The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• General Note
• Advertisement By the Translator.
• Juventuti Academicae Salutem.
• To the Students In Universities.
• Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria With a Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy
• Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria
• Liber I: Ethices Elementa.
• Caput I: De Hominis Natura Ejusque Partibus.
• Caput II: De Summo Bono Et Virtute.
• Caput III: De Variis Virtutum Divisionibus.
• Caput IV: De Virtutibus Et Officiis Erga Deum.
• Caput V: De Officiis Erga Alios Homines Exercendis.
• Caput VI: De Officiis Cujusque Erga Se, Et De Animi Cultura.
• 1 {caput VII: De Virtutis Studio Excitando Et Retinendo.
• Liber II: Jurisprudentiae Naturalis Elementa.
• Caput I: De Lege Naturali.
• Caput II: De Juris Natura Et Divisionibus.
• Caput III: De Virtutum Et Vitiorum Gradibus, Inter Se Comparatis{; Iisque Quae Speciem Moralem Afficiunt}.
• Caput IV: De Jure Privato Naturali.
• Caput V: De Jure Adventitio Reali, Et Rerum Dominio.
• Caput VI: De Dominii Acquirendi Rationibus.
• Caput VII: De Jure Derivato, Ejusque Causis.
• Caput VIII: De Dominii Transferendi Rationibus, Per Contractus, Successiones, Aut Testamenta.
• Caput IX: De Contractibus.
• Caput X: De Sermocinantium Officiis.
• Caput XI: De Jurejurando Et Votis.
• Caput XII: De Rerum Pretio.
• Caput XIII: De Variis Contractuum Generibus Post Pretia Rerum Constituta.
• Caput XIV: De Obligationibus Quasi Ex Contractu Ortis.
• Caput XV: Jura Ex Damno Dato, Atque Ex Aliorum Injuriis Orta. Jura Belli.
• Caput XVI: De Jure Extraordinario Ex Necessitate, Omniumque Jure Communi.
• Caput XVII: De Juris Interitu. De Litibus In Libertate Dirimendis, Et Interpretatione.
• Liber III: Oeconomices Et Politices Elementa.
• Caput I: De Conjugio.
• Caput II: De Parentum Et Liberorum Officiis.
• Caput III: De Herorum Et Servorum Jure.
• Caput IV: De Civitatum Origine Et Causis.
• Caput V: De Interna Civitatum Structura, Et Summi Imperii Partibus.
• Caput VI: De Variis Rerumpublicarum Formis.
• Caput VII: De Summi Imperii Jure, Ejusque Acquirendi Rationibus.
• Caput VIII: De Legibus Condendis, Et De Jurisdictione.
• Caput IX: De Jure Belli.
• Caput X: De Foederibus, Legatis, Et Civitatum Interitu [deletione].
• A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy.
• Book I: The Elements of Ethicks.
• Chapter I: Of Human Nature and Its Parts.
• Chapter II: Concerning the Supreme Good.
• Chapter III: Concerning the Chief Divisions of Virtue.
• Chapter IV: Our Duties Toward God.
• Chapter V: Our Duties Toward Mankind.
• Chapter VI: Concerning Our Duties Toward Ourselves, and the Improvement of the Mind.
• Chapter VII: Some Practical Considerations to Excite and Preserve the Study of Virtue.
• Book II: Elements of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter I: Of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter II: Of the Nature of Rights, and Their Several Divisions.
• Chapter III: Concerning the Various Degrees of Virtue and Vice, and the Circumstances On Which They Depend.
• Chapter IV: Concerning the Natural Rights of Individuals.
• Chapter V: Of Real Adventitious Rights and Property.
• Chapter VI: The Methods of Acquiring Property.
• Chapter VII: Of Derived Property.
• Chapter VIII: The Methods of Transferring Property, Contracts, Succession, Testaments.
• Chapter IX: Of Contracts In General.
• Chapter X: Our Obligations In Speech.
• Chapter XI: Of Oaths and Vows.
• Chapter XII: Concerning the Values Or Prices of Goods.
• Chapter XIII: Of the Several Sorts of Contracts.
• Chapter XIV: * Obligations Resembling Those From Contracts.
• Chapter XV: Of Rights Arising From Damage Done, and the Rights of War.
• Chapter XVI: Extraordinary Rights In Cases of Necessity, and the Common Rights of Mankind.
• Chapter XVII: How Rights and Obligations Cease: How Controversies Are to Be Decided In Natural Liberty: and the Rules of Interpretation.
• Book III: The Principles of Oeconomicks and Politicks.
• Chapter I: Concerning Marriage.
• Chapter II: The Duties of Parents and Children.
• Chapter III: The Rights of Masters and Servants.
• Chapter IV: The Original of Civil Government.
• Chapter V: The Internal Structure of States: and the Several Parts of Supreme Power.
• Chapter VI: Of the Various Plans of Government.
• Chapter VII: The Rights of the Supreme Power: and the Methods of Acquiring It.
• Chapter VIII: Of Civil Laws and Their Execution.
• Chapter IX: The Laws of War.
• Chapter X: Of Treaties and Ambassadors, and the Entire Dissolution of States.
• Bibliography of Modern Literature

CHAPTER V

The Internal Structure of States: and the Several Parts of Supreme Power.

I. As no governors are the natural parents or progenitors of their people, nor if they were, could they transmit to any one heir the parental power over his adult brethren: as this power is founded solely upon the parental affection, and the weakness of immature years: the parental power can never be the foundation of the civil, tho’ it be a natural sketch or emblem of it. Nor can any person have such power over a whole people as masters have over slaves; as appears from what was already said.1 Nor has God by any revelation nominated magistrates, shewed the nature or extent of their powers, or given a plan of civil polity for mankind. Nor lastly can mere force without some foundation of right constitute any just power. It must therefor remain that some deed or contract of a people must be the sole natural origin of all just power.2

In some extraordinary circumstances the case may be otherways. For since the good [safety and happiness] of the whole body, {as all allow,} is the sole end of all civil power; if any person of eminent wisdom and great power consults this end sufficiently, in prescribing a legal plan <for the common good>, which all upon trial shall soon heartily embrace, he may perhaps without any iniquity impose this plan upon a rude and unexperienced people, which upon experience they shall soon approve, tho’ he could not obtain their previous consent to it. But as no people can be happy while they live in perpetual doubts and fears, as to the security of their highest interests [rights] from the invasions of men in power; we may pronounce in general that there can be no right to power except what is either founded upon, or speedily obtains, the hearty consent of the body of the people.

II. To constitute a state or civil polity {in a regular manner} these three deeds are necessary; first a contract of each one with all, that they shall unite into one society to be governed by one counsel. And next a decree or ordinance of the people, concerning the plan of government, and the nomination of the governors; and lastly another covenant or contract between these governors and the people, binding the rulers to a faithful administration of their trust [of the granted power for the common good], and the people to obedience. ’Tis true that in the first constitutions of power [of states], ’tis scarce credible that a rude and incautious multitude, full of admiration of the shining virtues of some more eminent characters, took these three formal steps. But then in every just constitution of <civil> power,* something was originally done which plainly included the whole force of these three transactions; since the end known and professed by all sides in this constitution of power was the common good of the whole body [since is well known to all the only end of bestowing and receiving authority].3

As to the transmitting of these civil obligations to posterity, the following observations will explain it.

1. Each citizen in subjecting himself to civil power stipulated protection from the whole body, with all the other advantages of a civilized life, not only for himself but for his posterity: and in this{, tho’ uncommissioned,} did them a most important service.4 They are bound therefor,{† } whether they consent or not, to perform to the body of the state, as far as their power goes, all that which could reasonably be demanded from persons adult for such important benefits received. Now ’tis highly reasonable that all such should on their parts contribute to the defence and support of that state, by which they have been so long protected <and profited> in a civilized life, and not desert it unseasonably; but transmit that association {with its beneficent influence} <received from the ancestors> to posterity.

2. As it must be extremely dangerous to any political body settled in any district, that any lands within the same should remain exempt from the civil power of the united body, to be a receptacle to fugitives or foreign enemies; ’tis justly presumed that {when any body of men possessing such a district of land constitute a civil power}, each one thus subjects his lands to it, that no person can hold the same without also subjecting himself to it, and uniting with the body politick [that its property or use can not be transferred to anybody that is not subjected to the state].5

3. And yet, in times of ease and peace, it would seem unjust and dishonourable to any state to hinder its citizens from selling their lands, removing to any other state they please, and freeing themselves from their former political relation. For the several subjects by the taxes or tributes they pay annually, compensate all the ordinary advantages they receive from the community: and it would be unjust to hinder them to consult better their own interest if they can elsewhere.6 Nor is there danger that any state will be deserted by many of its subjects, unless it be either miserably constituted or administered; and in such cases the citizens have a better right to quit it, and cannot be compelled to remain its subjects.

III. A state constituted in this manner becomes as one person in law,7 holding rights different from those of the several members; and under obligations, which bind no individual; and committing to certain persons or councils the management of its common interests. Among several states thus constituted, as they are all with respect to each other in natural liberty {and independence}, the like rights and laws obtain as among individuals in liberty. States have their [the same or very similar] perfect rights, and obligations to each other, and are bound to offices of humanity, in a like manner as individuals in natural liberty: and have like rights of self-defence <by violence>. This is the case of all states which are independent, whether greater or smaller, whatever names and titles they bear, more humble or more ostentatious. By an easy substitution therefor of states for individuals, the natural law with respect to individuals in liberty, makes all that publick law of states with respect to each other, which is of necessary obligation. As to voluntary or positive publick law, we shall touch at it hereafter.{* }

IV. The several powers requisite for governing a people <or rights of sovereign power> are divided into the greater and lesser. Of these greater powers some are executed within the bounds of the state <and called internal>, and others respecting other states are to be exerted abroad <and called external>. Of the former class, is that of making laws to regulate the behaviour of the subjects [citizens], and maintain their rights, still regarding the law of nature.8

2. Another is, that of exacting all such tributes or <public> revenues as the <wise> administration of the state requires: this some make a branch of the former. Revenues are sometimes raised from subjects [citizens] <and called tributa by the Romans>, sometimes from conquered provinces <and called vectigalia>; some destined for support of the families of the supreme governors, and some for the publick uses of the state. As to the former, elective princes are deemed only as life-renters, and hereditary princes have a right like that in fiefs, to be transmitted unburdened to their heirs. As to the other branch, princes can only be deemed administrators or trustees for the whole state.

3. A third branch of power is the executive, containing all jurisdiction civil and criminal; and the right of constituting magistrates, and judges to take care of all publick affairs, and decide controversies, as also officers to collect the tributes.

The powers to be exerted abroad are first those of war, in enlisting soldiers, and appointing officers, and directing all military operations.

2. The power of making treaties, either for settling peace, or maintaining commerce, and of constituting ambassadors for this purpose.

There’s beside all these a certain extraordinary right in the supreme governors of any people, in great exigencies, to incroach upon those rights of the subjects which for ordinary are to be religiously maintained to them: as when it happens to be absolutely necessary, in some perilous emergencies, either to compell them to some extraordinary dangerous services, or to contributions of their goods beyond the ordinary proportions. This right in civil life answers to these extraordinary rights of necessity, we formerly{* } mentioned in natural liberty.

The smaller rights commonly vested in the supreme governor, are those of conferring civil honours, coining of money, granting to hold fairs or markets, legitimating of children, erecting corporations, admitting minors as if they were of due age, pardoning criminals, giving protections to debtors, and such like; which we briefly pass over as of less importance, and not always necessary in every state.9

V. Those persons or councils have the supreme power, who are intrusted with the greater branches of power above mentioned, or the greater part of them, so that they can exert them according to their own judgment, and no other person or council can rescind their deeds. Many have supreme power who don’t hold it unlimited, nor even for life: such too as cannot alter the order of succession, or abolish any of the fundamental laws of the state. He is supreme to whom the chief parts of civil power are committed, tho’ within certain limits, to be executed by his own order for the good of the body, so that he does not act by new commands, or commissions from any other; and whose deeds<, within the allowed limits of power,> derive not their force from the consent of any superior.

In every state the same quantity of power is deemed to be lodged some where or other; either with a monarch, a senate, or popular assembly{, or at least with the whole body of the people}. Nor is it any diminution of the supremacy or independence of a state that it is bound by its treaties with others, even tho’ they be very inconvenient ones; provided the state can still exercise all the greater parts of civil power, and can govern itself independently of others.

If a number of states enter into such a strict alliance <for whatever cause>, as to constitute some one person or permanent common council for them all, and commit to this person or council some parts of the supreme power, to be executed for them all; they are called a system of states, or Achaian states, from a famous instance of that kind. But independent states then incorporate entirely into one, when the very same persons or councils have committed to them all the parts of the supreme power to be executed for them all.10

[1. ]Cf. Locke, Two Treatises 2.15.

[2. ]Cf. Locke, Two Treatises 2.16.175. See also System 3.5.1, vol. II, pp. 225–26.

[* ]See Mr. Carmichaell’s notes on Puffendorf, Lib. II. vi. 9. [Notes on Puf., pp. 148–49.]

[3. ]See Pufendorf, De officio 2.6.7–9, De iure nat. 7.2.6–8. Cf. also System 3.5.2, vol. II, pp. 227–28.

[4. ]Locke, on the contrary, says that no one can “by any Compact whatsoever, bind his Children or Posterity” (Two Treatises 2.8.116). The difference from Locke is slightly more explicit in the corresponding paragraph of System 3.5.3, vol. II, pp. 228–31. In his letter to Hutcheson of Jan. 10th, 1743, p. 48, Hume writes: “You imply a Condemnation of Locke’s Opinion, which being the receiv’d one, I cou’d wisht the Condemnation had been more express.”

[† ]{This is an obligation quasi ex contractu. See Book II. xiv. 2.} This added note is suggested by System 3.5.3, point 2, vol. II, pp. 229.

[5. ]Cf. Locke, Two Treatises 2.8.117 and 120.

[6. ]Cf. Locke, Two Treatises 2.8.121.

[7. ]See Pufendorf, De officio 2.6.10, De iure nat. 7.2.13.

[* ]{Ch. ix. and x. of this book.}

[8. ]Hutcheson’s list of powers is in part different from Pufendorf’s list (De officio 2.15 or De iure nat. 7.4.1–8) and Locke’s (Two Treatises 2.12). See also System 3.5.5–7, vol. II, pp. 234–38.

[* ]{Book II. ch. 16. art. 3. near the end.}

[9. ]See Carmichael, Notes on Puf., p. 158.

[10. ]See System 3.5.8, vol. II, pp. 239–40.