The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Collector’s Acknowledgments
• Collector’s Foreword
• Introduction the Reputation of James Wilson
• The Text
• Part I: Political Papers, Speeches, and Judicial Opinions of James Wilson
• Considerations On the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament, 1774.
• Speech Delivered In the Convention For the Province of Pennsylvania, Held At Philadelphia, In January, 1775.
• An Address to the Inhabitants of the Colonies (1776). *
• An Address to the Inhabitants of the Colonies Submitted to the Continental Congress.
• Considerations On the Bank of North America 1785. A
• Remarks of James Wilson In the Federal Convention, 1787.
• James Wilson’s State House Yard Speech October 6, 1787. *
• Remarks of James Wilson In the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitution of the United States, 1787.
• Oration Delivered On the Fourth of July 1788, At the Procession Formed At Philadelphia to Celebrate the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States.
• Speech On Choosing the Members of the Senate By Electors; Delivered, On the 31st December, 1789, In the Convention of Pennsylvania, Assembled For the Purpose of Reviewing, Altering, and Amending the Constitution of the State. a
• Speech Delivered, On 19th January, 1790, In the Convention of Pennsylvania, Assembled For the Purpose of Reviewing, Altering, and Amending the Constitution of the State.
• A Charge Delivered to the Grand Jury In the Circuit Court of the United States, For the District of Virginia, In May, 1791.
• Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.s. 409 (1792), 411–414.
• James Wilson’s Opinion In Chisholm V. State of Ga., 2 U.s. 419 (1793), 453–466.
• Henfield’s Case Case No. 6,360 Circuit Court, D. Pennsylvania 11 F. Cas. 1099 (1793).
• James Wilson’s Opinion In Ware V. Hylton, 3 U.s. 199 (1796), 281
• “on the Improvement and Settlement of Lands In the United States,” Mid-1790s.
• On the History of Property.
• Part 2: Lectures On Law
• Bibliographical Essay History of James Wilson’s Law Lectures
• District of Pennsylvania:—to Wit.
• Preface
• Lectures On Law,: Part I
• Chapter I.: Introductory Lecture. of the Study of the Law In the United States.
• Chapter II.: Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation.
• Chapter III.: Of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter IV.: Of the Law of Nations.
• Chapter V.: Of Municipal Law.
• Chapter VI.: Of Man, As an Individual.
• Chapter VII.: Of Man, As a Member of Society.
• Chapter VIII.: Of Man, As a Member of a Confederation.
• Chapter IX.: Of Man, As a Member of the Great Commonwealth of Nations.
• Chapter X.: Of Government.
• Chapter XI.: Comparison of the Constitution of the United States, With That of Great Britain.

Remarks of James Wilson in the Federal Convention, 1787.

Friday 25 of May, when the following members appeared to wit: see Note A.

viz, From Massachusetts Rufus King. N. York Robert Yates, Alex^r Hamilton. N. Jersey, David Brearly, William Churchill Houston, William Patterson. Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, Thomas Fitzsimmons, James Wilson, Govurneur Morris. Delaware, George Read, Richard Basset, Jacob Broome. Virginia, George Washington, Edmund Randolph, John Blair, James Madison, George Mason, George Wythe, James M^cClurg. N. Carolina, Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs Spaight, Hugh Williamson. S. Carolina, John Rutlidge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler. Georgia, William Few.1

M^r Robert Morris informed the members assembled that by the instruction & in behalf, of the deputation of Pen^a he proposed George Washington Esq^r late Commander in chief for president of the Convention. M^r Jn^o Rutlidge seconded the motion; expressing his confidence that the choice would be unanimous, and observing that the presence of Gen^l Washington forbade any observations on the occasion which might otherwise be proper.

General Washington was accordingly unanimously elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by M^r R. Morris and M^r Rutlidge; from which in a very emphatic manner he thanked the Convention for the honor they had conferred on him, reminded them of the novelty of the scene of business in which he was to act, lamented his want of better qualifications, and claimed the indulgence of the House towards the involuntary errors which his inexperience might occasion.

[The nomination came with particular grace from Penna. as Doc^r Franklin alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Doc^r was himself to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of the weather and of his health confined him to his house.]

M^r Wilson moved that a Secretary be appointed, and nominated M^r Temple Franklin.2

. . .

Thursday May 31

William Pierce3 from Georgia took his seat.

In Committee of the whole on M^r Randolph’s propositions.

The 3^d Resolution “that the national Legislature ought to consist of two branches” was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Doc^r Franklin who was understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation.

Resol: 4. first clause “that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States” being taken up,

. . .

M^r Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the national Legislature. All interference between the general and local Governm^ts should be obviated as much as possible. On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to federal measures had proceded much more from the officers of the States, than from the people at large.

. . .

The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. “that the second, [or senatorial] branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures.”

. . .

M^r Wilson opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures and an election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several election districts, for one branch, in chusing members for the other branch, as a good model.

. . .

Friday June 1^st 1787

William Houston from Georgia took his seat.

The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7. “that a national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legislature—for the term NA of years &c to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the executive powers of Congress &c.”

. . .

M^r Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a single person.

. . .

M^r Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy, dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.

. . .

M^r Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it.

M^r Wilson’s motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz—“that a National Executive be instituted.”

M^r Madison thought it would be proper, before a choice sh^d be made between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and must be given to that departm^t whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive sh^d be struck out & that after the words “that a national Executive ought to be instituted” there be inserted the words following viz. “with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers ‘not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature,’ as may from time to time be delegated by the national Legislature.” The words “not legislative nor judiciary in their nature” were added to the proposed amendment in consequence of a suggestion by Gen^l Pinkney that improper powers might otherwise be delegated.

M^r Wilson seconded this motion—

. . .

The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive being under consideration.

M^r Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Mass^ts, shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.

. . .

The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question.

M^r Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States;

Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes however that M^r Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form.—the clause “to be chosen by the National Legislature”—was accordingly postponed.—

. . .

Saturday June 2^d. In Committee of whole

. . .

M^r Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode proposed by M^r Randolph’s resolution, “that the Executive Magistracy shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided into NA districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect NA members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at NA and they or any NA of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body NA person in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested.”

M^r Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election by the national Legislature.

. . .

M^r Dickenson4 moved “that the Executive be made removeable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual States.” It was necessary he said to place the power of removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great officers of State. He did not know how provision could be made for removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States.

. . .

M^r Madison & M^r Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent y^e removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for intrigues ag^st him in States where his administration tho’ just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency could be otherwise supplied.

. . .

Monday June 4. In Committee of the whole

The Question was resumed on motion of M^r Pinkney 2^ded by Wilson, “shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled with a single person?”

M^r Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had been opposed by the gentleman from Virg^a [M^r Randolph] but the arguments used had not convinced him. He observed that the objections of M^r R. were levelled not so much ag^st the measure itself, as ag^st its unpopularity. If he could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of the plan of which it should form a part, though the part was an important one, yet he would give it up rather than lose the whole. On examination he could see no evidence of the alledged antipathy of the people. On the contrary he was persuaded that it does not exist. All know that a single magistrate is not a King. One fact has great weight with him. All the 13 States tho agreeing in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of the Govern^t. The idea of three heads has taken place in none. The degree of power is indeed different; but there are no co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former reasons for preferring a unity, he would mention another. The tranquility not less than the vigor of the Gov^t he thought would be favored by it. Among three equal members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrouled, continued, & violent animosities; which would not only interrupt the public administration; but diffuse their poison thro’ the other branches of Gov^t, thro’ the States, and at length thro’ the people at large. If the members were to be unequal in power the principle of the opposition to the unity was given up. If equal, the making them an odd number would not be a remedy. In Courts of Justice there are two sides only to a question. In the Legislative & Executive departm^ts questions have commonly many sides. Each member therefore might espouse a separate one & no two agree.

. . .

M^r Williamson asks M^r Wilson whether he means to annex a Council.

M^r Wilson means to have no Council, which oftener serves to cover, than prevent malpractices.

. . .

First Clause of Proposition 8^th relating to a Council of Revision taken into consideration.

M^r Gerry5 doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as they will have a sufficient check ag^st encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the Judges had actually set aside laws as being ag^st the Constitution. This was done too with general approbation. It was quite foreign from the nature of y^e office to make them judges of the policy of public measures. He moves to postpone the clause in order to propose “that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by parts of each branch of the national Legislature.”

. . .

M^r Wilson thinks neither the original proposition nor the amendment go far enough. If the Legislative Exetv & Judiciary ought to be distinct & independent. The Executive ought to have an absolute negative. Without such a self-defense the Legislature can at any moment sink it into nonexistence. He was for varying the proposition in such a manner as to give the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute negative.

On the question to postpone in order to take M^r Gerry’s proposition into consideration it was agreed to, Mass^a ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. P^a ay. Del. no. Mary^d no. Virg^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. G^a ay.

M^r Gerry’s proposition being now before Committee, M^r Wilson & M^r Hamilton move that the last part of it [viz. “w^ch s^l not be afterw^ds passed unless NA by parts of each branch of the National legislature”] be struck out, so as to give the Executive an absolute negative on the laws. There was no danger they thought of such a power being too much exercised. It was mentioned by Col: Hamilton that the King of G. B. had not exerted his negative since the Revolution.

. . .

M^r Wilson believed as others did that this power would seldom be used. The Legislature would know that such a power existed, and would refrain from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation would therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief. The case of Pen^a formerly was very different from its present case. The Executive was not then as now to be appointed by the people. It will not in this case as in the one cited be supported by the head of a Great Empire, actuated by a different & sometimes opposite interest. The salary too is now proposed to be fixed by the Constitution, or if D^r. F.’s idea should be adopted all salary whatever interdicted. The requiring a large proportion of each House to overrule the Executive check might do in peaceable times; but there might be tempestuous moments in which animosities may run high between the Executive and Legislative branches, and in which the former ought to be able to defend itself.

. . .

Tuesday June 5. In Committee of the whole

Governor Livingston6 from New Jersey, took his seat.

The words, “one or more” were struck out before “inferior tribunals” as an amendment to the last clause of Resolⁿ 9^th. The Clause—“that the National Judiciary be chosen by the National Legislature,” being under consideration.

M^r Wilson opposed the appointm^t of Judges by the National Legisl: Experience shewed the impropriety of such appointm^ts by numerous bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences. A principal reason for unity in the Executive was that officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person.

. . .

M^r Wilson gave notice that he should at a future day move for a reconsideration of that clause which respects “inferior tribunals.”

. . .

Propos. 15 for “recommending Conventions under appointment of the people to ratify the new Constitution” &c. being taken up.

. . .

M^r Wilson took this occasion to lead the Committee by a train of observations to the idea of not suffering a disposition in the plurality of States to confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few States. He hoped the provision for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to admit of such a partial union, with a door open for the acession of the rest.

. . .

M^r Rutlidge hav^g obtained a rule for reconsideration of the clause for establishing inferior tribunals under the national authority, now moved that that part of the clause in propos. 9. should be expunged: arguing that the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgm^ts: that it was making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system.—M^r Sherman7 2^ded the motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson opposed the motion on like grounds, he said the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the national Government, as it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of particular states, & to a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to happen.

. . .

M^r Wilson & M^r Madison then moved, in pursuance of the idea expressed above by M^r Dickinson, to add to Resol: 9. the words following “that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals.” They observed that there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish them. They repeated the necessity of some such provision.

. . .

Wednesday June 6^th. In Committee of the whole

M^r Pinkney according to previous notice & rule obtained, moved “that the first branch of the national Legislature be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the people.” contending that the people were less fit Judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures would be less likely to promote the adoption of the new Government, if they were to be excluded from all share in it.

M^r Rutlidge 2^ded the motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson. He wished for vigor in the Gov^t, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority. The Gov^t ought to possess not only 1^st the force, but 2^dly the mind or sense of the people at large. The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole Society. Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively. The opposition was to be expected he said from the Governments, not from the Citizens of the States. The latter had parted as was observed [by M^r King] with all the necessary powers; and it was immaterial to them, by whom they were exercised, if well exercised. The State officers were to be the losers of power. The people he supposed would be rather more attached to the national Gov^t than to the State Gov^ts as being more important in itself, and more flattering to their pride. There is no danger of improper elections if made by large districts. Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.

. . .

M^r Wilson, would not have spoken again, but for what had fallen from M^r Read; namely, that the idea of preserving the State Gov^ts ought to be abandoned. He saw no incompatibility between the National & State Gov^ts provided the latter were restrained to certain local purposes; nor any probability of their being devoured by the former. In all confederated Systems antient & modern the reverse had happened; the Generality being destroyed gradually by the usurpations of the parts composing it.

. . .

M^r Wilson moved to reconsider the vote excluding the Judiciary from a share in the revision of the laws, and to add after “National Executive” the words “with a convenient number of the national Judiciary”; remarking the expediency of reinforcing the Executive with the influence of that Department.

. . .

M^r Wilson remarked, that the responsibility required belonged to his Executive duties. The revisionary duty was an extraneous one, calculated for collateral purposes.

. . .

Thursday June 7^th 1787—In Committee of the whole

. . .

The Clause providing for y^e appointment of the 2^d branch of the national Legislature, having lain blank since the last vote on the mode of electing it, to wit, by the 1^st branch, M^r Dickenson now moved “that the members of the 2^d branch ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures.”

. . .

M^r Wilson. If we are to establish a national Government, that Government ought to flow from the people at large. If one branch of it should be chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the people, the two branches will rest on different foundations, and dissensions will naturally arise between them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the people as well as the other branch, and the people might be divided into proper districts for the purpose & moved to postpone the motion of M^r Dickenson, in order to take up one of that import.

M^r Morris 2^ded him.

. . .

Friday June 8^th. In Committee of the whole

On a reconsideration of the clause giving the Nat^l Legislature a negative on such laws of the States as might be contrary to the articles of Union, or Treaties with foreign nations.

. . .

M^r Wilson would not say what modifications of the proposed power might be practicable or expedient. But however novel it might appear the principle of it when viewed with a close & steady eye, is right. There is no instance in which the laws say that the individual sh^d be bound in one case, & at liberty to judge whether he will obey or disobey in another. The cases are parallel. Abuses of the power over the individual person may happen as well as over the individual States. Federal liberty is to States, what civil liberty, is to private individuals. And States are not more unwilling to purchase it, by the necessary concession of their political sovereignty, than the savage is to purchase civil liberty by the surrender of his personal sovereignty, which he enjoys in a State of nature. A definition of the cases in which the Negative should be exercised, is impracticable. A discretion must be left on one side or the other? will it not be most safely lodged on the side of the Nat^l Gov^t? Among the first sentiments expressed in the first Cong^s one was that Virg^a is no more, that Mas^ts is no that P^a is no more &c. We are now one nation of brethren. We must bury all local interests & distinctions. This language continued for some time. The tables at length began to turn. No sooner were the State Gov^ts formed than their jealousy & ambition began to display themselves. Each endeavoured to cut a slice from the common loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length the confederation became frittered down to the impotent condition in which it now stands. Review the progress of the articles of Confederation thro’ Congress & compare the first & last draught of it. To correct its vices is the business of this convention. One of its vices is the want of an effectual controul in the whole over its parts. What danger is there that the whole will unnecessarily sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the whole at the mercy of each part, and will not the general interest be continually sacrificed to local interests?

. . .

Saturday June 9^th. M^r Luther Martin8 from Maryland took his seat. In Committee of the whole

M^r Gerry, according to previous notice given by him, moved that the National Executive should be elected by the Executives of the States whose proportion of votes should be the same with that allowed to the States in the election of the Senate.”

. . .

M^r Wilson hoped if the Confederacy should be dissolved, that a majority, that a minority of the States would unite for their safety. He entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation, stating for his first position that as all authority was derived from the people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal n^o of representatives, and different numbers of people different numbers of representatives. This principle had been improperly violated in the Confederation, owing to the urgent circumstances of the time. As to the case of A. & B, stated by M^r Patterson,9 he observed that in districts as large as the States, the number of people was the best measure of their comparative wealth. Whether therefore wealth or numbers were to form the ratio it would be the same. M^r P. admitted persons, not property to be the measure of suffrage. Are not the Citizens of Pen^a equal to those of N. Jersey? does it require 150 of the former to balance 50 of the latter? Representatives of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective Constituents hold to each other. If the small States will not confederate on this plan, Pen^a & he presumed some other States, would not confederate on any other. We have been told that each State being sovereign, all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign over himself, and all men are therefore naturally equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes a member of Civil Government? He can not. As little can a Sovereign State, when it becomes a member of a federal Govern^t If N. J. will not part with her Sovereignty it is in vain to talk of Gov^t A new partition of the States is desireable, but evidently & totally impracticable.

. . .

Monday June 11^th. M^r Abraham Baldwin10 from Georgia took his seat. In Committee of the whole

The clause concerning the rule of suffrage in the nat^l Legislature postponed on Saturday was resumed.

. . .

M^r King & M^r Wilson, in order to bring the question to a point moved “that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national Legislature ought not to be according the rule established in the articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of representation.” The clause so far as it related to suffrage in the first branch was postponed in order to consider this motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson & M^r Hamilton moved that the right of suffrage in the 2^dbranch ought to be according to the same rule as in the 1^st branch. On this question for making the ratio of representation the same in the 2^d as in the 1^st branch it passed in the affirmative:

. . .

Saturday June 16. In Committee of the whole on Resolutions propos^d by M^r P. & M^r R

M^r Lansing11 called for the reading of the 1^st resolution of each plan, which he considered as involving principles directly in contrast; that of M^r Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective States, that of M^r Randolph distroys it: the latter requires a negative on all the laws of the particular States; the former, only certain general powers for the general good. The plan of M^r R. in short absorbs all power except what may be exercised in the little local matters of the States which are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance.

. . .

M^r Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two plans so far he said as there had been time to examine the one last proposed. These points were 1. in the Virg^a plan there are 2 & in some degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan from N.J. there is to be a single legislature only—2. Representation of the people at large is the basis of the one:—the State Legislatures, the pillars of the other—3. proportional representation prevails in one:—equality of suffrage in the other—4. A single Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one:—a plurality is held out in the other.—5. in the one the majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail:—in the other a minority may prevail. 6. the Nat^l Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent &–:—in place of this Cong^s are to have additional power in a few cases only—7. A negative on the laws of the States:—in place of this coertion to be substituted—8. The Executive to be removeable on impeachment & conviction;—in one plan: in the other to be removeable at the instance of majority of the Executives of the States—9. Revision of the laws provided for in one:—no such check in the other—10. inferior national tribunals in one:—none such in the other. 11. In y^e one jurisdiction of Nat^l tribunals to extend &c—; an appellate jurisdiction only allowed in the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to extend to all cases affecting the Nation^l peace & harmony: there, a few cases only are marked out. 13. finally y^e ratification is in this to be by the people themselves:—in that by the legislative authorities according to the 13 art: of Confederation.

With regard to the power of the Convention, he conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to propose any thing. In this particular he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the two plans.

With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived it difficult to know precisely what they are. Those of the particular circle in which one moved, were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He could not persuade himself that the State Govt^ts & Sovereignties were so much the idols of the people, nor a Nat^l Gov^t so obnoxious to them, as some supposed. Why s^d a Nat^l Gov^t be unpopular? Has it less dignity? will each Citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen of Delaware be degraded by becoming a Citizen of the United States? Where do the people look at present for relief from the evils of which they complain? Is it from an internal reform of their Gov^ts? no, Sir. It is from the Nat^lCouncils that relief is expected. For these reasons he did not fear, that the people would not follow us into a national Gov^t and it will be a further recommendation of M^r R.’s plan that it is to be submitted to them, and not to the Legislatures, for ratification.

Proceeding now to the 1^st point on which he had contrasted the two plans, he observed that anxious as he was for some augmentation of the federal powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed that he could ever consent to give powers to Cong^s he had two reasons either of w^ch was sufficient. 1. Cong^s as a Legislative body does not stand on the people. 2. it is a single body. 1. He would not repeat the remarks he had formerly made on the principles of Representation. He would only say that an inequality in it, has ever been a poison contaminating every branch of Gov^t In G. Britain where this poison has had a full operation, the security of private rights is owing entirely to the purity of Her tribunals of Justice, the Judges of which are neither appointed nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty of that Nation, owing to the inequality of representation is at the mercy of its rulers. He means not to insinuate that there is any parallel between the situation of that Country & ours at present. But it is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the smallest bodies in G. B. are notoriously the most corrupt. Every other source of influence must also be stronger in small than large bodies of men. When Lord Chesterfield12 had told us that one of the Dutch provinces had been seduced into the views of France, he need not have added, that it was not Holland, but one of the smallest of them. There are facts among ourselves which are known to all. Passing over others, he will only remark that the Impost, so anxiously wished for by the public was defeated not by any of the larger States in the Union. 2. Congress is a single Legislature. Despotism comes on Mankind in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a Military, one. Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single House there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it.

On another great point, the contrast was equally favorable to the plan reported by the Committee of the whole. It vested the Executive powers in a single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested them in a plurality. In order to controul the Legislative authority, you must divide it. In order to controul the Executive you must unite it. One man will be more responsible than three. Three will contend among themselves till one becomes the master of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome first Caesar, then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The Kings of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove also the factious consequences of dividing the Executive Magistracy. Having already taken up so much time he w^d not he s^d proceed to any of the other points. Those on which he had dwelt, are sufficient of themselves: and on a decision of them, the fate of the others will depend.

. . .

Tuesday June 19^th. In Committee of whole on the Propositions of M^r Patterson

. . .

(Of M^r Randolph’s plan as reported from the Committee). the 1. propos: “that a Nat^l Gov^t ought to be established consisting &c.” being taken up in the House.

M^r Wilson observed that by a Nat^l Gov^t he did not mean one that would swallow up the State Gov^ts as seemed to be wished by some gentlemen. He was tenacious of the idea of preserving the latter. He thought, contrary to the opinion of [Col. Hamilton] that they might not only subsist but subsist on friendly terms with the former. They were absolutely necessary for certain purposes which the former could not reach. All large Governments must be subdivided into lesser jurisdictions. As Examples he mentioned Persia, Rome, and particularly the divisions & subdivisions of England by Alfred.13

. . .

M^r Wilson, could not admit the doctrine that when the Colonies became independent of G. Britain, they became independent also of each other. He read the declaration of Independence, observing thereon that the United Colonies were declared to be free & independent States; and inferring that they were independent, not individually but Unitedly and that they were confederated as they were independent, States.

. . .

Wednesday June 20. 1787. In Convention

M^r William Blount14 from N. Carolina took his seat.

1^st propos: of the Report of Com^e of the whole before the House.

. . .

M^r Wilson, urged the necessity of two branches; observed that if a proper model were not to be found in other Confederacies it was not to be wondered at. The number of them was small & the duration of some at least short. The Amphyctionic & Achaean were formed in the infancy of political Science; and appear by their History & fate, to have contained radical defects. The Swiss & Belgic Confederacies were held together not by any vital principle of energy but by the incumbent pressure of formidable neighbouring nations: The German owed its continuance to the influence of the H. of Austria.15 He appealed to our own experience for the defects of our Confederacy. He had been 6 years in the 12 since the commencement of the Revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt all its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others whether on many important occasions, the public interest had not been obstructed by the small members of the Union. The success of the Revolution was owing to other causes, than the Constitution of Congress. In many instances it went on even ag^st the difficulties arising from Cong^s themselves. He admitted that the large States did accede as had been stated, to the Confederation in its present form. But it was the effect of necessity not of choice. There are other instances of their yielding from the same motive to the unreasonable measures of the small States. The situation of things is now a little altered. He insisted that a jealousy would exist between the State Legislatures & the General Legislature: observing that the members of the former would have views & feelings very distinct in this respect from their constituents. A private Citizen of a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by the Gen^l or State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his happiness. His representative has an interest in its being exercised by the body to which he belongs. He will therefore view the National Legisl: with the eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Cong^s to the people at large, had always been better received & produced greater effect than those made to the Legislatures.

. . .

Thursday June 21. In Convention

M^r Jonathan Dayton16 from N. Jersey took his seat.

Doc^r Johnson.17

. . .

M^r Wilson’s respect for Doc^r Johnson, added to the importance of the subject led him to attempt, unprepared as he was, to solve the difficulty which had been started. It was asked how the Gen^l Gov^t and individuality of the particular States could be reconciled to each other; and how the latter could be secured ag^st the former? Might it not, on the other side be asked how the former was to be secured ag^st the latter? It was generally admitted that a jealousy & rivalship would be felt between the Gen^l & particular Gov^ts. As the plan now stood, tho’ indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch of the Gen^l (the Senate or second branch) was to be appointed by the State Legislatures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this participation in the Gen^l Gov^t would have an opportunity of defending their rights. Ought not a reciprocal opportunity to be given to the Gen^l Gov^t of defending itself by having an appointment of some one constituent branch of the State Gov^ts. If a security be necessary on one side, it w^d seem reasonable to demand it on the other. But taking the matter in a more general view, he saw no danger to the States from the Gen^l Gov^t. In case a combination should be made by the large ones it w^d produce a general alarm among the rest; and the project w^d be frustrated. But there was no temptation to such a project. The States having in general a similar interest, in case of any proposition in the National Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures, he conceived a general alarm w^d take place in the National Legislature itself, that it would communicate itself to the State Legislatures, and w^d finally spread among the people at large. The Gen^l Gov^t will be as ready to preserve the rights of the States as the latter are to preserve the rights of individuals; all the members of the former, having a common interest, as representatives of all the people of the latter, to leave the State Gov^ts in possession of what the people wish them to retain. He could not discover, therefore any danger whatever on the side from which it had been apprehended. On the contrary, he conceived that in spite of every precaution the general Gov^t would be in perpetual danger of encroachments from the State Gov^ts.

. . .

The third resolution of the Report taken into consideration.

Gen^l Pinkney moved “that the 1^st branch, instead of being elected by the people, sh^d be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each State should direct.” He urged 1. that this liberty would give more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accomodate the mode to the conveniency & opinions of the people 2. that it would avoid the undue influence of large Counties which would prevail if the elections were to be made in districts as must be the mode intended by the Report of the Committee. 3. that otherwise disputed elections must be referred to the General Legislature which would be attended with intolerable expence and trouble to the distant parts of the republic.

M^r L. Martin seconded the Motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson considered the election of the 1^st branch by the people not only as the corner Stone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and that the difference between a mediate & immediate election was immense. The difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect: that the Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people; but have an official sentiment opposed to that of the Gen^l Gov^t and perhaps to that of the people themselves.

. . .

Election of the 1^st branch “for the term of three years,” considered

M^r Randolph moved to strike out, “three years” and insert “two years”—he was sensible that annual elections were a source of great mischiefs in the States, yet it was the want of such checks ag^st the popular intemperence as were now proposed, that rendered them so mischievous.

. . .

M^r Wilson being for making the 1^st branch an effectual representation of the people at large, preferred an annual election of it. This frequency was most familiar & pleasing to the people. It would be not more inconvenient to them, than triennial elections, as the people in all the States have annual meetings with which the election of the National representatives might be made to co-incide. He did not conceive that it would be necessary for the Nat^l Legisl: to sit constantly; perhaps not half—perhaps not one fourth of the year.

. . .

Friday June 22. In Convention

The clause in Resol. 3. “to receive fixed stipends to be paid out of the Nation^l Treasury” considered.

. . .

M^r Wilson was ag^stfixing the compensation as circumstances would change and call for a change of the amount. He thought it of great moment that the members of the Nat^l Gov^t should be left as independent as possible of the State Gov^ts in all respects.

. . .

M^r Wilson moved that the Salaries of the 1^st branch “be ascertained by the National Legislature,” and be paid out of the Nat^l Treasury.

. . .

The present Mr Pitt18 and Lord Bolingbroke19 were striking instances.

M^r Ghorum20 moved to strike out the last member of 3 Resol: concerning ineligibility of members of the 1^st branch to offices during the term of their membership & for one year after. He considered it as unnecessary & injurious. It was true abuses had been displayed in G. B. but no one c^d say how far they might have contributed to preserve the due influence of the Gov^tnor what might have ensued in case the contrary theory had been tried.

. . .

M^r Wilson was ag^st fettering elections, and discouraging merit. He suggested also the fatal consequence in time of war, of rendering perhaps the best Commanders ineligible: appealing to our situation during the late war, and indirectly leading to a recollection of the appointment of the Commander in Chief out of Congress.

. . .

Saturday June 23. In Convention

. . .

M^r Madison renewed his motion yesterday made & waved to render the members of the 1^st branch “ineligible during their term of service, & for one year after—to such offices only as should be established, or the emoluments thereof, augmented by the Legislature of the U. States during the time of their being members.” He supposed that the unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of salaries, were the evils most experienced, & that if the door was shut ag^st them: it might properly be left open for the appoint^tof members to other offices as an encouragem^t to the Legislative service.

. . .

M^rWilson supported the motion. The proper cure he said for corruption in the Legislature was to take from it the power of appointing to offices. One branch of corruption would indeed remain, that of creating unnecessary offices, or granting unnecessary salaries, and for that the amendment would be a proper remedy. He animadverted on the impropriety of stigmatizing with the name of venality the laudable ambition of rising into the honorable offices of the Government; an ambition most likely to be felt in the early & most incorrupt period of life, & which all wise & free Gov^ts had deemed it sound policy, to cherish, not to check. The members of the Legislature have perhaps the hardest & least profitable task of any who engage in the service of the state. Ought this merit to be made a disqualification?

. . .

Monday June 25. In Convention

The mode of constituting the 2^d branch being under consideration.

The word “national” was struck out and “United States” inserted.

. . .

M^r Wilson. the question is shall the members of the 2^d branch be chosen by the Legislatures of the States? When he considered the amazing extent of Country—the immense population which is to fill it, the influence which the Gov^t we are to form will have, not only on the present generation of our people & their multiplied posterity, but on the whole Globe, he was lost in the magnitude of the object. The project of Henry the 4^th & his Statesmen was but the picture in miniature of the great portrait to be exhibited. He was opposed to an election by the State Legislatures. In explaining his reasons it was necessary to observe the twofold relation in which the people would stand. 1. as Citizens of the Gen^l Gov^t 2. as Citizens of their particular State. The Gen^l Gov^t was meant for them in the first capacity: the State Gov^ts in the second. Both Gov^ts were derived from the people—both meant for the people—both therefore ought to be regulated on the same principles. The same train of ideas which belonged to the relation of the Citizens to their State Gov^ts were applicable to their relation to the Gen^l Gov^t and in forming the latter, we ought to proceed, by abstracting as much as possible from the idea of State Gov^ts. With respect to the province & objects of the Gen^l Gov^t they should be considered as having no existence. The election of the 2^d branch by the Legislatures, will introduce & cherish local interests & local prejudices. The Gen^lGov^t is not an assemblage of States, but of individuals for certain political purposes—it is not meant for the States, but for the individuals composing them; the individuals therefore not the States, ought to be represented in it: A proportion in this representation can be preserved in the 2^d as well as in the 1^st branch; and the election can be made by electors chosen by the people for that purpose. He moved an amendment to that effect which was not seconded.

. . .

Tuesday June 26. In Convention

The duration of the 2^d branch under consideration.

M^r Ghorum moved to fill the blank with “six years,” one third of the members to go out every second year.

M^r Wilson 2^ded the motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen from others, but w^dadd an observation or two which he believed had not yet been suggested. Every nation may be regarded in two relations 1. to its own citizens. 2 to foreign nations. It is therefore not only liable to anarchy & tyranny within, but has wars to avoid & treaties to obtain from abroad. The Senate will probably be the depositary of the powers concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign Nations. The true reason why G. Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty with us has been, because she had no confidence in the stability or efficacy of our Government. 9 years with a rotation, will provide these desirable qualities; and give our Gov^t an advantage in this respect over Monarchy itself. In a monarchy much must always depend on the temper of the man. In such a body, the personal character will be lost in the political. He w^dadd another observation. The popular objection ag^st appointing any public body for a long term was that it might by gradual encroachments prolong itself first into a body for life, and finally become a hereditary one. It would be a satisfactory answer to this objection that as ⅓ would go out triennially, there would be always three divisions holding their places for unequal terms, and consequently acting under the influence of different views, and different impulses—On the question for 9 years, ⅓ to go out triennially.

. . .

M^r Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility of Senators to State offices.

M^r Williamson seconded the motion.

M^r Wilson remarked the additional dependence this w^d create in the Senators on the States. The longer the time he observed allotted to the officer, the more compleat will be the dependance, if it exists at all.

. . .

Thursday June 28^th. In Convention

. . .

M^r Wilson. The leading argument of those who contend for equality of votes among the States is that the States as such being equal, and being represented not as districts of individuals, but in their political & corporate capacities, are entitled to an equality of suffrage. According to this mode of reasoning the representation of the boroughs in Eng^ld which has been allowed on all hands to be the rotten part of the Constitution, is perfectly right & proper. They are like the States represented in their corporate capacity; like the States therefore they are entitled to equal voices, old Sarum21 to as many as London. And instead of the injury supposed hitherto to be done to London, the true ground of complaint lies with old Sarum: for London instead of two which is her proper share, sends four representatives to Parliament.

. . .

Saturday June 30. 1787. In Convention

M^r Brearly moved that the Presid^t write to the Executive of N. Hamshire, informing it that the business depending before the Convention was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance of the deputies of that State.

. . .

M^r Wilson wished to know whether it would be consistent with the rule or reason of secresy, to communicate to N. Hamshire that the business was of such a nature as the motion described. It w^d spread a great alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State on the subject; the meeting being merely voluntary—on the motion of M^r Brearly Mas^ts no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay P^a not on y^e floor. Del. not on floor. M^d div^d V^ano. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not on floor.

The motion of Mr Elseworth22 resumed for allowing each State an equal vote in y^e 2^d branch.

M^r Wilson did not expect such a motion after the establishment of y^econtrary principle in the 1^st branch; and considering the reasons which would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the 1^st branch. The Gentleman from Connecticut [M^r Elseworth] had pronounced that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States North of Pen^a one only would agree to any Gen^l Government. He entertained more favorable hopes of Conn^t and of the other Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a Country to which they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles, if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday ag^st the just principle of representation, were as 22 to 90 of the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure if there was any room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, the question will be shall less than ¼ of the U. States withdraw themselves from the Union; or shall more than ¾ renounce the inherent, indisputable, and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial systems of States. If issue must be joined, it was on this point he would chuse to join it. The gentlemen from Connecticut in supposing that the prepondenancy secured to the majority in the 1^st branch had removed the objections to an equality of votes in the 2^d branch for the security of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to controul in all cases whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. Seven States will controul six: Seven States, according to the estimates that had been used, composed 24/90 of the whole people. It would be in the power then of less than ⅓ to overrule ⅔ whenever a question should happen to divide the States in that manner. Can we forget for whom we are forming a Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called States? Will our honest Constituents be satisfied with metaphysical distinctions? Will they, ought they to be satisfied with being told that the one third compose the greater number of States? The rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the 2^d as in the 1^st branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be local, confined & temporary. This will expand with the expansion, and grow with the growth of the U. States.—Much has been said of an imaginary combination of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, sometimes of aristocracy, has been charged on it. No explanation however of the danger has been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both from reason & history that rivalships would be more probable than coalitions; and that there are no coinciding interests that could produce the latter. No answer has yet been given to the observations of [M^r Madison] on this subject. Should the Executive Magistrate be taken from one of the large States would not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the other States? Whence then the danger of monarchy? Are the people of the three large States more aristocratic than those of the small ones? Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their influence? It is all a mere illusion of names. We talk of States, till we forget what they are composed of. Is a real & fair majority, the natural hot-bed of aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this species of Gov^t or rather of tyranny, that the smaller number governs the greater. It is true that a majority of States in the 2^dbranch can not carry a law ag^st a majority of the people in the 1^st. But this removes half only of the objection. Bad Govern^ts are of two sorts. 1. that which does too little. 2. that which does too much: that which fails thro’ weakness; and that which destroys thro’ oppression. Under which of these evils do the U. States at present groan? under the weakness and ineffi-ciency of its Govern^t. To remedy this weakness we have been sent to this Convention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave the U. S. fettered precisely as heretofore; with the additional mortification of seeing the good purposes of y^e fair represention of the people in the 1^st branch, defeated in 2^d. Twenty four will still controul sixty six. He lamented that such a disagreement should prevail on the point of representation, as he did not forsee that it would happen on the other point most contested, the boundary between the Gen^l & the local authorities. He thought the States necessary & valuable parts of a good system.

. . .

M^r Wilson admitted the question concerning the number of Senators, to be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked forward to the time when the smallest States will contain 100,000 souls at least. Let there be then one Senator in each for every 100,000 souls and let the States not having that n^o of inhabitants be allowed one. He was willing himself to submit to this temporary concession to the small States; and threw out the idea as a ground of compromise.

. . .

Monday July 2^d. In Convention

On the question for allowing each State one vote in the second branch as moved by M^r Elseworth,

. . .

General Pinkney. was willing the motion might be considered. He did not entirely approve it. He liked better the motion of Doc^r Franklin. Some compromise seemed to be necessary: the States being exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in the 2^d branch. He proposed that a Committee consisting of a member from each State should be appointed to devise & report some compromise.

. . .

M^r Wilson objected to the Committee, because it would decide according to that very rule of voting which was opposed on one side. Experience in Cong^s had also proved the inutility of Committees consisting of members from each State.

. . .

Thursday July 5^th. In Convention

M^r Gerry delivered in from the Committee appointed on Monday last the following Report.

“The Committee to whom was referred the 8^th Resol. of the Report from the Committee of the whole House, and so much of the 7^th as has not been decided on, submit the following Report: That the subsequent propositions be recommended to the Convention on condition that both shall be generally adopted. I. that in the I^st branch of the Legislature each of the States now in the Union shall be allowed 1 member for every 40,000 inhabitants of the description reported in the 7^th Resolution of the Com^eof the whole House: that each State not containing that number shall be allowed 1 member: that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the Salaries of the officers of the Govern^t of the U. States shall originate in the 1^st branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the 2^d branch: and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury. But in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the 1st branch” II. That in the 2^d branch each State shall have an equal vote.”

. . .

M^r Wilson thought the Committee had exceeded their powers.

. . .

M^r Wilson was for a division of the question: otherwise it w^d be a leap in the dark.

. . .

Friday July 6^th. In Convention

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to commit so much of the Report as relates to “1 member for every 40,000 inhabitants”

. . .

M^r Wilson 2^ded the motion; but with a view of leaving the Committee under no implied shackles.

. . .

M^r Wilson signified that his view in agreeing to the commitm^t was that the Com^e might consider the propriety of adopting a scale similar to that established by the Constitution of Mast^s which w^d give an advantage to y^esmall States without substantially departing from a rule of proportion.

M^r Wilson & M^r Mason moved to postpone the clause relating to money bills in order to take up the clause relating to an equality of votes in the second branch.

. . .

The 1^st clause relating to the originating of money bills was then resumed.

. . .

M^r Wilson could see nothing like a concession here on the part of the smaller States. If both branches were to say yes or no, it was of little consequence which should say yes or no first, which last. If either was indiscriminately to have the right of originating, the reverse of the Report, would he thought be most proper; since it was a maxim that the least numerous body was the fittest for deliberation; the most numerous for decision. He observed that this discrimination had been transcribed from the British into several American constitutions. But he was persuaded that on examination of the American experiments it would be found to be a trifle light as air. Nor could he ever discover the advantage of it in the Parliamentary history of G. Britain. He hoped if there was any advantage in the privilege, that it would be pointed out.

. . .

M^r Wilson. If he had proposed that the 2^d branch should have an independent disposal of public money, the observations of [Col Mason] would have been a satisfactory answer. But nothing could be farther from what he had said. His question was how is the power of the 1^st branch increased or that of the 2^d diminished by giving the proposed privilege to the former? Where is the difference, in which branch it begins if both must concur, in the end?

. . .

M^r Martin said that it was understood in the Committee that the diffi-culties and disputes which had been apprehended, should be guarded ag^stin the detailing of the plan.

M^r Wilson. The difficulties & disputes will increase with the attempts to define & obviate them. Queen Anne was obliged to dissolve her Parliam^t in order to terminate one of these obstinate disputes between the two Houses. Had it not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one can say what the result would have been. The point is still sub judice23 in England. He approved of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble President [Doct^r Franklin] his Colleague, as to the expediency of keeping the people informed of their money affairs. But thought they would know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one way as in the other.

. . .

Saturday July 7. In Convention

“Shall the clause allowing each State one vote in the 2^d branch, stand as part of the Report”? being taken up—

. . .

M^r Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating temper, but firmness was sometimes a duty of higher obligation. Conciliation was also misapplied in this instance. It was pursued here rather among the Representatives, than among the Constituents; and it w^d be of little consequence, if not established among the latter; and there could be little hope of its being established among them if the foundation should not be laid in justice and right.

. . .

Wednesday July 11. In Convention

M^r Randolph’s motion requiring the Legisl^re to take a periodical census for the purpose of redressing inequalities in the Representation, was resumed.

. . .

M^r Williamson was for making it the duty of the Legislature to do what was right & not leaving it at liberty to do or not do it. He moved that M^r Randolph’s proposition be postpon^d in order to consider the following “that in order to ascertain the alterations that may happen in the population & wealth of the several States, a census shall be taken of the free white inhabitants and ⅗^ths of those of other descriptions on the 1^styear after this Government shall have been adopted and every NA year thereafter; and that the Representation be regulated accordingly.”

. . .

M^r Wilson had himself no objection to leaving the Legislature entirely at liberty. But considered wealth as an impracticable rule.

. . .

the next clause as to ⅗ of the negroes considered.

. . .

M^r Wilson did not well see on what principle the admission of blacks in the proportion of three fifths could be explained. Are they admitted as Citizens? then why are they not admitted on an equality with White Citizens? are they admitted as property? then why is not other property admitted into the computation? These were difficulties however which he thought must be overruled by the necessity of compromise. He had some apprehensions also from the tendency of the blending of the blacks with the whites, to give disgust to the people of Pen^a as had been intimated by his Colleague [M^r Gov^r Morris]. But he differed from him in thinking numbers of inhab^ts so incorrect a measure of wealth. He had seen the Western settlem^ts of P^a and on a comparison of them with the City of Philad^a could discover little other difference, than that property was more unequally divided among individuals here than there. Taking the same number in the aggregate in the two situations he believed there would be little difference in their wealth and ability to contribute to the public wants.

. . .

Thursday July 12. In Convention

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to add to the clause empowering the Legislature to vary the Representation according to the principles of wealth & number of inhab^ts a “proviso that taxation shall be in proportion to Representation.”

. . .

M^r Wilson approved the principle, but could not see how it could be carried into execution; unless restrained to direct taxation.

. . .

M^r Wilson observed that less umbrage would perhaps be taken ag^st an admission of the slaves into the Rule of representation, if it should be so expressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient in the rule, by saying that they should enter into the rule of taxation: and as representation was to be according to taxation the end would be equally attained. He accordingly moved & as 2^ded so to alter the last clause adopted by the House, that together with the amendment proposed the whole should read as follows “provided always that the representation ought to be proportioned according to direct taxation, and in order to ascertain the alterations in the direct taxation which may be required from time to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the States. Resolved that a census be taken within two years from the first meeting of the Legislature of the U. States, and once within the term of every NA years afterwards of all the inhabitants of the U. S. in the manner and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution of April 18. 1783; and that the Legislature of the U. S. shall proportion the direct taxation accordingly.”

. . .

Friday July 13. In Convention

It being moved to postpone the clause in the Report of the Committee of Eleven as to the originating of money bills in the first branch, in order to take up the following—“that in the 2^d branch each State shall have an equal voice.”

. . .

M^r Wilson hoped the motion would not be withdrawn. If it sh^d it will be made from another quarter. The rule will be as reasonable & just before, as after a Census. As to fractional numbers, the Census will not distroy, but ascertain them. And they will have the same effect after as before the Census: for as he understands the rule, it is to be adjusted not to the number of inhabitants, but of Representatives.

. . .

On the motion of M^r Randolph, the vote of saturday last authorising the Legisl^re to adjust from time to time, the representation upon the principles of wealth & numbers of inhabitants was reconsidered by common consent in order to strike out “Wealth” and adjust the resolution to that requiring periodical revisions according to the number of whites & three fifths of the blacks: the motion was in the words following—“But as the present situation of the States may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, that the Legislature of the U. S. be authorized from time to time to apportion the number of representatives: and in case any of the States shall hereafter be divided or any two or more States united or new States created within the limits of the U. S. the Legislature of U. S. shall possess authority to regulate the number of Representatives in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabitants; according to the provisions hereafter mentioned.”

. . .

M^r Wilson. If a general declaration would satisfy any gentleman he had no indisposition to declare his sentiments. Conceiving that all men wherever placed have equal rights and are equally entitled to confidence, he viewed without apprehension the period when a few States should contain the superior number of people. The majority of people wherever found ought in all questions to govern the minority. If the interior Country should acquire this majority, it will not only have the right, but will avail themselves of it whether we will or no. This jealousy misled the policy of G. Britain with regard to America. The fatal maxims espoused by her were that the Colonies were growing too fast, and that their growth must be stinted in time. What were the consequences? first. enmity on our part, then actual separation. Like consequences will result on the part of the interior settlements, if like jealousy & policy be pursued on ours. Further, if numbers be not a proper rule, why is not some better rule pointed out. No one has yet ventured to attempt it. Cong^s have never been able to discover a better. No State as far as he had heard, has suggested any other. In 1783, after elaborate discussion of a measure of wealth all were satisfed then as they are now that the rule of numbers, does not differ much from the combined rule of numbers & wealth. Again he could not agree that property was the sole or the primary object of Govern^t & society. The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most noble object. With respect to this object, as well as to other personal rights, numbers were surely the natural & precise measure of Representation. And with respect to property, they could not vary much from the precise measure. In no point of view however could the establishm^t of numbers as the rule of representation in the 1^st branch vary his opinion as to the impropriety of letting a vicious principle into the 2^d branch.—On the Question to strike out wealth & to make the change as moved by M^r Randolph, it passed in the affirmative—

. . .

Saturday July 14. In Convention

M^r L. Martin called for the question on the whole report including the parts relating to the origination of money bills, and the equality of votes in the 2^d branch.

. . .

M^r Wilson traced the progress of the report through its several stages, remarking y^t when on the question concerning an equality of votes, the House was divided, our Constituents had they voted as their representatives did, would have stood as ⅔ ag^st the equality, and ⅓ only in favor of it. This fact would ere long be known and it will appear that this fundamental point has been carried by ⅓ ag^st ⅔. What hopes will our Constituents entertain when they find that the essential principles of justice have been violated in the outset of the Governm^t As to the privilege of originating money bills, it was not considered by any as of much moment, and by many as improper in itself. He hoped both clauses w^d be reconsidered. The equality of votes was a point of such critical importance, that every opportunity ought to be allowed, for discussing and collecting the mind of the Convention on it.

. . .

M^r Wilson was not surprised that those who say that a minority is more than the majority should say that the minority is stronger than the majority. He supposed the next assertion will be that they are richer also; though he hardly expected it would be persisted in when the States shall be called on for taxes & troops—

. . .

M^r Pinkney moved that instead of an equality of votes the States should be represented in the 2^d branch as follows: N. H. by 2. members. Mas. 4. R. I. 1. Con^t 3. N. Y. 3. N. J. 2. P^a 4. Del 1. M^d 3. Virg^a 5. N. C. 3. S. C. 3. Geo. 2. making in the whole 36.

M^r Wilson seconds the motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson would add a few words only. If equality in the 2^d branch was an error that time would correct, he should be less anxious to exclude it being sensible that perfection was unattainable in any plan; but being a fundamental and a perpetual error, it ought by all means to be avoided. A vice in the Representation, like an error in the first concoction, must be followed by disease, convulsions, and finally death itself. The justice of the general principle of proportional representation has not in argument at least been yet contradicted. But it is said that a departure from it so far as to give the States an equal vote in one branch of the Legislature is essential to their preservation. He had considered this positon maturely, but could not see its application. That the States ought to be preserved he admitted. But does it follow that an equality of votes is necessary for the purpose? Is there any reason to suppose that if their preservation should depend more on the large than on the small States the security of the States ag^stthe Gen^l Government would be diminished? Are the large States less attached to their existence, more likely to commit suicide, than the small? An equal vote then is not necessary as far as he can conceive: and is liable among other objections to this insuperable one: The great fault of the existing confederacy is its inactivity. It has never been a complaint ag^stCong^s that they governed overmuch. The complaint has been that they have governed too little. To remedy this defect we were sent here. Shall we effect the cure by establishing an equality of votes as is proposed? no: this very equality carries us directly to Congress: to the system which it is our duty to rectify. The small States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality, but they may controul the Gov^t as they have done in Cong^s This very measure is here prosecuted by a minority of the people of America. Is then the object of the Convention likely to be accomplished in this way? Will not our Constituents say, we sent you to form an efficient Gov^t and you have given us one more complex indeed, but having all the weakness of the former Govern^t. He was anxious for uniting all the States under one Govern^t. He knew there were some respectable men who preferred three confederacies, united by offensive & defensive alliances. Many things may be plausibly said, some things may be justly said, in favor of such a project. He could not however concur in it himself; but he thought nothing so pernicious as bad first principles.

. . .

Tuesday July 17. In Convention

The 6^th Resolⁿ in the Report of the Com^e of the Whole relating to the powers, which had been postponed in order to consider the 7 & 8^th relating to the constitution of the Nat^l Legislature, was now resumed.

M^r Sherman observed that it would be difficult to draw the line between the powers of the Gen^l Legislatures, and those to be left with the States; that he did not like the definition contained in the Resolution, and proposed in place of the words “of individual Legislation” line 4. inclusive, to insert “to make laws binding on the people of the United States in all cases which may concern the common interests of the Union; but not to interfere with the Government of the individual States in any matters of internal police which respect the Gov^t of such States only, and wherein the general welfare of the U. States is not concerned.”

M^r Wilson 2^ded the amendment as better expressing the general principle.

. . .

9^th Resol: “that Nat^l Executive consist of a single person.” Ag^d to nem. con.

“To be chosen by the National Legisl:”

. . .

M^r Wilson. two arguments have been urged ag^st an election of the Executive Magistrate by the people. 1 the example of Poland where an Election of the supreme Magistrate is attended with the most dangerous commotions. The cases he observed were totally dissimilar. The Polish nobles have resources & dependents which enable them to appear in force, and to threaten the Republic as well as each other. In the next place the electors all assemble in one place: which would not be the case with us. The 2^d arg^t is that a majority of the people would never concur. It might be answered that the concurrence of a majority of people is not a necessary principle of election, nor required as such in any of the States. But allowing the objection all its force, it may be obviated by the expedient used in Mas^ts where the Legislature by majority of voices, decide in case a majority of people do not concur in favor of one of the candidates. This would restrain the choice to a good nomination at least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue & cabal. A particular objection with him ag^st an absolute election by the Legisl^re was that the Exec: in that case would be too dependent to stand the mediator between the intrigues & sinister views of the Representatives and the general liberties & interests of the people.

. . .

M^r Wilson. could not see the contrariety stated [by Col. Mason] The Legisl^re might deserve confidence in some respects, and distrust in others. In acts which were to affect them & y^r Constituents precisely alike confidence was due. In others jealousy was warranted. The appointment to great offices, where the Legisl^re might feel many motives, not common to the public confidence was surely misplaced. This branch of business it was notorious was most corruptly managed of any that had been committed to legislative bodies.

. . .

Wednesday July 18. In Convention

. . .

Resol. 11 “that a Nat^l Judiciary be estab^d to consist of one supreme tribunal.” ag^d to nem. con.

“The Judges of which to be appoint^d by the 2^d branch of the Nat^lLegislature.”

. . .

M^r Wilson, still w^d prefer an appointm^t by the Executive; but if that could not be attained, w^d prefer in the next place, the mode suggested by M^r Ghorum. He thought it his duty however to move in the first instance “that the Judges be appointed by the Executive.” M^r Gov^r Morris 2^ded the motion.

. . .

Resol. 15. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Cong^s &c. & for the completion of their engagements.

. . .

M^r Wilson did not entirely approve of the manner in which the clause relating to the engagements of Cong^s was expressed, but he thought some provision on the subject would be proper in order to prevent any suspicion that the obligations of the Confederacy might be dissolved along with the Govern^t under which they were contracted.

. . .

Resol. 16. “That a Republican Constitution & its. existing laws ought to be guarantied to each State by the U. States.”

. . .

M^r Wilson. The object is merely to secure the States ag^st dangerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions.

. . .

M^r Wilson moved as a better expression of the idea, “that a Republican form of Governm^t shall be guarantied to each State & that each State shall be protected ag^st foreign & domestic violence.

This seeming to be well received, M^r Madison & M^r Randolph withdrew their propositions & on the Question for agreeing to Wilson’s motion, it passed nem. con.

. . .

Thursday July 19. In Convention

On reconsideration of the vote rendering the Executive re-eligible a 2^d time, M^r Martin moved to reinstate the words “to be ineligible a 2^dtime.”

. . .

M^r Wilson. It seems to be the unanimous sense that the Executive should not be appointed by the Legislature, unless he be rendered ineligible a 2^d time: he perceived with pleasure that the idea was gaining ground, of an election mediately or immediately by the people.

. . .

Friday July 20. In Convention

. . .

“to be removable on impeachment and conviction for mal practice or neglect of duty.” see Resol: 9.

. . .

M^r Wilson concurred in the necessity of making the Executive impeachable whilst in office.

. . .

M^r Wilson observed that if the idea were to be pursued, the Senators who are to hold their places during the same term with the Executive, ought to be subject to impeachment & removal.

. . .

Doc^r M^cClurg asked whether it would not be necessary, before a Committee for detailing the Constitution should be appointed, to determine on the means by which the Executive is to carry the laws into effect, and to resist combinations ag^st them. Is he to have a military force for the purpose, or to have the command of the Militia, the only existing force that can be applied to that use? As the Resolutions now stand the Committee will have no determinate directions on this great point.

M^r Wilson thought that some additional directions to the Committee w^d be necessary.

. . .

Saturday July 21. In Convention

. . .

M^r Wilson moved as an amendment to Resolⁿ 10. that the supreme Nat^lJudiciary should be associated with the Executive in the Revisionary power. This proposition had been before made and failed: but he was so confirmed by reflection in the opinion of its utility, that he thought it incumbent on him to make another effort: The Judiciary ought to have an opportunity of remonstrating ag^st projected encroachments on the people as well as on themselves. It had been said that the Judges, as expositors of the Laws would have an opportunity of defending their constitutional rights. There was weight in this observation; but this power of the Judges did not go far enough. Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them have a share in the Revisionary power, and they will have an opportunity of taking notice of these characters of a law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the improper views of the Legislature.—

. . .

M^r Wilson. The separation of the departments does not require that they should have separate objects but that they should act separately tho’ on the same objects. It is necessary that the two branches of the Legislature should be separate and distinct, yet they are both to act precisely on the same object.

. . .

M^r Wilson. The proposition is certainly not liable to all the objections which have been urged ag^st it. According [to M^r Gerry] it will unite the Executive & Judiciary in an offensive & defensive alliance ag^st the Legislature. According to M^r Ghorum it will lead to a subversion of the Executive by the Judiciary influence. To the first gentleman the answer was obvious; that the joint weight of the two departments was necessary to balance the single weight of the Legislature. To the 1^st objection stated by the other Gentleman it might be answered that supposing the prepossion to mix itself with the exposition, the evil would be overbalanced by the advantages promised by the expedient. To the 2^d objection, that such a rule of voting might be provided in the detail as would guard ag^st it.

. . .

Monday July 23. In Convention

M^r John Langdon & M^r Nicholas Gilman24 from N. Hampshire, took their seats.

Resolⁿ: 17. that provision ought to be made for future amendments of the articles of Union, agreed to, nem. con.

Resolⁿ 18. “requiring the Legis: Execut: & Jud^y of the States to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union,” taken into consideration.

. . .

M^r Wilson said he was never fond of oaths, considering them as a left handed security only. A good Gov^t did not need them, and a bad one could not or ought not to be supported. He was afraid they might too much trammel the members of the Existing Gov^t–in case future alterations should be necessary; and prove an obstacle to Resol: 17. just ag^d to.

. . .

Tuesday July 24. In Convention

. . .

M^r L. Martin & M^r Gerry moved to re-instate the ineligibility of the Executive a 2^d time.

. . .

M^r Wilson. The difficulties & perplexities into which the House is thrown proceed from the election by the Legislature which he was sorry had been reinstated. The inconveniency of this mode was such that he would agree to almost any length of time in order to get rid of the dependence which must result from it. He was persuaded that the longest term would not be equivalent to a proper mode of election; unless indeed it should be during good behaviour. It seemed to be supposed that at a certain advance in life, a continuance in office would cease to be agreeable to the officer, as well as desirable to the public. Experience had shewn in a variety of instances that both a capacity & inclination for public service existed—in very advanced stages. He mentioned the instance of a Doge of Venice25 who was elected after he was 80 years of age. The popes have generally been elected at very advanced periods, and yet in no case had a more steady or a better concerted policy been pursued than in the Court of Rome. If the Executive should come into office at 35. years of age, which he presumes may happen & his continuance should be fixt at 15 years. at the age of 50. in the very prime of life, and with all the aid of experience, he must be cast aside like a useless hulk. What an irreparable loss would the British Jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of 50. been fixt there as the ultimate limit of capacity or readiness to serve the public. The great luminary [L^dMansfield] held his seat for thirty years after his arrival at that age. Notwithstanding what had been done he could not but hope that a better mode of election would yet be adopted; and one that would be more agreeable to the general sense of the House. That time might be given for further deliberation he w^d move that the present question be postponed till tomorrow.

. . .

M^r Wilson. As the great difficulty seems to spring from the mode of election, he w^d suggest a mode which had not been mentioned. It was that the Executive be elected for 6 years by a small number, not more than 15 of the Nat^l Legislature, to be drawn from it, not by ballot, but by lot and who should retire immediately and make the election without separating. By this mode intrigue would be avoided in the first instance, and the dependence would be diminished. This was not he said a digested idea and might be liable to strong objections.

. . .

Mr Wilson did not move this as the best mode. His opinions remained unshaken that we ought to resort to the people for the election. He seconded the postponement.

. . .

Wednesday July 25. In Convention

Clause relating to the Executive again under consideration.

. . .

M^r Gerry & M^r Butler moved to refer the resolution relating to the Executive (except the clause making it consist of a single person) to the Committee of detail.

. . .

M^r Wilson hoped that so important a branch of the system w^d not be committed until a general principle sh^d be fixed by a vote of the House.

. . .

Thursday July 26. In Convention

. . .

“The 2^d part, for disqualifying debtors, and persons having unsettled accounts,” being under consideration.

. . .

M^r Wilson was for striking them out. They put too much power in the hands of the Auditors, who might combine with rivals in delaying settlements in order to prolong the disqualifications of particular men. We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for future generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the moment. The time has been, and will again be, when the public safety may depend on the voluntary aids of individuals which will necessarily open acc^ts with the public, and when such acc^ts will be a characteristic of patriotism. Besides a partial enumeration of cases will disable the Legislature from disqualifying odious & dangerous characters.

. . .

The Constitution as Reported by the Committee of Detail, August 6, 1787.

Monday August 6^th In Convention

M^r John Francis Mercer from Maryland took his seat.

M^r Rutlidge delivered in the Report of the Committee of detail as follows: a printed copy being at the same time furnished to each member:

We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachussetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.

Article I

The stile of the Government shall be, “The United States of America.”

II

The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive; and judicial powers.

III

The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist of two separate and distinct bodies of men, a House of Representatives and a Senate; each of which shall in all cases have a negative on the other. The Legislature shall meet on the first Monday in December every year.

IV

Sect. 1. The members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen every second year, by the people of the several States comprehended within this Union. The qualifications of the electors shall be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors in the several States, of the most numerous branch of their own legislatures.

Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least three years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State in which he shall be chosen.

Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at its first formation, and until the number of citizens and inhabitants shall be taken in the manner herein after described, consist of sixty five Members, of whom three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts, one in Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in New-York, four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania, one in Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Virginia, five in North-Carolina, five in South-Carolina, and three in Georgia.

Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in different States will alter from time to time; as some of the States may hereafter be divided; as others may be enlarged by addition of territory; as two or more States may be united; as new States will be erected within the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall, in each of these cases, regulate the number of representatives by the number of inhabitants, according to the provisions herein after made, at the rate of one for every forty thousand.

Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of Government, shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the Public. Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.

Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment. It shall choose its Speaker and other officers.

Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representatives shall be supplied by writs of election from the executive authority of the State, in the representation from which it shall happen.

V

Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be chosen by the Legislatures of the several States. Each Legislature shall chuse two members. Vacancies may be supplied by the Executive until the next meeting of the Legislature. Each member shall have one vote.

Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six years; but immediately after the first election they shall be divided, by lot, into three classes, as nearly as may be, numbered one, two and three. The seats of the members of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that a third part of the members may be chosen every second year.

Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of thirty years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least four years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State for which he shall be chosen.

Sect. 4. The Senate shall chuse its own President and other officers.

VI

Sect. 1. The times and places and manner of holding the elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the Legislature of the United States.

Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient.

Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day.

Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members.

Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall not be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of the Legislature; and the members of each House shall, in all cases, except treason felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at Congress, and in going to and returning from it.

Sect. 6. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings; may punish its members for disorderly behaviour; and may expel a member.

Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the Senate, when it shall be acting in a legislative capacity, shall keep a journal of their proceedings, and shall, from time to time, publish them: and the yeas and nays of the members of each House, on any question, shall at the desire of one-fifth part of the members present, be entered on the journal.

Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that at which the two Houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not extend to the Senate, when it shall exercise the powers mentioned in the article.

Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United States, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected: and the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any such office for one year afterwards.

Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained and paid by the State, in which they shall be chosen.

Sect. 11. The enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be. “Be it enacted by the Senate and Representatives in Congress assembled.”

Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of originating bills, except in the cases beforementioned.

Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States for his revision: if, upon such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his approbation by signing it: But if, upon such revision, it shall appear to him improper for being passed into a law, he shall return it, together with his objections against it, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider the bill. But if after such reconsideration, two thirds of that House shall, notwithstanding the objections of the President, agree to pass it, it shall together with his objections, be sent to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of the other House also, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the names of the persons voting for or against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within seven days after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law, unless the legislature, by their adjournment, prevent its return; in which case it shall not be a law.

VII

Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States;

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States;

To coin money;

To regulate the value of foreign coin;

To fix the standard of weights and measures;

To establish Post-offices;

To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of the United States;

To appoint a Treasurer by ballot;

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To make rules concerning captures on land and water;

To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offenses against the law of nations;

To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its legislature;

To make war;

To raise armies;

To build and equip fleets;

To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;

And to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, by this constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against the United States, or any of them; and in adhering to the enemies of the United States, or any of them. The Legislature of the United States shall have power to declare the punishment of treason. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses. No attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, nor forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated by the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, (except Indians not paying taxes); which number shall, within six years after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within the term of every ten years afterwards, be taken in such manner as the said Legislature shall direct.

Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature on articles exported from any State; nor on the migration or importation of such persons as the several States shall think proper to admit; nor shall such migration or importation be prohibited.

Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census hereinbefore directed to be taken.

Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without the assent of two thirds of the members present in each House.

Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any title of nobility.

VIII

The acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the Constitution or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.

IX

Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court.

Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or that may hereafter subsist between two or more States, respecting jurisdiction or territory, the Senate shall possess the following powers. Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive authority, or lawful agent of any State, in controversy with another, shall by memorial to the Senate, state the matter in question, and apply for a hearing; notice of such memorial and application shall be given by order of the Senate, to the Legislature or the Executive authority of the other State in Controversy. The Senate shall also assign a day for the appearance of the parties, by their agents, before the House. The Agents shall be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a Court for hearing and determining the matter in question. But if the Agents cannot agree, the Senate shall name three persons out of each of the several States; and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as the Senate shall direct, shall in their presence, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them shall be commissioners or Judges to hear and finally determine the controversy; provided a majority of the Judges, who shall hear the cause, agree in the determination. If either party shall neglect to attend at the day assigned, without shewing sufficient reasons for not attending, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Senate shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the Clerk of the Senate shall strike in behalf of the party absent or refusing. If any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such Court; or shall not appear to prosecute or defend their claim or cause, the Court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce judgment. The judgment shall be final and conclusive. The proceedings shall be transmitted to the President of the Senate, and shall be lodged among the public records, for the security of the parties concerned. Every Commissioner shall, before he sit in judgment, take an oath, to be administred by one of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior Court of the State where the cause shall be tried, “well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question according to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of reward.”

Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed under different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, as they respect such lands shall have been decided or adjusted subsequent to such grants, or any of them, shall, on application to the Senate, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding controversies between different States.

X

Sect. 1. The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. His stile shall be, “The President of the United States of America;” and his title shall be, “His Excellency.” He shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time.

Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information to the Legislature, of the state of the Union: he may recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary, and expedient: he may convene them on extraordinary occasions. In case of disagreement between the two Houses, with regard to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he thinks proper: he shall take care that the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed: he shall commission all the officers of the United States; and shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution. He shall receive Ambassadors, and may correspond with the supreme Executives of the several States. He shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons; but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment. He shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States. He shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during his continuance in office. Before he shall enter on the duties of his department, he shall take the following oath or affirmation; “I———solemnly swear, (or affirm) that that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States of America.” He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction in the supreme Court, of treason, bribery or corruption. In case of his removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the President of the Senate shall exercise those powers and duties, until another President of the United States be chosen, or until the disability of the President be removed.

XI

Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.

Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers of the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States, and between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make. The Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned (except the trial of the President of the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.

Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases of impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be committed; and shall be by Jury.

Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust or profit, under the United States. But the party convicted shall, nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.

XII

No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal; nor enter into any Treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of Nobility.

XIII

No State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United States, shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie a tender in payment of debts; nor lay imposts or duties on imports; nor keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with any foreign power; nor engage in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so imminent, as not to admit of delay, until the Legislature of the United States can be consulted.

XIV

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

XV

Any person charged with treason, felony or high misdemeanor in any State, who shall flee from justice, and shall be found in any other State, shall, on demand of the Executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of the offence.

XVI

Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts and magistrates of every other State.

XVII

New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits of the United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into this Government; but to such admission the consent of two thirds of the members present in each House shall be necessary. If a new State shall arise within the limits of any of the present States, the consent of the Legislatures of such States shall be also necessary to its admission. If the admission be consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original States. But the Legislature may make conditions with the new States, concerning the public debt which shall be then subsisting.

XVIII

The United States shall guaranty to each State a Republican form of Government; and shall protect each State against foreign invasions, and, on the application of its Legislature, against domestic violence.

XIX

On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for that purpose.

XX

The members of the Legislatures, and the Executive and Judicial officers of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound by oath to support this Constitution.

XXI

The ratifications of the Conventions of NA States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution.

XXII

This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in Congress assembled, for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this Convention, that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention chosen, under the recommendation of its legislature, in order to receive the ratification of such Convention.

XXIII

To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Convention, that each assenting Convention should notify its assent and ratification to the United States in Congress assembled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and ratification of the Conventions of NA States, should appoint and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that after such publication, the Legislatures of the several States should elect members of the Senate, and direct the election of members of the House of Representatives; and that the members of the Legislature should meet at the time and place assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as may be, after their meeting, choose the President of the United States, and proceed to execute this Constitution.

Tuesday August 7^th. In Convention

The Report of the Committee of detail being taken up,

M^r Pinkney moved that it be referred to a Committee of the whole. This was strongly opposed by M^r Ghorum & several others, as likely to produce unnecessary delay; and was negatived, Delaware Mary^d & Virg^a only being in the affirmative.

The preamble of the Report was agreed to nem. con. So were Art: I & II.

Art: III. considered. Col. Mason doubted the propriety of giving each branch a negative on the other “in all cases.” There were some cases in which it was he supposed not intended to be given as in the case of balloting for appointments.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert “legislative acts” instead of “all cases”

M^r Williamson 2^ds him.

M^r Sherman. This will restrain the operation of the clause too much. It will particularly exclude a mutual negative in the case of ballots, which he hoped would take place.

M^r Ghorum contended that elections ought to be made by joint ballot. If separate ballots should be made for the President, and the two branches should be each attached to a favorite, great delay contention & confusion may ensue. These inconveniences have been felt in Mast^s in the election of officers of little importance compared with the Executive of the U. States. The only objection ag^st a joint ballot is that it may deprive the Senate of their due weight; but this ought not to prevail over the respect due to the public tranquility & welfare.

M^r Wilson was for a joint ballot in several cases at least; particularly in the choice of the President, and was therefore for the amendment. Disputes between the two Houses during & concern^g the vacancy of the Executive might have dangerous consequences.

. . .

M^r Madison wished to know the reasons of the Com^e for fixing by y^e Constitution the time of Meeting for the Legislature; and suggested, that it be required only that one meeting at least should be held every year leaving the time to be fixed or varied by law.

. . .

M^r Wilson thought on the whole it would be best to fix the day.

. . .

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out Dec^r & insert May. It might frequently happen that our measures ought to be influenced by those in Europe, which were generally planned during the Winter and of which intelligence would arrive in the Spring.

M^r Madison 2^ded the motion, he preferred May to Dec^r because the latter would require the travelling to & from the seat of Gov^t in the most inconvenient seasons of the year.

M^r Wilson. The Winter is the most convenient season for business.

“Art IV. Sect. 1. taken up.”

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out the last member of the section beginning with the words “qualifications of Electors,” in order that some other provision might be substituted which w^d restrain the right of suffrage to freeholders.

M^r Fitzimmons 2^ded the motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson. This part of the Report was well considered by the Committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided. It would be very hard & disagreeable for the same persons at the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for those in the Nat^l Legislature.

. . .

Wednesday Aug^st 8. In convention

. . .

Art IV. Sect. 2 taken up.

Col. Mason was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did not chuse to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern us. Citizenship for three years was not enough for ensuring that local knowledge which ought to be possessed by the Representative. This was the principal ground of his objection to so short a term. It might also happen that a rich foreign Nation, for example Great Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way into the Legislature for insidious purposes. He moved that “seven” years instead of “three,” be inserted.

M^r Gov^r Morris 2^ded the Motion, & on the question, all the States agreed to it except Connecticut.

M^r Sherman moved to strike out the word “resident” and insert “inhabitant,” as less liable to miscontruction.

. . .

M^r Wilson preferred “inhabitant.”

. . .

M^r Rutlidge urged & moved that a residence of 7 years sh^d be required in the State Wherein the Member sh^d be elected. An emigrant from N. England to S. C. or Georgia would know little of its affairs and could not be supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge in less time.

M^r Read reminded him that we were now forming a Nati^l Gov^t and such a regulation would correspond little with the idea that we were one people.

M^r Wilson enforced the same consideration.

. . .

M^r Dickenson proposed that it should read “inhabitant actually resident for NA year.” This would render the meaning less indeterminate.

M^r Wilson. If a short term should be inserted in the blank, so strict an expression might be construed to exclude the members of the Legislature, who could not be said to be actual residents in their States whilst at the Seat of the Gen^l Government.

. . .

M^r Pinkney, considered the fisheries & the Western frontier as more burdensome to the U. S. than the slaves. He thought this could be demonstrated if the occasion were a proper one.

M^r Wilson. thought the motion premature. An agreement to the clause would be no bar to the object of it.

. . .

M^r Mercer1 considered the exclusive power of originating Money bills as so great an advantage, that it rendered the equality of votes in the Senate ideal & of no consequence.

M^r Butler was for adhering to the principle which had been settled.

M^r Wilson was opposed to it on its merits without regard to the compromise

. . .

Thursday Aug^st 9. In Convention

Art: IV. Sect. 6. M^r Randolph expressed his dissatisfaction at the disagreement yesterday to Sect. 5. concerning money bills, as endangering the success of the plan, and extremely objectionable in itself; and gave notice that he should move for a reconsideration of the vote.

. . .

M^r Wilson, gave notice that he sh^d move to reconsider the vote, requiring seven instead of three years of Citizenship as a qualification of candidates for the House of Representatives.

Art. IV. Sect. 6 & 7. Agreed to nem. con.

Art. V. Sect 1. taken up.

M^r Wilson objected to vacancies in the Senate being supplied by the Executives of the States. It was unnecessary as the Legislatures will meet so frequently. It removes the appointment too far from the people; the Executives in most of the States being elected by the Legislatures. As he had always thought the appointment of the Executives by the Legislative department wrong: so it was still more so that the Executive should elect into the Legislative department.

. . .

M^r Read did not consider the section as to money bills of any advantage to the larger States and had voted for striking it out as being viewed in the same light by the larger States. If it was considered by them as of any value, and as a condition of the equality of votes in the Senate, he had no objection to its being re-instated.

M^r Wilson—Mr Elseworth & M^r Madison urged that it was of no advantage to the larger States, and that it might be a dangerous source of contention between the two Houses. All the principal powers of the Nat^l Legislature had some relation to money.

. . .

M^r Wilson. It seems to have been supposed by some that the section concerning money bills is desirable to the large States. The fact was that two of those States [P^a & V^a] had uniformly voted ag^st it without reference to any other part of the system.

. . .

Art: V. Sect. 3. taken up.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to insert 14 instead of 4 years citizenship as a qualification for Senators: urging the danger of admitting strangers into our public Councils. M^r Pinkney 2^ds him.

. . .

M^r Wilson said he rose with feelings which were perhaps peculiar; mentioning the circumstance of his not being a native, and the possibility, if the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his being incapacitated from holding a place under the very Constitution, which he had shared in the trust of making. He remarked the illiberal complexion which the motion would give to the System, & the effect which a good system would have in inviting meritorious foreigners among us, and the discouragement & mortification they must feel from the degrading discrimination, now proposed. He had himself experienced this mortification. On his removal into Maryland, he found himself from defect of residence, under certain legal incapacities which never ceased to produce chagrin, though he assuredly did not desire & would not have accepted the offices to which they related. To be appointed to a place may be matter of indifference. To be incapable of being appointed, is a circumstance grating and mortifying.

. . .

Friday Aug^st 10. In Convention

Art VI. Sect. 2. taken up.

. . .

M^r Wilson thought it would be best on the whole to let the Section go out. A uniform rule would probably be never fixed by the Legislature, and this particular power would constructively exclude every other power of regulating qualifications.

. . .

Art: VI. Sect. 3. taken up.

. . .

M^r Elseworth was opposed to it. It would be a pleasing ground of confidence to the people that no law or burden could be imposed on them, by a few men. He reminded the movers that the Constitution proposed to give such a discretion with regard to the number of Representatives that a very incovenient number was not to be apprehended. The inconveniency of secessions may be guarded ag^st by giving to each House an authority to require the attendance of absent members.

. . .

Art: VI. Sect. 7 taken up.

. . .

M^r Gov^r Morris & M^r Wilson observed that if the minority were to have a right to enter their votes & reasons, the other side would have a right to complain, if it were not extended to them & to allow it to both, would fill the Journals, like the records of a Court, with replications, rejoinders &c.

. . .

Saturday Aug^st 11. In Convention

M^r Madison & M^r Rutlidge moved “that each House shall keep a journal of its proceeding, & shall publish the same from time to time except such part of the proceedings of the Senate, when acting not in its Legislative capacity as may be judged by that House to require secrecy.”

. . .

M^r Wilson thought the expunging of the clause would be very improper. The people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings. Besides as this is a clause in the existing confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform with a pretext by which week & suspicious minds may be easily misled.

. . .

Monday Aug^st 13. In Convention

Art IV. Sect. 2. reconsidered—

M^r Wilson & M^r Randolph moved to strike out “7 years” and insert “4 years,” as the requisite term of Citizenship to qualify for the House of Rep^s. M^r Wilson said it was very proper the electors should govern themselves by this consideration; but unnecessary & improper that the Constitution should chain them down to it.

. . .

M^r Wilson, cited Pennsylv^a as a proof of the advantage of encouraging emigrations. It was perhaps the youngest [except Georgia] settlem^ton the Atlantic; yet it was at least among the foremost in population & prosperity. He remarked that almost all the Gen^l officers of the Pen^a line of the late army were foreigners. And no complaint had ever been made against their fidelity or merit. Three of her deputies to the Convention [M^r R. Morris; M^r Fitzimmons & himself] were also not natives. He had no objection to Col. Hamiltons motion & would withdraw the one made by himself.

. . .

M^r Wilson’s renewed the motion for 4 years instead of 7. & on question.

. . .

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to add to the end of the section [art IV. S. 2] a proviso that the limitation of seven years should not affect the rights of any person now a Citizen.

M^r Mercer 2^ded the motion. It was necessary he said to prevent a disfranchisement of persons who had become Citizens under and on the faith & according to the laws & Constitution from being on a level in all respects with natives.

. . .

M^r Wilson read the clause in the Constitution of Pen^a giving to foreigners after two years residence all the rights whatsoever of citizens, combined it with the article of Confederation making the Citizens of one State Citizens of all, inferred the obligation Pen^a was under to maintain the faith thus pledged to her citizens of foreign birth, and the just complaints which her failure would authorize: He observed likewise that the Princes & States of Europe would avail themselves of such breach of faith to deter their subjects from emigrating to the U. S.

. . .

M^r Wilson moved that [in Art: V. Sect. 3.] 9 years be reduced to seven, which was disag^d to and the 3^d section [Art. V.] confirmed by the following vote.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. C^t no. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Art. IV. Sec 5. being reconsidered.

M^r Randolph moved that the clause be altered so as to read—“Bills for raising money for the purpose of revenue or for appropriating the same shall originate in the House of Representatives and shall not be so amended or altered by the Senate as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised, or change the mode of levying it, or the objects of its appropriation.”—He would not repeat his reasons, but barely remind the members from the smaller States of the compromise by which the larger States were entitled to this privilege.

. . .

M^r Wilson was himself directly opposed to the equality of votes granted to the Senate by its present Constitution. At the same time he wished not to multiply the vices of the system. He did not mean to enlarge on a subject which had been so much canvassed, but would remark as an insuperable objection ag^st the proposed restriction of money bills to the H. of Rep^s that it would be a source of perpetual contentions where there was no mediator to decide them. The Presid^t here could not like the Executive Magistrate in England interpose by a prorogation, or dissolution. This restriction had been found pregnant with altercation in every State where the Constitution had established it. The House of Rep^s will insert other things in money bills, and by making them conditions of each other, destroy the deliberative liberty of the Senate. He stated the case of a Preamble to a money bill sent up by the House of Commons in the reign of Queen Anne,2 to the H. of Lords, in which the conduct of the displaced Ministry, who were to be impeached before the Lords, was condemned; the Commons thus extorting a premature judgm^t without any hearing of the Parties to be tried, and the H. of Lords being thus reduced to the poor & disgraceful expedient of opposing to the authority of a law, a protest on their Journals ag^st its being drawn into precedent. If there was any thing like Poynings law3 in the present case, it was in the attempt to vest the exclusive right of originating in the H. of Rep^s and so far he was ag^st it. He should be equally so if the right were to be exclusively vested in the Senate. With regard to the purse strings, it was to be observed that the purse was to have two strings, one of which was in the hands of the H. of Rep^sthe other in those of the Senate. Both houses must concur in untying, and of what importance could it be which untied first, which last. He could not conceive it to be any objection to the Senate’s preparing the bills, that they would have leisure for that purpose and would be in the habits of business. War, Commerce, & Revenue were the great objects of the Gen^l Government. All of them are connected with money. The restriction in favor of the H. of Represt^s would exclude the Senate from originating any important bills whatever—

. . .

Tuesday Aug. 14. In Convention

Article VI. Sect. 9. taken up.

M^r Pinkney argued that the making the members ineligible to offices was degrading to them, and the more improper as their election into the Legislature implied that they had the confidence of the people; that it was inconvenient, because the Senate might be supposed to contain the fittest men. He hoped to see that body become a School of public Ministers, a nursery of Statesmen: that it was impolitic, because the Legislature would cease to be a magnet to the first talents and abilities. He moved to postpone the section in order to take up the following proposition viz—“the members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the U. S. for which they or any of others for their benefit receive any salary, fees, or emoluments of any kind—and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively.”

Gen^l Mifflin4 2^ded the motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson could not approve of the Section as it stood, and could not give up his judgment to any supposed objections that might arise among the people. He considered himself as acting & responsible for the welfare of millions not immediately represented in this House. He had also asked himself the serious question what he should say to his constituents in case they should call upon him to tell them why he sacrified his own Judgment in a case where they authorised him to exercise it? Were he to own to them that he sacrificed it in order to flatter their prejudices, he should dread the retort: did you suppose the people of Penn^a had not good sense enough to receive a good Government? Under this impression he should certainly follow his own Judgment which disapproved of the section. He would remark in addition to the objections urged ag^st it, that as one branch of the Legislature was to be appointed by the Legislatures of the States, the other by the people of the States, as both are to be paid by the States, and to be appointable to State offices, nothing seemed to be wanting to prostrate the Nat^l Legislature, but to render its members ineligible to Nat^loffices, & by that means take away its power of attracting those talents which were necessary to give weight to the Govern^t and to render it useful to the people. He was far from thinking the ambition which aspired to Offices of dignity and trust, an ignoble or culpable one. He was sure it was not politic to regard it in that light, or to withold from it the prospect of those rewards, which might engage it in the career of public service. He observed that the State of Penn^a which had gone as far as any State into the policy of fettering power, had not rendered the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices of Gov^t.

. . .

M^r Wilson was by no means satisfied with the answer given by M^r Elseworth to the argument as to the discouragement of merit. The members must either go a second time into the Legislature, and disqualify themselves—or say to their Constituents, we served you before only from the mercenary view of qualifying ourselves for offices, and have^g answered this purpose we do not chuse to be again elected.

. . .

Wednesday August 15. In Convention

. . .

M^r Madison moved that all acts before they become laws should be submitted both to the Executive and Supreme Judiciary Departments, that if either of these should object ⅔ of each House, if both should object, ¾ of each House, should be necessary to overrule the objections and give to the acts the force of law—

See the motion at large in the Journal of this date, page 253, & insert it here.

[“Every bill which shall have passed the two houses, shall, before it become a law, be severally presented to the President of the United States, and to the judges of the supreme court for the revision of each. If, upon such revision, they shall approve of it, they shall respectively signify their approbation by signing it, but if, upon such revision, it shall appear improper to either, or both, to be passed into a law, it shall be returned, with the objections against it, to that house, in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider the bill: but if, after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house, when either the President, or a majority of the judges shall object, or three fourths, where both shall object, shall agree to pass it, it shall, together with the objections, be sent to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; and, if approved by two thirds, or three fourths of the other house, as the case may be, it shall become a law.”]

M^r Wilson seconds the motion.

. . .

M^r Carrol5 when the negative to be overruled by ⅔ only was agreed to, the quorum was not fixed. He remarked that as a majority was now to be the quorum, 17. in the larger, and 8 in the smaller house might carry points. The advantage that might be taken of this seemed to call for greater impediments to improper laws. He thought the controuling power however of the Executive could not be well decided, till it was seen how the formation of that department would be finally regulated. He wished the consideration of the matter to be postponed.

. . .

M^r Wilson; after viewing the subject with all the coolness and attention possible was most apprehensive of a dissolution of the Gov^t from the legislature swallowing up all the other powers. He remarked that the prejudices ag^st the Executive resulted from a misapplication of the adage that the parliament was the palladium of liberty. Where the Executive was really formidable, King and Tyrant, were naturally associated in the minds of people; not legislature and tyranny. But where the Executive was not formidable, the two last were most properly associated. After the destruction of the King in Great Britain, a more pure and unmixed tryanny sprang up in the parliament than had been exercised by the monarch. He insisted that we had not guarded ag^st the danger on this side by a sufficient self-defensive power either to the Executive or Judiciary department.

. . .

M^r Williamson moved to change “⅔ of each House” into “¾” as requisite to overrule the dissent of the President. He saw no danger in this, and preferred giving the power to the Presid^t alone, to admitting the Judges into the business of legislation.

M^r Wilson 2^ds the motion; referring to and repeating the ideas of M^r Carroll.

On this motion for ¾. instead of two thirds; it passed in the affirmative.

. . .

Thursday August 16. In Convention

. . .

Art: VII. Sect. I. taken up.

M^r L. Martin asked what was meant by the Committee of detail in the expression “duties” and “imposts.” If the meaning were the same, the former was unnecessary; if different, the matter ought to be made clear.

M^r Wilson, duties are applicable to many objects to which the word imposts does not relate. The latter are appropriated to commerce; the former extend to a variety of objects as stamp duties &c.

. . .

M^r Wilson was decidedly ag^st prohibiting general taxes on exports. He dwelt on the injustice and impolicy of leaving N. Jersey Connecticut &c any longer subject to the exactions of their commercial neighbours.

. . .

M^r Elseworth thought this a favorable moment to shut and bar the door against paper money. The mischiefs of the various experiments which had been made, were now fresh in the public mind and had excited the disgust of all the respectable part of America. By witholding the power from the new Govern^t more friends of influence would be gained to it than by almost any thing else. Paper money can in no case be necessary. Give the Government credit, and other resources will offer. The power may do harm never good.

M^r Randolph, notwithstanding his antipathy to paper money, could not agree to strike out the words, as he could not foresee all the occasions which might arise.

M^r Wilson. It will have a most salutary influence on the credit of the U. States to remove the possibility of paper money. This expedient can never succeed whilst its mischiefs are remembered, and as long as it can be resorted to, it will be a bar to other resources.

. . .

Friday August 17^th. In Convention

Art VII. Sect. 1. resumed on the clause “to appoint Treasurer by ballot.”

. . .

M^r Madison moved to strike out “and punishment” &c.

. . .

M^r Wilson was in favor of the motion. Strictness was not necessary in giving authority to enact penal laws; though necessary in enacting & expounding them.

. . .

M^r Wilson, thought “felonies” sufficiently defined by common law.

. . .

Art VII. Sect. 2. concerning Treason which see.

. . .

M^r Randolph thought the clause defective in adopting the words “in adhering” only. The British Stat: adds, “giving them aid and comfort” which had a more extensive meaning.

M^r Elseworth considered the definition as the same in fact with that of the Statute.

M^r Gov^r Morris “adhering” does not go so far as “giving aid and Comfort” or the latter words may be restrictive of adhering,” in either case the Statute is not pursued.

M^r Wilson held “giving aid and comfort” to be explanatory, not operative words; and that it was better to omit them.

. . .

M^r Wilson & Doc^r Johnson moved, that “or any of them” after “United States” be struck out in order to remove the embarrassment: which was agreed to nem. con.

. . .

It was then moved to insert after “two witnesses” the words “to the same overt act.”

Doc^r Franklin wished this amendment to take place—prosecutions for treason were generally virulent; and perjury too easily made use of against innocence.

M^r Wilson. much may be said on both sides. Treason may sometimes be practised in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult—as in a traitorous correspondence with an Enemy.

. . .

M^r Wilson in cases of a general nature, treason can only be ag^st the U—States. and in such they sh^d have the sole right to declare the punishment—yet in many cases it may be otherwise. The subject was however intricate and he distrusted his present judgment on it.

. . .

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. C^t no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.—

M^r Wilson. the clause is ambiguous now. “Sole” ought either to have been inserted—or “against the U. S.” to be re-instated.

. . .

Tuesday August 21. In Convention

. . .

Art. VII. Sect. 4.—M^r Langdon. by this section the States are left at liberty to tax exports. N. H. therefore with other non-exporting States, will be subject to be taxed by the States exporting its produce. This could not be admitted. It seems to be feared that the Northern States will oppress the trade of the Southⁿ. This may be guarded ag^st by requiring the concurrence of ⅔ or ¾ of the legislature in such cases.

. . .

M^r Wilson. Pennsylvania exports the produce of Mary^d, N. Jersey, Delaware & will by & by when the River Delaware is opened, export for N- York. In favoring the general power over exports therefore, he opposed the particular interest of his State. He remarked that the power had been attacked by reasoning which could only have held good in case the Genl Gov^t had been compelled, instead of authorized, to lay duties on exports. To deny this power is to take from the Common Gov^t half the regulation of trade. It was his opinion that a power over exports might be more effectual than that over imports in obtaining beneficial treaties of commerce.

. . .

M^r Madison. In order to require ⅔ of each House to tax exports—as a lesser evil than a total prohibition moved to insert the words “unless by consent of two thirds of the Legislature.”

M^r Wilson 2^ds and on this question, it passed in the Negative.

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Wednesday August 22. In Convention

Art VII sect 4. resumed. M^r Sherman was for leaving the clause as it stands. He disapproved of the slave trade; yet as the States were now possessed of the right to import slaves, as the public good did not require it to be taken from them, & as it was expedient to have as few objections as possible to the proposed scheme of Government, he thought it best to leave the matter as we find it. He observed that the abolition of Slavery seemed to be going on in the U. S. & that the good sense of the several States would probably by degrees compleat it. He urged on the Convention the necessity of despatching its business.

. . .

M^r Wilson observed that if S. C. & Georgia were themselves disposed to get rid of the importation of slaves in a short time as had been suggested, they would never refuse to Unite because the importation might be prohibited. As the Section now stands all articles imported are to be taxed. Slaves alone are exempt. This is in fact a bounty on that article.

. . .

M^r Pinkney & M^r Langdon moved to commit Sect. 6. as to navigation act by two thirds of each House.

. . .

M^r Wilson wished for a commitment in order to reduce the proportion of votes required.

. . .

M^r Gerry & M^r M^cHenry6 moved to insert after the 2^d sect.

Art: 7, the Clause following, to wit, “The Legislature shall pass no bill of attainder nor any ex post facto law.”

. . .

M^r Wilson was against inserting any thing in the Constitution as to ex post facto laws. It will bring reflexions on the Constitution and proclaim that we are ignorant of the first principles of legislation, or are constituting a Government which will be so. The question being divided, The first part of the motion relating to bills of attainder was agreed to nem. contradicente.

. . .

M^r Wilson. If these prohibitions in the State Constitutions have no effect it will be useless to insert them in this Constitution. Besides both sides will agree to the principle, & will differ as to its application.

. . .

Art. IX being next for consideration,

M^r Gov^r Morris argued ag^st the appointment of officers by the Senate. He considered the body as too numerous for the purpose; as subject to cabal; and as devoid of responsibility. If Judges were to be tried by the Senate according to a late report of a Committee it was particularly wrong to let the Senate have the filling of vacancies which its own decrees were to create.

M^r Wilson was of the same opinion & for like reasons.

. . .

M^r C- Pinkney moved to add as an additional power to be vested in the Legislature of the U. S. “To negative all laws passed by the several States interfering in the opinion of the Legislature with the general interests and harmony of the Union; provided that two thirds of the members of each House assent to the same.”

This principle he observed had formerly been agreed to. He considered the precaution as essentially necessary: The objection drawn from the predominance of the large States had been removed by the equality established in the Senate. M^r Broome 2^ded the proposition.

. . .

M^r Wilson considered this as the key-stone wanted to compleat the wide arch of Government, we are raising. The power of self-defence had been urged as necessary for the State Governments. It was equally necessary for the General Government. The firmness of Judges is not of itself sufficient. Something further is requisite. It will be better to prevent the passage of an improper law, than to declare it void when passed.

. . .

Art IX. Sect. 1. being resumed, to wit “The Senate of the U. S. shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors and Judges of the Supreme Court.”

. . .

M^r Wilson. In the most important Treaties, the King of G. Britain being obliged to resort to Parliament for the execution of them, is under the same fetters as the amendment of M^r Morris will impose on the Senate. It was refused yesterday to permit even the Legislature to lay duties on exports. Under the clause, without the amendment, the Senate alone can make a Treaty, requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina to be sent to some one particular port.

. . .

Friday August 24. 1787 . In Convention

. . .

Sect: 2 & 3 of art: IX being taken up,

M^r Rutlidge said this provision for deciding controversies between the States was necessary under the Confederation, but will be rendered unnecessary by the National Judiciary now to be established, and moved to strike it out.

Doc^r Johnson 2^ded the Motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson urged the striking out, the Judiciary being a better provision.

. . .

M^r Carrol moved to strike out “by the Legislature” and insert “by the people.” M^r Wilson 2^ded him & on the question.

. . .

M^r Wilson urged the reasonableness of giving the larger States a larger share of the appointment, and the danger of delay from a disagreement of the two Houses. He remarked also that the Senate had peculiar powers balancing the advantage given by a joint balot in this case to the other branch of the Legislature.

. . .

M^r Wilson remarked that as the President of the Senate was to be President of the U. S. that Body in cases of vacancy might have an interest in throwing dilatory obstacles in the way, if its separate concurrence should be required.

. . .

M^r Dickinson moved to strike out the words “and shall appoint to offices in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution” and insert—“and shall appoint to all offices established by this Constitution, except in cases herein otherwise provided for, and to all offices which may hereafter be created by law.”

. . .

M^r Dickinson then moved to annex to his last amendment “except where by law the appointment shall be vested in the Legislatures or Executives of the several States.” M^r Randolph 2^ded the motion.

M^r Wilson—If this be agreed to it will soon be a standing instruction from the State Legislatures to pass no law creating offices, unless the app^tsbe referred to them.

. . .

Monday Aug^st 27^th 1787. In Convention

Art X. Sect. 2. being resumed.

M^r L. Martin moved to insert the words “after conviction” after the words “reprieves and pardons”

M^r Wilson objected that pardon before conviction might be necessary in order to obtain the testimony of accomplices. He stated the case of forgeries in which this might particularly happen.—M^r L. Martin withdrew his motion.

. . .

Col: Mason & M^r Madison, moved to add to the oath to be taken by the supreme Executive “and will to the best of my judgment and power preserve protect and defend the Constitution of the U. S.”

M^r Wilson thought the general provision for oaths of office, in a subsequent place, rendered the amendment unnecessary—

. . .

M^r Dickinson moved as an amendment to sect. 2. art XI after the words “good behavior” the words “provided that they may be removed by the Executive on the application by the Senate and House of Representatives.”

M^r Gerry 2^ded the motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson considered such a provision in the British Government as less dangerous than here, the House of Lords & House of Commons being less likely to concur on the same occasions. Chief Justice Holt, he remarked, had successively offended by his independent conduct, both houses of Parliament. Had this happened at the same time, he would have been ousted. The judges would be in a bad situation if made to depend on every gust of faction which might prevail in the two branches of our Gov^t.

. . .

M^r Gov^r Morris wished to know what was meant by the words “In all the cases before mentioned it [jurisdiction] shall be appellate with such exceptions &c,” whether it extended to matters of fact as well as law—and to cases of Common law as well as Civil law.

M^r Wilson. The Committee he believed meant facts as well as law & Common as well as Civil law. The jurisdiction of the federal Court of Appeals had he said been so construed.

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Tuesday August 28. 1787. In Convention

M^r Gov^r Morris moved that “The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended; unless where in cases of Rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.”

M^r Wilson doubted whether in any case a suspension could be necessary, as the discretion now exists with Judges, in most important cases to keep in Gaol or admit to Bail.

. . .

Art. XII. being taken up.

M^r Wilson & M^r Sherman moved to insert after the words “coin money” the words “nor emit bills of credit, nor make anything but gold & silver coin a tender in payment of debts” making these prohibitions absolute, instead of making the measures allowable (as in the XIII art:) with the consent of the Legislature of the U. S.

. . .

M^r King moved to add, in the words used in the Ordinance of Cong^sestablishing new States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts.

. . .

M^r Wilson was in favor of M^r King’s motion.

. . .

Col: Mason. This is carrying the restraint too far. Cases will happen that can not be foreseen, where some kind of interference will be proper & essential. He mentioned the case of limiting the period for bringing actions on open account—that of bonds after a certain lapse of time—asking whether it was proper to tie the hands of the States from making provision in such cases?

M^r Wilson. The answer to these objections is that retrospective interferences only are to be prohibited.

. . .

Art: XV being taken up, the words “high misdemesnor,” were struck out, and “other crime” inserted, in order to comprehend all proper cases: it being doubtful whether “high misdemeanor” had not a technical meaning too limited.

M^r Butler and M^r Pinkney moved “to require fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals.”

M^r Wilson. This would oblige the Executive of the State to do it at the public expence.

. . .

Wednesday August 29^th 1787. In Convention

Art: XVI. taken up.

M^r Williamson moved to substitute in place of it, the words of the Articles of Confederation on the same subject. He did not understand precisely the meaning of the article.

M^r Wilson & Doc^r Johnson supposed the meaning to be that Judgments in one State should be the ground of actions in other States, & that acts of the Legislatures should be included, for the sake of Acts of insolvency &c.

. . .

Art VII Sect. 6 by y^e Committee of eleven reported to be struck out (see the 24 instant) being now taken up.

. . .

M^r Wilson took notice of the several objections and remarked that if every peculiar interest was to be secured, unanimity ought to be required. The majority he said would be no more governed by interest than the minority. It was surely better to let the latter be bound hand and foot than the former. Great inconveniences had, he contended, been experienced in Congress from the article of confederation requiring nine votes in certain cases.

. . .

Art. XVII—before the House, as amended.

. . .

M^r Wilson. When the majority of a State wish to divide they can do so. The aim of those in opposition to the article, he perceived, was that the Gen^l Government should abet the minority, & by that means divide a State against its own consent.

. . .

Thursday August 30^th 1787. In Convention

Art XVII resumed for a question on it as amended by M^r Gov^r Morris’s substitutes.

M^r Carrol moved to strike out so much of the article as requires the consent of the State to its being divided.

. . .

M^r Wilson was against the committment. Unanimity was of great importance, but not to be purchased by the majority’s yielding to the minority. He should have no objection to leaving the case of new States as heretofore. He knew of nothing that would give greater or juster alarm than the doctrine, that a political society is to be torne asunder without its own consent.

. . .

M^r Dickinson moved to add the following clause to the last—

“Nor shall any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts thereof, without the consent of the Legislature of such States, as well as of the Legislature of the U. States,” which was agreed to without a count of the votes.

. . .

M^r Wilson was ag^st the motion. There was nothing in the Constitution affecting one way or the other the claims of the U. S. & it was best to insert nothing leaving every thing on that litigated subject in statu quo.

. . .

Art: XXI. taken up. viz: The ratifications of the Conventions of States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution.”

M^r Wilson proposed to fill the blank with “seven” that being a majority of the whole number & sufficient for the commencement of the plan.

. . .

M^r Wilson mentioned “eight” as preferable.

. . .

M^r Madison, remarked that if the blank should be filled with “seven” eight, or “nine”—the Constitution as it stands might be put in force over the whole body of the people, tho’ less than a majority of them should ratify it.

M^r Wilson. As the Constitution stands, the States only which ratify can be bound. We must he said in this case go to the original powers of Society. The House on fire must be extinguished, without a scrupulous regard to ordinary rights.

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Friday August 31^st 1787. In Convention

. . .

M^r Madison proposed to fill the blank in the article with “any seven or more States entitled to thirty three members at least in the House of Representatives according to the allotment made in the 3 Sect: of art: 4.” This he said would require the concurrence of a majority both of the States and people.

. . .

M^r Wilson supported the motion of M^r Madison, requiring a majority both of the people and of States.

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Monday Sep^r 3. 1787. In Convention

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to amend the Report concerning the respect to be paid to Acts Records &c of one State, in other States (see Sep^r 1.) by striking out “judgments obtained in one State shall have in another” and to insert the word “thereof” after the word “effect”

Col: Mason favored the motion, particularly if the “effect” was to be restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings.

M^r Wilson remarked, that if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place among all Independent Nations.

. . .

M^r Pinkney moved to postpone the Report of the Committee of Eleven (see Sep^r 1) in order to take up the following,

“The members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the U. S. for which they or any other for their benefit, receive any salary, fees or emoluments of any kind, and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively.”

. . .

M^r Wilson considered the exclusion of members of the Legislature, as increasing the influence of the Executive as observed by M^r Gov^r Morris at the same time that it would diminish, the general energy of the Government. He said that the legal disqualification for office would be odious to those who did not wish for office, but did not wish either to be marked by so degrading a distinction.

. . .

Tuesday Sep^r 4. 1787. In Convention

M^r Brearly from the Committee of eleven made a further partial Report as follows

“The Committee of Eleven to whom sundry resolutions &c were referred on the 31^st of August, report that in their opinion the following additions and alterations should be made to the Report before the Convention, viz

. . .

M^r Wilson. This subject [election of the president] has greatly divided the House, and will also divide people out of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to decide. He had never made up an opinion on it entirely to his own satisfaction. He thought the plan on the whole a valuable improvement on the former. It gets rid of one great evil, that of cabal & corrup-tion; & Continental Characters will multiply as we more & more coalesce, so as to enable the electors in every part of the Union to know & judge of them. It clears the way also for a discussion of the question of re-eligibility on its own merits, which the former mode of election seems to forbid. He thought it might be better however to refer the eventual appointment to the Legislature than to the Senate, and to confine it to a smaller number than five of the Candidates. The eventual election by the Legislature w^d not open cabal anew, as it would be restrained to certain designated objects of choice, and as these must have had the previous sanction of a number of the States: and if the election be made as it ought as soon as the votes of the electors are opened & it is known that no one has a majority of the whole, there can be little danger of corruption. Another reason for preferring the Legislature to the Senate in this business, was that the House of Rep^s will be so often changed as to be free from the influence & faction to which the permanence of the Senate may subject that branch.

. . .

M^r Pinkney moved a clause declaring “that each House should be judge of the privilege of its own members.” M^r Gov^r Morris 2^ded the motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson thought the power involved, and the express insertion of it needless. It might beget doubts as to the power of other public bodies, as Courts &c. Every Court is the judge of its own privileges.

. . .

Wednesday Sep^r 5. 1787. In Convention

. . .

Col. Mason admitted that there were objections to an appointment by the Legislature as originally planned. He had not yet made up his mind, but would state his objections to the mode proposed by the Committee. 1. It puts the appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate, as it will rarely happen that a majority of the whole votes will fall on any one candidate: and as the Existing President will always be one of the 5 highest, his reappointment will of course depend on the Senate. 2. Considering the powers of the President & those of the Senate, if a coalition should be established between these two branches, they will be able to subvert the Constitution—The great objection with him would be removed by depriving the Senate of the eventual selection. He accordingly moved to strike out the words “if such number be a majority of that of the electors.”

. . .

M^r Wilson moved to strike out “Senate” and insert the word “Legislature”

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Thursday Sep^r 6. 1787. In Convention

. . .

M^r Gerry proposed, as the President was to be elected by the Senate out of the five highest candidates, that if he should not at the end of his term be re-elected by a majority of the Electors, and no other candidate should have a majority, the eventual election should be made by the Legislature. This he said would relieve the president from his particular dependence on the Senate for his continuance in office.

. . .

M^r Wilson said that he had weighed carefully the report of the Committee for remodelling the constitution of the Executive; and on combining it with other parts of the plan, he was obliged to consider the whole as having a dangerous tendency to aristocracy; as throwing a dangerous power into the hands of the Senate. They will have in fact, the appointment of the President, and through his dependence on them, the virtual appointment to offices; among others the offices of the Judiciary Department. They are to make Treaties; and they are to try all impeachments. In allowing them thus to make the Executive & Judiciary appointments, to be the Court of impeachments, and to make Treaties which are to be laws of the land, the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers are all blended in one branch of the Government. The power of making Treaties involves the case of subsidies, and here as an additional evil, foreign influence is to be dreaded. According to the plan as it now stands, the President will not be the man of the people as he ought to be, but the Minion of the Senate. He cannot even appoint a tide-waiter without the Senate. He had always thought the Senate too numerous a body for making appointments to office. The Senate, will moreover in all probability be in constant Session. They will have high salaries. And with all those powers, and the President in their interest, they will depress the other branch of the Legislature, and aggrandize themselves in proportion. Add to all this, that the Senate sitting in conclave, can by holding up to their respective States various and improbable candidates, contrive so to scatter their votes, as to bring the appointment of the President ultimately before themselves. Upon the whole, he thought the new mode of appointing the President, with some amendments, a valuable improvement; but he could never agree to purchase it at the price of the ensuing parts of the Report, nor befriend a system of which they make a part.

. . .

The Section 4.—to wit, “The President by & with the advice and consent of the Senate shall have power to make Treaties &c.”

M^r Wilson moved to add, after the word “Senate” the words, “and House of Representatives.” As treaties he said are to have the operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of laws also. The circumstance of secrecy in the business of treaties formed the only objection; but this he thought, so far as it was inconsistent with obtaining the Legislative sanction, was outweighed by the necessity of the latter.

. . .

“He shall nominate &c Appoint Ambassadors &c.”

M^r Wilson objected to the mode of appointing, as blending a branch of the Legislature with the Executive. Good laws are of no effect without a good Executive; and there can be no good Executive without a responsible appointment of officers to execute. Responsibility is in a manner destroyed by such an agency of the Senate. He would prefer the council proposed by Col. Mason, provided its advice should not be made obligatory on the President.

. . .

On motion of M^r Spaight—“that the President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate by granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of the next Session of the Senate” It was agreed to nem: con:

Section 4. “The President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall have power to make Treaties”—“But no treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the members present”—this last being before the House.

M^r Wilson thought it objectionable to require the concurrence of ⅔ which puts it in the power of a minority to controul the will of a majority.

. . .

Col: Mason said that in rejecting a Council to the President we were about to try an experiment on which the most despotic Governments had never ventured. The Grand Signor himself had his Divan. He moved to postpone the consideration of the clause in order to take up the following

“That it be an instruction to the Committee of the States to prepare a clause or clauses for establishing an Executive Council, as a Council of State, for the President of the U. States, to consist of six members, two of which from the Eastern, two from the middle, and two from the Southern States, with a Rotation and duration of office similar to those of the Senate; such Council to be appointed by the Legislature or by the Senate.”

. . .

M^r Wilson approved of a Council in preference to making the Senate a party to appointm^ts.

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Saturday September 8^th. In Convention

The last Report of Committee of Eleven (see Sep^r 4) was resumed.

M^r King moved to strike out the “exception of Treaties of peace” from the general clause requiring two thirds of the Senate for making Treaties.

M^r Wilson wished the requisition of two thirds to be struck out altogether. If the majority cannot be trusted, it was a proof, as observed by M^r Ghorum, that we were not fit for one Society.

A reconsideration of the whole clause was agreed to.

. . .

M^r Wilson If two thirds are necessary to make peace, the minority may perpetuate war, against the sense of the majority.

. . .

M^r Wilson & M^r Dayton move to strike out the clause requiring two thirds of the Senate for making Treaties—on which,

. . .

M^r M^cHenry observed that the President had not yet been any where authorised to convene the Senate, and moved to amend Art. X. sect. 2. by striking out the words “he may convene them [the Legislature] on extraordinary occasions” & insert “He may convene both or either of the Houses on extraordinary occasions.” This he added would also provide for the case of the Senate being in Session at the time of convening the Legislature.

M^r Wilson said he should vote ag^st the motion, because it implied that the senate might be in Session, when the Legislature was not, which he thought improper.

. . .

Monday Sep^r 10. 1787. In Convention

M^r Sherman moved to add to the article “or the Legislature may propose amendments to the several States for their approbation, but no amendments shall be binding until consented to by the several States.”

M^r Gerry 2^ded the motion.

M^r Wilson moved to insert “two thirds of” before the words “several States”—on which amendment to the motion of Mr Sherman.

. . .

M^r Wilson then moved to insert “three fourths of” before “the several Sts” which was agreed to nem: con:

. . .

M^r Gerry moved to reconsider art: XXI and XXII. from the latter of which “for the approbation of Cong^s” had been struck out. He objected to proceeding to change the Government without the approbation of Congress, as being improper and giving just umbrage to that body. He repeated his objections also to an annulment of the confederation with so little scruple or formality.

. . .

M^r Wilson was against a reconsideration for any of the purposes which had been mentioned.

. . .

M^r Hamilton then moved to postpone art XXI in order to take up the following, containing the ideas he had above expressed, viz

Resolved that the foregoing plan of a Constitution be transmitted to the U. S. in Congress assembled, in order that if the same shall be agreed to by them, it may be communicated to the Legislatures of the several States, to the end that they may provide for its final ratification by referring the same to the Consideration of a Convention of Deputies in each State to be chosen by the people thereof, and that it be recommended to the said Legislatures in their respective acts for organizing such convention to declare, that if the said Convention shall approve of the said Constitution, such approbation shall be binding and conclusive upon the State, and further that if the said Convention should be of opinion that the same upon the assent of any nine States thereto, ought to take effect between the States so assenting, such opinion shall thereupon be also binding upon such State, and the said Constitution shall take effect between the States assenting thereto”

. . .

M^r Wilson. This motion being seconded, it is necessary now to speak freely. He expressed in strong terms his disapprobation of the expedient proposed, particularly the suspending the plan of the Convention on the approbation of Congress. He declared it to be worse than folly to rely on the concurrence of the Rhode Island members of Cong^s in the plan. Maryland has voted on this floor, for requiring the unanimous assent of the 13 States to the proposed change in the federal System. N. York has not been represented for a long time past in the Convention. Many individual deputies from other States have spoken much against the plan. Under these circumstances can it be safe to make the assent of Congress necessary. After spending four or five months in the laborious & arduous task of forming a Government for our Country, we are ourselves at the close throwing insuperable obstacles in the way of its success.

. . .

Friday Sep^r 14^th 1787. In Convention

The Report of the Committee of Stile & arrangement being resumed.

. . .

To define & punish piracies and felonies on the high seas, and “punish” offences against the law of nations.

M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out “punish” before the words “offences ag^st the law of nations,” so as to let these be definable as well as punishable, by virtue of the preceding member of the sentence.

M^r Wilson hoped the alteration would by no means be made. To pretend to define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all the civilized nations of the world, would have a look of arrogance, that would make us ridiculous.

. . .

Doc^r Franklin moved to add after the words “post roads” Art I. Sect. 8. “a power to provide for cutting canals where deemed necessary”

M^r Wilson 2^ded the motion.

M^r Sherman objected. The expence in such cases will fall on the U. States, and the benefit accrue to the places where the canals may be cut.

M^r Wilson. Instead of being an expence to the U. S. they may be made a source of revenue.

M^r Madison suggested an enlargement of the motion into a power “to grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U. S. might require & the legislative provisions of individual States may be incompetent.” His primary object was however to secure an easy communication between the States which the free intercourse now to be opened, seemed to call for. The political obstacles being removed, a removal of the natural ones as far as possible ought to follow. M^r Randolph 2^ded the proposition.

M^r King thought the power unnecessary.

M^r Wilson. It is necessary to prevent a State from obstructing the general welfare.

M^r King. The States will be prejudiced and divided into parties by it. In Philad^a & New York, it will be referred to the establishment of a Bank, which has been a subject of contention in those Cities. In other places it will be referred to mercantile monopolies.

M^r Wilson mentioned the importance of facilitating by canals, the communication with the Western Settlements. As to Banks he did not think with M^r King that the power in that point of view would excite the prejudices & parties apprehended. As to mercantile monopolies they are already included in the power to regulate trade.

Col: Mason was for limiting the power to the single case of Canals. He was afraid of monopolies of every sort, which he did not think were by any means already implied by the Constitution as supposed by M^r Wilson.

. . .

M^r Wilson supported the motion.

. . .

M^r Wilson 2^ded & supported the motion. Many operations of finance can not be properly published at certain times.

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Saturday Sep^r 15^th 1787. In Convention

. . .

Art: II. Sect. 2. “he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the U. S. &c”

. . .

M^r Wilson. Pardon is necessary for cases of treason, and is best placed in the hands of the Executive. If he be himself a party to the guilt he can be impeached and prosecuted.

. . .

Monday Sep^r 17. 1787. In Convention

The engrossed Constitution being read,

Doc^r Franklin rose with a speech in his hand, which he had reduced to writing for his own conveniency, and which M^r Wilson read in the words following.

. . .

M^r King suggested that the Journals of the Convention should be either destroyed, or deposited in the custody of the President. He thought if suffered to be made public, a bad use would be made of them by those who would wish to prevent the adoption of the Constitution.

M^r Wilson prefered the second expedient, he had at one time liked the first best; but as false suggestions may be propagated it should not be made impossible to contradict them.

A question was then put on depositing the Journals and other papers of the Convention in the hands of the President, on which, N. H. ay. M^tts ay. C^t ay. N. J. ay. Pen^a ay. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The President having asked what the Convention meant should be done with the Journals &c, whether copies were to be allowed to the members if applied for. It was Resolved nem: con “that he retain the Journal and other papers, subject to the order of the Congress, if ever formed under the Constitution.”

The members then proceeded to sign the instrument.

Whilst the last members were signing it Doct^r Franklin looking towards the Presidents Chair, at the back of which a rising sun happened to be painted, observed to a few members near him, that Painters had found it difficult to distinguish in their art a rising from a setting sun. I have said he, often and often in the course of the Session, and the vicisitudes of my hopes and fears as to its issue, looked at that behind the President without being able to tell whether it was rising or setting: But now at length I have the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting Sun.

The Constitution being signed by all the members except M^r Randolph, M^r Mason, and M^r Gerry who declined giving it the sanction of their names, the Convention dissolved itself by an Adjournment sine die—7

[1. ]Rufus King (1755–1827) was recognized as a statesman (both state and federal) and orator of the highest caliber. He supported the Constitution of 1787. Robert Yates (1738–1801) was a justice of the supreme court of New York. He was a leader of the Antifederalists who opposed the Constitution and subsequently left the convention early on July 5, 1787. He later published letters in opposition to the Constitution under the names Brutus and Sydney. David Brearly (1745–1790) fervently backed the Revolution and participated in the New Jersey militia. He later served as the chief justice of the New Jersey supreme court and was appointed by Washington as a federal district court judge. William Churchill Houston (1740–1788) was a professor of mathematics and natural philosophy at Princeton. He fought in the Revolutionary War and was later admitted to the New Jersey bar. Houston was very ill during the convention and did not sign the final document. William Paterson (1745–1806) was a very capable statesman, serving as attorney general of New Jersey, U.S. senator, governor, and associate justice of the Supreme Court. He was at the constitutional convention only until late July (he returned to sign) but figured prominently in it because of his advocacy of the New Jersey, or Paterson, plan. Thomas Fitzsimmons (1741–1811) was a prominent businessman who supported the Revolution. A Federalist, he was active in state politics and later served in the U.S. House of Representatives. Gouverneur Morris (1752–1816) was a statesman and jurist. He was an ardent Federalist who spoke frequently in the constitutional convention. George Read (1734–1798) was an able jurist and statesman who served in the state politics of Delaware, a U.S. senator, and later chief justice of the supreme court of Delaware. Richard Basset (1745–1815) was a wealthy jurist and planter who was a U.S. senator from Delaware and later as governor. He supported the Federalist cause but did little in the constitutional convention. Jacob Broom (1752–1810) was active in state and local politics in Delaware. He never missed a session of the convention but did not play a major role. Edmund Randolph (1753–1813) aided George Washington during the Revolutionary War and was highly involved in the local and state politics of Virginia. He presented the Virginia plan at the constitutional convention, and though he declined to sign the final document, he supported it when it came time for ratification. John Blair (1732–1800) held legislative and judicial offices in Virginia. He supported the Constitution, though he played a minor role in the convention. Later he served as an associate justice of the Supreme Court. George Wythe (1726–1806) was active in the politics of Virginia, but his main contribution came from his role in the judicial and academic life of that state. He could count Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, James Monroe, and Henry Clay as his pupils. He supported the Constitution, but he left the convention early and did not sign. James McClurg (1746–1823) was an eminent physician in Virginia who served as a surgeon during the Revolutionary War. During the convention, he advocated greater power for the executive. He left the convention in early August and did not sign the Constitution. Alexander Martin (1740–1807) served in the North Carolina Senate, as governor, and as a U.S. senator. He left the convention in late August and did not sign the Constitution. William Richardson Davie (1756–1820) was an extremely capable soldier, jurist, and educator. He supported a strong federal government and was a strong supporter of the Constitution, though he left the convention early in mid-August. Richard Dobbs Spaight, Sr. (1758–1802), was a state representative, governor, and member of the U.S. House of Representatives. He attended every session of the convention and strongly supported the Constitution. Hugh Williamson (1735–1819) pursued the Presbyterian ministry, philosophy, medicine, and science in general. He fought in the Revolutionary War and played a significant role during the convention. John Rutledge (1739–1800) was the governor of South Carolina during the Revolutionary War. He participated in all three branches of state government and served as an associate justice of the Supreme Court for a short time. He took a moderately nationalist stance at the convention. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (1746–1825) was educated as a jurist but was mainly a soldier. He served through many battles of the Revolutionary War. He advocated a strong national government during the convention and defended the Constitution upon returning to South Carolina. Charles Pinckney (1757–1824) was a state legislator and governor, as well as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. He was one of the more influential members at the convention. Pierce Butler (1744–1822) was a planter and soldier who later served as a U.S. senator. Nominally a Federalist, he supported the Constitution but often crossed party lines. William Few (1748–1828) served in the U.S. Congress as both a representative and senator. Few missed many summer sessions of the convention but was supportive of the Constitution.

[2. ]William Temple Franklin (1760–1823) was the son of William Franklin, Royal Governor of New Jersey, and the grandson of Benjamin Franklin.

[3. ]William Leigh Pierce (1740–1789) was a merchant who served in the U.S. House of Representatives. He left the convention early, playing only a minor role. The notes he took of the proceedings have proved valuable, as they provide character sketches of the lesser known members of the convention.

[4. ]John Dickenson (1732–1808) represented Delaware at the convention. He was an orator and author of the highest caliber who served in various political capacities. He is best known for his Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania.

[5. ]Elbridge Gerry (1744–1814), a merchant who represented Massachusetts at the convention. He vacillated greatly in his political stances and was initially opposed to the Constitution. He later came to support it and served as governor of Massachusetts and as vice president under James Madison. The term “gerrymander” is named after him.

[6. ]William Livingston (1723–1790) served as the governor of New Jersey from 1776 until his death.

[7. ]Roger Sherman (1721–1793) was a delegate from Connecticut. In his home state he served simultaneously as a member of the upper house in the general assembly and as a superior court judge. He later served in the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate.

[8. ]Luther Martin (1748–1826) was the attorney general in Maryland for 28 consecutive years. He was strongly opposed to the Constitution and left the convention early.

[9. ]William Paterson (1745–1806) of New Jersey was a member of the constitutional convention. Wilson’s reference to Paterson’s “A & B” refers to Paterson’s explanation of state representation, as recorded by James Madison, on June 9.

[10. ]Abraham Baldwin (1754–1807) served for a total of eighteen years in the U.S. Congress as a member of both the House and the Senate. He was largely inconspicuous at the convention.

[11. ]Refers to John Lansing Jr. (1754–1829), a member of the convention from New York, who was vehemently against the Constitution and convention and left early. He later served as an associate justice and chief justice of the New York Supreme Court and as chancellor of that state.

[12. ]Philip Dormer Stanhope, the fourth Earl of Chesterfield (1694–1773), was an able orator, statesman, and politician who is mostly known for his administration of Ireland.

[13. ]Probably refers to Alfred the Great (849–899), who was famous for his defense of England against the Danes (or Vikings) and his reorganization of English society.

[14. ]William Blount (1749–1800) was a member of both the lower and upper houses of the North Carolina legislature. He did not attend the convention and signed the Constitution reluctantly. He was later active in state and national politics in Tennessee.

[15. ]House of Austria.

[16. ]Jonathan Dayton (1760–1824) was a Federalist who, although objecting to some provisions of the Constitution, signed it. He was later the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives in the fourth and fifth Congresses and a U.S. senator. Dayton, Ohio, was named after him.

[17. ]William Samuel Johnson (1727–1819) was a wealthy merchant and jurist from Connecticut. He served in various capacities in the state judiciary, in the legislature, and in the U.S. Senate. He did not arrive at the convention until June 2, but he supported the Constitution and worked towards its ratification

[18. ]William Pitt the Younger (1759–1806) became a member of the House of Commons in 1781 and the Prime Minister in 1783.

[19. ]Henry St. John, the first Viscount Bolingbroke (1678–1751), an English statesman, orator, and writer, who first took a seat in parliament in 1701.

[20. ]Nathaniel Gorham (1738–1796) was a merchant who served in various political offices in Massachusetts. He was a moderate nationalist who attended all sessions of the convention and later pushed for ratification in his home state.

[21. ]An ancient hilltop used since the Iron Age and the site of what once was the city of Wiltshire.

[22. ]Oliver Ellsworth (1745–1807) was a representative from Connecticut who later was a U.S. senator and chief justice of the Supreme Court. He left the convention in early August but supported ratification.

[23. ]Before the court for its consideration and determination.

[24. ]John Langdon (1741–1819) was an active soldier and politician during the Revolutionary War. He served as the speaker of the house in the assembly of New Hampshire as well as the state’s chief executive on more than one occasion. He was a Federalist during the convention and for the first half of his senatorial career, but later aligned himself with the Democratic-Republicans. Nicholas Gilman (1755–1814) served in the New Hampshire legislature, and the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. He began his career as a Federalist but later aligned himself with the Democratic-Republicans.

[25. ]The title of the chief magistrate of Venice when it was a Republic.

[1. ]John Francis Mercer (1759–1821) was strongly opposed to centralization and the Constitution as a whole. He served as a member of the state house in Maryland, U.S. representative, and later as governor.

[2. ]Anne (1665–1714) was queen of England from 1702 to 1714.

[3. ]Poynings’s law refers to the Statutes of Drogheda (created by the parliament of Drogheda, and summoned by Sir Edward Poynings), which made the Irish legislature entirely subordinate to the English parliament from 1494 to 1782.

[4. ]Thomas Mifflin (1744–1800) was a general in the Continental Army and a political leader in Pennsylvania. He attended the convention regularly but did not make a significant impact.

[5. ]Daniel Carroll (1730–1796) was a prominent planter from Maryland. He arrived late to the convention but supported the Constitution and later served in the U.S. House of Representatives.

[6. ]James McHenry (1753–1816) began his career in medicine but later entered the fields of politics and administration, serving in various legislative offices in Maryland and as the secretary of war under Washington and Adams. He missed significant portions of the convention because of the illness of his brother, but strenuously supported the Constitution.

[7. ]Adjournment without a subsequent day being set to meet again.