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Subject Area: Political Theory
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

TO JONATHAN JACKSON. - John Adams, The Works of John Adams, vol. 9 (Letters and State Papers 1799-1811) [1854]

Edition used:

The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: with a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, by his Grandson Charles Francis Adams (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1856). 10 volumes. Vol. 9.

Part of: The Works of John Adams, 10 vols.

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TO JONATHAN JACKSON.

Paris, 17 November, 1782.

Sir,—

Upon my arrival here, I found Mr. Jay in very delicate health, in the midst of great affairs, and without a clerk. He told me he had scarcely strength to draw up a state of the negotiation hitherto, but that he must do it for Congress. I offered him the assistance that Mr. Thaxter could afford him in copying, which he accepted.

Mr. Jay, as well as Dr. Franklin and myself, are exceedingly embarrassed by some of our instructions. The other gentlemen will speak for themselves.

No man has a higher sense than I have of the obligation of instructions given by the principal to a deputy. It is a point of duty to observe them. A French minister has only to ascend a pair of stairs to propose a doubt, to offer reasons, to lay open facts for the advice or the orders of his master and his councils; a Spanish, Dutch, or English ambassador has only to send a courier, and receive an answer in a few days. But we are at a vast distance. Despatches are opened, vessels are taken, and the difficulties of communication are innumerable. Facts, unknown when instructions were given, turn up; whole systems of policy appear in a striking light, which were not suspected. Yet the time presses, all Europe waits, and we must act. In such a case, I know of no other rule than to construe instructions, as we do all other precepts and maxims, by such limitations, restrictions, and exceptions, as reason, necessity, and the nature of things point out.

When I speak of this Court, I know not that any other minister is included but that of foreign affairs. A whole system of policy is now as glaring as the day, which, perhaps, Congress and the people of America have little suspicion of. The evidence now results from a large view of all our European negotiations. The same principle and the same system has been uniformly pursued from the beginning of my knowledge of our affairs in Europe, in April, 1778, to this hour; it has been pursued in France, in Spain, in Holland, in Russia, and even in England. In substance it has been this; in assistance afforded us in naval force and in money, to keep us from succumbing, and nothing more; to prevent us from ridding ourselves wholly of our enemies; to prevent us from growing powerful or rich; to prevent us from obtaining acknowledgments of our independence by other foreign powers, and to prevent us from obtaining consideration in Europe, or any advantage in the peace but what is expressly stipulated in the treaty; to deprive us of the grand fishery, the Mississippi River, the western lands, and to saddle us with the tories. To this end, by all I have learned of Mr. Dana’s negotiations in Russia, Mr. Jay’s in Spain, and my own in Holland, it is evident to me that the Comte de Montmorin, the Marquis de Verac, and the Duke de la Vauguyon, have been governed by the same instructions; to wit, instead of favoring, to prevent, if possible, our success. In Holland, I can speak with knowledge, and I declare that he did every thing in his power to prevent me, and that I verily believe he had instructions so to do, perhaps only from the minister, until I had declared to him, that no advice of his, or the Comte de Vergennes, nor even a requisition from the king should restrain me; and, when he found that I was a man not to be managed, that I was determined, and was as good as my word, and, further, thought I should succeed, he fell in with me, in order to give the air of French influence to measures that French influence never could have accomplished, and which, he thought, would be carried, even if he opposed them. This instance is the stronger, as the Duke is an excellent character, and the man I wish to meet everywhere in the affairs of France and America.

I must go further, and say that the least appearance of an independent spirit in any American minister has been uniformly cause enough to have his character attacked. Luckily, Mr. Deane out of the question, every American minister in Europe, except Dr. Franklin, has discovered a judgment, a conscience, and a resolution of his own, and, of consequence, every minister that has ever come, has been frowned upon. On the contrary, Dr. Franklin, who has been pliant and submissive in every thing, has been constantly cried up to the stars, without doing any thing to deserve it.

These facts may alarm Congress more than they ought. There is nothing to fear but the want of firmness in Congress. French policy is so subtle, penetrating, and enervating a thing, that the only way to oppose it, is to be steady, patient, and determined. Poland and Sweden, as well as Corsica and Geneva, exhibit horrid effects of this policy, because it was yielded to; whereas Switzerland, who never was afraid of France, and was always firm, has found her an excellent ally for one hundred and fifty years. If we are steadily supported by Congress, we will go clearly to the windward of them; but if Congress wavers and gives way, the United States will receive a blow that they will not recover in fifty years.

The affair of the refugees, I think, will divide us from the English at present, and precisely because the English are encouraged to insist upon a compensation by this Court; if it depended on my vote, I would cut this knot at once. I would compensate the wretches, how little soever they deserve it, nay, how much soever they deserve the contrary. I foresee we shall be prevented by it from agreeing with Britain now, and be intrigued into the measure at last, and that by this Court.

We have nothing to fear from this Court but in the particulars above mentioned. The alliance is too necessary to them, we are too essential to them, for them to violate the treaties, or finally disgust and alienate us. But they have not known, any more than England, the men with whom they have to do. A man and his office were never better united than Mr. Jay and the commission for peace. Had he been detained in Madrid, as I was in Holland, and all left to Franklin, as was wished, all would have been lost. If he is not supported in Congress, we will both come home together, and see if we cannot have better luck by word of mouth than we have had by letter, to convince our countrymen. The thanks of Congress ought, in sound policy and in perfect justice, to be given to Mr. Jay for his able and faithful execution of his trust both in Spain and for peace.

When we see the French intriguing with the English against us, we have no way to oppose it but by reasoning with the English to show that they are intended to be the dupes. Inclosed are a few broken minutes of conversations, which were much more extended and particular than they appear upon paper. I submit them to your discretion.1

I am amazed to see New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Delaware, where I find them sometimes, in the yeas and nays. Those gentlemen and their States mean well, but are deceived.

TO ARTHUR LEE.

Paris, 12 April, 1783.

Congress forced us into a situation, which obliged us to venture upon a piece of indiscipline, in order to secure a tolerable peace, so that you may well suppose we are anxious to know how it is received among you, and what is to be our fate; whether we are to be approved, excused, justified, or censured. The most curious and inexplicable part of the history is Franklin’s joining in the mutiny. You who know him will not be at a loss to account for it. In truth, the necessity was too obvious and glaring, and the cod, and bucks, and beavers were animals too dearly beloved in our country for a man to take upon himself to be responsible for the loss of them.

We have had a very dull pause since the peace. No news from America, and a stagnation in England, which has left us in a painful state of uncertainty. Now, indeed, the ministry is arranged for a little while, and Mr. Hartley is expected over to finish the negotiation. You know him; he is talkative and disputatious, and not always intelligible, so that I expect we shall be longer about the business than is necessary.

I am not able to conceive how a ministry, composed of parts so heterogeneous, can go on with business. It cannot be expected to be solid and durable. Mr. Fox professes to mean to finish soon and liberally; but I know not what opposition and contradiction he may meet in the cabinet. I confess I do not like the change at all. Shelburne and his set would have gone through well. Mr. Laurens, who is in London, seems pleased with the change, at least he was with the prospect a few days before it took place, and he seems to think that the tories are not so much regarded as we feared.

Shelburne did the best thing of his whole life when he made peace, and the vote against him does no honor to his opponents. The peace is really much better for England than she had a right to expect, and the continuance of the war would have been ruin. This the present set are sensible of, but truth is a small sacrifice to faction. The vote of dissatisfaction with the peace is a disagreeable event, and one knows not what effects it may have. I do not believe it could ever have been carried, if a treaty of commerce had been signed on the 30th of November. Why the commission for making such a treaty was revoked without issuing another, you must ask Mr. Marbois. I know not. I think, however, you cannot too soon send a minister to London to arrange finally a system of commerce, and to watch over all your interests in that country. French politics are now incessantly at work in England, and we may depend upon it they labor less for our good than their own. If our interests were the same with theirs, we might better trust them; yet not entirely, for they do not understand their own interests so well as we do ours.

Congress will never adopt a right system of foreign affairs until they consider their interests as distinct, and keep them separate, from those of all other nations. One essential part of the business and duty of their ministers is to watch French politicians as well as English, to coöperate with them where they coincide with our system, and to counteract them where they interfere with it. At least, this has ever been my opinion. It was so when I was in Congress in 1775, 1776, and 1777, and every day’s experience in Europe, in every country, in every department, has afforded something in confirmation of it. I have acted in conformity to it, at every risk, and, considering the furious wrath it has occasioned, and the violent efforts to demolish me, with wonderful success. But the success would have been much more complete, if Congress had adhered to the system as steadily as I did.

[1 ]This alludes to the extracts from the Diary. See vol. iii. p. 349, note.