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Subject Area: Political Theory
Subject Area: Law

Bentham to his Brother. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 10 (Memoirs Part I and Correspondence) [1843]

Edition used:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 10.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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Bentham to his Brother.

“This is a letter which I am desired to write to you, for the purpose of introducing to you the Earl of Wycombe. God knows when and where, if at any time and anywhere, it will be delivered to you. And who is the Earl of Wycombe? you will say. Why, he is the eldest of two sons of the Marquis of Lansdowne; as good a creature as ever breathed, and just what, from his countenance, you would imagine him to be. It is proper that you should know that he is a little deaf, in different degrees at different times—people hope that, as age advances, the infirmity will wear away. If this does not, I know of nothing else that should prevent his taking a leading part one of these days in public affairs. He has already begun to feel his ground, by taking a leading part in some novel propositions, and getting people to his side in a committee on the last Westminster election. Whatever intents he may be able to muster up, will be supported in the most powerful manner by an excellent and amiable character, which I dare venture to pronounce will never quit him. To this point, however, I speak rather from universal report than from particular experience. His father has opened to me a good deal of late, and I am become one of the Cabinet Council there, dining there regularly every week. With his son I have not equal intimacy, nothing in particular having happened to lead to it. Your age and character fit you better for an intimacy with him: the schoolmasterishness of mine acting naturally as a repellant. His father and I have lately come to a variety of explanations, and the result of it is, that he is as zealous as myself for universal liberty of government, commerce and religion, and universal peace. Consequently he is fond of the French; but the son, notwithstanding the unfeigned affection and respect he seems to feel for his father, is hitherto a sort of an Antigallican.”

Among the papers relating to French politics, transferred to Bentham for his opinion, is one written by Benjamin Vaughan, and addressed to Turgot. It contains suggestions of considerable value:—

“The ladies and women of France are equally patriotic with the men. Why not call this patriotism into immediate action, by an animated and flattering address made to them by the National Assembly? Good order, economy, education, and perhaps a rural life, are natural objects to which to direct their cares; and in favour of the three first, they are capable, perhaps, of being made perfectly enthusiastic at the present moment.

“May not the National Assembly be separated into two parts, when deciding upon some subjects, and remain undivided when determining upon others; since a division gives the king a negative upon what passes, whenever he gains over a half of either of the divided bodies, (which is only a quarter of the whole)? Thus, for example,—may not the Assembly preserve its general form for general and ordinary affairs, and be divided, for whatever peculiarly respects the king, nobility, or higher clergy?

“A division has been proposed, by throwing the nobles and church dignitaries into one body, and the rest of the deputies into another. But might not a part of the National Assembly be made more or less permanent, (this part to be selected by the choice of the public, of the Assembly itself, or of the king, as shall be most agreeable;) and thus, by changing a part of the Assembly rapidly, and another part at more distant periods, the influence of a sudden national enthusiasm upon the legislative body receive a check?

“Instead of the nobility and high clergy deputing themselves at the general elections, might not the choice of the deputies out of their bodies always rest with the public at large? The deputies for these orders would still be nobles and church dignitaries, but they would be the persons of the order most agreeable to the public. They are now the persons of the order most agreeable to the orders.

“England has obtained her ascendancy in Europe by her money, and by the nature of her forces, which are illsuited to continental conquests. If France dismisses her foreign troops, and reduces her national land forces onethird, or one-half, and trusts more to her militia, navy, and fortresses for self-defence than at present, she may obtain and employ great resources of money; and, by increasing her naval forces, she may become more independent of other nations, as having little need of intriguing with foreign powers for the use of their navies. When her navy is more on a par with that of England, she may be more tranquil about England.

“Why need the power of making war be left anywhere but in the nation? Is it true that a king can, in fact, begin a war with the advantages of secrecy, when, in general, it is seen that armaments are now always made proportionally on each side, previous to a war; and that in the forwardness of these armaments, lies the aptitude of beginning a war? On the other hand, will not a constant attention to self-defence prevent much of the danger of a surprise, in case of being attacked? A king may readily be allowed to make a peace, and his people can always force him to it, should he be backward when they want it on their side. Or, if he is to have a power of making war, may it not be after obtaining the consent of a council of secrecy to be chosen by the National Assembly, to confer with him on this subject; which council might be a standing institution, the members changing from time to time? To fetter the king in declaring war, is not to lessen his executive powers; he may conduct the war, and in this be executive; but to declare who shall or shall not be deemed a national enemy is to make the king legislative in a most important point.

“By stripping great persons of their court pensions, and of their feudal privileges on their estates, many will be reduced to nothing. The state must, naturally, take care of the creditors, at least of the persons whom it thus deliberately ruins; but how are the individuals, so reduced, to be made easy in their new situation, and kept free from faction and intrigue? Will not a sumptuary law operate in their favour, by checking the insulting ostentation of others who are less reduced in fortune? To prevent the sumptuary law from lessening the employment of the poor, and of the manufacturers for home consumption, (who alone need be much affected,) the public purse must be opened, or some of the lands forming part of the king’s domain must be given to them, upon which they might settle, with the loan of a capital or certain immunities; similar to what happens in the colonies, for these would in fact, be internal colonies. Till these, or other resources, are prepared, it will be difficult for a sumptuary law not to do mischief. A sumptuary law may vary in different parts of the kingdom.

“Till France puts her post-horses into private hands, as in England, collecting the duty of travelling, through the medium of inn-keepers, her internal communications never can be perfect or secure; for the actual system is particularly calculated to suit the return of despotism and the race of spies.

“Might not monasteries of every kind be gradually abolished, by directing, that as the individuals composing them at present die, none shall fill up their places; but that the dying persons shall have liberty to give away by will, to any individuals whatever, a certain portion of the property of the foundation which had supported them, government coming in for its share at each death? A few monasteries might or not be preserved, as shall seem prudent, upon the old plan; or persons might live as monks and nuns at their own expense.”

In a letter of Dumont to Bentham, dated 27th Sept. 1789, he says:—