The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• General Note
• Advertisement By the Translator.
• Juventuti Academicae Salutem.
• To the Students In Universities.
• Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria With a Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy
• Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria
• Liber I: Ethices Elementa.
• Caput I: De Hominis Natura Ejusque Partibus.
• Caput II: De Summo Bono Et Virtute.
• Caput III: De Variis Virtutum Divisionibus.
• Caput IV: De Virtutibus Et Officiis Erga Deum.
• Caput V: De Officiis Erga Alios Homines Exercendis.
• Caput VI: De Officiis Cujusque Erga Se, Et De Animi Cultura.
• 1 {caput VII: De Virtutis Studio Excitando Et Retinendo.
• Liber II: Jurisprudentiae Naturalis Elementa.
• Caput I: De Lege Naturali.
• Caput II: De Juris Natura Et Divisionibus.
• Caput III: De Virtutum Et Vitiorum Gradibus, Inter Se Comparatis{; Iisque Quae Speciem Moralem Afficiunt}.
• Caput IV: De Jure Privato Naturali.
• Caput V: De Jure Adventitio Reali, Et Rerum Dominio.
• Caput VI: De Dominii Acquirendi Rationibus.
• Caput VII: De Jure Derivato, Ejusque Causis.
• Caput VIII: De Dominii Transferendi Rationibus, Per Contractus, Successiones, Aut Testamenta.
• Caput IX: De Contractibus.
• Caput X: De Sermocinantium Officiis.
• Caput XI: De Jurejurando Et Votis.
• Caput XII: De Rerum Pretio.
• Caput XIII: De Variis Contractuum Generibus Post Pretia Rerum Constituta.
• Caput XIV: De Obligationibus Quasi Ex Contractu Ortis.
• Caput XV: Jura Ex Damno Dato, Atque Ex Aliorum Injuriis Orta. Jura Belli.
• Caput XVI: De Jure Extraordinario Ex Necessitate, Omniumque Jure Communi.
• Caput XVII: De Juris Interitu. De Litibus In Libertate Dirimendis, Et Interpretatione.
• Liber III: Oeconomices Et Politices Elementa.
• Caput I: De Conjugio.
• Caput II: De Parentum Et Liberorum Officiis.
• Caput III: De Herorum Et Servorum Jure.
• Caput IV: De Civitatum Origine Et Causis.
• Caput V: De Interna Civitatum Structura, Et Summi Imperii Partibus.
• Caput VI: De Variis Rerumpublicarum Formis.
• Caput VII: De Summi Imperii Jure, Ejusque Acquirendi Rationibus.
• Caput VIII: De Legibus Condendis, Et De Jurisdictione.
• Caput IX: De Jure Belli.
• Caput X: De Foederibus, Legatis, Et Civitatum Interitu [deletione].
• A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy.
• Book I: The Elements of Ethicks.
• Chapter I: Of Human Nature and Its Parts.
• Chapter II: Concerning the Supreme Good.
• Chapter III: Concerning the Chief Divisions of Virtue.
• Chapter IV: Our Duties Toward God.
• Chapter V: Our Duties Toward Mankind.
• Chapter VI: Concerning Our Duties Toward Ourselves, and the Improvement of the Mind.
• Chapter VII: Some Practical Considerations to Excite and Preserve the Study of Virtue.
• Book II: Elements of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter I: Of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter II: Of the Nature of Rights, and Their Several Divisions.
• Chapter III: Concerning the Various Degrees of Virtue and Vice, and the Circumstances On Which They Depend.
• Chapter IV: Concerning the Natural Rights of Individuals.
• Chapter V: Of Real Adventitious Rights and Property.
• Chapter VI: The Methods of Acquiring Property.
• Chapter VII: Of Derived Property.
• Chapter VIII: The Methods of Transferring Property, Contracts, Succession, Testaments.
• Chapter IX: Of Contracts In General.
• Chapter X: Our Obligations In Speech.
• Chapter XI: Of Oaths and Vows.
• Chapter XII: Concerning the Values Or Prices of Goods.
• Chapter XIII: Of the Several Sorts of Contracts.
• Chapter XIV: * Obligations Resembling Those From Contracts.
• Chapter XV: Of Rights Arising From Damage Done, and the Rights of War.
• Chapter XVI: Extraordinary Rights In Cases of Necessity, and the Common Rights of Mankind.
• Chapter XVII: How Rights and Obligations Cease: How Controversies Are to Be Decided In Natural Liberty: and the Rules of Interpretation.
• Book III: The Principles of Oeconomicks and Politicks.
• Chapter I: Concerning Marriage.
• Chapter II: The Duties of Parents and Children.
• Chapter III: The Rights of Masters and Servants.
• Chapter IV: The Original of Civil Government.
• Chapter V: The Internal Structure of States: and the Several Parts of Supreme Power.
• Chapter VI: Of the Various Plans of Government.
• Chapter VII: The Rights of the Supreme Power: and the Methods of Acquiring It.
• Chapter VIII: Of Civil Laws and Their Execution.
• Chapter IX: The Laws of War.
• Chapter X: Of Treaties and Ambassadors, and the Entire Dissolution of States.
• Bibliography of Modern Literature

CHAPTER XVI

Extraordinary Rights in Cases of Necessity, and the Common Rights of Mankind.

I. It has been already frequently shewn that an immediate sense generally points out and recommends our several duties; and that there are different degrees of them, in a certain subordination, some more, some less honourable; that the later should give place to the former, when they are inconsistent [some, though amiable for themselves, should give place to such as are more amiable and conducive to a greater amount of publick good]; and that the supreme beauty appeared in these affections of soul which are most extensive{, which should therefor controul the narrower}: and that in consequence of this, all the rights of individuals, and all the special rules of life [laws] should be postponed to the universal interest of all.1 Altho’ therefor these practical conclusions <of right reason> called the special laws of nature, which we are sacredly bound in all ordinary cases to observe, point out what is almost continually the virtuous part; yet by an extraordinary change of circumstances, it may become our duty to act in a different manner; and such singular cases are to be deemed excepted in these special laws.2 We never should speak thus, that in cases of singular necessity, we may justly violate the law of nature, or act unjustly or vitiously{: such expressions are contradictions}. But it is truly obeying the law to take the benefit of any exceptions appointed in it; or to follow the more sacred law when it derogates any thing from one of less importance. Now of all the social laws that is the most sacred, which prefers the general interest and safety to that of individuals or small parties.

II. But as the sense of every good man must shew it to be of high importance to preserve the authority of all the special laws {and that they should be religiously regarded}; we cannot be justified in departing from their appointment upon any light causes: the necessity must be great and manifest which will justify it. We must <therefore> not only consider cautiously what present advantages may ensue in this case from such a singular step; or what present inconveniences from following the ordinary law; but much more what greater and heavier {and more general} evils may follow from such a liberty allowed to all. Let us take an example or two, which may illustrate other cases. As the maintaining of veracity and faith in our conversation and dealings is of the highest importance to society; as is also the maintaining the rights of property, and leaving to each one the free administration of his own, for the mutual confidence and security of men in society: the causes must be of the highest nature, some terrible evils to be avoided or exceeding great advantages to be obtained which can be allowed to make exceptions from these important rules. Nor ought this plea of necessity to be extended to lighter matters: for we should consider all the <far heavier evil> consequences, even of a remoter kind which must ensue upon diminishing the deep reverence men should have for these laws. No cases therefor but those of the highest nature are to be deemed excepted; when evils superior to all these evil consequences are to be averted: and none will reckon among these, any ordinary ones of a lighter nature, unless he is plainly wicked and impious{, void of any conscience of duty}.

’Tis to no purpose to argue here, that we are to do nothing vitious <and dishonourable> for any prospects of advantage. In this all agree. But the question is, whether such extraordinary conduct be vitious in these circumstances, or not? It should not be matter of hesitation, whether we may abandon the conscientious part for the advantageous: but whether some great utility to ensue don’t make some extraordinary steps lawful or honourable? Nor is it more to the purpose to allege, that we should always adhere to the divine laws, and that we are no judges of future events, but should commit them to providence. Such things are pleaded by some very good men [some philosophers], tho’ not very acutely in this point. For the very question is, are not these cases to be deemed exceptions in the divine laws? and made known to us by the same use of reason by which the law itself is made known? If we are no competent judges of future tendencies, we are no judges about the ordinary natural laws; which are no otherways discovered than by our reasoning upon the tendencies of certain methods of action, as they appear conducive to the publick interest or detrimental: for no man can allege that our sole rule of life are the impulses of each particular passion {which we may generally approve in ordinary cases}.3

No doubt wicked selfish men devoted wholly to their own interests or pleasures will abuse this plea; but not without such impiety and unfairness of mind as would break through any bonds of laws. The passionate and revengeful often abuse the doctrine of self-defence{, and that about prosecuting the injurious}: but we don’t therefore {quit this doctrine, and} prohibit [condemn] all violence in defence or prosecution of our rights. Nor should we any more condemn all departure in singular cases from what the special laws of nature require in ordinary ones. Men seem agreed that the common rules of property yield to some singular exigences. One may use or destroy the goods of another without his consent, when ’tis necessary for the preservation of multitudes, as in the lightening of ships in a storm, or blowing up of a house to stop a raging fire. Nay some higher laws give way to singular necessities. The bravest and best citizens are exposed [are rightly ordered to expose] to certain death for their country{, in services where there can be no hopes of their escaping}. By drawing a bridge or shutting the gates, by which all the citizens have a right to be protected, the bravest men are sometimes [the bravest Romans were] exposed to the most cruel enemies. Tullus Hostilius is renowned to all ages for presence of mind in delivering a false account, by which the Roman people were preserved.4 But this doctrine so liable to misapplication needs always the following cautions.

III. First of all: the two general laws about loving God and {our neighbour, or} of promoting the general good of all, admit of no exceptions: nay in this later are founded all the exceptions which lye against any of the more special laws. But the external acts of worship are not necessarily annexed to any one time{, and therefor yield to urgent exigencies}.5

2. The more honourable any person’s temper is, the less apt will he be to allow to himself exceptions for any smaller interest of his own, or to claim any privileges of necessity.6

3. We must bring into account all the effects probably to ensue from any extraordinary steps, whether by natural consequence, or from the unfairness or rashness of others. Not that men are to be excluded from every right which unjust persons may make a pretence of in improper cases: but even these bad consequences are to come into the general account, to prevent our allowing exceptions in any but the most weighty cases. So that no man can plead exceptions in lighter ones, without that depravity of mind which would break any acknowleged law{, without any such pretence}.

4. The more sacred and important any law is, the greater must the causes be which can found any exception.

5. Causes of a publick nature [seeking the interest of others or of all] are far more honourable than those of a man’s own <and of his friends’> advantage. A good man often may quit part of his own <and his friends’> right; and ’tis often honourable not to take the advantages he might. But he is not thus master of the publick interests, and must act according to what the exigence of the times require.

6. No plea of necessity will justify a man in freeing himself from any threatening evil, by casting the like or greater upon any innocent person. This is plainly not subservient to any publick utility.

7. Whatever smaller damages we cast on others who do not consent to suffer them gratuitously, in order to free ourselves from any great danger, we are sacredly bound to repair. To this right in natural liberty, of warding off some great danger by actions detrimental to others, there corresponds in civil society an eminent right in the supreme powers, of which hereafter.{* }

IV. From the common bond of all with all, by which all mankind are constituted by nature one great society, {with some common laws binding them,} there arise certain common rights, not specially regarding the utility of any one, or a few, but that of all in general; which therefor every one as he has opportunity should maintain and prosecute. These rights as they obtain also in natural liberty, should be considered previously to those of civil societies. We shall give a few instances, which will also lead us to others.7

1. Mankind as a body, and each one as he has occasion, have a right to hinder any one to quit life without a just cause, or thus desert the duties incumbent on him. Suicide should therefor be prevented, or such self-maiming as may make one unfit for the duties of life.

2. There’s also a common right of all, to prevent certain vitious practices of most pernicious example, which yet cannot be said to injure any one person more than another: such as monstrous lusts, procuring abortion, or any other practices which are hurtful to mankind in general.

3. We are likewise to hinder any man to destroy such goods of his own as may be very useful in life, out of any caprice or ill-nature: nay they should not be allowed to perish of themselves without being used.

4. There’s also a like common right of one and all, to prevent injuries, and to punish such as are done; so [and to inflict such evils to the offender] that by the terror of the punishment, others also may be restrained from like attempts.

5. Mankind have a right also to compell any person, who has discovered any secret of great use in life, to divulge it upon reasonable compensations, and not suffer it to perish with himself; that such as need it may also enjoy the benefit.

6. Mankind in general, and every society, may justly require it of all such as enjoy ordinary health and strength, unless they otherways have a fund for their support, that they should maintain themselves by their own labour, and not intercept the liberality or charity of good men; which is due only to the weak who cannot support themselves. Such slothful wretches are to be compelled to labour <or to any lawful art for supporting themselves>.

The instances we have given are rights of the perfect kind belonging to mankind as a body. Imperfect rights of this class answer to the general duties of humanity and beneficence (above explained in treating of the nature of virtue) which must be left free to the honour and conscience of men.<* >

[1. ]Cf. System 2.17.1, vol. II, pp. 117–19.

[2. ]A new paragraph in the Latin text.

[3. ]See System 1.17.6, vol. II, p. 128.

[4. ]In his History of Rome (I.27) Titus Livius tells how during a battle the Roman king Tullus Hostilius makes his enemies and his own troops believe that the Albans, his treacherous allies, are not fleeing but going to attack the enemy from behind.

[5. ]Here Hutcheson repeats what was said by Carmichael at the beginning of his comment on Pufendorf’s exposition of “the case of necessity” in De officio 1.5. 18 (Notes on Puf., p. 71).

[6. ]For the same points established in this section, see System 1.17.9, vol. II, pp. 136– 40.

[* ]{Book III. Ch. v. 4.} [In the much larger chapter on “the rights of necessity” in System (2.17.5, vol. II, pp. 124–25), however, Hutcheson admonishes that “were there no justifying pleas of necessity in natural liberty, there is no accounting for this eminent right of magistrates in civil polity.”]

[7. ]The same points are treated in System (2.16.1–6, vol. II, pp. 104–10).

[* ]See book I, chapters iii and v.