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CHAPTER XX.: OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS. - Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, vol. 2 
Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Notes selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and others, Barron Field’s Analysis, and Additional Notes, and a Life of the Author by George Sharswood. In Two Volumes. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893).
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OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS.
*[*280We are next, according to the plan I have laid down, to take into consideration the proceedings in the courts of criminal jurisdiction in order to the punishment of offences. These are plain, easy, and regular; the law not admitting any fictions, as in civil causes, to take place where the life, the liberty, and the safety of the subject are more immediately brought into jeopardy. And these proceedings are divisible into two kinds, summary and regular; of the former of which I shall briefly speak before we enter upon the latter, which will require a more thorough and particular examination.
By a summary proceeding1 I mean principally such as is directed by several acts of parliament (for the common law is a stranger to it, unless in the case of contempts) for the conviction of offenders and the inflicting of certain penalties created by those acts of parliament.2 In these there is no intervention of a jury, but the party accused is acquitted or condemned by the suffrage of such person only as the statute has appointed for his judge,—an institution designed professedly for the greater ease of the subject by doing him speedy justice, and by not harassing the freeholders with frequent and troublesome attendances to try every minute **281]offence. But it has of late been so far extended as, if a check be not timely given, to threaten the disuse of our admirable and truly English trial by jury, unless only in capital cases.3 For,—
I Of this summary nature are all trials of offences and frauds contrary to the laws of the excise and other branches of the revenue, which are to be inquired into and determined by the commissioners of the respective departments, or by justices of the peace in the country; officers who are all of them appointed and removable at the discretion of the crown. And though such convictions are absolutely necessary for the due collection of the public money, and are a species of mercy to the delinquents, who would be ruined by the expense and delay of frequent prosecutions by action or indictment; and though such has usually been the conduct of the commissioners, as seldom (if ever) to afford just grounds to complain of oppression, yet when we again(a) consider the various and almost innumerable branches of this revenue which may be in their turns the subjects of fraud, or at least complaints of fraud, and of course the objects of this summary and arbitrary jurisdiction, we shall find that the power of these officers of the crown over the property of the people is increased to a very formidable height.
II. Another branch of summary proceedings is that before justices of the peace, in order to inflict divers petty pecuniary mulcts and corporal penalties denounced by act of parliament for many disorderly offences, such as common swearing, drunkenness, vagrancy, idleness, and a vast variety of others, for which I must refer the student to the justice-books formerly cited,(b) and which used to be formerly punished by the verdict of a jury in the court-leet. This change in the administration of justice hath, however, had some mischievous effects; as,—1. The almost entire disuse and contempt of the court-leet and sheriff’s tourn, the king’s antient courts of common law, formerly much revered and respected. **282]2. The burthensome increase of the business of a justice of the peace, which discourages so many gentlemen of rank and character from acting in the commission, from an apprehension that the duty of their office would take up too much of that time which they are unwilling to spare from the necessary concerns of their families, the improvement of their understandings, and their engagements in other services of the public. Though if all gentlemen of fortune had it both in their power and inclinations to act in this capacity, the business of a justice of the peace would be more divided and fall the less heavy upon individuals; which would remove what in the present scarcity of magistrates is really an objection so formidable that the country is greatly obliged to any gentleman of figure who will undertake to perform that duty which, in consequence of his rank in life, he owes more peculiarly to his country. However, this backwardness to act as magistrates, arising greatly from this increase of summary jurisdiction, is productive of,—3. A third mischief, which is, that this trust, when slighted by gentlemen, falls of course into the hands of those who are not so, but the mere tools of office. And then the extensive power of a justice of the peace, which even in the hands of men of honour is highly formidable, will be prostituted to mean and scandalous purposes, to the low ends of selfish ambition, avarice, or personal resentment. And from these ill consequences we may collect the prudent foresight of our antient lawgivers, who suffered neither the property nor the punishment of the subject to be determined by the opinion of any one of two men; and we may also observe the necessity of not deviating any further from our antient constitution by ordaining new penalties to be inflicted upon summary convictions.4
The process of these summary convictions, it must be owned, is extremely speedy. Though the courts of common law have thrown in one check upon them by making it necessary to summon the party accused before he is *[*283condemned. This is now held to be an indispensable requisite,(c) though the justices long struggled the point; forgetting that rule of natural reason expressed by Seneca,—
A rule to which all municipal laws that are founded on the principles of justice have strictly conformed: the Roman law requiring a citation at the least; and our common law never suffering any fact (either civil or criminal) to be tried till it has previously compelled an appearance by the party concerned. After this summons the magistrate, in summary proceedings, may go on to examine one or more witnesses, as the statute may require, upon oath;6 and then make his conviction of the offender in writing: upon which he usually issues his warrant either to apprehend the offender, in case corporal punishment is to be inflicted on him; or else to levy the penalty incurred by distress and sale of his goods. This is in general the method of summary proceedings before a justice or justices of the peace; but for particulars we must have recourse to the several statutes which create the offence or inflict the punishment; and which usually chalk out the method by which offenders are to be convicted.7 Otherwise they fall of course under the general rule, and can only be convicted by indictment or information at the common law.
III. To this head of summary proceedings may also be properly referred the method, immemorially used by the superior courts of justice, of punishing contempts by attachment, and the subsequent proceedings thereon.
The contempts that are thus punished are either direct, which openly insult or resist the powers of the courts or the persons of the judges who preside there, or else are consequential, which (without such gross insolence or direct opposition) *[*284plainly tend to create a universal disregard of their authority. The principal instances of either sort that have been usually(d) punishable by attachment are chiefly of the following kinds: 1. Those committed by inferior judges and magistrates by acting unjustly, oppressively, or irregularly in administering those portions of justice which are intrusted to their distribution, or by disobeying the king’s writs issuing out of the superior courts by proceeding in a cause after it is put a stop to or removed by writ of prohibition, certiorari, error, supersedeas, and the like; for, as the king’s superior courts (and especially the courts of king’s bench) have a general superintendence over all inferior jurisdictions, any corrupt or iniquitous practices of subordinate judges are contempts of that superintending authority whose duty it is to keep them within the bounds of justice. 2. Those committed by sheriffs, bailiffs, gaolers, and other officers of the court, by abusing the process of the law or deceiving the parties; by any acts of oppression, extortion, collusive behaviour, or culpable neglect of duty. 3. Those committed by attorneys and solicitors, who are also officers of the respective courts, by gross instances of fraud and corruption, injustice to their clients, or other dishonest practice;8 for the malpractice of the officers reflects some dishonour on their employers, and, if frequent or unpunished, creates among the people a disgust against the courts themselves. 4. Those committed by jurymen in collateral matters relating to the discharge of their office, such as making default when summoned, refusing to be sworn or to give any verdict, eating or drinking without the leave of the court, and especially at the cost of either party, and other misbehaviour or irregularities of a similar kind; but not in mere exercise of their judicial capacities, as by giving a false or erroneous verdict. 5. Those committed by witnesses, by making default when summoned, refusing to be sworn or examined, or prevaricating in their evidence when sworn. 6. Those committed by parties to any suit or proceeding before the court, as by disobedience to any **285]rule or order made in the progress of a cause, by non-payment of costs awarded by the court upon a motion, or by non-observance of awards duly made by arbitrators or umpires after having entered into a rule for submitting to such determination.(e) Indeed, the attachment for most of this species of contempts, and especially for non-payment of costs and non-performance of awards, is to be looked upon rather as a civil execution for the benefit of the injured party, though carried on in the shape of a criminal process for a contempt of the authority of the court.9 And therefore it hath been held that such contempts, and the process thereon, being properly the civil remedy of individuals for a private injury, are not released or affected by the general act of pardon. And upon a similar principle, obedience to any rule of court may also, by statute 10 Geo. III. c. 50, be enforced against any person having privilege of parliament by the process of distress infinite. 7. Those committed by any other persons under the degree of a peer, and even by peers themselves, when enormous and accompanied with violence, such as forcible rescous and the like,(f) or when they import a disobedience to the king’s great prerogative writs of prohibition, habeas corpus,(g) and the rest.10 Some of these contempts may arise in the face of the court, as by rude and contumelious behaviour; by obstinacy, perverseness, or prevarication; by breach of the peace, or any wilful disturbance whatever: others in the absence of the party, as by disobeying or treating with disrespect the king’s writ, or the rules or process of the court, by perverting such writ or process to the purposes of private malice, extortion, or injustice; by speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges, acting in their judicial capacity; by printing false accounts (or even true ones without proper permission) of causes then depending in judgment; **286]and by any thing, in short, that demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect which, when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority (so necessary for the good order of the kingdom) is entirely lost among the people.
The process of attachment for these and the like contempts must necessarily be as antient as the laws themselves; for laws without a competent authority to secure their administration from disobedience and contempt would be vain and nugatory. A power, therefore, in the supreme courts of justice, to suppress such contempts by an immediate attachment of the offender results from the first principles of judicial establishments, and must be an inseparable attendant upon every superior tribunal. Accordingly, we find it actually exercised as early as the annals of our law extend; and though a very learned author(h) seems inclinable to derive the process from the statute of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I. c. 39, (which ordains that in case the process of the king’s courts be resisted by the power of any great man, the sheriff shall chastise the resisters by imprisonment, “a qua non deliberentur sine speciali præcepto domini regis;” and if the sheriff himself be resisted, he shall certify to the courts the names of the principal offenders, their aiders, consenters, commanders, and favourers, and by a special writ judicial they shall be attached by their bodies to appear before the court, and if they be convicted thereof they shall be punished at the king’s pleasure, without any interfering by any other person whatsoever,) yet he afterwards more justly concludes that it is a part of the law of the land, and, as such, is confirmed by the statute of magna charta.
If the contempt be committed in the face of the court, the offender may be instantly apprehended and imprisoned, at the discretion of the judges,(i) without any further proof or examination. But in matters that arise at a distance, and of which the court cannot have so perfect a knowledge, unless by the confession of the party or the testimony of others, if the judges upon affidavit see sufficient ground to suspect that *[*287a contempt has been committed, they either make a rule on the suspected party to show cause why an attachment should not issue against him,(j) or, in very flagrant instances of contempt, the attachment issues in the first instance;(k) as it also does if no sufficient cause be shown to discharge; and thereupon the court confirms and makes absolute the original rule. This process of attachment is merely intended to bring the party into court; and, when there, he must either stand committed, or put in bail, in order to answer upon oath to such interrogatories as shall be administered to him for the better information of the court with respect to the circumstances of the contempt. These interrogatories are in the nature of a charge or accusation, and must by the course of the court be exhibited within the first four days;(l) and if any of the interrogatories are improper, the defendant may refuse to answer it, and move the court to have it struck out.(m) If the party can clear himself upon oath, he is discharged, but, if perjured, may be prosecuted for the perjury.(n) If he confesses the contempt, the court will proceed to correct him by fine or imprisonment, or both, and sometimes by a corporal or infamous punishment.(o) If the contempt be of such nature that, when the fact is once acknowledged, the court can receive no further information by interrogatories than it is already possessed of, (as in the case of a rescous,)(p) the defendant may be admitted to make such simple acknowledgment, and receive his judgment without answering to any interrogatories:11 but if he wilfully and obstinately refuses to answer, or answers in an evasive manner, he is then clearly guilty of a high and repeated contempt, to be punished at the discretion of the court.
It cannot have escaped the attention of the reader that this method of making the defendant answer upon oath to a criminal charge is not agreeable to the genius of the common law in any other instance,(q) *[*288and seems, indeed, to have been derived to the courts of king’s bench and common pleas through the medium of the courts of equity. For the whole process of the courts of equity, in the several stages of a cause, and finally to enforce their decrees, was, till the introduction of sequestrations, in the nature of a process of contempt; acting only in personam, and not in rem. And there, after the party in contempt has answered the interrogatories, such his answer may be contradicted and disproved by affidavits of the adverse party: whereas, in the courts of law, the admission of the party to purge himself by oath is more favourable to his liberty, though perhaps not less dangerous to his conscience; for, if he clears himself by his answers, the complaint is totally dismissed. And, with regard to this singular mode of trial, thus admitted in this one particular instance, I shall only for the present observe that, as the process by attachment in general appears to be extremely antient,(r) and has in more modern times been recognised, approved, and confirmed by several express acts of parliament,(s) so the method of examining the delinquent himself upon oath, with regard to the contempt alleged, is at least of as high antiquity,(t) and by long and immemorial usage is now become the law of the land.
[1 ] As to summary proceedings in general, and the disposition of the courts, especially where no appeal is given, to require a stricter accuracy than is essential in other cases where there is a trial by jury, see 1 Stra. 67. Burn, J., tit. Convictions. 1 East, 649, 655. 5 M. & S. 206. 1 Chitty on Game Laws, 189 to 223.—Chitty.
[2 ] As to convictions in general, and the forms, see Paley on Convictions. Boscawen on Convictions. Burn, J., tit. Convictions. Chitty’s Game Law, vol. i. 189 to 223, and vol. iii. 37 to 132.—Chitty.
[3 ] See observations, Burn, J., tit. Convictions. 1 East, 649. Hence it has been a doctrine that a different rule of evidence as to the strictness of proof should be required in the case of proceedings on a summary information than in an action, (see 1 East, 649;) but that doctrine now seems to have been properly overruled, (1 East, 655. 1 M. & S. 206;) for if the legislature has thought fit to intrust magistrates or other inferior jurisdictions with the decision in certain matters, their proceedings ought to be governed by the same rules of evidence as affect superior courts.—Chitty.
[(a) ] See book i. page 319, &c.
[(b) ] Lambard and Burn.
[4 ] Unless a power of appeal be expressly given by the legislature, there is no appeal, (6 East, 514. Wightw. 22. 4 M. & S. 421,) as in proceedings against unqualified persons in the game-laws, (8 T. R. 218, note 6;) but the party has in general a right to a certiorari, to remove the conviction into the court of King’s Bench, unless that right be expressly taken away. 8 T. R. 542. But though it seems to be a principle that an appeal ought to be preserved in cases where the certiorari is taken away, yet in many cases, although there be no appeal, yet the certiorari is expressly taken away. Per Lord Mansfield, Dougl. 552. If a statute authorizing a summary conviction before a magistrate give an appeal to the sessions, who are directed to hear and finally determine the matter, this does not take away the certiorari even after such an appeal made and determined; and lord Kenyon said, “The certiorari, being a beneficial writ for the subject, could not be taken away without express words, and he thought it was much to be lamented in a variety of cases that it was taken away at all.” 8 T. R. 542. Where an appeal is given, the magistrates should make known to the convicted party his right to appeal, but if he decline appealing they need not go on to inform him of the necessary steps to be taken in order to appeal. 3 M. & S. 493. Upon an appeal the magistrates are bound to receive any fresh evidence, although not tendered on the former hearing. 3 M. & S. 133.
Upon a certiorari the conviction of the magistrate is removed into the superior court, but there is not (as upon an appeal) any rehearing of the evidence or merits; and the court can only look to the form of the conviction and see from that whether or not the party has been legally convicted, and the certiorari therefore operates in the nature of a writ of error, and no extrinsic objection to the proceedings can be taken. 6 T. R. 376. 8 T. R. 590. If therefore the magistrate, in order to sustain his conviction, should misstate the evidence or other proceeding before him, the remedy is by motion founded on affidavits to the court of King’s Bench for a rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, requiring the magistrate to state the whole of the evidence adduced before him correctly in his conviction, pursuant to 3 Geo. IV. c. 23. 4 Dowl. & R. 352. If a magistrate wilfully misstate material evidence he will be subject to a criminal information of indictment. 1 East, 186.—Chitty.
[(c) ] Salk. 131. 2 Lord Raym. 1405.
[5 ] “He who decides a case without hearing both parties, though his decision may be just, is himself unjust;” which is adopted as a principle of law by Lord Coke, in 11 Co. Rep. 99. A summons is indispensably required in all penal proceedings of a summary nature by justices of peace. Rex vs. Dyer, 1 Salk. 181. 6 Mod. 41; and see the cases collected in 8 Mod. 154, note(a). It is declared by Lord Kenyon to be an invariable rule of law, (Rex vs. Benn, 6 T. R. 198;) and it is stated by Mr. Serj. Hawkins to be implied in the construction of all penal statutes. 1 Hal. P. C. 420. So jealous is the law to enforce this equitable rule that the neglect of it by a justice in proceeding summarily without a previous summons to the party has been treated as a misdemeanour, proper for the interference of the court of King’s Bench by information, (Rex vs. Venables, 2 Lord Raym. 1407. Rex vs. Simpson, 1 Stra. 46. Rex vs. Allington, id. 678;) which has been granted upon affidavits of the fact. Rex vs. Harwood, 2 Stra. 1088. 3 Burr. 1716, 1768. Rex vs. Constable, 7 D. & R. 663. 3 M. C. 488. As this is a privilege of common right which requires no special provision to entitle the defendant to the advantage of it, so it cannot be taken away by any custom. Rex vs. Cambridge, (University,) 8 Mod. 163. Upon a sufficient information properly laid, the magistrates are bound to issue a summons and proceed to a hearing, and if they refuse to do so will be compelled by mandamus. Rex vs. Benn, 6 T. R. 195. The summons should be directed to the party against whom the charge is laid, and should in general be signed by the justice himself by whom it is issued. Rex vs. Steventon, 2 East, 365. Where a particular form of notice is prescribed by the act, that must be strictly pursued. Rex vs. Croke, Cowp. 30. The intention of the summons being to afford the person accused the means of making his defence, it should contain the substance of the charge and fix a day and place for his appearance, allowing a sufficient time for the attendance of himself and his witnesses. Rex vs. Johnson, 1 Stra. 260. A summons to appear immediately upon the receipt thereof has been thought insufficient in one case. 2 Burr. 681. In another, an objection made to the summons that it was to appear on the same day was only removed by the fact of the defendant having actually appeared, and so waived any irregularity in the notice. Rex vs. Johnson, 1 Stra. 261. It is equally necessary that it should be to appear at a place certain: otherwise the party commits no default by not appearing; and the magistrate cannot proceed in the defendant’s absence upon a summons defective in these particulars without making himself liable to an information. Rex vs. Simpson, 1 Stra. 46. It has been made a question whether the service of the summons must be personal. It seems in general necessary that it should be so, unless where personal service is expressly dispensed with by statute. Parker, C. J., was of that opinion. 10 Mod. 345. And the provisions specially introduced into many acts of parliament to make a service at the dwelling-house sufficient, seem to justify the inference that the law in other cases is understood to require a service upon the person. Where personal service is not necessary, leaving a copy at the house is sufficient, (Rex vs. Chandler, 14 East, 268;) and the delivery may be to a person on the premises apparently residing there as a servant. Id. ibid. These rules apply, however, only to those cases where the defendant does not in fact appear; for if he actually appears and pleads, there is no longer any question upon the sufficiency or regularity of the summons. 1 Stra. 261. Paley on Convictions, 2d ed. by Dowling, 21, 23.—Chitty.
[6 ] The magistrate has in general no authority to compel the attendance of witnesses for the purpose of a summary trial, unless where it is specially given by act of parliament. This in many cases has been done; and in sundry acts the provision is accompanied with a penalty on refusal to attend for the purpose of being examined. It seems agreed that the examination of witnesses must be upon oath, and that no legal conviction can be founded upon any testimony not so taken. There is a difference in the manner in which the acts are worded in regard to the mode of examination to be pursued; for while some acts expressly mention the testimony of witnesses on oath, others in general terms authorize the magistrate to hear and determine, or to convict or give judgment on the examination of witnesses without noticing the oath. But such general expressions seem in legal construction necessarily to refer to the only kind of testimony known to the law, namely, that upon oath. “For,” says Dalton, “in all cases wheresoever any man is authorized to examine witnesses, such examination shall be taken and construed to be as the law will, i.e. upon oath.” Dalt. c. 6, s. 6; and see id. c. 115, c. 164; Plowd. 12, a.; Lamb, 517; ex parte Aldridge, 4 D. & R. 83; 2 M. C. 120; Rex vs. Glossopp, 4 B. & A. 616; Paley, 33, 34. Although no mode of examination be pointed out by the statutes giving jurisdiction over the offence, yet, as justice requires that the accused should be confronted with the witnesses against him and have an opportunity of cross-examination, it is required by law, in the summary mode of trial now under consideration, that the evidence and depositions should be taken in the presence of the defendant where he appears. For though the legislature, by a summary mode of inquiry, intended to substitute a more expeditious process for the common-law method of trial, it could not design to dispense with the rules of justice as far as they are compatible with the method adopted. Indeed, it may be useful upon this occasion to notice the general maxim which has been laid down as a guide to the conduct of magistrates in regulating all their summary proceedings, namely, that “acts of parliament, in what they are silent, are best expounded according to the use and reason of the common law.” Rex vs. Simpson, 1 Stra. 45. Unless, therefore, the defendant forfeits this advantage by his wilful absence, he ought to be called upon to plead before any evidence is given. 1 T. R. 320. And the witnesses must be sworn and examined in his presence. Rex vs. Vipont, 2 Burr. 1163. Or, if the evidence has been taken down in his absence and is read over to him afterwards, the witness must at the same time, unless the defendant upon hearing the evidence should confess the fact, (Rex vs. Hall, 1 T. R. 320,) be resworn in his presence, and not merely called upon to assert the truth of his former testimony. Rex vs. Crowther, 1 T. R. 125. For the intent of the rule is that the witness should be subjected to the examination of the defendant upon his oath. 2 Burr. 1163; and see Rex vs. Kiddy, 4 D. & R. 734; 2 M. C. 364. This rule is confirmed rather than contradicted by those cases wherein convictions have been sustained without expressly alleging the evidence to have been taken in the presence of the defendant. Rex vs. Baker, 2 Stra. 1240. Rex vs. Aiken, 3 Burr. 1786. Rex vs. Kempson, Cowp. 241. For it will be found that in all those cases the judgment proceeded upon a presumption collected from the whole conviction that the defendant was in fact present and did hear the evidence given, which was always admitted to be necessary to the regularity of the magistrate’s proceedings. Rex vs. Vipont, 2 Burr. 1163; and see Rex vs. Lovat, 7 T. R. 162; Rex vs. Thompson, 2 T. R. 18; Rex vs. Swallow, 3 T. R. 284; Paley, 39, 40.—Chitty.
[7 ] These acts have been consolidated, and the duties of justices clearly defined, by the statute 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, which provides a procedure applicable to the great majority of cases in which a summary conviction or order may be made by justices of the peace out of sessions.—Kerr.
[(d) ] 2 Hawk. P. C. 142, &c.
[8 ] It is not, however, usual for the court to interfere in a summary way against an attorney for a mere breach of promise where there is nothing criminal, (2 Wils. 371; and see 2 Moore, 665. 1 Bingh. 102, 105;) or on account of negligence or unskilfulness, (4 Burr. 2060. 2 Bla. Rep. 780. 1 Chitt. Rep. 661,) except it be very gross, (Say, 50, 169;) nor for the misconduct of an attorney independently of his profession. Put see 4 B. & A. 47. 5 B. & A. 898. 8 Chitt. Rep. 58. 1 Bingh. 91. 7 Moore, 424, 437. Tidd, 5th ed. 81.—Chitty.
[(e) ] See book iii. page 17.
[9 ] By the insolvent acts, persons committed to prison upon an attachment for non-payment of money awarded to be paid upon a submission to an arbitration which has been made a rule of court, or upon an attachment for not paying costs, may have the benefit of that statute as insolvent debtors.—Chitty.
[(f) ] Styl. 277. 2 Hawk. P. C. 152. Cro. Jac. 419. Salk. 586.
[(g) ] 4 Burr. 632. Lords’ Jour. Feb. 7, June 8, 1757.
[10 ] But a peer cannot be attached for non-payment of money, pursuant to an order of nisi prius, which has been made a rule of court. 7 T. R. 171, 448.—Chitty.
[(h) ] Gilb. Hist. C. P. ch. 3.
[(i) ] Staund. P. C. 73, b.
[(j) ] Styl. 277.
[(k) ] Salk. 84. Stra. 185, 564.
[(l) ] 6 Mod. 73.
[(m) ] Stra. 444.
[(n) ] 6 Mod. 73.
[(o) ] Cro. Car. 146.
[(p) ] The King vs. Elkins, M. 8 Geo. III. B. R.
[11 ] Although the defendant acknowledges all the facts charged against him, yet it is the practice of the court to compel him to answer interrogatories, unless they are waived by the prosecutor. 5 T. R. 362.—Christian.
[(q) ] See book iii. pp. 100, 101.
[(r) ] Year-book, 20 Hen. VI. c. 37. 22 Edw. IV. c. 29.
[(s) ] Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 6, 3. 13 Car. II. st. 2, c. 2, 4. 9 & 10 W. III. c. 15. 12 Anne, st. 2, c. 15, 5.
[(t) ] M. 5 Edw. IV. rot. 75, cited in Rast. Ent. 268, pl. 5.