287.
trower to ricardo
[Reply to 279.—Answered by 295]
Unsted Wood—Godalming—Novr. 24. 1818
My Dear Ricardo—
In the sentiment with which you preface your Constitutional argument I most cordially agree, “that we may continue to esteem each other, and give each other credit for sincerity, whether our political opinions accord or not.” I am convinced, that our friendship is too firmly fixed, and I trust our minds are both too liberal, for difference of opinion on any subjects to loosen the ties, that attach us to each other —Nor, do I even dispair, that our ideas will approximate, although they may not entirely coincide, upon this particular subject. You state your argument clearly and forcibly; and, if I agreed with you in the premises, I should find it difficult to deny the conclusion. Thus far, however, we do agree, that the only legitimate object of all Government is the happiness of the people, who live under it; and that a Government consisting of Kings, Lords and Commons, (mutually assisting and controlling each other) is the form best calculated to ensure that desireable object.—Now it follows, that whatever reform may be introduced into this Government should have a reference to the principle upon which it is established, and should not endanger the preservation of that balance of power, which is essential to its existence.— Previously to the adoption of any Reform two questions must, therefore, arise.—First, is the change desireable in itself; secondly, supposing it to be so, is it consistent with the principle of the established Government? Will it interfere with, or derange, that distribution of this power, allotted to each branch of the constitution, which is necessary to the preservation of the whole? This, then, I take to be the point at issue between us. I consider that a Reform (or Alteration as I call it) carried to the extent, that you wish to carry it, would endanger the safety of the Constitution; would give such additional force to the popular part of it, as would be inconsistent with the security of the other two branches— You are of a different opinion and your answer to my objection is “that all reasonable persons, having no private interests to serve, would select, as representatives, those only, who would engage to maintain the monarchical and aristocratical branches.”—But, let me ask, whether this is the description, that can be fairly given of the Electors of great Britain—“Reasonable persons having no private interests to serve”, “not disposed to give up a greater good for a smaller”. That you admit such must be the character of the Electors to justify your view of the subject, I readily infer, from your saying; “shew me the sinister interest, or the probability of a bad choise, and I will consent to deprive the individual, to whom they attach, of the right of electing Members.” No doubt if the electors were all reasonable persons, having no private interests to serve, not disposed to give up a greater good for a smaller, and qualified by habit and education to form correct notions upon the nice and delicate question of constitutional policy, they might safely be entrusted with the uncontrolled power of electing the whole of their Representatives. But, that they are not thus qualified, at present, I presume to imagine; and that they will not readily become so, I am very apprehensive. To approximate to such a desireable state of things, which indeed would satisfy me, (for it is foolish to aim at impossibilities, or even at great improbabilities,) you must carry your scheme of reform further than you propose; and by so doing I should feel much more disposed to go along with you. Limit the right of voting at Elections to such persons, who by their education have the ability to decide correctly; and who by their situation have the power of acting independently.—Upon what other subject of importance are we disposed to defer to the opinions of those, whose situation and circumstances render them incompetent to arrive at a just conclusion, or even to enter upon a consideration of the question? Yet, upon the momentous question of choosing those, who are to govern us, we are content to be guided, for the most part, by men whose ignorance, sordidness, and passion, render them fit instruments, for the mischievous designs of desperate and dangerous demagogues!—If, therefore, you are to alter the Constitution, with a view to its supposed primitive theoretical perfection, you should take care, whilst you extend the elective franchise to those from whom it certainly ought not to be withheld, that you withdraw it from those in whose hands it was not originally intended to be vested. But, even admitting the electors should become as qualified for the discharge of their important duty, as could reasonably be expected, under any circumstances, still, I contend, that if you were to let loose into the House of Commons the full force of the popular part of our constitution, that it would be impossible for the other branches to preserve, for a continuance, anything beyond a mere nominal authority.—The uncontrolled power over the purse, which is vested in the Commons, gives them, necessarily, such a superiority over the other branches, that, unless the influence of these was suffered silently to operate, to a certain extent, in that House, the whole form of the constitution would speedily be changed. If no such influence existed in what way could the other branches express their own opinions, when in opposition to the Commons; but by open dissent on the part of the Lords, or by veto on the part of the Crown.—And, surely, it were much better for the safety of the whole that these conflicting sentiments should be quietly arranged by means of influences moderately operating; than by constant recourse to those means provided by the theory of the Constitution, but, which could not be frequently indulged in without producing the most mischievous effects upon the body politick. If you say, that these sentiments ought not to be expressed, when in opposition to the declared sentiments of the Commons, then it is obvious, that you are contending for the supremacy of that House, and that you would have our Constitution a mixed Government merely in form, but a Republic in substance—If, on the other hand, you admit, as you must do, whilst approving of our mixed Government, that the opinions of the other branches should be felt, and that the ultimate result of the deliberations of the Legislature, should be the mixed and mellowed opinions of the three branches, then, I say, there is no way, in which those opinions can be so safely expressed, with a view to the general interests, as by the influence of these two branches, operating quietly and moderately, in the House of Commons. You will observe, that by this means the original principle of the Constitution is preserved; but that experiment and experience, the perfection of all things, have suggested a mode by which the principle should operate in a manner more conducive to the health and safety of the Commonwealth.—I admit, that it is a question, and an important one too, to what extent this influence ought to be suffered to operate. But it is obvious, that no general rule can be laid down upon this subject. It is a matter of feeling and observation, and one in which the public is too much interested to fear, that it will be over-looked—And sure I am, that this is not the danger to be apprehended in the present times; my apprehensions run in an opposite direction. No doubt, the last long war threw great additional influence into the hands of the Crown, and it is well, that it did so, for in perilous times the safety of a Country mainly depends upon the strength of the Government—But, it seems to be forgotten, that these times are speedily passing away, and with them, that additional power and influence in the Crown, which they necessarily created. Yet, the cry of dissatisfaction continues, although the disease (if such it be) is rapidly disappearing.—And, it is important to remark, that, with a view to preserving the just balance of the Constitution, it is no less necessary to watch the degree of influence, which is possessed by the popular part, than it is that of the other two. And, that that influence should be measured and regulated to prevent its undue preponderance. —And herein, appears to me, to consist the important duty of the Statesman—To bear constantly in mind, that the Government, over which he presides, is a complicated piece of machinery, consisting of various parts, endowed with different principles, and curiously harmonising, assisting, and controlling each other, for the benefit of the whole—But the perfection of this machine, and the powerful and beneficial effects of which it is capable, depends upon the due degree of power being preserved by each of the principles of which it is composed; and that, as the balance of the whole must equally be destroyed by the undue preponderance of any one of the Members, it is his imperious duty to endeavor, at all times, to preserve the balance, by throwing into the scales of that which is lightest, the degree of influence necessary to preserve the just equilibrium.—
If this be a just view of the subject it follows, that a sufficient security for the preservation of the Constitution is not to be found in the honesty of the electors, or in the virtue of our representatives, for if the machine be constituted with a tendency to lean too much to the popular side, it becomes necessary that means should be adopted to counteract this defect and to preserve the just equilibrium.—That such is the natural tendency of our Constitution is the declared opinion of our ablest constitutional writers; and if this truth were felt formerly how much more forcibly must it now impress itself upon our minds when we witness the rapid growth of the power of popular opinion.—To that opinion legitimately expressed, and prudently tempered by the wisdom of Parliament, I look, with confidence, to those reforms and improvements in Government, which are suggested by the evidence of experience and required by the progress of events.—
I fear I have, thus, run my observations, to what you may conceive, an unwarrantable length, and certainly much beyond what I intended. Yet in looking over your letter I observe there is still much remaining upon which I am tempted to remark.—But I believe I have embraced the substance of your opinions, and have considered the main points upon which we are at variance; and as I do not feel myself prepared or qualified to send you an essay on the subject, I will not fatigue you with any more desultory remarks. At all events I am happy to find you are likely to take your seat in that Assembly, where your sentiments may be advantageously expressed, and where you may join in that conflict of opinions by which truth is elicited, and wisdom established.
Report says I am to congratulate upon the approaching marriage of another daughter—I hope it will add to your happiness as well as hers—Poor Sr. S. Romilly! I honour[ed] him much and I hoped great things from the devotion of his enlarged mind to our criminal code, although in many of his political opinions I saw much to condemn.—
Mrs. Trower begs to join in kind remembrances to Mrs. Ricardo and family and believe me
Yrs very sincerely
Hutches Trower
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