no more included than under the English word knowledge, or the English word science. Yet in the Table itself the words Art and Arts occur in many places.
Again, the source of division, or, to begin with the first division which presents itself—the source of that leading division—what is it? Is it the nature of the subject—the different natures of the several different branches of the subject—on which the corresponding branches of art and science have to operate?—No: but the nature of the faculties, by means of which the subject, in its different parts, is (it is supposed) operated upon.
Lastly, the plan or scheme of division,—considered in respect of the number of branches, which are respectively the results of the several successive acts of partition or distribution, performed upon it,—what is it? Is it, as above proposed, regular and bifurcate? the number, at the first step, two, and at every step the same?—No: but at the first step trifurcate: and, after that, the number at each step varying, to the number of half-a-dozen or more.
Such is the scheme, or plan of division, pursued in that justly celebrated work: in these may be seen a part, and but a part, of the whole number of its incongruities: and, of some of the practical inconveniences resulting from some of these logical incongruities,—if, on the ground of science, confusion, and on the one part misrepresentation, and on the other part misconception, belong to the category of inconvenience,—it will be the endeavour of the next section to give a view.
D’Alembert’s Encyclopedical*Map or Tabular Sketch—its Imperfections.
Of the sketch given by D’Alembert, the leading principles are—as he himself has been careful to declare, taken from that given by Lord Bacon. Had it been entirely his own, it would have been, beyond comparison, a better one. For the age of Bacon, Bacon’s was a precocious and precious fruit of the union of learning with genius: for the age of D’Alembert it will, it is believed, be found but a poor production, below the author as well as the age.
Prudential considerations suggested to the French Philosopher the precaution of seeking shelter under the mantle of the foreign sage. But of this perhaps in another place.
Ingenious as, in several parts, and in several respects, it would, upon a particular examination, be found,—smoke, rather than light, will, upon the whole, be seen to be the result of it. At the very first step, the whole field, it will be seen, is involved in an all-obscuring cloud: a cloud too thick for any ulterior operation to be capable of dissipating.
Its principal merit and use will, it is believed, be seen to consist in the having formed, and presented to view, a general conception of a work of this sort,—and the having placed together, under one view, the whole stock of the materials, at that time known, to belong to it and to require to be employed in the composition of it.
Taking the work in the form in which it is exhibited by D’Alembert, the following are among the imperfections, which have presented themselves as chargeable upon it,—
1. The very subject of the work, inadequately designated.
2. The primary source of division, unhappily chosen.
3. The scheme of division, loose and irregular.
4. The appellations, in several leading instances, inapposite.
5. The distinctions, in several instances, groundless; distinctions, without any determinate and assignable difference.
6.Repetitions abundant:—under different names, the same object repeated a multitude of times.
7. The texture of the discourse incomplete: no verbs; consequently no propositions; nothing but substantives, with here and there an article or an adjective.
Subject of the work, inadequately designated.
Of the relation between Art and Science,—as well as of the relation between Art and Science taken together on the one part, and the remainder of the whole field of thought and action on the other part,—the idea above given† will (it is hoped) be found a tolerably clear one. Of this relation, no attempt to give any idea is made in D’Alembert’s Map, or in the Explanation given of it.
“Systême figuré”—figured system: des Connoissances Humaines—of Human Knowledge, is the title under which the whole contents of the Table are arranged. At the conclusion, even Poetry, presented to view in the character of the principal product of the imagination, is, at the same time, exhibited in the character of a subject, or a branch, of the all-comprehending aggregate—human knowledge.‡ In the same paragraph, and but four lines after, he speaks of this Table, by the description of “a Genealogical Distribution or Map of the Sciences and the Arts;” and, in this loose shape, and no other, is introduced the only mention made of the Arts, or the word Art. And, though fiction is mentioned as an essential ingredient in the composition of the idea meant by him to be attached to the word, yet neither on this occasion, nor on any other, is it brought to view in the character of the name of an Art, nor in any other character than that of the name of a branch of Science.
From the difficulty here in question, the mind of D’Alembert, it therefore appears, withdrew its force. His precursor, Chambers, in the Preface to his Dictionary had, before him, grappled with it; but (as any one, who, in this view, may be disposed to turn to that elaborate work, will, it is believed, find reason to acknowledge) altogether without success.
Instead of Knowledge, in which (see Chrestomathia, Table I.) Science is included,—instead of knowledge alone, the subject of the work in question should then have been Art and Science: art and science all along in conjunction: for, in conjunction they must all along be taken and considered, or no tolerably adequate conception of either will be formed.
But the subject of art and science together, what is it?—Answer—Being in general: being, in all the modifications, of which, to our view, it is susceptible. Being, in some shape or shapes, the subject,—well-being, in some shape or shapes, the object,—of everything that, by man, is or can be done or thought of. Of these fundamental and eminently simple truths, the bare mention may suffice for the present. In the section, in which some of the first lines, of the sort of map in question, are attempted to be given, the consideration of them will come to be resumed. As the process of division and distribution, drawn as the principle of division is from different sources,—as this sort of anatomical process proceeds, the several modifications of being which are the result of it, display themselves to view.
Primary Source of Division, ill chosen.
The primary source of his divisions is,—what? Not the nature of the subject, and of its respective parts, but, as already noticed, the nature of the several human faculties, which, by a strange misconception, are respectively considered as applying themselves exclusively to different parts of it.
Strange indeed may this misconception be pronounced: at any rate, if it be true, that, when these faculties come to be mentioned, so it is that, of all the branches into which the body of the arts and sciences has ever been or ever can be divided, not a single one can be mentioned, upon which the whole list of the human faculties can not be shown to be, in some way or other, applied.
Memory, Reason, Imagination.—Of these, and these alone, is his list of the human faculties, as brought forward on this occasion, composed. If, for any other purpose, if, on any other occasion, asked for a list of those faculties, would D’Alembert have given this for a complete one? Perception, for example, not to look any further, would not this have been added? would it not have been placed before Memory? But the truth is, that in the subsequent ramifications, though not in this primary one, not only perception, but other faculties besides, are by D’Alembert himself brought to view.
But, for this purpose, what list of these faculties, other than a complete one, could, with propriety, have been proposed to serve? In addition to these three, each of which, according to this division, applies itself exclusively to a certain parcel of the branches of art and science, or at any rate of science, is it that there are any, of which no application is made to any branch of art or science? Of the faculty of perception, for example, is it that no application is made, in the study of Natural History for example? If, either in this or in any other instance, any such faculty be to be found, if this be indeed a truth, it surely is not of the number of those truths, which are so completely obvious, that no proof of them can, either for conviction or satisfaction, be justly regarded as necessary.
Quere: unless it be through the perceptive faculty, through what medium does the retentive receive any of the original, and exteriorly derived, part of its contents?
Of a set of fictitious entities to give in a list, neither the correctness nor the completeness of which shall be exempt from dispute or doubt, cannot be a very easy task. Of the articles inserted in the Note, neither the perceptibility, (meaning that sort of perceptibility of which these sorts of fictitious entities are susceptible)—neither the perceptibility, nor the mutual distinctness,—say rather distinguibility,—will, it is hoped, be found much exposed to dispute.*
The inventor, the learner, the teacher: the inventor, or in the place of, or in company with the inventor, the discoverer, and their assistant,
Being a Reprint of D’Alembert’s ENCYCLOPÆDICAL TABLE, as inserted in his Melanges, tom. i. p. 239 or 250. Amsterdam, 1767. For an examination of this Table, see Chrestomathia, Appendix, No. IV. from p. 73 to 82.
the observer, in regard to every branch of science, be it what it may,—by these different sets of persons, different faculties, or sets of faculties, are put into exercise.
What the inventor is in relation to art, the discoverer is, in relation to science. In art and science, not merely every existing branch, but every the minutest twig, must have given exercise to the inventive faculty, ere it could have come into existence. Invention, as above, is imagination, taken under command by attention, and directed to the accomplishment of some particular object or end in view. The products of the exercise of the abstractive faculty are the materials of which the work of the imagination is composed. Among the objects of invention or discovery, is method: and, when once invented or discovered, it becomes an instrument in the hands of Invention, of Discovery, and of Observation. It is by Natural History, in greater proportion, than by any other branch of art and science, that exercise is afforded for observation and for method: next to that by those branches which have mind for their subject.
Abstraction, Imagination, Invention, Discovery, Methodization, Communication, of none of these faculties does the learner, as such, find in himself any demand for the exercise: attention and observation, applied to the impressions and ideas, which are respectively the products of the exercise of the several faculties of perception, judgment, memory, and ratiocination,—for the exercise of all these faculties, but for that of no others than these, does the situation, occupied by the learner, as such, afford a demand.
To the faculties, for the exercise of which the situation of the learner affords a demand, that of teacher adds that of communication; of communication, and in so far as, in the method which he employs, there happens to be anything which was thought of by him, without its having, to his knowledge, been thought of by any other person, invention.
Without any the slightest notice taken of any of these distinctions—Poetry, with its nearest branches, in vast capitals, and those next to them still in great and upright ones; after Poetry, Music, Painting, Sculpture, Civil Architecture, and Engraving, these, and no others, are, by D’Alembert, huddled together in a corner, and—as if standing in awe of Poetry, and should they presume to place themselves on a line with her, fearing the lash of one of her daughters, viz., Satire—are dressed, in capitals, indeed, but those leaning ones, and, in comparison with those which are not refused to Madrigal, Epigram, or Romance, scarcely visible. These, too, are all together placed under the head of imagination; as if, in the first place, to the exercise of all these branches of art, the exercise of the imaginative faculty were necessary; and as if, in the next place, it were not so to any of the others.
Yet, when once pointed out, who is there that does not recognise, that neither to the Musical performer, nor to the Painter as such, nor to the Sculptor as such, nor to the Architect, or, in plain English, the Builder, as such, nor to the Engraver as such, is any exercise of the imaginative faculty necessary? Yes; in so far as, by any of them, anything new is to be hit upon; but in this there is nothing which they do not possess in common with the artist in every other line whatsoever.
Aristotle was an observer and inventor: for by him was invented, how far soever from perfected, the art and science of Logic, schoolmistress of all the other arts and sciences. Bacon was an observer and inventor: for by him was invented the art of learning Natural History and Natural Philosophy, more particularly the latter. Neuton was an observer, a discoverer, and an inventor. Locke was an observer and a discoverer: his field of discovery the region of mind. Linnæus was, Werner is, an observer and inventive, and thereby imaginative, methodizer:—which of these men was ever a Musician, a Painter, a Sculptor, a Builder, or an Engraver?
Placed where it is, the word Reason is, of itself, sufficient to involve the whole subject in a cloud. To the production of confusion and dismay, had that been the purpose, it would have been but too effectually adapted; clear conceptions, placed where it is, it is not in the nature of it to bring to view. What is the object meant to be presented by it?—Answer. One of the faculties of the human mind. What, then, is this faculty?—Answer. The faculty called the ratiocinative or inductive faculty, including, of course, the judgment or judicial faculty. What, then, is Reason?—Answer. It is a name which, on some occasions, and only on some occasions, a man is wont to give to the ratiocinative faculty, or the exercise of it. What then are these occasions?—Answer. Those, and those alone, on which the exercise, which he considers as given to it, is such as he approves of. Here, then, instead of that neutral sort of appellation, which alone is suitable to the purpose, viz. that sort of appellation, of which the words induction and inductive faculty, judgment and judicial faculty, as well as the words memory and imagination, are exemplifications, the appellative, employed for the designation of the ratiocinative, including the judicial faculty, is an eulogistic one.
Of the act of misappellation thus committed, now then observe the consequence. Of every application made of this word, in the designation of the faculty in question, the effect being to attach to it a latent proposition, expressive of the approbation of the speaker, as annexed to the exercise given to the faculty, one consequence is, that, without a contradiction in terms, it cannot be employed, on any occasion, in which it is the intention to bring that exercise to view, in the character of an object of disapprobation; or even to avoid bringing it to view in the opposite character.
Thus it is, that of the three leading terms in question, while two are, as far as they go, proper and suitable to the purpose, between them is thrust in another, which mismatches them—and communicates to the whole group its own delusive colour.
Memory and Imagination—it is by the Logicians, that these two appellations, simple and suitable as they are, were taken in hand. Reason—it is of the Rhetorician that this appellative was the choice. In the word Reason may be seen one of that numerous set of names of fictitious entities, in the fabrication of which the labours of the Rhetorician and the Poet have been conjoined. In Reason they have joined in giving us a sort of goddess: a goddess, in whom another goddess, Passion, finds a constant antagonist—and a third goddess, Religion, Reason’s elder sister—sometimes a troublesome rival, sometimes a useful subordinate. It is not by any such mythology, that any clear and correct instruction can be conveyed.
Under the head of Memory—under that one head—are arranged the contents of the whole field of Natural History, together with those of the field of History, simply and properly so called:—under the head of Reason, the contents of the field of Natural Philosophy.
In regard to the distribution thus made, thus much is indeed true, viz. that in the formation and retention, of ideas relative to the subject of Natural Philosophy, the quantity of exercise given to the ratiocinative faculty,—more particularly in so far as the art and science takes for its subject the relation between cause and effect,—is commonly greater than the quantity of exercise given to another faculty? But, this other faculty, what is it? Not the Memory, to which the two philosophers refer so much; but the Perception or Apprehension, to which they refer nothing.
Scarcely has even History—History, in its narrowed and most usual sense, viz. an account of states of things and events, as they are supposed to have had existence in times past—scarcely in this limited sense can History, with more propriety than Natural History or Natural Philosophy, be said to belong to the province of the Memory. To the Memory, it is true, almost exclusively, before the invention of the art of writing, must all successive generations have been indebted for whatsoever notions they could have obtained and retained, concerning the states of things and events, that had had place in the respectively preceding generations. But,—of a state of things, or an event, that had had place at an antecedent point of time, when the description had once been expressed and fixed, in and by the permanent sort of signs, which are the product of that mind-exalting art,—a man’s faculty of bearing it in mind was no more dependent upon memory, than his faculty of bearing in mind the matter of any other branch of art and science:—the correspondency, for example, between the acquisition of mechanical power and the sacrifice of despatch; the composition of water and respirable air; or the equivalency of the sum of all the angles that can be constructed round any given point, to that of four right ones.
A circumstance which, at the times respectively in question, these philosophers seem not, either of them, to have been aware of, but which, when once brought to view, will not be found the less undeniable, is, that not only the practice and knowledge that has had place, in relation to international intercourse and internal government, but every other branch of Art and Science—every one as well as every other—has its History. Natural History, Natural Philosophy, Poetry, Music, Logic, everything. In relation to War and Government, has the state of this part of the universe, presented itself at different times, in different shapes? so has it in relation to Mechanics, to Chemistry, to Poetry, to Music, and so on. Not to speak of the future, which, to our limited view, is, all of it, in a state of contingency, the distinction between the past and the present, to what portion of the whole field of thought and action, to what portion of the known field of existence, does it not apply itself.
Placed under the head of Memory, the title Irregularities of Nature (Ecarts de la Nature) presents itself in the character of a blotch, to which a sponge might apply a not incongruous cure. Natural, and but too excusable, in Bacon’s time, it was not equally so in D’Alembert’s. In the time of the English Philosopher, the mind was annoyed and oppressed by terrors, which, in the time of his French disciple, had lost, though not the whole, the greater part of their force. In Bacon’s time—in the early part of the 17th century—everything in nature that was, or was supposed to be, extraordinary, was alarming; alarming, and in some shape or other, if not productive, predictive at least of human misery. In this place, as in other places—at this time, as at other times—Ghosts and Witches composed a constant part of the population, Devils an occasional one. Patronised by Queen Elizabeth, Dee had not long ceased to hold converse with his disembodied intimates: Lilly was preparing for the connexion he succeeded in forming with his. To burn heretics, to hang witches, and to combat devils, were operations, for all which Bacon’s Royal Patron held himself in equal and constant readiness.
Celestial Prodigies, Prodigious Meteors, Prodigies on Land and Sea, Monstrous Minerals, Monstrous Vegetables, Monstrous Animals, Prodigies of the Elements, by D’Alembert, all these (alas!) are exhibited in the character of so many distinct classes of the subjects of human knowledge, distinct classes of things, subordinate, and standing next in subordination, to the including class denominated as above, Irregularities of Nature. This too under title Memory: for most of them at least, the Imagination might have been a more apposite one.
In the days of Bacon battles on dry ground were scarcely more common than battles in the air; in the thin element, peace had assuredly been already pretty well established in D’Alembert’s time.
Placed under the head of Reason, Divination and Black Magic were perhaps two whiffs of necessary incense offered up to the Archbishop of Paris: subjects, if not branches, of that science which had for its already declared subjects “spirits beneficent and malificent,” for the expulsion of the latter of whom the Ritual of that Most Reverend person furnished him with weapons, to which they had never been known to oppose any effectual resistance—those gems in the panoply of theological warfare could not then be spared;—but, by that oblation his appetite for the supernatural might, one should have thought, have been satisfied, without the addition of so many swarms of monsters.
At present, at any rate, much, it is believed, will hardly be found to be said, in favour of a principle of Classification, by which a middle-sized man is placed in one niche, a tall man and a short man together in another.
In the ancient order of things, commencement precedes accomplishment, trial precedes success; experiment upon a small scale precedes establishment upon a large scale. In each and every part of the field, experimental researches must necessarily have preceded those established practices, of which the products of handicraft arts, manufactures, and the arts called fine arts, are the results. Accordingly, in the sketch attempted in the next section, exhibited under the new name, proposed as a substitute to this its present trivial one, Experimental Philosophy precedes Technology, the branch of science which belongs to the necessary and more useful part of the arts.
Not so in D’Alembert’s. In that, it is under the general head of Natural History, that we see ranked what concerns all finished products of the Arts, with their et ceteras, as above; while, by the still more general head Memory, intimation is given, if not that it is by the exertion of that single faculty that they are produced, at any rate, that it is by that one alone of all the human faculties, that anything else, in relation to them, is either known or done.
A dislocation so strange, by what train of thought can it have been produced? From the terms of the Table, a sort of conjectural answer may be collected. By every exercise given to Art, some production of Nature is put to use. Accordingly, Arts, (handicraft) Trades and Manufactures, are there exhibited, in the character of exemplifications, of the “Uses made of Nature.” But, by the same title, might not Poetry be ranked under the head of Natural History? and its fruits—an Epic or Dramatic poem, for example—represented as being the work of Memory, or, at any rate, as belonging, in some way or other, to the province or faculty of Memory? For, the brain, by which it was dictated, as well as the pen by which it was written, not to speak of the gall nuts, the sulphate of iron, and the water, by which the pen was enabled to give permanence to the marks traced by it, what are they, any of them, but so many works of Nature?
Scheme of Division, loose and irregular.
In a former section (VI.) the dichotomous or bifurcate mode of division, performed upon the exhaustive principle, has been already brought to view, in the character of the only one perfectly suited to what ought to be the design of the first lines of an Encyclopedical Map or Table. Of the considerations or reasons, by which its claim to that character was suggested, a view will be given in an ensuing section.
At the same time the observation was made, that, with the regularity and comprehensiveness which characterize that mode, the mode pursued in this Map of D’Alembert’s forms a striking contrast.
Of the existence of this character in it—of this imperfection, if such it should be deemed—it would be useless to present to view, in this place, and in this manner, any protracted chain of proofs. By a single glance at the Table, they will be seen all together:—for the assistance of the first steps of such a survey, a few words will be sufficient at least, if not superfluous.
Common Trunk, the understanding. Ramification of this trunk into three branches: viz. Memory, Reason, and Imagination:—division, trifurcate. Under Memory placed History: no division. Under History, Sacred, Ecclesiastical, Civil, Ancient and Modern, and Natural History:—division, quadrifurcate or quinquefurcate. Under Natural History, Uniformity of Nature, Irregularities of Nature, and uses made of Nature:—division, trifurcate.—Of title Uniformity, seven branches: of title Irregularities, seven. By the side of title Uses made of Nature—terms put in apposition, Arts, (handicraft) Trades, and Manufactures:—division, novemfurcate—the list of nine branches, concluding with an &c.; each of them having its own branches, each concluding in like manner with an &c.
Thus much under Memory: and, without proceeding onwards either with Reason or with Imagination, this sample will assuredly be found sufficient.
Of this species of imperfection no exemplifications worth noticing have been observed, other than those, with which the language he found in general use, stood chargeable,—and of which the principal samples have, in this Essay, been already brought to view. (§ 4.)—These are, 1. Natural History—2. Philosophy:—(not, as with us, Natural Philosophy, but simply Philosophy:) under which comes Physics. Physics is divided into general and particular: but under neither of them is Natural History (that being ranked under History) included.—3. Mathematics.
The promise, which it fell to his lot to give, being the promise of a body of information, relative to all the branches of art and science, which were, or were at that time considered as being, in existence,—that which it was necessary his Map should contain, was a collection of those names by which they were respectively in use to be designated, and by which and which alone they were generally known. Under these circumstances, whatsoever might be the imperfections which any of these denominations might be found labouring under, with none of them could this intelligent philosopher be justly chargeable: and it appears not that to this established stock of imperfections any of his own making have been added.
unwarranted by any determinate, and assignable, correspondent differences.
Of this species of imperfection several exemplifications may be seen under the ensuing head of Repetitions.
under different names, the same objects presented to view a number of different times.
Four times over, in the character of subjects of Memory, are the several classes of known bodies, of which the earth’s surface is composed, brought to view in this Table: viz. 1st, under the name of Meteors; 2dly, under the name of Earth and Sea; 3dly, under their own distinctive names; viz. Minerals, Vegetables, and Animals; 4thly, under the name of Elements.
Four times? Yes: and also four times more: viz. all such of them to which it should at any time happen to present to the eye of the reader, whoever he may be, anything, which, to that same eye, shall appear to have in it anything that is extraordinary, as if ordinary and extraordinary were anything more than relative terms: relative, not to the nature of the objects themselves, but to the position, occupied at the moment, by the mind, by which they are respectively viewed: as if the same object, which to a preceding generation had been extraordinary, had not become ordinary to a succeeding one. Such as they are, here they follow.—1. Prodigious Meteors, or Meteoric Prodigies. 2. Prodigies on Earth and Sea. 3. Monstrous Minerals. 4. Monstrous Vegetables. 5. Monstrous Animals. 6. Prodigies of the Elements.
Not content with thus presenting them, eight times over, in the character of objects or subjects of memory, once more are we made to see these same beings, and now in the character of objects or subjects of Reason: for, still they are the same existences, and even viewed under the same aspects, notwithstanding the termination logy (in the French, logie,) which now forms a termination to the Greek word, by which they are respectively brought to view. Meteors are now represented, in the first place by Meteorology, then presently once more by Aerology: Minerals, first by Geology, then presently once more by Mineralogy: Water, by Hydrology Vegetables, by Botany—divided, and not improperly, into Agriculture and Gardening.
Meteors (as already observed) Meteors—i. e. meteoric (meaning neither more nor less than elevated) bodies or particles, are,—what are they, what can they be but, bodies or particles, of the number of those of which the earth’s surface is composed?—only mixed up with that part of it, which is mostly in a gaseous state, and then detached, to a distance more or less considerable, above, i. e. beyond that principal mass, which is partly in a solid, partly in a liquid state?—masses, consequently composed, in different and ever-varying proportions, of matters belonging respectively to the three great kingdoms, as they are called—the mineral, the vegetable, and the animal.
Yet, in the character of a sort of subject—and that a distinct one—of Natural History, D’Alembert, as we have seen already, places Meteors, and that in a situation anterior to the situations respectively allotted to Minerals, Vegetables, and Animals: and to them he subjoins, as if they were constitutive of a distinct class of objects, Elements:—a word which in trivial language is indeed employed even now: but which had had its rise, in modes of thought and action, which, even in D’Alembert’s time, were already antiquated and exploded. Four in number, as every body knows, used to be these elements: viz. Earth, Water, Air, and Fire. Earth, a term employed to designate any mass of matter whatsoever, in so far as it is considered as being in a solid state: Water, a term employed to designate a mass of the same matter, when in the liquid state;—a mass of matter, which is itself the same, though, by its being thus designated by a different appellative, represented and spoken of as if it were different. Air, a term by which the self-same mass is once more designated, when considered as being in the gaseous state. Fire, a word, to which no determinate idea was ever annexed, but which is wont to be employed, whenever, in conjunction with an extraordinary mass of light, an extraordinary mass of caloric, i. e. heat, is perceived to issue from the same spot.
In a manner not unsuitable to our situation, and thence to our mode of contemplating objects of all sorts, the world, i. e. all that part of it, in relation to which it has been within our power to obtain any the smallest and faintest spark of knowledge, has by some been divided into Earth and Heaven: Earth, the globe which we inhabit: Heaven, comprehending all other globes, all other bodies, whatsoever. Accordingly, such is the conception, by which the Philosopher seems to have been guided, while Memory was the presiding deity. First comes Celestial History, and without any division: then comes History by itself, followed by its several adjuncts: viz. Meteors, Earth, and Sea, and so forth, as above.
In conformity to this part of the plan, when, furnished with Greek-sprung names, with the termination logy tacked to each name, the same objects or subjects came to be put under the presidence of Reason, Science de la Nature—(Natural History not having, it should seem, been recognised in the character of a science, but only as a sort of knowledge, different from, and employed to prepare the way for, science)—Science de la Nature, followed by its synonym Physique particulière, should have been branched out, in the first place into Cosmologie and Géologie, and after that Géologie into Météorologie, Mineralogie, and the other logies, according to the method which, as above, had already been observed. Instead of that, follow the particulars, in an order which, besides being, with relation to that in which the same objects had already been arranged, so completely incongruous, is, in itself, so completely perturbate, that to delineate, in the form of a continuous discourse, those intrinsic incongruities, which, after this intimation,—at any rate, with the help of the ensuing sketch—may be discovered by the examination of about forty words, (such being the number contained in this part of D’Alembert’s sketch) might afford full work for as many pages.
Branches of the Science of Nature, alias Particular Physics, seven; viz. 1. Zoology. 2. Physical Astronomy (as if there were an Astronomy that was not Physical.) 3. Meteorology. 4. Cosmology. 5. Botany, 6. Mineralogy. 7. Chemistry. Thus, in the first place, Animals of all sorts, then the Stars, and then (whatever they are) the Meteors, are brought to view, and that by Reason, before any such receptacle as a world has been found for them to exist in; and, between animals and the plants on which they have to depend for their existence, this same whole world, as soon as it is found, is placed, besides all the stars and all the meteors.
In company with this Figured System (Systême Figuré,) and antecedently to it, is presented by the Author, as above noticed, an “Explanation” of it. For an explanation, and therein for a justification, of the sort of order, a sample of which has just been exhibited, reference to the above Explanation was, of course, made. Of this reference, what was the result?—that the order pursued in the Explanation was, on this part of the ground, altogether different from the order, given to the articles which it professed to explain. This too after his having observed, in so many words, that, (p. 233,) “Particular Physics ought to follow thesamedistribution as Natural History.”*
In this same Explanation another strange intimation is given; and such is the store set upon it, it is repeated through the whole course of several pages. This is, that so long as under the presidence of Memory you are studying Natural History, (in which he includes the history of all the arts except the fine ones,) you are to make use of your senses and nothing more; on the other hand, when you come to the study of the same objects under the presidence of Reason, then it is, that for the first time you are to apply to them the faculty of reflection, and so long as that is at work, you have no occasion for your senses.† What perhaps might be found to be true is, that in the study of Natural History, rather more use is made of the senses than in that of Natural Philosophy; in the study of Natural Philosophy, rather more use made of the faculty of reflection than in the study of Natural History. But he who should attempt to do anything in Natural History, without being at any expense in the article of reflection, or in Natural Philosophy, without making any use of his senses, would assuredly find it very up-hill work.
The nature of the discourse incomplete; no verbs in it; consequently no propositions; nothing but substantives, with here and there an adjective.
By this sort of discourse, if discourse it can be called, for want of the necessary and indispensable tie, or copula, as the logicians and grammarians call it, which is afforded by the part of speech called a verb, no complete assertion being contained in it, no determinate information is conveyed.
By nothing short of an entire proposition can any such conveyance be made. True it is, that nouns, and in particular noun substantives, are the principal materials out of which the sign of an assertion is composed; but still, without the copula no determinate assertion is formed. Set down any two, or any greater number of substantives, out of these same materials, one man will make one sort of proposition, another man another, and a third man will not know what to make of them. Of the readers—that is, of the persons for whose instruction the work is intended—some, it is possible there may be, whose conception of the work, when executed, may be adequate to that which the workman, the instructor, had in his mind, at the time he executed it. But that such will be the case with the generality of readers,* is surely not the sort of supposition on which a work of this sort ought to be grounded. Destitute of this principle of fixation and bond of union, objects may, in innumerable multitude, and endless succession, be presented to the mind; and, after all, leave in it an impression, not more durable than that which is left in the waters by a vessel by which they have been traversed.
To the sort of sketch, a sample of which is attempted in the ensuing section, a Tabular Sketch, jotted down in this unconnected mode, will be found to bear much the same sort of relation, as a stock of bricks, mortar, and timber, deposited by the side of each other, bears to a house. Thus, instead of a structure ready put together for use, the reader, out of the materials thus shot down before him, is left to make one for himself as well as he is able. The learner is left, and called upon, to do for himself, what the teacher, perhaps because he knew not how to do it, has left undone.
Several causes concur, in recommending to the hand of the workman this mode of executing the work. In comparison of the opposite mode, the value given to the work in this mode is indeed small, and the interest of the customer, the learner, proportionably ill-served. Not so the interest of the workman, the instructor, over all errors and all ignorances a very convenient veil is everywhere spread by it. 1. No assertion at all being contained in it, no false assertion, no erroneous judgment, can be imputed to it. Scarcely in any way can a man thoroughly commit himself, by anything which he has inserted, still less by anything which he has omitted to insert, in it. 2. Yet, by a too natural misconception, the less the instructor has in this case done for his pupil, the more he is thought to have had it in his power to do, or even to have done. By this form of discourse, if discourse it can be called, an air of mysticism and oracularity is cast over it. This was among the characteristics of the Egyptian hieroglyphics. Ideas, such as they are, suggested in abundance; but, among them no such thing as an assertion to be found. Only in proportion as it is understood, is language of any use. Whatsoever is obscure is, in proportion to the obscurity, unintelligible. Speaking thus obscurely and unintelligibly, is it that you are unable to speak plain, or is it that you are unwilling? If unwilling, what but deception can be your object? Such are the questions to which every discourse stands exposed, in proportion as it is obscure.
Yet to those materials for thinking—loose as they were—profound, in former ages, was the depth of wisdom that was ascribed: to those loose materials for thinking, out of which the best thoughts that could have been made would, probably, have been, most, if not all of them, foolish ones. At the same time, while the understanding of the reader is thus left in this comparatively unsupplied state, his vanity is gratified: to do what the philosophers have left undone, affords to those who have a taste for it, a pastime; a pastime, in the course of which, as many little triumphs may be reaped, as there are propositions that can be put together out of such materials as it supplies.
Sketches of this sort, on a variety of subjects, are assuredly not wanting, in which D’Alembert may have found so many precedents, and thereby so many warrants, for this unconnected, and, to the reader, so little instructive,—but, at the same time, to the author, so much the most convenient,—mode. If, unconscious of any such warrant, he had regarded it as matter of obligation, to employ that mode which was best suited to the end in view, none but the connected mode would have presented itself to his view: the conception he would thus have been forced to frame to himself, would have been correspondently clear, and the work would have appeared, in a form very different from that in which it meets the eye at present.
All this while, to the French philosopher, circumstanced as he was, the choice of this inadequate form was matter, not so much of policy alone, as of necessity. But of this perhaps in another place.
Whether, in any place, it is in the nature of any such speculations, as the above, to be of any real use, to render to mankind any perceptible service,—whether for speculations of this sort, and to this effect, the place in which they are thus brought to view is a fit place,—these are, among the points in which, in his own way, every reader will pronounce his own judgment. By any one, whose patience may have carried him thus far, thus much at any rate will, it is believed, be admitted, viz. that if, at the time when that Table was made public, there existed, on the ground of utility, any real demand for a Table of that sort, that demand has not, by any of the information therein given, been superseded.
Specimen of a New Encyclopedical Sketch, with a correspondent Synoptic Table, or Diagram.*
Directly or indirectly, well-being, in some shape or other, or in several shapes, or all shapes taken together, is the subject of every thought, and object of every action, on the part of every known Being, who is, at the same time a sensitive and thinking Being. Constantly and unpreventably it actually is so; nor can any intelligible reason be given for desiring that it should be otherwise.
This being admitted, Eudæmonics, in some one or other of the divisions of which it is susceptible, or in all of them taken together, may be said to be the object of every branch of art, and the subject of every branch of science. Eudæmonics,† the art, which has for the object of its endeavours, to contribute in some way or other to the attainment of well-being, and the science in virtue of which, in so far as it is possessed by him, a man knows in what manner he is to conduct himself in order to exercise that art with effect.
Considered in the character of an edifice or receptacle, Eudæmonics may, therefore, be termed the Common Hall or central place of meeting, of all the arts and sciences: change the metaphor, every art, with its correspondent science, is a branch of Eudæmonics.
If the above observation be correct, it is only in one or other of two shapes or characters—viz. that of a source of happiness, or that of a security against unhappiness that being can in
PAUPER POPULATION TABLE.
I. Out-Door or Out-Allowance List; showing the Number of Paupers of the several Classes undermentioned, and of all Ages, not lodging in the Poor-House, but receiving Weekly or other regularAllowances.
II. In-Door or House List; showing in Red Ink (for which the same Columns may serve) the Numbers of the several Classes and Ages, lodging in the Poor-House, where there is one.
INSTRUCTIONS respecting the filling up of the Blanks in this TABLE, in such Manner as to convey the Information desired; the Object of which is—not the scrutinizing into the Management of any particular Parish, &c.—but the forming a Sample of the State of the Pauper Population throughout England, collected from as many Parishes, and those as differently circumstanced, as possible.—☞ For the Uses of such a Sample, see Vol. VIII. p. 362 et seq.
☞ 1. At the Top of the Table insert the Name of the Parish or Hamlet, &c. or, in the Case of an Industry-House, the District of Parishes, as the Case may be, with the Town (if any) and County; as also the Year, Month, and Day, on which the filling up of the Table happens to have been completed.
2. Give the several Ages, and the Numbers of each Age, as well in the Instance of the several particular Classes (viz. those with the Mother,) &c. [Columns 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,] Orphans, &c. [Columns 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,] and so on throughout—as in regard to all Sorts put together; meaning of the living; for, in regard to the dead, these Distinctions are not material: and accordingly no Columns are here provided for them.
3. The including of a Person in the Number contained under one of these Heads should not prevent the reckoning him under as many other Heads as his Condition in other respects requires. Thus a Child’s being with the Mother should not hinder its being numbered also with fatherless Orphans, if it happens to be fatherless; nor with Children deserted by the Father, if deserted by the Father; nor with Idiots, if an Idiot; and so on.
4. Amount of the Poor Rates for the three last Years; the said Years ending respectively on the [NA] Day of the Month of [NA].
Please to fill up the above Blanks, if there be no Objection; taking for the Sums the gross Sums imposed within the Period, whether collected or not; and without deducting what Sums may have been applied to Purposes other than the Relief of the Poor. The Day is left in blank, under the Uncertainty with respect to the Day on which the Account of the Poor Rates happens to be usually made up in the Parish or other District in question; viz. the last Day of each Year, or any other Day, such as Easter, &c. But observe that the Years set down be entire Years, on what Days soever they begin and end; otherwise the Comparison between the Expense of one Year and the Expense of another will lead to wrong Conclusions.
5. For each Entry observe to take that Compartment which has for its Bounds the perpendicular Lines that bound the Columns expressive of the Class or Condition, (as Orphans, Blind, and so forth,) and the horizontal Lines that include the Figures expressive of the Age. Thus among the female Children that are Bastards, should there happen to be 3, and no more than 3, that are between the Ages of 4 and 5, to express this, insert a Figure of 3 in Column 27, between the two horizontal Lines, between which, at that End of them which runs through the Column of Years of Age [Col. 1] the Figures 4 to 5 are included.
6.If the information hereby requested cannot, in regard to every point, be communicated; pleace to return the Table, the sooner the better, with such Part of the Information inserted, as can be communicated.—Direct toJeremy Bentham, Esq., Queen’s Square Place, Westminster.
7. [Columns 2 and 3—Died within the Year ending the [NA] of [NA 179 NA]. In the Blanks insert the Month and Day of the Month on which the filling up of the Table happens to be completed:—if this Part of the Account cannot conveniently be brought down to so late a Day, then take any prior Day, for example, 31 Dec. 1796; observing, however, that the Period taken for this Purpose be neither greater nor less than a whole Year; or if less than a Year, then mark the Length of it, by adding the first Day of the Period, with the Word [beginning] before it.
N. B. The Account of the Deaths is more particularly material in the instance of Persons dying at Ages short of 21.
If, in the Deaths under 1 Year old, the number of Days old can be given (as by giving the Birth-day) with the Initials of the Child’s or the Mother’s, or Mother’s and Father’s Names, just for the Purpose of identifying it, so much the better; but this Head of information is not so indispensable as the rest. This and any other miscellaneous Information, not reducible under the above Heads, may be entered in the blank Space.
If in any Instance the exact Year of Age cannot be given (which in this Rank of Life is not unfrequently the Case, especially among old People,) give it according to the nearest Guess.
8. [Columns 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23—Deserted]. Foundlings, having a distinct Pair of Columns provided for them, need not be inserted here.
9. [Columns 32, 33—Foolish or Weak in Mind]. Here insert any such as, though mature enough in point of Age, are, by reason of Weakness of Understanding, looked upon as not fit to be trusted with the Management of their own Affairs.
10. [Columns 38, 39, 40, 41—Crippled.] Here include as well those who have lost the Limb itself, as those who have lost the Use of it: mentioning, in the blank Spaces, Cases relative to two, three, or four limbs.
11. [Columns 40, 41.] Should the last happen to contain any Persons, rendered incapable of all Exertion in the Way of Industry, by any other lasting bodily Affliction, other than old Age, Mention may be made of the Number of Persons so circumstanced, specifying in each Case the Species of Infirmity, together with the Sex, and the Age. Cancerous Cases may serve as an Example. But if this Head of Information should be attended with any difficulty; no Notice need be taken of it.
12. [Columns 46, 47—Bedridden.] By this are meant those who are unable to stand or walk without Help, whether confined to their Beds or not. any of its modifications, possess any claim to man’s regard.*
Eudæmonics being the name for the universally practised art, the pursuit of happiness, being in some of its various shapes, will be allowed to be an indispensable means, without which the object of that art cannot in any instance be pursued and attained. Sensitive being is the only seat of happiness: being, in that and other shapes, is the universal instrument of happiness. To the attainment of happiness in any shape or degree, an acquaintance, more or less considerable, with the seat of happiness, and with such beings as, in each instance, afford a promise of serving in the character of instruments of happiness, is more or less conducive, or even necessary. For the designation, of whatsoever portion of science may be regarded as capable of being attained, concerning being taken in its utmost conceivable extent, the word Ontology has, for ages, been employed.
Eudæmonics is the art of well-being. Necessary to well-being is being. In every part, therefore, of the common field, concomitant and correspondent to Eudæmonics considered as an art, runs Ontology,† considered as a science.
For the expressly declared subject of division, let us take the science: art and science running along everywhere together, every division performed on the one, may, on any occasion, be considered as applying to the other.
By means of this joint consideration, as often as, on looking at the name of a branch of art and science as it stands in the Table, we come to consider its nature, our attention will be pointed to the only source and measure of its value.
Familiar as is the name Ontology, the idea commonly attached to that appellation has hitherto been subjected, by usage, to a restriction, which is not exactly conformable, either to the present purpose, or even to the etymology and original signification of the word, as above. The case is, that, by all those philosophers, by whom, under this name, any instruction has been undertaken to be given, those properties alone have been either considered, or professed to be considered, which have been regarded by them as incident to all beings without distinction: such as actuality, possibility, necessity, impossibility, probability, improbability, certainty, simplicity, compositeness, power of causation, derivation from a cause, and so forth.
Coenoscopic‡ and Idioscopic,§ by successively attaching to the subject Ontology these two adjuncts, the field of art and science may thus be divided, the whole of it, into two portions; in one of which, viz. the coenoscopic, shall be contained the appalling and repulsive branch of science, to which the no less formidable, and to many a man intensely odious, appellation of metaphysics, is sometimes also applied; while to the other, viz. the idioscopic, all the other branches of art and science, may, without distinction, be consigned.
Division the 1st. Division of Ontology into 1. Coenoscopic, and 2. Idioscopic.
Matter and mind—into these two portions, being in general, considered as an aggregate, is wont to be considered as divided. Hence arises,
In the consideration bestowed upon body, the mind may confine itself, or not confine itself, to that property which belongs alike to all body, and even to every determinate portion of space unoccupied by body, viz. quantity. Hence arises
Division 3d. Division of Somatics into Posological* [Pososcopic] Somatics, and Poiological† [Poioscopic] Somatics. To avoid an inconvenience above brought to view, for an equivalent to Posological Somatics, may be employed the single-worded appellative Posology.
In the consideration of quantity, that of figure may be either taken into account or neglected. Hence arises
Division 4th. Division of Posology into Morphoscopic‡ Posology, and Alegomorphic or Alegomorphous§ Posology. By Morphoscopic Posology is denoted the same branch of art and science, for the designation of which the not altogether unexpressive, yet but inadequately expressive, term Geometry is the word in use.
In so far as it is without relation to figure that quantity is considered, the only diversification of which it is susceptible, is of that sort, for the expression of which the several modifications of which number is susceptible are employed. By Alegomorphic or Alegomorphous Posology, is here designated the same branch of art and science, for the designation of which the single-worded and adequately expressive appellation Arithmetic is the word in universal use.
Of a quantity, for the designation of which no more than one numerical figure,—or one line of such figures, no matter how long, so it be an uninterrupted one,—is employed, the amount is considered as known: i. e. by itself; the conception of it being, in so far as it is capable of being conveyed, conveyed in a direct way, and without need of the intervention of any other set of signs, to the mind of every person, by whom the import of those same figures, placed in that position with relation to one another, is understood.
Of a quantity, for the designation of which any two or more such lines of numerical figures, or one or more single figures, together with one or more such lines of figures, are employed, the amount is not, in a direct way, as yet known: for practical purposes it is not sufficiently known, until the composite expression, composed as above, has been transformed, or translated as it were, into a simple expression, consisting, as above, of some one single numerical figure, or some one single line of numerical figures, the elements of which are free from all such interruption as is produced by the interposition of any other sort of sign. To substitute to any other more complicated mode the simple mode of notation thus described, is what every operation of simple arithmetic has for its object.
In and for the designation of numbers, a convenience has, comparatively speaking, of late years, been found in the employing, in addition to numerical figures, and even on some occasions, or during some part of the operation, in lieu of numerical figures, signs of another kind, not varying in their signification, according to the order in which they succeed one another, in the same way as do the component elements of a line of numerical figures: of these newly devised signs, such as are capable of being ultimately translated into those which are composed of numerical figures, have, for a long time past, universally and exclusively been composed of the letters of the alphabet. But by none of these recently employed signs can any quantity ever be expressed in a direct manner: in any other manner than by reference to some single numerical figure, or line of numerical figures, ranged in arithmetical order, as above. Hence arises
Division 5th. Division of Alegomorphous posology, into Gnosto-symbolic,* or say Delo-symbolic,† and Agnosto-symbolic, or say Adelo-symbolic:‡Gnosto-symbolic or Delo-symbolic being the term employed for the designation of the branch, for the designation of which the term common Arithmetic is in use to be employed, Agnosto-symbolic, or Adelo-symbolic, is the term, employed for the designation of that, for the designation of which the inadequately expressive composite appellation Algebraical Arithmetic,—or, much more frequently, the single-worded and completely unexpressive appellative Algebra,—is employed.
II. To return to Poiological Somatology [Poioscopic Somatics,] or Somatology at large.—Where bodies are considered, it may be either with, or without, reference to any operation, performed upon or in relation to them, by human art, by the help of human science. Hence arises
Division 6th. Division of Somatology, or Somatics at large, into Physiurgic§ [Physiurgoscopic] and Anthropurgic∥ [Anthropurgoscopic.] This division has for its source the consideration of the absence or presence of human art and science, applied to the purpose either of discovering latent properties already belonging to the subject, or of investing it with new ones. Physiurgic Somatology has for its synonym the above-mentioned misexpressive appellation—Natural History.
Anthropurgic Somatology has for its synonym the still more flagrantly and perplexingly misexpressive appellation Natural Philosophy, taken in one of the two or more different degrees of extension, which, as above, have been given to it.
Applied to bodies, alias portions of matter, in their natural, or say physiurgic, state, human art—or say elaboration by human art—has two distinguishable objects: sometimes it is to the one, sometimes to the other, sometimes to both, that it is directed. These are, 1. The discovery of such properties, as—already, and before it has, by the application of human genius and industry, been endued with any new properties—it is in possession of, having been put in possession of them, as it were, by the hand of Nature. 2. The giving to it, in addition to, or instead of, any such properties as it is found endued with by the hands of Nature, some new property or set of properties.
Intimately connected, and, in many instances, inextricably blended and intermingled, are, it is evident, these two functions: the detection of an already existing property or set of properties, being very often a condition precedent,—and always, in so far as it affords suitable indications, an encouragement,—to the engaging in any such operations as are found conducive to the faculty of investing the subject with new ones.
Of Physiurgy, alias Natural History, the object and business is—to discover and observe the properties possessed by objects, in the state into which they have been brought by the powers of unassisted Nature. But, to the bringing them for that purpose to view, and presenting them in a state as little changed as may be, new properties are, in many instances, requisite to be given to them: nor, in general, would the labour necessary to the accomplishment of this purpose be bestowed upon them, but in the view of investing them with new properties:—properties, by which they will be brought into some state or other, better adapted to human use, than any, into which they had been brought by the hand of Nature.
Uranoscopic Physiurgics has for its single-worded synonym the adequately expressive appellative Astronomy.
Abioscopic Physiurgics has for its synonym the adequately expressive and single-worded appellative Mineralogy.
Division 9. Division of Embioscopic Physiurgics into Azooscopic,*Azoologic, or Azoic, and Zooscopic or Zoologic Physiurgics.
Azooscopic Embioscopics has for its synonyms the adequately expressive and single-worded appellations already in use—Botany and Phytology.
Zooscopic Embioscopics has for its synonym the adequately expressive and single-worded appellative already in use—Zoology.
Beyond this point, no adequate advantage seems to be promised, at least on the present occasion, by the task of carrying on, in this direction, that track of dichotomous or bifurcate division, which, at the expense of much labour to the workman,—and not less perhaps to the small number of amateurs that can reasonably be looked for,—has thus far been persevered in. By the words Zoophytology, Entomology, Erpetology, Ichthyology, Ornithology, Tetrapodology, and Amphibiology, having for their respective subjects, Plant-Animals, Insects, Reptiles, Fishes, Birds, Beasts, alias Quadrupeds, and Amphibious, alias Land-and-Water Animals,—so many divisions of Zoology have for this long time actually been, or, in virtue of powers granted by Analogy, may, at any time, be in use to be designated.
Coenoscopic or Phanerodynamic Anthropurgics has for its single-worded synonym the inadequately expressive appellative Mechanics: viz. when taken in the most extensive sense of the word, i. e. that in which it is employed to include whatsoever portions of Anthropurgic Somatics are not comprehended within the domain of Chemistry.
Idioscopic, or Cryptodynamic Anthropurgics. has for its single-worded synonym the unexpressive appellation Chemistry.
The properties, of which Mechanics—or, as the phrase is, Mechanical Philosophy—takes cognizance, are for the most part such as belong to all matter, taken in all its forms and species; by this circumstance it is that this branch of Art and Science is entitled to the appellation of Coenoscopic Anthropurgics, or Somatics.
These properties are, moreover, in comparison with those which belong to the subjects of the other just-mentioned branch, manifest, or say conspicuous, of themselves; not requiring the aid of human art to bring them out to view: in this circumstance it is that this same branch founds its title to the appellation of Phanerodynamic.
These properties being mostly, if not altogether, such as, in the common course of scientific language, come under the denomination of powers; hence, in speaking of this division of art and science, it has been thought that, on this occasion, a word corresponding to powers might, by contributing to clearness of apprehension, be not altogether without its use.
The properties, of which Chemistry takes cognizance, are for the most part, such as belong, not to all matter, nor to matter in general, but to this or that particular species of matter, as distinguished, each of them from the rest, by such a collection of these properties as, taken in the aggregate, belongs peculiarly to itself. By this circumstance it is that this branch of art and science entitles itself to the appellation of Idioscopic Anthropurgics.
These properties are, moreover, in comparison with those which belong to the branch just mentioned, recondite and unconspicuous; requiring—to the production, and, in some instances, as it were, to the creation of them—more or less of human art and elaboration, consisting chiefly in mixture, and in the application of different degrees of temperature: changes, which, in so far as the phenomena of heat and cold are considered as being the result of the absence or presence, the influx or efflux, of a particular species of matter, termed caloric, or the matter of heat, may also be considered as referable to the head of mixture.
Accordingly, in the adequately expressive appellative, Mixiology, or Symmictology, should any clear advantage be ever found derivable from the use of it, the originally unexpressive term Chemistry might at any time find an equally single-worded, and by no means unexpressive synonym.¶
This division has for its source the application or non-application of those newly discovered or created properties, which Art, in conjunction with Science, has had for its fruits, to the purposes of common life, through the medium of commercially established Art and Manufacture: Art and Manufacture, established upon such a footing that their produce is become an object of commerce.
Anapirical Anthropurgics has for its synonym the familiar compound appellative Experimental Philosophy.
Catastatical, or Catastatic Anthropurgics, has for its synonym the expressive, already established, and not altogether unfamiliar, appellative Technology.§
This tenth division, it is manifest, is not with reference to the last preceding one, subordinate, but co-ordinate: the aggregate being in both cases the same; only the source, from which the principle of division is derived, different.
It comprehends accordingly, and with equal propriety applies itself to, the mechanical branch and the chemical.
The demand, which in practice, there seemed to be for this division, viz. Experimental Philosophy and Technology being considered, the appellatives, which constitute the two branches of it being already in use, a place in this sketch could not be refused to it. True it is that, from the first of these ideal receptacles, as the newly produced fruits of art and science are converted into articles of commerce, individual objects are continually passing into the second; but of the appellations respectively given to the receptacles themselves, the propriety remains unchanged.
Beyond this point in the line of bifurcate division, there seems not, at present at least, any adequate use, in carrying on the investigation in this direction. Of the genus Mechanics, the species, according to a list more or less approaching to completeness, will be found ranged in a vertical line in a column of Table I., and so of the genus Chemistry.
III. To return to Pneumatology or Pneumatics.
Alegopathematic, or say Alego-æsthetic Pneumatology has, for its single-worded synonym, the not unexpressive appellation Noology.‡‡
It has for its subject spirit or mind, considered apart from all feeling, whether of the pleasurable or painful kind: considered that is to say with reference to the purely intellectual part of the animal frame; including simple perception, memory, judgment, reasoning, abstraction, imagination, &c.
Pathematoscopic Pneumatology may have for its synomyn Pneumatic, or Psychological∥∥Pathology.
Aplopathematic Pneumatology or Pathology has for its subject the aggregate of Pleasures and Pains of all kinds, considered apart from whatsoever influence, in the character of motives, the prospects of them may have upon the will or volitional faculty, and the acts, as well purely mental and internal, as corporeal and external, of which those prospects may become the causes.∥
Thelematoscopic Pneumatology or Pathology, has for a syonym the single-worded appellative Ethics,* taken in its largest sense.
In the character of synonyms to Ethics are also used, in some circumstances, the words Morals and Morality.
To the head of Plasioscopic Noology may be referred the art of thinking, with the correspondent science of what belongs to the formation of the matter of thought, in so far as the work of formation can be kept in view, and carried on in a state of separation from the work of communication, as applied to the same individual portion of that ideal species of matter.
To the word Logic, considered as the name of a branch of art and science, the conception that has been attached, seems never to have been altogether so determinate and definite as could be wished. But in one at least of the senses, in which it has been employed, it may be considered as the single-worded synonym of Plasioscopic Noology, as above characterized.
Division 14. Division of Coenonesioscopic Noology, or say Coenonesiology, into Aplo-didactic, or say Didactic, and Pathemategeretic, [Pathocinetic‡ ] or say Egeretic. Aplo-didactic, i. e. simply information affording; having, for the end or object of the communication in question, that and nothing more: Pathemategeretic or Egeretic, i. e. Affection-exciting, or in one word excitative.
Of the word Grammar, if not exactly coextensive with, the import will (it is believed) be recognised as comprehended under, the import of the word Aplo-didactic, as above explained.
To the head of Grammar seem commonly to be referred those rules, and no others, which have for their subject, among the words employed for the communication of thought, such relations between word and word as are still the same, whatsoever may be the particular purpose and occasion of the communication, and the nature and subject of the thoughts communicated.§
To the head of Rhetoric seem commonly to have been referred those rules, which have for their subject the choice capable of being made of words and combinations of words, on occasions on which the communication made, has for its purpose, or in the number of its purposes, the exercising an influence on the Affections, on the Affections, whether considered as having place in a calm state, or as in that state of intensity and perturbation, in which they receive the name of Passions.∥
Division 15. First Division of Ethics (taken in the largest sense of the word) viz. into Dicastic,* i. e. Censorial, and simply Exegetic,† i. e. Expository, or Enunciative. Dioastic, or Censorial, i. e. expressive of a judgment or sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, as intended by the author of the discourse, to be attached to the ideas of the several voluntary actions, (or say modifications of human conduct,) which, in the course of it, are brought to view: in other words, his opinion, in relation to each such act, on the question, whether it ought to be done, ought to be left undone, or may, without impropriety, be done or left undone.
Simply Exegetic, i. e. Expository or Enunciative, viz. in so far as, without bestowing any such mark of approbation, disapprobation, or indifference, the discourse has for its object the stating what, in the opinion of the author, has, on each such occasion, actually come to pass, or is likely to have come to pass, or to have place at present, or to be about to come to pass in future,—i. e. what act is, on the occasion in question, most likely to have been done, to be doing, or to be about to be done.
This division has for its source the nature of the mental faculty, to which the discourse is immediately addressed. In so far as the discourse is of the Censorial cast, the faculty to which it addresses itself, and which, in so doing, it seeks to influence, is the volitional—the will, or at any rate the pathematic. In so far as it is of the simply Expository, or Enunciative, cast, the only faculty to which it immediately applies itself, viz. by seeking to afford information to it, is the intellectual faculty, the understanding.
For a synonym, Dicastic Ethics may have the single-worded appellative Deontology.‡
The principle of division, deduced from this source, will be seen to be applicable, and accordingly applying itself, severally to all the following ones.
Synonyms to Genicoscopic, as applied to Ethics, are, 1. Theoretical; 2. Speculative. Synonyms to Idioscopic, as applied to Ethics, is the word practical.
In this, as commonly in other cases, the limits between general and particular not being determinate, so neither are those between what, on the one hand, is theoretical or speculative, on the other, practical. Of the observations expressed, such part as is allotted to the explanation and fixation of the import of general words—words of extensive import, the use of each of which is spread over the whole field, or a large portion of the whole field, of the art and science—will belong mostly to the genicoscopic, theoretical, or speculative branch; and, under the name of principles, to the above observations will naturally be added any such rules, whether of the expository or the censorial cast, as in this respect are most extensive.
The deeper it descends into particulars, the more plainly it will be seen to belong to the idioscopic. In so far as, with the incidents exhibited in the fictitious narrative, any rules of a deontological nature (as in modern productions is frequently the case) happen to be intermixed, the matter of novels and romances comes to be included in, and the immense mass of it forms but a part of, the matter of practical ethics.
Division 17. Division of Ethics—whether Exegetic or Dicastic, and whether Genicoscopic or Idioscopic, into Apolioscopic,§ i. e. political-state-not-regarding, viz. private ethics,Ethics in the more usual sense of the word,—and Polioscopic, i. e. political-state-regarding,∥ viz. Government,¶ alias Politics.**
Division 18. Division of Politics and Government into Esoscopic,†† i. e. internal or interior-concerns-regarding, viz. Internal Government,—and Exoscopic,‡‡ i. e. external-concerns-regarding,—viz. Inter-national Government and Politics.
By internal Politics, may be understood that branch of Ethics which has for its subject the conduct of Government, i. e. of the ruling members of the political community or state in question, as towards the whole number of the members of that same community; by Inter-national Politics, that branch of Ethics, which has for its subject the conduct of Government, as above, as towards the members, whether rulers or subjects, of other such communities.
Division 19. Division of Internal Government and Politics, into Nomothetic, [Nomothetioscopic,§§ ] i. e. legislative, viz., Legislation,—and Aneunomothetic, [Aneunomothetioscopic,∥∥ ] i. e. without legislation,—viz. Administration.
In so far as it is by the establishing of laws that the business of government is carried on, it is carried on in the way of legislation;¶¶ in so far as it is carried on otherwise than by the establishing of laws, it is carried on in the way of Administration.
Division 20. Division of Administration into Aneristic,* [Aneristicoscopic,† ] i. e. Uncontentious, viz. Administration in the more common import of the term,—and Eristic, [Eristicoscopic,‡ ] i. e. Contentious—viz. Judicature.
Division 21. Division of Judicature into Autothetic,§ [Autothetoscopic,∥ ] i. e. self-established, viz. Judicature, according to CommonaliasUnwritten Law,—and Catanomothetic,¶ [Catanomothetoscopic,** ] i. e. according to Legislation, viz. Judicature according to StatutealiasWritten Law.
Explanations, relative to the above Sketch and Table.
In the sketch thus attempted, the following particulars present themselves as having, in a greater or less degree, a claim to notice. Subjoined to them, respectively, are a few questions, in relation to which some satisfaction may not improbably, it is supposed, be looked for, and will accordingly be here endeavoured to be afforded:—
1. In the Tabular Diagram, and accordingly in the Explanation given of it, the division or ramification professes all along to be exhaustive.—Question 1. What are the uses or advantages derivable from a tabular sketch, exhibiting in one view a number, more or less considerable, of the branches of art and science? Answer. See § 10.—Question 2. Why branches of Art and Science, and not Arts and Sciences? Answer. Because, in every part of the field, Art and Science are found together: no branch of art without a correspondent branch of science—no branch of science without a correspondent branch of art. It is not that in one part of the field you have an art, in another a science, in a third both; but that in whatever part you have either, you have both. See Chrestomathia, Table I. Note (32.) supra, p. 24.—Question 3. Why exhaustive? What are the uses and advantages resulting from its being so? Answer. See § 11.—Question 4. Can it, by any and what means, be proved to be so? Answer. See § 12.—Question 5. The idea of the utility of exhaustiveness, as applied to logical division—is it new to the scientific, and in particular to the logical world? Answer. Far from new; but at the same time not as yet quite so clear as it might be, and it is hoped will here be rendered. See § 13.—Question 6. Can any directions be given, by the pursuance of which, the exhaustiveness of a systematic sketch, of the subdivisions and contents, of any branch of art and science may be secured? Answer. See § 12.
2. The ramification is all along dichotomous, alias bifurcate, i. e. two-pronged.—Question 1. Why bifurcate rather than multifurcate? Answer. To secure its being exhaustive; concerning which, see § 12.—Question 2. Is the idea of the necessity of bifurcation to exhaustiveness new, as above? Answer. So it is supposed to be. See § 13.
3. Of the first partition of this kind that occurs, the result is composed of two, and no more than two, branches of art and science, which are thereby represented as included in that one, the division of which has thus been made; and as containing between them the whole contents of it. And so in the case of any other.
4. Of those two condivident branches, the names are respectively formed by, and composed of, the name of the immediate trunk,—which, grammatically speaking, is a noun-substantive,—followed, in each of the two instances, by a noun-adjective. Question 1. Of this two-worded name what is the use? Answer. To afford a definition, and, by means of the definition, an explanation, of the name constituting the immediate trunk.
5. Being thus composed of two words put together, each such name may, in Greek-sprung language, be termed a poly-epic, and in particular a biepic, name; in English-sprung language, a many-worded, and in particular a two-worded name.
6. In every instance, for reasons that have already been brought to view, (§ 6.) this two-worded name is, in the first instance, a Greek-sprung, and in most instances a newly-framed denomination. Question. Why Greek-sprung? Answer. See above, § 6.
7. In several instances, in the character of synonyms, subjoined to this principal biepic and Greek-sprung name, are other such names, one or more in each division; for which see the Notes. Question. Why these synonyms? Answer. 1. That, in each such group of names, the identity of import between the several names may be established; and in so far that error prevented, which would have place, if, from diversity in the sign, diversity in the object meant to be brought to view were inferred. 2. That by each of these names the object may in future be made known—not by that name only, but by any one or more of the others:—so that, on each occasion, that one of them may be employed, which, with reference to that same occasion, appears most convenient.
8. In most instances, to those Greek-sprung two-worded names, are added one or more two-worded, or many-worded, English-sprung names. Question. Why these names? Answer. To make known the import to such readers of English, to whom the import of the Greek-sprung names, new as they mostly are,—especially to English readers,—would not explain itself. By the unavoidable awkwardness of these compound English names, will be afforded the only justification that could be afforded for the practice of employing any such names, as, being borrowed from a foreign language,—and that a dead one,—are, until explanations of them have respectively been given and received, not intelligible to any but the comparatively small number, of those by whom the import of the corresponding foreign words happens to be understood.
9. Also, in several instances, new-coined, mono-epic, or single-worded Greek-sprung, names. Question 1. To what purpose are they thus added? Answer. To show by what means, in these several instances, the facility, afforded by the use of single-worded appellatives, may be substituted to the entanglement and embarrassment produced by the use of many-worded ones.
10. Also, in several instances, appellatives already in familiar use. Question 1. For what purpose are these added? Answer. For the purpose of contributing to the fixation of the import of these most familiar terms, viz. by presenting the clearest and most correct conception that can be afforded, of the mutual relations of the objects respectively designated by them,—and thus giving the greatest extent that can be given, to whatsoever benefits may be derivable, from the use of a Table constructed in this mode.
11. The first single-worded names that occur, viz. Eudæmonics and its associate Ontology (both of them Greek-sprung,) are so many names of that trunk which, with reference to the several pairs of branches,—products of successive acts of partition or ramification,—may be styled the universal trunk:—Eudæmonics, the universal trunk of Arts; Ontology, of Sciences.
12. With reference to the two branches into which it is divided, the name of every branch of art and science, which here presents itself, may, as above, be termed the name of the immediate trunk. Every such immediate trunk may, with reference to the universal trunk, be styled a particular or partial trunk.*
13. Any number of trunks, intervening between the universal trunk and the partial trunk in question, may, with reference to these two trunks, be styled intermediate trunks.
14. The trunk, which stands next to the universal trunk, may be styled the partial trunk of the first rank or order: that which stands next to it, the partial trunk of the second rank or order: and so on.
15. In some instances, several partial trunks are of the same rank or order. This is the case, as often as, from different sources, the same trunk is successively subjected to so many different divisive operations. In this case, whatsoever be the number of these operations, the divisions performed by them may, in every instance, be equally exhaustive. Be the numbers of sets of branches (viz. in so far as the bifurcate mode is conformed to, pairs of branches) ever so numerous, the operations themselves, and the pairs of branches, which are respectively their results, are all, with reference to each other, co-ordinate: with reference to the results of a division, performed on any trunk of a higher rank, (the highest rank being expressed by the smallest number) subordinate: with reference to the results, of a division performed on a trunk of a lower rank, superordinate.
16. The relation which, by the lesser aggregate designated by the name attached to any such subordinate trunk, is borne to the greater aggregate designated by the name attached to its immediate superordinate, is the same as that which, in the language of the current logic, a species bears to its next immediate genus—the genus of which it is the immediate species. The trunk, here styled the universal trunk, corresponds to the genus generalissimum of logicians.
17. Contrarily to the usage, which seems chiefly, if not exclusively, prevalent,—for giving intimation of the relation which, in each instance, is represented as having place between the trunk and its two immediate branches, the word is—instead of being omitted, and left to be supplied by the reader, is inserted.*
Question 1. Why thus depart from the most usual, it being also the most simple, mode?
Answer 1. To exclude obscurity unless the sign of this instrument of connexion is brought to view, no meaning is fully and adequately expressed:—unless the import of it is present to the mind, no meaning is comprehended. True it is, that, to the mind of one, to whom Tables of this kind are to a certain degree familiar, the import of this necessary bond of connexion may, at the first glance, and at the same instant, have been presented by those words of the proposition, which are inserted: and thus far no obscurity has place. But, other minds there may be, by which, though through the above-mentioned means, this same conception, will, sooner or later, have been obtained by them, yet for some time it will not have been obtained: and, till it is obtained, the undesirable quality of obscurity remains in the object, and the unpleasant sense of fruitless labour in the mind to which the object is presented.
Answer 2. To exclude ambiguity.—By the sort of omission here in question, it may be, that, in the individual sketch in question, framed as it is here framed, the imperfection thus denominated would not have been found produced. But, in a Table, framed in the manner, in which, to say the least, most Tables constructed for the sort of purpose here in question have been framed, the imperfection would, it is believed, be apt to have place. Two cases may be mentioned, in either of which it has place: 1. In so far as, between any two nouns that have place in the Table, a doubt arises, what is the copula intended, viz. whether the simple copula—the verb substantive—or this or that complex copula, that is, any verb, other than the verb substantive.† 2. In so far as, this simple copula being the one fixed upon, so it is that of the nouns, for the connexion of which it is capable of serving, the number is greater than two, a doubt arises for the connexion of what two or more it was intended to serve.
In the Table of D’Alembert, these doubts—one of them at least, if not both—will frequently, it is believed, be found presenting themselves.
Answer 3. To exclude misconception.—As often as of two conceptions, by the simultaneous existence of which ambiguity is presented, one alone is that which was intended by him whose discourse the discourse is, here the ambiguity has two issues or modes of termination, either of them capable of taking place. In so far as that which happens to be embraced by the reader, is different from that which was intended by the writer, misconception is the result.
17. For presenting to view so many different classes of the words of which the Table in question is composed, so many different types are, it may be observed, employed:—viz. 1. for the designation of the Greek-sprung words, which, in conjunction with the name of the immediate trunk, constitute respectively the two-worded names of its immediate branches, Italics, and these in a comparatively large type, are employed.
18.—2. For the familiar English words, which, when strung together in the form of one composite word, form those appellatives which, to the English reader, are designed to afford an explanation of the, in most instances, new, and, in every instance, Greek-sprung epithet,—the common Roman types, and in a comparatively small size, are employed.
19.—3. For the words, which form respectively those single-worded appellatives, which, being of Greek origin, and for the most part new, have on the present occasion been framed for the present purpose,—the sort of type called black-letter is employed.
20.—4. For those words, which, being respectively names of so many branches of art and science, are already in the English language, and in familiar use,—for these appellatives, whether single-worded or two-worded,—capital letters are employed.
21. As the trunks, which they respectively designate, recede further and further from the universal trunk, the types employed for these capitals are smaller and smaller.*
Questions respecting Articles 17 to 21.
Question 1. Why, for the different classes of words, employ types of different species?—Answer. That, at short glances, the differences may be the more rapidly and clearly apprehended.
Question 2. Why, for trunks, at different distances from the universal trunk, employ types of different sizes?—Answer. That the relations, which have place, in respect of extent of import, between these several terms, may be the more rapidly and clearly apprehended.
Question 3. For the English many-worded appellatives (viz. epithets) inserted for the explanation of the corresponding Greek-sprung, and mostly new-coined, appellatives, why employ so small a type?—Answer. In order that, forming as it were so many botches, they may, while offering themselves to the eye, rather recede from it than meet it, so as not to be looked at, but in proportion as the demand for the use of them presents itself.
Uncouth as this portion of the language here employed cannot be denied to be, it is not more so than that in which, for the accommodation of English readers, entire works, viz. on the subject of Botany, may be seen composed.
Question 4. For those names of arts and sciences which are already in familiar use, why employ large and conspicuous capitals? Answer. That with a particular degree of force they may attract the eye: two main uses of the Table being the helping to fix the imports respectively attached to these most frequently employed appellatives, and to exhibit to view, in the clearest manner, the mutual relations between the objects which they are respectively employed to designate.
22. By the familiar sign, composed of the letters i. e.—initials of the Latin words, id est,—the eye is throughout conducted to the above-mentioned explanatory words, explanatory of the Greek-sprung adjectives; by the kindred sign, viz. for videlicet, to those appellatives in common use, to which, for the reason above-mentioned, the types called capitals have been allotted.
23. Though, by means of some of the above-mentioned appellatives,—viz. trunk, universal trunk, partial trunks, and intermediate branches, the matter of the Table is spoken of as if it were arranged in the form of a tree, yet the position of the object styled the universal trunk, is at the top of the Table; and that of the branches, instead of being higher and higher, is lower and lower, as they recede from it. Question. Why this apparent contradiction and incongruity? Answer. That, here in the tabular diagram, as in the continued explanatory discourse, those parts, which, for the understanding of it, require to be first read, may be the first to meet the eye. Nor, at bottom, is there any absolute contradiction in the case. Roots, as well as trunks, have their branches: and in the instance of a numerous tribe of plants; in a word, in that of trees in general, by so simple a cause as a change in the surrounding medium, branches being buried in the earth, while roots are exposed to the air, not only under the hand of the artist, but even under the hand of Nature, roots are found convertible into branches, as well as branches into roots.
Uses of a Synoptic Encyclopedical Table or Diagram.
By the name of an Encyclopedical Sketch, two perfectly different, however nearly related, objects may, with equal propriety, be designated, and under that common appellative thereby comprehended. The one is, a continued discourse, expressed in the forms of ordinary language: the other is a Systematic Table or Diagram, so constructed as to be in some degree emblematic. In the continued discourse, the relations in question are expressed at length in words and words alone: in the emblematic diagram some image is employed, by reason of which, while by their respective names, the objects in question are presented to the eye, all of them in the same place, and at the same time, certain relations* which they bear to one another, are at the same time held up to view. As to the image, that of a tree, with its trunk and branches, is that which, in the earliest example known,* was thus employed; nor does it appear that the nature of the case affords any object better adapted to this purpose.
To the form of a continued discourse the advantage attached is, that the quantity of explanation given by it is not restricted: but with this advantage is connected a disadvantage, viz. that, if it be of a certain length, it is only in succession that the several parts of it are presented to, and can be taken cognizance of by, the eye; so that, unless it be under the constantly repeated trouble and embarrassment, of turning backwards and forwards, leaf after leaf, or that of a constant strain upon the memory, or both, no comparison of part to part can be made.
In the systematic diagram, the advantage is, that, for the purpose of uninterrupted and universal comparison, continued to any length, after the objects with their several relations have been respectively explained, each of them, at whatever length may have been deemed requisite, in and by the continued discourse, the whole assemblage of them is, or at least, as above-mentioned, may be so brought together, as to be kept under the eye at once, forming as it were so many parts of one and the same picture.
Thus it is, that to this form two perfectly distinguishable, howsoever closely connected, advantages, both of them of a practical nature, are attached: in the first place, of the whole matter taken together, conception is facilitated and expedited; in the next place, comparison—reciprocal comparison—the articles being capable of being run over for all purposes, in all directions, and in all imaginable orders of succession, without interruption, and with that rapidity which is proverbial as being among the characters of thought.
To set against these advantages, no disadvantage has place, except that to the quantity of matter, to which this form is capable of being given, there are limits which apply not to the other. But, within these limits, here, as in a map or an assortment of maps, it is seldom that, be the purpose what it may, within the quantity of space capable of being thus employed, a quantity of matter sufficient for the purpose will not be capable of being displayed.
Anterior to the time of Bacon, were the profit worth the trouble, Encyclopedical Sketches might, even in the tabular form, it is believed, be found, and in both forms in no inconsiderable abundance. But, by the true lights, shed upon the field of thought and action, and thence upon the field of art and science, by that resplendent genius, all those false lights have been extinguished.
Of the two above-distinguished forms, of which an Encyclopedical Sketch is susceptible, the only one, however, of which the works of Bacon afford an exemplification, is that of a continued discourse, the purely verbal form.
In like manner, in no other than the purely verbal form, and that, too, wrought in a looser texture, may be seen the Encyclopedical Sketch prefixed by Ephraim Chambers to his Dictionary of Arts and Sciences.
With the two Encylopedical Sketches of Bacon and Chambers before him, D’Alembert prefixed to the French Encyclopedia his Encyclopedical Sketch, in the purely verbal form, taken, as he says, chiefly from Bacon: and, moreover—and for the first time reckoning from the days of Bacon—that correspondent sketch, in the form of a systematic diagram, which is here copied,† and which has been the subject of the remarks given above.
This diagram is exhibited by him in the character of the principal object; and it is in the character of an Explanation of that principal object, that the continued and purely verbal discourse attached to it, is delivered by him.
Notwithstanding the imperfections above held up to view, to which others might have been added, signal was the service which, in the estimation of the author’s collaborators, among whom were numbered almost all the men of any literary eminence whom France at that time afforded, was rendered by the instrument so constructed as hath been seen. In it they beheld, nor with other eyes has it been beholden (it is believed) in that or other countries, by their contemporaries or their successors, a sort of novum organum in miniature: a sort of instrument, which every man, to whose lot it has fallen, to labour, upon a scale of any considerable extent, in any part of the field of art and science, ought to have constantly in his hands and before his eyes.
To what instruction soever may have been extractible from that diagram, whether any and what addition has been afforded, by the remarks herein above made on it, together with the subjoined sample of another, executed upon a plan considerably different, the reader will judge.
A Table of this sort may be considered as an instrument in the hand of Analogy.
Scarce will the art be found, from which, through the medium of Analogy, assistance may not, in some shape or other, be borrowed by some other art, not to say by every other.
By Analogy, scarce will the article of knowledge be found, by which, in some shape or other, light may not be received from some other, not to say every other.*
Conception, retention, combination, generalization, analysis, distribution, comparison, methodization, invention—for all or any of these purposes, with an Encyclopedical tree in his hand, suited to the particular object which he has in view, skipping backwards and forwards, with the rapidity of thought, from twig to twig, hunting out and pursuing whatsoever analogies it appears to afford, the eye of the artist or of the man of science may, at pleasure, make its profit, of the labour expended on this field.
Yes, true it is that, no otherwise than through individual objects, can any clear ideas be imbibed, from the names of those ideal aggregates or bundles, of different sorts and sizes, into which, by the associating and dividing power of those appellations, they are collected and distributed. But, from a comparatively small number of individual objects, may be obtained very instructive and practically serviceable ideas, of very extensive aggregates. Many years age, forty thousand, or thereabouts, was supposed to be the number of species of plants at that time more or less known: forty thousand, the number of those ideal aggregates, designated by the name of species: millions of millions the number of the individuals at each moment designated by those same specific names. Yet from any one of those individuals may be abstracted a tolerably adequate idea of the species in which it is considered as contained; and how small is the number of species necessary to plant in the mind the prodigiously extensive idea designated by the word plant!
By attention, applying itself all along with still closer and closer grasp, by this faculty it is that advances, fresh and fresh advances, all of them so many conquests, are continually made in the field of art and science. Each laborious and inventive adventurer proceeds on in the wilderness, as far as his inclination and the force of his mind will carry him. Sooner or later, the same man or another, more frequently another, makes a road, whereby, to succeeding travellers, the quantity of labour necessary to the reaching of that farthest point is more or less reduced. By successive labourers of this pioneering class, the road is made gradually smoother and smoother. Where one ends, another begins; and hence it is that the veriest pigmy is at present able to look down, from a point, which, by his utmost exertions, the giant of anterior times could never reach.
That, of the branches of Art and Science, which, by the denominations here employed are thus endeavoured to be brought to view, the distinctness is, in a multitude of instances, far from corresponding to the distinctness of the denominations themselves, is but too true, and presents to view an imperfection no less undeniable than it is believed to be irremediable. In this tract, approximation is, throughout, the utmost that can be hoped for. But, unless and until some other scheme of distribution shall have been found, such as shall be exempt from, or at least in a less degree exposed to, this imputation of indistinctness, than that which is here submitted, the imperfection, so long as the work has any use, will not afford any sufficient reason for leaving it unattempted. That no scheme will be found altogether exempt from the imperfection, may be asserted with full assurance; and, if any scheme less tinctured with it than the present one is, could on this occasion, and by these eyes have been found, that and not this would have been the scheme in this place brought to view.
Let it not at any rate be said, that, by reason of this indistinctness, it is no more than upon a par with those other Encyclopedical Sketches, in the hope of superseding which it has been framed. Between the degree, and even the species of indistinctness, which has place in the two cases, wide indeed (it is believed) will be seen to be the difference. In this sketch (to borrow a phrase from Scottish history) in this sketch, may here and there be found (it is true) a small proportion of debateable land, concerning which it may be dubious to which of two contiguous districts it may with most propriety be said to belong: but in those cases, many are the instances, in which the whole of the territory, which is represented as belonging exclusively to one of two districts, may, with equal propriety, be said to belong to either or to both.
The Mode of Division should, as far as may be, be exhaustive—why?
If, of a sketch of the kind in question, the utility is by any person recognised, to satisfy him of the utility of its being rendered exhaustive, not many words can, it is supposed, be necessary. To be exhaustive, the parts which, at each partition or division so made, are the results of the operation, must, if put together again, be equal to the whole; and thus, and in this sense, exhaust (to use the word employed by logicians) the contents of the whole. It is only in so far as the divisions which it contains are, in this sense, respectively exhaustive, that the information, contained in a work which is composed of them, can be complete—can be what it appears to undertake for being, can be what it might be, and what, if it might, it ought to be. This being the case, if it be not exhaustive, every proposition, in which the exhaustiveness and completeness of the division is assumed, will, in so far as the assumption is proceeded upon, be, pro tanto, erroneous and incorrect; and, if received and acted upon, delusive: and, in whatsoever stage of the division the incompleteness has place, the consequence is, that, in every sub-division, the original imperfection is repeated, and the correspondent part of the work tainted with it.
But it is only by means of a system of division, carried on in the thus declaredly exhaustive mode, that any assurance can be afforded or obtained, that the survey taken of the field of thought and action, and therein of the field of science and art, or of whatsoever portion of that field is proposed to be comprehended, in the survey, is complete; any assurance, that, in the course of the progress made through it, a number of parts, in unlimited abundance each to an unlimited extent, may not have been omitted.
It is only in this way, that, even supposing the whole to have been actually embraced and comprehended in the survey, it can, in the mind that has embraced it, wear the aspect and character of a whole: instead of that of a regular tree, the form in which it presents itself will be no other than that of a confused heap of unconnected fragments,—each of them, in respect of form and quantity, boundless and indeterminate.
In the body of this work, intimation was given of what presented itself as the chief use, derivable from an insight, more or less extensive into those foreign languages, ancient and modern, in which the vernacular language has its roots. It consists (it was said) in this, viz. that, to an eye thus instructed, in the whole field of the language, there being no hard words, there shall be no absolutely dark spots; nothing that shall have the effect of casting a damp upon the mind, by presenting to it the idea of its ignorance, and thence of its weakness.
Correspondent to the sort of consciousness of power so obtainable in the field of language, is that which, by means of a set of systematic sketches,—and, an particular, by means of a set of systematic and tabular diagrams,—always supposing the mode pursued to be exhaustive, may be obtained and exercised over the field of art and science. No parts in it, from which through the medium of these appropriate denominations (the relations of which, as well those to one another, as to the matter of the body or branch of art and science, are determined and brought to view) ideas, more or less clear, correct, and complete, are not radiated to the surveying eye: in a word, no absolutely dark spots: no words that do not contribute their share towards the production of so desirable an effect, as that of substituting the exhilarating perception of mental strength, to the humiliating consciousness of ignorance and weakness.*
Desirable as this property will, it is hoped, be acknowledged to be, with reference to the purpose at present in question,—a purpose will now be mentioned, to which it must be acknowledged not to be applicable. Relations of logical identity and diversity, and relations of practical dependence, as between branch and branch, both these sets of relations have already been mentioned, as capable of being, with good effect, brought to view in the form of a synoptic Table. But, for the exhibition of relations thus different, neither can any one Table, nor any number of Tables, upon this same plan, be made to serve. In the plan, of division and correspondent distribution, pursued in the view given of the logical relations as above explained, exhaustiveness will indeed always be an essential feature. But where the relations to be exhibited are the practical sort of relations just spoken of, viz. those of dependence, or say, of subservience, (whether the subservience be mutual or but unilateral,) the nature of the subject admits not of any such regularity and all-comprehensiveness. From branches of art and science, the most remote from one another in the logical tree, one and the same art may be seen looking for assistance. Natural History, Anatomy, Chemistry, Architecture, Political History, Ethics—all these, not to mention any more, the Painter, not to speak of the Poet, may have occasion to summon to his aid.*
Exercising dominion over almost every branch of art and science, sometimes in furtherance of the interests of the professors of that particular branch, more frequently and more necessarily in furtherance of the interests of the whole community, the legislator, on pain of acting blindfold, has need of an insight,—the more clear, correct, and extensive the better,—into the matter of every such branch of art and science. For his use, therefore, to the Table of logical relations, exhibited upon an exhaustive plan, a Table of relations of dependence or subservience, as above explained, constructed upon a plan in which particularity and copiousness should be the ruling objects, would be an essential accompaniment.
Test of All-comprehensiveness in a Division how constructed—Additional Advantages, Distinctness and Instinctiveness. Bifurcation why necessary.
A problem is here proposed, and undertaken to be solved. A logical aggregate of any kind, as designated by any appropriate name, being given, required to divide it into a number of parts, each in like manner designated by a distinctive name, in such sort, that, in the sum of these parts, shall be contained the same individuals, and all the individuals which, and no other individuals than those which are contained in the whole.
Such is the problem, the solution of which is requisite for the present purpose. In other words, the solution of it consists in securing to the parts, into which the sort of whole in question is to be divided, the property of all-comprehensiveness.
For the accomplishing of this solution, what has been found necessary, is, the construction of an instrument, such as, being employed in the divisional operation in question, and thereby in the conformation of the parts, which are the results of it, shall serve as a test, in such sort, as to demonstrate, if such be really the case, that the division thus effected is in fact an all-comprehensive one: call it accordingly, the test of all-comprehensiveness.
An instrument of this sort has accordingly been constructed;† and, on turning to the Encyclopædical Table, will be seen to have, in every part of it, been explicitly or implicitly employed. It consists in what may be called the contradictory formula: the essence of which consists in the sign of negation, employed or employable in the designation of some one in each pair of branches, and not in that of the other. But of this presently.
In and by the word pair, as applied to the branches thus produced, what is already implied is, that, by the instrument in question, it is only in the way of bisection that the problem can be solved. But in this mode, it will be seen, that every desirable purpose may be accomplished: that it cannot by any other mode; and that on any occasion at pleasure, by division into two parts, division into any other number of parts may, if there be any use in it, be accomplished.
Of the desirable property, which, on this occasion, stands as the principal object, and occupies the fore-ground,—all-comprehensiveness, having for its synonym, as already explained, the word exhaustiveness,—is the name. But, by the same means by which to the scheme of division in question this property is secured, two other desirable properties, as it will be seen, are, at this same time, secured, viz. distinctness and instructiveness.
Intimately as they are connected with the principal property, and, by the same docimastic instrument, secured to the scheme of division executed by means of it, what will at the same time be seen is, that these two subsidiary properties are not, either of them, inseparable from it. Instances require to be shown, and will accordingly be shown, in which a scheme of division is or may be all-comprehensive without being distinct, and all-comprehensive and distinct without being instructive.‡
For securing clearness to the ideas attached to the names of those three properties, a few words of explanation may have their use.
1. Of all-comprehensiveness, with its synonym exhaustiveness, enough has in this view been said already.
2. By distinctness, as applied to the division in question, (whether by the word division what is here meant be the operation or the result,) by distinctness what is meant is, that, of all the individuals contained in the subject of the division, viz., the trunk or say, the major aggregate, it shall, when the division has been performed, be, in the instance of every such individual, clear and manifest to which of the several branches it belongs.
3. By instructiveness is meant a property which bears relation, and applies to both the others. It consists in this; viz. that the words, employed for giving denomination to the branches, shall be such, as to declare and announce, that the division is all-comprehensive, as also that it is distinct.
Of this property, it will be seen, that neither is it useless, nor is the warning, thus given to secure to the scheme of division the benefit of it, superfluous. 1. The property is not useless. For from the property of all-comprehensiveness no use can be derived, but in so far as the scheme of division is understood to be possessed of it: and so in the case of distinctness. 2. Neither is the warning superfluous. For, various, it will be seen, are the instances, in which these properties, though really possessed by the branches, into which, by the current names employed in the designation of them, the trunk has been divided, yet (such is the structure of those names) are not held up by them to view, and are therefore of little or no use.
Thus much as to the desirable properties, which, by the test above alluded to, viz. the contradictory formula have been secured, it is supposed, to the scheme of division here employed:—now as to the contradictory formula itself. Examples of it have been in existence as long as the logical tree of Rames, improperly (as will be seen) attributed to Porphyrius, has been in existence.* Examples of it are, as above, the matter of which the Encyclopædical tree here attempted is composed. What remains to be done here is, to point out the precise part to which the appellation is meant to be applied, and the ground on which it has been thus applied.
In the instance of each trunk, observation has been made, of a particular property, as being possessed by every individual, to which the name of the generic (say the major or comprehending aggregate, employed to represent the trunk) is applied: possessed, moreover, in like manner, by every individual, is a property to which the name of the minor or comprehended aggregate (the relatively specific appellative, employed to designate one of the two branches) is applied,—but as to the other of the two branches, not possessed by any one of the individuals, to which the appellative employed to designate that branch is applied.
Having thus the effect of giving, as it were, birth to, and, at any rate, indication of, the distinctness supposed to be possessed by the two branches, this property may be termed the distinctive property.
This subject (be it what it may) is possessed of this quality (be it what it may;) this subject (meaning the same subject)†isnotpossessed of the quality (meaning the same quality)—these two are—as the logicians call them, and as any body may see they are,—a pair of contradictory (viz. mutually contradictory) propositions the former of these may be termed the positive contradictory, the other the negative.
In regard to contradictories (such for shortness is the term employed, instead of saying a pair of mutually contradictory propositions) two observations have been made by logicians, and delivered in the character of axioms. One is, that, to whatsoever property, and with reference to whatsoever subject, these opposite assertions are applied, in no instance will they, both of them, be found true. The other is, that, to whatsoever quality, and with reference to whatsoever subject, they are applied, one or other of them will be found true.‡
An example may here perhaps be required. Turning to the Encyclopædical tree (letter-press or diagram) take then for the dividendum, viz. the trunk or major aggregate, the branch of art and science therein denominated Posology, but commonly called Mathematics. It having been proposed, in an all-comprehensive and distinct manner to divide this major aggregate into two minor aggregates, exhibited in the character of branches, a property was looked out for, which, being possessed by every individual object comprehended in the major aggregate, as also by every individual in one of the two aggregates into which the major aggregate was to be divided,—and at the same time not possessed by any individual not comprehended in that same minor aggregate,—might, for the purpose of distinguishing each of the two minor aggregates from the other, serve in the character of a distinctive property. In the property of bearing relation to form, or say figure—i. e. in the property of taking for its subject form or figure—a property which seemed capable of being employed in the character of a distinctive property was found. Of the two minor aggregates, into which, by this means, the major aggregate, Posology or Mathematics, was divided; form-regarding, or figure-regarding Posology or Mathematics, in Greek-sprung language, Morphoscopic Posology, was the name given to the positive minor aggregate: this done, the name of the negative minor aggregate was thereby determined and given, viz. form-not-regarding, in Greek-sprung language, Amorphoscopic Posology, or, to exclude ambiguity Alegomorphoscopic.
But, in that portion of the matter of discourse, which in the Table, is employed for giving expression to these two minor aggregates, in the character of branches of the major aggregate, of the division of which they are the immediate results, is contained the import of the above-mentioned formula, brought to view under the name of the contradictory formula. The division, of which they are the results, is therefore, at the same time all-comprehensive (or say, exhaustive) and distinct. It is moreover instructive: for, in and by the terms of it, the all-comprehensiveness and distinctness, which really belong to it, are declared. Speaking of propositions, delivered on the subject of Mathematics.—This proposition does regard figure.—This proposition does not regard figure; of no one proposition,* delivered on the subject of Mathematics, will these two contradictories be found, both of them, to hold good: and if, of all the propositions, which do thus regard figure, one branch of Mathematics be (and there is nothing to hinder it from being) composed, and if of all those which do not thus regard figure, another, and the whole of that other branch, be composed; here we have two branches, in one or other of which every conceivable proposition belonging to mathematics will be found to be contained.
For each one of these minor aggregates or branches, when in the character of a major aggregate, in pursuance of the divisional process, it came itself to be divided, in lieu of, or at least in addition to, the many-worded appellative, which, in its character of a branch, is, in the first instance, employed to designate it, there should be a single-worded appellative. In the words Geometry and Arithmetic, two words in current use presented themselves as being,—and that without any violence done to their established imports,—capable of being employed in this character; i. e., as comprehending between them the whole of the import, which either is, or with propriety can be, comprehended in the import of the word mathematics: with propriety, i.e. without outstretching* the most extensive import, for the designation of which that appellative has ever been employed.
On this occasion, the pair of names, which, for these two branches of mathematics, have, on this occasion, been, in the first place, brought to view, are the two newly-devised many-worded ones. But the pair of names, by which those names, and the relation of which they are expressive, were, in the first instance, suggested, are the two old-established single-worded ones. Geometry and Arithmetic, considered as branches of art and science, in what particular, it was asked, do they agree? The answer was obvious enough:—as being, both of them, branches of Mathematics. So far so good. But, forasmuch as they are not the same branch, in what is it that they differ? Of a survey taken of the contents of each, with a view to this question, the result was that, to which, as above, the pair of many-worded appellatives have given expression. In one of them figure is regarded; in the other, not.
Now then, thanks to the Encyclopædical names,—of the two trivial names, viz. Geometry and Arithmetic, which are in use to be employed in the designation of these two branches of mathematical art and science, the all-comprehensiveness† will, it is believed, be readily enough, and generally enough recognised: nor will the distinctness,‡ it is believed, be found to be in any greater degree exposed to dispute.
At the same time, in regard to instructiveness, as above explained, the utter absence of this quality will, in the instance of both these trivial names, be found, it is believed, equally manifest: and thence it was, that, as soon as it did present itself, it was in the character of a sort of discovery, that the coincidence of these two imports, with the imports of the two many-worded appellatives to which they are here stated as being respectively synonymous, presented itself:—and, in this same character, howsoever it may be in the case of an adept, in the case of many a learner, there seems little doubt of its presenting itself.
Of the nature of the contradictory formula, the explanation above given will, it is hoped, be found tolerably intelligible. Its capacity of serving, in the character of a test of all-comprehensiveness and distinctness, in a logical division, will also, it is hoped, be recognised. In the formation of the Encyclopædical appellatives employed in the Table, this test will, in several instances, be seen actually and explicitly employed, included as it is in the composition of the words themselves. Other instances, however, there are, in which it is not thus employed. In the production of this omission, two considerations, whether sufficient or not, concurred: one was—that, by the employment of the two epithets, both in the positive form and independent of each other, instead of no more than one positive one, with the correspondent negative, a greater quantity of instruction might, in a given compass, be conveyed: the other was—that, in some instances, doubts seemed to hang over the question, which of the two contradictory properties should be presented in the positive form; which in the negative: and, on whichever side the determination might happen to fall, for explaining the grounds of such determination, more words might become necessary than could well be spared. Of the plan of nomenclature here pursued, the characteristic property accordingly is—not that, in the composition of either name of the pair, the criterion in question—the sign of the contradictory formula—has in every instance been actually employed; but that, in the character of a test of the all-comprehensiveness and distinctness of the division, in the expression of which these names have been employed, a pair of names, in one of which this sign is employed, may, without misrepresentation, in every instance in which it has not been thus employed, be added or substituted.*
Of the lights, which the nature of the work admits of and requires, the Encyclopædical names thus provided, though they are the only instruments, are not, it should be observed, the only objects. Other objects, for the illustration of which the demand, as being much more general, is accordingly still more urgent, are those current names, examples of which have just been brought to view; and which, wheresoever they could be found, have been sought out, and put by the side of those Encyclopædical names, with the imports of which their respective imports seemed to approach nearest to a coincidence.
Unfortunately, that this coincidence should be perfect, is in many instances plainly impossible: such it will be seen to be in every instance, in which the import attached to the current name is in any degree indeterminate; and the further this import is from being determinate, the further will the agreement be from amounting to a perfect coincidence. Unfortunately, again, these instances are at present but too numerous: of one of these mention has already been made; and, without need of looking elsewhere, among such of these names as are comprehended in this Table, other instances will, it is believed, be found observable.
To the satisfaction of the reader, that, in so far as it has place, observation of the impossibility in question should be taken, is highly necessary: otherwise, where everything has been done that can be done, it may appear to him that nothing has been done. To give determinateness to the import of an appellative of his own framing depends upon the author; not so as to that of any of those which he finds already made. Towards effecting that coincidence, which, as above-mentioned, is so highly desirable, all that depends upon him, is, in the first place, to give to the appellatives of his own framing that degree of determinateness which the nature of the case admits of; and, in the next place, among those which he finds ready made, to choose for synonyms to those of his own making, such trivial names, the import of which appears, upon the whole, to come nearest to that of his own, being at the same time, if in any, in the smallest degree indeterminate.
For securing determinateness to those of his own framing, the established logical expedient of the distinctive property afforded to the author of this Table an effectual means: for choosing out of the existing stock of trivial names such as should stand least exposed to the imputation of indeterminateness, no equal security could be afforded by the nature of the case.
In this way, though by no direct and immediate means can determinateness be given to the import of those current names, of which at present the import is indeterminate, yet in time, and by means of the instrument of fixation here brought to view, an object so desirable may gradually perhaps be accomplished. By the supposition, a standard of comparison and reference will have been set up; supposing it to be what it is intended to be, and, in the nature of the case, well capable of being made, supposing it to be in itself clear, and as near as may be to the range of the variable one, conformity to this standard will be found matter of general convenience; and in proportion as the fixed import comes to be adopted, the varying one, in all its variations, will drop out of use.
What if, in this way, and by these means, the import of all words, especially of all words belonging to the field of Ethics, including the field of Politics, and therein the field of Political Religion, should one day become fixed? What a source of perplexity, of error, of discord, and even of bloodshed, would be dried up! Towards a consummation thus devoutly to be wished, there does seem to be a natural tendency. But, ere this auspicious tendency shall have been perfected into effect, how many centuries, not to say tens of centuries, must have passed away!
All this while, on the nearness of the approach made to a perfect coincidence, depend the strength and utility of the mental light capable of being reflected upon each other’s import, by the two denominations, the Encyclopædical and the trivial. Hence comes the need of a memento, to which expression may be given by the following rule.—For determining the contents of the two branches, into which the trunk in question is to be divided, look out for that distinctive property, by the application of which such a pair of branches shall be produced, the imports of which shall come as near as possible to the imports of the two appellatives already in current use.
Of the above rule, in no instance will any neglect be followed by impunity. He who, taking up a word, gives a definition of it, issues thereby a requisition, calling upon as many as read or hear of it, to use the word in that sense. Let the word thus defined be a word of a man’s own creation, in this case, if so it be, that for this new-invented instrument an adequate use can be found—provided also that the newly-attributed import is not contradictory to any import already attached to it,—if both these conditions are fulfilled, then so it is that for any expectation he may happen to entertain of seeing the requisition generally complied with, a substantial ground has been laid. On the other hand, if it be a word in common use, in that case, if the import thus newly endeavoured to be attached to it be to a certain degree at variance with common use, the consequence is—what?—that, against the sort of law, which he is thus taking upon himself to enact, he finds (nor is there any reason why he should not find) as many rebels, as there are persons, by whom, in its old established sense, the word has been in use to be employed.
Fixation, yes: this may be endured: comparatively at least, the thing is not difficult: the use is manifest. Substitution, no: the difficulty is extreme; and that difficulty not atoned for by any the smallest use.
1. Define your words, says the capital rule, laid down, and so much insisted upon, by Locke.—Yes: define your words.—But, in addition to this rule, a subsidiary one there is, the demand for which will, it is believed, be scarcely found less imperative.
2. In defining a word, if it be a word in current use, be it your care, that the import you are thus endeavouring to attach to it, be not only determinate, but as near to the current import, as a determinate import can be to an indeterminate one.
In the character of a distinguishable addition to the mass of instruction afforded by means of the contradictory formula, may perhaps be mentioned the series of those definitions, which thus in substance, and almost in form, presenting themselves at every joint, give to the whole system a degree of precision and compactness, altogether incapable of being infused into it by any other means. So many pairs of branches or minor aggregates, so many pairs of definitions: major aggregate, at each joint, a genus: its two immediate branches the two minor aggregates, its species: the distinctive property, with its negative, the two specific or differential characters. To this advantage a brief reference has been already made, viz. in the section (§ 9.) in which the particular characters of the Encyclopædical tree are brought to view.*
Such being the advantages, indicated by the terms all-comprehensiveness, distinctness, and instructiveness, as applied to a scheme of logical division,—in the next place comes the question—in what way, if in any, is the existence of these advantages attached to the use of the bifurcate, as contradistinguished from the multifurcate mode?
To this question the answer has probably, in the mind of many a reader, already presented itself. To the bifurcate mode alone, to the bifurcate mode, and not to the multifurcate, is the test of all-comprehensiveness and distinctness, viz. the contradictory formula, applicable.
After the explanation above given, exists there any person, in whose eyes, when compared with the bifurcate, the multifurcate mode would be preferable? To a tree, or any part of a tree, once constructed in the bifurcate mode, might be substituted a tree constructed in the multifurcate mode, without trouble and almost without a thought. Throw out the Encyclopædical names, put together the current names—the thing is done. The plan of division pursued, suppose it all along all-comprehensive and distinct, the all-comprehensiveness and the distinctness would, after this change, remain to the matter as expressed in the multifurcate mode; but the proof of its being all-comprehensive, the proof of its being distinct, and the instruction afforded by the language by which this proof is expressed, all this would be gone. After these deductions made, by this means, out of a system constructed and exhibited in the bifurcate mode, you might have remaining a system equally good, constructed, or at least exhibited in the multifurcate mode. Constructed? Yes; but in what manner? Exactly in the manner in which, in his oration given to an audience of Shoemakers, Orator Henley showed them how, by one man, a gross of shoes might be made in a day: viz. by cutting them out of a gross of boots.
Of this conversion the converse would not be altogether so easy. Nor indeed, without addition, supposing the multifurcate tree to be, in any one of its ramifications, less than all-comprehensive, would it be possible. On the opposite supposition, however, i. e. if in every one of its ramifications it be supposed to be all-comprehensive, the converse would be possible. Of the required bifurcate tree, the matter would, on this supposition, in part, though only in part, be given; and, as to the mode of filling up the deficiencies it has already been explained, and may be seen exemplified in the Table.
Of a division, which in the article of all-comprehensiveness, is deficient, an example, should any person be desirous of it, may with equal facility be extracted from the same Table. Take, for instance, Natural History: branches, upon the multifurcate plan, supposing it in the execution all-comprehensive, three, viz. Mineralogy, Botany, and Zoology. Suppose any one of them left out, thus, instead of the all-comprehensive division, you have an imperfect,* or, as Euclid might have said, a deficient one.†
That, for obtaining a clear, correct, all-comprehensive and commanding view of the contents of any logical aggregate or whole, bifurcate, in contradistinction to multifurcate, is the only adequate mode, another consideration may perhaps help to satisfy us. Of two objects, and no more, can the eye of man, (whether it be of the bodily and real, or the mental and fictitious organ, that the word be understood as designative,) obtain any usefully distinct view at the same time. Vibrating, as it were, between the two; and at each vibration, applying (as Euclid might have said) to the impression made by the one, the still vivid idea‡ of the other, one by one it can compare them; but if any greater number, say three, be presented to it at the same time, then so it is, that, for any such purpose as that of obtaining a perception of those reciprocal points of coincidence and diversity, ere it can bestow upon them a steady and persevering consideration, it will find itself under the necessity of dividing them, in the first place, into two lots; in one of which it will place one of them, and in the other lot either it will place one alone of the two remaining objects, or if both, then, for the purpose of comparing the other object of the comparison, the two will be put together, and, by conjunction in the same lot, be in imagination reduced to one.
Endeavours are used (suppose) to consider and compare all three at the same time. What will be the consequence?—that, while any two of them are thus kept in comparison, the third, before any clear and decided judgment can be formed in relation to these two, will be obtruding itself. Confusion will thus ensue: and a necessity will be found of recommencing the comparison: and so toties quoties.*
One word more on the subject of instructiveness. In the exhaustively bifurcate mode,—in and by means of the ramified chain of virtual definitions which have been brought to view,—at each joint a pair or rather a triplet of relations, has been brought to view: viz. the relation of each minor aggregate to the immediate major aggregate, and the relation of each minor aggregate to the other: the two first, relations of identity and coincidence; the third, a relation of diversity and separation. But, of every object of the understanding, be it what it may, the nature is the more thoroughly known, the greater the number is of those relations† which it is seen to bear to other objects: and, were it only in virtue of its being an object of the understanding, every such object bears some relation—in truth a multitude of relations to every other. By Algebra, whatsoever riddles are solved, are solved—whatsoever is done, is done—by the converting of this or that unknown quantity into a known one: a conversion, which neither is, nor ever can be, effected in any other way, than by means of a relation which it bears, viz. the relation termed the relation of equality,‡ (which, in a case that affords nothing but quantity, is the same as the relation of identity,) to such or such other quantity or quantities, which were known already.
No object is known, but in so far as its properties are known: and, for every property, the manifestation of which depends upon any other object, a correspondent relation between the two objects must be acknowledged to have place.*
Exhaustiveness, as applied by Logical Division—the idea whence taken—Saunderson’s Logic—Porphyrian or Ramean Tree—Hermes.
To the author of these pages, the first object by which the idea of exhaustiveness, as applied to logical division, was suggested, was a chapter of Saunderson’s Logic, which has this operation for its subject. Much about that same time, viz. some four and fifty years ago, on the occasion of a set of College-Lectures, in which that book of Saunderson’s was employed as a text-book, the copy of it, now lying on the table, received in manuscript a copy of a diagram of a logical tree, therein called Arbor Porphyriana—the Porphyrian Tree—exactly
TABLE IV. ARBOR PORPHYRIANA, seu potius RAMEA:
Being a Diagram, contrived for exhibiting at one view the principal Divisions of the Aggregate Mass of real Entities, as designated by the word Substantia, employed by the Latin Logicians, in imitation of their Grecian masters, as the name of a correspondent Genus, styled the Genus Generalissimum: such Divisions being designated by their several single-worded, trivial, or current names; preceded by their several many-worded names, herein termed Encyclopædical names, by which are expressed the mutual relations borne by one to another of the several assortments of objects so denominated: such assortments being the results of the several corresponding divisional operations, to which the matter of the whole Aggregate Mass has been subjected. N. B. 1. This Diagram exhibits the earliest example known of a system of Logical Divisions, executed in the exhaustively-bifurcate mode, with the test of exhaustiveness applied to each joint or ramification; such test being in each instance expressed in and by the denomination given to the negative one of the two branches or minor aggregates.—N. B. 2. Of the system in question, an explanation is given by Porphyrius, one of Aristotle’s Commentators, in his Isagoge, i. e. Introduction to the Organon of Aristotle, as it stands in the edition of those same works, printed at Frankfort, anno 1597. To the Letter-press is there attached a sort of Diagram (p. 9); but, darkness rather than light being the effect of it, it is not here inserted.—N. B. 3. As to the word Genus, considered as one single object, the object designated by it is a fictitious Entity: although the individuals, to the designation of each of which it is applicable, are so many real Entities. Concerning this Diagram, see Chrestomathia, Appendix, No. IV. pp. 110-112.
The Arbor Porphyrianain its orginal form; being the forms in which it was transcribed from the copy exhibited in the course of a College Lecture, delivered, Anno 1761, at Queen’s College, Oxford.
Explanatory of the Differences by which this amended Form, No. II., is distinguished from the original Form, No. I., together with the Reasons of those Differences.
[Planta—Vitale—Vivum—Animatum.] 1. Taking for the subject the aggregate here in both forms, designated by the word Planta (Planta, the name of the logical genus in which all individual plants are included) to the application made of the word vivum, as designative of the superior genus or major aggregate, in which this inferior genus or minor aggregate is included—to the application made of this word in the character of a substantive, together with the corresponding word vitale, in the character of an adjective, as in No. II., there seems no objection: not so in regard to the word animatum employed in the original Diagram, No. I.
2. Compared with vitale, vivum presented itself as having, in this as in the other instances, the advantage of varying the sign, where the object to be designated is different: it moreover seemed rather better adapted than vitale, to the purpose of officiating in the character of a substantive.
3. In the original Table, the use which, in this one alone of the four ramifications, is made of one and the same word, for the expressing of two different objects, viz. the objects designated by the two different parts of speech, a noun adjective and a noun substantive, presented an anomaly, which, by the substitution of the word vitale, for the one purpose, while the word vivum was employed for the other, is, in the Diagram as here amended, avoided.
4. In this second joint, the place for the single-worded and trivial name of the negative minor aggregate being in the original Diagram left blank, so is it in the amended Diagram: the language, as it should seem, not affording any such trivial name.
The Arbor Porphyrianain a supposed amended form; more explicit, and supposed to be, in other respects, now somewhat improved.
in the state in which it is represented in Table IV., No. I. In Table IV., No. II., it is exhibited with some little alterations, which, on the present occasion, might serve, it was thought, to render it somewhat more readily intelligible.
In this same work of Saunderson’s, in a list given of the commentators of Aristotle, the very first place is occupied by this same Porphyrius. Yet, useful as it not only is in itself, but more particularly useful as it might have been made, to the purpose of affording exemplification and illustration to some of the instructions contained in that same work of Saunderson’s, in no part of that work is any reference to it to be found.*
By every eye, by which this prime and most ingenious example of logical analysis is glanced at, the divisions made by it may at one glance be seen to be, at each step, bifurcate. By every one who, in this point of view shall have had the patience to examine into it, it will be found to be at every such step exhaustive.
On the subject of Division, Saunderson has—for, in following out and paraphrasing the system of Aristotle, he could not fail to have—a chapter. Amongst other rules for the performance of this operation, he requires that it be exhaustive—that it possess this property. In that chapter, had it occurred to him to avail himself of the exemplification thus already given of this his own rule, he might have exhibited to his readers a specimen of division, which, being throughout bifurcate, is throughout exhaustive. In so doing, after causing his readers to observe, that it is bifurcate, he might have shown to them, in the first place, that it is exhaustive, in the next place, that it is by its being bifurcate that it is rendered capable of being proved to be so; and, lastly, that by the mutual contradictoriness of the two propositions, the import of which is suggested by the pair of denominations presented by each pair of branches, the proof of its being so is actually afforded.†
Planted and firmly rooted, by the logical work of Saunderson, the conception of the necessity of the property of exhaustiveness to an adequate division, received, at a later period, further confirmation, as well as illustration, from the grammatical work of James Harris.
Upon reference now made to that work, no such word as exhaustiveness or all-comprehensiveness has been found in it; but by the word all, repeatedly decked out in emphatic capitals, and reinforced by the word whatever, together with the division made of the contents of it, by the words either and or, the idea was plainly meant to be conveyed, and was accordingly brought to view. Whether in the instance of every one, or so much as any one, of the divisions there exhibited, that quality is given to it, has not, for the present occasion, been thought worth inquiring into. What is certain is, that, for proof of the existence of that quality, neither the test here in question, nor any other, is there brought to view. What is also certain is, that, be they as they may in regard to exhaustiveness, or say all-comprehensiveness, in regard to distinctness, the divisions exhibited in Hermes are stark naught.
Under the name of attributives of the second order, adverbs—all adverbs,—are there given as being in their import, distinct from the three parts of speech following: viz. from substantives, for example place and time; from attributives of the first order, for example the pronoun adjective this, and from connectives, for example the preposition in. Unfortunately, to look no further, in the import of every adverb designative of place, and in that of every adverb designative of time may be found the several imports of the three several parts of speech, from the imports of which, the import of an attributive of the second order had, in that division of Harris’s, been represented as distinct. Adverb of place, here; i. e. in this place: adverb of time, now; i. e. in or at this time: and so in regard to quality, manner, and so forth.*
Imperfection of the current Conceptions relatively to Exhaustiveness and Bifurcation;—ex. gr. 1. in Saunderson’s Logic.
Of the systems of logical division, which, for one purpose or other, are so abundantly framed, and so continually observable, many there are, which, in some of their ramifications, particularly those which are the nearest to the trunk, will be seen to be bifurcate; nor can it be doubted, but that of these again a large proportion would, upon the application of the above test, be found to be exhaustive: and, lamentable, indeed, it would be, if—in those arrangements, by which, on all sorts of subjects, men’s conceptions are settled and determined—a property which by all logicians, has been acknowledged to be the inseparable accompaniment of a good and adequate system of division, and thence indisputably necessary to a complete and sufficient comprehension of the subject, were not frequently to be found.
Not very frequently, however, in giving denomination to the component parts of the division, are those names employed, those correlative and contrasted names, by which, as above, the test of plenitude is actually applied.
On this occasion three institutes of logic have been referred to: viz. Bishop Saunderson’s, in Latin; Dr Watts’, in English; and the view given of the Aristotelian Logic, by Dr Reid, in Lord Kaimes’s History of Man.
Of all the views that have ever been given of Aristotle’s System of Logic,—concise, nervous, compact, methodical, well-divided,—Saunderson’s would, it is believed, be found by far the best; several others, which for this purpose were taken in hand, seemed far inferior to it.
In England, at any rate, Watts’, as being in English, and furnished with familiar illustrations,—Watts’, though diffuse, and teeming with anilities, appears, by the multitude of the editions, to have been the most in use.*
Posterior, by a generation or more, to Watts’, as that is by several to the Bishop of Lincoln’s, the view given in the work of Kaimes presents in conjunction the authority of two distinguished Scottish writers.
To no one of all these writers does the utility and excellence of the exhaustively bifurcate method, or so much as the use actually made of it in the Ramean tree, appear to have made itself sufficiently sensible. By all of them the bifurcate method is indeed mentioned.—Mentioned? But for what purpose? Scarcely for any other purpose than the being slighted. By Reid and Kaimes it is even taken for a subject of pleasantry: but of pleasantry (it will perhaps be seen) not very happily applied.
First, as to Saunderson—Lib. i. Cap. 18. De Divisione.
After stating, that, on the occasion of division, the whole, (say rather the aggregate,) which is taken for the subject of the operation, is called the divisum, (say rather dividendum,† ) and that the parts into which it is divided (viz. the parts which are the results of the operation) are called the membra dividentia,—(he immediately after designates them by the more expressive adjunct condividentia,) i. e. the divident, or, more expressively, the condivident members,—he proceeds to give his rules of division: the rules, in conformity to which, the operation should, according to him, be carried on. They here follow in so many words.
1.Membraabsorbeanttotum divisum. Let the members absorb (i. e. include, comprehend, comprise) the whole of the dividendum; in other words, let the division be exhaustive. Let the division be performed in such a manner, that, if of the parts, which are the result of it, the contents are summed up, in the sum of them, the whole sum of the contents of the dividend will be found.
2.Divisum esto latius singulis suis membris; adæquatum universis. Let the dividendum be more extensive than each of its members; equal, or say commensurate, to all of them put together. After laying down the first, to add, in the character of a distinct one, this second rule, was sad trifling; it shows, as it should seem, that, on this subject, the ideas of the author were far from being clear ones.
Two separate parts does this rule of his include; each of them in its form a distinct rule. But in substance and import, the second part of this second rule is identical with the first rule; and the other part is as obviously as it is necessarily included in both: in the first rule, and in the second part of this same second rule.
To say of a part that it is equal to the whole, would be neither more nor less than a self-contradiction in terminis—a self-contradictory* proposition.
3.Membra condividentia sint contradistincta et opposita; to which, by way of explanation, is added, ita ut confundi nequeant vel coincidere. Let the condivident members be contradistinct (viz. from each other) and opposite; in such sort that they shall not coincide or be capable of being confounded.
By this explanation no very clear light seems to be thrown upon the subject. What seems to be meant is, that, after the division has been made, things shall be in such a state, that of no one of all the several distinguishable articles or masses of matter, contained in the whole dividend, shall any portion be found to lie, part in one of the members, other part in another. In so far as any such incongruity is found to have place, the division, it is evident, is indistinct, and, being indistinct, is therefore imperfect; the operation has not been completely performed. On the subject of distinctness, see above, § 12.
4.Divisio fiat in membra proxima et immediata, et (quam fieri commodè potest) paucissima. Let the division be made into the nearest and (so far as convenience allows) fewest members. Then immediately after, in the same paragraph, and under this same 10th head or rule, he goes on to say—A proximis porro ad remotiora et minutiora descendendum per subdivisiones. From the nearest, (viz. members,) to those which are more remote and minute (say rather less extensive) let descent be made by sub-divisions.
In the instance just brought to view, of the second of these rules, the substance of one rule being, in other words, given over again, was given in the character of a distinct and different rule. In the instance of this 4th rule, two rules, perfectly distinct, are confounded under one head, and represented as constituting but one and the same rule. On this last occasion, a new case, or state of things, is brought upon the carpet: viz. the case, in which, by the repeated application made of the operation of division, to the results of a former division, the operations with their results are thus carried on as it were in the form of a chain, or rather (as hath been seen) in the form of a tree.
Dichotomiæ (he goes on to say) sunt laudatissimæ, ubi commodè haberi possunt; non tamen nimium superstitiosè et anxiè ubique venandæ; quod faciunt Ramæi. For division, the dichotomous (i. e. the bifurcate, or two-pronged) mode is most to be commended, when it can conveniently be employed; but it ought not to be everywhere hunted out too superstitiously and anxiously, as it is by the Rameans. In this translation, the expression, it will be seen, is bad enough; and in the original it is still worse. It is composed of a cluster of tautological, or (as they are also called) identical propositions; a sort of verbiage, the natural growth of a weak mind, and of which every mind, that is not a weak one, will, as it values its character, avoid being seen to make use. What ought not to be employed, ought not to be employed. On an occasion on which it ought not, an instrument of the sort in question ought not to be employed. What ought not to be done, ought not to be done. This is the language of a driveller in his dotage.
This instrument, which, at the first mention, is pronounced to be a commendable one, and of which therefore it cannot but be true that, on some occasions at least, the employing of it is a proper course to take, what are the occasions on which it is convenient, and thence proper, what the occasions, on which it is not convenient, and thence not proper? Such are the questions, by the answers to which, and not otherwise, the reproach of tautologism, incurred as it is by the observation, as it stands, might have been wiped away.
II. Watts’ Logic.
In his chapter, intituled Special Rules to direct our Conception of things, Sect. 8. Of Division and the Rules of it, Watts delivers on this subject a set of rules; of which, according to his numeration, the number is six. But in that which calls itself the sixth, may be seen two perfectly distinct ones.
By anything like a thorough examination of them, much more room would be taken up than can here be spared. The fourth, and the last part of the sixth, are the only ones that have any direct bearing on the present point.
1. “Let not sub-divisions (says the fourth) be too numerous without necessity.” Here we have anility in a still worse form, than as above in Saunderson. Anile tautology patent; self-contradiction latent. “Let them not be too numerous:” this is plain identicalism and nothing more: add, “without necessity,” the identicalism is now topped by self-contradiction. Good simpleton! what mean you by the word too? Know you then of so much as an imaginable case, in which there is a “necessity” that anything should be “too” anything? in which that which ought not to be done ought to be done?
2. Lastly, as to that second part of his Sixth Rule—“Do not,” says he, “affect Duplicities, nor Triplicities, nor any certain number of Parts in your Division of Things;” “For,” (continues he, and then come reasons, in which not much application to the subject has been perceived) “yet,” (continues he,) “some persons have disturbed the Order of Nature, and abused their Readers by an affectation of Dichotomies, Trichotomies, Sevens, Twelves, &c.”
The section then concludes with another effusion of anility, condemning what he calls “a too nice and curious attention to the mere formalities of logical writers, without a real acquaintance with things.”
What applies more particularly to the subject here in hand, is, that this division, into no more than two parts at each operation, is, in the scale of usefulness, placed by him upon a level, not superior to that of division into any other number of parts; to this or any one number, in comparison of any other, any preference that can be given is equally ascribed to no better a source than affectation. Thus what is plain is, that to his eyes, as already observed, the matchless beauty of the Ramean tree, the test which it affords of exhaustiveness, had not displayed itself.*
III. Reid and Kaimes, in Kaimes’s History of Man.
In Lord Kaimes’s work, entitled Sketches of the History of Man, is contained “A Review of Aristotle’s Logic,” which he declares to have received from Dr Reid. In general, the account there given of that work, is, it may be presumed, correct. But, in the particular passage which now stands for consideration, his lordship’s froth seems, in a dose more or less considerable, to have mixed itself with the phlegm of Dr Reid.
On this occasion the exhaustive mode came under his review:—he begins with a declaration of its usefulness: he ends with an attempt to turn it into ridicule.
He acknowledges it to be good: but, at the same time, finding the use of it to be attended with some difficulty, and that a difficulty with which he did not feel himself in a condition to cope, he vows revenge, and, to accomplish his vow, applies to Momus.
Ascribing it, and as it should seem with reason, to the above-mentioned Ramus, he calls it new: in that character it becomes fair game for ridicule; and with ridicule it seems to him that he has completely and sufficiently covered it, by a proposal, that, for the purpose of exhaustion, in a series of divisions, carried on in this dichotomous mode, to one of the two members an et cætera should in each instance be substituted.
Here then, according to this pair of Logicians, the Latin phrase et cætera, in English, and the rest, might, on every occasion, and with equal advantage, be substituted to the name of either, or at least to that of one, of the branches in each joint of a system of logical divisions, framed and denominated in the exhaustively bifurcate mode. But is this so? No: not on any occasion, with any such advantage. Why not? Answer. Because, by an &c., substitute it to which of the two names you will, though you may make your division equally exhaustive, you can neither make sure of making it equally distinct, nor can you (see § 12.) render it equally instructive.
In the name, which, upon the Ramean plan, you give to each branch, viz. the two-worded name, be it positive, be it even negative, you bring to view two properties: one, in respect of which the individuals contained in both branches agree with one another; another in respect of which they differ from one another: those of the one having this latter property, those of the other not. But an et cætera?—what are the properties of an et cætera?
Let it not be said, that the name, the two-worded name, of a negative branch, shows no property. For, in the first place, it shows that property, which the individuals belonging to that branch possess in common with those that belong to the other: in the next place, it shows another property: for, to the purpose of instruction, concerning the nature of the object, even the non-possession of this or that property, is itself a property.
Under the assurance afforded by the bifurcate mode, when it is declaredly exhaustive, viz. the assurance, that, at each joint, in the composition of the two-worded name of either of the two branches, if the sign of negation is not actually employed, it may, without impropriety, be so employed at pleasure, under this assurance, so it is that they may either, or both of them, be employed as trunks, and, in that character, may be subjected to ulterior division. And in this way accordingly it is, that, in several instances, in the annexed sample of an Encyclopædical tree, both branches may be seen employed.—But an &c.?—the phrase et cætera?—in what way could these Logicians have made it serve in the character of a trunk? In what way could they have divided it into branches?
Of what one sort of aggregate is et cætera the name? Yet, according to them, with as much propriety as any given number of other names, an et cætera, if repeated that same number of times, is capable of giving denomination to all sorts of aggregates.
By the contradictory formula, which, in every ramification, if performed in the Ramean mode, is, as above, either expressed or implied,—an assurance is given, that the mode of division pursued is meant to be exhaustive, and to that end is rendered bifurcate. But if, in the instance of either branch, in the room of a significant name the insignificant name et cætera is employed,—in this way, what assurance is given that the mode employed will be bifurcate? True it is, that, in the case supposed by Reid and Kaimes, the mode (it seems to be taken for granted) is the bifurcate mode. But in the nature of their et cætera, there is nothing to hinder its being employed when the mode is multifurcate: whereas, as hath been seen, it is the property and excellence of the contradictory formula, that it cannot be employed but that the mode of division is, at the same time, bifurcate and exhaustive.
More misconception—more confusion. Of the confusion made by Watts, for want of his being sufficiently aware, that what belonged to the subject was, not a physical and real whole, but a logical and fictitious aggregate, notice has been taken in § 12. Exactly into that same inadvertence may Reid and Lord Kaimes be seen to have fallen in this place. “Division of England into Middlesex and what is not Middlesex:”* this is what they give as an example of the only sort of division here in question, viz. a logical one. But, agreeing in this respect with the vegetable body called a tree, the portion of the earth’s surface, called England, is a physical and real whole, not a logical and fictitious aggregate.
In a logical division, performed in the exhaustively bifurcate mode, the two-worded name of each branch gives intimation of two properties belonging to all the individuals contained in it: one, in the possession of which they agree; another, by the possession and non-possession of which they are distinguished. But, of no one property,—whether as possessed, either by all “England,” or by itself, or by anything that “is not” itself,—dees the word “Middlesex” give any intimation. “It is evident” (say they) “that these two members comprehend all England.” True. “In the same manner” (say they) “we may divide what is not Middlesex into Kent, and what is not Kent.” True again. “Thus,” (continue they) “one may go on by divisions and sub-divisions that are absolutely complete.” True, once more: but while, for your subject, instead of a logical aggregate, you take a physical whole, although those divisions will indeed be as trifling and useless as to yourselves they appear to be, being so, will they prove what you bring them to prove? Not they indeed. Why? Because they are nothing to the purpose. “This example” (they go on to say) “may serve to give an idea of the spirit of Ramean division.” How far this purpose is really served by it, the reader may now judge.
A curious circumstance is, that it is in the character of a source of objection to this mode, that his lordship brings to view the train of false “conclusions” that, in relation to this subject, “philosophers, ancient and modern,” have, according to him, in great abundance, fallen into: fallen into, and from what cause? From the having made use of this security against error? No: but from their having (says he) omitted to make use of it. To the “divisions” of their making, the fault he ascribes, is that of being “incomplete.” Of the mode of division, which he is thus holding up to ridicule, the distinctive character is, that it is capable not only of being rendered, but, wherever it is so, proved to be complete. Yet the mode is (according to him) a bad one. Why?—but because by pursuing it?—no: because, for want of having pursued it,—certain persons have made bad work.
So much for the objection, which, by this pair of Scottish philosophers, we have seen made to the scheme of logical division, which, in that age of comparative darkness, was invented, as it should seem, by the ingenious French Logician, Pierre Ramée.
As to any of those applications which by him (as we are told) were made of it, that at this time of day, unless it be from seeing how the instrument itself was managed by him, any useful instruction should be derivable, there seems no great reason to expect. Observation and experiment,—in these, as above observed, (§ 12.) may be seen the only sources of all real knowledge. In the days of Peter Ramus, anterior as they were to those of our Lord Bacon, scarcely, unless it were here and there by accident, had these funds been, either of them, so much as begun to be drawn upon. Of Logic with its divisions, all that it is in the power to do is, to arrange and display in the most instructive manner whatsoever matters have been extracted from those sources. What it can do is, to methodise; and in that unimmediate way promote creation:—what it can not do is, to create.
Process of exhaustive bifurcation, to what length may and shall it be carried?
In the division of a logical aggregate, exhaustiveness can never fail to be useful and instructive: to afford assurance and demonstration of its existence, bifurcation can never fail to be necessary. By this time these propositions may, it is hoped, be assumed as truth. There remain however still, on every occasion, two questions: viz. how far this useful process can be, and how far it ought to be carried on.
By these questions the answers are suggested. Two bars present themselves, by either of which, where it has place, the employment of these instruments may be effectually opposed. One is impracticability, the impracticability of the operation: the other may perhaps be termed the uneconomicalness of it: being that which has place, where, whatsoever may be the value of the benefit, the value of labour necessarily attached to it—labour of creation, communication and receipt included—would be still greater.
I. As to impracticability. Of impracticability, in this case two causes present themselves as capable of having place: viz. uncognoscibility and unexpressibility.
1. As to uncognoscibility. It is only in so far as the properties, of the aggregates or classes of things in question, are known, that, for the purpose in question, or any other, any one such aggregate, with its branches, can thus be exhibited: this or that property being stated as having place in all the individuals contained in one of the two branches, and as not having place in any of those contained in the other. Take, for example, Natural History, and therein Botany. Forty thousand was, some years ago, stated as the number of supposed different species of plants (exclusive of varieties) at that time more or less known to the botanic world. But, at that time, the utmost knowledge obtained of them by any person was not, to any such degree clear, correct, and complete, as to enable him, in this way, to show, of every one of them, in any such concise mode, its points of agreement and disagreement with reference to every other. And even if, in and for any one year, the distinctive properties of the whole multitude of individuals contained in the whole multitude of species then known, could have been exhibited in this systematic form, the sketch given of them, if with regard to the whole number of species of plants then existing it professed to be, and even if it really were, an exhaustive one, would, in and for the next year, no longer possess that quality.
2. The quantity of surface necessary to the exhibition of such a diagram, presents another circumstance, by which, long enough before the number of the extreme branches had reached to any such number as forty thousand, as above, not to say the tenth or the hundredth part of it, the bar of impracticability would be opposed. Number of the extreme branches being 40,000; and this number, being the last term of a series of multiplications in which two is the common multiplier, what would be the sum required of the number of the intermediate branches, which being to be interpolated between the first term, viz. 1, and the last, viz. 40,000, would be to be added to the sum of those two numbers? To this question the answer is left to be found by any ready arithmetician, in whose eyes the profit would pay for the trouble.*
II. As to uneconomicalness. To perform the comparatively small number of ramifications exhibited by the annexed sample, was found to have imposed so heavy a labour, that over and over again, the thought of having undertaken it has been matter of regret. In comparison of the labour necessary to the execution of such a work, the mere labour of perusing it is obviously nothing. Yet even with this comparatively slight burthen, it is only in the instance of a very small proportion of the whole number of those by whom this volume may happen to be opened, that any expectation of their charging themselves with it can reasonably be entertained.
To those who have inclination and leisure, an assurance is here ventured to be afforded, that whatsoever may be the information derivable from the perusal of a work of this sort, to whatsoever subject applied, much greater will be the profit derivable in that same shape from the execution of it.
As to the length to which the operation shall be pursued, each individual will in both instances be determined by his own feelings in regard to net profit and convenience. But in one thing all persons, it is supposed, will be agreed, viz. that of the whole number of ramifications, which in this way it might be possible to exhibit, it will in most instances be no more than a part and that in most instances a small part, of the whole field, that will be found to afford adequate payment for the trouble.
On the other hand, the more extensive the universal trunk, the more extensive will be the quantity of information which, in and by each such ramification, will have been obtained and communicated; the more extensive the field, the greater will be the profit derivable from this mode of cultivation.
In the fields of Noology and Ethics it is, in contradistinction to that of Somatology (including Natural History and Natural Philosophy) that the nature of the field will, it is believed, be found to afford the greatest profit. Why? Because, for example, in Natural History, the knowledge of the utmost number of peculiar properties that could in this way be brought to view, would be but inconsiderable, in comparison with the number of such properties as are seen really to have place; and for which, though in each instance they might be exhibited, as they are actually exhibited in a simple list,—no place could be found in any such Table.
The objects, of which the words that belong to Noology and Ethics are the names, are chiefly the works of man, the products of his mind. In multitude and variety the works produced by this instrument are as nothing in comparison with those produced by the hand of Nature.†
How to plant a Ramean Encyclopædical tree, on any given part of the field of art and science.
Having, during a long course of years, and on a great variety of occasions, if his conceptions on this subject are not altogether illusory, derived much advantage from the use of the Ramean tree, the author is unwilling to quit this part of the field altogether, without having first thrown out a few hints, which have occurred to him, as capable of affording more or less assistance, to any other person,* who, on any occasion, may feel inclined to make trial of the old logical instrument, thus newly offered to notice.
1. As far as they go, employ such materials as you find ready provided to your hands. These materials are such words as, in relation to the subject in question, are to be found already existing in the language: the words, and thereby the relations, in the designation of which they are respectively employed. Set them down together, one after another, for example in columns, as many as in the first instance you can think of or find, adding from time to time others as they occur.
2. When you have got enough of them to begin upon, whatsoever be the field of which you were then endeavouring to take a survey, among the words the import of which is contained within the limits of it, look out for the one of which the import presents itself as most extensive. See whether it exactly covers the whole extent of the proposed field of your survey. If yes, employ it for your universal trunk; if not, you must frame some word which, by its import, shall, after what explanation may be found necessary, present to view, in the most effectual manner, the whole contents of that same field.
3. The universal trunk being thus found or made, for the first pair of branches look out for the two words, the imports of which present themselves as being both of them contained in the trunk, and at the same time the most extensive of all those that are; applying to them the test herein described, observe whether within their imports, taken together, the whole matter of the trunk be comprehended: if yes, there is your first pair of minor aggregates given, your first ramification made.
4. If no two such words can be found, then take the one the import of which—it being, (as it naturally will be,) the name of a positive property—appears, next to that of the above-mentioned trunk, the most extensive. Taking this for the name of one of your two minor aggregates, branches of the first ramification, the sign of negation added to it gives you the other.
5. The test always in hand or mind, proceed in the same way, carrying on your series of ramification as far as you find convenient: at every joint, for your two branches looking out for a pair of names, both of them in common use: taking up with only one such name, and for the corresponding name adding to it its contradictory, in those cases alone in which no such already existing pair of trivial, but at the same time all-comprehensive names are to be found.
6. For each such branch, if you see occasion, in addition to such its two-worded name, framed as last-mentioned, find or frame a single-worded name;† which will thus stand as a synonym to the just-mentioned Encyclopædical two-worded name, and will for ordinary use be a commodious substitute.
7. If, under any trunk, whether by finding them or by framing them, you provide yourself, in the first instance, with a pair of single-worded names, then, for purely Encyclopædical synonyms, you will have to frame for each a two-worded synonym: if, in the first instance, the pair of two-worded Encyclopædical names are those with which you provide yourself, then, for Encyclopædical use, or trivial use, or both, what you will have to do is, as above, to find or frame, as the case may be, one or two single-worded synonyms.‡
8. On proceeding in this track, what will be very apt to happen to you is, the finding that, after you have thus found places in your system for a certain stock of appellatives, growing always in number greater and greater, but in point of import each of them less and less extensive as you advance, a number of appellatives, more or less considerable, the imports of which are more extensive than those of some to which you have given admittance, have been left behind. These imports, however, being, by the supposition, included, every one of them, within the limits of the field which you are thus surveying, will not present to you any new difficulty. By the imports of these words, as well as by those of the others, will the field be divisible: only, for the making of your divisions, you must look out for some one or more other sources.*
9. In these cases, as in those first mentioned, these sources will be furnished by so many distinctive properties: which accordingly you must be on the look out for, and for each of which, if it have not a name already, you must make one.
10. Having found or made names for all these several sources of division, set them down one after another in one list; which done, for exhibiting the relation which the objects so denominated bear to one another, you will probably find some means of comprising, in one and the same system of divisions, the whole list of those sources of division, in the same manner as you have comprised in one such system the results of the several divisions from the first of all these several sources.†
11. On looking over the stock of words, belonging to this your field, you will probably find, in a number more or less considerable, pairs or parcels of words, which with relation to one another are synonymous. These, as they occur, you will pick up, and, in that character, note them, and set them down. Examples of words thus related may also be seen in the Table.
12. Whatsoever they may be in other respects, it was impossible these directions should be made anything like complete for use, without some intimation given of the distinction between names of real entities and names of fictitious entities; a distinction which, in some of his Encyclopædical remarks, D’Alembert was, it is believed, the first to bring to view, and which will be found to pervade the whole mass of every language upon earth, actual or possible. Names of bodies, for example, are names of real entities;‡ names of qualities and relations, names of fictitious entities. The names, by which the branches of the Porphyrian or Ramean tree are designated, are names of real entities.§ The names of the branches of the Encyclopædical tree here submitted to view, are names of fictitious entities; though to a considerable extent included in them, as will be seen, are references made to correspondent names of real entities.
Names of real, names of fictitious entities, in the division thus expressed, may be seen one exhaustive division of the whole stock of nouns substantive. Strict, to the highest pitch of strictness, as is the propriety with which the entities here called fictitious are thus denominated, in no instance can the idea of fiction be freer from all tincture of blame: in no other instance can it ever be equally beneficial; since, but for such fiction, the language of man could not have risen above the language of brutes.
The above seemed as little as could be said, to prevent the whole field of fictitious entities from presenting itself to the eye of the mind in the repulsive character of an absolutely dark spot. More cannot be said, without wandering still further from the main subject, and trespassing beyond hope of endurance upon the reader’s patience.
The endeavour to trace out, throughout the whole of their extent, the principal relations between the field of thought and the field of language—comprising, of necessity, the leading principles of the art and science of universal grammar—have been the business of a distinct Essay, which it has been, and continues to be, the wish of the author to include within the limits of the present work. And in that work, in addition to the discoveries, half concealed or left unperfected, by Horne Tooke, the distinction, between names of real and names of fictitious entities, will constitute a capital and altogether indispensable instrument.* Almost all names, employed in speaking of the phenomena of the mind, are names of fictitious entities. In speaking of any pneumatic (or say immaterial or spiritual) object, no name has ever been employed, that had not first been employed as the name of some material (or say corporeal) one. Lamentable have been the confusion and darkness, produced by taking the names of fictitious for the names of real entities.
In this misconception may perhaps be found, the main, if not the only source, of the clouds, in which, notwithstanding all their rivalry, Plato and Aristotle concurred in wrapping up the whole field of pneumatology. In the phantoms generated in their own brains, it seemed to them and their followers that they beheld so many realities.
Of these fictitious entities, many will be found, of which, they being, each of them, a genus generalissimum, the names are consequently incapable of receiving what is commonly understood by a definition, viz. a definition per genus et differentiam. But, from their not being susceptible of this species of exposition, they do not the less stand in need of that species of exposition, of which they are susceptible.†
By any person,—should there be any such person to whom the ideas thus hazarded, present themselves as having a substantial footing, in the nature of things on the one hand, and the nature of language on the other,—it will probably be admitted, that a demand exists for an entirely new system of Logic, in which shall be comprehended a theory of language, considered in the most general point of view. For the construction of such an edifice, a considerable proportion of the materials employed in the construction of the Aristotelian system of logic, would be indispensably necessary. But in this very supposition is included the necessity of taking to pieces the whole mass of that most elaborate, and, considering its date, justly admired and venerated monument of human industry and genius.
As to Plato, when in the vast wilderness of words with which, by this spoilt child of Socrates, so many shelves and so many brains have been loaded, and in which so many wits, beginning with those of Cicero, have been lost, when among all these signs, so much as a single thought, which is at once clear and instructive, shall have been pointed out, it will be time enough to steal from the examination of Aristotle’s Logic, either a word or so much as a thought, to bestow upon his master’s eloquence.
With some modifications, which reflection will suggest, and which it would take up too much time and room here to endeavour to particularize, the method herein above proposed, as applicable to names of objects, to those elementary parts of propositions, which by logicians are distinguished by the name of terms, would be found applicable to propositions themselves: to those propositions, for example, by which, under some such name as Contents, intimation is given, in general expression, of the matter contained in any literary work, and more particularly in any work of the institutional kind: and thus it is, that to the view taken of any such portion of the field of art and science, may be given, in the promptest and most commodious manner, any degree of extent of which the existing state of the materials, collected by observation and experiment, has rendered it susceptible: and in truth, terms being the matter of which propositions are principally composed, by any arrangement given to those principal ingredients, an arrangement is already in some sort given to the whole matter of all the several propositions, into the composition of which those elementary articles are capable of being made to enter.
In the explanation above given of the manner in which, out of such terms as, in any given part of the field, the existing state of the language furnishes, a system of exhaustively bifurcate division may be formed—it has been seen how it is that, in a number of places more or less considerable, for want of such names, already in use, gaps will be left in the work: gaps, for the filling up of which instructions are thereupon given.
By the powers of the imagination, working with analogy for its instrument as well as its guide, words, especially where, in some orderly manner, spread out, a number of them, together on one and the same surface, before the eye, will bring to view, each of them, not only the particular object, which in common discourse it is employed to designate, but an indeterminate multitude of other objects which, by means of some relation or other, stand, each of them, in some way or other associated with it. In this way it is, that by means of some indication, afforded by the import of this or that article belonging to the existing stock of names, the filling up of a gap of the sort just described will be effected: and by every gap thus filled up, precision at least, and frequently extension, will, if the operation be properly performed, be given to the conception entertained of the contents of that part of the field: and thus may be seen, according to the nature of the branch of art and science which is in hand, one way at least in which inventions may be, and doubtless have been brought to light, and discoveries made. Quodlibet cum quolibet, is a motto that may serve for every discovering, and every inventing mind.
Logical Mode of Division—its Origin explained and illustrated.
For facilitating the execution of a work of the sort here in question, viz. a system of logical division in the exhaustively bifurcate mode—a few instructions, such as they have been seen, have just been hazarded. The topic was upon the point of being closed, when, by a dip taken into Condillac’s little work on Logic, an addition was suggested, which now seemed indispensable. The only sort of analysis, which in the present work hath as yet been in question, is of that sort, of which not so much as the conception could have presented itself, but in a considerably matured state of the human mind. But in that little work of Condillac, under the same name analysis, was observed to be brought to view a sort of logical operation, to which that appellation could not, it seemed, with propriety, be refused, but of which it was at the same time evident, that it could not but have been in use in the very earliest stage of human existence: a stage so early, that although the operation must, in its extension, have kept pace with that of language, yet in part the existence of it must have been anterior even to that of the earliest formed raw materials, of which language was gradually composed: since those materials are not, any of them, anything but signs of ideas, and it is only by the sort of analysis now in question—viz. the primæval logical analysis, performed by the mind upon individual objects in the character of physical wholes, that those ideas were supplied.
Of every logical analysis—of every system of logical divisions—the subject is a logical whole. But, any such logical analysis, nowhere could it ever have had a subject, but for that system of primæval logical analysis, which has had for its subjects physical wholes, and for its results those ideas, which at the very moment of their conception, were respectively accompanied and fixed by so many names or denominations:—signs, by means of which, in so far as those signs were the sort of names called common names, those ideas were as it were tied up into bundles, called sorts, kinds, species, genera, classes, and the like: the connexion being effected by another sort of logical instrument, which, as will be seen, is not analysis, but its converse, synthesis.
Of this double course—a course of analysis, conjoined with a correspondent course of synthesis—the commencement must have had place in the very infancy of society; and neither to the continuance nor to the extension of it can any conceivable bounds be assigned, other than those which apply to the extension and continuance of society itself.
1. Difference between a physical whole and a logical whole; 2. difference between physical analysis and logical analysis, when both have for their subject a physical whole; 3. difference between logical analysis and logical synthesis; 4. operation and instrument by which logical synthesis is performed; 5. necessity of an antecedent logical analysis, performed upon a physical whole, to the previous formation, and thence to the subsequent analysis of a logical whole; 6. necessity of an act of logical synthesis to the formation of such logical whole: such are the points, on all which, as soon as the definitions of the two species of wholes have been given, a conjunct illustration will be attempted.
By a physical whole, understand any corporeal real entity, considered as being in one mass, and without any regard paid at the instant to any parts that might be observable in it: for instance, this or that individual plant.
By a logical whole, understand that sort of fictitious aggregate, or collection of objects, for the designation of which any one of those names which, in contradistinction to proper names are termed common names, are employed; for example, the aggregate designated by that same word plant. The common name plant is applicable to every individual plant that grows; and not only to those, but moreover to all those which ever grew in time past, and to all those which will grow in time future; and in saying, of any one of them individually taken—viz. of those that are now growing, this plant exists, there is no fiction. But the aggregate, conceived as composed of all plants, present, past, and future put together, is manifestly the work of the imagination—a pure fiction. The logical whole, designated by the word plant, is therefore a fictitious entity.
For the illustration of these several points, follows now a short history, which though at no time perhaps realized in every minute particular, must many millions of times have been exemplified in every circumstance, which, to the purpose of the present explanation, is a material one.
Walking one day over his grounds, a certain husbandman observed a plant, which was not of the number of those which he was employed in cultivating. Overhanging some of them, it seemed to him to impede their growth. Taking out his knife, he cut the plant off just above the root; and a fire, in which he was burning weeds for the ashes, being near at hand, he threw it into the fire. In so doing, he had thus in two different modes performed, upon this physical whole, the physical analysis. By being cut as it was, it became divided into two parts, viz. the root, and that which was above the root: and thus in the mechanical mode was the physical analysis performed upon it. By its being thrown into the fire and there consumed, of the portion so cut off as above, part was made to fly off in the state of gas, the rest staid behind in the state of ashes: and thus in the chemical mode was the physical analysis performed upon it.
Not long after, came a daughter of his that same way, and a plant of the same kind which her father had thus cut down being left standing, her attention was caught by the beauty of it. It was a sweet-brier rose, of which one flower had just expanded itself. All parts of the plant were not alike beautiful. By one part her attention was more forcibly engaged than by the rest. It was the flower. To examine it more closely, she plucked it off, and brought it near her eye. During its approach, the scent of it became perceptible; and thus another sense received its gratification. To prolong it, she tried to stick the flower in a part of her dress that covered her bosom. Meeting with some resistance, the stalk to which, with a few leaves on it, the flower was attached, was somewhat bruised; and now she perceived and distinguished another odour, which though not less agreeable, was somewhat different from the first.
All this while she had been performing upon this physical whole the logical operation termed logical analysis: performing it not the less, though, as in Moliere’s Bourgeois Gentilhomme Monsieur Jourdan when talking prose, without knowing it. The instrument, by which this mental operation was performed by her, was the fictitious entity attention. By the attention which she bestowed upon the flower, while no equal degree of attention was bestowed upon any other part of the plant, she analyzed it—she mentally resolved or divided it—into two parts, viz. the flower, and all that was not the flower: and thus she distinguished part from part.
Again. By applying her attention, first to the beauty of the flower, composed as it was of the beauty of its form and the beauty of its colour, she performed in this same original subject another analysis, which though still a logical analysis, was productive of results somewhat different from those produced by the former; for thus, in the same part she distinguished two properties or qualities; viz that of presenting to the sense of sight a peculiarly agreeable appearance, and that of presenting to the sense of smell a peculiarly agreeable odour. The parts were both of them real entities: the qualities were, both of them, fictitious entities.
Eager to communicate the discovery to a little brother of her’s, she took him to the spot: she showed him the plant from which the flower had been plucked. The flower had already become a subject of conversation to them: that part had already received the name of flower: not having equally engaged her attention, the other part, like a sheep in a flock, or a pig in a litter, remained without any distinctive name.
Ere long her sweet-brier rose put forth two other blossoms; being so little different from the first, each of these became flower likewise. From a proper name, flower thus became a common name.
In the course of another social ramble, a mallow plant, with a flower on it, met her eye. At a distance the flower was not yet distinguished from that of the sweet-brier rose—“Ah,” (cried she,) “here is flower again.” The sweet-brier, on account of its scent, which continued after the flower was gone, had been preserved: the mallow, having nothing but colour to recommend it, was neglected.
These rambles had not continued long, before other sweet-briers and other mallows met her eye. The former being regarded with interest, the other with comparative indifference, the occasion for distinguishing them in conversation was not unfrequently recurring. The rose flower became a rose flower, the mallow flower a mallow flower.
When the flower first observed was named flower, as yet nothing but analysis—logical analysis—had been performed; no operation of the nature of logical synthesis: of one individual object it was and no other, that the word flower had been made the name. But, no sooner was the second flower observed, and the same name flower, which had been applied to the first, applied to this other, than an act of logical synthesis was performed. The proper name was thus turned into a common one; and the fictitious entity, called a sort, a kind, a species, or a genus, (call it which you please) was created.*
The fictitious entity being nothing at all, and the two real entities being each of them something, the fictitious entity itself did not contain within itself the two real entities, or either of them. But the name, which, after having occasionally been applied to each of the two real entities, became, by degrees, designative of the fictitious entity deduced from them, as above, by abstraction, continued to be employed for the designation of either of them, and occasionally for the designation of both of them together: and thus, in a sense, which, although not strictly proper, has the advantage of conciseness, the one fictitious entity, the species, may be said to have contained, and to contain, the two individual real ones: to contain, viz. though not in a physical, in a logical sense.*
The analysis thus unconsciously performed by the maiden on the first-observed sweet-brier rose, viz. by applying her attention to one part, while it was not applied to the other, had for its subject the real entity, the physical whole. It may be termed, the primæval or primordial analysis: for by no other sort of logical analysis will it be found capable of having been preceded. The analysis, by which the rose-flower became rose-flower, and the mallow-flower, mallow-flower, had for its subject no other than the fictitious entity, the logical whole, viz. the whole designated, fixed, and, as it were, created, by the denomination flower, so soon as, after having been employed merely as a proper name, it had come to be employed as a common, and thence as a specific or generic name. It may be termed the secondary analysis, or analysis of the 2d order. In her young mind, and in this its simple form, this secondary mode of analysis had nothing in it of science, nothing of system. But, in it may be seen the germ of all those systems of division, which, being framed by scientific hands, have spread so much useful light over every portion of the field of art and science.
The maiden had for her sweetheart a young man, who, though not a member of the Company of Apothecaries, (for the company had not yet received its charter,) had, on his part, been engaged in a little train of observations, to an improved and extended series of which, together with the experiments which they suggested, some thousands of years afterwards that most useful and respectable community became indebted for its establishment.
He had observed his dog, after a full meal, betake itself to a grass-plat, and gnaw the grass: a sort of article which, when hungry, it had never been seen to meddle with. To this sagacious swain the maiden was not backward in reporting her above-mentioned discoveries. It might, perhaps, have been not altogether impossible to obtain a communication of some of those observations and discoveries of his, for the purpose of adding them to hers. But, for the explanation of what has here been endeavoured to be explained, what has already been reported of the damsel’s will, it is hoped, be found to suffice, without any further trial of the reader’s patience.*
Some thousands of years after appeared Linnæus. In the course of that interval, not only in the language in which he wrote, but in every lettered language at least, not indeed with perfect steadiness, but still without much dispute or variation, a name corresponding to the word plant had been in use to be employed in the designation of any one of those physical objects, to which, when individually taken, that same denomination continues to be applied.
For the same length of time accordingly, a logical whole, possessing this vast extent—a logical whole, formed by the logical process called synthesis—had been in possession of the sort of existence which the nature of an object of this sort admits of.
For the purpose of distributing, according to such of these properties, as were at the same time most easily observable, most steady in their union, and most interesting to man, whether in the way of use or harm, such individual plants as from time to time should come under observation, and this to the end that such names might be given to them, whereby, for the purpose of putting to use their useful properties, or excluding the operation of their pernicious properties, they might, when seen, be recognised,—various sources of division had occurred to various scientific observers. By none of them had this useful object been completely accomplished. To Linnæus it appeared, that it was in the flower that the most apt source of division was to be found: inasmuch as, for the determination of the principal and most comprehensive divisions of a vast logical whole, certain differences, in respect of the form in which that part manifests itself, might be made to serve with as yet unknown advantage. Why? Because, with those differences in respect of the flower, other differences in respect of some of the properties most interesting to man—differences pervading the entire mass of each individual plant—had been observed to be conjoined. Thence, by seeing what sort of a thing the plant in question is, in respect of the flower, a guess may be formed, better than can be formed by any other means, what sort of a thing the plant is in other respects.
From this view a conception may be formed, of the disadvantage, under which every system of logical division comes to be framed. In this way no two things can be put asunder, but what have first been put together. To no other objects can this mode of analysis be applied other than to logical wholes—objects which are altogether the product of so many antecedent logical syntheses. But, in the first place, the primæval logical analysis, performed upon individual objects—this process, notwithstanding this its scientific name, having taken its commencement at the very earliest stage of society, cannot but have had for its operators the most unexperienced, the most uninformed, and unskilful hands. In the next place, the synthetic process, by which the results of that analysis, fragments detached, by abstraction, from these physical wholes, were placed as it were under so many different common names, and by those names bound together by so many logical ties,—this likewise was a work, which, though not yet concluded, nor in a way to be soon concluded, must in its commencement have been coæval even with that of the primæval process, to which it has been indebted for all the materials on which it has had to operate: coæval with the very first crude effusions, of the results of which the matter of spoken, and thence of written language, came, by continual additions, to be composed.
Thus stands the matter, in regard to those names of aggregates, in the signification of which are comprised such individual objects as are purely corporeal. How then stands it (says somebody) in regard to objects of the pneumatic cast, real and fictitious? The answer is—to apply to this division of the objects of thought the triple process, just above described, would require a full and detailed explanation of the nature of those fictitious entities, which, by reason of the similarity of the aspect of their names to that of the names of corporeal objects, all which names are real entities, are so continually confounded with real ones. But to suggest the question is almost all that can be done here. To attempt anything like a complete answer, would be to transgress beyond endurance the proper limits of this work. A few words, for the purpose of affording an indication, how faint soever, of the only track, by the pursuit of which, a satisfactory answer would, it is supposed, be to be found, may be seen in the concluding note.*
Proposed new Names—in what cases desirable—in what likely to be employed?
Among the new names, here proposed for Encyclopedical purposes, are there any, of which it is desirable that they should come to be employed for ordinary use? Among these again, are there any which present any chance of their being so employed?
In answer to both these questions, a very few words are all that can be afforded.
Geometry, Arithmetic, Algebra, Fluxions—for familiar use, what seems as far from being desirable as from being probable, is—that terms, of all which, though only one of them is exactly and originally expressive, the import is so well fixed, should be expelled by new ones.
To Mathematics, considered as a branch of art and science, in which all those others are included—to Mathematics, howsoever in its original import misexpressive, the same observation may be extended. Not but that Posology, should it ever be its lot to come into use, would form a more instructive, and, to all by whom its original import is borne in mind, a more satisfactory name.
Being in their original import so misexpressive,—and, even in respect of present import, one of them at least so indeterminate,—that Natural History and Natural Philosophy should give way to appellations fixed in their import, in some sort instructive, and at the worst not misexpressive, seems at any rate to be wished. Whether to be looked for seems not equally clear. To a grecianized ear in the first instance, and to an ungrecianized ear when explained to it, Physiurgic Somatology and Anthropurgic Somatology are expressive,—but then they are not single-worded. Physiurgics and Anthropurgics are, each of them, when separated from Somatology, single-worded. To the use of these, what seems to be the only obstacle, or at any rate the only assignable objection, is—that, being expressive of accidents without a subject—being substantives formed out of an adjective without a visible substantive—they might, for some time, fail of being sufficiently expressive. In themselves, (not to speak of Algebra, which, in its original import, is all darkness,) they are, however, in this respect, but upon a par with Fluxions. Even Physiurgic Somatics, or Physiurgic Somatology—Anthropurgic Somatics, or Anthropurgic Somatology—even these, though, as touching their two-wordedness, they are in no better case than Natural History and Natural Philosophy, yet in that respect they are in no worse case; and, in respect of determinateness and instructiveness, they stand in that so much better case, which in Section the fourth has been brought to view.
In all these instances, for presenting the import desired—the import for the presentation of which the demand is continually occurring—words, howsoever originally unexpressive or misexpressive, are—and without any very considerable inconvenience—already in universal use. Not so in the case of that branch of Ethics, for the designation of which the word Deontology has here been ventured to be proposed. Under the undiscriminating import of the word Ethics, a branch in itself so perfectly distinct, and which in practice so frequently requires to be distinguished from, and put in opposition to, that which joins with it in forming the two branches of the common trunk, is at present continually, and, but for those many-worded explanations, which are never given, and scarcely ever so much as thought of, irremediably confounded.*
For exemplification, thus much may perhaps have its use. To examine, in this same view, every new appellative which the Table furnishes, would surely be superfluous.
[* ] For a list of the contents of the Sections, see the general contents of Chrestomathia at the commencement.
[* ] (Single denomination). For both these purposes the thing to be wished for is—that, in so far as possible, the denomination should be comprised in the compass of a single word: viz. of course, a noun substantive: and this, not merely for shortness, but to avoid the embarrassment which has place, in so far as the appellation is a compound one, composed of two words or more. If, in addition to the noun substantive, there be but one other, that other will be a noun adjective: and, by this means, the denomination will be disabled from receiving without inconvenience any other adjunct; the place of the adjunct being already occupied by the adjective, which is one of the elements of the compound denomination thus composed. If it be composed of more than two, the inconvenience will be still greater: for in this case, all the words which enter into the composition of this long-winded substitute to a single substantive, will, in the texture of any sentence, of which that substantive would have constituted but one component part, be liable to be confounded with its other component words: in such sort that, in relation to each of them, it will be matter of difficulty—momentary difficulty at any rate—to determine, to which parcel of words it bears grammatical relation. viz. the sentence at large, in which the appellation, had it been a single-worded one, would have officiated in the character of a substantive, or the fragment of a sentence, composed of the words of this compound substitute to a proper substantive.
Such are the circumstances by which, to all purposes and on all occasions, this simplicity—this single-wordedness—is rendered desirable. But it is only on the occasion of ordinary discourse, that, as will soon be seen, the nature of the case admits of it. In the case of a systematic table, for the denomination of each branch, two words at least will be found requisite: one, to mark the genus to which the species in question belongs; the other, to give intimation of the characters, by which it stands distinguished from the other species of that same genus.
In what way it is that, as the number of subdivisions increases, the many-worded systematic name grows longer and longer, more and more complicated,—and an equipollent single-worded name more and more difficult to frame,—may be seen in the sample of an Encyclopædical Diagram or Table, § 8, and the explanation of it which follows, § 9: as likewise in the diagram, called the Porphyrian Tree, hereunto annexed.
[† ] These relations of identity and diversity of properties—thence of agreement and disagreement—important as they are, are not the only ones which, in the present instance, are so. In a practical point of view, a set of relations, still more important, are relations of connexion or dependence: viz., those which have place, in so far as a person by whom this or that art is practised, or science studied, has, in respect thereof, need of an acquaintance, more or less intimate, with this or that other branch of art and science. Instances of this sort of relation may be seen in Table I. But of this sort of relation, between branch and branch, no indication, it may be seen, can in general be afforded by their respective names.
[* ] For a more particular account of the uses of a systematic sketch of this sort, and more particularly of a systematic Table, see § 9, 10, 11 and 12.
[* ] See Table L Note 32, supra, p. 36.
[† ] See Table L Stage V. Notes 87, 88, supra, p. 38.
[* ] See Table I.
[* ] Take, for instance, the Offices respectively designated by the names Chancellor, Secretary of the Petty Bag, Clerk of the Pells, Clerk of the Hanaper, Clerk of the Pipe, Surveyor of the Green Wax.
[* ] See § 8.
[† ] See Table I. note (32.)
[* ]Knowledges would be the word, if, in English as in French, the substantive knowledge had a plural number.
[* ] The denomination Encyclopedia had established usage, and perhaps even necessity, to warrant it.
Considered, however, in its original import, viz. instruction in a circle, it is not in every respect a very happy one. Moving continually in a circle is not the way to get on. By labour, speed may indeed be increased; but by no degree of either can any advance be made. Thus, at the very outset, and by the very name, an irrelevant idea is obtruded, and in lieu of that encouragement which is so much needed, discouragement is presented.
The image of a field presented itself as being in every respect much better adapted to the purpose. By the image of a circle, is presented the idea of a limited extent, determined by the circumference. By the image of a field no limitation whatsoever is presented.
This image of a field will moreover be, with equal convenience, applicable to two expanses—two perfectly distinguishable, though intimately connected expanses, one within the other—the one of them boundless, and so therefore the other, viz. the field of action and thought, and the field of art and science.
In the pursuance of this necessary fiction (for all language which has mind for its subject, is unavoidably fictitious, speaking of mind as if it were matter,) on the occasion of the use made of this necessarily fictitious image, there will be found a convenience in speaking, sometimes of the ideal receptacle, the field, as if it were a real one, sometimes of the objects in question, viz. the several branches of art and science, in the character of its contents. By the word field this convenience will always be afforded.
[† ] Table I. note (9.)
[‡ ] Voilà toute la Partie Poetique de la Connoissance Humaine; ce qu’on en peut rapporter à l’imagination, et la fin de notre distribution généalogique (ou si l’on veut Mappemonde) des Sciences et des Arts.—D’Alembert Melanges, i. 239. Amsterdam, 1767. Explication du Systême figuré.—N. B. The above, as far as it goes, is an exact copy of the original; but, as in the grammatical structure of the passage some deficiency in the articles of clearness and correctness presents itself, some slip of the press is suspected.
[*∗* ] Of those which are here distinguished by an * mention is made in D’Alembert’s Table: those and no others.
*1.Perception, or say perceptive faculty, alias simple apprehension.
*2.Judgment, or say judicial faculty.
*3.Memory, or say retentive faculty.
*4.Deduction, or say ratiocination or deductive faculty—that by which a number of judgments, i. e. acts of the judicial faculty are deduced one from another.
5.Abstraction or say abstractive faculty.
6.Synthesis, i. e. combination.
*7.Imagination, or say imaginative faculty, whereby a number of abstracted ideas—results, or products of the exercise of the abstractive faculty—are combined, compounded, put together as it were, into one image. It is combination, preceded by, and operating upon, the products of abstraction.
8.Invention, or say inventive faculty, whereby, out of a number of the products of the abstractive faculty, such compounds are formed as are new: i.e. were never produced before. Invention is imagination, directed in its exercise to the attainment of some particular end.
9.Attention, or the attentive faculty. The exercise of this faculty seems to be the result of an exercise of the will: of a special application made, of the power of that faculty to the purpose of attaching to their work, with different degrees of force, and for different lengths of time, any one or more of the several distinguishable faculties above-mentioned.
10.Observation.—In this are included, perception, memory, judgment, and commonly ratiocination, set and kept to work by attention, and directed commonly in their exercise to the accomplishment of some particular end.
11.Comparison. This is an application made of the faculties of attention and judgment. In this case the attention applies itself alternately to the objects which are the subjects of it—viz., for the purpose of descrying their mutual relations to each other.
12.Generalization. This is a mode of imagination: i. e. from the observation of one or more individuals, perceived or supposed to be endued with a certain property, imagination of an indefinite number of individuals, regarded as being possessed, each of them, of a property of that same sort. It is combination, performed by the imagination, and guided by observation of analogy, i. e. similitude.
13.Induction: i. e. deduction, or say ratiocination, applied as a result of the process of generalization as above, followed by a judgment accordingly passed, pronouncing that the sort of conformity so imagined has, in the instances in question, been realized.
14.Analysis—i. e. division (literally resolution)—viz. logical, or say noological analysis. This is the converse of generalization; and supposes that operation antecedently performed. By the combination made of the ideas of a multitude of individuals, or sorts of individuals, in virtue of some property, which is supposed to belong to them in common, and which is thus made to serve as a bond of ideal union, by which they are bound together into one aggregate, and that aggregate recorded and fixed by one common name,—generalization is performed. By the division and sub-division of an aggregate thus found, correspondent names, whether single-worded or many-worded, being either formed or made for the several parts, which are the results of the several acts of division and sub-division,—analysis, i. e. the resolutive division and decomposition of the antecedently formed artificial aggregate, is performed.
Thus, on the Porphyrian tree, as in the annexed Table, working in the direction of generalization, and setting out either from Homo or Brutum, or from a sub-species, or an individual of either species, you may arrive, immediately, or through sensitivum, vivens and corpus, all or any of them, at least at substantia. Working in the direction of synthesis, the course you take is exactly the reverse.
By imagination, the idea and practice of logical, noological, metaphysical analysis, was deduced from that of physical. Physical is either mechanical of chemical. Physical analysis is an instance of a real and material operation; logical, of an immaterial, and thus, in some sort, a fictitious one, of the same name.
A term, which will be apt to be considered as not only the opposite, but exactly co-extensive, correlative of analysis, is the above-mentioned term synthesis:—synthesis, literally, putting together; analysis, literally, resolution, i. e. putting asunder. If the coincidence were thus complete, synthesis and generalization would be exactly synonymous, and ought to be interconvertibly employed. This, however, is not the case. Of any number of ideas, how heterogeneous soever, the putting together may be termed synthesis. But, in so far as the term analysis is applied, the ideas, comprehended in the subject in which the operation is to be performed, are by the supposition homogeneous. The subject analysed is an aggregate or genus, which is divided into species, those into sub-species, and so on. The only case in which synthesis is exactly opposite and correspondent to, and no more than co-extensive with analysis, is when between the ideas put together there is that sort of conformity from which the act of putting them together receives the name of generalization.
Analysis and synthesis—analytic method and synthetic method—are locutions which are but too frequently to be found employed, on occasions in which the import meant to be attached to them is far from being clear and determinate. The same operation which by one person is called by one of these names, shall by another person be called by the other. By giving to every supposed explanation the name of an analysis, Condillac, in his Logic, thinks he has explained everything: and thus it is that he explains nothing. Analysis (he says) is nothing but a language well-made. He sees not, that it is of an act of synthesis (the declared object of his antipathy) that every name, which is not, in the grammatical sense, a proper name, is the sign and the result: and that, were it not for that despised and much vituperated agent, his favourite and exclusively lauded instrument would not have a subject on which to operate.
15.Methodization, or say arrangement, or the exercise of what (if a faculty is to be imagined for the purpose) may be called the tactic faculty. It may be employed, with little or no exception, in the service of every one of the above-named faculties, in the exercise of which the attention is employed. By it, for giving facility to comparison, objects are imagined to lie in a certain order; for example, above, below, or by the side of one another.
16.Distribution. In effect this is, generally speaking, much the same sort of operation as Division: but, for presenting that effect to view, a somewhat different image is employed. In the case where the word employed is division, whatsoever may be the parts, or elementary articles contained in the subject, they are considered as antecedently aggregated into one whole: whereupon, in proportion as the operation proceeds, that whole is divided into parts. In the case where the word employed is distribution, whatsoever may be the subject on which the operation is to be performed, the parts or component articles, whatsoever they may be, which are considered as belonging to it, are considered as lying in a state of separation from each other.
When a multitude of articles being considered as co-existing, no aggregation of them is considered as having been made, no divisum can be considered as being capable of being made: consequently, in this case, distribution is the only one of the two instruments of method that the nature of the case can be considered as admitting of.
17.Communication, or the communicative faculty: a faculty which may have for its subject, the results or products of the exercise of any one or more of the several faculties above-mentioned:—Speaking, writing,—and pantomime, i. e. discourse by gestures, or otherwise by deportment—are so many modes, in and by which it is exercised.
Communication, on the one part, supposes receipt, or say reception, on the other. In so far as, to the exercise of the act of reception, attention, on the part of the receivre, is considered as necessary—the receiver is styled a learner.
For correctness—viz. as a test of, and security for that quality—for correctness, as well as clearness, this test would require a correspondent list of examples. But, for any such additional quantity of matter, neither time nor place can here be afforded In its present form it must, therefore, be left to stand: in its present form, and with all its imperfections.
An intricate subject of discussion would be—the order in which the several articles might be most advantageously disposed, and made to follow one another. What shall be the principle of arrangement? Shall it be priority? But from this source no decision can be deduced, as between a number of operations which are performed at the same time.—Shall it be degree of simplicity?—From this source some light seems to be reflected on the first steps: but, when multitudes flock together, with equal forwardness, this light is extinguished.
[The author’s opinions on these subjects will be found more at length in the works on logic and its cognate branches of knowledge immediately following the Chrestomathia.—Ed.]
[* ] La physique particulière doit suivre la meme distribution que l’histoire naturelle, p. 233.
[† ] De l’histoire, prise par les sens, des Astres, de leurs mouvemens, apparences sensibles, &c., la réflexion a passé à la recherche de leur origine, des causes de leurs phénomènes, &c., et a produit la science qu’on appelle Astronomie physique . . . . . . De l’historie, prise par les sens, des vents, des pluies, &c., . . . . la réflexion a passé à la recherche de leurs origines, . . . . &c.—Ib.
[* ] By the writers on Rhetoric, a certain degree of unconnectedness being, in certain cases, capable of rendering the discourse more impressive, and, in its operation upon the passions, more efficient, is, under the name of asyndeton, i. e. that which is without connectives, brought to view in the character of a rhetorical figure. But the connectives, which on that occasion are in view, are—not verbs, but conjunctions—conjunctions copulative.
[* ] In the original edition of the Table there is the following note:—“The completion of this Table, as it now stands, having been posterior by about a twelvemonth to the printing of the letterpress of Chrestomathia, Appendix, (No. IV.,) to which it belongs, in the interval some few changes having presented themselves in the character of amendments, they are here inserted. But, of these alterations one consequence has of course been, a correspondent diversity, between the nomenclature employed in the body of the work and the nomenclature employed in this Table.” In further explanation, it is said, “a convenience had, in the interval, been found in giving to the termination scopic (regarding) a more extensive application than in the first instance had been given to it.” To have, in this edition, substituted the nomenclature of the Table for that which it supersedes, in the body of the Essay, would have occasioned the sacrifice of much valuable matter, attached in the way of commentary and incidental remark, to the superseded words. It has, however, been thought advisable, for the purpose of facilitating reference from the Essay to the Table, to insert in brackets the word made use of in the latter, whenever it differs from that employed in the former, and to append in notes, the explanation given to each word in the note to the table here quoted.—Ed.
[† ] [Eudæmonics.] From a Greek word, which signifies happiness, originally, attended by a good genius.
For reasons already given (see § 6.,) and according to the usage, which, with great advantage, has place as above-mentioned, in regard to newly devised scientific names, the following ones are mostly taken from the Greek: explanations of them, in English, are subjoined; and that for two reasons; one is, that, among the persons to whom speculations of this kind may be not unacceptable, there may be many, to whom the Greek language is not sufficiently familiar, to render the denominations in question, in every instance, readily intelligible to them, even supposing those denominations constructed with perfect propriety; the other is, that the words will, probably, not be in every instance so well adapted to the giving expression to the intended meaning, as, with the help of a less imperfect acquaintance with the language, they might have been made.
The quantity or degree of well-being, experienced during any given length of time, is directly as the magnitude (i. e. the intensity multiplied by the duration) of the sum of the pleasures, and inversely as the magnitude of the sum of the pains, experienced during that same length of time.
In so far as the sum of the pleasures of all kinds, experienced by the person in question, during the length of time in question, is regarded, as considerable,—the sum of the pains of all kinds, experienced by him during that same length of time, being, moreover, laid out of the account,—the state which in that respect he is regarded as being in, is termed a state of happiness.
In so far as the sum of the pain of all kinds experienced by the person in question, during the length of time in question, is regarded as considerable, the sum of the pleasures of all kinds, experienced by him during that same length of time, being, moreover, laid out of the account, the state which, in this respect, he is regarded as being in, is termed a state of unhappiness.a
[a ] Any person, to whom this account of happiness fails of being satisfactory, may find a very different one given by James Harris, in that one of his “Three Treatises,” published together in one octavo volume, which takes Happiness for its subject and its title; but from no part of which would any person suppose, that any such dark spot as that of unhappiness is anywhere to be found.
[* ] The summum bonum is a fruit of the tree of pure good, upon the taking of which into his mouth, a man experiences at one and the same time every pleasure of which in the nature of a sensitive being he is susceptible, each in the highest degree; pains of all sorts at the same time keeping aloof, so long as this precious fruit remains in any part of the primæ viæ.
It is the kernel of that fruit, of which the philosopher’s stone is the shell. It was lately found by Baron Munchausen, in the Island of Medemusia, after a careful search made, in pursuance of the directions given by Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero, in whose philosophical repasts,—as in the codes of those universally admired masters of ethical science, anybody may see,—it formed a constant article.
By Cicero, in his Tusculan Questions, it has been made plain, to the perfect satisfaction of his Auditor, (a most perfectly well-bred young gentleman, whom he introduces to us by that name,) that pain is no evil. But the truth is, as the philosopher confessed to the Baron, that, during the whole of this dialogue, they were both of them chewing the summum bonum nut, to which the areca, even when wrapped up in the betel leaf, forms a very inadequate substitute. The consequence was—that, all that time, to the philosopher and his agreeable young friend, pain was no evil, whatsoever it may have been, and be about to be, to the vulgar of that and other ages.
[† ] [Ontology.] From two Greek words:—one of which signifies being in general; the other, an account:—an account of being in general.
[‡ ] [Coenoscopic.] From two Greek words: one of which signifies common—things belonging to others in common; the other looking to. By Coenoscopic ontology, then, is designated that part of the science, which takes for its subject those properties, which are considered as possessed in common by all the individuals, belonging to the class which the name ontology is employed to designate: i. e. by all beings.
In the word Coenobite—less properly spelt Cenobite—the first of these words has already a footing in the language. In the words microscope, microscopic,—telescope, telescopic,—and several others designative of philosophical instruments,—the termination—scopic is become perfectly familiar.
The termination -scopic, in what cases shall it be employed in the formation of the appellative?—On the one hand, in many instances it is either indispensably necessary, or at least highly conducive, to the intelligibility of the word; on the other hand, in every instance it adds to its length, and in some instances would probably be found to render it too unwieldy for use.
Cases, in which it will (it is supposed) be found indispensably necessary to complete the intended signification, are as follows: viz. 1. Mesoscopic, as applied to Eudæmonics: 2. Morphoscopic, as applied to Posology: 3. Abioscopic, as applied to Physiurgic Somatics: 4. Embioscopic, as applied to Physiurgic Somatics: 5. Pathematoscopic, as applied to Pneumatology or Pneumatics: 6. Thelematoscopic, as applied to Pneumatology or Pneumatics: 7. Esoscopic, and 8. Exoscopic, as applied to Ethics.—for the etymology and explanation of all which, see the ensuing pages.
Cases, in which it may be dispensed with, whether as being altogether unnecessary, or as being less indispensably necessary, are those, in which the import, intended to be conveyed by it, may, without difficulty, or with little difficulty, be understood to be expressed by the more customary terminations—logy and logical, or the still shorter, though less expressive, termination, ics.
Instances of terminations already in use are 1. Physics, 2. Mechanics, 3. Pneumatics, 4. Mathematics, 5. Statistics, 6. Ethics, 7. Politics—and various others. In Logic, the final s has, for this long time, been omitted.
[§ ] [Idioscopic.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies peculiar. In Idioscopic Ontology, then, we have that branch of art and science, which takes for its subject such properties, as are considered as peculiar to different classes of beings: some appertaining to one such class, others to another.
In the words idiom, idiomatical, idiosyncrasy, and a few others, though none of them in any very common use—this word has already a footing in the language; a footing, better known in some instances than in others.
Coenosyncratocoscopic and idiosyncratocoscopic might be somewhat more expressive, but would be too long-winded. Coenosyncratic and idiosyncratic would scarcely be equally expressive:—syncratic, from syncrasis i. e. commixture, composition, constitution.
[* ] [Somatology.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies body, matter, or corporeal substance.
[† ] [Pneumatology.] From two Greek words: the first of which (ατευμα) signifies spirit, i. e. incorporeal substance, in the sense in which it is used as synonymous to mind: in their original sense, the Latin as well as the Greek word corresponding to the English word breath. In the New Testament, αγιον ανευμα is the name, employed in the original, in designating the object, for the designation of which, in the English version, the compound appellative Holy Spirit is employed: more frequently (according to a phrase, which, when, on other occasions, applied to other objects, is either obsolete, or expressive of a different class of beings or supposed beings) Holy Ghost. In this sense, pneumatology and pneumatics, as well as psychology, are already in use: though more upon the continent than in Britain.
If, on this occasion, and in this sense, the word pneumatics were employed, it would need to cease being employed in the sense in which it is at present wont to be employed: viz. that in which it designates the branch of art and science, which has for its subject bodies in general, considered as being in the state, which, since Chemistry has become a science, has been termed the gaseous state. [In the Table the alternative word Pneumatics is not employed. In the original edition the following explanation of the omission is given, accompanied by a statement that the Table was completed subsequently to these notes. “To Pneumatology, Pneumatics could not here be added, as Somatics is to Somatology—Why?—Because Pneumatics is at present much more commonly used in an acceptation comparatively limited: an acceptation, appertaining partly to Mechanics, partly to Chemistry, both of them branches appertaining to Somatology, or say Somatics—the condivident branch correspondent and opposite to that, for the designation of which the word Pneumatology is here employed.”—See p. 82, Note *.]
By the name of materialists, stand distinguished a set of philosophers, of whom Priestley was one, according to whom there exists not any such created being as a mind distinct from matter: for that that which is called mind is but an assemblage or collection, of the sort of fictitious entities called properties, with which certain species of matter are endowed. One of the grossest imperfections, that could be chargeable upon any Encyclopedical system, would be found to attach upon it, if, by the unnecessary assumption of any proposition, which by any class of men were regarded as false, the effect of it were to render itself so far: i. e. with reference to that class of men, unfit for use.
To the use of this class of philosophers, this division may be sufficiently accommodated by a very slight change of phrase, as thus:—To pneumatology belongs the consideration of such bodies or portions of matter, as are endowed with the aggregate mass of properties collectively styled mind, considered in relation to those same peculiar properties.
[‡ ] [or.] On this occasion,—as on every other on which certainty is an object,—an imperfection, attached to the English language, presents a very distressing impediment. It consists in the ambiguity inherent in the import of the conjunction or, Inserted between two words,—noun-substantives suppose,—it is employed with equal frequency, and without any the least discrimination, for two purposes altogether different: and is thus continually liable to give rise, either to interminable uncertainty, or to any the most delusive and most mischievous misconceptions. The one is—that of giving to understand that what is meant to be said of the thing signified by the one, is not meant to be said of the thing signified by the other: the other, that they are but two words for one and the same thing: not to speak of a third case, in which the option is meant to be given between two things, for the designation of which the two words are employed. In other words, it is employed in either of the two so widely different senses, distinguished by the grammarians of classical antiquity, and, after them, by Harris, in his Hermes, by the two adjuncts, disjunctive and sub-disjunctive: disjunctive, when the two words are meant to be exhibited in the character of names of two different things; sub-disjunctive, when they are meant to be represented as different names of one and the same thing.
A more frequently occurring, or a more frequently pernicious, imperfection will not easily be found in any language.
From this great blemish, the Greek language, as observed by Harris, is altogether free: it has one word for the disjunctive sense, and another for the sub-disjunctive.
Even the French language either is already exempt from this imperfection, or at any rate, with comparatively little difficulty, might be rendered free from it. Ou, or ou bien, it is believed, is the diction, or at any rate a diction employed, where the purpose is to present to view the disjunctive sense: employed it assuredly is in this sense, and, it is believed, seldom if ever employed in the other: while, when put between two substantives, soit is indubitably employed in the sub-disjunctive sense, and seldom if ever, it is believed, in the disjunctive.
In English, if or, being confined to the disjunctive, or say were the diction employed, and that exclusively, where the sense meant to be presented is the sub-disjunctive,—a blemish, so incompatible with certainty and clearness of conception, might thus be removed. But supposing the improvement were ever so desirable, how the introduction of it could be effected seems not very easy to conceive. The inconvenience of departure from habit is an inconvenience, which, in such a case, would be felt by every body: by every body, as well in the capacity of speaker or writer, as in that of hearer or reader.
The uneasiness produced by a violation of the law of custom, in matters of discourse, is an inconvenience to which everybody, without exception, is more or less sensible: want of precision—want of certainty—is an inconvenience to which, though in many cases so much more serious than the other is in any case, few indeed are sensible.
For this same purpose—viz. designation of the sub-disjunctive sense, the Latin word alias—a word already applied to this same purpose—would serve full as well, were it not for the displeasing idea attached to it by the use made of it on the occasions on which it is employed, in speaking of this or that man of bad character, who, to elude justice, has, at different times, assumed different names. For conveying to the eye the import in question, the well-known letters, i. e. might in some measure be made to serve: but id est, of which they exhibit the abbreviation, is crude Latin: and the correspondent English phrase would be felt to be insufferably long.
[§ ] From a Greek word which signifies a butterfly, and (probably from thence) the soul of man.
[* ] [Posology.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies quantity.
[† ] [Poiology.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies quality.
[‡ ] [Morphoscopic.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies shape, form, or figure; the other regarding: from the first comes the English word metamorphosed—changed in respect of figure.
[§ ] [Alegomorphic.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies disregarding or not regarding: from the other cones the English verb to metamorphose.
[* ] [Gnosto-symbolic.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies known; the other, a sign, or belonging to a sign.
[† ] [Delo-symbolic.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies manifest, or manifestly known.
[‡ ] [Agnosto-symbolic.] [Adelo-symbolic.] Prefixed to a word, the Greek particle a frequently, as in these cases, is significative of negation:—of the negation, for example, or absence of any quality, to the denomination of which it is prefixed.
[§ ] [Physiurgic.] From two Greek words; the first of which signifies nature; the other, work, or belonging to work: the art and science which has for its subject those properties, the production and display of which are the work of nature alone, unmodified by the intervention of human genius and industry. In several instances, the termination formed by the latter word is, in this same sense, already in the language: viz. in chirurgy (from whence surgery,) energy, liturgy, metallurgy, theurgy.
[∥ ] [Anthropurgic.] From two Greek words; the first of which signifies Man:—the art and science, which has for its subject those properties, either the production or the discovery and display of which, are the work of human genius and industry.
[¶ ] [Uranoscopic.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies heaven, or say the heavens.
[** ] [Epigeoscopic.] From three Greek words: the first of which signifies upon; the second, the earth.
[†† ] [Abioscopic.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies that which has not life.
[‡‡ ] [Embioscopic.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies that which has life.
[* ] [Azooscopic.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies that which has not animal, i. e. sensitive life.
To azooscopic might be added, for a synonym, anæsthesioscopic; and to zooscopic, the correspondent synonym, æsthesioscopic. Anæsthesioscopic, from two Greek words: the first of which signifies that which is not endowed with sensation, i. e. feeling. The word æsthetics has already a footing in modern language, and even in the English: though as yet not so much employed in the English as in some of the continental languages, particularly the German. It is used to signify the doctrine concerning what belongs to taste: viz. as applied to literary composition, and the arts called Fine Arts:—feeling, principally of the mind, considered as applied to the productions of those arts.
[† ] [Coenoscopic.] See above, note †, p. 83.
[‡ ] [Phanerodynamic.] From two Greek words: one of which signifies conspicuous, the other, power. The word Dynamics, as applied to designate a branch of Mechanics, is already in use in modern languages; ex. gr. in the English, but not so much so as in the French.
[§ ] [Idioscopic.] See above, note §, p. 83.
[∥ ] [Cryptodynamic.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies latent or unconspicuous.
[¶ ] By the word Crasiodiæresics, a more adequately expressive—and, though a compound, yet still a single-worded appellative—might be afforded. By it, in addition to mixture, decomposition would be designated: and, of a chemical operation, even without mixture, decomposition is sometimes the result.
[* ] [Anapiric.] From a Greek word, which signifies experimental. Empiric,—a word, the signification of which was originally the same,—has, in modern languages, and in particular in the English, been long in use. By having been confined in its application to the designation of medical practitioners,—and, among medical practitioners, to those who are considered as making experiments on the bodies of patients, without taking for the ground of such their practice, any sufficient stock of scientific information,—thus it has happened, that the word Empiric, how proper soever in its original acceptation, is in any other than that dyslogistic, i. e. condemnatory one,—and in particular in the one here in question,—become unfit for use. Hence came the necessity of having recourse, as here, to the word anapiric:—aword which, no less than empiric has place already in the Greek language.
[† ] [Catastatical or Catastatic.] From a Greek word, which signifies established.
[‡ ] [Viz.—Established use affording.]
[§ ] [Technology.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies art. The word technical—belonging to art—has long been in the language. The word Technology has for many years had place in modern languages, and is come into use even in the English, though not so much so as in some of the continental languages.
[∥ ] [Alegopathematic.] Sensitive-faculty—not-regarding; from two Greek words: the first of which, as above, signifies to pass by unnoticed; the other, sensation, feeling, or affection.
[¶ ] [Synonyms, Alegopathematic, as above; and Alego-æsthetic, taste or feeling not regarding.]
[** ] [Pathematoscopic.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies sensation or feeling, as above.
[†† ] [Synonyms, Pneumatic Pathology, Psychological Pathology.]
[‡‡ ] [Noology.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies mind, and in particular the intellectual part. Though the word thus compounded has not yet found its way into the body of the language, yet among literary men, and in particular in the universities, the first of its elements nous has for many years been in use, though rather in a jocular and purely colloquial, than a serious and regularly established sense. A man is said to have some nous—or to be not altogether devoid of nous—i. e. understanding—intelligence.
[∥∥ ] [Psychological.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies the soul of man; though, probably enough, it began to do so, not till after it had for some time signified a butterfly. The word psychology, though more in use on the continent than in England, is already in the English dictionaries. Animula, vagula, blandula, &c.—“Little foolish, fluttering thing”—was the celebrated address, made, on his death-bed, to his own soul, by the Emperor Adrian, to whose mind the original signification of the word psychc seems, on that occasion, to have presented itself.
[* ] [Pathology.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies feeling or sensation. It has long been in the English language, though not often employed in any other than a medical sense: in which case the import of it is seldom extended beyond that of bodily sensation or feeling, considered with a view to some disorder with which it may be supposed to be connected.
[† ] [Aplo-pathematic.] From two Greek words: the first of which means simple,—relating to the thing in question and nothing else;—the other, sensation or feeling, as above.
[‡ ] [Mere-sensation-regarding, in which is included Æsthetics, the science of what regards taste. Vide supra, note *, p. 87.]
[§ ] [Thelematoscopic.] From two Greek words, the first of which denotes the faculty of the will—the volitional faculty—as contradistinguished from the intellectual. It seems wonderful, that, neither from the Greek, nor from the Latin, a word so continually in demand as the substantive will should have any conjugate in the shape of an adjective belonging to it. The adjective volitional, derived by analogy from the substantive volition, is not in Sheridan’s English Dictionary, nor, probably, in any other; instead of it may be found the word volitive, a word which is not at all in use, nor is, by a good deal, so nearly allied in sound.
[∥ ] [Aplopathematic Pathology.] Either from the genus Technology, or from the genus Aplopathematic Pathology, the process of ramification might have been carried on further to an indefinite length. But, on the present occasion, in consideration partly of the quantity of labour, which, in case of any such formal continuation, would, on the part of the author, have been necessary, partly of the largeness of the draughts which it would have been necessary to make on the patience of the reader—at this point it has been deemed most advisable to stop.
Beyond this point it seems as yet matter of uncertainty, whether it would be worth while to persevere in proceeding on the exhaustive principle.
Of these two branches, Aplopathematic Pathology, as being in the Systematic Sketch, with its accompanying Table, that to which the precedence was found necessary to be allotted, is that which, in respect of its nearer vicinity, and more obvious relation to the common end, a convenience may be seen in bringing to view, on the present occasion, in the first instance.
Under Aplopathematic Pathology, the source of ramification will be the nature of the end, to which the several branches of art and science issuing from it, will respectively and successively be directed: under Technology, it will be the nature of the means employed for the attainment of that end.
Proceeding from the consideration of the nature of the end, the first division might be into Odynothetic and Hedonosceuastic, or say Hedonistic—pain-repelling and pleasure-producing.
Widely distant as pain and pleasure are from one another in their extreme degrees, not only in their nearest degrees do they run one into another undistinguishably, but, in some instances, to an indefinite extent, by one and the same individual operation, by which the one is excluded, the other is produced. But this is a difficulty which, throughout the whole field, the labours of the logical tactician have to encounter at every step; nor does the nature of things admit of its being either avoided or removed.
Under Odynothetics, one obvious source of division is the nature of the source, from which, immediately or more or less remote the pain may be found to flow; and here the distinction between the work of unassisted Nature and the work of Man would again find place.
Considered as being purely the work of Nature, Pain will have its immediate source, either within the precincts of the body afflicted with it, or without those precincts. Considered as having its source within the body, it may be referred to disease; and under the name of Hygiantics, the branch of art and science, which employs itself in combating that affliction, may, together with those branches which presented themselves as subservient to this principal one, be seen already held up to view, though without any attempt at systematic order, in Table I.
Considered as having its source without the body, pain will be found referable either to the head of calamity, purely physical calamity, or to that of delinquency.
As to the means immediately employable for combating pain, considered as having calamity for its source, these will, of course, be different, according to the nature of the particular calamity, and will accordingly be referable to different branches of art and science. But, in so far as power—political power—is, in a less immediate way, employed in causing application to be made of those means, the subject belongs to the ensuing head of Politics or Government, and there-under to one of the subbranches of the branch termed Police.
In so far as the affliction is considered as having its source in delinquency, the art and science to which it belongs is also Government, of which in the text.
For the subject of Hedonistics, two obvious sources of division present themselves: one is the seat of the pleasure in question; the other, the channel or inlet, through which it is let in to the mind.
The seat will either be, in virtue of the whole of the nervous system taken together, the whole of the bodily frame, or, in a more particular manner, this or that particular organ, or other part. To the first of these heads belong the means employed to the opposite purposes of calefaction and refrigeration: both concurring in confining the quantity of caloric diffused through the body within those bounds, within which bodily comfort is among the fruits of it.
To this same head belongs, in the next place, the consideration of the various instruments, by the application of which that state of the nervous system which, in its several modifications may be comprised under the generic term of intoxication, is capable of being produced.
To the other of the above two heads may be seen to belong the subjects of Cookery and Confectionary, Liquor-making and Perfumery: the term Liquor-making being here considered as confined to the designation of potable liquors, other than those applied to the just-mentioned purpose of intoxication.
From the nature of the inlet, considered as distinct from the seat, may be deduced any such ramifications as may be employed in presenting to view, in the first place, gymnastic exercises in general, exercises productive of a pleasure of which the whole body is the inlet, as well as the instrument: in the next place, such games of skill, and even of chance, which, no part of the pleasure afforded by them being considered as having its seat in the body, may be considered as exercises productive of a pleasure administered by, and let in through the body, to the mind.
To the branches of Art and Science, which have for their subject the above exercises, none of which have any special inlet, may here be added,—under the description of branches, having, for their subject, pleasures admitted respectively through their several special inlets,—those which are commonly designated by the collective name of the Fine Arts:—viz. Music, having for its sole inlet the ear; Painting and Sculpture, the eye; Poetry, affording a pleasure which finds its entrance at both those inlets.
In the case of the Fine Arts, two perfectly different species, affording commonly as decidedly distinct degrees of pleasure, may be distinguished: viz. that which is experienced by those, by whom nothing but the product of the operation is enjoyed, and that which is experienced by him, by whom—singly, or in conjunction with others,—the operation is performed: the first-mentioned set unlimited in multitude; the other, limited to the fortunately endowed few: the former, mere passive recipients; the other, adding in their persons to the character of passive recipients, that of active and productive instruments.
Under the name of Somatico-Hedonistics might be collected and comprehended, those branches of art and science which, as above, have for their objects those modifications of pleasure, which have the body for their seat; under the name of Pneumatico-Hedonistics, such as have for their objects those more refined classes of pleasures which, passing through one or more of the inlets afforded by the body, find their ultimate seat in the mind.
For Technology, the first division might be that which has for its source, the distinction between such instruments as are applied immediately to one or other, or both together, of the two all-comprehensive objects above-mentioned,—viz. exemption from pain, and perception of pleasure,—and such as are conducive to the production of those same desirable effects, no otherwise than in a manner more or less remote, viz. by being, in some way or other, conducive to the production of the just-mentioned immediate instruments. Of the branches thus elicited, the field upon the face of this account of it, appears to be nearly, if not altogether co-extensive and coincident, with that of Aplopathematic Pathology,—considered in its two branches, viz. the Odynothetic and the Hedonistic, as above-mentioned.
Materials and instruments—materials on which the art is exercised, and instruments with the help of which it is exercised—in the distinction between the extensive and multifarious classes of objects, thus respectively denominated, another source of division may be observed.
In respect of vicinity to use, the station of the materials, serving as subjects to the art, is susceptible of indefinitely numerous degrees. The extreme stations are those respectively expressed by the appellatives raw materials and finished work. Between these two extremes may be seen interposed, according to the nature of the finished work, different numbers of distinguishable intermediate states. As the number of these intermediate states increases, the finished work being the same, the total mass of labour, employed in the production of the finished work, has been observed to be diminished; diminished by the influence of causes, which, under the head of division of labour, have been so clearly held up to view by Adam Smith.
When, considered under all the modifications of which it is susceptible, the work has been brought into that state in which the appellation of finished work may with propriety be applied to it,—on taking any article of it for an example, it will be found to be either of such nature as enables it, without the intervention of any other object, to be applied in an immediate way to immediate use,—viz. in the way either of excluding pain or of administering pleasure, as above,—or else not to be susceptible of being applied to use in any other shape than that of preparatory, subservient, or say instrumental use,—viz. by being subservient to the production, or right and effective application, of some subject or subjects, applicable, as above, in an immediate way to use.
As there are instruments, the use of which consists in their being respectively applied in an immediate way; that is, each according to its nature and destination, applied without the intervention of any other, to the repulsion of pain, or production of pleasure, or to both at once, so there are others which, howsoever truly conducive to these ends, are not so in any other than an unimmediate way, i. e. by being subservient either to the production, or to the application of some instrument or instruments, coming, as above, under the denomination of immediate instruments. Immediate utility admits not of degrees; but of unimmediate utility, as above, degrees may have place in any number. The scale, to which these degrees, belong, may be termed the scale of vicinity to use. Instruments the station of which is on the highest degree of the scale—say the first degree—the degree nearest to immediate use, may be termed instruments of the 1st order; those, next to them, i. e. next below them, instruments of the 2d order; and so on, through any number of degrees, which, in any system of connected instruments, may, at any time, be found exemplified.
Of materials, and instruments of all kinds, whether applied immediately or unimmediately to use, some are applicable, and accordingly applied to their respective uses, each of them by itself; others, not but in conjunction, each of them with one or more other instruments.
Agriculture is conspicuous for the number of instances it affords of instruments which are capable of being, and are wont to be employed single, as above: Manufactures, taken in the aggregate, for the multitude of the instances they afford, of instruments which cannot be employed but conjunctly.
The principal characteristics, by which the systems of productive operations, commonly comprehended under the appellation of manufactures, are distinguished from those called trades, or handicraft trades, seem to be, the greater length to which they carry the division of labour, the multitude of the instances they afford of instruments of subservient use, employed conjunctly with each other, and the number of the different orders into which, as above, those instruments would be found ranged below one another in the scale of vicinity to use.
Raw material, or finished work—instrument of immediate use, or instrument of unimmediate and subservient use—no portion of matter can ever, or in any way be of use, until it is arrived at the place, which it is requisite it should occupy, in order to its being applied in that same way to use. Hence two universally concomitant modes of subserviency to use, of which, in so far as they are moveable, all useful instruments are susceptible: viz. subserviency in the way of formation or application, and subserviency in the way of conveyance.
To this place belongs a system of division, which, with a view to clear, correct, and all-comprehensive conception, might not altogether without advantage, in the way of instruction, be applied to the aggregate mass of the several different instruments of conveyance; these are (say) stationary, i. e. Roads; moveable, i. e. Carriages; and so on.
In the above may be seen, though nothing like a complete list, a specimen of the various sources of division, by means of which, taken altogether, roads might, with no small instruction and convenience at any rate to the as yet unpractised traveller, be cut in so many various directions, through the wilderness of Technology.
A view of what was done in this way, by an ingenious philosopher of the 17th century, viz. Bishop Wilkins, though in prosecution of a design different from the present one, his being no less than that of substituting, throughout the whole field of language, an entire new language to all those at present in use, is intended for a separate article in this Appendix; it contains so much of that great work as seemed to bear relation to Technology.
[* ] [Ethics.] From a Greek word, which signifies manner or manners: manner of conducting one’s self in the course of life.
[* ] [Plasioscopic.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies formation.
[† ] [Coenonesioscopic.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies communication.
[‡ ] [Passion-exciting.]
[§ ] See the work on Grammar in this volume.
[∥ ] Words, and assemblages of words, considered as applied or applicable to this purpose, are, in the institutional books, styled books of Rhetoric, designated by the collective name of Figures of Speech; but, on the list of these Figures of Speech, as designated by their respective names, several may be seen, that apply more decidedly to the imagination than to the affections; as well as others, which, without addressing themselves to either of these two classes of psychological fictitious entities, are considered as capable of being subservient to the communication of thought, by means of collateral associations; i. e. by means of accessory ideas, which stand associated with the principal idea, with the idea, of which the word in question is directly and professedly significative, and which it was in the first instance employed to bring to view.
Works of this description—the study of which is commonly, in schools, an immediate sequel to that of the rules of grammar—are what the author of Hudibras appears to have had in view, where he says—
This portion of stock, marshalled as have been the contents of it by the didactic verse-maker rather than by the Logician, remains as yet, it is believed, in that original chaotic state in which, without particular examination, it seems scarcely practicable to bestow upon it any denomination, more characteristic than that of Figures of speech, by which it has hitherto been designated.
Between the imports, which, by even the most ancient Greek writers extant, was annexed, and from them continues to be annexed, to the words Grammar and Rhetoric respectively, the relation, which may be seen to have place, is very different from that which can not but have originally had place, if not between the words themselves, between those from which they were respectively derived. By the word Rhetoric, derived from the verb ϱεω to flow in a stream, which in some of its conjugates, though not in all, (for in this secondary sense the assemblage is far from complete,) was employed to designate the particular kind of efflux, distinguished by the name of speech, the audible signs of language, and none but the audible signs, were denoted: by the word Grammar, derived from γϱαφω to make visible or tangible marks, none but the visible or tangible ones.
Thus far, to judge from the undubitable etymologies of the two words, Rhetoric should have been the name, which, in the earliest stage of society—viz. antecedently to the invention of the visible and tangible class of signs—was employed to designate the thought-communicating art, viz. taken in the whole of its then extent, and to what purpose soever it was considered as applied or applicable. So, in like manner, from and after the introduction of those visible and tangible signs, Grammar should have been applied to the same field, taken in the same unlimited extent, so as in its import to differ from Rhetoric on no other point than that of the different species of signs respectively employed by the two arts.
Of the change which, upon the face of this statement, appears to have taken place between those original, and the subsequently established and still existing imports, absolute and relative, of the two words, the cause seems to be this:—Antecedent to the time at which the use of letters was invented in, or imported into, the cluster of nations, whose language was the Greek language, the operation of speaking to a numerous audience, on subjects of a complicated nature, and thence in discourses which continued flowing on as it were, to a considerable length, had in consequence of the form taken by the political constitution of some of these nations, grown into use. Ρητωϱ (Rhetor) the man of fluency, was accordingly the appellation by which a man, considered as engaged in operations of this description, came to be designated.
But, on the occasion of an address, delivered on such subjects, and to such audiences, motives for exercising on the affections, and even on the passions, whether directly, or through the medium and with the assistance of the imagination, whatsoever influence a man was able to exercise, could never be wanting. And thus it was, that Rhetoric—the language of the Rhetor—i. e. the Public Speaker, came to signify, not so much speech at large, as speech considered as addressing itself, either directly or through the medium of the imagination, to the affections and the passions.
When, the art exercised by the public speaker having, for a length of time more or less considerable, been already in use, the signs, invented for the purpose of giving permanence to the import expressed by those audible and evanescent signs, had also, for a length of time more or less considerable, been in use, then, and not till then, it was, that those relations, for the designation of which the collective appellation parts of speech came to be employed, could for the first time have presented themselves to view.
To obtain over the vast aggregate, composed of the whole assemblage of the words, of which the language used by the nation in question was composed, such a command, as enabled a man to marshal them all in his mind, and lodge them, every one of them in one or other of the eight or ten classes, having for their collective denomination the many-worded appellative parts of speech, was an enterprise, such as could scarcely have been projected, much less executed, without the benefit of that assemblage of permanent and everlasting signs, which, in every combination they are susceptible of, are capable of being kept in a steady position during any required length of time, under the corporeal, and thence under the mental eye.
And, in the progress of the art of Education, thus it was, that to instruction in the art of perceiving the import, and tracing the forms, of these visible and tangible characters, came by degrees to be added instruction in the nature of those relations, between their respective imports, in contemplation of which the whole body of the words, of which a language is composed, is divided and distributed among the parts of speech.
In the institutional works on this subject, derived by us, whether immediately, or through the medium of the Latins, from the Greeks, a division made of Grammar is into Orthoëpy and Orthography:—Orthoëpy, the art of performing the operation of speaking, in the right, i. e. in the customary mode; Orthography, the art of performing the operation of writing in the correspondently right mode.
Considered merely as operations, first of the two, as above, came speech, then, and not till after an interval of indefinite and unmeasurable length, writing. But considered as arts, to the exercise of which aberration from a standard, and thence rectitude (the absence of aberration) were incident, first must have come (if the above observations be well grounded) Orthography, the art of writing, and not till after that, the art of speaking correctly, viz. according to the usages to which expression had been given, in and by the rules of Grammar.
The word Rhetoric having thus two considerably different significations, the one, original and unbounded; the other, derivative, comparatively modern, and comparatively narrow: the one designating the operation of speech, taken in its whole extent; the other, the art of speech considered no otherwise than as applied to the particular purpose of exercising, occasionally, through the medium of the imagination, influence over the affections and the passions, no wonder if, in works having for their subject the import of this word, the line drawn between these two connected significations should be found not altogether clear and uniform; in this or that work taken singly, not clear; in such or such two works compared together, not the same.
How narrow the conception is, which, by the word rhetoric has been presented to the authors of the small institutional books above alluded to, may be seen, by means of a glance bestowed on the string of definitions and examples, of which the books so intituled are composed, and scarcely by any other means. In any one of these books may be seen the import of this appellation taken at its minimum. The maximum may be seen in the definition given of it, in one of the most instructive as well as most recent books on the subject—viz. The Philosophy of Rhetoric, by the late Dr Campbell, of Aberdeen. In the first page of the body of the work, after having, without notice given of the change, or of the relation between the import of the two words, substituted eloquence to rhetoric—“The word eloquence, taken in its greatest latitude, denotes” (he says) “that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end. All the ends of speaking” (continues he) “are reducible to four; every speech being intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will.” Thereupon, not adverting to the practice of writing, whether for the writer’s own use, or for the use of others—whether particular individuals or the public at large, he immediately uses not only the word speech, but the word speaking, as co-extensive with and synonymous to the word discourse. In a Note, “the word eloquence” (says he) “in common conversation is seldom used in such a comprehensive sense.” For “the choice” made “of this definition,” he thereupon gives two reasons: the second too long to be noticed here; the first is, that “it exactly corresponds with Tully’s idea of a perfect orator,” which he thereupon quotes. But in this the Christian Divine does the Heathen Philosopher much more, and himself much less than justice: for of his last mentioned end, viz. influencing the will, in comparison of which those mentioned by Tully are, all of them, but as means, the passage from Tully says nothing.
In regard to Grammar, the case is, that, of the field of language,—considered without reference to the particular nature, of the subject, purpose, or occasion on which it is employed, and in that sense, in a purely grammatical point of view,—the consideration of what belongs to the mutual relations correspondent to the different parts of speech, does not cover the whole expanse. In this part of the field, what is wanted for use, for general use, is a work, the object of which shall be to show the course best adapted to the purpose of rendering language,—i. e. the particular language employed, whatsoever it be,—in the highest practical degree, well adapted to the general end or purpose of language, viz. communication of thought, abstraction made of the particular nature of the particular purpose, to which, on the particular occasion in question, it may happen to it to be employed. By the observation of the rules, called rules of grammar, belonging to the particular language in question, true it is, that general purpose will in some measure be accomplished. But to afford a complete direction for the complete accomplishment of it, will, it is believed, be found to require, in addition to those at present designated by the appellation of grammatical rules, others, in considerable numbers, extent and variety, which have not as yet been brought to view. To attempt something in this way has been among the designs comprehended in the present work.
[* ] [Dicastic.] From a Greek word, which signifies to determine, in the character of a judge.
[† ] [Exegetic.] From a Greek word which signifies to set forth in the way of discourse.
[‡ ] [Deontology.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies fit, fitting, right, becoming, proper. Deontology—an account or indication of that which, on the occasion in question, whatsoever it be, is (i. e. by him who speaks or writes, is regarded as being) fit, fitting, becoming, proper. It is in sound only, and not in signification, that it has any connexion with the word ontology, employed above.
Applied to every branch of Ethics, taken in the largest sense of the word Ethics, the use of such a word as Deontology affords a promise of being attended with considerable convenience. It will accord equally well with every system which ever has been, or ever can be, devised, in relation to the foundation of moral obligation: in the use of it, no such incongruity and presumption is involved, as that which is called petitio principii—i. e. a begging of the question, an assumption of the matter in dispute.
[* ] This division will not be found in the Table.—Ed.
[† ] [Genicoscopic.] From two Greek words, the first signifying general.
[‡ ] [Idioscopic.] From two Greek words, the first signifying particular.
[§ ] [Apolioscopic.] From three Greek words: the first of which is the sign of negation; the second signifies a political state, and the third regarding.
[∥ ] [Polioscopic.] From two Greek words, as above.
[¶ ] [Government.]
[** ] [Politics.] By the word Government, the practice, and thence the art, seems to be more especially signified: by the word Politics, the corresponding branch of science.
A commodious division of Private Ethics might be into esoscopic and exoscopic, i. e. within-regarding, (or say self-regarding,) and extra-regarding, what it is right for a man to do, in so far as his own is the sole interest in question, and what it becomes right for him to do, when the interests of other sensitive beings are taken into the account.
[†† ] [Esoscopic.] From two Greek words, the first of which signifies within or inwards: looking inwards, viz. to the welfare of that individual alone, by whom, on the occasion in question, the subject in question—viz. his own conduct—is looked into.
[‡‡ ] [Exoscopic.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies outwards: looking outwards, i. e. to the welfare of some person or persons, other than the one whose conduct is in question, as above.
Two words from the same roots, viz. esoteric and exoteric, are already in the language; they are, however, but little in use, being terms of technical divinity, applied to the case where the same discourse is supposed to have had, in the intention of him whose discourse it was, two different meanings; one, in which it was designed that it should be understood by one person or set of persons; another, in which it was designed it should be understood by another.
[§§ ] [Government-by-legislation-regarding.]
[∥∥ ] [Government-otherwise-than-by-legislation regarding.]
[¶¶ ] A law is a discourse—conceived mostly in general, and always in determinate, words—expressive of the will of some person or persons, to whom, on the occasion, and in relation to the subject in question, whether by habit or express engagement, the members of the community to which it is addressed are disposed to pay obedience.
This is the only plain and proper sense of the word: in this sense the object of which it is designative is a real entity. In every other sense, it is figurative and improper; the object of which it is designative is a mere fictitious entity; and every discourse, in which the reality of it is assumed delusory.
Mostly in general words—loose is the expression; but the looseness was unavoidable. Of the mode and degree of generality, necessary to distinguish a law from an order of administration, no description is to be found anywhere; and any description on the subject would here be out of place.
Scarcely, perhaps, will the few lines that follow find excuse.
Of the hands, by which political power—whether of the administrative or the legislative cast—is exercised, the situation may be either supreme or subordinate. In common speech, however,—so indistinct are the conceptions commonly entertained, and the language commonly held, in this part of the field of thought and action,—the terms legislation and legislators are wont to be regarded and employed, as if applicable in no other case than that in which the situation of the hands, by which the power is exercised, is supreme. Accordingly, and in consequence, in the case where it is regarded as being subordinate, the discourses, in and by which their will stands expressed, are, by a confusion of terms, wont to be spoken of, as being the result of the exercise, not of legislative but of administrative power: as acts, not of legislation but administration.
Between such discourses, as are regarded as being the results or products of the exercise of legislative power, and such as are not regarded in that light (the will expressed being, in both instances, regarded as the will of a person or persons, possessing in that behalf competent authority) the line of separation remains, even to this day, altogether unsettled and indeterminate. Among the terms, employed in the designation of the various objects, whether persons or things, to which the discourse makes reference, the greater the proportion of those, which, in contradistinction to the individual, are of the generic cast,—being names of sorts of persons or things, and not merely of individual persons or things, the more likely,—the less that proportion, the less likely,—the discourse is, to be regarded as a result of the exercise of legislative power.
[* ] [Aneristic.] From two Greek words: one of which is a sign of negation; the other signifies contention or of contention.
The science corresponding to the art of judicature is termed Jurisprudence. But this is not the only sense in which the word Jurisprudence is employed. In France and in French it has been used to designate what, in English, is called Common, or Unwritten, Law, in contradistinction to Statute, or Written, Law. Witness Jurisprudence des Arrets.
[† ] [Uncontentious-administration-regarding.]
[‡ ] [Contentious-administration-regarding.]
[§ ] [Autothetic.] From two Greek words: the first of which signifies self; the second, established.
[∥ ] [Self-grounded-judicature-regarding: from autothetic and scopic. Many are even the already made compounds, which the common Lexicon (Hederic’s) presents as capable of being, with more or less propriety and felicity, capable of being, in the character of synonyms to this word autothetic, employed to designate the differential character, by which Law in this form is distinguished from Law in the Statute form: autothemethlic, (self-grounded); autogenethlic, (self-sprung); autogonous, (self-begotten); autognomonic, (self-opinioned); autobulic, (self-counselled), &c. &c.]
[¶ ] [Catanomothetic.] From three Greek words: the first of which signifies according to; the second, law, or by law, the third, established.
[** ] [Law-grounded-judicature-regarding.]
[* ] Thus, in Botany, within an universal umbel, are, in the instance of many plants, included a number of umbels, termed on that account partial umbels.
[* ] The word is—parcel of the aggregate of intimately related words, framing, altogether, what, by grammarians, is called a verb, viz. the verb substantive—the verb by which existence and nothing else is indicated—(a verb—as if the different sorts of words of which it is composed, were, all of them put together, no more than one) is by logicians styled the copula: i. e. the instrument of connexion, of which, in the operation, styled by logicians predication, the import is always either expressed or understood. By it, unless where the sign of negation is added to it, existence is, in every instance, attributed to some one object, and, in most instances, identity, coincidence, or connexion, to two objects with which it is associated.
[† ] In addition to the import of the copula, i. e. of the mere sign of existence, by every verb other than the verb substantive, the import of the name of some quality or other, either in the character of a permanent, or in that of a momentary one, may, it is believed, be found presented to the mind:—and this, over and above any of those accessory imports, which are denoted by the grammatical terms, mood, tense, person, and number.
[* ] It will be found that the author has, in his table, diverged slightly from this description.—Ed.
[* ] Pleading for his quondam instructor, the poet Archias, “Between art and art,” (says Cicero,) there exists throughout the whole assemblage of them, commune vinculum, a common tie—True; and that tie is the one already above indicated: viz. their common object—well-being—by which they are constituted so many branches of the universal art, Eudæmonics. Between art and art?—Yes; and moreover between science and science: and of these the common tie is their common subject, viz. substance:a and by this common tie it is that they are constituted so many branches of the universal science, ontology—particular as well as general ontology included, as above, (§ 8.) But, between art, taken in its whole extent, and science, taken in its whole extent, there runs throughout that all-pervading and most intimate connexion, which has above been brought to view: (See Tab. I. Note 32.) For the arts he was speaking of, the Orator might thus, in virtue of this connexion, supposing him aware of it, and supposing it to have been suitable to his purpose and to the occasion, have found two, viz. the two above-mentioned, common ties.
Not that, in any part of the field, any such conception, as it is in the power of any of the words in question to convey, of those general ideas, of which they are respectively the names, can serve in the place of ideas derived from the perception of individuals, of the correspondent individual objects respectively contained in them. No; it is only through individual objects, that any clear and adequate ideas are presented and lodged in the mind: and it is the opposite notion, that constituted the all-pervading error of the class of philosophers called the Schoolmen or School-Logicians, and gave, to little less than the whole mass of knowledge or supposed knowledge of those times, the character of a nut-shell without a kernel, or a skull without brains.
But what it is in the power of these words to do is—to afford so many ready receptacles, as it were, or boxes, in which the individual ideas,—in proportion as they are drawn forth from the individual objects which are their sources,—may be lodged and deposited, in such manner as to take hold of the memory, and there to remain, in readiness to be, at any time, called up for use.
[a ] In the import of this word,—in the sense in which, by the Aristotelians—at any rate by the Christian followers of that philosophy—it has always been employed,—is included (it should be remembered) not matter only (i. e. all bodies) but mind.
[* ] The Tree of Porphyrius, as exhibited in the Table hereto annexed. For explanation, see the next Section.
[† ] See the Table.
[* ] See Note *, page 98.
[* ] Words which, whether derived or not from foreign languages, appertain exclusively to particular trades and occupations, will of course continue to operate as so many incidental sources of the sensation of ignorance to a person not correspondently conversant with the language of those particular trades and occupations respectively, there must, in those several divisions of the language, be of course as many dark spots as there are of these peculiar words. But, in these instances, it will, by the context of the discourse, be sufficiently shown, that, by a want of acquaintance with the import of these particular words, nothing worse is indicated, than a correspondent want of acquaintance with the field of that particular trade or occupation; not any want of acquaintance with any part of the general body of the language. The language of seamanship will afford an example.
[* ] In the French Encyclopædical Table, so often mentioned, between the art and science of the Painter and that of the Chemist, according to the view there given of the two objects, there could not be any relation at all, except in so far as painting is a branch of Connoissances Humaines—human knowledges or knowledge. According to that Table, in painting (and not only in painting but in engraving) the only one of the human faculties employed, is the imagination: and as, according to the same Table, the art of making colours, fit to be used in painting, belongs to memory,—and, if it be included in Chemistry, the knowledge how to make them, belongs to Reason,—the Painter might be at some difficulty about his colours, if, for finding out the way to have good ones, he had no other means than what are afforded him by that French Table.
[† ] By the mathematical reader, with reference to the solution of the principal problem, the construction of this test may, if he pleases, be considered in the character of a lemma.
[‡ ] On the occasion of every such division, what, to prevent confusion, is altogether necessary, is—that, of the names, given to the parts which are the results of the division by no one shall any individuals be designated, other than those which are comprehended in the aggregate so undertaken to be divided. By the word preciseness or precision may be designated the ulterior property thus represented as desirable. But, to its presenting this signification, it will be necessary, that the original and material import of the word (precision from precido, to cut off, viz. everything that out-stretches the proper line) be at the same time present to the mind.
Of this property, however, to avoid embarrassing the present inquiry with matter which, on the present occasion, has not presented itself as essential to it, no further mention, except what follows in this note, will be made.
In the scheme of division, pursued in the example here given of an encyclopædical tree, this property will, it is believed, be found actually possessed, and that by every branch without exception. But among the trivial or current names, which, in the character of synonyms to the names of the branches of the tree in its encyclopædical form, have for illustration been introduced, some may perhaps be found, whose claim to the possession of this property may not present itself as exempt from dispute. This deficiency, in respect of preciseness, is among the unavoidable results, of the indeterminateness, which will, in so many instances, be seen to be attached to the names in common use.
Properties may receive explanation from their opposites. All-comprehensiveness may be said to have for its opposite, scantiness; preciseness, extravasation.
[* ] For this diagram see Table IV.
[† ] Viz. if it be an individual, the same individual—the same in all its parts; if an aggregate, an aggregate composed of exactly the same individuals, neither more nor less.
The portion of time in question must also be, in both instances, exactly the same; for it may be that, at one time, the individual is possessed of the property in question; at another time not possessed of it.
[‡ ] If, so far as it goes, the account here given of contradictories is correct and clear, that which may be seen given by the Aristotelian logicians will hardly be found in complete possession of either of these desirable qualities. Only between assertions, surely, can contradictoriness have place: yet, by Saunderson, it is spoken of as having place between two terms. Of the two above-mentioned axioms, which have contradictories for their subject, it has been seen how well they correspond.—Yet, by Saunderson, one of them, viz. the one last mentioned, is represented as applying to terms alone,a nothing being therein said of propositions; the other, as applying to entire propositions alone,b nothing being there said of terms, and of these axioms, that which is applied to terms alone, instead of constituting a rule of itself, is, in the form of a parenthesis, sunk as it were under the head of another rule, which seems far from equalling it in clearness.—Though really derived from the Aristotelian logic, the account here given of contradictories not being exactly conformable to the account given in that system,—what difference there is between the two accounts might, but for this warning, be liable to be, without further scrutiny, supposed to be the result of misconception.
To obviate any such supposition, it seemed necessary thus to give a brief intimation, of the considerations, by which the departure here made from the authoritative standard seemed necessitated. Could room have been spared, other supposed imperfections in the Aristotelian account of the matter might here have been pointed out.
[a ] Logicæ Artis Compendium, p. 40.
[b ] Ib. p. 72.
[* ] [Proposition.] Note, that the sense in which the word proposition is here employed, is not that in which it is commonly employed by Mathematicians, but that in which it is employed by Logicians. If the former were the sense put upon it, the distinctness, here ascribed to the two branches, might not be very readily recognised, if, indeed, it would really be to be found. So apt are mathematical men to go backwards and forwards, between the geometrical and the algebraical mode of expression, according to the supposed convenience of the occasion and the moment, in a manner as it were mechanical, and almost without notice taken of the difference,—what may very well happen is, that of what may, in the mathematical sense, be one and the same proposition, in one part figure may be, and in another part not be, an object of regard. But, because two things are capable of being mixed together, it follows not that in their own natures they are not distinct: and, taking the word proposition, in the logical sense, scarcely will it be said, that, in one and the same proposition, the matter is spoken of at the same time in a Geometrical and in an Arithmetical point of view,—spoken of with reference to figure, and not with reference to figure at the same time.
[* ] [Out-stretching] See above, Note ‡ to p. 102.
[† ] [All-comprehensiveness.] True it is, that, to the purpose of its being regarded as all-comprehensive (this division of Mathematics into Geometry and Arithmetic) it is necessary that, under Arithmetic, Algebra should be considered as comprehended: but about this there cannot be any difficulty; since, by Newton (as appears by his work, entituled Arithmetica Universalis,)—by Newton and so many others—it is spoken of as thus included.
True also it is—that, to this same purpose, it is equally necessary that, under Algebra, Fluxions, which, on this supposition, might, in the many-worded form, be denominated Fluxional Algebra, should be considered as included. But upon consideration, neither in this case, it is believed, will there be found any serious difficulty. Applicable, with equal propriety, to Fluxions, as well as to whatever part of Algebra cannot be brought under the denomination of Fluxions, will be found the appellative Agnosto-symbolic. Agnosto-symbolic, i. e. expressed by signs unknown; by signs, of which, in the first instance, antecedently to the solution of the problem the value and import is not known:—known in the same degree of clearness as those of which the written language, peculiar to common Arithmetic, is composed.
This division of Algebra, into common and fluxional, would any one wish to see it expressed in the language of the Encyclopædical tree? In the solution of this logical problem there would not, it is believed, be found much difficulty; and by this means an exemplification may be afforded of the method in which, in any given part of it, the process by which these first lines of the Encyclopædical tree have been constructed, may at pleasure be carried on to any further length.
For distinguishing Fluxional from Common Algebra, take, for the distinctive property of Fluxions, the fiction by which in this case, for the production of the quantities in question,—for the genesis or generation of them (to use the language of Mathematicians)—motion is supposed. If this assumption be admitted as correct, Algebra being taken for the immediate trunk, here then we have,—for the positive branch Cinesiopseustic, (motion-feigning;) for the negative branch, Acinesiopseustic (motion not feigning.) By him, by whom, being considered in the Newtonian point of view, the subject of the branch in question is accordingly treated of in the Newtonian language, the propriety of the denomination thus proposed for the positive branch, will not, it is believed, be considered as being exposed to dispute. Whether for the same branch, or at any rate the correspondent branch, if considered in the Leibnitzian point of view, and in the Leibnitzian language, (that being the language mostly employed on the Continent,) styled the Calculus differentialis et integralis, (in French, Calcul differentiel et integral,) the same Encyclopædical division, with or without the same nomenclature, would, and with equal propriety might, be made to serve, is an inquiry which stands too wide of the present disquisition to be endeavoured to be comprised in it.
[‡ ] [Distinctness.] See above, p. 104, Note, on the word [proposition.]
[* ] Thus it is, that, in every instance, the proposed test, and the capacity of the division to endure the application of it, have been kept in view. The difference is—that, in some instances, in the composition of the appellatives in question, the application of this test has been actually made—made by the author himself,—in other instances left to the reader. If, in the eyes of any student in logic, this work should happen to find favour, the application of this test would, it is believed, be found capable of affording him a not altogether uninstructive exercise. But if, by the mere use of this instrument, in its present shape, instruction may thus be gained, much greater is the degree of instruction capable of being gained by the endeavour to improve upon it: and with whatsoever degree of success it may happen to any such endeavour to be attended, any labour thus employed, he may be well assured, so far as instruction to the labourer himself is a gain, will not be lost.
[* ] [Definitions.] These definitions present themselves naturally in the character of answers to so many questions, which, in a course of instruction, administered in the mode now so well known by the name of the interrogative mode, might be applied to the matter of any such scientific tree. And thus, pursuing the phraseology, as well as the method applied in the National Society Schools to the Church-of-England Catechism, we have the matter of the tree of art and science “broken into short questions.” In what degree soever, on the superior ground of importance the matter of this Encyclopædical tree may fall below the matter of that consecrated formulary, on the ground of facility of intellection it will scarcely be thought to yield to it.
1. What is Mathematics? Answers. The branch of art and science which has for its subject quantity.
2. What is the Encyclopædical name for Mathematics? Answer. Posology.
3. What is Geometry, expressed in the Encyclopædical language? Answer. Morphoscopic Posology.
4. What is Arithmetic, expressed in Encyclopædical language? Answer. Alegomorphic Posology.
To the above will be added, of course, the questions adapted to the extraction of the requisite ulterior explanations. But of these the above sample will, it is believed, be found to suffice.
[* ] Of an imperfect division, Watts, in his Logic, undertakes to give an example. But on this occasion he seems not to know very exactly what he is about. The sort of aggregate, which belonged to his subject, was a logical aggregate—a genus: such as this Table exhibits in every part of it. The sort of aggregate which he employs for his example is a physical aggregate:—an individual—any individual of the genus tree. The division which he gives, as an example of an imperfect one, is that of a tree into trunk and leaves. What in his view renders it an imperfect one, is but the want of mention made of root and branches. Not to speak of other parts, two much more important deficiencies are, the want of flowers and fruit. But the lights struck out by Linnæus, had not as yet shone upon the field of Physiurgics.
Immediately afterwards, he takes up, indeed, a logical aggregate: viz. Logic itself. But, for want of some words, perhaps, that were necessary to complete the expression, instead of light, the result is thicker darkness. Logic, he supposes, divided into apprehension, judgment, and reasoning. This division gives us another example of an incomplete one: for, to render it complete, method, he says, should have been added: of the art in question (meaning logic,) method (he says) is a considerable part. Be it so: but apprehension, is it also an art? No, surely. Of the art and science of logic it may be taken for one of the subjects:—true:—but itself it is neither art nor science. Thus, confounding the subjects of an art with the art itself, what he gives as an example of the division of a logical aggregate, is—a division of it into four parts, of which no more than one can, with any sort of propriety, be spoken of as a part of that same whole. No; nor even that, without a force put upon the import of the word. To express a species of art—to express an operation—methodization, not method, was the proper word: method is—not the operation itself, but the result of it.
[† ] Elements, book vi. p. 28.
[‡ ]Impression—viz. the effect produced in the mind, at the very time when the object, which is the source of it, being present to bodily sense, is actually the object of the faculty of perception—idea—viz. the effect produced when the object, not being so present, is—or rather the impression made by it as above, is—the object of the faculty of memory. The first writer, it is believed, by whom this distinction, so necessary to every clear and correct perception of the phenomena of the human mind, was held up to notice, was David Hume. A consequence is—that, where observation is made, of the existence of this or that relation,—and, on that occasion, comparison, as above, is spoken of as being made, or distinction as having place,—if the number of the objects in question is greater than two, he, who has to speak of the relation, the comparison, or the distinction, finds himself in a very awkward dilemma. By the preposition among—it being scarcely in use for this purpose—scarcely is the import in question presented to view. Comparison of object with object, yes: comparison between object and object, yes: comparison between objects, yes: comparison among objects—comparison, for example, among those three objects—scarcely: So as to relation. Relation of object to object, yes: relation between object and object, yes: relation between objects, yes relation among objects—relation among these three objects—scarcely. And so, in the instance of the word distinction. In these cases what shall be the word employed?—Shall it be the word among? Scarcely is the import conveyed: or, if it be, it is not without the idea of impropriety for its accompaniment, that the corveyance of it is made. Comparison, relation, distinction, among these three?—scarcely will any such phrase be endurable. Shall it be the word between? comparison between three? relation between three?—the hue of self-contradictoriness presents itself upon the very face of the phrase. By one of the words in it, the number of the objects is asserted to be three: by another it is asserted to be no more than two.
Be this as it may, the confirmation which, from this particularity in the language, though it should be found to be in no more than one language, the notion in question receives, seems equally manifest. To the use thus exclusively made of the word between, what could have given rise, but a sort of general, howsoever indistinct, perception, that it is only one to one that objects can, in any continued manner, be commodiously and effectually compared.
[* ] On the very face of the portion of language, with which the hand of custom has covered this part of the field, may be seen a testimony—nor that a weak one—in favour of the conception thus hazarded. Distinction between is the phrase, not distinction among: comparison between, not comparison among.—Why?—Answer. Because it is only between two objects that any clear perception of distinction can be obtained at the same time:—because to no greater number of objects than two can the faculty and correspondent operation of comparison be applied at exactly the same point of time.
Many, in a word, are the occasions on which,—it being supposed that of certain objects a survey is to be taken, and that survey a conjunct one,—it will be found, that, of the two words here in question, viz. between and among, it is the former only that can with propriety be employed: and, besides these just mentioned, on many others, if not on all occasions, will the like testimony, it is believed, be seen to be afforded.
The truth is—that, on this ground, the English language labours under a defect, which, when it is compared in this particular with other European languages, may perhaps be found peculiar to it. By the derivation, and thence by the inexcludible import, of the word between, (i. e. by twain,) the number of the objects, to which this operation is represented as capable of being applied, is confined to two. By the Latin inter—by its French derivation entre—no such limitation seems to be expressed.a
[a ] To the Greek,—the set of prepositions which that language furnishes being wretchedly ambiguous, unappropriate, unexpressive,—in vain, on such an occasion, could any reference be made.
[† ] [Relations ..... to other objects.] When first penned, the passage stood as follows:—“It is only by means of such relations as it bears to other objects, that any object can be known.” .. Without explanation, this (it might have appeared) would have been going too far: for, supposing the object in question to contain parts, on this supposition the relations which it bore to other objects would not comprehend more than a portion of the whole number of relations of which it was susceptible: in addition to them, there would remain the relations borne to each other by its several parts. The only supposition, therefore, on which the position thus discarded would be strictly true, is this, viz. that the subject of it is an atom:—an object too minute to be divisible into parts. On this supposition, if deduction were made of all relation, borne by this atom to objects exterior to itself, after such deduction there would not remain any relations at all. For in the very import of the word relation, two objects at least, between which it is considered as having place, are comprehended. No powers, for example, could the atom have: Why? Because no subject would it have to operate upon.
[‡ ] Hence the term equation applied to algebraical propositions.
[* ]Caution, to prevent that misconception, by which Aristotle, after bewildering himself, kept the thinking part of the world bewildered for little less than two thousand years—by which he put out the eyes of the otherwise powerful mind of James Harris—and which, by Bacon and Locke, has scarcely ever yet been completely done away.
Lest, to the instrument here employed, viz. the contradictory formula,—employed as here in the character of a test of, and security for all-comprehensiveness and distinctness, in a logical division,—any extraordinary powers, beyond those which really belong to it, should be ascribed—lest, by being employed in the composition of propositions wearing on the face of them the form of demonstration, a degree of conclusiveness, independent of observation and experiment, and superior to anything which by means of those instruments of knowledge can be produced, should be supposed to be attainable,—this caution is subjoined:—a caution, which, however, to those who by an adequate conception of, and a sufficient attention to, the discoveries made in the region of mind by Bacon and Locke, have learnt to recognise the emptiness of the Aristotelian philosophy, will at the utmost be no more than a memento.
Yes, upon observation made of individual perceptions, and upon the correctness with which it has been made, and the judgments grounded on it deduced, will depend, in every instance, the truth of whatsoever propositions of a general nature can, upon that part of the field of thought and action, to which these same individual perceptions and judgments appertain, be framed and delivered.
By general words, a truth, in so far as ascertained by individual observation, may indeed be expressed: but, it is not by stringing together general words, be they what they may, or in what number they may, that truth can be proved: i. e. that sufficient ground for regarding any one of these propositions as true—any of the properties in question as really appertaining to the subject in question—can be afforded.
Of the formulary, here proposed in the character of a test of all-comprehensiveness in the division to which it is applied, what then is the real function and use?—Answer. To point the attention of the reader to the individual matters of fact, on which the possession of this property depends: to point the attention to them, viz. by the means of a pointed form of words, by which the existence of them in all the individual subjects in question is asserted in explicit terms.
That all living bodies, (turn here to the Ramean tree, Table IV.) that all living bodies, other than those that are sensitive, are insensitive,—this, for example, is what can be neither denied nor doubted of.—Why? Because the assertion thus brought to view has, in truth, for its subject, nothing more than the import of certain words, compared with certain others:—words, the import of which is on both sides fixed by universal usage.
But that all the living bodies, which are called animals, are sensitive, i. e. possess the property of sensation,—of this proposition the truth depends upon individual observation: viz. partly upon the observation, that bodies, which at first view have been supposed to possess sensation, have upon further observation and experiment been found to give further indications of that property; partly upon the observation, that,—in whatever instance body has been found or supposed to be possessed of that same property,—animal, and not plant, has, of these two correspondently extensive names of classes, been the name to which it has been wont to be referred, as well as the name by which, in common language, it has been wont to be designated.
Of these two observations, the first is an observation relative to the nature of things; and the field it belongs to is that of Natural History: the other is an observation relative to the import of words: i. e. relative to the usage which, among that portion of the human species, by which the language in question has been employed, has obtained in respect of the things, or real objects, for the designation of which the words in question have been wont to be employed; and the field it belongs to is that of Language.
It was by fancying that everything could be done, by putting together a parcel of phrases, expressive of the respective imports of certain words, mostly of certain general words, without any such trouble as that of applying experiment or observation to individual things,—that, for little less than two thousand years, the followers of Aristotle kept art and science nearly at a stand.
In the present instance, what may be seen is—that, already, in whatsoever may have presented itself in the character of a demonstration, among the data of it, the existence of the property, the existence of which is the object of such demonstration—the existence of that property in the subject in question, viz. in the division in question—is virtually assumed. In and by the remainder of the process—in and by the demonstrative part itself—what then is it that is or could be done? Nothing more than to show, that to the two branches or minor aggregates in question that formula is truly applicable, which, wherever it is found to be truly applicable, is received,—or at any rate is fit to be received,—as a compendious indication,—and, in so far as the individual assertions included in it are true, i. e. agree with the nature of things on the one hand, and the usage of language on the other,—as a commodious test, and provisional proof, though no more than a provisional proof, of the existence of the property in question in the subject in question: viz. in the present instance, of the property termed all-comprehensiveness or exhaustiveness, in the system of divisions supposed and asserted to be possessed of it.
It is from such truth as there is in the included particular—yes and even individual—propositions, that whatever truth there is in any more general one is originally perceived,—not vice versâ. A general proposition is but an aggregate of individual ones: it can only be in so far as the individual propositions contained in it are true, that in the general proposition by which those individuals are contained any truth can be to be found.
The case is—that all perceptions are not only particular but individual. In so far as it goes beyond actually existing individuals on which the actual observation has been made, every general proposition,—how well warranted soever the induction is by which it has been formed,—how useful soever it is when applied to practice,—and how truly soever the sensation it produces in the mind is different from that produced in the same receptacle by any one of the individual observations of which it contains the assertion,—is still but a figment—the mere figment of the imagination.
Hence—once more, and for the last time—it is only in the character of a provisional test that this general formulary is presented. In observation and experiment—observation and experiment having for their subjects individual objects—in these are the only original, and in case of dispute or doubt, the only definitive tests to be found.
To give to mere assertion the appearance, and for that purpose the name of demonstration, is a contrivance, invented and brought forward, probably without seeing the hollowness of it, by Aristotle, and which, down to the present day, either from inability or from unwillingness, to recognise the hollowness of it, polemical writers have not yet prevailed upon themselves to abstain from the use of. The proposition which a man stands engaged to support, is in its nature a self-contradictory one, and thereby a mere heap of nonsense,—expressive neither of truth nor even so much as of falsehood?—Nothing will serve him but he must give a demonstration of it. The more palpable the absence of all genuine instruments of persuasion, the more urgent the demand for fallacious ones.
[† ] For further elucidation on the subject of this and the succeeding sections, see the subject of division, as treated in the work on Logic in this volume.—Ed.
[* ] From the Greek of the Isagoge of Porphyrius—i. e. his Introduction to the Aristotelian System of Logic—this diagram is supposed to have been translated. But it was the Latin translation, as it stands in No. I.—a Latin translation in manuscript, and not the Greek original in print—that was put by the tutor into the hands of his pupils: nor has it ever happened to this one of them to have had a copy of it under his eye.
[† ] Since what is in the text was written, an opportunity has been obtained of consulting the work of Porphyrius: and the result is—that most improperly has this diagram been ascribed to that wordy and cloudy pre-expounder of a nebulous original.
An edition of Aristotle’s Organon, (i. e. System of Logic,) to which is prefixed the Introduction, ascribed to Porphyrius, is now on the table: it is that published by Pacius, with a Latin Translation, at Frankfort, Anno 1597. In the Greek there is no diagram. In the Latin alone is there any diagram.a But, in the Greek, what is described is—not a tree, but a mere nest of boxes, one within another. In the Latin diagram, the image presented has in it something of a ladder, but nothing at all of a tree.
The truth is—what is brought to view by Porphyrius is not a system of divisions; it is nothing more than a system of logical subalternation. Of the materials of the diagram here exhibited, it has not any of the negative branches: it has none but the positive. Genus Generalissimum, Ουσια: next to and within ουσια, σωμα: next to and within σωμα, εμψυχον σωμα: next to and within εμψυχον σωμα, ζωον: next to and within ζωον, λογιϰον ζωον: next to and within λογιϰον ζωον, ανϑϱωτος. To Grecians it will, without explanation, be manifest enough, how clumsy and incorrect the workmanship is of this nest of boxes: how much inferior to that of the Latin tree: to non-Grecians, it seems scarcely worth explaining. Thus it appears, that, of this admirable instrument, scarce a trace is to be found in the work of this Porphyrius, by whose name it has been found designated. No ramification, no division, is to be found in it: no ramification, consequently no place for that contradictory formula, by which the relation of the contents of the branches, to one another and to the trunk, is so satisfactorily expressed.
Wonderful, therefore, it is, how, among logicians,—or from the pen of so much as a single logician, of the Aristotelian School,—the diagram in question should have been ascribed to this Porphyrius. The probability seems to be, that the inventor of it was no other than Peter Ramus: that Ramus, whom we have seen, and shall see again, so slightingly spoken of for the use he made of it.a
In the text of this section,b when, from the gname under which it was handed down, the diagram was concluded to have been the invention of Porphyrius, it was mentioned as matter of surprise, that Saunderson had made no use of it. Though the ascription of it to Porphyrius was, as above, the result of misconception, the ground for surprise remains without much alteration. To Saunderson the works of Ramus were known, for he refers to them. By Ramus, what is certain is—that for the bifurcate mode of division a strong predilection was entertained, and abundant use made of it: what seems highly probable therefore, is—that the divisions, thus made by him, either, were, or were intended to be, exhaustive.
According to Moreri, (verbo Ramus) on the subject of Logic, (for he wrote on Mathematical and other subjects) the works he wrote were intitled Institutiones Dialecticæ, and Aristotelicæ Animadversiones, Anno 1543:—his books were condemned, and he turned out of his Professorship, he not being at that time more than twenty-eight years of age. Being the declared opponent of Aristotle, the wonder is how, for that time, he escaped with life.—Being moreover a Protestant, he suffered for both sins at once, being comprehended in the Bartholomew-tide Massacre, Anno 1572.
In some of our public libraries, not to speak of private ones, these works of the ingenious Frenchman—gallicè, Pierre Ramée, latinè, Petrus Ramus—would be to be found of course. What he found to say against Aristotle would at least be matter of curiosity, though, considering at what time of day he said it, probably not of much use.
[a ] Pp. 8, 9.
[a ] The Porphyrian tree, in its usual Latin form, is found in use before the time of Ramus: e. g. by Boethius and others.—Ed.
[b ] P. 111.
[* ] Some five-and-forty years ago was the discovery of this imperfection made. What led to it was this. Observing that, to the divisions made in that work, the quality of all-comprehensiveness was therein ascribed,—and concluding that accordingly, in the contents of it, matter, fit for the being represented as endowed with that quality, would throughout be to be found,—thereupon, by way of exercise, taking the text of it in hand, the author of these pages set himself the task of exhibiting it in the form of a Ramean tree: but, not to speak of anterior sources of perplexity, no sooner did the test come to be applied to the attributives of the second order, than the delusion vanished, and the operation was found to be impracticable.
[* ] Of all the colleges in the university of Oxford, Queen’s College was, in the year 1761,—and, for aught the writer of this has heard, continues to be,—the one, in which the art and science of Logic was and is cultivated with most attention. In those days, Saunderson’s and Watts’, as above, were,—and, for aught he has heard, continue to be, on this subject,—employed there in the character of the earliest, if not the only institutional writers.
[† ]Dividendum, rather than divisum, seems to be the more proper term, in so far as the time, at which the subject is taken into consideration, is anterior to that at which the operation has been performed upon it: and the first-mentioned is the time which seems to have been in view on the occasion of some of the ensuing rules.—The dividendum, not the dividend, for fear of running foul of the Thread-needle-street Bank.
[* ] By this unfortunate mass of surplusage, another source of confusion will be seen to be opened.—On the supposition, by which the field for the application of these rules is marked out, a problem is proposed. Of this problem the subject is supposed to be already determined, viz. the aggregate, of which a division is to be made. Upon this subject it is, that, according to this same supposition, an operation is to be performed, viz. that of division. Of this operation, when performed, the condivident parts or members will be the results: of which several results the contents will, of course, respectively depend upon the scheme or mode of division, which shall have been pursued. Here then all that is supposed to depend upon the operator, is the mode of the division, and therefrom the results of it: that which, as being, by the supposition, already determined, is supposed not to depend upon him, is,—the dividendum—the aggregate upon which the operation—the division—is to be performed. Of these conditions of the problem, necessary as is the perception and comprehension of them to any clear and correct conception of the nature of the operation and the work, so it is, that by this institutionalist no clear conception seems, on this occasion, to have been entertained. Addressing himself to the operator, the direction which on this occasion he gives is—how to frame his dividendum. But, on this same occasion, according to the conditions of the problem, he is not to frame it at all: it is ready framed to his hands.
Upon the whole, what seems evident enough is—that, taken in both its parts, this second rule is worse than useless, and that the complete erasure of it would be an improvement.
[* ] From the fifth of these his rules substantial and useful instruction will, however, be found obtainable:—“Divide,” says he, “every subject, according to the special design you have in view.” Then immediately follows an observation, which, with perfect propriety, might have been made to constitute a distinct rule. “One and the same idea or subject,” says he, “may be divided in very different manners, according to the purposes we have in discoursing of it;” whereupon, by way of exemplification, he adduces the several purposes, which, in regard to a book, it may naturally happen to the Printer, the Grammarian, and the Logician, to have in view.—Of this rule of his, two exemplifications may have been observed in the Encyclopedical Table here exhibited.
[* ] Kaimes’s Sketches, book iii. Sk. i. p. 163.
[* ] No, (says he,) the conditions are inconsistent.—First term 1; Common multiplier, 2; No number of terms will give 40,000 for the last, the two nearest will give—the one a less number, the other a greater. Hence a demand for discussions, the profit of which would not pay for the place occupied.
[† ] In various parts of the field of art and science, in his own instance, towards giving clearness, correctness, and completeness to his own views, the writer of these pages has found it—so at least it has seemed to him—of the greatest use. For this purpose he had even brought together a few exemplifications. But, seeing to what a length they had led him from the main purpose, and considering that where, by any person by whom, after such particular discussion and explanation, the reality of the benefit is not recognised in that part of the field which has here been operated upon, still less reasonable would be the expectation of seeing it recognised on any other ground, of which no more than the slightest and most general view could be presented, he struck them out.
Without any such trouble as that of exhibiting them in this particular view, other exemplifications may, however, perhaps, be seen to be afforded by some of the subsequent Numbers of this Appendix.
[* ] The reader will probably find a convenience in having open before him the diagram of this Encyclopædical Tree, and occasionally to turn to the Explanations given, in relation to it in § 9.
[† ] Of a word thus framed, an exemplification may be seen in the Encyclopædical Tree, in the word Eudæmonics.
[‡ ] An instance, in which the pair of names first provided were single-worded names, and these trivial names, is afforded by the words Geometry and Arithmetic:—an instance, in which the names first provided were indeed single-worded names, but those not trivial names, but names framed for the purpose, are Posology and Poiology. From thence, by the addition of the name of the trunk, were made,—as may be seen both in the diagram and the explanation of it,—the two two-worded Encyclopædical names, Pososcopic Somatics and Poioscopic Somatics.
To either of these two Encyclopædical two-worded names, in the structure of which the contradictory formula is not expressed but only implied, had it been deemed necessary to substitute two names, in which that test of all-comprehensiveness is expressed, the following is the mode in which it might have been effected:—Pososcopic being continued, to poioscopic alegoposic might have been substituted. In this case, the existence of all-comprehensiveness would have been effected, and that (it is supposed) with truth. But that instruction would not, upon the face of the ramification, have been stamped, which, by exhibiting Posology and Poiology together, in the character of two branches, comprehending between them the whole contents of the trunk Somatology, seems to be afforded.a
[a ] Neither is quantity so perfectly out of the question in Natural History and Natural Philosophy, as quality is in Mathematics. Scarcely, therefore, could Alegoposic Somatology have been employed as the two-worded synonym of Poiology. Here there may be seen an instance of those imperfections which in such a case it seems impossible altogether to avoid.
[* ] Take an apple. Cut it once through with a knife: by cutting it in this one direction, you divide it into two parts. Put the parts together again, you may in like manner cut it again into two other parts. If those produced by the former division are considered as united, you have still but two parts: if not, you may have four parts. Correspondent to the different dissections taken by the instrument of division in the case of this physical whole, are the different sources of division in the case of the logical whole. In both cases the division is equally bifurcate and exhaustive.
[† ] Of divisional operations, performed on the same subject, from divers sources, examples may be seen in the Table.
[‡ ] Even by Bishop Berkeley, by whom, as if to out-scepticize the sceptics, and foil them at their own weapons,—the existence of the table he was writing upon was denied,—the name of the table would have been allowed to be—in common intendment at least—the name of a real entity: and, even in his own view of the matter, the table (an utensil, which required wood to make it of, and a saw, &c. to make it with,) would have been allowed to approach somewhat nearer to the state of reality, than a sort of entity, such as a quality, as a relation, in the making of which thoughts have been the only materials, and words the only instruments.
[§ ] Say, strictly speaking, names of so many aggregates or classes, of objects in which real entities are included: for, strictly speaking, individual objects are the only real entities: considered in themselves, the aggregates or classes in which those real entities are regarded as included, are no more than so many fictitious bodies, put together by the mind for its own use. See above, Note *, pp. 210-211, and below, § 19.
[* ] See the several works on “Grammar,” “Language,” and “Ontology,” in this volume.—Ed.
[† ] Examples of these undefinable fictitious entities are—
I. Physical fictitious entities—motion, rest, quality, &c.
II. Ethical fictitious entities—obligation, right, vower, &c.
III. Ontological fictitious entities—condition, certainty, impossibility, &c.
Of the demand for a species or mode of exposition, adapted to the nature of this class of appellatives, hints may be seen in an anonymous tract published by the author, A° 1776, under the title of “Fragment on Government,” &c., p. 179 to 185. It has this long time been out of print.—[See this collection, vol. i. p. 283, et seq.]
[* ]Genus and species are words which cannot, either of them, be employed without impliedly asserting the existence of the other. Both are aggregates, or names of aggregates: genus is the whole, of which species is a part. Suppose but one aggregate, either of these names may as well be applied to it as the other; or rather, and for the above reason, neither can with propriety be applied to it.
[* ] Thus it is, that, considered as distinct from the individuals contained in them, these aggregates, as above, are but fictitious entities:—the names, employed in the designation of them, so many names of fictitious entities. But, when compared with names of fictitious entities at large, these may be seen to have something peculiar in them, which, if he would avoid confusion and disputation, it seems necessary a man should have in mind. In this case, the same word which is employed to signify the fictitious entity, viz. the fictitious aggregate, is also employed to designate anyone of the individual real entities, of which that aggregate is regarded as being composed: an homonymy, which may be seen not to have place in the instance of any other sort of fictitious entity, such as a quality, a property, a relation, and the like. Nor let it be said, that, because it contains real entities, the aggregate, called a species, a genus, a class, is itself a real entity. For by the word plant, taking plant, for example, for the aggregate, are designated—not only all plants existing at the time of the speaking, or the writing of that word, but also all plants that ever have existed,—and all plants that ever shall exist in future,—and even all plants that, without existing, shall be but conceived to exist: and to these last, at any rate, the term real entity will hardly be regarded as properly applicable. But though, in addition to the several individual objects, to which the word plant is applicable, no real entity, corresponding to it, has place out of the human mind,—yet, within that receptacle, by this same name of a fictitious entity, a real entity—a general idea,—an entity, which though not corporeal, is not less real than that which is produced in it by the sight or touch of an individual plant,—is produced. To convince himself of this, the reader need but ask himself—whether, after, and by thus reading the word plant, his mind is not put in a state more or less different from that which it was in, before this word was read by him. If this be not enough, then let him say, for example, whether by the proposition, plants have a property which minerals have not, three distinguishable mental sensations at least—not to speak of any others—have not been produced in his mind: three perfectly distinct ideas, each of which is of that sort which is termed a general or abstract one. Yet, to some philosophers, it has, somehow or other, been matter of supposed discovery, that there are no such things as general or abstract ideas: not considering that, if this position of theirs were true, nothing that they say in proof of it would have so much as the least chance of being productive of the effect they aim at: or, to speak still more generally, scarcely would anything they say be productive of any more effect than would be produced by so much nonsense. Yes:—by the word plant, or the word plants, when read, an effect, a sort of feeling, or mental image, is as really produced, as by the sight of any individual plant,—and it is a clearly different one. In the one case it is an abstract idea; in the other case, an impression: but in the one there is just as much reality as in the other. Of the evidence of the existence of the general idea, the probative force is even nearer, and more promptly and surely satisfactory, than that of the existence of any individual plant, from which, by abstraction, that general idea was deduced. In the former case, the evidence is perception: in the other case, it is but inference—ratiocination: and that such ratiocination, as many an acute mind (Bishop Berkeley’s for instance) has not been satisfied with.
In speaking of genera and species, two sources of indistinctness and confusion, and (if observed) of perplexity, are continually presenting themselves. One is—the difficulty which, on the appearance of a generic or specific name, is found, in determining whether it is the fictitious entity—the aggregate itself,—or only the name employed for the designation of it—that, in the character of the subject of the proposition, the word is intended to bring to view. The other is—the penury and imperfection, under which language—the best constructed not excepted—still labours: viz. in respect of its furnishing no more than these two names, for the designation of the results of any number of ramifications, which, in a system of logical division, there may have been occasion to bring to view. Hence it is, that the same word, which, with reference to this or that other is a generic term, is specific with reference to a third. Hence again the continually recurring question—is this a generic or a specific name? and the dispute with what that question is pregnant, is altogether an interminable one.
[* ] In their present shape, the conceptions above brought to view would not have been formed, nor consequently would this section have been penned, but for a very recent glance cast on the Logic of Candillac. More than once, at different times, had that little work been glanced over, or at least glanced at: never without its presenting itself in the character of a mass of confusion, from which little or no information was to be reaped. Analysis is the name there given to the instrument, by which everything is there supposed to be done: everything by that one instrument; in every case that one instrument the same. Language-making was analysing: and “analysis itself was but a well-made language.” (Pp. 88, &c., 121, &c.) On looking at the work once more, observation was made of such passages, in which—always under this one name, analysis—an explanation is given of the mode, for the distinguishing of which the epithet primæval has herein-above been just employed. Now, for the first time, presented itself to view, matter which seemed capable of being put to use. A resolution was accordingly taken, to endeavour to derive such instruction as might be found derivable from it. Its claim to attention being now recognised, thus it was that, by a closer application of that faculty, those distinctions, which have above been seen, were brought to view. Logical analysis of the physical whole, logical synthesis, performed upon the qualities—upon the parts which had been produced by that logical analysis—these,—together with the logical analysis of those aggregates which were the products of that logical synthesis,—were, in the logic of Condillac, seen, all of them, designated by, and confounded together under, the one undiscriminating term analysis.—For the subject of the primæval analysis, Condillac, before he came to the plant, had employed a magnificently furnished château: for the present occasion, a couple of plants seemed quite sufficient, without any such encumbrance as the château. Moreover, of the sort of work here in question, abundance must have been done, before there were any such things as châteaux.
Yes, (says somebody;) and so there was before husbandmen’s daughters amused themselves with gathering flowers. The ancestors of husbandmen were shepherds: the ancestors of shepherds, hunters. In certifying this genealogy Geography joins with History.
Assuredly (it may be answered) man had need to provide food, before maidens had need to gather flowers. But, to provide food, man must, somehow or other, have been in being, and able to provide it. Here then the explanation would have been entangled in the mysteries of Cosmogony—a subject, which, besides its inexplicability, is altogether foreign to the present purpose. No doubt that, for attention, and thence for analysis,—to be performed, as above, upon these physical wholes,—and thence for synthesis, and thence for logical analysis, to be performed upon the logical wholes, results of these logical syntheses,—demands much more urgent, as well as much more early, must have been produced by eatable fruits and roots than ever can have been produced by flowers. But, by any such illustration, we should have been sent to the Garden of Eden: and of that garden no map being to be had, sufficiently particular for the present purpose, there we should have lost ourselves.
Pluming himself, as it should seem, upon the discovery, and bringing it to view as such thrice in two small 12mo pages, Condillac (pp. 114, 115) will have it, that languages are but so many analytic methods—methodes analytiques: meaning, as far as he can be said to mean anything, the results of so many analytic—purely analytic—processes. He sees not, that, so far from being an analytic process, the process, by which the principal and fundamental materials of all languages—viz. common names—are framed, is of a nature exactly opposite to that of analysis; viz. synthesis. True it is, that this synthetic is necessarily preceded by an analytic process: viz. by the one above explained under the denomination of the primæval or inerudite analysis:—a logical analysis performed upon physical wholes. True it also is that, to the wholes, which are the results of this synthetic process,—with the exception of those minimums, which are in immediate contact with individuals,—another analytic process may, to any extent, be applied, viz. the scientific or logical analysis, performed upon these logical wholes. But, how promptly soever they may succeed to each other, disaggregation and aggregation—putting asunder and putting together—never can be one and the same operation—never can be other than opposite operations: and, but for and by means of the aggregative process, not a single word—not a single instrument—would the philosopher have had, wherewith to put together this his not sufficiently considered account of the formation of language.
One of these days—the sooner the better—by a still closer application of the faculty of attention, a more discerning eye will, perhaps, discover and bring to light similar imperfections in the account given of the matter in these pages: and thus it is, that,—by still closer and closer application of that same faculty,—additional correctness, distinctness, and comprehensiveness, is given to man’s conceptions, in relation to each and every portion of the field of art and science.
Of the aggregations thus formed, some have been better made, others worse. Those which he regards as having been better made, were (he assures us) the work of Nature: those which were worse made, the work of learned men: meaning such whose labours in this line he saw reason to disapprove of. Nature being a sort of goddess—and that a favourite one—by ascribing to this goddess whatsoever was regarded by him as good, he seems to have satisfied himself, that he had proved the goodness of it: and, by so concise an expedient—an expedient, in the employment of which he has found but too many successors, as well as cotemporaries and predecessors—he has saved himself no small quantity of trouble.
Nature is a sort of fictitious personage, without whose occasional assistance it is scarce possible (it must be confessed) either to write or speak. But, when brought upon the carpet, she should be brought on in her proper costume—nakedness: not bedizened with attributes—not clothed in eulogistic, any more than in dyslogistic, moral qualities. Making minerals, vegetables, and animals—this is her proper work; and it is quite enough for her: whenever you are bid to see her doing man’s work, be sure it is not Nature that is doing it, but the author, or somebody or other whom he patronizes, and whom he has dressed up for the purpose in the goddess’s robes.
One word more, on the subject of a former topic, before this philosopher is parted with.—In § 7, p. 74, may be seen the result of the provisional attempt towards an enumeration of the distinguishable operations, and correspondent faculties, of the mind. In number they were seventeen: Condillac (ch. 7. p. 61) makes but six: viz. 1. Attention. 2. Comparison. 3. Judgment. 4. Reflection. 5. Imagination. 6. Ratiocination. It might be an exercise for a student—nor would it surely be a useless one—to compare these six with those seventeen:—to observe, whether, in this longer list, there are any articles that do not properly belong to it—and if not, whether Condillac’s shorter list be, in any particular, defective or not:—whether, for example, memory has not been forgotten by him:—and if not defective, in which of the articles of his shorter list those of the longer list are respectively comprised.
On considering the catalogue once more, it seems as if some such article as analogization or analogoseopy—i. e. observation of analogies might form a useful addition to it. Not but that, in the explanation thus given, the phrase, observation of analogies is already to be found. But,—so distinct from simple abstraction, analysis, and comparison are those abstractions, analysis and comparisons, which have observation of analogies for their result,—and so powerful and perhaps indispensable an instrument is the faculty so denominated in the hand of Invention,—that a separate denomination would, it should seem, be not ill bestowed upon it. Note, that to the above catalogue of the distinguishable operations and correspondent faculties of the human mind, the so-often-mentioned test of distinctness and all-comprehensiveness has not been applied. It is the result of no other operation than the analysis above distinguished, by the name of the primæval analysis: and (unless the title by which it is thus designated be regarded as the result of an act of synthesis) not subjected to any synthesis; nor consequently to any scientific analysis, as above distinguished.
Hence it cannot be given in any other character than that of a collection of raw materials, not so much as attempted to be made up into a finished work. The task was too heavy to be attempted in a parenthesis. But if, in the materials thus brought together, any addition should be found made to those which had already been brought together by other hands, it will be not altogether without its use.
[* ] According to that conception of the matter, which is here alluded to and assumed, entities are either real or fictitious: real, either perceptible or inferential: perceptible, either impressions or ideas: inferential, either material, i. e. corporeal or immaterial, i. e. spiritual. Material are those of which the principal divisions are exhibited in the Ramean tree: of such inferential real entities as are immaterial, examples may be seen in the Almighty Being, and in the human soul, considered in a state of separation from the body.
By fictitious entities are here meant, not any of those which will be presented by the name of fabulous, i. e. imaginary persons, such as Heathen Gods, Genii, and Fairies, but such as quality—property, (in the sense in which it is nearly synonymous to quality) relation, power, obligation, duty, right, and so forth. Incorrect as it would be, if the entities in question were considered as being, in point of reality, upon a footing with real entities, as above distinguished, the supposition of a sort of verbal reality, so to speak, as belonging to these fictitious entities, is a supposition, without which the matter of language could never have been formed, nor between man and man any converse carried on other than such as hath place between brute and brute.
Fictitious as they are, entities of this description could not be spoken of at all, if they were not spoken of as real ones. Thus a quality is spoken of as being in a thing or a person: i. e. the thing or the person is spoken of as being a receptacle, and the quality as being something that is contained in it.
As in the case of all words, which have an immaterial, as well as a material, the root of the immaterial will be found in the material import; so, to explain the nature and origin of the idea attached to the name of a fictitious entity, it will be necessary to point out the relation, which the import of that word bears to the import of one or more names of real entities: i. e. to show the genealogy, or (to borrow an expression from the mathematicians,) the genesis of the fictitious entity.
From the observation, by which, for example, the words duties and rights are here spoken of as names of fictitious entities, let it not for a moment so much as be supposed, that, in either instance, the reality of the object is meant to be denied, in any sense in which in ordinary language the reality of it is assumed. One question, however, may be ventured to be proposed for consideration, viz. whether, supposing no such sensations as pleasure or pain, duties would not be altogether without force, and rights altogether without value?
On this occasion, in the case of the name of a fictitious entity, a distinction requires to be made between the root of the idea, and the root of the word by which it is designated. Thus, in the case of obligation, if the above conception be correct, the root of the idea is in the ideas of pain and pleasure. But the root of the word, employed as a sign for the designation of that idea, is altogether different. It lies in a material image, employed as an archetype or emblem: viz. the image of a cord, or any other tie or band, (from the Latin ligo, to bind,) by which the object in question is bound or fastened to any other, the person in question bound to a certain course of practice.
Thus, for the explanation of a fictitious entity, or rather of the name of a fictitious entity, two perfectly distinct species of operations, call them paraphrasis and archetypation, will, in every case, require to be performed; and the corresponding sorts of propositions, which are their respective results, formed; viz. the paraphrasis, performing the function of a definition, but in its form not coinciding with any proposition to which that name is commonly attached.
The paraphrasis consists in taking the word that requires to be expounded—viz. the name of a fictitious entity—and, after making it up into a phrase, applying to it another phrase, which, being of the same import, shall have for its principal and characteristic word the name of the corresponding real entity. In a definition, a phrase is employed for the exposition of a single word: in a paraphrasis, a phrase is employed for the exposition of an entire phrase, of which the word, proposed to be expounded, is made to constitute the principal or characteristic word.
Archetypation (a word employed, for shortness, rather than archetypophantia, i. e. indication of the archetype or pattern) consists in indicating the material image, of which the word, taken in its primæval sense, contains the expression.
Thus, without being drawn out into form, (an operation for which a multitude of distinctions and discussions would be found requisite,) in the case of the word obligation, both the paraphrasis and the archetypation may be deduced from what is indicated above.
Rhizophantia, indication of the root, might serve as a common or generic term applicable to both.
To return to analysis. It is by an operation of the nature of analysis, primæval analysis, that the ideas, designated by the several names of fictitious entities, have been formed. Unfortunately, in the case of these fictitious objects, the description of the way in which the analysis must, or may have been performed, will be matter of much more difficulty than in the case of the above-mentioned real ones.
Not to leave the field of fictitious entities, and with it the corresponding part of the field of logical analysis, in the state of an utterly dark spot, thus much has here been hazarded: and here it is high time that what has been said on the subject of analysis should be brought to a close.
Unfortunately, here are not only new words, but these in a multitude, greater by the whole number than would have been employed, could the ideas intended have, at any cheaper rate, been conveyed. But he who, in any branch of art and science, ethics itself not excepted, is resolved not to have anything to do with new words, resolves by that very resolution to confine himself to the existing stock of ideas and opinions, how great soever the degree of incorrectness, imperfection, error, and mischievousness which may in those ideas and opinions happen to be involved.
One parting word in relation to D’Alembert: lest, from the indication given in a preceding section (§ 7,) of the imperfections observable in his Encyclopædical tree, any unduly unfavourable estimate of the instruction derivable from the philosophical works of that illustrious Frenchman, should be deduced.
With the exception of that which contains the Encyclopædical tree, the five volumes of Miscellanies, which comprise his philosophical works, had not been opened for some thirty or forty years, when, in expectation of finding in one of them the germ of what has here been said on the subject of fictitious entities, it was thought necessary to run over it.
In that particular the search has not been successful. But, in the course of it, ample ground has been seen for the conclusion, that although, with eyes closed by prudence, or rather by necessity, treading in the steps of his illustrious precursor, he, on that occasion, kept himself below the level of his own age, yet, on every succeeding occasion, he may be seen rising high above it.
In the two last of those five volumes are contained applications, successively, and everywhere more or less successfully made, of the all-comprehending and all-commanding art of Logic, to every subjacent part of the field of art and science.
By a recent but still imperfect review of it, (such as time and eyes would allow of,) much regret has been suggested at the thoughts of its never having yet, it is believed, been brought within the reach of the English reader: for even at the present comparatively advanced period, much useful instruction, as well as, to a comprehensive mind, much gratification, might surely be reaped from a critical perusal of it.
Consummate surely is the originality, the comprehensiveness, the penetration, the discernment, the moderation, the prudence, the elegance of expression, and, amidst surrounding dangers, the steersmanship manifested in that work. It is, for that age, what for the present generation the present work would have endeavoured to render itself, could any such endeavour have found a ray of hope to animate it. Of those volumes, the fourth has for its title, Essai sur lcs Elémens de Philosophie, ou sur les principes des Connoissances humaines: the fifth, under the name of Eclaircissemens, &c., contains supplements to some of the principal articles of the preceding Volume. It speaks of itself as having been written at the desire of Frederic the Great of Prussia. In a translation, the supplements might with advantage, it is believed, be worked up along with the original articles: and prefixed to both might be the contents of the first Volume of the five: viz. the preliminary discourse attached to the first French Encyclopædia, and the Preface to the third Volume of that great work.
On the subject of analysis, however, the conceptions of D’Alembert, (iv. 157, 257, 287, &c.) seem not much more correct than those of Condillac. By their manner of speaking of it one would think it was a sort of instrument by which everything is done. In general the attention paid by men of science to the Greek language, seems not to have been so general in France as in Britain, particularly as in England. Yet even in the Logic of Saunderson, who can scarcely be suspected of not being well conversant with Greek, the account given of analysis and synthesis, (for by him they are both spoken of.) has not been found a clear one. By an observation taken of the archetypal image, had this use of the correspondent operation been sufficiently understood, all this observation might have been prevented. In the case of every name of an immaterial object, the archetype is at once an index and a holdfast to the sense of it. In the case of every name of a fictitious entity, the only sure test of intellection is paraphrasis.
[* ] Some fourscore years ago, by David Hume, in his Treatise on Human Nature, the observation was, for the first time, (it is believed,) brought to light—how apt men have been, on questions belonging to any part of the field of Ethics, to shift backwards and forwards, and apparently without their perceiving it, from the question, what has been done, to the question, what ought to be done, and vice versá: more especially from the former of these points to the other. Some five-and-forty years ago, on reading that work,—from which, however, in proportion to the bulk of it, no great quantity of useful instruction seemed derivable, that observation presented itself to the writer of these pages as one of cardinal importance. To every eye, by which those two objects have not been completely separated from each other, the whole field of Ethics, in all those divisions of it, which the Table will show, must ever have been,—yea, and ever will be,—a labyrinth without a clue. Such it has been in general, for example, to the writers on International Law: witness Grotius and Puffendorf. In their hands, and apparently without their perceiving it, the question is continually either floating between these two parts of the field of Ethics, or shifting from one to the other. In this state of things, a name, which, such as Deontology, turns altogether upon this distinction—suppose any such name to become current, the separation is effectually made, and strong and useful will be the light thus diffused for ever over the whole field. That this distinction should, on every occasion, be clearly perceived, is (need it be observed?) the interest of the great bulk of mankind. Unfortunately, this most extensive interest finds opposed to it a cluster of particular interests, which, though so much narrower, being but the more concentrated, have ever been acting against it with proportionable advantage, and hitherto with irresistible effect. One day these particular interests will be recognised. On the present occasion, to attempt bringing them to view would be consistent neither with the unity of the design, nor, perhaps, with prudence.