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BOOK XI - Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus 
The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, trans. Francis Hutcheson and James Moor, edited and with an Introduction by James Moore and Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008).
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1. These are the privileges of the rational soul: It contemplates itself: It forms or fashions itself in all parts: It makes itself such as it desires: * The fruit it bears, itself enjoys; whereas, others enjoy the fruits of vegetables and lower animals: It always obtains its end, whensoever the close of life may overtake it. In the dance, or the dramatic action, if by any thing interrupted, the whole action is made incomplete; but, as to the soul, in whatever part of action, or wheresoever, overtaken by death, the past action † may be a com-plete whole, without any defect. So that, I may say, “I have obtained all which is mine.” Nay, further, it ranges around the whole universe, and the void spaces beyond; views its extent; stretches into the immensity of duration, and considers and comprehends the periodical renovation of the whole. It discerns, also, that those who come after us shall see nothing new; and that our predecessors saw no more than we have seen. Nay, one who has lived but forty years, if of any tolerable understanding, has, because of the uniformity of all things, seen, in a manner, all that is past and future. These, too, are the properties of the rational soul: love to all around us; truth, and modesty; and the respecting nothing more than itself. Which, too, is the property of the * law. Thus, there is no difference between right reason and the † reason of justice.
2. You may be enabled to despise the delightful song, or the dance, or the admired exercises; if you divide the harmonious tune into its several notes, and ask yourself about each of them apart, “Is it this which so charms and conquers me?” For you would blush to own that. Do the like as to the dance, about each posture and motion; and the like about the exercises. In general, as to all things, except virtue, and the offices of virtue, remember to enure yourself to a low estimation of them, by running forthwith to their several parts, and considering them separately. Transfer the like practice to the whole of life.
3. How happy is that soul, which is prepared, either to depart presently from the body, or to be extinguished, or dispersed, or to remain along with it! But, let this preparation arise from its own judgment, and not from mere obstinacy, like that of the ‡ Christians;2 that you may die considerately, with a venerable composure; so as even to persuade others into a like disposition; and without noise, or ostentation.3
4. Have I done any thing social and kind? Is not this itself my advantage § ? Let this thought always occur; and never cease to do such actions.
5. What art do you profess? To be good. And, how else is this to be accomplished, but by the great maxims about the nature of the whole, and about the peculiar ** structure and furniture of human nature?
6. Tragedies were, at first, introduced, as remembrancers of the events which frequently happen, and must happen, according to the course of nature; and to intimate, that, such events, as entertain us on the stage, we should, without repining, bear upon the greater stage of the world. You see that such things must be accomplished; and, that those per-sons could not avoid bearing them, who made the most dismal exclamations, “* Alas Cithoeron!” Our dramatic poets have many profitable sayings; such as that, especially,
And such like.5
To tragedy succeeded the antient comedy; using a very instructive liberty of speech; and, by open direct censure, humbling the pride of the great. To this end, Diogenes used something of the same nature. Next, consider well, for what purpose the middle comedy, and the new, was introduced;6 which, by degrees, is degenerated, from the moral view, into the mere ingenuity of artifi-cial imitation. ’Tis well known, however, that they, too, contain many useful admonitions. But, consider for what † purpose this whole contrivance of poetry, and dramatical pieces, was intended.
7. How manifest is it, that ‡ no other course of life was more adapted to the practice of philosophy than that you are engaged in?
8. A branch broken off from that branch to which it adhered, must necessarily be broken off from the whole tree. Even thus, a man broken off from any fellow-man, has fallen off from the social community. A branch must always be broke off by the force of something else: But, a man breaks off himself from his neighbour, by hatred or aversion; and is not aware that he thus tears off himself from the whole political union. But, this is the singular gift of Jupiter, who constituted this community, to mankind, that we may again re-unite in this continuity, and grow together, and become natural parts, completing the whole. Yet, such separations, happening often, make the reunion and the restitution more difficult. In general, there is a considerable difference, between a branch which has always grown along, and conspired, with the tree; and one which has been broken off, and ingrafted again. Of these, say the gardeners, they may * make one tree in appearance with the stock, but not make an uniform whole with it.9
9. They who oppose you, in your progress according to right reason; as they cannot force you to quit the sound course of action; so, let them not turn you off from your kind affections toward themselves. Vigilantly persist in both these; not only in the stable judgment and practice, but in all meekness toward those who attempt to hinder you, or otherwise give you trouble. ’Tis a sign of weakness, either to be enraged at them, or desist from the right practice, and give up yourself as defeated. Both are deserters from their post, the coward, and he who is alienated in affection from one by nature a-kin to him, and who ought to be beloved.
10. Nature cannot be inferior to art: The arts are but imitations of nature. If so, that nature which is of all others the most complete, and most comprehensive, cannot be inferior to the most artificial contrivance. Now, all arts subject and subordinate the less excellent to that which is more excellent. The universal nature must do the same. Hence the original of * Justice; and from Justice spring the other virtues. Justice cannot be preserved, if we are anxiously sollicitous about indifferent things, or are easily deceived, rash in assent, or inconstant.
11. If those things which occasion you such disturbance in the keen pursuits or dread of them, don’t advance to you, but you advance toward them; restrain your judgments about them, and they will stand motionless; and you will neither pursue nor dread them.
12. The soul is as a polish’d sphere, when it neither † extends itself to any thing external, nor yields inwardly to it, nor is compressed in any part; but shines with that light which discovers both the truth in other things, and that ‡ within itself.
13. Does any one despise me? Let him see to it. I shall endeavour, not to be found acting or speaking any thing worthy of contempt. Does any one hate me? Let him see to it. I shall be kind and good-natured toward all; and even ready to shew to this man his mistakes: not to upbraid him, or make a shew of my patience; but from a genuine goodness; as § that of Phocion,10 if he was truly sincere. Such should be your inward temper; so that the Gods may see you neither angry, nor repining at any thing. For what can be evil to you, if acting what suits your nature? Won’t thou bear whatever is now seasonable to the nature of the universe, O man! Thou, who art formed to will that every thing should happen which is convenient for the whole.
14. Such as despise each other, yet are fawning on each other. Such as strive to surpass each other, are yet * subjecting themselves to each other.
15. How rotten and insincere are these professions: “I resolve to act with you in all simplicity and candor.” What are you doing, man? What need you tell us this? It will appear of itself. This profession should appear written in the fore-head: your temper should sparkle out in your eyes; as the person beloved discerns the affection in the eyes of the lover. The man of simplicity and goodness should, in this, resemble such as have a disagreeable smell in their arm-pits; his disposition should be perceived by all who approach him, whether they will or not. The ostentation of simplicity is like a dagger for insidious designs. Nothing is more odious than the friendship of the † wolf. Shun this above all things. The man of real goodness, simplicity, and kindness, bears them in his eyes, and cannot be unobserved.
16. The power of living well is seated in the soul; if it be indifferent toward things which are ‡ indifferent. It will obtain this indifference, if it examines them well in their parts, as well as in the whole; and remembers that none of them can form opinions in us, nor approach to us; but stand still, without motion. These judgments we form ourselves, and as it were inscribe them in ourselves. We may prevent this inscription; or, if it lurks within, unawares, immediately blot it out. ’Tis but for a short time we shall need this vigilance. Our life shall presently cease. Where is the great difficulty of keeping these things right? If the opinions are according to nature, rejoice in them; they will sit easy. If they are contrary to nature, examine what it is that suits your nature; and quickly haste after it, tho’ attended with no glory. A man is always excused, in pursuing his own proper good.
17. [Consider] whence each thing arose; of what compounded; into what changed; what the causes of the change; and that it suffers no evil.
18. [As to those who offend me, let me consider,] first, how I am related to them; that we were formed for each other; that, in another respect, I was set over them [for their defence,] as the ram over the flock, and the bull over the herd. Ascend yet higher. There is either an empire of atoms, or an intelligent nature governing the whole. If this latter, * the inferior natures are formed for the superior, and the superior for each other.
Again, consider † what sort of men they are at table, in bed, and elsewhere; how necessarily they are influenced by their own maxims; and with ‡ what high opinions of their own wisdom they entertain them.
Thirdly, that, if they do right, you ought not to take it ill; if wrong, sure ’tis § unwillingly and ignorantly. ’Tis unwillingly, that any soul is deprived of truth, by erring; or of justice, by a conduct unsuitable to the object. How uneasy is it to them to be reputed unjust, insensible, covetous, or injuriously offensive to all around them?
Fourthly, that ** you have many faults of your own, and are much such another. And, that, though you abstain from some such crimes, yet you have a like strong inclination; however from fear, or concern about your character, you abstain from them.
Fifthly, †† you are not sure they have done wrong. Many things may be done justly, with another intention than you imagine, on some singular occasions. A man must be well informed of many points, before he can pronounce surely about the actions of others.
Sixthly, when your anger and resentment is highest, remember human life is but for a moment. We shall be all presently stretched out dead corpses.
Seventhly, that ’tis not the action of others, which disturbs us. Their actions reside in their own souls. Our opinions alone disturb us. Away with them; remove the notion of some terrible evil befallen you, and the anger is gone. How shall I remove it? By considering that what befalls you, has no moral turpitude: And, if you allow any thing else to be * evil, you must fall into many crimes, may become a robber, or one of the worst character.
Eighthly, what worse † evils we suffer by anger and sorrow for such things, than by the things themselves, about which those passions arise.
Ninthly, that meekness is invincible, where it is genuine, and sincere without hypocrisy. For, what can the most insolent do to you, if you stedfastly persist in kindness to him, and, upon occasion, mildly admonish and instruct him thus, at the very time he is attempting to do you an injury? “Don’t do so, my son! Nature formed us for a quite different conduct. You cannot hurt me; you hurt yourself, my son!” and shew him tenderly, and in general, that it is so; that bees, and other tribes of animals, don’t thus behave to their fellows. But, this must be done without scorn or reproach; with a genuine good-will; and with a calm mind, not stung with the in-jury, without ostentation of your philosophy, or any view to draw admiration from spectators; but as designed for him alone, altho’ others may be present. Remember these nine topics, as gifts received from the muses; and begin at length to become a man, for the rest of life. But guard against flattering men, as well as being angry with them: Both are unsociable, and lead to mischief. And, in all anger, recollect, that wrath is not the manly disposition; that calm meekness, as it more becomes the rational nature, so, it is more manly. Strength, and nerves, and fortitude, attend this disposition, and not the wrathful and repining: the nearer this disposition approaches to an immunity from passion, the nearer is it also to strength and power. As sorrow is a weak passion, so is anger: Both have received the wound, and yield to it.
If you want a tenth gift from the president, [or, leader,] of the muses; take this: that, to expect bad men should not commit faults, is madness: ’Tis demanding an impossibility. To allow them to injure others, and demand they should not injure you, is foolish and * tyrannical.
19. These † four dispositions of the soul you should chiefly watch against; and, if discovered, blot them out; by saying thus concerning each of them. “This appearance is not certain evidence. This disposition tends to dissolve the social community. You could not say this from the heart: Now you must repute it the most absurd thing, to speak not according to your own heart.” And, fourthly, [suppress] whatever you are conscious is the part of one who is defeated, and subjects the diviner part to the more dishonourable and mortal, the body, and its grosser passions.
20. The aerial and etherial parts in your composition, tho’ they naturally ascend; yet, obedient to the order of the whole, they are retained here in the compound. The earthy and humid parts, tho’ they naturally descend; yet are raised, and stand erect, tho’ not their natural situation. Thus, the elements, wheresoever placed by the superior power, obey the whole; waiting till the signal be given for their dissolution. Is it not grievous, that the intellectual part alone should be disobedient, and fret at its situation? Nor is there any thing violent and opposite to its nature imposed upon it; but all according to its nature; and yet, it cannot bear them, but is carried away in a contrary course: For, all its motions toward injustice, debauchery, sorrows, and fears, are so many departures from its nature. And, when the soul frets at any event, it is deserting its appointed station. It is formed for holiness and piety toward God, no less than for justice. Nay, these are branches of * social goodness; yea, rather more venerable than any of the branches of justice toward men.
21. He who has not proposed one constant end of life, cannot persist one and the same in the whole of life. But, that is not enough: you must examine this also; what that end or purpose ought to be. For, as the same opinion is not entertained concerning all those things which to the vulgar appear good, but only concerning some of them, such as are of public utility; so, your end proposed must be of the social and political kind. For, he alone who directs all his pursuits to such an end, can make all his actions uniform, and in this manner ever remain the same man.
23. Socrates called the maxims of the vulgar hob-goblins, and terrors only for children.19
24. The Spartans, at their public shows, appointed the ‡ seats for foreigners in the shade; but sat themselves any where, as they happened.
25. Socrates made this excuse, for not going to Perdiccas upon his invitation: “lest,” says he, “I should perish in the worst manner; receiving kindnesses, for which I cannot make returns.”20
27. The Pythagoreans recommended to us, in the morning, to view the heavens, to put us in mind of beings which constantly go on executing their proper work; and of order, and purity, and naked simplicity; for, no star hath a vail.
28. Consider what ** Socrates appeared, dressed in a skin; when Xantippe had gone abroad dressed in his cloaths; and with what pleasantries he detained his friends, who seemed ashamed to see him in that dress, and were retiring.23
29. In writing, or in reading, be first taught yourself, before you pretend to teach others. Observe this much more in life.
31. “And my heart laugh’d within me—.”25
32. “Virtue herself they blame with harshest words.”26
33. ’Tis madness to expect figs in winter; so it is, to expect to retain a child, when [fate] allows it not.27
34. Epictetus advises that when a father is fondly kissing his child, he should say within himself, “he is, perhaps, to die to morrow.”28 Words of bad omen, say you. Nothing is of bad omen, says he, which intimates any of the common works of nature. Is it of bad omen, to say corn must be reaped in harvest?
35. The unripe grape, the ripe, and the dryed. All things are changes, not into nothing, but into that which is not at present.29
36. “None can rob you of your good intentions,” says Epictetus.30
37. He tells us also,31 we must find out the true art of assenting; and, when treating of our pursuits, that we must have a power of restraining them: That we may form every purpose with † reservation; take care they be kind and social, and proportioned to the worth of the object: That, for keen desires, we should restrain them altogether, and have no aversion to what depends not on our power.
39. What do you desire? Says Socrates, to have the souls of rational creatures, or brutes? Rational, surely. What sort of rational, of the virtuous or vicious? Of the virtuous. Why, then, don’t you seek after them? Because we have them already. Why, then, are you fighting with each other, and at variance?33
[* ] See IX. 10.
[† ] As the supreme excellence of the rational soul is, according to the Stoics, an entire conformity to the will of the presiding mind, or agreement with nature; and this is their supreme and only happiness: He who acts well the part appointed to him, whether a long or a short one, has attained to the greatest happiness and perfection of his nature. Hence their paradox that “length of time is of no importance to happiness.” All obstacles to our designs about external things, afford new occasions of the best actions, those which are most conformable to nature: Such as resignation to the will of God; good-will toward those who oppose us; submission to any distresses, or to an early death, happening by the divine providence. And thus our part may always be complete.1
[* ] See X. 25.
[‡ ] It is no wonder an heathen emperor should thus speak of the Christians. It is well known that their ardour for the glory of martyrdom was frequently immoderate; and was censured even by some of the primitive fathers. This is no dishonour to christianity, that it did not quite extirpate all sort of human frailty. And there is something so noble in the stedfast lively faith, and the stable persuasion of a future state, which must have supported this ardour, that it makes a sufficient apology for this weakness, and gives the strongest confirmation of the divine power accompanying the Gospel.
[§ ] See the end of the IX. book.
[** ] This, as it was often mentioned already, is such as both recommends to us all pious veneration and submission to God, and all social affections; and makes such dispositions our chief satisfaction and happiness.
[† ] I suppose, to make us see, that many calamities, unlucky accidents, crimes, frauds, oppressions, and cunning artifices, are to be expected in the world; and to make them so familiar to us, that we shall not be much surprised, or lose presence of mind, and proper self-command and recollection, when they happen.
[‡ ] This is an amiable notion of providence, that it has ordered for every good man that station of life, and those circumstances, which infinite wisdom foresaw were fittest for his solid improvement in virtue, according to that original disposition of nature which God had given him.8
[* ] There is great difficulty in ascertaining the text here, and apprehending well what is intended by the terms of gardening alluded to. In general, ’tis the author’s intention to shew how much a continued innocence of manners is preferable to even the most thorough repentance after gross vices; as to the inward tranquillity, and uniform satisfaction, of the soul with itself. To this refer many thoughts in the former books, about the advantage of “being always straight and upright, rather than one rectified and amended.”
[* ] The grand point of justice is the highest love to the supreme goodness and excellence, and resignation to infinite wisdom; and, next to this, a steddy obedience to his will, in all acts of beneficence and goodness to our fellows. See X. 12.11
[† ] That is, as it were, stretching into length by desires, or admitting other things to stick to it by too eager and passionate fondness or anxiety, or yielding and sinking under the pressure of external evils. See VIII. 41.
[‡ ] As the most important practical truths are found out by attending to the inward calm sentiments or feelings of the heart: And this constitution of heart or soul is certainly the work of God, who created and still pervades all things; it is just and natural to conceive all divine and social dispositions as the work of God: all the great moral maxims deeply affecting the soul, and influencing the conduct, are the illumination of God, and a divine attraction toward himself, and that way of life he requires.Ille Deo plenus—Haeremus cuncti superis. Temploque tacente,Nil facimus non sponte Dei: nec vocibus ullisNumen eget: dixitque semel nascentibus auctorQuidquid scire licet.Lucan. lib. IX.12
[§ ] The story alluded to, is uncertain. Phocion was of the sweetest and calmest temper.
[* ] By desiring to obtain their applause, or fretting when disappointed: or by such passionate emulation or envy, as occasions a great deal of pain when another succeeds in his designs.
[* ] This consideration should have great power in restraining all anger, malice, or envy: As no event happens but by the permission of sovereign goodness: and as the great command of this supreme goodness, intimated in the very constitution of nature, is, that all intelligent beings should love and do good to each other.15
[† ] This thought leads us to pity the mistakes and errors of others, because of their ignorance; and has frequently occurred before.
[‡ ] See IX. 34.
[§ ] See above, II. 1. and VIII. 14. with the places referred to there.
[** ] See X. 30.
[†† ] This explains IX. 38.
[* ] This reasoning is frequent among the Stoics. If other things are reputed evils beside vices, say they, some high degrees of these natural evils impending may overpower our virtuous resolutions. If we dread pain, poverty, or death, as great evils; in order to avoid them, we may be tempted to acts of injustice, to break our faith, or desert our duty to our friends or our country.
[† ] Rashness of assent, anger, insincerity, sensuality.
[* ] The Stoics speak of the universe, as a great society or state made up of Gods and men, and therefore obedience and resignation is a piece of justice to the governours of this state, See B. V. 22.
[‡ ] This shews how manly it is to be enured to hardships, and to bear heat or cold; or is designed as an instance of courtesy.
[§ ] Or, in the Ephesian commentaries; the Greek text is suspected.
[** ] This story is not preserved to us.
[* ] The design of these citations is uncertain. The first may serve as an admonition to submit to providence. The second, to place our joy in virtue, and not in external things. The third, to make us easy under reproach.
[1.] See the editors’ introduction, pp. xxi–xxii.
[2.] This is Marcus’s only explicit reference to Christians in the Meditations (if it is not a later interpolation). As Gataker recognized (1697, p. 386), Marcus is referring to the stubbornness with which Christians refused to sacrifice to the emperor, which seemed to be tantamount at times to voluntary martyrdom.
[3.] See also “The Life of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus,” pp. 19–23, for further considerations by Hutcheson in mitigation of the charge made against Marcus Aurelius that he was guilty of persecuting Christians. See also the editors’ introduction, p. xxiv.
[4.] The relevant note is found at bk. X, art. 11, pp. 124–25.
[5.] For the sources of these quotations, which Marcus also quotes in bk. VII, arts. 38–41, see the endnotes, pp. 179–80nn6–9.
[6.] The major surviving figure of Old Comedy is Aristophanes; Middle Comedy is almost entirely lost; New Comedy is represented by Menander. Diogenes is the Cynic philosopher of the fourth century (see the endnotes, bk. VIII, p. 181n3). Shaftesbury juxtaposed the first sentence of this article with the three sentences preceding this note to illustrate the “natural and gradual refinement of styles and manners among the ancients,” in “Soliloquy or Advice to an Author,” in Characteristics, ed. Klein, p. 21. Moreover, the writers of comedy served “as a sort of counter-pedagogue against the pomp and formality of the more solemn writers”: Ibid., p. 113n. Hutcheson’s understanding of this article was different and more Stoical. It was that poetry and drama make us familiar with calamities so that we will not lose self-command when they happen. See bk. XI, art. 6, the daggered note on p. 135.
[7.] Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus 1391 (Loeb ed., vol. I, pp. 468–69).
[8.] See bk. VII, art. 57, p. 91n, where Hutcheson writes: “For, a man who desires only what God destines him, can never be disappointed; since infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, must always accomplish its designs; and, as he [God] loves all his works, every event ordered by him, must be best for the whole, and for the individuals to which it happens.” Hutcheson had not replaced fate (or predestination) with benevolence: he thought rather that acting in a manner consistent with predestination or the divine plan was the most effective way to promote benevolence or the universal happiness. See also bk. XI, art. 18, p. 139, and the editors’ introduction pp. xxi–xxii.
[9.] See bk. I, art. 12, p. 28: “He [Claudius Maximus] taught me, not to be easily astonished or confounded with any thing, never to seem in a hurry, nor yet to be dilatory, or perplexed, without presence of mind, or dejected, fretful, angry, or suspicious; and to be ready to do good to others, to forgive, and to speak truth; and in all this, to appear rather like one who had always been straight and right, than ever rectified or redressed.”
[10.] Phocion “the good,” fourth-century Athenian general and politician, noted for his uprightness, condemned to death by the Athenians in 318 bc From the many anecdotes about Phocion’s forbearance, Marcus may be referring to his injunction, just before he drank the hemlock, to his son, that he should “cherish no resentment against the Athenians” (Plutarch, Phocion, chap. 36, sec. 3). Plutarch’s Lives, Loeb ed., vol. VIII, pp. 228–31.
[11.] The correct reference is bk. X, art. 11, p. 124.
[12.] Lucan, The Civil War, IX.564 and 573–76 (Loeb ed., pp. 546–49): “Cato, inspired by the god whom he bore hidden in his heart” [said] “We men are all inseparable from the gods, and, even if the oracle be dumb, all our actions are predetermined by Heaven. The gods have no need to speak: for the Creator told us once for all at our birth whatever we are permitted to know.”
In Lucan’s Pharsalia, a narrative epic of the civil war between the legions of Pompey and of Julius Caesar, the above lines contain the Stoical response of Cato to a request put to him by his lieutenant, Labienus, who had urged Cato to consult an oracle to learn what virtue is and to obtain from the oracle a description of an honorable man. Cato was offended by the request; he was himself the model of virtue and honor that Labienus hoped the oracle would describe. David Hume had quoted Labienus’s request to Cato in an epigraph prefaced to book III of A Treatise of Human Nature (1740).
Hutcheson in turn found it apposite to quote Cato’s response to that question in this context and identify Cato’s response with Marcus’s moral philosophy and with his own.
[13.] Aesop, Fables, “The Wolves and the Sheep,” no. 217 in the Budé ed. (ed. Chambry, 96–97).
[14.] The correct reference is bk. III, art. 11, pp. 44–45.
[15.] See bk. XI, art. 7, p. 135.
[16.] On the distinction between natural and moral evil, see Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (2004), sec. I, art. 1, pp. 90–91.
[17.] “Equal law among a free people.”
[18.] See bk. XI, n22, below.
[19.] Similar to Epictetus, Discourses, bk. II, chap. 1, sec. 15 (Loeb ed., vol. I, pp. 216–17).
[20.] Aristotle, Rhetoric, bk. II, chap. 23, sec. 8 (1398a24); Hutcheson and Moor write “Perdiccas” following Gataker’s text (1697, p. 113), but Aristotle makes Socrates’ remark refer to Perdiccas’s son, Archelaus, rather than to Perdiccas himself. Both were kings of Macedon contemporary with Socrates. Gataker discusses the passage on p. 409. Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. II, p. 2228.
[21.] It is Epicurus, fragment 210, in Epicurus, Epicurea, p. 163.
[22.] Aesop, Fables, “The Country Mouse and the City Mouse,” no. 243 in the Budé ed., pp. 107–8; no. 41 in the Penguin Classics trans. (Fables of Aesop, trans. Handford, p. 43); there is a classic treatment of the story in Horace, Satires, bk. II, Satire 6.77–117 (Loeb ed., 216–19).
[23.] Xanthippe was Socrates’ wife, reputedly shrewish.
[24.] Source unknown.
[25.] Homer, Odyssey bk. IX.413 (Loeb ed., pp. 346–47).
[26.] Hesiod, Works and Days 186 (Loeb ed., pp. 102–3). Hutcheson and Moor translate Gataker’s Greek text (though ignoring the future tense of the verb). That text, however, is corrupt and quotes Hesiod inaccurately (aretēn instead of ara tous). Gataker’s Latin translation quotes Hesiod correctly (1697, p. 114).
[27.] Epictetus, Discourses, bk. III, chap. 24, secs. 86–87 (Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 213).
[28.] Ibid., secs. 88–91 (Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 213).
[29.] Ibid., secs. 91–93 (Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 215).
[30.] Ibid., chap. 22, sec. 105 (Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 167).
[31.] Epictetus, fragment 27 (Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 471).
[32.] Epictetus, fragment 28 (Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 471).
[33.] Marcus does not seem to be referring to any specific passage of Plato or Xenophon.
[34.] See also the editors’ introduction, p. xiii.
[35.] See bk. VII, art. 73, p. 94.