The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• General Note
• Advertisement By the Translator.
• Juventuti Academicae Salutem.
• To the Students In Universities.
• Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria With a Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy
• Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria
• Liber I: Ethices Elementa.
• Caput I: De Hominis Natura Ejusque Partibus.
• Caput II: De Summo Bono Et Virtute.
• Caput III: De Variis Virtutum Divisionibus.
• Caput IV: De Virtutibus Et Officiis Erga Deum.
• Caput V: De Officiis Erga Alios Homines Exercendis.
• Caput VI: De Officiis Cujusque Erga Se, Et De Animi Cultura.
• 1 {caput VII: De Virtutis Studio Excitando Et Retinendo.
• Liber II: Jurisprudentiae Naturalis Elementa.
• Caput I: De Lege Naturali.
• Caput II: De Juris Natura Et Divisionibus.
• Caput III: De Virtutum Et Vitiorum Gradibus, Inter Se Comparatis{; Iisque Quae Speciem Moralem Afficiunt}.
• Caput IV: De Jure Privato Naturali.
• Caput V: De Jure Adventitio Reali, Et Rerum Dominio.
• Caput VI: De Dominii Acquirendi Rationibus.
• Caput VII: De Jure Derivato, Ejusque Causis.
• Caput VIII: De Dominii Transferendi Rationibus, Per Contractus, Successiones, Aut Testamenta.
• Caput IX: De Contractibus.
• Caput X: De Sermocinantium Officiis.
• Caput XI: De Jurejurando Et Votis.
• Caput XII: De Rerum Pretio.
• Caput XIII: De Variis Contractuum Generibus Post Pretia Rerum Constituta.
• Caput XIV: De Obligationibus Quasi Ex Contractu Ortis.
• Caput XV: Jura Ex Damno Dato, Atque Ex Aliorum Injuriis Orta. Jura Belli.
• Caput XVI: De Jure Extraordinario Ex Necessitate, Omniumque Jure Communi.
• Caput XVII: De Juris Interitu. De Litibus In Libertate Dirimendis, Et Interpretatione.
• Liber III: Oeconomices Et Politices Elementa.
• Caput I: De Conjugio.
• Caput II: De Parentum Et Liberorum Officiis.
• Caput III: De Herorum Et Servorum Jure.
• Caput IV: De Civitatum Origine Et Causis.
• Caput V: De Interna Civitatum Structura, Et Summi Imperii Partibus.
• Caput VI: De Variis Rerumpublicarum Formis.
• Caput VII: De Summi Imperii Jure, Ejusque Acquirendi Rationibus.
• Caput VIII: De Legibus Condendis, Et De Jurisdictione.
• Caput IX: De Jure Belli.
• Caput X: De Foederibus, Legatis, Et Civitatum Interitu [deletione].
• A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy.
• Book I: The Elements of Ethicks.
• Chapter I: Of Human Nature and Its Parts.
• Chapter II: Concerning the Supreme Good.
• Chapter III: Concerning the Chief Divisions of Virtue.
• Chapter IV: Our Duties Toward God.
• Chapter V: Our Duties Toward Mankind.
• Chapter VI: Concerning Our Duties Toward Ourselves, and the Improvement of the Mind.
• Chapter VII: Some Practical Considerations to Excite and Preserve the Study of Virtue.
• Book II: Elements of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter I: Of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter II: Of the Nature of Rights, and Their Several Divisions.
• Chapter III: Concerning the Various Degrees of Virtue and Vice, and the Circumstances On Which They Depend.
• Chapter IV: Concerning the Natural Rights of Individuals.
• Chapter V: Of Real Adventitious Rights and Property.
• Chapter VI: The Methods of Acquiring Property.
• Chapter VII: Of Derived Property.
• Chapter VIII: The Methods of Transferring Property, Contracts, Succession, Testaments.
• Chapter IX: Of Contracts In General.
• Chapter X: Our Obligations In Speech.
• Chapter XI: Of Oaths and Vows.
• Chapter XII: Concerning the Values Or Prices of Goods.
• Chapter XIII: Of the Several Sorts of Contracts.
• Chapter XIV: * Obligations Resembling Those From Contracts.
• Chapter XV: Of Rights Arising From Damage Done, and the Rights of War.
• Chapter XVI: Extraordinary Rights In Cases of Necessity, and the Common Rights of Mankind.
• Chapter XVII: How Rights and Obligations Cease: How Controversies Are to Be Decided In Natural Liberty: and the Rules of Interpretation.
• Book III: The Principles of Oeconomicks and Politicks.
• Chapter I: Concerning Marriage.
• Chapter II: The Duties of Parents and Children.
• Chapter III: The Rights of Masters and Servants.
• Chapter IV: The Original of Civil Government.
• Chapter V: The Internal Structure of States: and the Several Parts of Supreme Power.
• Chapter VI: Of the Various Plans of Government.
• Chapter VII: The Rights of the Supreme Power: and the Methods of Acquiring It.
• Chapter VIII: Of Civil Laws and Their Execution.
• Chapter IX: The Laws of War.
• Chapter X: Of Treaties and Ambassadors, and the Entire Dissolution of States.
• Bibliography of Modern Literature

CHAPTER XI

Of Oaths and Vows.

I. Oaths are deemed a natural confirmation of <pactions,> promises or testimonies, in the more important affairs: an oath is “a religious act in which for confirmation of something doubtful, we invoke God as witness and avenger{, if we swerve from truth.}” A truly good man indeed will so strictly regard veracity, that such as know him well need not require his oath. But when the interests of those are at stake who know not his character, they may justly demand his oath, in confirmation either of his testimony or his promise. Since the using of oaths in such cases contains no impiety toward God; but is rather an expression of pious reverence; as we acknowledge in swearing his universal knowledge, and government, <providence,> and justice.

And since this persuasion has obtained, in all nations and ages, that God exercises a just government over the world, inflicting punishments on the wicked; this invocation of God as witness and avenger must raise in mens minds an higher sense of their obligations, and <by fear of punishments> deter them from falshood. But we must not imagine that our invocations make God more attentive in observing, or more keen in punishing of perfidy; or that by our voluntary consent, we give him any new right of punishing he had not before.1 Our own guilt indeed is made much greater when, after the confirmation of an oath, we either violate our promises, or falsify in our testimony.

To swear about trifling matters, or without any cause, is very impious; as it plainly tends to abate that awful reverence which all good men should constantly maintain toward God; and is a plain indication of contempt. Where perjuries in serious matters grow frequent in any state, the magistrates or legislators are generally chargeable with much of the guilt, if they either frequently exact oaths without necessity in smaller matters, or when the oaths give no security in the point in view;{* } when the engagement designed may either be impracticable, or appear to the persons concerned to be unlawful; or if oaths are required{† } where there are great temptations to perjury, with hopes of impunity from men. They also do bad service to religion who don’t appoint an awful solemn form of words, fit to strike the minds of men with reverence in such an action.

II. ’Tis no doubt vain {to exact from others, or} to swear by any being whom the swearer judges not invested with divine power, so as to invoke that being as witness and avenger. And yet there are some forms of oaths {truly valid and} not unlawful, tho’ not the most convenient, where without expressing the name of God, the swearer either names something very dear or necessary to himself{‡ } upon which he is understood to imprecate the divine vengeance{, or that he may be deprived of it if he should act perfidiously}; or truly invokes God under some{§ } metonymical expression.

Tho’ it be idle to exact an oath from any one by any being whom he conceives not as endued with divine power, nor exercising any providence; yet there are certain general descriptions of the Deity in which men {of the most opposite religions} agree: such therefor ought to be used, when persons of different religious sentiments are required to swear.

As in covenants, so in oaths, he is justly deemed to have sworn, and to be liable to the penalties of perjury should he falsify, who professing an intention of swearing makes such signs as ordinarily signify to others that one swears.2

Altho’ an oath and a promise, or an assertion, may often be expressed by one and the same grammatical sentence; yet the act of swearing is plainly a distinct one from that of promising or asserting; as it consists in the invocation of God <as witness> to avenge if we violate our faith. This shews therefor that mens duties are not altered as to their matter by an oath; nor any new matter of obligation produced; nor any covenant or promise otherways void confirmed; nor just exceptions excluded; nor conditional contracts made absolute; nor any obligation imposed to act contrary to the perfect rights of others, or about matters not subjected to our power, or what would be a direct piece of irreverence and impiety toward God, or a violation of any special prohibition, by which we are precluded from transacting in certain affairs.3 But in matters naturally subjected to our power {and committed to human prudence}, as we may bind ourselves by a common contract, so much more by one confirmed by oath, even when we have entered into it imprudently and rashly, contrary to the rules of discretion; unless when there has been a plain obvious fraudulent design of defeating some obligations of humanity.{* }

III. A promise {tho’ confirmed by oath} can produce no obligation, unless it has been accepted by the other party, who also after his acceptance may remit to us his right, and free us from the promise. A promise in like manner is void, upon the declared dissent of a person whose consent was necessary before the promiser could oblige himself, or the other party accept of it.

Where one requires of us an oath by his just authority, and prescribes to us the form of words; if we understand his sense of the words, and can sincerely swear in that sense, ’tis well; if not, we should not take the oath. No inferior magistrate deputed to take an oath in the name of the state has a right to give explications of the formula prescribed by the supreme powers.

Oaths according to their different purposes are divided into promissory and assertory. Oaths of this later sort when required by a judge are called necessary: and when one party in judgment refers the cause to the oath of the other, ’tis called judicial. If this be done, not in judgment, but by the private deed of the parties, ’tis called voluntary. When an oath is demanded from the person accused in a criminal action, to refute imperfect proof; ’tis called a purgatory oath, or oath of purgation.4

But in such cases where a person’s life or character is concerned, as there are very high temptations to perjury; this way of exacting purgatory oaths in tryals is highly improper and unjust. By this means the impious and wicked will always be absolved; and those only convicted who retain such a sense of piety that they won’t even for preservation of life or character perjure themselves. A good man surely would rather choose that such persons should escape punishment for a doubtful crime, (of which{, if they have really been guilty,} they will probably soon repent sincerely), than that they should be brought to suffer by their very sense of religion.

IV. A vow is a religious promise made to God about something to be done or performed. In vows we don’t conceive a right transferred to men, unless they have been also attended with a contract. The main use of vows is this, that by a serious consideration of a just and holy Deity beholding all our actions, we may further confirm all our pious and virtuous resolutions; and be the more cautious of neglecting our duty, lest we should also involve ourselves in the horrid guilt of perjury.

But as no promise not accepted by the party to whom ’tis made can be obligatory; and as we are sure God will not accept any promises made to him rashly, out of any sudden fear, or other passion, which is contrary to the mans duty; and ’tis most unworthy of the Deity to imagine him as it were insidiously watching to catch advantages of the incautious, timorous, wrathful, or superstitious; or that, contrary to the <humanity or> common interest of all, he has some favourite orders of men for whose advantage he is acting the part of a sharping agent, snatching at all opportunities of gain to them; hence it must appear, that vows can produce no obligation to such actions or performances as would not antecedently have been pious, humane, and prudent.5 Much less are vows of any avail which men take on themselves from hatred, envy, groundless or excessive anger, or contrary to either the perfect rights of others, or even any obligations of <equity and> humanity.{* } Vows therefor produce no new matter of obligation.

[1. ]See System 2.11.1, vol. II, p. 44.

[* ]{Thus engagements by oath to adhere to certain schemes of religion, which may afterwards appear false; or to a government which may appear an unjust usurpation.} [This added footnote is derived from System 2.11.[1], vol. II, pp. 45–46.]

[† ]{Thus purgatory oaths as to capital crimes, or very secret matters of scandal, or injustice, or about a man’s secret opinions, generally have no good effect.} [Cf. below, p. 207, and System 2.11.4, vol. II, p. 49.]

[‡ ]So we understand swearing by one’s head, his life, his soul, his children, his prince or patron, the earth, the light, the sun. [See System 2.11.2, vol. II, p. 46.]

[§ ]{’Tis thus men swear by their faith, viz. the object of it; or by the heavens, the temples, or altars; for the Divinity residing in them, or to whom they are dedicated.} [See Matth. 23.20–23. It is a footnote by Hutcheson in System 2.11.2, vol. II, p. 46, that suggests this footnote to the translator.]

[2. ]See Pufendorf, De officio 1.11.5.

[3. ]Cf. System 2.11.2 and 3, vol. II, pp. 47–48; Pufendorf, De officio 1.11.6 and De iure nat. 4.2.6.

[* ]{Mark vii. 11, 12, 13.} [Compare above, 2.9.11, p. 193.]

[4. ]See System 2.11.4, vol. II, pp. 48–49.

[5. ]Cf. System 2.11.5, vol. II, pp. 51–52, where these arguments against the vows in use in the Catholic Church are developed at length by Hutcheson.

[* ]{Mark vii. 11, 12.} [Compare above, 2 9.11, p. 193 and System 2.11.5, vol. II, p. 52.]