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Subject Area: Political Theory
Topic: The American Revolution and Constitution

TO T. PICKERING, SECRETARY OF STATE. - John Adams, The Works of John Adams, vol. 8 (Letters and State Papers 1782-1799) [1853]

Edition used:

The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: with a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, by his Grandson Charles Francis Adams (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1856). 10 volumes. Vol. 8.

Part of: The Works of John Adams, 10 vols.

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TO T. PICKERING, SECRETARY OF STATE.

East Chester, 31 October, 1797.

Dear Sir,—

I received your favor of the 28th. Inclosed are some papers I received from the city of Washington. They are duplicates of such as I received several weeks ago. I have delayed an answer, because I was not satisfied, and wished to take advice. After you have examined them, I wish for your opinion, first, whether I ought to sign the warrant of attorney without limitation of time; second, whether the power ought not to be to Scott, Thornton, and White, and their successors in the office of commissioners. The papers you will please to return to me with your advice.

I thank you for another abridgment of the public despatches. Are you not misinformed concerning La Forest? I have understood that he is in Philadelphia, and that he arrived there this last summer in the questionable shape of an unaccredited chargé des affaires.

Talleyrand, I should suppose, could not be for war with this country; nor can I apprehend that even the Triumvirate, as they begin to be called in France, will be for a measure so decided. A continued appearance of umbrage, and continued depredations on a weak, defenceless commerce, will be much more convenient for their views. By all the public papers I receive from abroad, it appears that the state of things at present in France is exactly as I have many times written to particular friends in Europe. The executive directory is divided into a party of three, and a party of two. The two are the most popular, coincide best with the public opinion, and agree with a majority in both houses of the legislature. This drives the three to the necessity of courting the army and the populace. And the question between the three and the two can be decided only by a civil war. The worst evil that can happen in any government is a divided executive; and, as a plural executive must, from the nature of men, be forever divided, this is a demonstration that a plural executive is a great evil, and incompatible with liberty. That emulation in the human heart, which produces rivalries of men, cities, and nations, which produces almost all the good in human life, produces, also, almost all the evil. This is my philosophy of government. The great art lies in managing this emulation. It is the only defence against its own excesses. The emulation of the legislative and executive powers should be made to control each other. The emulation between the rich and the poor among the people, should be made to check itself by balancing the two houses in the legislature, which represent these two classes of society, so invidious at all times against each other.

But, instead of three lines, which I intended to write to you, I have slided into a pedantical lecture upon government, for which I beg your pardon.

With great esteem and regard, yours, &c.

John Adams.

TO THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENT.

Philadelphia, 24 January, 1798.

The President of the United States requests the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney-General, to take into their consideration the state of the nation, and its foreign relations, especially with France. These, indeed, may be so connected with those with England, Spain, Holland, and others, that perhaps the former cannot be well weighed without the other. If our envoys extraordinary should be refused an audience, or, after an audience, be ordered to depart without accomplishing the objects of their mission,

1. They may repair to Holland; or, 2. Two of them may return home, leaving one abroad; or, 3. All of them may return to America.

In the first case, will it be prudent to call them all home? and, in the second, to recall the one?

In any of these three cases, what will be necessary or expedient for the executive authority of government to do here?

In what manner should the first intelligence be announced to Congress; by message, or speech?

What measures should be recommended to Congress? Shall an immediate declaration of war be recommended or suggested? If not, what other system shall be recommended more than a repetition of the recommendations heretofore repeatedly made to both houses? Will it in any case, and in what cases, be advisable to recommend an embargo?

What measures will be proper to take with Spain? What with Holland? What with Portugal? But, above all, what will policy dictate to be said to England, and how shall it be said? by Mr. King, or to Mr. Liston? and how shall it be conveyed to Mr. King? by packet, or any ordinary conveyance; or by some special, trusty, and confidential messenger? Will it not be the soundest policy, even in case of a declaration of war on both sides, between France and the United States, for us to be totally silent to England, and wait for her overtures? Will it not be imprudent in us to connect ourselves with Britain, in any manner that may impede us in embracing the first favorable moment or opportunity to make a separate peace? What aids or benefits can we expect from England by any stipulations with her, which her interest will not impel her to extend to us without any? On the brink of the dangerous precipice on which she stands, will not shaking hands with her necessitate us to fall with her, if she falls? On the other hand, what aid could we stipulate to afford her, which our own interest would not oblige us to give without any other obligation? In case of a revolution in England, a wild democracy will probably prevail for as long a time as it did in France; in such case, will not the danger of reviving and extending that delirium in America, be increased in proportion to the intimacy of our connection with that nation?1

John Adams.

[1 ]No answers have been found to these questions, on the part of the Secretary of State or of the Treasury.

The Secretary of War, in his reply, dated the 15th of February, thought that there was a general aversion to war in the minds of the people of the United States, and a particular dislike on the part of a portion of them, to a war with France. Hence an express declaration was unadvisable, as subjecting the country to all the chances of evil from the vengeance of an excited and victorious nation. A mitigated hostility would, therefore, be most advisable, which might leave a door open for negotiation. This might consist of a truly vigorous, defensive plan, with a countenance still kept up to negotiate. Should, therefore, one or more of the commissioners remain in Europe, it might be well to leave them there, not to lose the appearance of a disposition to negotiate. If, however, they should all return, it would be too humiliating to send them back.

In this view the measures proposed to Congress should be:

1. To give permission to merchant vessels, under proper guards, to arm for defence.

2. To authorize the President to prepare, as fast as possible, twenty sloops of war, from sixteen to twenty guns each.

3. To authorize him to complete the three remaining frigates.

4. To authorize him, in case of open rupture, to provide a number of ships of the line, not exceeding ten.

5. To declare the treaties of alliance and commerce suspended.

6. To provide for an immediate army of sixteen thousand men, and an auxiliary one of twenty thousand.

7. To bring into action all the sources of revenue, and to authorize an immediate loan.

The President’s message, predicated on these measures, should recite all the inducements in a grave and dignified tone.

An embargo did not seem to be eligible.

With regard to other nations it was not expedient to enter into any formal engagements with any of them. Yet it might be well to sound Great Britain about a loan, about convoys, and a coöperation in case of open rupture, pointing to the Floridas, Louisiana, and the South American possessions of Spain. All on this side of the Mississippi, with New Orleans, to be ours in case of conquest. It might be well, too, to make a provisional negotiation for ten ships of the line, to have effect in case the President should receive the authority to provide so many. A confidential messenger to be employed to communicate these instructions to the minister, Mr. King.

The appointment of a day of national fast, proper and expedient.

The Attorney-General, assuming that the envoys had been refused an audience, thought all communications to Congress should be by message.

The envoys ought to be recalled by an order of the President.

The President should recommend a declaration of war.

An embargo should not be laid, except by way of reprisal on French vessels in our ports only.

An intimate connection with Great Britain to be avoided. Yet, through a confidential messenger, instructions might be given to Mr. King, to make stipulations to open our ports to British privateers and to prohibit all trade with France. Our own merchant ships might arm.

An additional force to the army to seize upon New Orleans, in case Spain should follow France.

The exequaturs to the French consuls to be revoked.

This opinion bears date the 8th of March.

The President’s own opinion of the policy to be pursued towards Great Britain, is sufficiently indicated by the form of the questions. Mr. Pickering invited Mr. Hamilton to encourage an alliance, offensive and defensive, but Mr. Hamilton was too wary to commit himself precipitately, though clearly favoring the idea as an ultimate measure. He especially urged the procuring “a dozen British frigates to be sent to our coast, to pursue the directions of this government.” See the letter of Mr. Pickering and the answer. Hamilton’s Works, vol. vi. p. 272, p. 278.