The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Works On Government.
• A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America. Volume Ii
• Chapter First.: Italian Republics of the Middle Age. Florence.
• Chapter Second.: Florence.
• Chapter Third.: Florence.
• Chapter Fourth.: Machiavel’s Plan of a Perfect Commonwealth.
• Chapter Fifth.: Siena.
• Chapter Sixth.: Bologna.
• A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America. Volume Iii
• Chapter Seventh.: Italian Republics. Pistoia.
• Chapter Eighth.: Cremona.
• Chapter Ninth.: Padua.
• Chapter Tenth.: Mantua—montepulciano.
• Appendix.
• Postscript.: to the AbbÉ De Mably.

CHAPTER NINTH.

PADUA.

The elements and definitions in most of the arts and sciences are understood alike, by men of education, in all the nations of Europe; but in the science of legislation, which is not one of the least importance to be understood, there is a confusion of languages, as if men were but lately come from Babel. Scarcely any two writers, much less nations, agree in using words in the same sense. Such a latitude, it is true, allows a scope for politicians to speculate, like merchants with false weights, artificial credit, or base money, and to deceive the people, by making the same word adored by one party, and execrated by another. The union of the people, in any principle, rule, or system, is thus rendered impossible; because superstition, prejudice, habit, and passions, are so differently attached to words, that you can scarcely make any nation understand itself. The words monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, king, prince, lords, commons, nobles, patricians, plebeians, if carefully attended to, will be found to be used in different senses, perpetually, by different nations, by different writers in the same nation, and even by the same writers in different pages.

The word king, for example. Ask a Frenchman, What is a king? His answer will be, A man with a crown and sceptre, throne and footstool, anointed at Rheims, who has the making, executing, and interpreting of all laws. Ask an Englishman. His idea will comprehend the throne, footstool, crown, sceptre, and anointing, with one third of the legislative power and the whole of the executive, with an estate in his office to him and his heirs. Ask a Pole; and he tells you, It is a magistrate chosen for life, with scarcely any power at all. Ask an inhabitant of Liege; and he tells you, It is a bishop, and his office is only for life. The word prince is another remarkable instance. In Venice, it means the senate, and sometimes, by courtesy, the doge, whom some of the Italian writers call a mere testa di legno. In France, the eldest sons of dukes are princes, as well as the descendants of the blood royal; in Germany, even the rhingraves are princes; and in Russia, several families, not descended from nor allied to royal blood, anciently obtained, by grant of the sovereign, the title of prince, descendible to all their posterity; the consequence of which has been, that the number of princes in that country is at this day prodigious; and the philosopher of Geneva, in imitation of the Venetians, professedly calls the executive power, wherever lodged, the Prince. How is it possible that whole nations should be made to comprehend the principles and rules of government, until they shall learn to understand one another’s meaning by words?

But of all the words in all languages, perhaps there has been none so much abused in this way as the words republic, commonwealth, and popular state. In the Rerum-Publicarum Collectio, of which there are fifty and odd volumes, and many of them very incorrect, France, Spain, and Portugal, the four great empires, the Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman, and even the Ottoman, are all denominated republics. If, indeed, a republic signifies nothing but public affairs, it is equally applicable to all nations; and every kind of government, despotisms, monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, and every possible or imaginable composition of them are all republics. There is, no doubt, a public good and evil, a commonwealth and a common impoverishment in all of them. Others define a republic to be a government of more than one. This will exclude only the despotisms; for a monarchy administered by laws, requires at least magistrates to register them, and consequently more than one person in the government. Some comprehend under the term only aristocracies and democracies, and mixtures of these, without any distinct executive power. Others, again, more rationally, define a republic to signify only a government, in which all men, rich and poor, magistrates and subjects, officers and people, masters and servants, the first citizen and the last, are equally subject to the laws. This, indeed, appears to be the true and only true definition of a republic. The word res, every one knows, signified in the Roman language wealth, riches, property; the word publicus, quasi populicus, and per syncope pôplicus, signified public, common, belonging to the people; res publica, therefore, was publica res, the wealth, riches, or property of the people.*Res populi, and the original meaning of the word republic could be no other than a government in which the property of the people predominated and governed; and it had more relation to property than liberty. It signified a government, in which the property of the public, or people, and of every one of them, was secured and protected by law. This idea, indeed, implies liberty; because property cannot be secure unless the man be at liberty to acquire, use, or part with it, at his discretion, and unless he have his personal liberty of life and limb, motion and rest, for that purpose. It implies, moreover, that the property and liberty of all men, not merely of a majority, should be safe; for the people, or public, comprehends more than a majority, it comprehends all and every individual; and the property of every citizen is a part of the public property, as each citizen is a part of the public, people, or community. The property, therefore, of every man has a share in government, and is more powerful than any citizen, or party of citizens; it is governed only by the law. There is, however, a peculiar sense in which the words republic, commonwealth, popular state, are used by English and French writers; who mean by them a democracy, or rather a representative democracy; a “government in one centre, and that centre the nation;” that is to say, that centre a single assembly, chosen at stated periods by the people, and invested with the whole sovereignty; the whole legislative, executive, and judicial power, to be exercised in a body, or by committees, as they shall think proper. This is the sense in which it was used by Marchamont Nedham, and in this sense it has been constantly used from his time to ours, even by writers of the most mathematical precision, the most classical purity, and extensive learning. What other authority there may be for this use of those words is not known; none has been found, except in the following observations of Portenari, in which there are several other inaccuracies; but they are here inserted, chiefly because they employ the words republic, commonwealth, and popular state, in the same sense with the English and French writers.

“We* may say with the philosopher,1 that six things are so necessary to a city, that without them it cannot stand. 1. The first is provisions, without which its inhabitants cannot live. 2. The second is clothes, habitations, houses, and other things, which depend upon the arts, without which civil and political life cannot subsist. 3. The third is arms, which are necessary to defend the city from its enemies, and to repress the boldness of those who rebel against the laws. 4. The fourth is money, most necessary to a city in peace and in war. 5. The fifth is the care of divine worship. 6. The sixth is the administration of justice, and the government of the people. For the first are necessary, cultivators of the land; for the second, artificers; for the third, soldiers; for the fourth, merchants and capitalists; for the fifth, priests; for the sixth, judges and magistrates. Seven sorts of men, therefore, are necessary to a city: husbandmen, artificers, soldiers, merchants, rich men, priests, and judges.

“But, according to the same philosopher,* as in the body natural not all those things, without which it is never found, are parts of it, but only instruments subservient to some uses, as in animals, the horns, the nails, the hair, so not all those seven sorts of men are parts of the city; but some of them, namely, the husbandmen, the artificers, and the merchants, are only instruments useful to civil life, as is thus demonstrated. A city is constituted for felicity, as to its ultimate end; and human felicity, here below, is reposed, according to the same philosopher, in the operations of virtue, and chiefly in the exertions of wisdom and prudence; those men, therefore, are not parts of a city, the operations of whom are not directed to those virtues; such are the husbandmen who are occupied, not in wisdom and prudence, but in laboring the earth; such are the artisans, who fatigue themselves night and day to gain a livelihood for themselves and their poor families; such, finally, are the merchants, who watch and labor continually, not in wisdom and prudence, but in the acquisition of gold. It is therefore clear, that neither husbandmen, artificers, nor merchants, are parts of a city, nor ought to be numbered among the citizens, but only as instruments which subserve certain uses and conveniences of the city.”

We must pause here and admire! The foregoing are not only the grave sentiments of Portenari and of Aristotle, but form the doctrine almost of the whole earth, and of all mankind; not only every despotism, empire, and monarchy, in Asia, Africa, and Europe, but every aristocratical republic, has adopted it in all its latitude. There are only two or three of the smallest cantons in Switzerland, besides England, who allow husbandmen, artificers, and merchants, to be citizens, or to have any voice or share in the government of the state, or in the choice or appointment of any who have. There is no doctrine, and no fact, which goes so far as this towards forfeiting to the human species the character of rational creatures. Is it not amazing, that nations should have thus tamely surrendered themselves, like so many flocks of sheep, into the hands of shepherds, whose great solicitude to devour the lambs, the wool, and the flesh, scarcely leave them time to provide water or pasture for the animals, or even shelter against the weather and the wolves?

It is, indeed, impossible that the several descriptions of men, last enumerated, should, in a great nation and extensive territory, ever assemble in a body to act in concert; and the ancient method of taking the sense of an assembly of citizens in the capital, as in Rome for example, for the sense of all the citizens of a whole republic, or a large empire, was very imperfect, and extremely exposed to corruption; but, since the invention of representative assemblies, much of that objection is removed, though even that was no sufficient reason for excluding farmers, merchants, and artificers, from the rights of citizens. At present a husbandman, merchant, or artificer, provided he has any small property, by which he may be supposed to have a judgment and will of his own, instead of depending for his daily bread on some patron or master, is a sufficient judge of the qualifications of a person to represent him in the legislature. A representative assembly, fairly constituted, and made an integral part of the sovereignty, has power forever to control the rich and illustrious in another assembly, and a court and king, where there is a king. This, too, is the only instrument by which the body of the people can act; the only way in which their opinions can be known and collected; the only means by which their wills can be united, and their strength exerted, according to any principle or continued system.

It is sometimes said, that mobs are a good mode of expressing the sense, the resentments, and feelings of the people. Whig mobs to be sure are meant! But if the principle is once admitted, liberty and the rights of mankind will infallibly be betrayed; for it is giving liberty to tories and courtiers to excite mobs as well as to patriots; and all history and experience shows, that mobs are more easily excited by courtiers and princes, than by more virtuous men, and more honest friends of liberty.

It is often said, too, that farmers, merchants, and mechanics, are too inattentive to public affairs, and too patient under oppression. This is undoubtedly true, and will forever be so; and, what is worse, the most sober, industrious, and peaceable of them, will forever be the least attentive, and the least disposed to exert themselves in hazardous and disagreeable efforts of resistance. The only practicable method, therefore, of giving to farmers, &c. the equal right of citizens, and their proper weight and influence in society, is by elections, frequently repeated, of a house of commons, an assembly which shall be an essential part of the sovereignty. The meanest understanding is equal to the duty of saying who is the man in his neighborhood whom he most esteems, and loves best, for his knowledge, integrity, and benevolence. The understandings, however, of husbandmen, merchants, and mechanics, are not always the meanest; there arise, in the course of human life, many among them of the most splendid geniuses, the most active and benevolent dispositions, and most undaunted bravery. The moral equality that nature has unalterably established among men, gives these an undoubted right to have every road opened to them for advancement in life and in power that is open to any others. These are the characters which will be discovered in popular elections, and brought forward upon the stage, where they may exert all their faculties, and enjoy all the honors, offices, and commands, both in peace and war, of which they are capable. The dogma of Aristotle, and the practice of the world, is the most unphilosophical, the most inhuman and cruel that can be conceived. Until this wicked position, which is worse than the slavery of the ancient republics, or modern West Indies, shall be held up to the derision and contempt, the execration and horror, of mankind, it will be to little purpose to talk or write about liberty. This doctrine of Aristotle is the more extraordinary, as it seems to be inconsistent with his great and common principles,* “that a happy life must arise from a course of virtue; that virtue consists in a medium; and that the middle life is the happiest.

“In every city the people are divided into three sorts, the very rich, the very poor, and the middle sort. If it is admitted that the medium is the best, it follows that, even in point of fortune, a mediocrity is preferable. The middle state is most compliant to reason. Those who are very beautiful, or strong, or noble, or rich, or, on the contrary, those who are very poor, weak, or mean, with difficulty obey reason. The former are capricious1 and flagitious; the latter, rascally and mean; the crimes of each arising from their different excesses. Those who excel in riches, friends, and influence, are not willing to submit to command or law; this begins at home, where they are brought up too delicately, when boys, to obey their preceptors. The constant want of what the rich enjoy makes the poor too mean; the poor know not how to command, but are in the habit of being commanded, too often as slaves. The rich know not how to submit to any command; nor do they know how to rule over freemen, or to command others, but despotically. A city composed only of the rich and the poor, consists but of masters and slaves, not freemen; where one party despise, and the other hate; where there is no possibility of friendship, or political community, which supposes affection. It is the genius of a free city to be composed, as much as possible, of equals; and equality will be best preserved when the greatest part of the inhabitants are in the middle state. These will be best assured of safety as well as equality; they will not covet nor steal, as the poor do, what belongs to the rich; nor will what they have be coveted or stolen; without plotting against any one, or having any one plot against them, they will live free from danger. For which reason, Phocylides* wisely wishes for the middle state, as being most productive of happiness. It is plain then that the most perfect community must be among those who are in the middle rank; and those states are best instituted wherein these are a larger and more respectable part, if possible, than both the other; or, if that cannot be, at least than either of them separate; so that, being thrown into the balance, it may prevent either scale from preponderating. It is, therefore, the greatest happiness which the citizen can enjoy, to possess a moderate and convenient fortune. When some possess too much, and others nothing at all, the government must either be in the hands of the meanest rabble, or else a pure oligarchy. The middle state is best, as being least liable to those seditions and insurrections which disturb the community; and for the same reason extensive governments are least liable to these inconveniences; for there those in the middle state are very numerous; whereas, in small ones, it is easy to pass to the two extremes, so as hardly to have any medium remaining, but the one half rich, and the other poor. We ought to consider, as a proof of this, that the best lawgivers were those in the middle rank of life, among whom was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was not a king; and Charondas, and, indeed, most others. Hence, so many free states have changed either to democracies or oligarchies; for whenever the number of those in the middle state has been too small, those who were the more numerous, whether the rich or the poor, always overpowered them, and assumed to themselves the administration. When, in consequence of their disputes and quarrels with each other, either the rich get the better of the poor, or the poor of the rich, neither of them will establish a free state, but, as a record of their victory, will form one which inclines to their own principles, either a democracy or an oligarchy. It is, indeed, an established custom of cities, not to desire an equality, but either to aspire to govern, or, when they are conquered, to submit.”

These are some of the wisest sentiments of Aristotle; but can you reconcile them with his other arbitrary doctrine, and tyrannical exclusion of husbandmen, merchants, and tradesmen, from the rank and rights of citizens? These, or at least, those of them who have acquired property enough to be exempt from daily dependence on others, are the real middling people, and generally as honest and independent as any; these, however, it must be confessed, are too inattentive to public and national affairs, and too apt to submit to oppression. When they have been provoked beyond all bearing, they have aimed at demolishing the government, and when they have done that, they have sunk into their usual inattention, and left others to erect a new one as rude and ill-modelled as the former. A representative assembly, elected by them, is the only way in which they can act in concert; but they have always allowed themselves to be cheated by false, imperfect, partial, and inadequate representations of themselves, and have never had their full and proper share of power in a state. But to proceed with Portenari.

“The other kinds of men,” says he, “namely, the rich, the soldiers, the priests, and the judges, are parts of the city, and properly citizens. The first, because riches are instruments for generating and conserving virtue in the citizens. The second, because it is necessary that military men, besides the virtue of fortitude, should be adorned with prudence, to know the times and occasions proper for undertaking an enterprise. The third, because the priests ought to be examples of every virtue to the people, and give themselves to the contemplation of divine things. The fourth, because the judges and rectors of a city, to judge and govern rightly, have occasion more than all the others for science and prudence, which are the true lights and guides of human actions.”

If these are proper arguments for admitting these descriptions of men into the order of citizens, instead of being reasons for excluding merchants, &c. they are of proportional weight for admitting them.

“As to the form of government, which is the other part of the animated city, let us say with those wise men who have written of civil dominion and public administration, as Plato,* Aristotle,† Polybius,‡ Plutarch,§ and others,∥ that the simple forms of good government are three, to which are opposed three other forms of bad government. The first form of good government is monarchy, or kingship, and is the absolute and independent dominion of one man alone, who has for the ultimate end of his operations the public good, and the best state of the city, and who has the same relation to his subjects that the shepherd has to his flock, and the father to his children. Such were the monarchies of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Macedonians, Scythians, Egyptians, and Romans, from the beginning of their reign to the creation of the consuls, and, after the extinction of the Roman republic, under the empire of many Cæsars. To monarchy is opposed* that form of government which is called tyranny, in which one lords it alone, who has no thoughts of the public good, but whose aim is to depress and exterminate the citizens, to whom he shows himself a monster, rapacious after their property, and a cruel wild beast after their lives; such were Phalaris in Agrigentum,† Dionysius in Syracuse,‡ and Nero in Rome.§

“The second form of good government is aristocracy, according to which the dominion is held by those who, above all others, are adorned with virtue, prudence, and benevolence; who directing all their actions to the utility and common dignity of the city, procure it a happy and blessed state. This species of government is called also the regimen of the better sort, (optimates,) either because the best men of the city bear rule, or because they look, in all their operations, to the best and most perfect state of the city. This manner of government was used by the Spartans. To this form of government is opposed oligarchy, which is a principality of the most rich and powerful, who, for the most part, are few; who, by depressing and robbing of their property the less rich, and crushing the poor with intolerable weight, make a government full of arrogance and of violence, and are like wolves among lambs. Such was the dominion of the Triumvirs in Rome, who having oppressed the republic, proscribed and put to death many good citizens, and plundered their property; exalting the seditious and perverse, and abasing good men, they distempered Rome with their contagious wickedness; and of a city, the capital of the world, they made it a den of robbers.∥

“The third form of good government, not having a proper name, was called by the Greeks politeia, and by the Latins, respublica, names common to every species of government. This is the dominion of the multitude, namely,—of the whole body of the city, composed of all sorts of citizens, rich and poor, nobles andplebeians, wise and foolish, which is also called a popular government. All this body, which contains men, some endowed with prudence and wisdom, some inclined to virtue and persuadable to all good works, by the conversation and familiarity which they have with the prudent and learned, employ all their care, labor, and industry, to the end that the city flourish in all those things which are necessary and convenient for living well and happily, such as was at one time the government of the Athenians.* To this species of good government is opposed democracy; according to which the most abject plebeians, and the vilest vulgar, hold the domination for their own private interest, by which they oppress the rich and the noble, and aggrandize and enrich the poor and the ignoble, as the two brothers, the Gracchi, began to do in Rome.†

“Three, therefore, are the simple forms of good government, monarchy, aristocracy, and that which by a common name is called a republic; and from these, mixed together, four others may result. The first is compounded of all the three, as was that of the Lacædemonians, instituted by Lycurgus,‡ who, selecting the good from the three former, composed out of them one of the most perfect kind. Such, also, was the Roman republic,§ in which the power of the consuls was like the regal authority; that of the senate was aristocratical; and that of the people resembled the popular state. The second form of mixed government is composed of monarchy and aristocracy, such as, according to some, is the most serene republic of Venice,∥ in which the annual podestàs have a power similar to a regal authority, and the senate are an assembly or collection of the optimates; although others contend that it is a perfect aristocracy. The third is mixed of a monarchy and a republic; and the fourth of a republic and an aristocracy; of which two species of mixed government we have no examples to allege.

“But to return to the three simple forms; it is the common opinion of the learned,¶ that monarchy holds the first rank above all others, resembling the power of God Almighty, who alone governs the world; resembling the heart, which alone vivifies all the parts of the animal; and resembling the sun, which alone illuminates the celestial bodies, as well as the lower world. It is very true, that to a monarchy ought to be elevated only that citizen, according to the philosopher,* who, exceeding others in the ordinary course, in riches, wisdom, prudence, and benevolence, is like a god upon earth; such as would be the man who should be adorned with heroic virtue, according to which, performing all the labors of virtue in the utmost perfection and supreme excellency, he would appear to be not the son of a mortal,† but of God. But it being impossible, or at least most difficult, to find a man so rare, it has happened, that, laying aside monarchy, the philosophers have disputed which of the other two forms of good government is better accommodated, more practicable, and more profitable, for the regimen of cities and of peoples. Some were of opinion that this praise was due to an aristocracy; nevertheless Aristotle confutes them, because in the aristocratical government the magistracies and the honors being always in the hands of a few, there is great danger that the multitude, perpetually excluded from public management, should be tumultuous, and conspire against the lives of the principal men, to the great damage of the whole city; because in these revolts the force and violence of the people regard friends no more than enemies; it is mad, and most horribly pillages, murders, and abuses, all that comes in its way. It remains, then, that the third species of good government, which is the popular government, in which the citizens alternately command and obey, must be the most useful, and better adjusted to the nature of man, in whose soul the Divinity has stamped the desire of ruling; with such limitations and temperaments, however, as, says the same philosopher, that the vile plebeians may not have magistrates appointed for their ignorance and imprudence, which are the two fountains of all civil calamities; but that the plebeians may not be totally despised, and that all occasion of insurrections may be taken away, power should be given them of joining with the other citizens in the election of magistrates, and of calling them to account for their administration.”

“All these opinions appear to be not unbecoming; for, although the plebeians be not qualified of themselves to judge who are fit for the administration of the affairs of the city, and to know the failings of those who have governed, nevertheless, by the conversation and practice which they have in such things with the wise men, it is presumed that, from daily intercourse with these, and from common fame and public reputation, which daily circulates concerning men who are wise and good in government, they may have so much light, that they may discern the apt from the inept, and good behavior from bad. This may suffice to have said concerning the different forms of government according to the writers before cited, in order to explain the following account of the form of government in Padua, and the various changes it passed through.

* “In the four hundred and fifty-second year of the Christian era, Padua was miserably destroyed by Attila, King of the Huns. The Paduans, who then fled for safety to the islands in the Adriatic, could not return for fifty years to rebuild their city, for the many armies of barbarians who infested Italy till 493, when Theodoric, King of the Ostrogoths, killed Odoacer, King of the Heruli, and remained unrivalled in the dominion of Italy. But Justinian, the emperor, having, in 535, sent Belisarius, and afterwards, in 552, Narses, to drive away the Goths from Italy, Padua, in that war, which lasted with alternate victories and defeats of the Goths and the Greeks, eighteen years, was subjected sometimes by one and sometimes by the other. Afterwards, under the government of exarchs, till 601, it was a second time burned and destroyed by Aginulphus, King of the Lombards. It was afterwards restored by the Paduans, assisted by the Venetians, and remained under the dominion of the Lombards, till they were exterminated by Charlemagne, King of France, in 774. It became subject to the Kings of France of the race of Charlemagne, and after them to the Berengarii, and finally to the emperors of Germany, from Otho I. to Henry the Fourth, according to the German, and the Third, according to the Italian historians. In a word, Padua lived under foreign law six hundred and twenty-nine years, namely,—from 452 to 1081; thirty-three years before which period, namely,—in 1048, a few rays of liberty began to dawn, because the Emperor Henry III., (as appears by public instruments preserved in the archives of the cathedral of Padua,) granted, for the repose of his soul, and that of Agnese his wife, to Bernard Maltravers, Bishop of Padua, the prerogative of coining money, building fortresses and castles with towers and ramparts, erecting mills, and to be, as it were, prince of the city. Afterwards, Henry IV., his son, at the solicitation of the Queen Bertha, his wife, and on account of the prayers of Milo, Bishop of Padua, his relation, gave liberty, in 1081, to the Paduans, conceding to them, that, for the future, they might live according to their own laws, and have a triumphal chariot, (carroccio,) which was the principal sign of a free city.* This carroccio, for a perpetual memorial of the benefit received by the intercession of Queen Bertha, was called by the Paduans by her name. Henry also granted them the faculty of making of the body of their nobility a senate, who, for the government of the city, created annually two consuls.†

“There was, therefore, formed a government mixed of monarchy and aristocracy, says the historian; of monarchy, because the consuls, according to the manner of kings, had the power of life and death; and of aristocracy, because the senate, exclusively of the plebeians, was composed only of patricians or nobles. These, as the desire of enlarging dominion is insatiable, not contented to have the government of the city, procured, partly by imperial grants, and partly by other means, jurisdiction of blood in their castles situated in the country of Padua, assuming the titles of proceri, peers or barons, and a little afterwards the yet higher ones of marquises, counts, and castellans. Padua was ruled by this form of government about eighty years, in peace and tranquillity; but peace being the nurse of riches, and riches of ambition, the consular dignity began to be ardently desired by all men, and caballed for by every artifice. In the progress of these contests, as one would not give way to another, and as it all depended on a few of the most powerful, the city became divided into factions, which finally, in 1177, came to arms, and civil wars ensued, which for some years filled the city with slaughter, burnings, revolt, and confusion; so that the consulate, becoming feeble, was now intermitted, and then exercised, according as the power of different parties prevailed. But finally, this magistracy, serving no longer for the maintenance of the public good, but merely as an instrument of revenge against enemies, and having become most pernicious, not less to the plebeians than to the patricians, was, in 1194, abrogated and totally extinguished.

“The good government,1 composed of monarchy and aristocracy,” as our author calls it, though nobody will agree with him in opinion at this day, “being changed, by the malice of men, into the bad one of oligarchy, and this by its noxious qualities being in a short time annihilated, there arose another species of government, mixed of monarchy and a republic, in this form:—The Paduans instituted four councils; the first was of eighteen, whom they called the Anziani, three of whom were drawn by lot every three months. They were afterwards reduced to the number of sixteen, and then drawn to the number of four every four months. The office of these magistrates was, together with the podestà, to exert themselves with all their influence and power to conciliate and appease all discords and dissensions among the citizens, not only in civil affairs, but in criminal prosecutions; to see that the decrees of the senate regarding the public utility were observed; that the buildings going to decay should be rebuilt or repaired; that the streets, public roads, and walks should be kept in order, free, and unincumbered with obstructions; that in the principal quarters of the city instruments should be provided for extinguishing or preventing the progress of fire, such as buckets, vessels and ropes for drawing water, ladders, hatchets, pickaxes, iron bars, &c.; and, finally, to suggest to the other councils all those things which might be of public utility. And that they might be enabled to do this, all public letters from foreign princes, and from all magistrates within the dominion of Padua, were read in their presence. No man was admitted to this council of the anziani who was not a Paduan by birth, and an inhabitant of the city for at least thirty years without interruption, and who had not a foundation of property among his fellow citizens of at least two hundred pounds a year.

The second council was called the lesser, which at first consisted of forty citizens, partly noble, and partly plebeian, but afterwards was increased to the number of sixty. The authority of this council was such, that nothing could be treated in the greater council if it were not first discussed and agitated here, and from hence proposed to the greater council. The mode of discussing and consulting upon business was by the way of orations or harangues made by the senators, after which they proceeded to a vote, and two thirds of the suffrages determined the question. This rule was also observed in the greater council. This council was changed every four months, and the senators who had once been in it must be excluded for eight months. Father and son, brothers, and uncle and nephew, were not permitted to sit together in it. To be of this council, it was necessary to be a Paduan born, to have a father who was a Paduan born, to have inhabited in Padua with a family at least for forty years continually, to have an estate of fifty pounds income, and to have served in the ordinary charges of the commons of the city.

“The third council was called the Greater Council and Parliament. It was at first of three hundred senators, one moiety nobles, and the other moiety plebeians; it was afterwards increased to the number of six hundred, and finally, in 1277, to a thousand. The magistrates were chosen, and all affairs relative to peace and war were debated in it. By these two councils, the greater and the less, were made, at divers times, various municipal laws and statutes, of which, by a determination of 1263, four copies were made. The first was deposited in the monastery of St. Benedict, the second in that of St. John, the third in that of St. Mary, and the fourth in that of the fathers of St. Mary di Porciglia.

The fourth and last council was common to all the people of the city, into which, the doors being open, every one might enter. But this council was very seldom assembled, and never but for things of the utmost importance. The Paduans desirous of providing a remedy against the disorders and mischiefs occasioned by the consulate, and to extinguish in the citizens all occasions of ambition to enjoy the government of the city, invented the annual magistrate of the podestà, which was the best medicine that could be thought of by them to cure the disorders already felt, and prevent the greater that were apprehended. They established, therefore, as ruler of the city, a person who should be a foreigner, of noble blood and excellent reputation for virtue, who, by the weight and eminence of his authority in cases of life and death, and from his superintendence over all the judicial authority, civil and criminal, from the more absolute obedience paid him as the supreme head of all the other magistracies, of the patricians, of the plebeians, and of the rustics, and, in a word, from his absolute power, as it is called, over the city and its territory, was called, by way of eminence, by the name of Podestà.

“This manner of government continued happily enough, as it is said, till 1237, when the city was subjected by Ezzelino da Romano, who most terribly afflicted and most cruelly tormented it for the space of nineteen years; in which time there was no sort of torment, inhumanity, or cruelty, which it did not suffer from that infernal monster, during whose tyranny that most malignant pestilence, the factions of Guelphs and Ghibellines, which, under the names of the Imperial party and the party of the Church, infected many cities of Italy, among others, distempered Pistoia, and did inestimable mischief.

“Before we pass on, it may be well, for the more complete information concerning this magistrate of the podestà, to relate a few particulars. The podestà was obliged, three months before the end of his government, which lasted one year, to assemble the greater council, and cause to be elected eight citizens, four noble and four plebeian, of more than thirty years of age. These elected twelve senators of the same council and of the same age, six of the patricians and six plebeians; who, in like manner, elected eight others of the same council, age, and condition, the office of whom was to elect the new podestà. These were shut up together in one apartment, and could not speak to any one, or have more than one repast a day, that they might the sooner agree in the nomination of three personages, who were afterwards carried to the greater council, who proceeded to the election in this manner. All three were separately balloted for, and he who had the most suffrages was the new podestà; he who had the next number of votes held the second place; and he who had fewest, the last, in such election. The syndic of the city was sent in haste with public letters to him who had been honored with most votes, who, if he accepted the charge, was understood to be podestà; but if in four days he did not accept it, the syndic was sent to the second; and if he refused, the third was sent to; and if he declined, a new election was made of other three persons; and of the acceptance or refusal of these a record was made by a notary.

“This method of electing the podestà was changed in 1257, whereby the examination of the subjects fit for the post was committed to the lesser council, the election of whom afterwards was made by the greater council, with this condition, however, by virtue of a statute made in 1236, that the electors of the present podestà could not have a vote in the election of the subsequent podestà. No man could be elected podestà who had in Padua, relations, by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree, nor who had been banished from his country for forgery or treason; and this was also understood of the court or retinue which the podestà brought with him, which consisted of four judges or assessors, two lieutenants of police, and some other constables. The office of the first judge was to assist the podestà in all things belonging to the government of the city; the other three judges had the charge of hearing and trying the criminal causes, each one for three months, which was ordained to remove all occasion of suspicion that the accused, by length of time, might possibly corrupt the judges. But these orders were afterwards changed, and it was resolved that the first judge, who must be an eminent doctor of laws, should be the vicar of the podestà; that the second should judge criminal causes; the third should have the charge of the provisions; and that the fourth should be questor and receiver of the public money. The podestà, judges, and lieutenants, could not have with them in Padua their wives, nor other ladies their relations, unless for fifteen days, on occasion of sickness, nor even their brothers, sons, or nephews, above twelve years of age, nor servants who were Paduans. The podestà was obliged to bring with him his two lieutenants, twelve bailiffs, twelve horses, twelve valets and servants, and to maintain all this family and these horses at his expense, for the public service of the city. His salary was two thousand five hundred lire a year, and was afterwards increased to four thousand. The podestà was required to come to Padua eight days at least before possession was given him of the post, in which time he was obliged to take the oath of office, namely,—to swear that he, with his judges, would govern without ambition and justly, and that they would give the greatest attention to the affairs of the public, and with all their power would conciliate and pacify the controversies and discords of the citizens. The podestarate began on the first of July; but in 1280, it was decreed to begin the first of January. This magistracy at first continued for a year; but in 1294, a law was made that it should endure only six months, and that two podestàs should be created each year, one of whom should begin his administration with January, the other with July; which law was observed as long as the republic of Padua remained. But after Padua became subject, now to the emperor, Henry VII., now to Frederic, Duke of Austria, now to his brother Henry, Duke of Carinthia, now to the Scaligeri, Lords of Verona, then to the Duke of Milan, and finally to the Carrara family, this custom of two podestàs went into desuetude.

“The podestà, when once in possession of his office, was bound to execute the following orders:—First, in the space of eight days, to cause to be read, and afterwards to cause to be punctually observed, the papal constitutions against heretics. Secondly, to reside continually in the city, and rule it until the arrival of a successor. Thirdly, during the whole time of his administration, to hear the causes of all persons indifferently, to which end the gates of the palace, except at the hour of dinner, always stood open. Fourthly, that, together with the anziani, he should use all his endeavors that the canonicates and the other ecclesiastical benefices of the bishopric and diocese of Padua should be conferred on citizens of Padua or of the district. Fifthly, to elect eight citizens, men of prudence and experience, two for each quarter, who should make choice of four or five hundred able men, who, when they should hear the sound of the palace bell, were to come armed, under their standards, to the palace of the pretor, and to the Piazza del Vino, for the defence of the podestà. Sixthly, to give orders that, at the sound of the great bell of the tower of the palace, all the citizens and inhabitants of Padua, from sixteen to sixty years of age, should run armed to the piazza to defend the common liberty. Seventhly, to create a captain, who, with some soldiers, should have the custody of the city and its suburbs. Eighthly, to hold, night and day, guards at the gates of the city. Ninthly, to give orders that in the city and in the suburbs should be kept crossbows and other weapons to exercise the soldiers. Tenthly, to cause to be enrolled in the militia many men of the villages, who, according to occurrences, should come armed to the city. Eleventhly, in all great tumults, to order into the piazza the standard of the community; in which case, all the gastaldi of the arts, at the sound of the bells of the palace, were held to go to the Piazza del Vino, with the men under their command, armed, ready to obey whatever orders the podestà should issue, and there assemble, to be formed into a body, under the ensign of the community, which could not depart from the piazza without the express command of the podestà himself, for whose guard there were always five hundred soldiers chosen, one hundred from the body of the patricians, and four hundred from the plebeians, and distinguished into four squadrons, under four standards. Twelfthly, that for eight days before the arrival of a successor, the podestà cannot give sentence in civil or criminal causes. Thirteenthly, that having finished his podestarate, he, his assessors, and court, should remain fourteen days in Padua, to render an account before the syndic of their administration, which is done in this manner:—For the first three days, it was lawful to every one to accuse the podestà, assessors, and court, before the syndics, of any wrongs or injuries done them. In the eight following days these complaints were determined by the votes of the major part of the syndics; and if, by the multitude of complaints, or by differences of opinions among the syndics, or through other reasons, the business could not be finished, three other days were added, in which the syndics were obliged to determine it. From the defence against the complaints made of the podestà, all his favorites, friends, and relations were excluded, and all advocates; his own judges and assessors were alone admitted, and were thought sufficient for his defence. At the end of the fourteenth day the podestà might depart with his family. He could not be confirmed in the post for the next year, nor for the five following years; neither himself, nor any of his relations, could hold any office, dignity, or honors, in the city of Padua; and this was understood of the assessors, lieutenants of police, and other officers. But this statute was very often not observed. As population augmented, and causes and controversies multiplied, and, therefore, the podestà and his assessors could not determine the whole, certain other judges were instituted, and called Judges of the Lower Courts, and were distinguished from each other by the names of animals, for the most part, as the bear, the horse, the leopard, and others. For the suits arising between relations, two judges were instituted as arbitrators, who, in the space of two months, were to give sentence, and terminate the controversy. And if they could not agree, they called in ten jurors for each party; and if these disagreed, the podestà himself, in the space of fifteen days, sat in judgment with the rest, and decided the cause.

1 “As to the government of the territory, it is to be observed, that some of the most rich and powerful citizens of Padua had the name of proceres, noblemen or barons, and in some of their landed estates and places they exercised the jurisdiction of blood, that is, the power of life and death; and to ennoble their dominions, manors, or lordships, with the magnificence of titles, in the year 1196, they distinguished themselves into marquises, counts, and castellans. The lords of Este were entitled marquises; the lords of Anguillara, Abano, Arquà, Baone, Bibano, Borgoricco, Calaone, Rusta and Cerro, Calcinara, Caldenazzo, Candiana, Carturo, Castelnuovo, Cortaloro, Fontaniva, Honara, Limena, Lozzo, Montebello, Montebuso, Montemerlo and Mandria, Nono, and Piazzola, were called counts; the lords of Carrara, Camposanpiero, Montagnone, Peraga, Pievedisacco, Publica, Revolone, Ronchi de’ Campanili, Stra, Selvazzano, Tertula, Tribano and Galzignano, Noventa, Treville, and Villa Nova, were denominated castellans. But the Castellan of Selvazzano having caused the eyes of a certain woman to be put out for theft, who afterwards came, deprived of her eyes, to Padua, the cruelty of this action displeased the republic so much that, in the year 1200, a law was made, that under pain of death, no man should, for the future, exercise any jurisdiction in the territory of Padua; which law was reënacted and confirmed in 1205. The jurisdiction of life and death, and all other jurisdiction, being taken away from these grandees, (magnati,) the whole territory was governed by the Podestà of Padua; and afterwards, in the course of time, the republic of Padua sent a podestà into the following districts of land, namely,—Conselve, Lonigo, Montagnana, and twenty-four other districts. The custom of sending podestàs into those districts continued till 1290, when a statute was made, that places which were not walled should not have a podestà, but that into some of them vicars only should be sent.

“Such, then, was the government of Padua, from the year 1194 to the tyranny of Ezzelino, mixed of monarchy and a republic, and this constitution was restored after the delivery of the city from that fierce and cruel oppression, and lasted happily for fifty years, with a remarkable increase of the city in riches and power; and it would have lasted much longer, if the cursed factions of Ghibellines and Guelphs had not disturbed the peace of the citizens, which afterwards, by little and little, after the fashion of poison, creeping in their hearts, afflicted the city to such a degree that, at last, in the year 1318, it took away their vital spirits, depriving them of their beloved liberty.

“The parties of Ghibellines and Guelphs, under the names of the Empire and the Church, sown in the hearts of men by the enemy of the human race, had poisoned Italy, and distempered the city of Padua.”

So says the historian; and, without denying to the devil his share in the instigation of all such party distinctions and animosities, it must be still insisted on, that the essential defect in the constitution of every Italian republic was the greatest cause, and the instrument with which the infernal agent wrought. The parties of rich and poor, of gentlemen and simplemen, unbalanced by some third power, will always look out for foreign aid, and never be at a loss for names, pretexts, and distinctions. Whig and Tory, Constitutionalist and Republican, Anglomane and Francomane, Athenian and Spartan, will serve the purpose as well as Guelph and Ghibelline. The great desideratum in a government is a distinct executive power, of sufficient strength and weight to compel both these parties, in turn, to submit to the laws.

“The mischiefs of these contagious parties were greatest under the tyranny of Ezzelino, who, being standard-bearer and head of the Imperial or Ghibelline party, exerted all his force to extirpate the Guelph party, followed by the people and a great part of the patricians. After his death, the Guelph party rose, and with all their power persecuted the Ghibellines, driving them from the city, and spoiling them of all their goods; and, as the plebeians of Padua were devoted to the Guelph party, whether from their natural inclinations, or because the Guelphs had delivered the city from the empire of Ezzelino, upon this occasion certain profligate popular men, made through their favor heads of the Guelph faction, became proud, arrogant, and presumptuous, desiring that all the affairs of the republic should depend upon their will; but suspecting that some of the principal gentlemen, to whom, although Guelphs, so much pride had become disgusting, would oppose their ambitious enterprises, they gave the plebeians to understand, that those gentlemen intended to make themselves sole masters of the government. So great a commotion was excited, that the plebeians, who, servile in adverse fortune, as insolent in prosperity, demanded in a turbulent manner, and obtained by threats of force, the institution of a magistrate, according to the usage of the Roman republic, like a tribune of the people, (the Paduans called these magistrates Gastaldi dell’ Arti,) who should defend the rights of the plebeians, and have authority to rescind all those determinations of the senate, (as was the custom in Rome,) which could occasion any prejudice to the jurisdiction of the plebeians. Wherefore, in testimony of the power granted to the tribunes, it was, in 1293, ordained by a decree of the senate, that every podestà, in the beginning of his administration, should consign to each of the gastaldi of the arts the standard of that art; and this tribunitian magistracy advancing every day in power, caused to be made in its favor, in the year 1296, a statute, that, on the first Sunday in every month, the gastaldi should all assemble in the church of the palace of the commons, and treat fully of all things that belonged to the state of the city.

“The whole government of the city, by this alteration, devolved into the hands of the tribunes; because, as has been said before, they annulled or confirmed at their pleasure, the determinations of the greater council; and because they carried up to the council whatever they had concluded among themselves, with a certainty of obtaining their concurrence, by the dependence which they had upon the popular1 senators, and also upon the less powerful of the noble senators, whose devotion they had secured by electing them to the honors of the city, and by assuming some of them into the number of the tribunes, from which magistracy, as universally from all the greater honors, they always most arbitrarily excluded the most powerful.

“From this disorderly and violent domination of the tribunes, who had, for the most part, greatly enriched themselves, grew intestine hatreds and terrible seditions between the first class of persons and the heads of the popular party, with whom the patricians of middling power, exalted by the people to honors, joined. And, finally, some of the gentlemen and most powerful patricians, not being able any longer to bear to be neglected by the tribunitian power, took up arms, killed the principal heads and defenders of the plebeians, and so far intimidated those patricians who adhered to the plebeians, that, after many engagements, and a profuse effusion of blood, the tribuneship of the people was abolished in the year 1314, and the government and the public authority were transferred to the patricians, excluding totally the plebeians. These, in order to keep down the Ghibellines, increased the senate (which, from the time of the extinction of the house of Honara, had been only of three hundred members) to the number of a thousand, incorporating seven hundred Guelphs; and, wishing that all questions and matters relative to peace or war should depend wholly on the Guelph faction, and the better to establish the superiority of their party, they instituted another council, wholly of Guelphs, which had authority to approve or reject the decrees of the greater senate. From the body of this lesser council were created the four anziani, conservators of liberty, and eight secretaries for the care of the city. This mode of government continued till the year 1318, when Padua began to lose her liberty, which she afterwards wholly lost, remaining subject sometimes to the Germans, sometimes to the Scaligeri, sometimes to the Carrari, until, finally, after infinite calamities, she was benignly received into the pious bosom of the most serene republic of Venice, in the year 1405.”*

Such, as has been related, were the vicissitudes of the government of the city of Padua after the tyranny of Ezzelino, which may be recapitulated thus. According to the historian, at first, it was a mixture of monarchy and a republic; afterwards it was changed into a democracy, for such he denominates the tribuneship of the plebeians, in which the people attempted the abasement and annihilation of the grandees; and, finally, it terminated in a government mixed of monarchy and aristocracy, having the senate of the optimates, and creating the podestà annually; for the major part of the time, from 1081 to 1318, it was governed by one or other of the two best species of mixed government, as our historian thought, which are composed of monarchy and aristocracy, and of monarchy and a republic.1

This sovereignty of Padua was, for the most part, in one assembly; for, although a check was aimed at by the law, that nothing should be done in the great council, which had not been previously debated in the little council, yet, when any thing was proposed by the latter to the former, they sat together and voted as one assembly. At some times the sovereignty was clearly in one assembly of optimates or patricians; at another, in one assembly of plebeians, as that of the tribunes was. At last, two assemblies were formed, with each a negative; but there being no third power to mediate between them, no balance could be formed or maintained between them. At no time had the monarchical power, either under the consuls, anziani, or podestàs, a negative; for, though the podestà was an office of great dignity and splendor, he never had the whole executive power, nor a negative on the legislative. The nobles and commons were mixed together in both councils; and the executive power, the appointment of officers, &c. was always in one or other of the assemblies; and the consequence was instability to the laws, insecurity to life, liberty, and property; constant rivalry between the principal families, particularly the Scaligeri and Carrari, which ended in conquest and subjection to Venice.

From 1103 to 1194, the government of consuls continued; from 1195 to 1236, the government of podestàs, under the republic of Padua. From 1237 to 1256, the tyranny of Ezzelino was supported. From 1257 to 1294, the government of podestàs, under the republic, was revived and maintained. From 1295 to 1311, they had two podestàs. In 1312, Gerardo de gl’ Inzola da Parma was imperial vicar for the Emperor Henry VII., to whom the Paduans began to yield obedience; though they rebelled again this year against his authority, and the podestàs and republic were revived and continued till 1318, in which year Giacomo Grande da Carrara was made the first Lord of Padua. He governed one year and three months, and then renounced the dominion, and died in 1324. In 1319, a podestà again for one year. In 1320, the city of Padua, to deliver itself from the siege of Cane Scaligero, Lord of Verona, gave itself to Frederic III., Emperor and Duke of Austria, who afterwards gave it to his brother Henry, Duke of Carinthia, under whom they were governed by podestàs, who were, at the same time, imperial vicars, till 1328. The podestà of this year was dismissed by Marsilio da Carrara, who had been elected by the people Lord of Padua, who, however, made Pietro de i Rossi, of Parma, podestà; but he, not being able longer to resist in the war with Cane della Scala, married Tadea, daughter of Giacomo Grande da Carrara, first Lord of Padua, to Mastino dalla Scala, nephew of Cane, giving him Padua in dower. From 1329 to 1337, Padua was governed by podestàs, under the dominion of the Scaligers. In 1337, Marsilio da Carrara, having expelled the Scaligers, was made the second Lord of Padua, and governed in 1338. In 1338, Marsilio da Carrara, second Lord of Padua, died; and to him succeeded Ubertino da Carrara, third Lord of Padua. From 1339 to 1345, the government of podestàs continued under the Princes Carrara. In 1345, Ubertino da Carrara, third Lord of Padua, being sick, caused to be elected for his successor Marsilietto Papafava da Carrara, who was the fourth Lord of Padua, and died; but the same year, Marsilietto was killed by Giacomo da Carrara, who became the fifth Lord of Padua; and under him the government of podestàs continued till 1350, when Giacomo da Carrara, the fifth Lord of Padua, was assassinated by William da Carrara, a natural son of Giacomo Grande, the first lord; to whom succeeded Giacobino da Carrara, his brother, the sixth lord, and Francesco da Carrara, surnamed the Old, his son, and seventh Lord of Padua. Under these, the government by podestàs continued till 1362, when Francesco da Carrara the Old imprisoned his uncle, Giacobino da Carrara, because he had conspired his death, and reigned lord alone till 1388, when Francesco da Carrara renounced the dominion of this city to his son, Francesco da Carrara, called the New, eighth and last Lord of Padua. The same year, in November, both the father and the son were deprived of the government of this state by John Galeazzo Visconti, first Duke of Milan, who governed it by podestàs, for the years 1388 and 1389, when Francesco da Carrara, called the New, drove out the people of the Duke of Milan, and recovered Padua and its district, except Bossano. From 1390 podestàs were continued till 1405, when the Carrara were conquered, and Padua admitted into the republic of Venice. In 1393, Francesco da Carrara, surnamed the Old, seventh Lord of Padua, died in a prison in Monza, to which he had been sent by John Galeazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan.

[* ]See any of the common dictionaries, Soranus, Stephens, Ainsworth.

[* ]Della Felicità di Padova, di Angelo Portenari, Padovano Agostino, libre nove, in Padova, per Pietro Paolo Tozzi, 1623, p. 115.

[1 ]Aristot. Polit. b. 7, c. 8.

[* ]Arist. Polit. lib. vii. c. 9.

[* ]Aristot. Pol. lib. iv. c. 11.

[1 ]ὐβϱισταὶ, in the original, “insolent.”

[* ]Πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄϱιστα· μέσος ϑέλω ἐν πόλει εἰναι.

Which Dr. Gillies interprets thus:

• “How happy is the middle walk of life,
• O! may it be my portion in the state!”

[* ]4 & 8 De Leg. & in Civili, seu De Regno.

[† ]3 Polit. c. 7, 8, & 8 Eth. c. 10.

[‡ ]Lib. vi.

[§ ]De Unius in Repub. Domin.

[∥ ]Sigon. De Ant. Jur. Civ. Rom. lib. i. c. 1.

[* ]Plutar. Loc. Cit. Beros. lib. iv. Diodor. lib. i. 3. 10 Justin. lib. i. 2, 3. Oros. lib. i. & seq. Herod. lib. i. 2. Liv. et alii script. Rom. Hist.

[† ]Val. Max. lib. ix. c. 2. Cic. in Verr. 5.

[‡ ]Cic. 2, De Offic. Plat. Epist. vii. Diodor. lib. xiv.

[§ ]Suet. in Neron. Tacit. 14 Annal.

[∥ ]Appian. 4, De Bel. Civ. Plutarch in Ant.

[* ]Plut. De Unius in Rep. Dominio. Thucyd. lib. ii. in Orat. Periclis. Sig. De Repub. Athen. lib. i. c. 5.

[† ]Appian. 1, De Bel. Civ. Plutarch in Gracchis.

[‡ ]Polyb. lib. vi. Sigon. De Ant. Jure Civ. Rom. lib. i. c. 1.

[§ ]Bellarm. De Roma.

[∥ ]Boter. Relat. Venet. p. 1. Sabellic. lib. iii. lec. 2.

[¶ ]Plat. in Civili vel De Reg. Arist. 8 Ethic. c. 10. & 3 Polit. c. 10. Philo. lib. De Conf. Linguar. Senec. 2 De Benef. Herod. lib. iii. Hom. 2 Iliad, v. 204.

[* ]Aristotle, 3 Polit. c. 11.

[† ]7 Eth. c. 1.

[* ]Lib. iv. cap. 2, p. 123.

[* ]See a description and stamp of the Paduan carroccio, in Portenari, lib. v. c. 5 and 6.

[† ]Sigonius, De Reg. Ital. lib. ix. an. 1081.

[1 ]Cap. xiii. p. 124.

[1 ]Cap. v.

[1 ]“popolari,” “of the popular party.”

[* ]Laugier, vol. v. p. 236.

[1 ]Sismondi traces the vicissitudes of the government directly to the ill-regulated impulses of the people.

“Les Padouans, dans l’ensemble de leur conduite, méritoient souvent tous les reproches qu’on a faits aux démocraties absolues. Le sénat même étoit démocratique, car il étoit composé de mille citoyens qu’on élisoit chaque année; et le peuple, toujours passioné, n’agissoit point avec suite, ou d’après les règles qu’auroit prescrites la prudence la plus commune. Une jalousie violente lui faisoit écarter du gouvernement les nobles, qui, par leurs richesses, leurs talens, leur courage, et l’illustration de leur nom, auroient donné du relief à l’administration; une prévention non moins déraisonnable lui faisoit confier aveuglément une autorité dangereuse à une seule de ces familles nobles, celle qui, plus qu’aucune autre, auroit mérité sa jalousie, et qui en restoit seule exempte, la maison de Carrara. Les plus légers succès inspiroient à ce peuple une présomption insensée, et un orgueil ridicule; les plus légers revers abattoient son courage, et le disposoient à se soumettre aux dernières humiliations.”

Rép. Ital., tome iv. p. 382.