The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• General Note
• Advertisement By the Translator.
• Juventuti Academicae Salutem.
• To the Students In Universities.
• Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria With a Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy
• Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria
• Liber I: Ethices Elementa.
• Caput I: De Hominis Natura Ejusque Partibus.
• Caput II: De Summo Bono Et Virtute.
• Caput III: De Variis Virtutum Divisionibus.
• Caput IV: De Virtutibus Et Officiis Erga Deum.
• Caput V: De Officiis Erga Alios Homines Exercendis.
• Caput VI: De Officiis Cujusque Erga Se, Et De Animi Cultura.
• 1 {caput VII: De Virtutis Studio Excitando Et Retinendo.
• Liber II: Jurisprudentiae Naturalis Elementa.
• Caput I: De Lege Naturali.
• Caput II: De Juris Natura Et Divisionibus.
• Caput III: De Virtutum Et Vitiorum Gradibus, Inter Se Comparatis{; Iisque Quae Speciem Moralem Afficiunt}.
• Caput IV: De Jure Privato Naturali.
• Caput V: De Jure Adventitio Reali, Et Rerum Dominio.
• Caput VI: De Dominii Acquirendi Rationibus.
• Caput VII: De Jure Derivato, Ejusque Causis.
• Caput VIII: De Dominii Transferendi Rationibus, Per Contractus, Successiones, Aut Testamenta.
• Caput IX: De Contractibus.
• Caput X: De Sermocinantium Officiis.
• Caput XI: De Jurejurando Et Votis.
• Caput XII: De Rerum Pretio.
• Caput XIII: De Variis Contractuum Generibus Post Pretia Rerum Constituta.
• Caput XIV: De Obligationibus Quasi Ex Contractu Ortis.
• Caput XV: Jura Ex Damno Dato, Atque Ex Aliorum Injuriis Orta. Jura Belli.
• Caput XVI: De Jure Extraordinario Ex Necessitate, Omniumque Jure Communi.
• Caput XVII: De Juris Interitu. De Litibus In Libertate Dirimendis, Et Interpretatione.
• Liber III: Oeconomices Et Politices Elementa.
• Caput I: De Conjugio.
• Caput II: De Parentum Et Liberorum Officiis.
• Caput III: De Herorum Et Servorum Jure.
• Caput IV: De Civitatum Origine Et Causis.
• Caput V: De Interna Civitatum Structura, Et Summi Imperii Partibus.
• Caput VI: De Variis Rerumpublicarum Formis.
• Caput VII: De Summi Imperii Jure, Ejusque Acquirendi Rationibus.
• Caput VIII: De Legibus Condendis, Et De Jurisdictione.
• Caput IX: De Jure Belli.
• Caput X: De Foederibus, Legatis, Et Civitatum Interitu [deletione].
• A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy.
• Book I: The Elements of Ethicks.
• Chapter I: Of Human Nature and Its Parts.
• Chapter II: Concerning the Supreme Good.
• Chapter III: Concerning the Chief Divisions of Virtue.
• Chapter IV: Our Duties Toward God.
• Chapter V: Our Duties Toward Mankind.
• Chapter VI: Concerning Our Duties Toward Ourselves, and the Improvement of the Mind.
• Chapter VII: Some Practical Considerations to Excite and Preserve the Study of Virtue.
• Book II: Elements of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter I: Of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter II: Of the Nature of Rights, and Their Several Divisions.
• Chapter III: Concerning the Various Degrees of Virtue and Vice, and the Circumstances On Which They Depend.
• Chapter IV: Concerning the Natural Rights of Individuals.
• Chapter V: Of Real Adventitious Rights and Property.
• Chapter VI: The Methods of Acquiring Property.
• Chapter VII: Of Derived Property.
• Chapter VIII: The Methods of Transferring Property, Contracts, Succession, Testaments.
• Chapter IX: Of Contracts In General.
• Chapter X: Our Obligations In Speech.
• Chapter XI: Of Oaths and Vows.
• Chapter XII: Concerning the Values Or Prices of Goods.
• Chapter XIII: Of the Several Sorts of Contracts.
• Chapter XIV: * Obligations Resembling Those From Contracts.
• Chapter XV: Of Rights Arising From Damage Done, and the Rights of War.
• Chapter XVI: Extraordinary Rights In Cases of Necessity, and the Common Rights of Mankind.
• Chapter XVII: How Rights and Obligations Cease: How Controversies Are to Be Decided In Natural Liberty: and the Rules of Interpretation.
• Book III: The Principles of Oeconomicks and Politicks.
• Chapter I: Concerning Marriage.
• Chapter II: The Duties of Parents and Children.
• Chapter III: The Rights of Masters and Servants.
• Chapter IV: The Original of Civil Government.
• Chapter V: The Internal Structure of States: and the Several Parts of Supreme Power.
• Chapter VI: Of the Various Plans of Government.
• Chapter VII: The Rights of the Supreme Power: and the Methods of Acquiring It.
• Chapter VIII: Of Civil Laws and Their Execution.
• Chapter IX: The Laws of War.
• Chapter X: Of Treaties and Ambassadors, and the Entire Dissolution of States.
• Bibliography of Modern Literature

CHAPTER IV

The Original of Civil Government.

I. Having finished the account of domestick society, we proceed to shew the origin and rights of civil society [states], {[in which ’tis universally understood, there is included a right vested in some person or council to decide all controversies arising amongst large numerous bodies, to direct the actions of all for the common interest, and to compell all by force to obey their orders.]}1 By the associations <and conjunctions> already explained, if all men were faithful in discharging their duties, human life must have sufficient affluence and pleasure. It must therefore have been some fear of mischiefs to arise either from the weakness or vices of men, which has moved them to subject themselves to civil power [to constitute states and civil power]. But we must not therefor, call civil society unnatural or contrary to nature. For whatever that reason, nature has endued us with, shews to be necessary or very conducive to obtain those advantages we naturally desire, or avert the contrary evils, must plainly be deemed natural to a creature endued naturally with reason and forethought. Men therefor are justly called “creatures [animals] fitted by nature for civil polity.”2

Let us suppose all men so just that none would do to others any thing he judged injurious, but that they are pretty liable to mistakes about their own and others rights, through their strong selfish desires, and the byass of impetuous passions: this would frequently occasion controversies among them. Let us further suppose that many honest men are yet too suspicious, so that they won’t submit their disputes to the arbitration of others, each fearing perhaps the interest of his adversary with the arbiters, or his art in seducing them:3 if there be added to this, too much confidence on both sides in their own force, and obstinacy in opinion; their controversies in natural liberty can be decided no other way than by {violence and} all the mischiefs of war.

But there’s something in our nature which more immediately recommends civil power to us. Some of our species are manifestly superior in wisdom to the vulgar, as the vulgar are often sensible. These of superior <skills and> sagacity, {as all must own,} are capable of contriving and inventing many things of consequence to the common utility {of multitudes}, and of pointing out more effectual methods for each one to promote his own interest, if their directions are complied with. If to these abilities be added also eminent moral virtues, goodness, justice, fortitude; the appearance of such excellencies obtains the trust and confidence of all, and kindles their zeal to promote such persons to honour and power; as they conclude that under their direction all may obtain every sort of prosperity.4 ’Tis highly probable therefor that not only the dread of injuries, but eminent virtues, and our natural high approbation of them have engaged men at first to form civil societies.

II. But if we consider how much injustice, depravation of manners, avarice, ambition, and luxury prevail among men: it will be manifest, that without civil power, men cannot be preserved in safety, not to speak of any high advantages or pleasures to be enjoyed in society: and that it is by civil power alone an effectual remedy, and such a one as must strike the senses of the most inconsiderate, can be found for the evils to be dreaded from these vices of men. For tho’ all the members of a large assembly were so unjust, that upon a fit opportunity each one for his own interest would do injuries to others; yet each one would abhor like injustice done by his fellow, when he had no share in the gain of it. An assembly therefor of such men, of whom each condemned that injustice in his neighbour which he would indulge in himself, will never make unjust decrees for their whole body.5 Each one will be ashamed to own his dishonesty, and will live in dread of receiving injuries from others, unless they are all restrained by equal laws enforced by proper punishments.

Nor is there any other way of preserving society in safety. For altho’ men were not generally so depraved, and that even humanity and conscience [the sense of what is right and honourable] {restrained the generality from injuries, and} inclined them to give aid to any who happened to be wronged: yet multitudes would omit this duty through fear and cowardice, if it exposed themselves to danger. Nay further; a sufficient number of honest brave men, if they were not directed by some head, and that united in their efforts, would run into the most different measures, according to their different sentiments (and obstinacy); and when thus disjoined would become a prey <and laughing-stock> even to a smaller number of less bravery, who were united in their counsels.

’Tis therefor very probable that some of the wiser and more sagacious, observing these inconveniences of a state of anarchy, fell upon this as the only remedy, that a large number of men should covenant with each other about entering into a firm society, to be regulated by the counsel of the wiser few, in all matters relating to the safety and advantage either of individuals or the whole body. And discerning the many conveniencies to ensue upon such a project, have explained it to others, and persuaded them to put it in execution.6

III. They who ascribe the first origin of all civil power [states] to the violence of ambitious men, plainly presuppose that already existing, whose original they are searching for [before the force that are claiming to be its cause]: as no one man could have force enough, without a large number of others already subjected {to his direction and government,} to compell a multitude sufficient to form a state, to submit themselves to his power. A civil power therefor was constituted previously to that conquest they suppose to have produced the first civil power.7

Should one allege that a potent head of a family, with his numerous domesticks, might have {conquered and thus} compelled his neighbours around to submit to him {as their prince}. This may have happened no doubt. But we are not to regard names, but things themselves. Heads of families no doubt sometimes had a proper regal power over their domesticks. And further, we are not inquiring into the possible injurious methods of usurpation, but into the probable just causes of just power.8

IV. That it must conduce much to the interest of a multitude to be governed by a council of the wise, no man can deny. And altho’ under some foolish plans of government, power [too much authority] may often be intrusted to bad hands, and thence great mischiefs arise, as the corruptions of the best things may be most pernicious; yet this is no dishonour to civil government, as if it were in general of little use or pernicious. For God has given men sufficient powers of reason to choose some of the more prudent convenient forms out of the innumerable multitudes conceivable.

A state or civil society is, “a society of free men united under one government for their common interest.” That the common interest of the whole body is the end of all civil polity, is owned by all. This all subjects insist upon; and all governors [kings] glory in it as their dignity; except some vain monsters, who forgetting their mortal state, arrogate to themselves the rights of almighty God, or even powers more extensive. The very notion of civil life, or polity, is opposite to despotism{, or the power of masters over slaves}.9 That civil power therefor alone is just which is naturally adapted to this end: other power tho’ granted by the rash deed of an ignorant people, has no foundation of right. There was an essential defect in the deed granting it, as it was founded in an error about what is owned by all to be most essential in such contracts.

One can scarce avoid wondering how some* ingenious authors seem to pique themselves upon aggravating and exaggerating all the burdens of civil subjection, as if they designed to deter men from entering into it; but then least they should do so, they paint a state of liberty {and anarchy} as the most frightful monster of all. Whereas ’tis plain both states have both their advantages and disadvantages. There are no doubt many dangers [not light evils to be repeatedly feared] in a state of liberty, but these not continual: generally they are <equal and even> greater and more frequent than in civil life; unless a people have been exceedingly incautious in the plan of power they constituted: as in civil life we have a much surer prospect of protection from injuries by the united force of all. {Nor are there any evils peculiar to a civil life under regular government; the like or worse, men were also† exposed to in liberty: [as it will appear by considering the several parts of civil power in the following chapter.]}

[1. ]Square parenthesis in the original text. This definition is not in the Institutio.

[2. ]Aristotle, Politica, 1253a.3, 1278b.19. See System 3.4.1, vol. II, p. 212.

[3. ]Cf. System 3.4.2, vol. II, p. 214.

[4. ]See System 3.4.1, vol. II, p. 213.

[5. ]See System 3.4.2, vol. II, p. 215.

[6. ]Cf. System 3.4.2, vol. II, pp. 216–17.

[7. ]See Carmichael, Notes on Puf., pp. 146–47, for the same argument directed against Titius and Barbeyrac, who rejected Pufendorf’s idea of general agreement as the origin of civil society, and ascribed it to the violence of ambitious and cunning men (cf. Titius, Observationes, nos. 547 and 555, and Pufendorf, De iure nat. 7.1.6, Barbeyrac’s note 1).

[8. ]Cf. System 3.4.6, vol. II, pp. 224–25.

[9. ]Cf. System 3.4.4, vol. II, p. 221.

[* ]The author has here in view Hobbes; and Puffendorf, both in his greater and lesser book, who has too blindly followed Hobbes {, nay even transcribed his very words}. [The translator, as well Hutcheson, may have in mind those passages of Pufendorf, such as De iure nat. 2.2.2 or De officio 2.1.9, where Pufendorf is echoing Hobbes, De cive 1.13.]

[† ]{Thus subjects are bound to pay taxes, for the common interest, for fortifying or defending the state. But each one in liberty must on his part be at greater charges, either for his own conveniency, for fortifying his house and arming his domesticks, or for hiring assistance. Each subject may be obliged to hazard his life for the state. But so each one in anarchy may more frequently for his own defence. Subjects submit to a power of life and death over themselves in criminal jurisdictions. But so each one in anarchy is subjected to a worse power of any inraged person who alleges he is injured by him, and intituled to use force for redress. If by a power of life and death one means an arbitrary power in a governor, upon any caprice, without a crime alleged, to take mens lives away; no such power is in any wise polity; nor can any human deed constitute it.} [The translator derives the added text and this note from what Hutcheson says in System 3.4.5, vol. II, pp. 222–23.]