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• Lectures On Political Economy.
• Part First.: of Political Economy Proper. (continued.)
• [continuation of Book Second.]: [of National Wealth.]
• [chapter III.]: [of Trade.]
• Sect. I.—: Of the Freedom of Trade.
• [sect. II.]—: Of the Corn Trade.
• [sect. III.]—: On Subjecting the Commerce of Money to the Regulation of Law.
• [sect. IV.—: On Subjecting the Commerce of Land to the Regulation of Law.]
• [chapter IV.]: Of Taxes.
• [sect. I.—: Of Taxes In General.—introductory.]
• [sect. II.]—: Taxes Upon Land. *
• [sect. III.]—: Taxes Upon the Rent of Houses.
• [sect. IV.]—: Taxes Upon Profit, Or Upon the Revenue Arising From Stock.
• [sect. V.—: Conclusion.]
• [book Third.]: [of the Poor—their Maintenance.]
• [chapter I.]: [historical Sketch of the Poor-laws.]
• [sect. I.—: Of the English Poor-laws.]
• Sect. II.—: Of the Scottish Poor-laws.
• [chapter II.]: [subsidiary Measures For the Relief of the Poor.]
• [sect. I.—: Of Charity Workhouses.]
• [sect. II.—: Of Benefit Clubs, Or Friendly Societies.]
• [sect. III.—: On the Distresses of the Poor, In So Far As They Proceed From Their Own Evil Habits.]
• [book Fourth.]: [of the Education of the Lower Orders.]
• [part Second.]: [of the Theory of Government, Or Politics Proper. * ]
• [chapter I.]: Of the Simple Forms of Government.
• [sect. I.]—: Introduction.
• [sect. II.—: Of the Simple Forms of Government In Special.]
• [chapter II.]: Of Mixed Governments.
• [sect. I.—: Of Mixed Governments In General.]
• [sect. II.—: On, In Special; and Particularly] of the English Constitution.
• Appendices to Parts First and Second.
• Appendix I.—: To B. II. Ch. III. § 3, P. 114.
• Quotation On the Exportation of Grain, From Howlett.
• Appendix II.—: To Part I., P. 326.
• A Conclusion of the First Three Books of Political Economy,—strictly So Called.
• Appendix III.—: To Part II., P. 452.
• An Earlier Conclusion of Politics Proper.

[SECT. IV.—

ON SUBJECTING THE COMMERCE OF LAND TO THE REGULATION OF LAW.]

(Interpolation from Notes.)—I proceed next, agreeably to the arrangement formerly laid down, [Political Economy, Vol. I. p. 45,] to make some remarks on the expediency of restraints on the Commerce of Land.

The pre-eminent importance of landed property, and the various effects connected with its distribution, will justify me sufficiently for treating of it separately from the other constituents of National Wealth. From the observations which I formerly had occasion to make, it appears how intimately this subject is connected with the advancement of that species of wealth which gives existence to all the others, furnishing to the various classes of manufacturers and artists, both the materials of their subsistence, and the rude materials on which their industry is employed. “Il faut cependant observer,” to borrow the words of a French writer, “que le laboureur fournissant à tous l’objet le plus important et le plus considérable de leur consommation, (je veux dire leurs aliments, et de plus la matière de presque tous les ouvrages,) a l’avantage d’une plus grande indépendance. Son travail, dans l’ordre des travaux partagés entre les différents membres de la Société, conserve la même primauté, la même pré-éminence qu’avait, entre les différents travaux qu’il était obligé dans l’état solitaire de consacrer à ses besoins de toute espèce, le travail qui subvenait à sa nourriture. Ce n’est pas ici une primauté d’honneur ou de dignité; elle est de nécessité physique. Le laboureur peut absolument parlant se passer du travail des autres ouvriers, mais aucun ouvrier ne peut travailler si le laboureur ne le fait vivre.”* This general proposition I endeavoured to illustrate in a former part of my course.† The remarks which I have now to offer, relate entirely to the policy of different nations, with respect to the distribution and commerce of landed property.

In the codes of the ancient legislators, one of the leading objects of attention appears to have been to secure as great an equality as possible in the appropriation of lands, by establishing various expedients to obviate the effect of those circumstances which have a tendency to disturb this equality.—For this purpose, Moses prohibited the perpetual alienation of landed property, and ordered that every fiftieth year, the land which had been sold during the preceding period should return to the former proprietor or his family.‡ —In the laws of the Athenians, we meet with a variety of provisions, plainly proceeding from the same views as influenced the Jewish legislator. Such were those which restricted the citizens in the power of making testaments,—those which established an equal division of property among the male children,—those which put it out of the power of the same person to succeed to two inheritances,—and many other regulations of a similar nature. On the subject of the laws of succession among the Greeks, a great deal of most important light has been thrown by Sir William Jones, in the Commentary annexed to his Translation of the Speeches of Isæus.

Among the ancient Germans, according to a passage in Tacitus, there appear to have been some regulations which tended to accomplish the same object, by a process still more simple and direct. The nation was considered as the proprietor of all the lands, which individuals held for a time; and at the end of each year, a new distribution of land was made, according to the varying circumstances of the population.* It is remarkable, as Mr. Hume observes in his History of England, that “among the Irish, as far down as the seventeenth century, land was divided in a similar way. If any of the sept died, his portion was not shared out among his sons, but the chieftain, at his discretion, made a new partition of all the lands belonging to that sept, and gave every one his share.”†

The earliest laws of the Romans deserve attention in the same point of view. By an examination of these, it is evident that their leading idea was to prevent the original number of proprietors from being diminished. This was more particularly the case with their laws relating to the succession of females, which have been very ingeniously illustrated by Montesquieu.‡

In modern times, the state of society which arose in Europe after the subversion of the western empire, gave rise to a very opposite policy, by suggesting as a necessary expedient against the rudeness and violence of the time, two institutions, which have both had a most extensive influence, not only on the distribution of land, but on the whole system of modern manners. These are the right of Primogeniture and the practice of Entails.

That a certain preference should be given by a parent to his first-born, who, in the order of nature, is marked out as the protector and guardian of his younger children, is so agreeable to the most obvious suggestions of the mind, that it is not surprising we should find traces of it in the history of the earliest ages. In the accounts of the primitive times, given in the Sacred Writings, the influence of the prerogative that has always been attached to seniority, is strongly illustrated by the stories of Jacob and Esau, and of Leah and Rachel. The same preference, too, occurs in the Pagan mythology, where, in consequence of this very circumstance, Jupiter is invested with the supremacy. This preference, however, does not seem to have existed among the Greeks, Romans, Britons, and Saxons, all of whom divided the land indiscriminately among the children. At Athens, the sons succeeded equally; but the daughters were endowed by their brothers. What share of the inheritance was allotted to the daughters, or whether it was regulated by any fixed rule, does not appear. Sir William Jones, in the learned Commentary mentioned above, thinks that this was left entirely to the affection and liberality of the brothers. By the Roman law, all the children, both male and female, were called equally to the inheritance of their father’s possessions.

From the custom of Gavelkind in Kent, which divides the land equally among all the sons, Selden concludes, that this was the general custom of the realm before the Norman Conqust, retained in this district, in consequence of the successful struggle which was made by the inhabitants to preserve their ancient liberties. The same opinion, also, is sanctioned by Sir William Blackstone.* Spelman, in his Glossary, under the word Gaveletum (Gavelkind,) refers the origin of this custom to Germany. “Prisca Anglo-Saxonum consuetudo e Germania delata, qua omnes filii ex æquis portionibus, patris adeunt hæreditatem; (ut filiæ solent, prole mascula deficiente.) Fratres similiter, defuncto sine sobole fratre; et nullo existente fratre, sorores pariter.” But it appears to be somewhat doubtful what the rules of succession in Germany really were. Mr. Barrington, in his Observations on the Statutes, with many others, follows on this point the opinion of Spelman, relying entirely on the following passage of Tacitus, which certainly does not warrant any such conclusion:—“Hæredes tamen successoresque sui cuique liberi: et nullum testamentum. Si liberi non sunt, proximus gradus in possessione fratres, patrui, avunculi. Quanto plus propinquorum, quo major adfinium numerus, tanto gratiosior senectus: nec ulla orbitatis pretia.”* It is not here said that the property was divided equally among the children, nor does it contain one expression at all inconsistent with the supposition, that the children first succeeded singly and in the course of their ages, in defect of these, the brothers, and on their failure, the uncles. On the other hand, another passage from Tacitus is quoted by Dr. Gilbert Stuart,† in proof of the right of primogeniture among them, which it seems to me impossible to explain away:—“Inter familiam, et penates, et jura successionum, equi traduntur: excipit filius, non, ut cetera, maximus natu, sed prout ferox bello et melior.” This testimony in favour of the eldest son, Dr. Stuart remarks, is the more strong, as being included in an exception to the general rule.

But whatever may have been the origin of the law of gavelkind, there cannot well be any diversity of opinion about its expediency as a political institution, more particularly when it is considered in connexion with that system of Political Economy which has been dictated by the circumstances of modern Europe. Of this, indeed, no proof more striking can be produced than the prosperous state of agriculture in the county where it still exists,—an effect which, as I mentioned formerly, [Vol. I. p. 168,] Mr. Arthur Young seems disposed to ascribe to the want of manufactures. The following information on this point, stated by Mr. Marshall in his Rural Economy of the Southern Counties, is extremely interesting and valuable:—“In the district of Maidstone, even among the tenantry, are found men of wealth and respectability; qualities for which the yeomanry of Kent have long been proverbial.

“Out of the Law of Gavelkind, this valuable order of men have principally risen. And seeing the present flourishing state of their county, after seven hundred years of experience, the wisdom of that law appears in a strong light. For although it has furnished the county with its present high state of society, with respect to the middle classes, it has not done away the gradations of rank, which appear to be necessary in every organized society.”*

Its moral tendency is illustrated by an anecdote mentioned by the same writer:—“Some years ago, in the district of Maidstone, a person, who died possessed of considerable property, left five sons, and a will, in which partiality to individuals was, of course, expected. Nevertheless, the brothers, harmonized by the influence of equal law, agreed, before the will was broken open, to inherit according to the natural law of their county; and the will was burnt with the seal unbroken.

“The operation of this equitable law in the instance under notice, has been highly favourable to society, which has thereby gained five wealthy, respectable, productive members,—yeomen of the higher class. Whereas, had the whole property devolved on one of them, even this one, probably, would have been rendered unprofitable to society, while the rest must have been thrown upon the world, to scramble for property in trade or the professions.”†

Another mode of succession, of which some traces still remain in England, is worthy of notice, as a yet more striking contrast to those ideas with which we have been familiarized by the prevailing laws and manners of modern Europe; I mean the custom of Borough-English, according to which the youngest son, and not the eldest, succeeds to socage tenements on the death of his father. Blackstone’s suggestion concerning the origin of this custom is not entirely destitute of probability.

“Perhaps a more rational account may be fetched (though at a sufficient distance) from the practice of the Tartars, among whom, according to Father Duhalde, this custom of descent to the youngest son also prevails. That nation is composed totally of shepherds and herdsmen; and the elder sons, as soon as they are capable of leading a pastoral life, migrate from their father with a certain allotment of cattle, and go to seek a new habitation. The youngest son, therefore, who continues latest with the father, is naturally the heir of his house, the rest being already provided for. And thus we find that, among many other northern nations, it was the custom for all the sons but one to migrate from the father, which one became his heir. So that possibly this custom, wherever it prevails, may be the remnant of that pastoral state of our British and German ancestors, which Cæsar and Tacitus describe.”*

What the circumstances were which first introduced the Law of Primogeniture in modern Europe, has been explained with great ingenuity by Mr. Smith in his Wealth of Nations.†

The obstacles which this institution opposes to the improvement of agriculture, have been so ably and distinctly pointed out by the same author, that I shall not here enter into the discussion. It is necessary that our speculations should apply as much as possible to the actual circumstances of the world, without regard to any ideal improvements of which they are susceptible. I cannot help, however, remarking, how much these restraints have a tendency to complicate the science of Political Economy, when studied with reference to our present situation. In truth, these are of infinitely greater moment than any restraints on the freedom of trade can possibly be; and while they exclude a variety of the general principles of the science from having an application to our present circumstances, others must, in consequence of their influence, as I apprehend, be admitted with great limitations. Some questions, too, of a very intricate nature, derive their origin entirely from the inconveniences which result from these discouragements of the natural distribution of land. Their influence, for instance, on the progressive cultivation of the soil, has rendered it necessary for the Legislature to interfere, for the accomplishment of that end, by a more indirect process than would otherwise have been necessary. In a commercial country, where there are no perpetuities, the attachment to land would be everywhere nearly proportioned to its intrinsic value; and a number of properties would be constantly brought to market, which would put an end to that monopoly price which land may be said at present to bear. Our existing institutions, by diverting small capitals from the purchase and improvement of land, contribute, more than any other single cause, to depress agricultural industry below the level of other employments of capital and labour.

In this manner, the free circulation of land would animate and invigorate the remotest extremities of the political body; while the natural course of human affairs would determine effectually those inequalities in the distribution of land and money, which are essentially connected with political subordination, and with the progressive improvement of the human mind. There is not, indeed, among all the different objects of policy, any one instance which illustrates more strongly the good sense of the old French maxim, Not to govern too much, than that of the history of landed property, fettered, among the ancients, by agrarian laws, and among the moderns, by institutions of an opposite tendency, and so seldom left to the operation of those natural causes which, wherever they have free scope, are found to be wisely and beneficently ordered for the improvement and prosperity of the human race. The Statute of Alienations, passed in the reign of Henry VII, is universally understood to have had a powerful influence on the subsequent progress, not only of agriculture, but of all the other arts; and however just Mr. Hume’s strictures may be on the motives which influenced that sovereign in the enactment of this law,* the great and beneficial consequences which have followed from his innovation on the former system, are indisputable. The Statute of Alienations, like all other wise improvements in legislation, accomplishes its end, not by giving any sudden shock to the prejudices and interests of the existing generation, but by giving natural causes a time and opportunity to operate, and by removing those artificial obstacles which check the progressive tendencies of society.

It may be proper to mention, before leaving this subject, that these general principles of Political Economy, though unquestionably just, as far as regards the wealth and population of a country, may probably require some limitation, when applied to an actually existing government such as ours, where an order of Nobility makes an essential part of the constitution. Some deviations from a perfectly free commerce of land may, in such cases, be expedient to secure the independence of hereditary legislators, and to accomplish whatever other purposes of their order may accord with the essential spirit of the constitution. It must never be forgotten, that wealth and population, though important objects of care, ought always to be regarded in their due subordination to those political arrangements on which the order of society depends. Even in such cases, however, the reasonable and equitable exception thus rendered necessary, should be carried no farther than the nature of the constitution requires.

To those who wish to prosecute this subject, I would recommend a perusal of a Sketch of the History of Entails by Lord Kames, subjoined to his Sketches. In the same publication you will find a proposal by that ingenious and public-spirited writer, for the gradual removal of this disorder, for such I must call it, the general scope of which is, to prohibit Entails for the future, and to delare those that had been already made, effectual only to such of the heirs as should be in existence at the date of the proposed Act. A similar declaration is suggested with regard to trust-deeds, without a restriction of which, Lord Kames says, that the other provision would be of little avail.* In conformity to the same wise and equitable respect for the interests of heirs actually existing, a committee was appointed, about fifty years ago, by a very respectable body in this country, the Faculty of Advocates, to frame such a Bill as that advised by Lord Kames. The general plan drawn up by the committee was very similar to that proposed by his Lordship; and according to the opinion of most persons at the time, the effect of this Bill, if passed into a law, would have been, that one half of the entails then existing would be sunk in twenty years, and nine-tenths of them in forty or fifty. A majority of the Faculty gave their sanction to this measure; but, in consequence of some circumstances, the detail of which would be uninteresting, the whole project, after it had excited much discussion, fell to the ground. That this, or some similar palliative of an evil so great and so rapidly progressive, would be soon followed by the happiest effects, it is impossible to deny.

To these very slight remarks on the Law of Entails, I shall make no apology for adding a few others on a subject to which it naturally leads the attention, though not immediately connected with the foregoing argument; I mean the question relative to the limits within which the power of Testamentary Succession should be confined by law. This, indeed, may be considered as a sort of digression from the plan to which I have confined myself, as it relates to movables equally with immovables. But the subject will be found, if I do not deceive myself, to reflect some additional light on certain general principles which have been already stated: at any rate, it will be useful by turning your thoughts to a political problem which has attracted the attention of many eminent persons among our contemporaries, and to which I shall have no other opportunity of attending before the conclusion of these lectures.

As the Law of Entails leaves too much to the fancy of the proprietor in regulating the succession to his property, so some modern politicians have gone into the opposite extreme, by affirming that individuals ought to have no power to dispose of their property, real or personal, by Will; and that all the rules of succession should be fixed by legislative authority. This seems to have been the opinion of Cocceii and of Turgot, and the same doctrine is maintained by the author of the Frederician code. It is not a little remarkable, that Sir William Blackstone has indirectly given his sanction to the equity of this project, by denying, not only that the right of testamentary bequests has any foundation in natural law, but by affirming that the case is the same with the right of succession of the children of a person deceased. “We are apt to conceive at first view, that this right has nature on its side; yet we often mistake for nature what we find established by long and inveterate custom. It is certainly a wise and effectual, but clearly a political establishment; since the permanent right of property, vested in the ancestor himself, was no natural, but merely a civil right.”* In so far as this reasoning rests on the supposition, that the personal right of property, vested in the ancestor himself, is not a natural one, I flatter myself, that it is sufficiently refuted by the observations which I have made in my other course, on the foundation of the right of property in the law of nature.† And as to the fact with respect to the right of inheritance, I believe it will be found, that the further back we carry our researches into the history of mankind, the stronger the general prepossessions of mankind will be in favour of the claims of children. With respect to the right of devising by testament, Sir William Blackstone’s assertion, although not so strikingly contradicted by the general prepossessions of mankind, will be found to be stated in much too strong and unqualified a manner. It is true, that wills do not exist among rude nations; for this plain reason, that it requires the aid of an established government to enforce the observance of them. But it does not appear from this that the right of testamentary bequest has no foundation in our sense of justice, any more than the respect paid by rude nations to the possessor in the case of stolen goods, proves that the right of property has no similar foundation. The truth, however, seems to be, that rude nations indirectly acknowledge the right of testamentary bequests, in the case, at least, of persons who have no children of their own, by the practice of adoption, which prevails almost universally in the rude periods of society, and which answers nearly the same purpose as disposing of property by will. It is, indeed, the only way, till regular government is established, by which it is possible to render a last will effectual; as, when it is resorted to, the property never wants a possessor.

It may be worth while to add to this remark, that in the earlier ages of society, the habits and associations produced necessarily by the circumstances and relations of domestic life, supply, in many cases, the want of municipal regulations, and of a strict police. When we look back to the accounts of the patriarchal times, recorded in the Sacred Writings, we find the religious reverence with which the parental authority was regarded securing to the death-bed injunctions of the head of the family, as complete an obedience as if he had still lived to enforce their execution.

Of this we have a fine instance in the conversation between the patriarch Jacob, and his son Joseph, recorded in the forty-eighth chapter of the Book of Genesis:—

“And Israel beheld Joseph’s sons, and said, Who are these?

“And Joseph said unto his father, They are my sons, whom God hath given me in this place. And he said, Bring them, I pray thee, unto me, and I will bless them.

“Now the eyes of Israel were dim for age, so that he could not see. And he brought them near unto him; and he kissed them, and embraced them.

“And Israel said unto Joseph, I had not thought to see thy face: and, lo, God hath shewed me also thy seed.

“And Joseph brought them out from between his knees, and he bowed himself with his face to the earth.

“And Joseph took them both, Ephraim in his right hand towards Israel’s left hand, and Manasseh in his left hand towards Israel’s right hand, and brought them near unto him.

“And Israel stretched out his right hand, and laid it upon Ephraim’s head, who was the younger, and his left hand upon Manasseh’s head, guiding his hands wittingly; for Manasseh was the first-born.

“And he blessed Joseph, and said, God, before whom my fathers Abraham and Isaac did walk, the God which fed me all my life long unto this day,

“The Angel which redeemed me from all evil, bless the lads; and let my name be named on them, and the name of my fathers Abraham and Isaac; and let them grow into a multitude in the midst of the earth.

“And when Joseph saw that his father laid his right hand upon the head of Ephraim, it displeased him: and he held up his father’s hand, to remove it from Ephraim’s head unto Manasseh’s head.

“And Joseph said unto his father, Not so, my father: for this is the first-born; put thy right hand upon his head.

“And his father refused and said, I know it, my son, I know it: he also shall become a people, and he also shall be great: but truly his younger brother shall be greater than he, and his seed shall become a multitude of nations.

“And he blessed them that day, saying, In thee shall Israel bless, saying, God make thee as Ephraim and as Manasseh: and he set Ephraim before Manasseh.”

In this beautiful picture of patriarchal manners, we have a proof, not only of the extent of the father’s power in regulating the succession to his property after his death, but in altering the rank and condition of his children, contrary to the arrangement pointed out by nature in the order of their birth, the religious reverence paid to his last injunctions, supplying the authority of laws and magistrates. We may remark also the effect of a very natural sentiment, in the peculiar latitude of bequest, which the patriarch found himself entitled to exercise with regard to that portion of his property which had been his own personal conquest.

“And Israel said unto Joseph, Behold, I die: but God shall be with you, and bring you again unto the land of your fathers.

“Moreover I have given to thee one portion above thy brethren, which I took out of the hand of the Amorite with my sword and with my bow.”

These observations may be of some use in correcting the erroneous conclusions into which writers on jurisprudence have been led by the vague idea which they annex to the phrase natural law,—a phrase which they sometimes employ to express the rules of justice in opposition to positive institutions, and sometimes to denote the practices of rude nations before the establishment of the power of the civil magistrate. That Sir William Blackstone himself has been partly misled by this circumstance, the following passage seems a sufficient proof:—“Wills and testaments, rights of inheritance and successions, are all of them creatures of the civil or municipal laws, and accordingly are, in all respects, regulated by them; every distinct country having different ceremonies and requisites to make a testament completely valid; neither does anything vary more than the right of inheritance under different national establishments.”*

If these reasonings were just, they would undoubtedly obviate one very strong objection to the project of Cocceii and Turgot, and would have the subject to be decided entirely on principles of political expediency; not that I think the ideas of these two ingenious writers could be vindicated even on such grounds, for if they were carried into effect, a variety of mischievous consequences seems unavoidable.

In the first place, the effect of such an arrangement would be to diminish the parental authority; a principle, however, which, on the other hand, notwithstanding its importance to the welfare of society, may undoubtedly be carried too far, and which it may be expedient to restrain within due bounds, by securing to children a certain proportion of their father’s effects, placed beyond the reach of the caprices and bad passions to which human nature is subject. The second effect would be to damp the spirit of industry, by rendering men indifferent about the acquisition of riches, and disposing them to spend them with indiscretion. The third is, the effect it would have in leading them to transfer their property to other countries, where the interests of the community, and the feelings of individuals, are treated with more respect.

I confess, too, it appears to me, notwithstanding what Blackstone has said on this subject, that our natural sense of justice, independently of any views of expediency, dictates, that the fruits of a man’s laborious industry, or what is the same thing in the present constitution of society, everything which is fully and completely his own property, he should be able to transfer by testament, agreeably to his own pleasure, a due provision being secured to those individuals whom he has been the means of bringing into the world, and to whom, independently of all considerations of their personal merit or demerit, he lies under obligations of the most sacred nature. But how far the right of bequest should extend in the case of landed property, is another question, upon which I do not presume to decide, any farther, than that it should not extend to any individuals who, at the death of the testator, were mere creatures of the imagination. Perhaps, as I hinted before, the principles of English jurisprudence on this head, even with all the disadvantages resulting from their institution of trust-deeds, which reprobates perpetuities, but allows the testator, as far as he sees proper, to exert the powers of bequest in favour of any heirs actually existing at the time, is as consonant as any other that can well be imagined, to those established habits of thinking and feeling, which, in the present state of the world, it is peculiarly incumbent on a wise legislator to respect; while, at the same time, its beneficial effects to society are incalculably great. Compared with our [the Scottish] system of policy in this respect, it leaves the commerce of land in a great measure free. With some slight restriction, therefore, the following sentiment of Sir William Blackstone is as just as it is elegantly expressed:—“The transmission of one’s possessions to posterity, has an evident tendency to make a man a good citizen and a useful member of society; it sets the passions on the side of duty, and prompts a man to deserve well of the public, when he is sure that the reward of his services will not die with himself, but be transmitted to those with whom he is connected by the dearest and most tender affections.”*

In the case of those who die intestate, these considerations do not apply. Here the arrangements of the Legislature are unembarrassed by the regard which is always due to the feelings, and even prejudices, which are interwoven with the national manners.

I could have wished to prosecute this subject a little farther, and to illustrate the happy effects which a general freedom of commerce and industry, in particular of landed property, produces on the moral and intellectual improvement of mankind. The field, however, is too extensive to be now entered on. I shall content myself, therefore, with remarking how widely the characters of men are diversified by the species of property to which they attach themselves, as well as by the proportions in which it is distributed among them. The various pursuits of private life are still more remarkable in the strongly contrasted manners of an agricultural and of a commercial nation. It is only in such a state of society as that in which we live, in which commerce, agriculture, and manufactures act and react upon each other, that the human character and genius can be completely developed. The inconveniences we labour under, which are comparatively few, arise chiefly from some legislative restraints, which might easily be removed, without injury to individuals, or damage to the state. Nor can there be a doubt, that the progress of human reason, which has already accomplished so much, will, gradually and slowly, correct these imperfections, and bring the established systems of Political Economy nearer and nearer to the order of nature.—(End of Interpolation from Notes.)

[CHAPTER IV.]

OF TAXES.

[* ] [Turgot, Sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses, § v.; Œuvres, Tom. V. p. 6.]

[† ] [Supra, Political Economy, Vol. I. (Works, Vol. VIII.) p. 258, seq.]

[‡ ] [Leviticus, xxv. 10.]

[* ] [Germania, cap. xxvi.]

[† ] [Chap. xlvi. James I.]

[‡ ] [Esprit des Loix, Liv. xxvii. Partie II. p. 167, ed. Genève, 1749.]

[* ] [Treatise on the Law of Descents: Law Tracts, Vol. II. pp. 189-248, orig. edit.]

[* ] [Germania, cap. xx.]

[† ] [View of Society in Europe; Authorities, Book I. chap. ii. sect. ii. p. 220, edit. 1778.]

[* ] [District of Maidstone, Division III. § ii.; Vol. I. pp. 53, 54, edit. 1798.]

[† ] [Ibid. pp. 54, 55.]

[* ] [Commentaries, Book II. chap. vi.; Vol. II. p. 83, fourteenth edition.]

[† ] [Book III. chap. ii.; Vol. II. p. 82, seq, tenth edition.]

[* ] [History of England, Chap. xxvi.]

[* ] [Sketches, Appendix, Sketch i.; Vol. II. p. 490, 4to edition.]

[* ] [Commentaries, Book II. chap. i.; Vol. II. p. 10, fourteenth edition.]

[† ] [Supra, Works, Vol. VII. pp. 260-273.]

[* ] [Commentaries, Book II. chap. i.; Vol. II. p. 12, fourteenth edition.]

[* ] [Commentaries, Book II. chap. i.; Vol. II. p. 10, seq., fourteenth edition.]