Front Page Titles (by Subject) 66.: JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTIOUS ACTS: ITS HISTORY 1 - Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, vol. 3
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66.: JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTIOUS ACTS: ITS HISTORY 1 - Committee of the Association of American Law Schools, Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, vol. 3 
Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, by various authors, compiled and edited by a committee of the Association of American Law Schools, in three volumes (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1909). Vol. 3.
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTIOUS ACTS: ITS HISTORY1
Not infrequently do the records of the related laws serve as the sole resource, or the safest one, for a methodical explanation of dark and doubtful topics in the legal development of our own native system.
Brunner:Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, i. 2.
“NO conception can be understood except through its history,” says the Positivist philosopher; and of no legal conception in Anglo-American law is this more true than of the notion of Responsibility for Tortious Acts. By this phrase is indicated that circumstance or group of mental circumstances attending the initiation and eventuation of an acknowledged harmful result, which induces us to make one person rather than another (or than no one at all) civilly amenable to the law as the source of the harmful result (and independently of whether this person can show some recognized justification for the harm). It is this notion whose history we find it possible to trace back in a continuous development in our Germanic law, without a break, for at least two thousand years.
To get a starting-point, let us look back from present principles. The law to-day, so far as we are entitled to take it as standing on a rational basis, distinguishes classes of cases which may be roughly generalized for present purposes as follows: (1) Cases where the source of harm is pure misadventure, as where a customer is handling a supposed unloaded gun in a gun-store, and it goes off and injures the clerk; (2) Cases where no design to injure exists, but a culpable want of precaution and foresight is found; (3) Cases where no design to injure exists, and yet no inquiry into the actor’s carefulness is allowed,—in other words, where he does the specific harm-initiating act “at his peril,” as where he fires a gun in the street, or sells goods which prove to be those of another; (4) Cases where actual design to produce the harm exists.1 Now, the thing to be noted is that the primitive Germanic law knew nothing of these refinements; it made no inquiry into negligence, and it based no rule on the presence or absence of a design or intent; it did not even distinguish, in its earlier phases, between accidental and intentional injuries. The distinctions of to-day stand for an attempt (as yet more or less incomplete) at a rationalized adjustment of legal rules to considerations of fairness and social policy. But the indiscriminate liability of primitive times stands for an instinctive impulse, guided by superstition, to visit with vengeance, the visible source, whatever it be,—human or animal, witting or unwitting,—of the evil result. Both these extremes are fairly clear; it is the transition from one notion to the other which forms the interesting and complex process.
In endeavoring to realize the nature of the primitive canons of Responsibility, one must take into consideration the essentially superstitious and unreasoning spirit which pervaded the jural doings of primitive society; for the notion here dealt with was only one of the vehicles of his expression. One need not here to call to mind in detail the characteristics of primitive culture;1 only certain of the more germane may be noted. The instinct of revenge, as an aggressive reaction from inflicted pain, preceding any developed sense of justice;2 the prevalence of clan-organization and clan-responsibility;3 the idea of transgression as associated with ceremonial observances;4 the implicit belief in taboo and curse;5 the propitiation of ghosts and deities by gifts and sacrifices;6 the sense of pollution and contamination (as by the touching of blood or of a corpse);7 the inheritance of guilt; the appeal to a decision of the Deity or of chance in litigation (as by the subjection to ordeals, the swearing of exculpatory oaths, the engaging in formal combat);8 the arbitrary formalism of words and phrases in pleading and oaths,9 —these give the tone to the times. In the light of these it is easy to understand that the notion of Responsibility for Harmful Results was determined largely by crude primitive instincts of superstition,—that our ancestors were satisfied with finding a visible source for the harm and following out their ideas of justice upon it.
It must be remembered, moreover, that we are here dealing with a sentiment characteristic of primitive justice everywhere. It was, beyond question, universal. It appears not only in the strictly Germanic peoples, but in the records of all the race-stocks, however mixed, of post-Christian Europe,—the Scandinavian,1 the Flemish-Dutch,2 the Celtic,3 the French,4 the Spanish,5 the Italian,6 the Slavic,7 the Hungarian.8 It is found in earliest Greece9 and earliest Rome.10 It is equally marked in the Semitic races—Jews1 and Mohammedans—,2 as well as their predecessors in Chaldea and Egypt;3 and in the totally unrelated Hindus4 and Chinese,5 as well as the Japanese.6 And in the primitive tribes still surviving everywhere—in Africa, Australia, America, and Asia—it is still observable.7 In the two following passages, its general bearing is broadly stated:
1884, A. H. Post, Die Grundlage des Rechts und die Grundguege seiner Entwickelungsgeschichte, §§ 39, 40, pp. 350, 354:
“All wrongs are originally violations of rights between one clan and another. Every wrong done by an individual creates an obligation for his clan towards that of the injured person. There is thus no doctrine, in civil wrongs, about intent, negligence, guilt, capacity, voluntariness, mistake, fear, or the like. The whole point of view of individual mental states which dominates our modern tort-law (a law essentially of individual rights and duties) is alien to primitive law. Each clan is liable to the other for every injury suffered, whether it be done by adult clan-members or by women, children, animals, or lifeless objects belonging to the clan, and whether the wrongdoer be blamable or be merely the involuntary tool of external forces. It is only with the dissolution of the clan-organization that the individual aspect of wrongs comes into consideration; and at the same time the wrongdoer’s mental state (wholly ignored in clan-law) comes for the first time into the foreground. . . . With the disappearance of the clan-organization and the development of the State, by which the inter-tribal union grows into a community held together by a higher social power, and in which the individual is accorded a more or less personal sphere of rights, there arises gradually the notion of personal culpability as a presupposition of personal responsibility for wrongs. One of its first expressions is in the idea that harm caused by accident is not to be so stringently treated as an intentional harm. Though the intentional harm would justify a blood-feud, the accidental one can be compounded by expiation-money; and wherever the injured party’s duty to accept expiation-money comes to be recognized, this is found first applied to accidental harms.
“A further mark of this gradual transition to personal culpability appears in the diminution of the fine for negligent harms as compared with that for intentional ones; and also in the application of the negligence-fine to harms done by the women, children, slaves, animals, and lifeless objects belonging to the clan, or by a blood-relation not himself responsible. . . . To this distinction between intentional and unintentional harms the distinction appears to be originally due between criminal and civil law. The intentional wrong becomes the crime, by which the doer is made corporally responsible. The unintentional wrong creates only an obligation to give redress; only the property of the wrongdoer is thereby made liable. It is only gradually that certain negligent misdeeds are made punishable as crimes, and that certain intentional wrongs are treated merely as calling for redress. . . .
“Moreover, a special grouping of negligent wrongs is quite alien to the early legal systems. Only intentional and unintentional acts are distinguished. The unintentional includes the negligent as well as the unavoidable, but without discriminating them. . . . With the rise of the conception of culpability as the presupposition of a wrong, there develops a deep and remarkable change in legal ideas. In the primitive the social order is regarded merely from a mechanical point of view and the responsibility for harm is placed on him who caused it, regardless of whether he willed it or was only the medium of a higher force; but now the mental side of the social union comes strongly to the front. There is thus prepared the basis for a psychological theory of compromise or settlement. The principle that without moral culpability no liability arises either to make compensation or to suffer punishment develops necessarily a body of doctrine about guilt, capacity, intent, negligence, and thus to distinctions between voluntary and involuntary acts. The mechanical aspect of the social order, originally the marked one, now begins more and more to be ignored, and the mental aspect, on the other hand, comes to be exclusively emphasized.”
1888, P. F. Girard, Les actions noxales, in Nouvelle revue historique du droit français et étranger, XII, 38:
“There is a phenomenon which one can discern throughout all antiquity,—that is, vengeance, the physical, unreasoning emotion, which drives the victim of an injury to a violent reaction against the immediate author of the injury. He who regards himself as offended against, takes vengeance for the offence as he will and as he can, alone or with the help of others, recognizing only the brute fact that he has suffered, and dominated by a feeling of resentment measured solely by the harm he has undergone. . . . The victim of the harm knows nothing but the harm done to him. He does not concern himself with the intent of the doer. . . . He therefore revenges himself for the harm-causing act, even though it may have been unintentional. . . . Moreover, for the same reason, the victim takes his revenge even where the immediate author of the harm is not capable of intending it,—where it is not a human being, but an animal, or an inanimate object.”1
In this particular field, too, there are numerous manifestations, all akin. The doer of a deed was responsible whether he acted innocently or inadvertently, because he was the doer;2 the owner of an instrument which caused harm was responsible, because he was the owner, though the instrument had been wielded by a thief;3 the owner of an animal, the master of a slave, was responsible because he was associated with it as owner, as master;4 the master was liable to his servant’s relatives for the death, even accidental, of the servant, where his business had been the occasion of the evil;1 the rachimburgius, or popular judge, was responsible for a wrong judgment, without regard to his knowledge or his good faith;2 the oath-helper who swore in support of the party’s oath was responsible, without regard to his belief or his good faith;3 one who merely attempted an evil was not liable because there was no evil result to attribute to him;4 a mere counsellor or instigator of a wrong was not liable, because the evil was sufficiently avenged by taking the prime actor,1 and where several cooperated equally, a lot (frequently) was cast to select which one should be amenable;2 while the one who harbored or assisted the wrongdoer, even unwittingly, was guilty, because he had associated himself with one tainted by the evil result.3 Of these various forms of the primitive notion which determined responsibility, we are here concerned with only a few,—those that have a more or less intimate connection with later doctrines of the English law of torts, and are therefore for us more worth tracing from early times.
These may be, for convenience, grouped into four classes, each one of which will be to better advantage followed out separately,—to be distinguished according as the harmful results may be traced back to (a) a personal deed; (b) an animal; (c) an inanimate thing; (d) a servant or slave. It will be convenient also to take up first the general Germanic notion, and follow it down to, say, the Norman Conquest, and then to keep to English soil, and trace down the later forms. As it happens, this division falls in fairly with epochs of doctrinal change.4
We have, then, to deal with the primitive notion which instinctively visits liability on the visible offending source, whatever it be, of a visible evil result. The notion, as applied to persons, is that of the schædliche Mann, a person from whom some evil result has proceeded.1 It can best be illustrated in advance by two instances, one drawn from a well-known tale in the Northern mythology, the other from mediæval Frisian chronicles:—
“Baldur the beautiful was beloved by all the gods, and Frigga had exacted an oath from all things—fire, water, stones, trees, and all—not to harm Baldur; for Baldur had dreamed of his own death. Then the gods, his safety assured, began in fun to pelt him with stones, clubs, and battle-axes, and found him indeed invulnerable. But Loki the jealous was vexed because Baldur was not hurt; and going in disguise to Frigga, he learned that the mistletoe alone had not been sworn, for it seemed too feeble a plant to do harm. Then Loki went up to Hodur, the blind god, who had been standing apart, for he had nothing to throw. He could not see to aim, so Loki gave him the mistletoe twig and guided his hand, and the twig flew, and struck Baldur lifeless. Then the other gods were for laying strong hands on the murderer; but they were in a sacred place. And Hodur fled. And Odin said, ‘Now, who will wreak vengeance on Hodur, and send Baldur’s slayer to Hades?’ The avenger was Wali, Baldur’s younger brother, who washed not his hands and combed not his hair until he had fulfilled his vengeance and smitten to death the slayer of Baldur.”2
A clearer case of innocence, one would think, in these days, could hardly be made out; but not so by the tests of our ancestors.—Next, an example showing an exceptionally late survival of these ideas, and at the same time the transition to different standards:—
“Owen Alwerk was brewing beer. During his absence the child of Swein Pons came in and stood by the kettle. The kettle slipped from its hook, and the liquid burned the child so that it died on the third day. The relatives of the child pursued Alwerk, who fled to the house of a friend for refuge. The master of the house opposed the entrance of the pursuers, and an affray ensued, in which the master by inadvertence killed his own nephew. The affair was laid before six men as judges; and they decided at first that Alwerk must pay the head-money for the dead child and for the dead nephew, and must besides make a pilgrimage to Rome. But Alwerk opposed the judgment, and to such a good purpose that they altered it to this effect,—that he should be absolved without more from the child’s death, and from the nephew’s if he swore that he did not urge on the master of the house to fight.”1
With these preliminary illustrations of the attitude of mind we are dealing with, we may take up, in the order of topics already named, the primitive ideas for the exposition of which we are indebted to the great Brunner.
Harm connected with a Personal Deed
It is not possible to draw hard-and-fast lines in tracing the stages of development; we can simply note that there were several stages, and point to particular rules or passages as illustrating approximately this or that successive form.
1. Of the primitive form of absolute liability, then, we find a few comparatively late traces; though, as Brunner points out, the fact of the necessity for an express mention of a prohibition or a penalty in a law is often an indication that the popular regard for the principle involved is on the wane:
Lex Bavariorum, 19, 6.—“Who injures the corpse of a man whom another has killed, either by cutting off the head or the ear or the foot, or by otherwise drawing the slightest blood, pays a fine of twelve shillings.” The example then given is this: The corpse of a murdered man is discovered by birds of prey, who settle upon it to devour it; a man sights them and draws bow at them, but strikes the corpse so that it is wounded: he shall pay the fine.
Westgothic Law.1 —The rule of Wamba: “Ut quicumque deinceps occiderit hominem, si volens aut nolens homicidium perpetravit, . . . in potestate parentum vel propinquorum defuncti tradatur.”
Roger of Sicily’s Law (1100-1150).2 —“Qui . . . lapidem ad aliud jecit hominemque occidit, capitali sententia feriatur.” The notable thing is that the first part of the law is a copy of the Lex Cornelia de sicariis; but liability is substituted for nonliability, and the above is added.
Anglo-Saxon Law.—(1) Beowulf (Chronicles) v. 2436 (ed. Heyne): the story of King Hredel, whose second son, Haedcyn, unfortunately killed his brother by an arrow which went wide of the mark. The death of the slayer was required in expiation; and the king so mourned at the untimely loss of his two sons that he took his own life. (2) LL. Henry I. (so called) 90, 11: “Legis enim est, qui inscienter peccat scienter emendet, et qui brecht ungewealdes [unintentionally] bete gewealdes, . . . [e. g.] si alicujus equus, ab aliquo stimulatus vel subcaudatus, quamlibet percuciat.”
It may be noted here that the proceeding of attaint was only a later form of the same early notion. In early times it was a general custom, where adultery or the like was discovered, to slay every living thing within the house, whether man or beast.3 The legal visitation of the sins of the fathers upon the children was one of the latest survivals of this idea.4
2. As times change, and superstition begins to fade, the notion of “misadventure,” “ungefaehr,” is hazily evolved, and facts of the sort are regarded as ground for an appeal to the king or the lord on the offender’s behalf. The strict law is thus regarded as requiring his punishment; but no vengeance can be wreaked upon him, no blood-feud started by the members of the victim’s family:
Holland.—In 1425 Aelwyn, a citizen of Delft, had “by ongevalle ende onwetende”1 killed another. The case went to the lord, Philip of Burgundy, who granted a pardon: “We hold the said Aelwyn quit and forgiven by this letter of all wrong and misdoing which he has done against us and our lordship, and we give him again his life and goods, which he thereby should have forfeited to us.”2
France.—(1) Coutumes de Clermont en Beauvoisis (1200+):3
“In case of accidents happening by mischance, in such cases pités et miséricorde ought rather obtain instead of stern justice.” When a man in turning his wagon injures another, “it is a case of mischance, and the wagoner should be shown mercy, if it does not appear that he managed it with a malicious purpose of injuring the other.” If one is separating two quarrellers, and accidentally injures the one who is his friend, “let mercy be shown him.” (2) Somme Rurale:4 Under the head “d’occire autre par cas d’aventure,” all such cases are said to fall under the penalty of death, and to need remission by the prince.
England.—(1) Anglo-Saxon laws, quoted post. (2) Bracton, De Legibus: “Crimen homicidii, sive sit casuale vel voluntarium, licet eandem pœnam non contineant, quia in uno casu rigor, in alio misericordia” (f. 104 b; also 141 b). (3) Stat. Gloucester (6 Ed. I., 1278) c. 9: If one kills another in defending himself or by misadventure, he shall be held liable, but the judge shall inform the king, “et le roy lui en fra sa grace, s’il lui plaist.” (4) Fleta5 repeats the rule of the statute. (5) Early cases in the King’s Court: (1214) “Roger of Stainton was arrested because in throwing a stone he by misadventure killed a girl. And it is testified that this was not by felony. And this was shown to the king, and the king, moved by pity, pardoned him the death. So let him be set free.”1 (1225) “Mabel, Derwin’s daughter, was playing with a stone at Yeovil, and the stone fell on the head of Walter Critels, but he had no harm from the blow; and a month after this he died of an infirmity, and she fled to church for fear, but [the jurors] say positively that he did not die of the blow. Therefore let her be in custody until the king be consulted.”2
It is to be noted that a killing done in self-defence was regarded as one of those which required to be pardoned in this way by the king; and this notion long left its impress on English criminal law:3
Early Cases.—(1221) “Howel, the Markman, a wandering robber, and his fellows assaulted a carter and would have robbed him; but the carter slew Howel, and defended himself against the others and escaped them. And whereas it is testified that Howel was a robber, let the carter be quit thereof. And note that he is in the parts of Jerusalem, but let him come back in security, quit as to that death.”4 Note that there is here no resort to the king’s pardon, yet the carter had thought it wise to seek safety by absconding.—(1203) “Robert of Herthale, arrested for having in self-defence slain Roger, Swein’s son, who had slain five men in a fit of madness, is committed to the sheriff that he may be in custody as before, for the king must be consulted about this matter.”5
3. But still, in the earlier days, the malfeasor by misadventure must at least pay a fine, though released from the penalty of death, and, later on, when the blood-feud had disappeared and a fixed payment was the regular form of civil liability, he must pay a portion of the ordinary amount:
Holland.—In 1438 Philip of Burgundy pardons by special grace the members of a guild in Leyden who have killed some one by misadventure, remitting the forfeiture of life and goods, but saving the expiation-money due the dead man’s kindred.1
Franks.—Capitulary of Charlemagne, 819 ad, with instructions to the missi, or itinerant officials: As for a person held to answer, “let this be the treatment, that if one has offended ignorantly, let him not be obliged to pay according to the full rule, but as near as seems possible.”2
England.—LL. Henry I. (so-called), 90, 11: After the maxim above cited, “qui inscienter peccat scienter emendet,” and the illustrations of misadventure, “In these and like cases, where a man intends one thing, and another eventuates, i. e., when the result, not the intention, is charged as blamable, let the judge fix a small fine and fee, inasmuch as it really occurred by accident.”3
4. Moreover, probably at a somewhat later stage, as the notion of complete exculpation (in a criminal process) grows, the malfeasor must, immediately after the occurrence, give notice of it, and swear an extra-processual exculpatory oath as to its occurring by accident or in self-defence; otherwise, he loses the benefit of the plea if suit is brought:
Franks.—Lex Ripuaria, 77: When a man slays a malefactor, flagrante delicto, who has resisted capture, he must make oath with eleven helpers that he slew the other as an outlaw; if he does not, “homicidii culpabilis judicetur.” Then afterwards he must come to his trial within forty nights, and make oath with thirty-six law-men.
Sweden.—The wrongdoer by misadventure, without waiting for suit, must offer an oath and render satisfaction for the deed.1
Holland.—The oath of exculpation for the death of a servant declared that it happened “by his self’s fault and by misadventure, and without deed of his.”2
In the thirteenth century, then, in England we find the primitive notion still living, for harm caused unintentionally; in cases of homicide, at least, the slayer forfeited goods and paid some fine or fee to the king in a criminal process, and in probably all torts the harmdoer paid some compensation to the injured party.3
We leave this topic at that stage, and turn to—
Harm connected with Animals
The successive phases of development are nearly akin to those already considered.4
1. Of the primitive idea of full liability for harm caused by one’s animals, there are a few traces:
Sachsenspiegel1 speaks of complete liability being the ancient rule, “quantum si facinus in persona propria commisisset.”
2. In the next phase, the injured party is found without the privilege of carrying out the blood-feud; this recognition of the unintentional nature of the deed seems to have come earlier here than in any other class of cases. But the owner is still answerable for the wergeld or the composito appropriate to the harm done,—by most laws for the full sum, by others for an aliquot part; and in many cases the value of the mischievous animal, if surrendered, can be used in reduction of this sum:
The full sums were required by the early Lombards,2 the Anglo-Werini,3 and the Saxons;4 the Alamanni5 required it for injuries by horses, oxen, swine, but one half only if by others; the Frisians6 required one quarter only. The Salians (early period)7 and the Ripuarians8 required the whole, but allowed the animal to go for one half. The later Lombards required one half.9 These rules may be traced in much later records of those regions.10
3. The next step is to absolve the owner entirely, if he divests himself of all relation with the accursed thing by putting it from him entirely; and this would take place, (1) in the beginning, by handing it over to the injured party for the infliction of vengeance (or, as above, in time, as in some sort a compensation or perquisite), and (2), later, by merely turning the animal loose:
(1) Lex Visigothorum.1 —The animal is delivered “ut eum occidat.”
Laws of Alfred.2 —(871-901) “If a neat wound a man, let the neat be delivered up or compounded for.”
Fitzherbert.3 —(1333) “If my dog kills your sheep, and I, freshly after the fact, tender you the dog, you are without recovery against me.”
(2) Flanders.4 —(1241, 1264). The owner is not liable if he “expellet et abneget” the animal.
Poitou.5 —The owner is freed if he “désavouer” the animal; and he is bound if he takes it back again.
Norway.6 —The owner is free if he “von der hand sagen” the horse, swine, ox, or dog; otherwise he is liable as if the murderer.
The owner would thus not be liable if the animal had escaped; for he is no longer connected with it, he is absolved:
Twisden, J.:7 “If one hath kept a tame fox, which gets loose and grows wild, he that hath kept him before shall not answer for the damage the fox doth after he hath lost him, and he hath resumed his wild nature:” this may be a trace of the early notion.8
Moreover, the notion that the owner is liable if he harbors or takes the animal back after repudiation,9 became, when rationalized as time went on, one of the sources (apparently) of the scienter rule in English law.
It must be added that the feature of delivering to the opposite party for his purpose of wreaking private vengeance was largely supplanted by the idea of forfeiture to the authorities for public punishment: sometimes the animal was outlawed, and could be killed by any one;1 later it was forfeited to the lord or to the church.2 Sometimes it was tried for its offence, and the theories and methods of trying and punishing animals form a long and interesting sidepath from the present subject.3
4. Along with all this we find in various regions in later times the requirement of an exculpatory oath as a preliminary to allowing the owner to free himself by giving up the animal. The oath perhaps at first declares merely that the owner was not privy to the wrong; but later it is that the owner was not aware of the animal’s vice:
Lex Salica.4 —“Per lege [oath] se defendere potest, ut nihil pro ipso pecore solvat.”
Livre des Droiz, etc.5 —“Celui a qui le beste sera est tenu de amender le dommage au blécié; et si ne fera amende a justice, par quoy il ose jurer qu’il ne sceust la teiche de la beste [that he did not know the vice of the animal].”
Flanders (1241).—The owner is not liable unless the animal has for at least two days shown “manifestae noxae.”
6 From this basis (and perhaps that just mentioned) the later doctrines as to animals ferae et mansuetae naturae, and as to a scienter of the tame animal’s viciousness in cases of violent injuries, would easily work out.
Harm connected with Inanimate Things
Here we may trace, mutatis mutandis, stages of development substantially analogous to those found in the preceding class of cases.
1. Of the most primitive form, subjection to the blood-feud for injuries caused by things belonging to a person, and without the owner’s personal use of them, there are only a few traces, for the change came early:
In the early times,1 when rape or adultery was committed in a house, its inmates were killed, and the house (of commission or of refuge) was destroyed.
2. This passes into a mere pecuniary liability, accompanied sometimes by the duty of handing over the injuring thing, sometimes by the privilege of using its surrender to reduce the amount of the payment:
LL. Henry I.2 —A fine was imposed “si alicuius arma perimant aliquem ibidem posita ab eo cuius erant.”
Schleswig.3 —If one is building a house, and a beam falls and kills a man, the beam is to be given over to the dead man’s heirs (or, by later law, merely thrown away), and the owner also pays them 9 marks.
3. The notion of complete exculpation by a surrender or repudiation of the offending thing, or by an abstention from using it again, very early makes its appearance:
Lex Ripuaria.4 —“Si quis homo a ligno seu a quolibet manufactile interfectus, non solvatur,5 ni forte quis6 auctorem interfectionis in usus proprios adsumperit; tunc absque frido culpabilis judicetur.”
Schleswig.—In the case above, if the beam is built in after all, the whole house is forfeited.
Norway.1 —A traveller speaks of seeing sickles, axes, and the like, with which men have been killed, lying about abandoned and unused.
LL. Henry I.2 —The owner of weapons used by another to do harm must not take them into his hands again till they are “in omni calumpnia munda.”
The notions with regard to the forfeiture of such noxal things passed through phases similar to those respecting animals; and the “deodand” is one of the traces in later law.3
4. In some cases the feature reappears (along with the principle of exculpation by surrender or repudiation) of a preliminary exculpatory oath:
LL. Henry I.4 —Where a man puts down his arms somewhere, and another takes them and does harm with them, or where he has left them with a polisher or a repairer, and the like happens, the owner must free himself by oath.
5. Finally, but coming at different times with respect to different classes of things, we find something approaching a rationalization of the rules. In some clear cases there is an absolute exculpation, without more said; in others, there is a foreshadowing of a test of due care or the like:
Lex Burgundiorum.5 —It is found necessary to say that if a lance or other weapon is stuck in the earth, and a man or animal chances to trip on it, the owner need not pay.
Lex Saxonum.1 —Payment must be made, where injuries occur from ditches or traps, “a quo parata sunt.”
Lex Anglo-Werinorum.2 —“Qui machinamentum fecit, dampnum emendet.”
LL. Alfred.3 —Where a man is injured by a spear in another’s hand, he is liable “if the point be three fingers higher than the hindmost part of the shaft; if they both be on a level, . . . be that without danger.”
Sweden.4 —At first the owner, but afterwards the user, of the noxal instrument must respond.
Harm connected with a Servant
1. There was certainly a time when the master bore full responsibility for the harmful acts of his serf or his domestic. It is worth while to emphasize this by quoting passages from Professor Brunner’s chapter on “territorial lordship,”7 his name for “the sum of the rights exercised by the lord over the tenants:”
“As regards the origin of territorial lordship, we have to distinguish in the Frankish empire a lordship by Germanic law and one by Roman law. The starting-point of the former is the responsibility of the lord for his people. According to Germanic law, as above remarked, the house-master was responsible to third persons for those attached to his house. This responsibility extended not merely to bondsmen, but also to half-free and free persons. If a free but landless man remained for some time in the house of another, he acquired a relation of dependency which established the responsibility of the house-master. . . . The liability of the master extended not merely over bondsmen living in the house, but over those settled on the land, and even over those elsewhere, so long as the master kept his ownership and no third person became responsible by receiving the man. . . . The responsibility of the master for free persons extended at least to those living in his house, followers and vassals not excepted. How far it extended without the circle of actual members of the household is doubtful. . . . For misdeeds of the bondsman the master originally bore full responsibility towards third persons. He had, as the party to the suit, to represent him and to render satisfaction for him. . . . The responsibility for free persons shows itself in the form of a duty upon the master to answer for the freeman’s misdeeds.”1
2. This responsibility disappeared in the case of freemen, as time went on, so that the master could relieve himself by handing them over to the regular courts; and this apparently worked a complete discharge. But in the case of serfs and domestics, the effect of a surrender was at first merely to relieve from the blood-feud and from the payment of peace-money; it put the situation on the footing of a “misadventure,” as then conceived, i. e., it left the master liable to pay compensation-money:
2Kent Laws.—“If any one’s slave slay a freeman, whoever it be, let the owner pay with a hundred shillings, give up the slayer, etc.”
Lex Anglo-Werinorum.3 —“Omne damnum quod servus fecit dominus emendet.”
3. Then comes the usual step of allowing the value of the surrendered slave to be set off, and finally of complete exoneration by surrender of the slave; at first to the injured family, then generally to the courts for justice to be done:
Lex Salica.1 —The master pays one half the wergeld and, for the other, surrenders the slave.
LL. William I, c. 52.—“All who have servants are to be their pledges; if any such [servant] is accused, they [the masters] are to have him before the hundred for trial. If in the mean time he flees, the master shall pay the money due.”4
4. And, accompanying the later form (complete exoneration), the master must usually swear an exculpatory oath denying any connivance with the deed; for the exoneration presupposes that the master had no part in the deed:
Chilperic.5 —“Tunc dominus servi, cum VI [hominibus], juramento [affirmet] quod pura sit conscientia sua, nec suum consilium factum sit nec voluntatem eius, et servum ipsum det ad vindictam.”
Lex Saxonum.6 —He gives up or sets free the slave, and swears “se in hoc non conscium esse.”
5. In Norman England we find this notion, “se in hoc non conscium esse,” “pura conscientia,” “nec suum consilium,” distinctly reappearing in the idea that it made a difference whether the master consented to or commanded the harm done by the servant or other member of his household. But it is necessary, before risking a generalization, to set forth the available evidence:
Maitland’s Manorial Courts, I, 8 (ad 1246).1 —“Isabella Peter’s widow is in mercy for a trespass which her son John had committed in the lord’s wood.”
P. 9 (1247): “Roger the Pleader is at his law against Nicholas Croke, [on the issue] that neither he [Roger] nor his killed Nicholas’ peacock.”
P. 17 (1248): “Hugh of Stanbridge complains of Gilbert Vicar’s son and William of Stanbridge that the wife of the said Gilbert, who is of his [Gilbert’s] mainpast,2 and the said William unjustly, etc., beat . . . And Gilbert and William come and defend all of it fully.”
P. 96 (1279): “They say that the ploughman of Sir Ralph Rastel beat and ill-treated John Scot. . . . And one Thomas, the servant of the said Sir Ralph Rastel, by way of objection said that . . . the said John Scot beat and ill-treated the said ploughman. . . . The jurors say that J. Scot did not beat [the ploughman]. . . . Therefore the said Thomas is in mercy, 12 d.”
PP. 149, 153, 154.—Court of the Fair of St. Ives (1275), Saturday, May 11: “Hugh of Swinford comes and complains of Thomas of Toraux, the Canvasser. . . . And the said Thomas comes and is charged and convicted of having by [his servant] Simon the Blake of Bury sold canvas by a false ell in his booth. And R. B., R. P., and J. G.3 are associated with him in that booth.” . . . Wednesday, May 15: “Let all the merchants . . . be summoned to come to-morrow before the steward to adjudge and provide that Thomas of Toraux, R. B., R. P., and J. G., merchants selling canvas, have justice and equity in the matter of Simon the Blake of Bury, servant of said Thomas and his fellows, who was found in their booth measuring canvas with a false ell and selling it. Pledge for Thomas’ appearance, all his goods.” . . . Thursday, May 16: “For that Simon the Blake of Bury was found, etc., . . . the said merchants as well as the said Simon were accused as consenting to the said iniquity, and the said Thomas and his fellows named above have offered to prove . . . that they are not guilty thereof . . . and for that the said Simon confessed . . . it was ordered that his body be arrested. . . . And the said merchants give 40s. to the lord for his grace and favor.”4 In a later suit (p. 155) by Simon’s lawyer, it appears that Simon “confessed in full court that he received the said rod by the hand and bailment of one Thomas of Toraux, merchant of Rouen, whom he thereof vouched to warranty,” and that he was “not to withdraw himself from his plaint, but was to press his suit against the said Thomas;” yet he did withdraw his voucher.
Court Baron, 36 (1250-1300 ad).1 —William of Street’s Case: Charge against one who sent his son in to take fruit from the lord’s tree; denial that the son ever did so at his bidding: “William (saith the steward) at least thou canst not deny that he is thy mainpast,2 nor that he was seized in the lord’s garden . . .; how wilt thou acquit thyself that thou didst not make or bid him do this?” “Sir, for the deed of my son and the trespass I am ready to do thy will, and I ask thy favor. My pledges are, etc.” “But how wilt thou acquit thyself of the sending and bidding?” “In such wise, sir, as this court shall award that acquit myself I ought.”
P. 38: William Lorimer’s Case; charge of sending two men to cut stubble in E’s field; denial, “never did such persons by his sending or bidding cut the stubble of that place nor carry it thence.” So also Walter Coket’s Case, p. 39. In another case of William Lorimer’s, p. 55, he answers, “to prove that never did my folk, J. and T. by name, cut the stubble of that place by my commandment, nor carry it off, I am ready, etc.” But in an alternative version, he denies that J. and T. were his mainpast, alleging that they were only laborers hired from day to day. Apparently either defence was good.
P. 53: “William of E., thou art attached to answer in this court wherefore thy son who is thy mainpast entered the lord’s garden over the walls, etc. . . . Sir, [to prove] that never was any manner of fruit carried off by me, I will do whatever this court shall award that do I ought.—William, at least thou canst not deny that he was found inside and carried off divers kind of fruit at his will.—Sir, ’t is true; wherefore I put myself in mercy.”
Bracton’s Note-Book.—II, 596, No. 779 (ad 1233): An assize of novel disseisin by Simon against John. J. did not come, but “William of L., his bailiff, came and said, for J., that if any disseisin was done it was not done by him, because he does not avow [i. e. sanction] the deed, nor, if it was done by his men, did any one come to him to lay it before him [ostendere] so that he might make amends [corigeret].” And Simon replies, and ends by saying that “he sent to John asking that he should make amends [emendaret] and he refused to make amends.” Ultimately John wins, “because he did no disseisin.”
Ib., II, 600, No. 781 (ad 1233): An assize of novel disseisin by Ralph Basset against the Abbot of Kirkstede, for ploughing over the line of their fields, which adjoined. The Abbot denies any disseisin, and says, “that if his lay-members did anything there, this is not by him, and if it were so [i. e. that they had done harm] and it had been laid before him, he would have caused amends to be made [emendari], but if anything was done it was not laid before him, and therefore he says that he (ipse) did no disseisin if any was done.” Then Ralph answers “that the Abbot well knew of it and it was laid before him, and the grain was carried off to the Abbot’s own grange.” The jury find that the ploughs of the Abbot did plough two or three feet over the line; and “on being asked whether the Abbot knew of this, they say that they cannot tell, but they do know well that the monks and the lay-brethren of the Abbot were there to see that it was done [? ad visum faciendum]; and since they did not lay it before the Abbot, the Abbot should fall back upon them [capiat se ad eos], for they ought to inform him of the affair. And because the jury say that the field was so ploughed and that there are no boundaries and that the Abbot last year had the grain carried off, it is adjudged that . . . the Abbot be in mercy; damage, 5s.” The jury here were asked if the Abbot knew of the deed; yet he lost the case, though the jury could not tell; and the annotator (an early hand) writes on the margin: “Note that if one’s bailiffs and servants do not lay it before their master that a disseisin has been done, the master is not excused though he says that he knew nothing of it, inasmuch as his men knew of it. So also of monks rendering obedience.”
Ib., II, 471, No. 616 (ad 1231): In an action for taking the plaintiffs’ nets and preventing them from fishing, the defendants are asked “whether they themselves avow [i. e. are ready to answer for] the taking, or whether they did the taking by authority of the Abbot of S. Edmund’s, whose men they are, and they say that they took the nets of their own authority and avow the taking.”1
Bracton De Legibus.—f. 204 b: After dealing generally with the topic of disseisin, and passing to actions for disseisin by servants, he says: “But if they [the masters] have disavowed the deed of their men, and, when they shall have been sued in any respect by any man or in any mode, they shall not have made amends [emendaverint], they are still liable, so long as they are present1 and have freely placed themselves on the assize, although they are not named in the writ. But, if they shall have made amends for the deed of their men, whether before demand or after, as long as it was before the taking of the assize, they shall free themselves and their men from the penalty of the disseisin. But if the masters are occupied in parts remote, so that they cannot be made parties, and if they have not known anything about the disseisin, for this reason the assize2 shall not be stayed.” Here it seems that the avowal or disavowal affects merely the liability to a fine, and the duty to make compensation is assumed as invariable. Almost the same principles are further expounded at f. 171 a and f. 172 b. So also 158 b, as to distraints by the servant of a lord: “It must be inquired of the master whether he has avowed the deed of his servants or not; and if not, then the master will have an opportunity to make amends; but if he has avowed it or has not made amends, he makes the wrong his own, if there was a wrong.”
We see here going on the process of a general leavening by the principle of “se in hoc non conscium esse;” and apparently we are safe in concluding that by the end of the 1200s the general civil rule was still as indicated by Bracton’s statement on the particular topic of disseisin. In other words, so far as any penal results were concerned, the master could pretty generally3 exonerate himself by pleading that he had not commanded or consented to the act;4 while nevertheless this was only a growing exception to a responsibility which the moral sense of the community was still inclined to predicate generally, and accordingly the liability to make good any harm done—i. e. the civil liability—still continued without regard to command or consent. As we shall see later, the test of command or consent was soon after extended generally to a civil liability; and even in the 1200s we seem to see it coming. Yet as that century was not thoroughly conscious of the distinctions “civil” and “criminal,”1 it can only be said that, at the point to which we have now traced the topic, we find that the test of command or consent was applied in some cases and not applied in others, the general notion being that absence of command or consent excused from correctional or penal consequence.2
In tracing these topics to this stage, two things must be noted with reference to the sources from which we thus arrive at a knowledge of the root Germanic idea: (1) It is not an absolute and unvarying idea. It was not uniformly and invariably dominant, and there were of course exceptions more or less notable. Possibly one of these obtained in the case of fire kept in one’s house and accidentally resulting in a conflagration;1 this we shall consider later. But on the whole the popular ethico-legal sentiment was of the content above set forth. (2) The various stages of the idea’s development, as already remarked, cannot be plainly pieced out for each of the Germanic communities; nor can it be asserted that for the whole race the development went on with any homogeneity of time and incident. What can be affirmed is merely that the idea, in the various communities and at various epochs, passed through stages such as those indicated.
We have now reached the stage when the notions of tortious civil responsibility, as developed in the newly organized Anglo-Norman courts, may begin to be traced separately from those of criminal responsibility. Here the process begins to be more complicated. The groupings thus far assumed for convenience—harm from (a) a personal deed, (b) an animal, (c) an inanimate thing, (d) a servant or agent—must here be abandoned, and the line of tracing must be accommodated to the groupings which are most marked in the precedents of 1300-1800; the effort in hand being always to make out the subjective course of legal thought in its progress towards the accepted standards of to-day. The topics then may be followed down in this order: 1. Harm done Unintentionally and Personally; 2. Harm done in Self-defence; 3. Harm done by an Infant or a Lunatic; 4. Keeping of Fire; 5. Keeping of Animals, with reference to (a) land trespasses, (b) trespasses by biting, etc.; 6. Keeping of Dangerous Things in general; 7. Harm done by a Servant or Agent.
1. Harm done Unintentionally and Personally.—Here, about the 1200s, the responsibility was still absolute, and irrespective of personal blame in producing the harm. In homicide, at least, the slayer by misadventure forfeited his goods and paid some fine or fee to the king, though his life was spared; while in probably all torts the harm-doer paid some compensation to the injured party. What we have to note is, first, that no distinction as to negligence or the like was yet made; it was either “misadventure,” “unwitting,”—that is, not intentional,—or wilful, intentional. Secondly, we note that the state of things still corresponded in essence with prevailing ethical notions; the man was getting fair dealing as far as the standards of the time went. Our object must be to discover how and when the notion got away from these tests.
The first circumstance we perceive is that the penal law was already getting away from them, as is shown by the sparing of the life; and as the purposes of a penal law became more and more clearly realized, we may suppose that the penal treatment grew less and less rigorous as time passed; though the forfeiture remained, in name at least, even in Blackstone’s time. But a distinction was early made between penal and civil consequences, as the Thorn-Cutting case indicates.1 This rested probably on the ground, still very properly accepted, that “in all civil acts the law doth not so much regard the intent of the actor as the loss and damage of the party suffering.”2 But to-day in torts we do certainly consider, not merely the sufferer’s damage, but the blamableness of the defendant’s conduct; while no such distinction was yet made, in the 1300s, even in cases of mere “misadventure.” We have still therefore to trace the transition in this respect.
Now, it has been generally supposed that until the present century (earlier in this country,1 later in England2 ) the old notion continued, i. e. that the rationalization never proceeded any further than to posit a voluntary act by the defendant; that if from a voluntary act a Trespass—that is, a direct and immediate injury—followed, nothing could save the defendant from civil responsibility.3 And no doubt this came to be at least the preliminary test, the sine qua non, showing itself most prominently in the rule of pleading that if there had been no such voluntary act, then there was not even a prima facie Trespass.4 But more than this the whole course of precedents and of contemporary legal opinion does not allow us to believe. The evidence seems plain that the rationalization towards the present standards began at a much earlier period than has been supposed.5 In other words, there has never been a time, in English law, since (say) the early 1500s, when the defendant in an action for Trespass1 was not allowed to appeal to some test or standard of moral blame or fault in addition to and beyond the mere question of his act having been voluntary; i. e. conceding a voluntary act, he might still exonerate himself2 (apart from excuses of self-defence, consent, and the like). At first this test, naturally, was vague enough. “Inevitable necessity,” “unavoidable accident,” “could not do otherwise,” served indiscriminately to express, in judicial language, the reasons of fairness on which they equally exempted him who had intentionally struck in self-defence, and him who had unintentionally injured without what we now call “negligence,” and him who intentionally trespassed on the plaintiff’s land to avoid a highway attack.3 The phrases, “non potuit aliter facere” and “inevitable necessity,” served as leading catchwords for many centuries; and even up to the 1800s we find Court and counsel constantly interchanging “inevitable accident” and “absence of negligence or blame.”1 The precedents show us, then, that somewhere about 1500 a decided sloughing-off of the last stage of the primitive notion took place, and a defendant could exempt himself in this sort of an action if his act, though voluntary, had been without blame; the standard being more indefinite, and perhaps not as liberal, as to-day, but not different in kind.2 But it would seem that towards the latter half of the 1800s the opinion at the bar in England misconceived the language of some of the earlier cases,3 and it became necessary to review them in two cases (Holmes v. Mather, 1875; Stanley v. Powell, 1891), in which the doctrine was finally settled, for England, that the defendant’s attention to the requirements of due care may be (not necessarily always is) a defence, even where a trespass has been done. The same doctrine (“there must be some blame or want of care and prudence to make a man answerable in trespass”) had long before been laid down in this country, and that, too, purely as a matter of the right reading of the precedents.4
In trespasses to personalty1 and to realty there had originally been a disposition, at the time the general tendency to mitigation began, to carry it out in this field also. For instance, Rede, C. J., in 21 H. VII, (1506),2 declared that “where the executors take the goods of a stranger with those of the testator, they are excusable for the taking in trespass,” because “one cannot prima facie know perfectly which goods belong to the testator and which to the stranger;” and the excused trespass of the oxen in 22 Edw. IV, (1483) 8, 24,3 seems to rest on a similar notion; while Choke, C. J., shows it clearly in the Thorn-cutting case (1446).2 But this tendency soon disappeared,4 probably for reasons of policy, which are still accepted as valid;5 and no such defence is now admissible, except in trespasses or conversions of personal property under exceptional circumstances.6
2. Self-defence.—Here, as we have already seen, the Statute of Gloucester (1278) provided that, in crown cases, the slayer in self-defence (though forfeiting his goods) should receive a pardon by the king’s favor if he pleased.7 Yet the practice as to a pardon varied, for in two of these cases (1302, 1349) the defendant was apparently set free immediately.8 By 1624 the forfeiture was not required.9 In civil actions of trespass, however, the mitigation was longer in coming. In 129410 and in 131911 the defendant was obliged to respond; but in 1400,12 and ever since, the plea is accepted as a complete defence.1 Yet its whole scope was not fully realized at first. For instance, in the very case preceding that of 1302, in which the defendant was set free for killing a wheat-thief in self-defence, the defendant (in a crown case) who killed a wheat-thief in defence of his brother was sent to prison;2 and in 1436,3 when it was agreed that in all justice “it is lawful for a man to aid his master,” it seems to be a case of first impression.
3. Lunatics and Infants.—The natural result of the primitive notion would be to hold the lunatic liable, no less than the slayer by misfortune; and in fact the two stood at this time on the same footing:
“It was presented that a certain lunatic wounded himself with a knife, and, after he recovered from his infirmity [lunacy] and received the rites of the church, he died of his wounds; his chattels were confiscated” (1315).4 In 1330 a lunatic homicide is given a king’s charter of pardon.5
But the popular superstitions in such matters prevented as rapid an approach as might have been expected towards a rational treatment, even in criminal cases, of lunatic harm-doers. It would seem that a similar inability to make allowances served for a long time as in part a basis for tortious responsibility; though doubtless as much or more influence is to be attributed to the maxim, so powerful in the sphere of deeds and contracts, that “no man of full age shall be, in any plea to be pleaded by him, to be received by the law to stultify himself.”6 However, by Lord Bacon’s time, the principle was maintained in the form that a lunatic was responsible for his torts in the same way as an ordinary person.7
The development was quite otherwise with the responsibility of Infants. In Germanic custom the male child was without a standing in the community as an obligor or an obligee. Like the master for the slave, the father answered for and made claims on behalf of the child.1 The ceremony of investing him with arms as a wehrhaft, or weapon-bearing, member of the community, was the usual period for the assumption of rights and liabilities; and this customarily (not always) took place at the age of twelve. Hence we find, in Anglo-Norman days, the age of twelve years as the earliest at which liability can begin.2 We soon see, however, a tendency to reduce this age-limit,3 and the twelve-year rule came to be disregarded in criminal cases;4 while a seven-year limit appears in later criminal law as the subject of a presumption against criminal intent.5 The case of 35 H. VI, 11, pl. 18 (1457) is usually given as the first in which an infant was held liable in Trespass.1 But the language of the Court there shows (the penal idea being still at that time attached to the idea of a trespass) a disposition to exempt the infant; and the reason given for refusing to discharge him as incapable of discretion (that the possibility of a plea of justification takes the power from the Court) does not put the case on any ground of the immateriality of intention. Moreover, in 16112 it was resolved by the Court that a writ of capiatur would not be issued in an action of vi et armis against an infant; and in Temp. Car. I.3 an action of Case for slander against an infant was sustained on the ground that malitia supplet ætatem. However, about this time we find infants ranked with lunatics as liable civilly on the general ground that the intent (i. e. bad intent, bad motive) was immaterial.4
4. Keeping of Fire.—Here the old responsibility, in its strictest form, continued down to Queen Anne’s reign, and for almost the whole period, we may believe, it was sanctioned by popular notions.5 The short name of the action (“for negligent garder son feue”) is a misleading one; it means merely “for failing to keep in his fire,” and the responsibility was absolute, as may be seen from the words of the writ6 (“quare . . . homo et femina . . . ignem suum die ac nocte salvo et secure custodire teneatur, ne pro defectu custodiæ,” etc.), and from the proceedings in Beaulieu v. Finglam (1400),1 where any question of blamableness is excluded.2 The primitive idea is seen remaining in the argument there made and rejected, that “the fire could not be alleged to be his fire, because a man cannot have property in fire.”3 In Tuberville v. Stamp (1698)4 the old tradition was still adhered to (“be it by negligence or by misfortune, it is all one”); though the intervention of a sudden wind-storm was treated as an available excuse.5 In 17006 a similar action failed, apparently only by bad pleading; but in 17127 the responsibility for accidental fires in houses8 was abolished by the Legislature.9
5. Keeping of Animals.—(a) In trespasses of animals by biting or otherwise wounding, we find the rule on English soil to be a lineal successor of the form already seen in the North French records,10 that the owner “did not know the animal’s vice.” The three writs in the Register11 begin by alleging that the defendant “quosdam canes ad mordendum oves consuetos apud B. scienter retinuit,” “quondam canem ad mordendos homines consuetum1 apud L. scienter retinuit,” “quondam aprum ad percutiendum animalia consuetum apud W. scienter retinuit.”2 Sometimes, especially for dogs, we find a modification of the old rule, the same in idea though somewhat different in form, intimating that liability ensued where the vice and the knowledge could not be shown, if the owner incited the animal to the trespass;3i. e. the same broad idea, of Command or Assent, as in the case of servants. The rule remained on this basis for several centuries,4 though the form of the usual writ seems to have changed slightly.5 By Lord Holt’s time it was found desirable to rule that a scienter was not necessary in the case of animals “naturally mischievous in their kind;”6 and his admirably concise statement of the rule has since prevailed, giving Courts nothing to do but apply it to varying circumstances; though even in this apparently simple task they have sometimes found that they had an elephant on their hands.1
(b) But for land-trespasses of animals the old strict liability continued in full force. Some indications appear of a tendency to impose a greater penalty for trespasses repeated after a first trespass has occurred;2 but no such relaxation seems to have maintained itself,3 and the principle was kept that “a man should so occupy his common that he does no wrong to another man.”4 In modern times, as we shall see, this rule has been rationalized with others under the principle that those who keep things likely to do mischief keep them at their peril.5 There were but two modifications made. One was the decision, in a solitary case, that in turning the plough on adjoining land (as custom allowed) the owner was not liable for the trespass of the oxen in snatching a mouthful of grass, since “a man cannot at all times govern them as he will;” here the existence of such a custom was held a necessary element in the exemption.1 The other was the exemption from trespasses of cattle who wander, when driven along the highway lawfully, provided the driver is present and not in fault and makes fresh pursuit.2 This seems at first to have been granted in cases where the plaintiff was bound by custom to fence along the highway;3 but in the 1800s this limitation disappeared, and such a duty now seems to play no part;4 so that an English Court will now go so far as to exempt the driver (barring negligence) of the bull who breaks into the traditional china-shop,5 —thus bringing true the law laid down by Doddridge, J., in 1605,6 which, however, was probably not yet law in his day.7
With this history for the rule, it is in appearance strange that it should not have been applied equally to dogs as to other animals. The explanation seems to be that in the Germanic days, from which the traditions come down, the dog was not a domesticated animal,—was only a half-savage hanger-on in the human communities, as he is to-day in many parts of the world. Belonging to nobody, nobody was responsible for him;8 and by the time man’s relation to him could be said as a usual thing to be one of control or possession, the tradition was all against making his owner responsible (barring wilfulness) for his trespasses to land. Such seems to have been the judicial attitude up to this century,1 and not by any means on grounds of tradition merely; but although Victoria has reached a different result,2 and although in this country Dog Acts have dealt decisively with the acts of a dog, the law of England on the subject cannot yet be said to be declared.3
6. Sundry Acts; Acts at Peril. We have now traced down to modern times sundry doctrines of Responsibility in the typical classes of acts found expressly regulated in the primitive law; and everywhere there has been more or less rationalization of the rules. In some classes (e. g. keeping cattle) the duty is made an absolute one for all in similar situations; in others the question of culpability is reopened as to due care in each case on its circumstances; but in all there has come to be assumed some degree of fault sufficient to amount to culpability. There are, however, numbers of acts not falling under the classes above traced; and the question arises, What has been, historically, the canon of Responsibility with reference to these? When did the Courts in these cases begin to base an action upon negligence alone, or upon some other test? We are here brought to the subject of the history of the Action on the Case for Negligence, so-called. But this is an inquiry too complex to be here taken up; a summary reference to its probable history must here suffice. Looking, then, at these sundry injuries (other than the above classes) as the Courts of several centuries ago must be imagined to have approached them, we find that they would probably have presented themselves in one of three aspects: (1) There was as early as the 1600s, and probably earlier, a principle that one who did an unlawful act (or one who committed a trespass) was liable for all the consequential damage, when properly alleged as special damage.1 (2) The principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas was early familiar to the judges, and can clearly be traced even where it is given an English garb.2 This was generally employed to cover the case of an injury caused by acts done on one’s own land, but it was sometimes extended to cover the case of injuries by cattle. (3) For harm caused by a mere non-feasance, including many cases which we now subsume under Negligence, probably no action would lie.3 The word negligentia, as used in earlier times, meant apparently (as has been seen in the action for fire) merely “failure to do” a duty already determined to exist; thus, though the Courts constantly said that “a man is bound to keep his cattle in at his peril,” he is sometimes said to be held for “defaut de bon garde,”4 —meaning, not careless keeping, but merely failure to keep as bound; and the misapprehension of this was probably the source of Blackstone’s well-known misstatement that the action was for “negligently keeping” his cattle.5 It seems, then, that the action on the case based on a mere negligent doing was of little or no consequence until the 1800s,6 and that it then came about partly through the principle of consequential damage noted above, and partly through the growing application of the test of negligence in Trespass, as already indicated. But this suggestion is merely one made in passing; the essential point to note is that certain of the cases we have studied historically had become, in the 1800s, amenable to a generic test of Negligence, or Due Care under the Circumstances, which had somehow come to be applied to some other cases also. What we have still to notice is the fate of those remaining classes of cases which never became amenable to this test of Due Care under the Circumstances.
Briefly, they wandered about, unhoused and unshepherded, except for casual attention, in the pathless fields of jurisprudence, until they were met, some forty years ago, by the master-mind of Mr. Justice Blackburn, who guided them to the safe fold where they have since rested. In a sentence epochal in its consequences this judge co-ordinated them all in their true category:—
“There does not appear to be any difference in principle between the extent of the duty cast on him who brings cattle on his land to keep them in and the extent of the duty imposed on him who brings on his land water, filth, or stenches, or any other thing which will, if it escape, naturally do damage, to prevent their escaping and injuring his neighbor; . . . the duty is the same, and is to keep them in at his peril.”1
It is not that the phrase “at peril” was a novel one. On the contrary, it is an indigenous one and a classical one in our law.2 Nor is it that no previous attempt had been made at such a co-ordination of these kindred instances; for several such attempts, of more or less insight and conviction, may be found.1 What gave the exposition on this occasion its novelty and its permanent success was the broad scope of the principle announced, the strength of conviction of its expounder, and the clearness of his exposition, and perhaps, too, the fact that the time was ripe for its acceptance.2 It caught up and reconciled the absolute liabilities already predicated, as well in the two rules just above mentioned (consequential damage of an unlawful act, and “so use your own as not to injure another’s”) as in the remaining rules for trespasses by acts done “at peril” (keeping cattle, shooting guns under certain circumstances, and others already mentioned); it furnished a general category in which all such rules, whenever formed, could be placed. The full scope of the principle has since not always been perceived in individual instances; and Courts may differ, and have differed, as to whether particular acts (e. g. keeping reservoirs) should, in policy, have the principle applied to them.3 But the practical effect of that great jurist’s opinion has been to furnish us with four main categories of voluntary acts from which may arise a question of Responsibility for a specific harm, viz. (1) acts done wilfully with reference to that harm; (2) acts done at peril with reference to that harm; (3) acts done negligently with reference to that harm; (4) acts done nonnegligently with reference to that harm. In point of theory, the second and the fourth can best be regarded as subdivisions of the third.1 But at any rate all four are nowadays kept separate by rules of law. We had, at the times of the Conquest, two categories only,—acts wilful and acts of misadventure,—and these scarcely distinguishable civilly. To-day, with the process of rationalization nearly accomplished, we find these transmuted to four,—a differentiation which is in scope and conscious significance novel to the past.
7. Harm Done by Servants and other Agents: 1300-1850. It remains to trace the test of master’s responsibility for the tortious acts of persons in his service. In the first part of this Essay we found that in the primitive Germanic idea the master was to be held liable absolutely for harm done by his slaves or servants; that, in later Germanic times, the master could exonerate himself by surrendering the offending person, and at the same time taking an exculpatory oath, “se in hoc non conscium esse,” “quod pura sit conscientia sua;” that, on English soil, in the early Anglo-Norman period this idea of responsibility appeared in the shape of exoneration for deeds of the servant not commanded or consented to; but that in that period the test of Command or Consent had hardly begun to be applied to responsibility in what we now term its civil aspect,2 and, while common in penal matters, was by no means fixed in its scope. The subsequent development of the idea we may now take up in three stages: A. the period beginning with Edward I’s time, 1300 circa; B. the period beginning with Lord Holt’s time, 1700 circa; C. the period beginning with Lord Kenyon’s time, 1800 circa. Speaking provisionally and roughly, these stages stand for the following phases: (1) the extension of the Command or Consent test to civil responsibility; (2) the test of Implied Command from General Authority; (3) the test of Scope of Authority or Course of Employment. We may now take up the evidence of this development.
A. ad 1300-1700. It will be apparent to one who studies the following cases that for a century or so the undercurrent of feeling was still that the master bore absolute civil responsibility for his servant’s doings; that the extension of the Command test had to make its way against what may be called the presumption to the contrary, and that it came first in cases (such as fraud) more nearly related to the sort of conduct to which it was already recognized to apply, i. e. morally reprehensible, criminal acts; and that it can hardly be found to be accepted as a general rule in trespass, etc., until early in the sixteenth century:
1302, Y. B. 30-31 Ed. I, 532 (Rolls ed.).—Hugo is charged with rape. Duodecim: “Nos dicimus quod ipsa rapiebatur vi per homines domini Hugonis.” Justiciarius: “Fuitne Hugo consentiens ad factum vel non?” Duodecim: “Non.” . . . Justiciarius: “Hugo, quia ipsi vos acquietant, nos vos acquietamus.”
1302, Y. B. 30-31 Ed. I, 203 (Rolls ed.).—A poor woman complained of frequent distresses by B. The inquest “said that the woman’s son, who was of her mainpast [household], had done damage in B.’s wood.” Berrewik, J.: “And inasmuch as he did wrong to distrain the woman for [the deed of] her mainpast,” B. was found guilty.
1305, 33 Ed. I, 474 (Rolls ed.).—Writ of covenant by Henry de Bray, a tenant against his landlord, a knight, for disseisin. The inquest founded that the knight’s lady had come with her friends, and the plaintiff, departing in fear, left her in possession “without that Master Henry was ousted by the knight himself or his counsel.” The Court held that, “inasmuch as the deed of the wife is the deed of the husband, it is awarded that Master Henry recover these damages of 100 marks.”1
1353, St. 27 Ed. III, 2, c. 19.—“No merchant nor other, of what condition that he be, shall lose or forfeit his goods nor merchandizes for the trespass and forfeiture of his servant, unless he do it by the command or procurement of his master, or that he hath offended in the office in which his master hath set him, or in other manner that the master be holden to answer for the deed of his servant by the law merchant, as elsewhere is used.” (Apparently this is the first positive modification in civil matters. Here, as often elsewhere, mercantile convenience is earliest in calling for new adjustments.)
1401, Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y. B. 2 H. IV, 18, pl. 6.—Action for damage caused by the defendant’s fire. Markham, J.: “A man is held to answer for the act of his servant or of his guest in such a case; for if my servant or my guest puts a candle on a beam, and the candle falls in the straw and burns all my house, and the house of my neighbor also, in this case I shall answer to my neighbor for the damage which he has, quod concedebatur per curiam.” Hull, for the defendant: “That will be against all reason to put blame or default in a man where there is none in him; for negligence of his servants cannot be called his feasance.” Then the traditional misfortune-liability is cited in reply. Then Markham, J.: “I shall answer to my neighbor for him who enters my house by my leave or my knowledge, or is entertained by me or by my servant, if he does, or any one of them does, such a thing . . . ; but if a man from outside my house, against my will, puts the fire . . . for that I shall not be held to answer to them, etc., for this cannot be said to be through ill-doing on my part, but against my will.”1
1498, Y. B. 13 H. VII, 15, pl. 10.—“It was held in Common Bench, if my servant, against my desire, chases my beasts into the land of a stranger, I shall not be punished for this, but my servant; otherwise if my beasts escape against my desire, for I shall there be punished. Quaere, if I keep a dog, and my servant against my desire incites and causes the dog to bite and kill the beasts of a stranger, whether I shall be punished for this.”
1505, Y. B. 20 H. VII, 13, pl. 23.—Trespass for false imprisonment; justification as bailiff by command of the sheriff under a writ; the sheriff had neglected to return the writ, and this was objected to as defeating the plea. Rede, C. J., “to the contrary. For there is no default in the bailiff. . . . For suppose that the master commands the servant to distrain, and so he does it and takes [the distress] to his master, and the master misuses it, is it reason to punish the servant? No, surely; and so no more here. And if the master commands the servant to distrain, and the servant does so, it is not reason, if the servant misuses the distress, that the master should be punished by cause of his command, which was lawful in the beginning; wherefore, on the other hand, [in this case also] the law should be all one.”
1506, Y. B. 21 H. VII, 22, pl. 21.—Same facts as in 20 H. VII, supra; probably the same case adjourned. Rede, C. J., holding the defendant excused “since every bailiff and every servant is bound to do the precept of his master in all that is legal,” and showing that “there is a defendant in his master, in whom the default is,” says: “As if I command my servant to take a distress for my rent, and he does it and leads the distress to me, and I kill it, or do other illegal thing with it, in this case the servant is excused; and, on the other hand, where I command my servant to take the distress legally, and he rides on the distress, in this case he shall be punished, and I excused, for that when I command him to do a thing legally, and he does contrary to the commandment, he does a wrong to which I did not assent [agrea]; it is reason to punish him and to excuse me, and so here. . . .”
1518, Doctor and Student, II., c. 42 (Muchall’s ed. 233).—“For trespass or battery, or wrongful entry into lands or tenements, ne yet for felony or murther, the master shall not be charged for his servant, unless he did it by his commandment.”
1525 circa, Treatise on Subpoena (1 Hargreave’s Law Tracts, 347): “Also if a man’s servant thro’ negligence of his maister, tho’ it be not by his commandmente or assente, but for lacke of correction, do offences and trespasse to his neighbour, whereby the master is bound in conscience to make restitution if his servante be not able, yet there lieth no subpœna againste the master to compel him to it.”
1606, Waltham v. Mulgar, Moore, 776.—Action against the owner of a privateer which captured a friendly ship. A civilian solicitor argued for an absolute responsibility of masters “in public affairs.” “He who has put a ship in traffic should provide servants who will not commit public offences.” But Popham, C. J., said: “Where the master put his servant to do an illegal act, the master shall answer for the servant if he mistakes in the doing of the act; but where he put his servant to do a legal act, as here to take the goods of the king’s enemies, and he has taken the goods of friends, the master shall not answer. As if one sent his servant to a market to buy or sell, and he robs or kills by the way, the master shall not answer; but if he sets him to beat some one, and he kills him or mistakes the person and beats another, the master is a murderer. So with rescous or trespass.”
1677, Michael v. Alestree.—Action for bringing ungovernable horses to be trained in Lincoln’s Inn Fields, whereby the plaintiff was injured; the horses were actually taken there by a servant of the defendant. The chief discussion was as to the general liability for so using horses. It is then said, in 2 Lev. 172: “It shall be intended that the master sent the servant to train the horses there;” in 3 Keb. 650, “The master is as liable as the servant if he gave order for it.”
1685, Kingston v. Booth, Skinner, 228. In an action of trespass for assault, battery, and wounding, “these points were ruled by three of the justices. . . . Secondly, If I command my servant to do what is lawful, and he misbehave himself, or do more, I shall not answer for my servant, but my servant for himself, for that it was his own act; otherwise it was in the power of every servant to subject his master to what actions or penalties he pleased. Thirdly, If I command my servant to do a lawful act, as in this case to pull down a little wooden house (wherein the plaintiff was . . .) and bid them take care they hurt not the plaintiff, if in this doing my servants wound the plaintiff, in trespass of assault and wounding brought against me, I may plead not guilty, and give this in evidence, for that I was not guilty of the wounding, and the pulling down the house was a lawful act.”1
In view of the almost uniform language of Courts, counsel, and text-writers in these records of the 1500s and 1600s, it seems necessary to believe that the test, as it came to be accepted in those centuries, was none other than that of Command (i. e. before the deed) or Consent (Assent) (i. e. before or after the deed). In one specific case it is fairly clear that (for reasons already seen2 ) the old strict liability continued down through the 1600s, viz., the case of a fire started by the servant within the house. But apart from this exceptional case, and possibly one or two others involving the persistence of extraneous traditions, it may be inferred that the Command or Consent test was the natural and universal one. Moreover, it accords perfectly with the notions which we have found to characterize the later Germanic and the early Anglo-Norman periods, being the natural form of their orderly development.
Harmonizing with and corroborating the general rule, are two subsidiary rules, worth noting by way of evidence: (a) The rule that the command of the master excused the servant. It does not necessarily follow, of course, that where the servant had no command to plead in excuse, there the master would not be liable (though, as above indicated, that was in fact the rule); but the cases on pleading a command as an excuse are useful in indicating how common and natural that test was, and in thus corroborating the applicability of the corresponding test in suits against the master.1 (b) The rule of pleading that the replication in denial de injuria sua propria, when made in answer to a plea of justification as servant under the command of a master, was proper only where the justification consisted in a command merely, without any claim of interest in property (Crogate’s Case).2 That a master’s command, as above in (a), was generally a sufficient excuse is clearly implied in this rule, and we have here a corroborative effect of the same sort.
In the cases in the 1500s and 1600s there further appears the refinement which may be termed the doctrine of Particular Command, i. e. the doctrine that the master, to be liable, must have commanded the very act in which the wrong consisted (unless the command had been to do a thing in itself unlawful).3 It was somewhat by way of a reaction against this refinement that the form of the rule began to change under Lord Holt; and to this next stage we now come.
B. ad 1700-1800. We may here pause for a moment to consider the situation at that time. It is obvious that the Particular Command doctrine, if pushed to its logical extreme (as it was apparently coming to be), must have resulted in putting very narrow limits on the principle of responsibility for servants’ and agents’ doings. The doctrine would require, in effect, that the master should be liable (unlawful errands apart) only when the deed in all its details had been expressly and specifically commanded; and the arguments in Southern v. How,1 suggest the practical consequences of such a rule. Now, whether or not such a limited rule would have been desirable, it is certain that the circumstances of the time forced upon the judges a serious consideration of the expediencies of such a rule. The nation was reaping in commercial fields the harvest of prosperity sown in the Elizabethan age and destined to show fullest fruition in the age of Anne. The conditions of industry and commerce were growing so complicated, and the original undertaker and employer might now be so far separated from the immediate doer, that the decision of questions of masters’ liability must radically affect the conduct of business affairs in a way now for the first time particularly appreciated. A time had come when persons administering the affairs of others could no longer be classed indiscriminately as “servants,” at the beck and call of the master for each bit of work,—a time when in social development the position of a factor or agent vested with more or less authority and discretion was in fact no longer that of a servant.2 It was therefore natural that the judges should find themselves forced to consider (1) the practical expediency of the traditional test of liability, (2) if they should revise it, the expression and presentation of the test as revised.
On the first point, it is clear that they did in effect revise it. They determined (whether rightly or wrongly need not be here considered) that practical expediency could not put up with the logical consequences of the Particular Command test.1
As to the second point, the new phrasing, there was much uncertainty for a time, indeed for a century or more; but naturally enough the existing test was laid hold of and modified to suit their needs; and after all it was in itself fairly adapted to answer for the test which they thought just.2 The test now became what may be termed the rule of Implied Command from a General Command or Authority. At the same time, amid the general reconsideration, other phrasings of the test were sometimes vouchsafed. “Whoever employs another is answerable;” “acting in the execution of authority;” “acting for the master’s benefit;” “being about the master’s business,”—these appear as tentative expressions in the general effort to re-state on a rational basis. But the old test, in its broader scope, is still dominant in the last half of the new century:
1691, Boson v. Sandford, 2 Salk. 440; 3 Mod. 321.—The question was whether the owners of a ship were responsible for goods received by the master and spoiled by his negligence. Holt, C. J.: “The owners are liable in respect of the freight and as employing the master; for whoever employs another is answerable for him, and undertakes for his care to all that make use of him.”
1698, Tuberville v. Stamp; action for a fire started by the defendant’s servant in a field. Skinner, 681: It was argued by the defence that “it does not appear in this case to be done by the command of the master, and then it being out of his house he is not responsible.” Comb. 459. Holt, C. J.: “And though I am not bound by the act of a stranger in any case, yet if my servant doth anything prejudicial to another, it shall bind me, where it may be presumed that he acts by my authority, being about my business.” 1 Ld. Raym. 264: Holt, C. J.: “So, in this case, if the defendant’s servant kindled the fire in the way of husbandry, and proper for his employment, though he had no express command of his master, yet the master shall be liable . . . ; for it shall be intended that the servant had authority from his master, it being for his master’s benefit.”
1699, Middleton v. Fowler, 1 Salk. 282.—Case against owners of a stage-coach for a trunk taken on by the driver, but lost. Holt, C. J., said that a stage-coachman was not here within the custom of carriers, and adds, as to the receipt of money by the driver, “no master is chargeable with the acts of his servant, but when he acts in execution of the authority given by his master, and then the act of the servant is the act of the master.”
1709 (?), Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289.—Deceit for cloth of wrong quality; the deceit was in defendant’s factor beyond sea. “Holt, C. J. was of opinion that the merchant was answerable for the deceit of his factor, though not criminaliter, yet civiliter; for seeing somebody must be a loser by the deceit, it is more reasonable that he that employs and puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver should be a loser than a stranger.”1
1722, Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Stra. 505.—Where an apprentice converted a jewel handed to him for weighing, “the action well lay against the master, who gives a credit to his apprentice and is answerable for his neglect.” (Pratt, C. J.)1
1734-6, Boucher v. Lawson, Lee’s Hardwicke, 85, 194.—A ship-master took on gold at Portugal, contrary to Portuguese law, and on arrival in London it was missing. Counsel for defendant: “If the servant of a carrier carry goods without the privity of his master, or his receiving a reward for taking them, the master is not chargeable. . . . A master is not answerable for the acts of his servant but where he acts in execution of any authority given him by the master. . . . My servant sells false stuff without my commanding it; no action lies against me; otherwise if by my commandment.” Counsel for plaintiff: “As to the master’s not being liable for his servant but in the exercise of his trade, this is in the master’s trade, for it is the trade of the owners of ships to carry goods;” citing Choke’s case of the horseshoer in 11 Edw. IV, ante. Hardwicke, C. J., decides for the defendants: “. . . It deserves to be considered whether, if a ship be sent for a particular purpose, and not in the general way of trade, the master can take in goods to charge the owners. . . . For anything that appears in this case, this might be a ship sent to Lisbon for a special purpose, and if so, no one can say that the master, by taking in goods of his own head, could make the owners liable. . . . This is no reason why these cases should be carried any further than they have been already.”2
1758-65, Blackstone, Commentaries, I, 429.—“As for those things which a servant may do on behalf of his master, they seem all to proceed upon this principle, that the master is answerable for the act of his servant, if done by his command, either expressly given or implied; nam qui facit per alium facit per se. Therefore, if the servant commit a trespass by the command or encouragement of his master, the master shall be guilty of it. If an inn-keeper’s servants rob his guests, the master is bound to restitution; for as there is a confidence reposed in him that he will take care to provide honest servants, his negligence is a kind of implied consent to the robbery; nam qui non prohibet, cum prohibere possit, jubet. So likewise if the drawer at a tavern sells a man bad wine, whereby his health is injured, he may bring an action against the master; for although the master did not expressly order the servant to sell it to that person in particular, yet his permitting him to draw and sell it at all is impliedly a general command. . . . In the same manner, whatever a servant is permitted to do in the usual course of his business, is equivalent to a general command. . . . A wife, a friend, a relation, that use to transact business for a man, are quoad hoc his servants; and the principal must answer for their conduct; for the law implies that they act under a general command; and without such a doctrine as this no mutual intercourse between man and man could subsist with any tolerable convenience. . . . [As to a servant’s negligence], in these cases the damage must be done while he is actually employed in the master’s service. . . . [In conclusion] the reason of this is still uniform and the same,—that the wrong done by the servant is looked upon in law as the wrong of the master himself; and it is a standing maxim, that no man shall be allowed to make any advantage of his own wrong.”1
Attention may here be called to—
1. The form and phrasing of the test. From the arguments in Boucher v. Lawson and the passages of Blackstone, it may easily be seen how the idea of Express Command was naturally enlarging itself into that of Implied Command, a Command to be implied or posited from a general commission to do a class of acts. “Whatever a servant is permitted to do in the usual course of his business,” says Blackstone, “is equivalent to a general command.” “Where he acts in execution of any authority,” says counsel in Boucher v. Lawson; and this is the dominant phrase with Lord Holt. “It may be presumed that he acts by my authority, being about my business,” is another phrase of his. The new terms are natural enough and hardly call for explanation. It may be suggested, however, that “authority” was particularly easy of adoption because about this time it seems to have had, as a primary sense, the concrete meaning of a specific order (not merely the power itself, abstractly regarded).1 As the full meaning of the situation was realized, it was inevitable that the broader terms “scope of authority,” “exercise of trade,” “course of employment,” should prevail; but this was not yet to be.2
2. The reasons offered for the rule. As already observed, we find first under Lord Holt an effort to put the rule on a rational footing of policy,3 —an effort which, owing to inherent difficulties, has not yet by any means ceased. Usually some definite ground of policy, more or less tenable, was offered. Lord Holt’s reasons are in substance covered by his brief sentence in Wayland’s Case, “It is more reasonable that he should suffer for the cheats of his servant than strangers and tradesmen,” because it is he (Hern v. Nichols) who “puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver,” and (Armory v. Delamirie, per Pratt, C. J.) “gives a credit” to him. Blackstone, tracing the harm back to the original command of the master, says “no man shall be allowed to make any advantage of his own wrong.” Lord Hardwicke (Boucher v. Lawson) tries to strike a fair balance between the “security” which others ought to have who trust the servant and the “security” which masters ought to have from wayward employees. But very often the judicial mind gave up the troublesome task of accurately expressing a reason, and, quite content with the policy of the rule, took refuge, when it came to naming a reason, in a fiction or other form of words. “The master undertakes for the servant’s care,” said Lord Holt, in Boson v. Sandford; which of course is not true. The favorite expressions of this sort, however, were “the act of the servant is the act of the master,” when done in execution of authority (Middleton v. Fowler, Jones v. Hart), and “qui facit per alium facit per se” (Blackstone); and perhaps “respondeat superior” has often been used thus to evade giving a clear reason. Now here it must be noticed that there are different ways of employing a fiction. One is to accept as a guide a traditional element, though it no longer answers to the notions of the day, and to insist upon its use; as when the loss and finding are alleged in trover, or the loss of service in seduction. In the former instance the allegation is now recognized as a pure and ineffectual fiction; in the latter, except in some states, the loss of service must still be proved, though the whole basis of the claim rests to-day on other notions. A very different way is to employ a fiction to sanction a rule which we thoroughly believe in, but lazily prefer to evade accounting for openly and rationally. Of this sort is the instance in hand. Sometimes, as where in a document under seal the seal is said to presume a consideration, we borrow some kindred doctrine and force it to our present use; but sometimes, as here, we put forth a phrase not already used for the purpose, but now found very handy. So that what we have to remember about the employment of the above fiction of Identification, in the history of the present doctrine, is, (1) that it was merely a reason, an easy, concise reason, which was put forth to sanction and support a rule of whose practical expediency the Courts were perfectly satisfied; (2) that it was merely one of several reasons, and by no means the most common, and that, in short, the rule would have stood substantially as it does now, if all reference to the Identification fiction were wanting.1
C. ad 1800+. In what may be taken as the next stage, the balance is seen to change gradually; the Command phrase disappears as a regular one, and the Scope of Employment phrase, with its congeners, come into full control. The opinions of Lord Kenyon seem chiefly to mark the change (though his language is not uniform). Savignac v. Roome and Stone v. Cartwright show the rivalry with particular clearness:
1795, Morley v. Gaisford, 2 H. Bl. 442.—Case against one whose servant negligently drove a cart against the plaintiff’s chaise. A verdict was found for the plaintiff, but a motion was made in arrest of judgment that the action should have been trespass. “The Court seemed at first inclined to refuse the rule, saying that it was difficult to put a case where the master could be considered a trespasser for an act of his servant, which was not done at his command,” but, after delaying for further consideration, the rule was discharged on the defendant’s suggestion.2
1795, Savignac v. Roome, 6 T. R. 125.—Case for wilfully driving, by his servant, a coach against the plaintiff’s chaise. Verdict for the plaintiff. Espinasse moved in arrest, because, first, “no action could be maintained against the defendant for a wilful act of the servant, accompanied with force, unless done by command of the master,” citing Jones v. Hart, supra; and, second, because the action should have been trespass. Bayley contended that it was enough if the injury was done in the course of employment; but Espinasse quoted Blackstone, ubi supra, and Kingston v. Booth, supra. The Court made the rule absolute on the second ground, without noticing the first.
1796, Stone v. Cartwright, 6 T. R. 411.—The defendant managed a colliery as guardian; he employed a superintendent for the work, but took no personal concern in it. He was held not liable for a caving of the soil resulting from the improper removal of pillars. Lord Kenyon stated that such actions should be brought against either “the hand committing the injury, or against the owner for whom the act was done.” Lawrence, J., said: “If the plaintiffs had given evidence that the defendant had particularly ordered those acts to be done from whence the damage had ensued, that would have varied the case.”
1811, Paley on Agency: “But the responsibility of the master for the servant’s negligent or unlawful acts is limited to cases properly within the scope of his employment. . . . The responsibility of the principal is confined to acts done either under his express direction, or in his service and therefore under his constructive command. In all cases in which the frauds or injuries of servants have been held to affect their employers, it appears that the employment afforded the means of committing the injury. No wilful trespass of a servant, not arising out of the execution of his master’s orders or employment, will make him responsible.”
1826, Laughter v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547.—Here the defendant hired a coach from a stable, and the stable-keeper sent a driver with it, and a collision ensued, there is no traceable remnant of the literal form of the doctrine; all seemed ready to say, as Lord Kenyon did: “I admit the principle, that a man is answerable for the conduct of his servants in matters done by them in the exercise of the authority that he has given them.”1
From this time the general test is phrased as “scope” or “course” of “employment,”2 “scope of authority,”3 or, in later times, more carefully, “in furtherance of and within the scope of the business with which he was trusted.”1
Did no direct traces remain at later times of the supplanted Command test? Or was its broader substitute left in sole possession of the field after Lord Kenyon’s time?
1. A very few cases are to be found in which (the judges, perhaps, having been brought up under the earlier form of doctrine) a direct survival may be seen.2
2. By one of those misunderstandings not infrequent in our legal system, the language of the 1700s century became, in the 1800s, the basis of the rule that the form of the action against the master could be Trespass in that case alone where the specific act had been commanded by him.3 But this rule began in a misconception, gradually evolved, of the earlier rules, as reflected in the later series of cases just examined. The stages were three: (1) Morley v. Gaisford (1795), in the Common Pleas, initiates the above rule; but a comparison of it with Savignac v. Roome (1795), and Brucker v. Fromont (1796), indicates the prevailing principle, as administered in the King’s Bench, to have been that the form of action followed the intrinsic nature of the act; i. e. sue the master in Case where negligence of the servant is the basis of the claim, sue in Trespass for the servant’s trespass. (2) In McManus v. Crickett (1800), Lord Kenyon held that the master is not liable at all for a wilful trepass of the servant, unless done at express command, because he thus practically exceeds his authority; for his trespasses not wilful, Case lies. Of this understanding are Paley4 and Peake,5 writing shortly after. (3) Then forgetfulness ensued, the opinion at the bar altered, and in (1826) Gregory v. Piper and in (1849) Sharrod v. R. Co., it was said that the master is not liable in Trespass for his servant’s trespasses (i. e. direct acts, wilful or not), unless expressly commanded. This doctrine may well be regarded as a necessary result of the common-law theory of Trespass; but it seems on the evidence that it originally crept in through a misconception of the language of the old Command test, then becoming obsolete.
A review of this history of the idea of the master’s and principal’s liability throws some light on the validity of the principle in point of policy. As an existing rule, it cannot be objected to as the mere fossil remnant of a fiction. A learned writer has however averred that “common-sense is opposed to the fundamental theory of agency.” This is not the place to offer to do what no one has yet succeeded in doing,—to phrase the feeling of justice which every one has in the more or less extended responsibility for agents’ torts. But it is worth while noting that the doctrine of to-day took shape under Lord Holt in a conscious effort to adjust the rule of law to the expediency of mercantile affairs. It is also worth noting that the Command or Authority principle may prove to be, theoretically as well as historically, the true support of the rule of responsibility for agents’ torts. Perhaps the nearest approach to theoretic adequacy is that of Lord Brougham, in Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Cl. & F. 894, 910: “I am liable for what is done for me and under my orders by the man I employ, . . . and the reason that I am liable is this, that by employing him I set the whole thing in motion, and what he does, being done for my benefit and under my direction, I am responsible for the consequences of doing it.”1 In other words, (1) if I command A to do act x, I ought to be liable for the natural consequences peculiar to that act taken in itself; (2) the same follows if x is a class, series, or group of acts; (3) if A does the act in a careless or otherwise wrongful way, different from that in which I expected him to do it, and not as I myself might have done it, my personal culpability is no longer clear; nevertheless, complete legal exoneration in such cases would be poor policy, for it would afford ample opportunity to shirk responsibility, merely by appointing substitutes; so that some medium must be found. If, then, I employ knowingly a careless servant, here at least I should be liable, just as for imprudently keeping a dog known to be ferocious. But even this may on practical grounds be too lenient a rule, for I may still find means of evading due responsibility under cover of that test. Public convenience then may demand that I should be liable up to a still further point, even though I select agents carefully; in other words, we may say that I employ a substitute more or less at my peril. Just as gunpowder is kept at peril, but steam-engines, through demands of industrial welfare, are not kept at peril, so there is an undefined point at which the appointment of a substitute ceases to be at peril; and in the nature of the case that point is in individual instances hard to determine. But the conflict is hardly, as the learned jurist would place it, between common-sense and tradition, but between one great consideration of policy and another. If the restraining consideration just now seems to be the weak one, it is precisely because, as the above-mentioned article admits, public opinion is convinced (rightly or wrongly) that the broad rule is a “seemingly wholesome check on the indifference and negligence of great corporations.” Whether for the sake of this alone we should sanction such broad limits in dealing with the general mercantile community is perhaps a really different question. But at any rate the whole liability, wherever it be bounded, can be discussed and expressed, it would seem, “according to the ordinary canons of legal responsibility,” without borrowing support from a supposed historic fiction.
PROPERTY (IN GENERAL)
[Other References on the Subject of this Part are as follows:
Folcland, by Paul Vinogradoff (English Historical Review, 1893, VIII, 1).
The Transfer of Land in Old English Law, by Paul Vinogradoff (Harvard Law Review, 1907, XX, 532-548).
Changes in the American Law of Real Property. Anon. (American Jurist, 1829, pp. 28-97).
Les fondations [charitable gifts] en Angleterre; étude de droit comparée, by Jean Escarra (Paris, 1907).
History of Land Tenure in Scotland and England, by R. Campbell (Law Quarterly Review, 1885-86, I, 175-183, 400-411, II, 166-176).
History of the Irish Land System, by W. O. Morris (Law Quarterly Review, 1887, III, 133-157).
Alienation of Estates Tail, by H. W. Elphinstone (Law Quarterly Review, 1890, VI, 280-288).
Short Studies in the Early Common Law; II, Rents-Charge, by W. G. Hammond (Green Bag, 1892, IV, 283-292).
Early English Land Tenures, by M. Kovalevsky (Law Quarterly Review, 1880, IV, 266-285).
The Seisin of Chattels, by F. W. Maitland (Law Quarterly Review, 1885, I, 324-341).
The Beatitude of Seisin, by F. W. Maitland (Law Quarterly Review, 1888, IV, 24-39, 286-299).
Possession for a Year and a Day, by F. W. Maitland (Law Quarterly Review, 1889, V, 253-264).
Feoffment and Livery of Incorporeal Hereditaments, by L. O. Pike (Law Quarterly Review, 1889, V, 29-43).
Origin of Rights of Common, by T. E. Scrutton (Law Quarterly Review, 1887, III, 373-398).
History of Legislation concerning Property in England, by J. E. R. de Villiers (London, 1901).
Changes of Real Property Law in the United States, by G. E. Beers (in Two Centuries of Growth of American Law, Yale Bi-Centenary Studies, New York, 1901).
Origin of the System of Recording Deeds in America, by J. H. Beale, Jr. (Green Bag, 1907, XIX, 335).]
[1 ]This Essay first appeared in the Harvard Law Review, 1894, vol. VII, pp. 315, 383, 442, and has been revised and brought down to date by the author for this Collection; most of the quotations from English cases given in the original article, in the second and third parts, have been here omitted.
[2 ]A biographical note of this author is prefixed to Essay No. 40, in Volume II of this Collection.
[1 ]Compare Holmes, Common Law, cc. iii., iv., esp. pp. 92 ff., 144 ff.; Pollock, Torts, p. 19. It is here assumed, for present purposes, that in the few classes of cases where actual malicious motive is material, no question of responsibility, properly considered, is involved, but rather a question of the loss of a privilege; as pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in his article on Privilege, Malice, and Intent (Harvard Law Review, VIII, 1; 1894) and by the present author in an article on the Tripartite Division of Torts (id., VIII, 200, 377; 1894). Professor Whittier, in his article on Mistake in the Law of Torts (id. XVI, 335; 1902) does not accept this analysis.
[1 ]The keenest and most comprehensive analysis of these related features of primitive life is to be found in The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, by Edward Westermarck (lecturer at Helsingfors and at London; Eng. ed. 1906), vol. I (vol. II, 1908, has little). Next in suggestiveness and insight should be mentioned G. Glotz’ La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce (Paris, 1904). A general survey of the primitive attitude in English law is given in Professor J. B. Ames’ article on “Law and Morals,” 1908 (Harvard Law Review, XXII, 97).
[2 ]Westermarck, supra.
[3 ]Westermarck, Glotz, supra.
[4 ]Spencer, Ceremonial Institutions, 10.
[5 ]Westermarck, Tylor.
[6 ]Tylor, Primitive Culture (3d Amer. ed.), ii. 380.
[7 ]Tylor, Ib., ii. 429.
[8 ]Lea, Superstition and Force, passim.
[9 ]Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, i. 181, ii. 349; Wort und Form in altfranzös. Prozess, 1868 (reprinted in Revue Critique de Législ. et de Jurisp., 1871-72, and more recently in his Forschungen, 1894).
[1 ]K. v. Amira, Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht, 1882, I, 389-91; H. Matzen, Forlaesninger over den danske Retshistorie, 1897, II, 48-57; F. Brandt, Forlaesninger over den norske Retshistorie, 1883, II, § 50, pp. 38-46.
[2 ]S. J. Fockema-Andreae, Het oud Nederlandsch burgerlijk Recht, 1906, II, 115-123; L. A. Warnkoenig, Flandrische Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte, 1842, III, 164, 183, 200; A. His, Das Strafrecht der Friesen, 1901, § 46, pp. 37-61.
[3 ]Ancient Laws of Ireland, 1879, IV, 247; H. d’Arbois de Jubainville, Etudes sur le droit celtique, 1895, I, §§ 20, 22, pp. 184, 190.
[4 ]E. Glasson, Histoire du droit et des institutions de la France, 1889, III, 560.
[5 ]B. Oliver, Historia del derecho de Cataluña etc., 1879, III, 339.
[6 ]A. Pertile, Storia del diritto italiano, 1892, 2° ed., V, § 170, pp. 58-64; C. Calisse, Storia del diritto penale italiano, 1895, §§ 3-7, pp. 4-13; G. Salvioli, Trattato di storia del diritto italiano, 1908, 6° ed., § 540, p. 720.
[7 ]W. A. Maceiowski, Slavische Rechtsgeschichte (Germ. tr.), 1839, IV, 278, 281, 301, 305; H. Jirecek, Das Recht in Boehmen und Maehren geschichtlich dargestellt, 1865, vol. I, pt. 2, p. 142.
[8 ]A. v. Timon, Ungarische Verfassungs- und Rechtsgeschichte, 1904 (Germ. tr. Schiller), 421.
[9 ]G. Glotz, La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce, 1904, pp. 48, 165. It is true that B. W. Leist, in his Graeco-Italische Rechtsgeschichte, 1884, pp. 286, 333, 344, 350, 394-406, denies that even in the most primitive Greek period a distinction was made between intentional and non-intentional harms; but in this he stands alone; though Freudenthal, in Mommsen’s Zum aeltesten Strafrecht (cited infra, n. 4) inclines to that view. However, Glotz has once for all demonstrated the matter. It is doubtless to be conceded that the Greeks developed the distinction at an earlier stage of their history than any other people; this was simply one of the many marks of their precocious sense of ethics in justice. The later Greek ideas are fully discussed in R. Loening’s Die Geschichte der strafrechtliche Zurechnungslehre, 1905, vol. I: Aristoteles; on which an elaborate critique is made by O. Kraus, in Der Gerichtsaal, 1904, LXV, 153, 172, “Die Zurechnungslehre des Aristoteles.”
[10 ]T. Mommsen, Zum aeltesten Strafrecht der Kulturvoelker, Fragen zur rechtsvergleichung, 1905, p. 3 (with contributions also on the Greek, Hindu, Arab, Islamic, and Germanic laws, by various scholars, and another on Roman law, by Hitzig, agreeing with Mommsen); Pernice, Labeo, 1873-1900, I, pp. 117, 216, II, pp. 5, 36, 49; Beschuetz, Die Fahrlaessigkeit, infra, note 7; R. v. Ihering, Das Schuldmoment im Roemischen Recht (in his Vermischte Schriften, 1879), pp. 155, 163, 200 (“Is the eye of primitive man closed to the discrimination of culpable and innocent intent? . . . [It is, for] a wrong is estimated, not according to its cause, but its effect,—not according to some element in the person of the doer, but from the standpoint of the injured party”); Hepp, Die Zurechnung auf dem Gebiete des Civilrechts, 1838, passim; Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht, 1899, p. 85 (“the idea of wrong requires an unlawful intent in a person having capacity; but this fundamental principle of developed criminal law is in the origins of that subject an alien one.”)
[1 ]I. J. M. Rabbinowicz, Législation criminelle du Talmud, 1876, p. 174; J. Thonissen, Etudes sur l’histoire du droit criminel des peuples anciens, 1869, II, 183, 265, App. D; Numbers, XXXV, 22-25, et passim.
[2 ]Thonissen, supra, II, 271; J. Kohler, Zur Lehre von der Blutrache, 1885, p. 23; J. Goldziher, in Mommsen’s Zum aeltesten Strafrecht, supra, 104; Wellhausen, ibid. 96.
[3 ]Thonissen, supra, I, 163, 164; Code of Hammurabi, ed. Harper, §§ 196-208, 249-251.
[4 ]Oldenberg, in Mommsen’s Zum aeltesten Strafrecht, supra, 76; J. Kohler, Das Indische Strafrecht (Zeitschrift fuer vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 1903, XVI, pp. 179, 183, note 13); E. P. Buffet, translation of Parajika, III, c. 5 (American Law Review, XLII, 387, 423; 1908).
[5 ]H. Betz, Chinesische Strafrechtsfaelle [der Gegenwart] (Zeitschrift fuer vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, XXI, 393, 397; 1908). Staunton, tr. of Ta Tsing Leu Lee (Penal Code), 1810, § 292, and App. XI; C. Alabaster, Notes and Commentaries on Chinese Criminal Law, 1899, pp. 260-287; A. Leclère, Recherches sur la législation criminelle des Cambodgiens, 1894, pp. 292, 299, 371.
[6 ]O. Rudorff, Tokugawa Gesetzsammlung (Mittheil. der deutschen Ostasiatischen Gesellschaft, 1889), Art. 71, §§ 36-39, Art. 74 of the Kujikata Osadamegaki of 1742-83; H. Weipert, Das Shinto-Gebet der grossen Reinigung (Der Gerichtsaal, 1904, LXV, 241, 261).
[7 ]Westermarck, Moral Ideas, supra, passim; A. H. Post, Afrikanische Jurisprudenz, 1887, II, § 199, p. 28; A. H. Post, Grundriss der Ethnologischen Jurisprudenz, 1894-5, II, §§ 48-55, pp. 214-233; P. Wilutzky, Vorgeschichte des Rechts, 1903, II, 40; Beschuetz, Die Fahrlaessigkeit innerhalb der geschichtlichen Entwickelung der Schuldlehre, Teil I: Vom primitiven Strafrecht bis zur peinlichen Gerichtsordnung Karls V (No. 76, Ser. XIV, in v. Lilienthal’s Strafrechtliche Abhandlungen, Breslau), 1907, § 2, pp. 8-28. Loening’s notable book (supra, n. 3) is apparently not completed beyond Greek law.
[1 ]So far as regards the many concurring elements that produce this particular principle, it should be noted that Post over-emphasizes the clan-life element, while Girard over-simplifies the problem in noting only the vengeance-instinct. How tangled the primitive elements are can be seen in Westermarck’s masterly chapter, (cited supra, p. 476, note 1), pp. 30-72, 217-231, 241-260, 306.
[2 ]See post.
[3 ]See post.
[4 ]See post.
[1 ]Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (1892), II, 549. “The master was liable for the weregeld of the workman if the latter lost his life in the service, and for the appropriate money-payment if he was injured,—so far as the injury could not be imputed to some third person for whom the master (who had to answer for the misdeeds of his own people) was not responsible. If one who was in the service of another lost his life by misadventure, by reason of a tree or of fire or of water, the accident was imputed to the master as homicidium. If one person sent another away or summoned him on the former’s business, and the latter lost his life while executing the order, the former was taken as the causa mortis.” See LL. Henry I. 90.
[2 ]Brunner, Ib., II, 360. “That the intention to act wrongfully is presumed as of course against the defeated party [in a suit against the judges], and, especially as regards the judges, that the excuse of having judged according to their best knowledge and belief is not allowed, is merely an individual application of a fundamental principle pervading the Germanic penal law, which is to argue without question from the particular external circumstance to the presence of an unlawful intent, and (apart from typical exceptions, not here involved) to treat unintentional misdeeds the same as intentional ones, without allowing proof of the absence of intent.”
[3 ]Brunner, Ib., II, 389. “The earlier times paid no regard to the good faith of the individual oath-helper, in accordance with their general principle of penal law, which without discussion treated the unlawful intent as accompanying the external fact of an offence. . . . The latter development shows the tendency, on the one hand, to increase the punishment for a false oath, but, on the other hand, to distinguish between false oaths sworn wittingly and unwittingly.” It may be suggested that when the learned investigator in these passages speaks, e. g., of “treating the unlawful intent as accompanying, etc.,” he hardly means to attribute to a past age the sentiments peculiar to the present one. The primitive Germans did not “presume” or “impute” an unlawful intent: they simply did not think of the distinction at all. To feel the need of such an element, and to “impute” or “presume” it, marks a later stage of development.
[4 ]Brunner, Ib., II, 558. “The penalty of unintentional misdeeds is parallelled by the general impunity accorded to attempts.” Moreover, though certain acts which fell short of causing death, and yet put life in peril (as pushing into the water, etc.) were treated as lesser offences, somewhat as we treat attempts; yet “it was immaterial whether the result was caused with the intention of killing, or with some other design, or unintentionally” (560).
[1 ]Brunner, Ib., II, 565.
[2 ]LL. H. I. 59, 25; Brunner, Ib., II, 468.
[3 ]Brunner, Ib., II, 575. “From the jural notion that the misdeed in itself puts a man beyond the law, follows fundamentally the penalty on the act of rendering assistance. . . . [This notion] has to do with the idea that the helping of the offender is a mutiny against the common weal, or it springs directly from the principle that he who stands out for the wrongdoer takes upon himself, as against the community, the wrongdoing and its consequences.”
[4 ]Note.—This seems the best place to say, once for all, that the ensuing first part of the essay is for the most part merely a condensation of Prof. Dr. Heinrich Brunner’s article in the Proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, vol. xxxv., July 10, 1890, “Ueber absichtslose Missethat im altdeutschen Strafrecht,” afterwards reprinted in the learned author’s Forschungen zur Geschichte des deutschen und franzoezischen Rechts (1894).
[1 ]Br., D. Rg. II, 537; 2d ed. 1906, I, § 21, p. 211.
[2 ]In Bugge, Norrven Fornkvaedi (Christiania, 1867), p. 212, is another instance, from the Song of Sigurd, the slayer of the dragon Fafnir. Loki, in company with Odin and Honir, had seen an otter and killed it with a stone; for it had been carrying off the pelts belonging to the gods. But they discovered that the supposed otter was none other than the son of Hreidmar, who had put on the form of an otter; and, for the compensation they were obliged to give, they filled the otter-skin within and covered it without with gold, and gave it to Hreidmar.
[1 ]ad 1439, Richthofen, K. v., Friesische Rechtsquellen, 570; 1840.
[1 ]Walter, Corpus Juris Germanici Antiqui, I, 668. The general dates of these Germanic codes vary from 400 to 900 adcirca. The large collections usually referred to for the texts are Monumenta Germaniae Historiae, Quarto ed., 1888+ (cited M H G), and Schmid’s Gesetze der Angelsachsen, 2d ed. 1858, now superseded by Liebermann’s Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen, 1898-1906; other editions and source-books will be found cited in Br. D. Rg. I, vii.
[2 ]Merkel, Commentatio, 1856, p. 31, fragm. 42.
[3 ]J. Grimm, in Zeitschrift fuer deutsches Recht, V, 17, 18.
[4 ]Westermarck, Origin of Moral Ideas, c. XX. Bracton says (f. 105b): “Crimen vel pœna paterna nullam maculam filio infligere potest;” but this is a borrowed humanity, and does not represent the actual law of his time. By the Golden Bull of Charles IV. in 1356, the lives of the sons of such as conspire to kill an elector of the Imperial Crown are spared by the Emperor’s particular bounty; but they lose all rights of succession and of holding office, “to the end that, being always poor and necessitous, they may forever be accompanied by the infamy of their father, may languish in continual indigence, and may find their punishment in living and their relief in dying.” In Blackstone’s time this corruption of blood still existed, though he disparages it; but the forfeiture of estates he defends on grounds of policy.
[1 ]“By accident and unwittingly.”
[2 ]Van Mieris, Groot Charterbuch van Holland, 4, 800.
[3 ]Beaumanoir (ed. Beugnot, 1847, Salmon, 1899), c. 69.
[4 ]Bouteiller (pub. 1537), ii. 40.
[5 ]I, 23, 15.
[1 ]Selden Society, vol. I. Pleas of the Crown, I, No. 114.
[2 ]Ib., No. 188. See also Bracton, Note-Book, III, 157, No. 1137 (ad 1235-36), where “nescitur adhuc utrum ipsum interfecit per infortunium vel alio modo,” and so the defendant is allowed to abjure the kingdom.
[3 ]Blackstone, Comm. iv. 182-188.
[4 ]Selden Society, vol. I, Pleas of the Crown, I, No. 145.
[5 ]Selden Society, ibid, No. 70. So also Bracton, De Legibus, 1446, mentioning a case of a pardon to a man who defended himself against a burglar in his own house (ad 1234); Bracton, Note-Book, III, 229, No. 1216 (ad 1236-37), where the jury found a killing in self-defence, and “dominus rex de gracia sua, non per judicium, perdonavit ei mortem illam” (1236); also Bracton, N. B. III, 107, No. 1084 (ad 1225). These were before the Statute of Gloucester (1278), cited above. So also the following case: Gross, Select Cases from the Coroner’s Rolls ad 1265-1413, p. 102 (Selden Society, vol. IX; 1895).
[1 ]Mieris, Handvoeren, etc. der Stad Leyden, 289.
[2 ]Boretius, Capitularia, I, 290 (M H G, Sectio II), Cap. Missorum, ch. 15.
[3 ]In old Swedish law accidental killing is not to be punished unless both parties (i. e., the deceased’s relatives, practically) wish it (v. Amira, Altschwedisches Obligationenrecht, 382, 1882). So in old Japan the custom is recorded (Simmons and Wigmore, Notes on Land Tenure, etc., Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 1891, vol. XIX, p. 121) that the judge may pardon if the deceased’s family withdraw their charge against a murderer; an application of the rule mentioned in Rudorff’s Tokugawa Gesetzsammlung, (cited supra, p. 478), Art. 35 of the Reigaki, giving a case of 1744, and Art. 46 of the Hundred Laws of Iyeyasu, a century earlier; note there the idea of expiation, in that the guilty man then becomes a priest: S. & W. supra. This is probably the transition-form preceding the above stage; first, the family agree to compound for less money, and then the judge compels them to. A curious example of this phase is seen in the LL. Henry I.: where a man falls from a tree and kills another below, he shall be held innocent; yet the blood-feud will be allowed if insisted upon, but it may be carried out in one way only,—the avenger may himself mount the tree, and in turn fall upon the slayer. This is recorded also in Holland (Brieler Rechtsbuch, Matthijssen, 212; pub. in Oude Vaderlandsche Rechtsbronnen, 1880, 1st ser. vol. I), and in a Hindu popular tale (Kohler, Shakespeare in dem Forum der Jurisprudenz, 93; 1883).
[1 ]v. Amira, Altschwedisches Obligationenrecht, 379.
[2 ]Brieler Rechtsbuch, Matthijssen, 210. So also, in maritime law, for a death on shipboard: Fruin, De oudste Rechten der Stad Dordrecht (1882), ii. 52, No. 70; i. 235, No. 79 (Oude Vaderlandsche Rechtsbronnen, 1882, 1st ser. vol. IV); and R. Wagner, Handbuch des Seerechts, 1884, I, 399.
[3 ]For some cases of “misadventure” not particularly significant, see Selden Society, Pleas of the Crown, I, Nos. 81, 132, 156, 203 and Seld Soc. vol. IX, Gross’ Select Cases from the Coroner’s Rolls, pp. 24, 38. The general principle is noted in Bateson’s Borough Customs, 1906, II, Introd. p. 40 (Selden Society, vol. XXI).
[4 ]For the corresponding phases in the noxal action of Roman law, see the following special articles besides the usual treatises: P. F. Girard, quoted ante, p. 480; H. Isay, Die Verantwortlichkeit des Eigenthuemers fuer seine Thiere, in Ihering’s Jahrbuch, 1898, XXXIX, 209-322 (an exhaustive study).
[1 ]Landrecht, ii. 62, Sunesen, 55.
[2 ]Rothar, 326-8, 330.
[3 ]Lex Ang.-W., 52.
[4 ]Lex Sax., 57.
[5 ]Pactus Alam., iii. 17.
[6 ]Lex Fris. Add., 3, 68.
[7 ]Lex Salica, 36.
[8 ]Lex Rip. 46.
[9 ]See note 1.
[10 ]Etablissemens de St. Louis, i. 125; Warnkönig, Flandrische Rechtsgesch., ii. 2. 226 (1265). In Pact. Alam., where a dog bit to death, the half wergeld was allowed; yet the avenger might demand the whole, on condition that he should suffer the dog’s dead body to hang in his doorway till it rotted away (iii. 16).
[1 ]Lex Visig., 8, 4, c. 20. Accord. Schwabenspiegel (Lassberg), 204.
[2 ]C. 24.
[3 ]Abridgment, Barre, 290.
[4 ]Warnkönig, Flandrische Rechtsgeschichte, ii. 2, No. 222; iii. No. 166.
[5 ]Livre des droiz et des commandemens, c. 871.
[6 ]Brandt, Forlaesninger over den Norske Retshistorie, ii. 46.
[7 ]Mitchel v. Alestree, 1 Vent. 295 (1676).
[8 ]For further traces in later times, see Holmes in The Common Law, 22 and ante, in Essay No. 63.
[9 ]Poitou, supra.
[1 ]Bouteiller, Somme Rurale, i. 38; Magk (Norway), in Paul’s Grundriss der germanischen Philologie, ii. 1, 120; Andreae, Stadregt van Vollenhove, i. 316. But the sentiment which ultimately grew up may be early seen in scattered passages: “Car bestes mues n’ont nul entendement, qu’est biens ne quest maus” (Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvoisis, 6, 16).
[2 ]Etablissemens de St. Louis, i. 125; Coutumes de Touraine-Anjou, 114; Livre des droiz, etc., 119; Bouteiller, Somme Rurale, i. 37.
[3 ]K. v. Amira, Thierstrafen und Thierprocesse (1892); E. P. Evans, The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals (1907); Westermarck, Origin etc. (cited ante, p. 476), pp. 254-260.
[4 ]C. 36 (later texts).
[5 ]C. 114; Etablissemens de St. Louis, i. 125; Bouteiller, Somme Rurale, i. 38 (where the owner had been warned by the local authorities).
[6 ]Ubi supra, par. 3.
[1 ]J. Grimm, in Zeitschrift fuer deutsches Recht, v. 17-18; Westermarck, Origin, etc. (cited ante, p. 476), p. 262.
[2 ]C. 90, 11.
[3 ]Thorsen, De Stadsretter for Slesvig, etc. (1855), 19, 49, 75, 192.
[4 ]C. 70, 1. This is found in almost the same words in LL. Henry I., 90, 6.
[5 ]No payment need be made.
[6 ]Observe that any one who uses them is liable.
[1 ]Liebrecht, Zur Volkskunde (1879), 313.
[2 ]C. 87, 2.
[3 ]Holmes, Common Law, 25, citing, among other cases, “If my horse strikes a man, and afterwards I sell my horse, and after that the man dies, the horse shall be forfeited” (Plowden, 260). A number of instances will be found in Gross’ Select Cases from the Coroners’ Rolls ad 1265-1413 (Selden Soc. Pub., vol. IX; 1895), pp. 8, 15, 40, 50, 54, 59, 68, 77, 82, 92, 94, 95, 96, 99, 105, 106, 121, 122, 125; Bateson’s Borough Custumals, I, 17 (Selden Soc. Pub. vol. XVIII, 1904). For Roman law, see Girard’s article cited on p. 480, ante. Every one is familiar with the fossil remains of the deodand in the clause of the criminal indictment stating the value of the weapon with which a murder was done.
[4 ]C. 87, 2.
[5 ]C. 18, 2, and see LL. Henry I., 90, passim.
[1 ]C. 58. Cf. also Lex Rip. 70, 2: “Si quis autem fossam vel puteum fecerit, seu pedicam vel balistam incaute posuerit. culpabilis judicetur.”
[2 ]C. 61.
[3 ]C. 36.
[4 ]v. Amira, Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht, i. 286.
[5 ]Bouteiller, Somme Rurale, i. 39.
[6 ]But as late as 1466 a counsel thus argued in England: “If I am building a house, and when the timber is being put up a piece of timber falls on my neighbor’s house and breaks his house, he shall have a good action, etc.; and yet the raising of the house was lawful, and the timber fell, me invito, etc.” (Fairfax, in the Thorn-cutting case, Y. B. 6 Edw. IV. 7, pl. 18).
[7 ]Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (1892), II, § 93; see also I, 71, 98.
[1 ]Further authorities on this primitive general notion are given in; Westermarck, Origin, etc. (cited ante, p. 476), pp. 30, 44, 60-70; G. Meyer, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fuer Rechtsgeschichte, 1881, II (Germ. Abth.), pp. 83, 90, “Die Gerichtsbarkeit ueber Unfreie und Hintersassen nach aeltestem Recht”; P. Leseur, Nouvelle Revue historique du droit français et étranger, 1888, XII, pp. 576, 657, “Des conséquences du délit de l’esclave dans les Leges Barbarorum et dans les capitulaires”; Jastrow, Zur Strafrechtliche Stellung der Sklaven bei Deutschen und Angelsachsen, 1878, passim (No. 2 in Gierke’s Untersuchungen zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte).
[2 ]Thorpe, i. 27, 29.
[3 ]C. 59.
[1 ]35, 1; 35, 5. Accord: Pactus Alamannorum, iii. 17; Lex Frisionum, 1, 13 (slave for one third); Lex Bavariorum, 8, 2, 89 (for 20 s.).
[2 ]Laws of Ine, 74.
[3 ]The slave might, in a few communities, merely be set free (as with animals) and the responsibility thus disclaimed; but this was forbidden by a Carolingian capitulary as against peace and order, and persisted only in South France (Br., Pr. Ak., 832). As in the case of animals, the giving of nourishment after the deed was equivalent to a sanctioning by harboring (Br., Pr. Ak. 833).
[4 ]Bracton, De Legibus, f. 124 b, accord.
[5 ]Edict. Chilperic, c. 5.
[6 ]C. 18. Accord. Lex Frisionum, 1, 73; Knut, p. 75; Lex Alamannorum, 78, 6; Rothar (Lombards) 264, 342; Lex Salica, 35, 5 (later texts); Capitularia Ribuaria, Add. 5.
[1 ]Selden Society, vol. II.
[3 ]Abbreviations are here made where feasible.
[4 ]It does not appear whether the merchants were found by the jury to have consented; but if the confession of Simon, as set forth in the next paragraph, was taken as true, then they must have so found. The accusation implies that consent was necessary.
[1 ]Selden Society, vol. IV (ed. Maitland and Baildon).
[1 ]Cf. also Bracton, N. B. III. 131, No. 1114 (ad 1234-1235), where the Prior of St. Swithin was summoned for having a gallows, etc., and violating royal privileges, and answered as to one charge, describing how the men of the place caught a notorious robber and murderer “et illum suspenderunt,” but says “quod factum illum non advocat;” yet the defence was here insufficient, “et Prior in misericordia.”
[1 ]In court.
[2 ]Against the servants.
[3 ]But for some time exceptions remained: Fitzherbert, Abridgment, “Corone,” 148 (1315).
[4 ]This seems indicated by the questions of the steward in the Court Baron cases (with one exception) and the inquiry at the Fair of St. Ives; for in those cases the penal idea would apparently predominate. So also in local customs: Bateson, Borough Customs, I, p. 62 (Selden Soc. Pub. vol. XVIII, 1904).
[1 ]Notwithstanding Glanvil’s and Bracton’s use of the terms “placita criminalia” and “placita civilia.”
[2 ]The situation in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is somewhat complicated by the responsibilities involved in the frank-pledge police regulations. But there can be no doubt on the evidence that there was a general Germanic notion of responsibility for servants, related closely to the clan or kinship-responsibility which was universal in primitive law, but preceding and independent of the system of communal responsibility known as frank-pledge (whether it was or was not a direct successor of frithborg). This being understood, the authorities of the thirteenth century, rightly read, do not give us any reason to doubt that the responsibility for one’s household was (though in actual content not dissimilar) in history and in popular feeling a distinctly different thing from the responsibility for one’s neighbors in the tithing (frank-pledge). Thus Bracton (f. 124 b), after declaring that the tithing is not responsible for persons not required by law to be in frank-pledge, says that in such case that one shall be responsible in whose household he is, “nisi consuetudo patriæ aliud inducat,” as in Hertford, where one is not responsible “pro manupastu [household] suo,” unless by harboring an offender. Then, after describing the application of the rule to bishops, etc., and their duty to produce their servants to the court or pay a forfeit, he continues, “and so it shall be done for all others who are in anybody’s household, because every man, whether free or serf, either is or ought to be in frank-pledge or in some one’s household” (the italics are the writer’s). He then reproduces the old Germanic ideas (LL. Hlothar and Eadric, c. 15) as to “household,”—“receiving food or clothing from him, or only food with wages, . . . and according to ancient custom he may be said to be of one’s family who has been given hospitality for three nights.” (Cf. also Selden Soc., Pl. Cr., i. No. 55 (ad 1202): “William of Morton and Simon Carpenter are outlawed. . . . They were nowhere in frank-pledge, but servants of the Abbot of Woburn;” Bracton, N. B. iii. 563, No. 1724 (ad 1226): “Henricus le Ireys captus . . . non est in decenna [tithing], nec habet dominum qui eum advocet, . . . suspendatur;” also Ib. ii. 116, annotator, and footnote 1; Gneist, Const. Hist. Eng., i. 185; Bracton, De Legibus, 153 b.) It seems clear, then, that there is nothing which should induce us to believe that the responsibility for servants was not a perfectly clear and natural one apart from frank-pledge. When we meet such expressions as “omnes qui servientes habent, eorum sint franc-plegii” (LL. Wm. I. c. 52; Thorpe, i. 487), and “if the servant of any lord . . . commits a felony. . . . [the lord] is to be amerced, and the reason is because he received him in bourgh [pledge]” (Fitzherbert, “Corone,” 148), we see that we are dealing with expressions used either by way of analogy (the responsibility being in both cases practically the same) or at a later date in ignorance or in disregard of the former distinctions. Compare the fellow-burgess responsibility in towns (Bateson’s Borough Customs, ii, introd. p. xxiv, Selden Soc. vol. xxi, 1906).
[1 ]Brunner, D. Rg., ii. 657-658.
[2 ]This and Part III are reversed from the order of the original article.
[1 ]Y. B. 6 Edw. IV, 7, 18 (1466): Fairfax, for the plf., “I say there is a diversity between an act resulting in a felony and one resulting in a trespass, for . . . when it was against his will, it was not animo felonico.”
[2 ]Lambert v. Bessey, T. Raym. 421 (1681).
[1 ]Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62 (1835), Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & Den. Suppl. 193 (1843), Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292 (1850).
[2 ]Stanley v. Powell, infra.
[3 ]See, for example, the language of Grose, J., in Leame v. Bray, infra; the argument for the defendant in Holmes v. Mather, infra; Lord Cranworth, in Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 3 H. L. 330: “When one person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer;” and 5 Harv. Law Review, 36: “The rule, so well settled in America, that inevitable accident is a good defence to an action of trespass for personal injuries, has not hitherto found entire favor with the English courts. There crept very early into the English law a principle, which the Courts have been slow to repudiate, to the effect that he who acts voluntarily acts at his peril, and is responsible for personal injuries to another resulting from his acts, though the injury be the outcome neither of wilful wrong-doing nor of negligence. The few cases in which a defence has been allowed have been decided either upon principles of expediency or upon questions of pleading. . . . The English judges have obstinately refused to adopt squarely the reasoning of the American courts, that where a man uses due care he is not responsible for results which could not have been foreseen, and, while practically arriving at the same results in a number of cases, have based their decisions upon narrow and unsatisfactory grounds.”
[4 ]Gibbons v. Pepper, 1 Ld. R. 38; Knapp v. Salsbury, Boss v. Litton, Goodman v. Taylor, Hall v. Fearnley, supra.
[5 ]Following is a chronological list of the principal precedents showing the transition: 1330, Fitzherbert, Abridgment, “Corone,” 302, 354; 1400, Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y. B. 2 H. IV, 18, 6; 1466, Thorn-Cutting Case, Y. B. 6 Ed. IV, 7, 18; 1506, Tithe case, Y. B. 21 H. VII, 27, 5; 1605, Millen v. Fandrye, Popham 161; 1616, Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134; 1630, Bacon, Maxims, No. VII; 1681, Lambert v. Bessey, T. Raymond 421; 1682, Dickenson v. Watson, T. Jones 205; 1700, Mason v. Keeling, 12 Modern 332; 1716, Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, I, c. 28, § 27; 1724, Underwood v. Hewson, 1 Strange 596; 1760, Buller’s Nisi Prius, 6th ed., 16; 1767, Beckwith v. Shordike, 4 Burrow 2092; 1770, Davis v. Saunders, 2 Chitty 639; 1773, Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Wm. Bl. 892; 1773, Barker v. Braham, 3 Wilson 368; 1793, Comyn’s Digest, 4th ed., “Battery,” (A); 1794, Ogle v. Barnes, 8 T. R. 188; 1797, Bacon’s Abridgment, “Trespass,” (D), (I); 1799(?), Espinasse, Nisi Prius, 3d ed., 313; 1800, McManus v. Crickett, 1 East 109; 1803, Leame v. Bray, 3 East 593; 1806-8, Selwyn, Nisi Prius, 1328; 1808, Chitty, Pleading, 128; 1810, Milman v. Dolwell, 2 Camp. 378; 1810, Knapp, Salsbury, 2 Camp. 500; 1823, Wakeman v. Robinson, 1 Bing 213; 1832, Boss v. Litton, Goodman v. Taylor, 5 C. & P. 407, 410; 1834, Pearcy v. Walter, 6 C. & P. 232; 1837, Cotterill v. Starkey, 8 C. & P. 691; 1842, Hall v. Fearnley, 3 Q. B. 919; 1849, Sharrod v. R. Co., 4 Exch. 585; 1870, Smith v. R. Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 14; 1875, Holmes v. Mather, L. R. 10 Exch. 261; 1891, Stanley v. Powell, 1 Q. B. 86.
[1 ]For a qualification as to trespasses to realty and to personalty, see post.
[2 ]Originally the distinction requiring this to be done by an affirmative plea in justification seems not to have prevailed.
[3 ]Bracton’s Note-Book, III, 229, No. 1216 (ad 1236-37), where in a killing in defence he is pardoned, the test being “quia non potuit aliter evadere manus eius;” ib. III, 107, No. 1084 (ad 1225), “aliter enim mortuus esset;” (1319) Y. B. 12 Edw. II, 381, “since the defendant could not otherwise escape;” (1459) 37 H. VI, 37, pl. 26, the defendant trespassed to avoid the attack of the plaintiff on the highway; held justifiable, “because he could not do otherwise than this;” Choke, C. J., in Thorn-cutting case (1466): “As to what was said about their falling in, ipso invito, that is no plea, but he ought to show that he could not do it in any other way, or that he did all that was in his power to keep then out;” see also Catesby, arg.: Britton (Nichols), I, 15, “from necessity to avoid death;” Bacon, Maxims, V, “impossible to do otherwise;” Blackstone, J., in Scott v. Shepherd: “Not even menaces from others are sufficient to justify a trespass against a third person . . . nothing but inevitable necessity,” citing Weaver v. Ward, Dickenson v. Watson, Gilbert v. Stone; counsel in Gibbons v. Pepper, 4 Mod. 405, “for it was no neglect in him, and the mischief done was inevitable;” and the other cases cited supra, note 5.
[1 ]Buller’s Nisi Prius, “that it was inevitable, and that he committed no negligence;” Comyn, “inevitable and without any neglect;” Espinasse, “involuntary and without fault;” Lord Denman, in Boss v. Litton, “inevitable accident,” i. e. “one which the defendant could not prevent;” Patteson, J., in Cotterill v. Starkey, to the same effect; Nelson, C. J., in Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & Den. Suppl. 193 (1843), “from inevitable accident, or which in law or reason is the same thing, from an act that ordinary human care and foresight are unable to guard against;” Center v. Finney, 17 Barb. 94 (1852), “wholly unavoidable and no blame imputable;” Selden, J., in Dygert v. Bradley, 8 Wend. 470 (1832), “When we speak of an unavoidable accident, in legal phraseology, . . . all that is meant is that it was not occasioned in any degree, either remotely or directly, by the want of such care or skill as the law holds every man bound to exercise;” and the other cases cited supra, note 5, p. 505.
[2 ]The same differentiation of misfortune from negligence may be seen progressing in the law of tenant’s liability for waste; here it had become plainly announced by the 1500s: Kirchwey, Liability for Waste, Columbia Law Review, VIII, 625, 627 (1908).
[3 ]Probably owing chiefly to the expressions of Grose, J., in Leame v. Bray, supra, note 5, p. 505. These, taken apart, appeared to support, and perhaps were intended by him to support, the stricter view. The other and later cases show that Lord Ellenborough (also a judge in Leame v. Bray) did not hold it.
[4 ]See Vincent v. Stinehour, Harvey v. Dunlop, and other American cases cited supra, notes 1, pp. 505, 507.
[1 ]Including cases where to-day trover would lie.
[2 ]Cited supra, note 5, p. 505.
[3 ]Post, p. 515, note 1.
[4 ]Basely v. Clarkson, 3 Lev. 37 (1681). But it perhaps lingers in Beckwith v. Shordike, supra, note 0.
[5 ]See Holmes, The Common Law, 151.
[6 ]E. g. Wellington v. Wentworth, 8 Metc. 548.
[7 ]The earlier cases of this sort are: (1302) Y. B. 30-31 Ed. I, 513 (Rolls ed.); (1338) Y. B. 12 Ed. III, 533 (Rolls ed.); (1338) Y. B. 21 Ed. III, 17, pl. 22; (1349) Fitzh. Abr., “Corone,” 261; (1370) ib., 94; (1368), 41 Ass. 21 (appeal of mayhem).
[8 ]A pardon was required as late as 1489 (Fitzherbert, Abridgment, “Corone,” 61).
[9 ]Dever’s Case, Godbalt, 288.
[10 ]Y. B. 21-22 Ed. I, 586 (Rolls ed.).
[11 ]Y. B. 12 Ed. II, 381 (Rolls ed.).
[12 ]Y. B. 2 H. IV, 8, pl. 40.
[1 ]So also in the borough courts in the 1400s (Bateson’s Borough Customs, I, 53, and II, Introd. p. 40; Selden Soc. vols. XVIII, 1904 and XXI, 1906), where the learned editor is therefore hardly correct in commenting that at that time “by the law of the land nothing less than the King’s pardon would suffice.”
[2 ]Y. B. 30-31 Ed. I, 518 (Rolls ed.).
[3 ]14 H. VI, 24, pl. 72.
[4 ]Fitzh. Abr., “Corone,” 412 (1315).
[5 ]Ib. 351.
[6 ]Beverley’s Case, 4 Coke R. 123 b (1603).
[7 ]Bacon, Maxims, VII (1630); Weaver v. Ward, Hobart, 134 (1616).
[1 ]See Brunner, Deutsche Rechstgeschichte, I, 76; Wackernagel, Die Lebensalter, 1862, p. 46; and some references to Anglo-Saxon laws in Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, I, 20 ff. Notice the same notion of legal disability in one of the two forms of the writ of pardon for infants in the Registrum Brevium (309 b), where the infant is discharged, but is to come up again and answer, if any one raises the question after he has arrived “ad legitimam ætatem.”
[2 ]Y. B. 30-31 Ed. I, 529 (Rolls ed.); a boy had set up a mark inside the house, and in shooting, his arrow accidentally went without and killed a woman; Justiciarius: “Since he is not of the age of twelve years he is not a felon, but good and loyal;” and as he had absconded, it was publicly proclaimed that he might return if he would.
[3 ]1302, Y. B. 30 Ed. I, 511 (Rolls ed.); one who killed in defence of his brother was committed to prison; and it was said that he was under twelve years of age; Spigurnel, J.: “If he had done the deed before his age of seven years he should not suffer judgment; but if he had done any other deed not causing the loss of life or limb, though against the peace, he should not answer, because before that age he is not of the peace.”
[4 ]1338, Y. B. 12 Ed. III, 627 (Rolls ed.): “Itan, a girl of thirteen years, was burnt for that while she was the servant of a certain woman she killed her mistress; and this was [so] found; therefore adjudged to be treason. And it was said that by the old law no one under age was hung, or suffered judgment of life or limb. But Spigurnel found a case that an infant of ten years killed his companion and concealed him, and he was hung, since by the concealment he showed that he knew how to distinguish between evil from good. And thus malitia supplet ætatem.” So also in the borough courts, ad 1200-1400. (Bateson’s Borough Customs, I, p. 63, II, Introd. p. 42; Selden Soc. Pub. vols. XVIII, 1904, and XXI, 1906), where the parent is often held answerable; yet there is no consistent principle visible.
[5 ]Reg. v. Smith, 1 Cox Cr. C. 260.
[1 ]The child was four years of age; the judge says: “Can you find it in your conscience to declare against this child of so tender an age? I think that he did not know any malice, for he is not of great strength, and you can see that before your own eyes.” Counsel replies that the fact remains that one of his client’s eyes is out. Counsel for defence claims that, as in felony, the Court can dismiss the case if they think his youth shows that he did not know he was doing wrong. But Moyle refuses, because in felony there is only a plea of not guilty, and no justification, and so “the justices have it in their discretion to dismiss him if it appears to them that he is of such an age that he has not discretion; but otherwise in trespass, for in a writ of trespass the party may justify the trespass, and not plead not guilty, and so the justices have no such power.” Then a guardian is appointed, and the defendant’s counsel is granted an adjournment for a conference.
[2 ]Holbrooke v. Dagley, Croke Jac. 374.
[3 ]Hodsman v. Grissell, Noy, 129.
[4 ]Bacon, Maxims, vii.
[5 ]Bateson, Borough Customs, I, 82 (Selden Soc. Pub. vol. XVIII, 1904); here the later custumal exonerates. The same popular attitude seems to have lingered in other countries; e. g. in Japan the responsibility for accidental fires continued, in the rural communities, into the present century; and during a residence in Tokyo the writer’s landlord tried to have inserted in the lease a clause making the tenant responsible for all fires originating within the house.
[6 ]Rastell, Entries, 8.
[1 ]2 H. IV, 18, pl. 6.
[2 ]The case in 42 Ass. pl. 9 (1369), which the plaintiff lost, in an action where the jury found that the fire fuit suddeinment illumine, the defendant knowing nothing, is not conclusive to the contrary; for (1) it does not appear that the defendant set the fire; (2) Rolle (Abridgment, 1, pl. 2) thinks the vi et armis spoiled the writ; (3) 2 H. IV., supra, is unmistakable. For other cases, see (1450) 28 H. VI. 7, pl. 7; (1582) Anon., Croke El. 10; and also Rolle’s Abr., Action on the Case, (B) Fire.
[3 ]So, also, in Tuberville v. Stamp, “The fire in his field is his fire as well as that in his house.”
[4 ]1 Salk. 13; Comb. 459; Skinner, 681; Garth. 425.
[5 ]The doubts there expressed because the fire was started in the field, not in the house, arose hardly from the fact that the tradition dealt only with fire in a house (for the writ does not betray this, nor does Germanic tradition), but from the fact that it was started by a servant, and the old rules about absolute responsibility for deeds done in the house and by the household became the source of confusion.
[6 ]Allen v. Stephenson, 1 Lutwych 36.
[7 ]10 Anne, c. 14, s. 1.
[8 ]Extended by 14 G. III. c. 78, s. 86, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 87, s. 1, to “estates.”
[9 ]Blackstone (I, 131) and Lord Lyndhurst (1 Phill. Ch. Cas. 320) misunderstood “accidentally” to include “negligently” in these statutes. This was corrected by Philliter v. Phippard, 11 Q. B. 347 (1847); Bacon, Abr., Case, already had had the right interpretation.
[10 ]Ante, p. 490.
[11 ]Registrum Brevium, 110.
[1 ]The writ reads “mordendum” and “consuetos,” and the terminations should apparently be exchanged.
[2 ]Compare Selden Soc. vol. IV, Court Baron, 131 (1320): “[The jurors present] that the said John the Swineherd has a dog which ate a rabbit of the lord . . . And that a dog of the Vicar often chases hares in the field (fine 3d.) . . . And that the dog of John Manimester chased a sow of John Albin, so that he lost her pig, to his damage, taxed at 18d., which the Court awards, etc., and John Manimester is in mercy (6d.),” also ib. p. 52. Here it seems that there was not always an allegation of the scienter, or even of the habit, in these lower courts.
[3 ]Britton (Nichols’ ed.) I, 15: “Let it be inquired . . . [if the killing was] by a beast, whether by a dog or other beast, and whether the beast was set on to do it and encouraged to do such mischief, or not, and by whom, and do of all the circumstances.” Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium, Trespass, 89, L: “And if a man do incite or procure his dog to bite any man, he shall have an action of trespass for the same;” following a writ for inciting dogs to bite sheep. In 3 Edw. III, 3, 7 (1330), a bill lays the “incitement” of the dogs to bite the sheep. See also 13 H. VII, 15, pl. 10 (1498).
[4 ]Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 Salk. 662 (1697); s. c. Bayntine v. Sharp, 1 Lutw. 36; Smith v. Pelah, 2 Stra. 1264 (1747). In Millen v. Fandrye, the Court seem to have had in mind mainly the land-trespass of the dog (Popham, 161). See Laws and Liberties of Mass. (1648), “Sheep” (Whitmore, 191): “If any dog shall kill any sheep, the owner shall either hang such dog or pay double damages for the sheep; and if any dog hath been seen to course or bite sheep before, not being set on, and his owner hath had notice thereof, then he shall both hang his dog and pay for such sheep;” re-enacted in General Laws of 1672, s. v. Probably in England, as here, the claim might always be based either on the habit plus the scienter, or merely on an incitement.
[5 ]“Quod retinuit quondam canem sciens canem predictum ad mordendum oves consuetum.”
[6 ]1700, Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332, Holt, C. J.: “If they are such as are naturally mischievous in their kind, he shall answer for hurt done by them without any notice; but if they are of a tame nature, there must be notice of the ill quality.” The restriction of this rule to “things in which he has no valuable property,” and the application of a stricter rule to things in which he has a “valuable property,” seems to have been a passing invention of Holt, C. J., in distinguishing the rule as to cattle’s trespasses on realty, and has no support in preceding literature. But it may have been inspired, as Mr. Justice Holmes suggests, by the old idea, already noticed, that animals let loose could not bring home responsibility to their former owner (The Common Law, 22).
[1 ]Filburn v. People’s Palace Co., L. R. 25 Q. B. D. 258 (1890), where an elephant escaped.
[2 ]See Laws of Ine, c. 49.
[3 ]Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium, “Trespass,” 87 A; Selden Soc. vol. II, Manorial Courts, I, 9: “Hugh Tree is in mercy for his beasts caught in the lord’s garden. Pledges, Walter of the Hill and William Slipper. Fine, 6d.” Accord., pp. 7, 10, 12, 13, 15, 18, 37, 90, 183; also 114: “one sow and five small pigs of John William’s son entered the court-yard of Bartholomew Sweyn and did damage among the leeks and cabbages. . . . Therefore let John make satisfaction to him for the said 2d. and be in mercy for his trespass.” These cases date from 1247 to 1294. Add Y. B. 27 Ass. 14, pl. 56 (1354).
[4 ]Y. B. 20 Ed. IV, pl. 10 (1481); “Doctor and Student,” I. 9 (Muchall’s ed., 31) (1518): “Every man is bound to make recompense for such hurt as his beasts shall do in the corn or grass of his neighbour, though he know not that they were there;” under the head of things which are doubtful upon the law of reason. Noy, Maxims, c. 44 (1642), borrows the same language.
[5 ]Blackburn, J., in Fletcher v. Rylands, post.
[1 ]Y. B. 22 Ed. IV, 8, pl. 24 (1483). But compare also 2 Rolle’s Abr. 566 (1618): “If a man has a road along my land for his beasts to pass, and the beasts eat the grass in morsels in passing, this is justifiable;” adding, “this is to be understood as done against his will.”
[2 ]Y. B. 10 Ed. IV, 7, pl. 19 (1471); Y. B. 15 H. VII, 17, pl. 13 (1502), semble; Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium, 128, notes.
[3 ]Rastel’s Entries, 621, and cases just cited; Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. Bl. 527 (1795). It was always an excuse that the plaintiff was bound, by agreement or by custom, to fence against the defendant; and the modification in question was apparently treated as merely one phase of this, the plaintiff being bound by custom to fence against the highway.
[4 ]Goodwyn v. Cheevely, 28 L. J. Exch. 298.
[5 ]Tillett v. Ward, L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 17 (1882).
[6 ]Millen v. Fandrye, Popham 161: “A man is driving cattle through a town, and one of them goes into another man’s house, and he follows them, trespass does not lie for this.”
[7 ]Danby and Moyle, JJ., in 10 Ed. IV, 7, pl. 19 (1471).
[8 ]Trained hunting-dogs and the like were the exception.
[1 ]Millen v. Fandrye, Popham 161 (1605); Beckwith v. Shordike, 4 Burrow 2092 (1767); Brown v. Giles, 1 C. & P. 118 (1823).
[2 ]Doyle v. Vance, 6 Vict. L. R. (Law) 87 (1880).
[3 ]Read v. Edwards, 18 C. B. n. s. 260 (1864).
[1 ]1699, Parkhurst v. Foster, 1 Ld. Raym. 479; trespass against a constable for billeting a dragoon upon him, and forcing him to find meat, drink, etc.; the jury found that the dragoon was the one who forced the plaintiff, etc.; Holt, C. J.: “At common law, if a man does an unlawful act, he shall be answerable for the consequences of it, especially where, as in this case, the act is done with intent that consequential damage shall be done.” 1773, Nares, J., and Gould, J., in Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Wm. Bl. 893: “Wherever a man does an unlawful act, he is answerable for all the consequences.” See also Courtney v. Collet, 1 Ld. Raym. 272 (1698); Reynolds v. Clarke, 1 Stra. 634 (1722).
[2 ]Brian, J., in 20 Ed. IV, 10, pl. 10 (1481): “A man should so occupy his common that he does no wrong to another man.” Holt, C. J., in Tenant v. Goldwin, 2 Ld. Raym. 1089 (1705): “Every man must so use his own as not to do damage to another;” and also in Tuberville v. Stamp, 1 Salk. 13 (1698). Gibbs, C. J., in Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29 (1815), approves this argument of counsel: “An individual is bound so to restrain the exercise of his rights over his own land that he may not thereby injure his neighbor”
[3 ]Compare the hesitation in granting assumpsit for a non-feasance.
[4 ]27 Ass. 141, pl. 56. See also the action for keeping a ferocious dog, where “pro defectu curæ” is a part of the declaration, as in Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332.
[5 ]Commentaries, III, 211. Compare the sense of “negligence” in the precedents in Comyn’s Digest, Action on the Case for Negligence.
[6 ]In Mitchil v. Alestree (1677), e. g., the declaration alleged “improvide et absque debita consideratione ineptitudinis loci;” but this allegation plays little part in the decision (2 Lev., 172, alone has it), and the whole case is approached in a very different way from our negligence cases of to-day.
[1 ]Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Exch. at 282 (1866).
[2 ]Littleton, J., in 10 Ed. IV, 7, pl. 19: “It is at the peril of him who drives;” Doctor and Student, II, 16 (p. 149): “When a man buyeth land or taketh it of the gift of any other, he taketh it at his peril;” ib. II, 27 (pp. 191, 192); Mitchil v. Alestree, in 3 Keb. 650: “Per Curiam: It’s at peril of the owner to take strength enough to order them:” Holt, C. J., in Anon, 12 Mod. 342; keeping gunpowder; action for nuisance; “It would be at peril of builder;” Nares, J., in Parsons v. Loyd, 3 Wils. 346: “Every plaintiff sues out process at his peril.” Martin, B., had already phrased the same idea in a little different form: (1856) Blyth v. Waterworks Co., 11 Exch. 781, during argument: “I held, in a case tried at Liverpool, in 1853, that if locomotives are sent through the country emitting sparks, the persons doing so incur all the responsibilities of insurers; that they were liable for all the consequences,” citing Lambert v. Bessey; and in Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 793 (lower Court), he speaks of “quasi-insurers.”
[1 ]Holt, C. J., in Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332 (1700), and Tenant v. Goldwin, 2 Ld. Raym. 1089 (1705); Cockburn, C. J., in Vaughan v. Taff Vale R. Co., 5 H. & N. 679 (1850); and counsel in a few prior cases.
[2 ]Supplementing Lord Blackburn’s judicial utterance, the theoretical exposition of Mr. Justice Holmes, in cc. III and IV of “The Common Law,” has served more than anything else to commend and establish the distinction. It has been accepted also by Sir Frederick Pollock, in his “Torts,” p. 17 (apparently), and by Mr. (now Justice) Wm. Schofield, formerly instructor in Torts in the Harvard Law School, in 1 Harv. Law Rev. 52
[3 ]It is sometimes said, for instance, that Fletcher v. Rylands, is “not law” in America or in this or that State. But such statements fail to distinguish between (1) the acceptance of Lord Blackburn’s principle above, and (2) its application to the specific facts in Fletcher v. Rylands. The principle is sanctioned, in one way or another, consciously or unconsciously, in every court of the country. But (a) it is not invariably held to control in cases having facts like Fletcher v. Rylands; and (b) the tendency may perhaps be said to be in many States to restrict to as few as possible the classes of situations to be governed by the principle. An example of the latter attitude is found in the masterly opinion of Mr. Justice Doe, in Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442.
[1 ]See the writer’s articles on the theory of Torts, in VIII Harvard Law Review 200, 377.
[2 ]We find as late as Finch’s Law (1654; ed. 1759, p. 198) the statement, “trespass is a criminal offence punishable by a fine unto the king;” and it is perhaps unsafe to draw any fixed distinction of “civil” and “criminal” in the present connection till the seventeenth century.
[1 ]For the husband’s responsibility for his wife in the borough courts, see Bateson’s Borough Customs, I, pp. 223, 224, II, Introd. pp. 111-114 (Selden Soc. Pub. vols. XVIII, 1904, and XXI, 1906).
[1 ]For this period, compare also the practice in borough courts (Bateson’s Borough Customs, II, Introd. pp. 40-42).
[1 ]The following intervening cases are corroborative: 1306, Y. B. 34 Ed. I, 252 (Rolls ed.); 1410, 11 H. IV, 91, 47; 1431, Y. B. 9 H. VI, 53, 37; 1443, Y. B. 21 H. VI, 39, 6; 1469, 8 Ed. IV, 17, 24; 1471, 10 Ed. IV, 18, 22; 1472, 11 Ed. IV, 6, 10; 1497, Keilwey, 3 b; 1618, Southern v. How, 2 Rolle’s Rep. 5, 26, Poph. 143; 1625, Shelley v. Burr, 1 Rolle’s Abr. 2, pl. 7; 1630, Bacon, Maxims, XVI; 1641, Noy, Maxims, c. 44; 1668, Cremer v. Humberton, 2 Keb. 352.
[2 ]Ante, p. 511.
[1 ]Among the cases in point may be noted (1441) 19 H. VI, 50 pl. 7; (1463) 2 Ed. IV, 5, pl. 10; (1481) 21 Edw. IV, 5 pl. 10; (1678) Mires v. Solebay, 2 Mod. 244. This notion began to be repudiated in (1694) Sands v. Childs, 2 Lev. 351, and (1701) per Lord Holt, in Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 488.
[2 ]8 Rep. 66 (1608).
[3 ]Notably in Southern v. How, Cremer v. Humberton, Kingston v. Booth, also in Noy and Doctor and Student, all pointing back to the idea in the 9 H. VI. case.
[1 ]Cited supra, note 1, p. 524.
[2 ]Mr. Justice Holmes has shown (Harvard Law Review, IV, 361, V, 6, “Agency”) how the early law knows only “servants,” and how the “agent” is a later branching off from this class. The same thing has been additionally shown by Mr. C. C. Allen, in the American Law Review (XXVIII, 18). According to Murray’s Dictionary, “agent” first appears in the commercial sense in Marlowe and Shakespeare. It may fairly be claimed that Shakespeare has in mind the rule of his day (applying it, to be sure, to a case of moral, not legal, responsibility) when he introduces the following colloquy:—
[1 ]Lord Holt’s judgments markedly show this point of view; but the following passage of Lord Hardwicke’s (Boucher v. Lawson, (1734) infra) is perhaps the most pointed brief one: “This case seemed at the trial of very great consequence, as it concerns on the one side . . . the security that persons have in trusting their gold, . . . and on the other side, as it concerned the security of owners of ships that they might not be charged by the default of their masters further than reason requires.”
[2 ]Not that they fully appreciated the historical perspective and the significance of the situation; but one may gather from all said and done the meaning of events. We are dealing, not merely with the progress of a rule, but also with the development of an idea.
[1 ]Here may be noted (1699) Jones v. Hart, 2 Salk. 441; (1704) Ward v. Evans, 2 Salk. 442; Wayland’s Case, 3 Salk. 234. In Lane v. Cotton, (1701) 1 Salk. 17, 12 Mod. 477, where the postmaster was sued for the loss of a package by a clerk, the case was argued on the effect of a statute and on the peculiar position of a public officer.
[1 ]Under similar circumstances the master was held responsible in Mead v. Hammond, 1 Stra. 505 (1722) by Pratt, C. J.; and in Grammar v. Nixon, 1 Stra. 653 (1726) by Eyre, C. J., the master was made responsible for a false warranty; no reasons being given in either case.
[2 ]In 1733 (Commons Journal, 277; Abbott on Shipping, 12 ed., Pt. IV., c. VII. vol. II, p. 339), in consequence of the claim made for the plaintiff in Boucher v. Lawson, a petition of merchants was presented to the House, setting forth the discouragement to commerce if owners were held liable for goods made away with by masters and mariners “without the knowledge or privity of the owner or owners,” and a statute was passed (7 Geo. II. c. 15) exonerating them from being answerable for merchandise “made away with by the master or mariners without the privity of the owners” beyond the value of vessel and freight. This illustrates how the mercantile community noticed the broader scope of the revised rule as now substituted by the Courts for the traditional test of Particular Command (i. e. direct privity).
[1 ]Compare here, also, (1773) Barker v. Braham, 3 Wils. 368; an action allowed against client and attorney for an arrest made by an error of the latter; De Grey, C. J.: “They say, whoever procures, commands, assists, assents, etc., is a trespasser; here the client commands the attorney, the attorney actually commands the sheriff’s officer; the real commander is the attorney, the nominal commander is the plaintiff in the action. . . .”
[1 ]Cf. Brandon v. Peacock, Lee’s Hardwicke, 86 (1730): “A person put tobacco on a ship, the master run away with the ship and tobacco, the goods being insured, the person that owned the tobacco applied to the insurance office and received the value of it. The insurance office took an authority from him to sue the owner, and the C. J. held that the action lay.”
[2 ]One might fancy that the phrase of the St. 27 Ed. III (ante, p. 0) “offended in the office in which his master hath set him,” supplies an antecedent for these phrases. But it would seem that “office” was purely a civil or canon (not Roman) law phrase. In Doctor and Student (II. c. 42) the civilian, asking for the English law, gives as a part of his own test, “when the household offendeth in any office or ministry that the master is the chief officer of;” and the writer has not found the phrase elsewhere than in that book and in the above statute. In the latter it may easily have been inserted by some clerical secretary learned in the canon law.
[3 ]E. g. in Beaulieu v. Finglam (1401), ante, note 0, the Court harshly refuses to argue the question of expediency.
[1 ]Mr. Justice Holmes (Harvard L. Rev. IV, 345-364, V, 1-23, reprinted in this Collection as Essay No. 63) has expressed the belief that the identification fiction plays a leading part in earlier history; but the learned author has apparently been able to find before 1700 only five or six instances, not all unambiguous. The plain one from West’s Symboleography clearly owes its origin to the civil law (as does a great deal throughout the book). West’s “by some bond he is fained to be all one person,” is the borrowing of a notion well known across the water: “Eadem est persona domini et procuratoris. Eadem, inquam, non rei veritate, sed fictione,” etc. (Digesta, 44, 2, 4, note to Elzevir ed.). Very different are the indigenous English expressions,—scarcely fictions, but merely statements of legal results; e. g. “the driving of the servant is the driving of the master” (Smith v. Shepherd). Coke says of disseisin (Co. Litt., sects. 430-435): “Where the servant doth all that which he is commanded, . . . there it is as sufficient as if his master did it himselfe, for the rule is, qui facit, etc.” This “as if” (and Littleton says the same) shows that there is here no fiction in a proper sense,—merely a concise statement of the legal result. The out-and-out identification expressions do not come into much vogue until after Blackstone’s time.
[2 ]The argument for the defendant in Brucker v. Fromont, 6 T. R. 659 (1796), shows that this misconception of the earlier form of the rule was already in the air. Note that this, the first judicial misunderstanding of it (which became the basis of a special doctrine noticed later on), was in the Common Pleas, and that the King’s Bench, Lord Kenyon’s Court, did not exhibit it until well on in the next century.
[1 ]Intervening cases are: 1799, Bush v. Steinman, 1 B. & P. 404; 1800, Ellis v. Turner, 8 T. R. 531; 1800, McManus v. Crickett, 1 East 107; 1826, Gregory v. Piper, 9 B. & C. 591.
[2 ]Sleath v. Wilson, 9 C. & P. 607, 1839; Story on Agency, 1839; Smith on Master and Servant, 1852.
[3 ]Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. & W. 358, 1840; Att’y-Gen. v. Siddon, 1 Tyrwh. 41, 1830; Coleman v. Riches, 16 C. B. 104, 1855.
[1 ]Keating, J., in Bolingbroke v. Board, L. R. 9 C. P. at 577, 1874.
[2 ]1828, Goodman v. Kennell, 1 Moore & P. 241; 1857, Patten v. Rea, 2 C. B. N. S. 606; 1867, Barwick v. Bank, L. R. 2 Exch. 259.
[3 ]1859, Gordon v. Rolt, 4 Exch. 365; 1849, Sharrod v. R. Co., ibid. 581.
[4 ]Agency, cited ante.
[5 ]Nisi Prius, p. 294.
[1 ]Or this: “If, instead of driving the carriage with his own hands he employs a servant to drive it, the servant is but an instrument set in motion by the master” (Alderson, B., in Hutchinson v. R. Co., 5 Exch. 350).