The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Preface
• Introduction
• British Moralists
• Shaftesbury an Inquiry Concerning Uirtue Or Merit
• Book I. Part II.
• Book I. Part III.
• Book II. Part I.
• Part II.
• Part III.
• Hutcheson an Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas of Virtue Or Moral Good
• Introduction
• Sect. I.: Of the Moral Sense By Which We Perceive Virtue and Vice , and Approve Or Disapprove Them In Others .
• Sect. II.: Concerning the Immediate Motive to Virtuous Actions.
• Sect. III.: The Sense of Virtue , and the Various Opinions About It, Reducible to One General Foundation. the Manner of Computing the Morality of Actions .
• Sect. IV.: All Mankind Agree In This General Foundation of Their Approbation of Moral Actions. the Grounds of the Different Opinions About Morals.
• Butler
• Sermons
• Preface.
• Sermon I.: Upon the Social Nature of Man.
• Sermon Ii, III: Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience .
• Sermon III.
• Sermons Xi, XII.: Upon the Love of Our Neighbour .
• Sermon XII.
• Dissertation II.
• Adam Smith the Theory of Moral Sentiments
• Part I.: Of the Propriety of Action
• Part II.: Of Merit and Demerit Or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment.
• Part III.: Of the Foundation of Our Judgments Concerning Our Own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty.
• Part IV.: Of the Effect of Utility Upon the Sentiment of Approbation.
• Part VII.: Of Systems of Moral Philosophy.
• Bentham
• An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislatian
• Appendix
• Hutcheson: On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections
• Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense
• A System of Moral Philosohy
• Book I.
• Book II.

Part III.

Sect. II.

67 Is there then, said he, a natural Beauty of Figures? and is there not as natural a one of Actions 1 ? No sooner the Eye opens upon Figures, the Ear to Sounds, than straight the Beautiful results, and Grace and Harmony, are known and acknowledg'd. No sooner are Actions view'd, no sooner the human Affections and Passions discern'd (and they are most of 'em as soon discern'd as felt), than straight an inward Eye distinguishes, and sees the Fair and Shapely, the Amiable and Admirable, apart from the Deform'd, the Foul, the Odious, or the Despicable. How is it possible therefore not to own, 'That as these Distinctions have their Foundation in Nature, the Discernment it-self is natural, and from Nature alone'?

If this, I told him, were as he represented it; there cou'd never, I thought, be any Disagreement among Men concerning Actions and Behaviour: as which was Base, which Worthy; which Handsom, and which Deform'd. But now we find perpetual Variance among Mankind; whose Differences were chiefly founded on this Disagreement in Opinion; 'The one affrming the other denying that this, or 'that, was fit or decent.'

Even by this then, reply'd he, it appears there is Fitness and Decency in Actions since the Fit and Decent is in this Controversy ever pre-suppos'd: And whilst Men are at odds about the Subjects, the Thing it-self is universally agreed. For neither is there agreement in Judgments about other Beautys. 'Tis controverted 'Which is the finest Pile, the loveliest Skape, or Face:' But without controversy, 'tls allow'd 'There is a Beauty of eack kind.' This no-one goes about to teach: nor is it learnt by any but confess'd by All. AH own the Standard, Rule, and Measure: But in applying it to Things, Disorder arises, Ignorance prevails, Interest and Passion breed Disturbance, Nor can it otherwise happen in the Affairs of Life, whilst that which interests and engages Men as Good, is thought different from that which they admire and praise as Honest.— But with us, Philocles! 'tis better settled; since for our parts, we have already decreed, 'That Beauty and Good are still the same.']

HUTCHESON AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF VIRTUE OR MORAL GOOD

[First edition 1725. Reprinted here from the second edition, London 1726, omitting the author's ltalics.]

HUTCHESON An Inqeiry concerning Moral Good and Evil

[1]Supra, § 12.