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CHAPTER VI: Of the Various Plans of Government. - Francis Hutcheson, Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria with a Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy [1747]

Edition used:

Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria with a Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, edited and with an Introduction by Luigi Turco (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007).

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


CHAPTER VI

Of the Various Plans of Government.

I. The simple forms of government are divided into three classes, according as the power is committed to one person or to one council. When it is committed to one person, it is called monarchy <and has different names>; when to a council of some few eminent citizens, it is an aristocracy; and when it is committed to a popular assembly either of all the free citizens, or of some more reputable persons deputed by them, ’tis democracy.

When power is committed to a council, that is deemed the will of the council which is determined by the major part; unless by some fundamental law, a certain number of members is made necessary for determining any matters of publick administration, as a quorum{; and what proportion of this number, can make any alterations}. Precaution should also be taken against an inconvenience which may always happen when a question of three or more parts is put to a vote, that that part to which a great majority may be most averse, may yet have more votes than any one of the other parts{, and thus be enacted}. This may always be prevented by reducing a complex question into two {or more simple ones}, of two parts each; or by excluding by previous votes one or two of the parts of the complex question{, so as only two parts shall remain for the last decisive vote}. A like method may be taken where many candidates set up for the same office.1

II. Of each of these simple kinds there are many species. Monarchy is either absolute, <and unlimited,> where the whole administration is committed to the prudence of the monarch, without any other limits than those which are always understood from the general <nature and> end of all civil government; <when the power is bound by the fundamental laws of the state> or it is limited in the original conveyance of the power; and certain rights reserved to the people and exempted from it. And then each of these kinds are subdivided into hereditary and elective: the elective princes again may either be chosen for life, or for a certain term.

There are likeways several kinds of aristocracys, absolute, <or unlimited,> or limited <and circumscribed by law>: hereditary or elective; perpetual or temporary.{* } In this last sort the senators hold their seats for a certain term; upon the expiration of which, others are substituted in their places. If such new senators are elected by the people, and any free citizen may stand candidate, the council is rather democratical: but if the places are filled by the votes of the remaining members of the council; or only some eminent families can be candidates, it is aristocratical. When the seat in the senate depends upon a certain quantity of wealth; or is held in virtue of certain lands justly possessed; ’tis called properly oligarchical. When these alone can be elected who have discharged certain great offices with approbation, this is deemed aristocracy in the properest sense, <or politia> {and the plan of it most commended by some great authors of antiquity}.

There are also different kinds of democracies{, as the popular assembly is differently constituted}. We have examples of two ways in the comitia curiata, and centuriata of the Romans. In the former all citizens voted equally: In the later according to their fortunes <and for that reason called timocratic>. In some states the lot determined the members of the assembly: in others the people being divided into a number of tribes, counties, or districts, and these again subdivided; each division sends so many delegates or deputies, chosen by themselves, to be members of the popular assembly.

The complex forms are innumerable, according as any of the different sorts of senates jointly share the supreme power, with any of the sorts of monarchy; and again as any of those complex kinds are again conjoined with one or other of the popular assemblies: and then as such or such parts of the supreme power are vested in one or other of these councils, or in the monarch; or in all three jointly.2

III. That we may discern which of these forms is preferable, the following <few> observations seem proper.

1. In constituting of a state these four points are to be aimed at; that first, there be sufficient wisdom in the government to see what is best for the state; and then fidelity to choose what is best; and next that concord be maintained; and lastly a secret and speedy execution. If in any plan sufficient precaution is taken for all these, a people cannot desire more from its civil polity.

2. Where the parts of the supreme power are placed in different subjects or bodies; there must be some such political bonds between them, as shall prevent their acting in opposition to each other; that the prince, for instance, may do nothing of high importance without consent of the senate or popular assembly; nor these bodies do any thing without consent of the prince; nor one of these bodies without the concurrence of the other. If any sufficient precautions of this kind be taken, the civil power is better lodged by parts in different bodies, than all committed to either a monarch, or to any one council.

3. The power wheresoever lodged will never remain stable unless it has large property for its foundation; without this it must be fluctuating, and exposed to frequent seditions. Wealth carries force along with it, which will overturn rights not supported by wealth; or be wrested from the owners by the civil power [or the power of the state will collapse with fluctuating wealth]. An hereditary monarchy needs for its stability large crownlands, or hereditary provinces{, belonging to the monarch’s family}. A senate will not remain stable unless a large share of the lands are the property of the senators: and lands must be dispersed among great multitudes, and preserved thus dispersed by agrarian laws, to make a stable democracy; or some other causes must keep property much diffused. And altho’ the diligent and active should not, without weighty causes, be any way restrained in their just acquisitions: (and indeed the best sorts of democracy may allow them to acquire as much as can be requisite for any elegance or pleasure of life that a wise man could desire) yet we are never to put in the ballance with the liberty or safety of a people, the gratifying the vain ambition, luxury, or avarice of a few. It may therefor often be just to prevent by agrarian laws such vast wealth coming into a few hands, that {a cabal of them} might endanger the state.3

4. No such insolent or oppressive privileges should be granted to any one order in the state, as would exclude all others from publick offices of dignity or profit. For they will become occasions of perpetual seditions.{* }

5. As it would be of little consequence what were the form of polity, were it provided that none but good and wise men got into power; (which perhaps no precaution can ensure) the main drift of good policy is, to provide that even tho’ bad men come into power, they shall either have small temptations to abuse it, or at least no hopes of gain and impunity in doing so.4

6. As to the fittest number for making an happy state, nothing can be precisely determined. If the number is small, there won’t be strength enough against bands of the avowedly unjust{, who may attack it by surprize}; nor will there be sufficient wealth to execute any wise designs for the improvement of life. On the other hand when the numbers and the extent of a country is very large, no governors can take sufficient care of all their interests, and prevent frauds, extortions and oppressions{, even by the avarice of the deputy-magistrates, as access to complain must be more difficult}. And besides, far fewer men can be employed in the greater and more important state-affairs, and thus improve in that most important part of wisdom [and thus learn to cultivate more extensive virtues], than if out of the same numbers and the same tract of ground, several distinct independent societies had been framed. Indeed this is seldom matter of choice, what numbers should unite. For if once vast empires are formed, it becomes necessary to any little states around them to incorporate together, as many of them as may be, for their defence against a potent neighbour.5 But as agrarian laws are often justifiable in a state, to prevent the immoderate increase of wealth in the hands of a few <and to prevent the fear of their power>; ’tis equally just, for the same reasons, that smaller neighbouring states should take timely precautions, and that by violence too, if gentler methods are not like to succeed, that no neighbour-state should acquire such force as may enslave all around; especially if they see a prevalent disposition in all {the institutions and} manners of any neighbour-state toward {military affairs and} conquest.6

IV. <Simple> Monarchy has these peculiar advantages, that it is adapted to preserve concord, and make a secret and speedy execution of any design. But then in hereditary monarchies there’s small security for either the wisdom or fidelity of the monarch. In elective monarchies there’s greater probability for wisdom; but rather less for fidelity: and upon the death of each monarch there’s an open gate to civil wars. Under an absolute hereditary monarchy nothing is secure. Under the limited hereditary, no better precaution is taken for wisdom, but there is better precaution as to a faithful administration: since if the monarch violates the fundamental laws, or breaks over the bounds set by them to his power, he plainly declares himself a tyrant{, and forfeits his right}; which all the subjects must plainly see: and hence will more readily agree in dethroning him to set up another, or to constitute some better plan. But then in the limited monarchies there generally prevail factions, which sometimes [repeatedly] turn into civil wars.7

In the simpler hereditary aristocracies scarce sufficient precaution is taken for wisdom, and scarce any for fidelity, concord, or secret and speedy execution. In the elective are better precautions for wisdom and fidelity, but no better for concord or execution.

In democracies we are always secured as to fidelity; and may have a tolerable prospect as to wisdom too, when mens votes are according to their fortunes; or when the assembly is made up of deputies elected by the people: but there’s no security of concord, or of speedy and secret execution {in any pure democracy}.8

The most convenient way of voting in all large councils or assemblies is by the ballot: as by this means, men need not dread the resentments of men in power; and ’tis less easy to use any indirect influence [to corrupt the ballot by bribery]. And altho’ in the ballot there’s no restraint of shame, but a door opened for private favour, hatred, and envy; yet it seldom happens that these passions work in the majority of a people without some just or probable cause. But if something of the lot be also intermixed,* it may often quite defeat great cabals, and their arts of corruption, and stop the power of malice and envy. But the lot alone must be quite unfit to determine any point of consequence, or to advance any persons to offices; for tho’ no man is affronted by a disappointment this way, nor is there any room for partial favour; yet it is plainly void of all prudence or wisdom.

V. We have said enough to shew that none of the simple forms of government are well adapted to preserve any state happy. Nor is it of any avail to plead antiquity here. If all the most antient ways were best, we should return to caves and beast-skins for our shelter and dress. What flatterers of princes often tell us, that monarchy was the earliest form, is rather dishonourable to it; importing indeed that it at first pleased a rude and unexperienced populace, but could not continue to please upon experience and the increase of wisdom. And indeed in nothing could one less expect that the first essays would be perfect, than in the constitution of civil polity; a work requiring the greatest knowledge and prudence, to be acquired only by much thought and experience of human life. The several great inconveniences attending each of the simple forms shew the necessity of having recourse to the mixt and complex; and the several great advantages peculiar to each of the simple, shew that those mixed forms are best where all the three kinds are artfully compounded: and this was the opinion of the wisest men of antiquity.{* }

As a council of delegates or deputies duly elected by a general popular interest can never want fidelity or good intention, and seldom can be deficient in wisdom, it may seem advisable that a large share of the civil power should be lodged in such a body; such as that of enacting laws and even determining definitively the most weighty affairs in deliberation. And this part of a constitution should be secured by agrarian laws: not so strait however as to discourage industry, or exclude any innocent elegance or ornament of life.

If there be also a senate of a few <elected by the people> who have approved their abilities and fidelity in discharging the great offices of the common-wealth; it may safely be intrusted with the sole right of deliberating, debating, and proposing business to the popular assembly <so that no weighty affair is decided without the authority of the senate>. In both councils it may be proper to contrive <by annual laws> a rotation, by new members gradually succeeding to the old, so that neither council may have above one third of [may be formed by all]9 unexperienced new men, nor yet any one man continue a member perpetually [has a perpetual right of voting or authority]. Laws limiting the times that any {general, minister of state, or} magistrate can continue in office have also great advantages, to prevent any person’s so rooting himself in power or popularity, as to be dangerous to the constitution; and to train up greater numbers in political wisdom, by experience in all the important offices; so that the state may never be obliged to have all its hopes depending upon one mortal life. Where such laws are sacredly established, the state will never want the benefit of the wisdom or experience of such as have served out their legal time. For it will be no matter of offence that at the expiration of it they must lay down their offices according to law.

And lastly, for sudden unexpected exigences or dangers, and for the secret and speedy execution of what the publick interest may require, some sort of regal or dictatorial power is requisite; but such an one as has no other foundation of its force but the laws themselves. And to this power may be committed the command in war, and the execution of the laws. This third branch may be as an arbitrator, {holding the ballance between the two other parts of the constitution,} if there should arise any high contention between the senatorial order and the plebeian.10

The power of promoting to all sorts of offices may be some way vested in these three jointly, or divided among them; so that offices requiring great abilities and wisdom should be filled by the nomination of the senate; such officers as are to be employed in speedy execution, to be nominated by the prince: and such as are to protect the rights of the people, and administer justice among them, to be elected by the people.

A censorial power too would be of the highest use, to reform, or prevent the corruption of manners; by degrading persons of any dignity whatsoever, as soon as they run into a dissolute course of debauchery.11

[1. ]See System 3.6.1, vol. II, pp. 240–41.

[* ]{The characters of aristocracy, are cooptation by the senate, to a perpetual seat, and a limitation to certain eminent families, distinguished by fortune, or bearing great offices. The characters of democracy are popular elections, temporary seats, and access to all citizens to stand candidates. There’s in many constitutions a mixture of these different characters.} [This note added by the translator is not suggested by Hutcheson’s System.]

[2. ]See System 3.6.2, vol. II, pp. 241–43.

[3. ]System 3.6.3, vol. II, pp. 243–47, contains the same three points. Hutcheson emphasizes the relevance of large landed property for the stability of the civil power in whatever form of government. James Harrington in his Oceana (1656) considers the agrarian law limiting and evenly distributing land to the people fundamental law to a long lasting commonwealth. For his defence of the agrarian laws against detractors, see Oceana, part 3.1.]

[* ]{Of this we have a clear instance in the Roman state, till the plebeians got access even to the consulate.} [Also this footnote is a free addition by the translator.]

[4. ]See System 3.6.3, vol. II, p. 252.

[5. ]See System 3.6.3, vol. II, pp. 249–51.

[6. ]More literally: “’tis equally right that smaller neighbouring states, when justly suspicious of the wealth of anyone of the others, especially if the latter is excited by an ambition of conquest, put limits to its increase of wealth, even by violence if it is not possible otherwise, before it turns out to be so great that their safety and liberty is no more secured.”

[7. ]See System 3.6.4, vol. II, pp. 252–54.

[8. ]The observations on aristocracies and democracies in System 3.6.5–6, vol. II, pp. 254–58, are much more detailed than in the Institutio.

[* ]All these points are fully explained by Harrington. [Cf. System 3.6.6 and 7, point 8, vol. II, pp. 257 and 264. James Harrington, in his Oceana, part 3 (1656), plans a complex system of secret ballots, drawing representatives by lot and rotation of magistrates in order to avoid corruption and sedition.]

[* ]{Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Cicero.} [See System 3.6.7, vol. II, pp. 258–59. Here Hutcheson refers to Aristotle, Politica, books IV–VI, and to Harrington.]

[9. ]Hutcheson mentions the Harringtonian rotation of one third of the representatives only in System 3.6.8, vol. II, p. 261.

[10. ]See System 3.6.5–8. point 7, vol. II, p. 263.

[11. ]Ibidem, point 10, p. 265.