The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Introduction
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• General Note
• Advertisement By the Translator.
• Juventuti Academicae Salutem.
• To the Students In Universities.
• Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria With a Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy
• Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria
• Liber I: Ethices Elementa.
• Caput I: De Hominis Natura Ejusque Partibus.
• Caput II: De Summo Bono Et Virtute.
• Caput III: De Variis Virtutum Divisionibus.
• Caput IV: De Virtutibus Et Officiis Erga Deum.
• Caput V: De Officiis Erga Alios Homines Exercendis.
• Caput VI: De Officiis Cujusque Erga Se, Et De Animi Cultura.
• 1 {caput VII: De Virtutis Studio Excitando Et Retinendo.
• Liber II: Jurisprudentiae Naturalis Elementa.
• Caput I: De Lege Naturali.
• Caput II: De Juris Natura Et Divisionibus.
• Caput III: De Virtutum Et Vitiorum Gradibus, Inter Se Comparatis{; Iisque Quae Speciem Moralem Afficiunt}.
• Caput IV: De Jure Privato Naturali.
• Caput V: De Jure Adventitio Reali, Et Rerum Dominio.
• Caput VI: De Dominii Acquirendi Rationibus.
• Caput VII: De Jure Derivato, Ejusque Causis.
• Caput VIII: De Dominii Transferendi Rationibus, Per Contractus, Successiones, Aut Testamenta.
• Caput IX: De Contractibus.
• Caput X: De Sermocinantium Officiis.
• Caput XI: De Jurejurando Et Votis.
• Caput XII: De Rerum Pretio.
• Caput XIII: De Variis Contractuum Generibus Post Pretia Rerum Constituta.
• Caput XIV: De Obligationibus Quasi Ex Contractu Ortis.
• Caput XV: Jura Ex Damno Dato, Atque Ex Aliorum Injuriis Orta. Jura Belli.
• Caput XVI: De Jure Extraordinario Ex Necessitate, Omniumque Jure Communi.
• Caput XVII: De Juris Interitu. De Litibus In Libertate Dirimendis, Et Interpretatione.
• Liber III: Oeconomices Et Politices Elementa.
• Caput I: De Conjugio.
• Caput II: De Parentum Et Liberorum Officiis.
• Caput III: De Herorum Et Servorum Jure.
• Caput IV: De Civitatum Origine Et Causis.
• Caput V: De Interna Civitatum Structura, Et Summi Imperii Partibus.
• Caput VI: De Variis Rerumpublicarum Formis.
• Caput VII: De Summi Imperii Jure, Ejusque Acquirendi Rationibus.
• Caput VIII: De Legibus Condendis, Et De Jurisdictione.
• Caput IX: De Jure Belli.
• Caput X: De Foederibus, Legatis, Et Civitatum Interitu [deletione].
• A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy.
• Book I: The Elements of Ethicks.
• Chapter I: Of Human Nature and Its Parts.
• Chapter II: Concerning the Supreme Good.
• Chapter III: Concerning the Chief Divisions of Virtue.
• Chapter IV: Our Duties Toward God.
• Chapter V: Our Duties Toward Mankind.
• Chapter VI: Concerning Our Duties Toward Ourselves, and the Improvement of the Mind.
• Chapter VII: Some Practical Considerations to Excite and Preserve the Study of Virtue.
• Book II: Elements of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter I: Of the Law of Nature.
• Chapter II: Of the Nature of Rights, and Their Several Divisions.
• Chapter III: Concerning the Various Degrees of Virtue and Vice, and the Circumstances On Which They Depend.
• Chapter IV: Concerning the Natural Rights of Individuals.
• Chapter V: Of Real Adventitious Rights and Property.
• Chapter VI: The Methods of Acquiring Property.
• Chapter VII: Of Derived Property.
• Chapter VIII: The Methods of Transferring Property, Contracts, Succession, Testaments.
• Chapter IX: Of Contracts In General.
• Chapter X: Our Obligations In Speech.
• Chapter XI: Of Oaths and Vows.
• Chapter XII: Concerning the Values Or Prices of Goods.
• Chapter XIII: Of the Several Sorts of Contracts.
• Chapter XIV: * Obligations Resembling Those From Contracts.
• Chapter XV: Of Rights Arising From Damage Done, and the Rights of War.
• Chapter XVI: Extraordinary Rights In Cases of Necessity, and the Common Rights of Mankind.
• Chapter XVII: How Rights and Obligations Cease: How Controversies Are to Be Decided In Natural Liberty: and the Rules of Interpretation.
• Book III: The Principles of Oeconomicks and Politicks.
• Chapter I: Concerning Marriage.
• Chapter II: The Duties of Parents and Children.
• Chapter III: The Rights of Masters and Servants.
• Chapter IV: The Original of Civil Government.
• Chapter V: The Internal Structure of States: and the Several Parts of Supreme Power.
• Chapter VI: Of the Various Plans of Government.
• Chapter VII: The Rights of the Supreme Power: and the Methods of Acquiring It.
• Chapter VIII: Of Civil Laws and Their Execution.
• Chapter IX: The Laws of War.
• Chapter X: Of Treaties and Ambassadors, and the Entire Dissolution of States.
• Bibliography of Modern Literature

CHAPTER IV

Concerning the Natural Rights of Individuals.

I. We have already shewn that the several duties of life may be naturally explained by explaining the several rights belonging to men, and the corresponding obligations, in all the several states and relations they stand in to each other. By a state we understand “some permanent condition one is placed in, as it includes a series of rights and obligations.”1 Our state is either that of the <unbound> freedom in which nature placed us; or an adventitious state, introduced by some human {acts or} institution.

The state of natural <and unbound> liberty, is “that of those who are subjected to no human power”: which plainly obtained at first in the world, among persons adult and exempt from the parental power. This state too must always subsist among some persons, at least among the sovereign Princes of independent states, or among the states themselves, with respect to each other.2

The character of any state is to be taken from the rights and laws which are in force in it, and not from what men may do injuriously contrary to the laws. ’Tis plain therefor {from the preceeding account of our nature and its laws}, that the state of nature is that of peace and good-will, of innocence and beneficence, and not of violence, war, and rapine: as both the immediate sense of duty in our hearts[of what is right or honourable], and the rational considerations of interest must suggest to us.{* }

For let us observe what’s very obvious, that without society with a good many of our fellows, their mutual aids, and an intercourse of friendly offices, mankind could neither be brought to life or preserved in it; much less could they obtain any tolerably convenient or pleasant condition of life. ’Tis plain too that no one has such strength that he could promise to himself to conquer all such as he may desire to wrong or spoil, and all such enemies as he may raise up against himself {by an injurious course of life}; since an honest indignation at wrongs will make many more enemies to him than those he immediately injures: and there are few who won’t find considerable strength to avenge themselves {or their neighbours}, when they have conceived a just indignation.3 And then men have it generally in their power much more certainly and effectually to make others uneasy and miserable, than to make others easy and happy. External prosperity requires a perfectly right state of the body, and all its tender and delicate parts, many of which may be disturbed and destroyed by very small forces; it requires also a considerable variety of external things, which may be easily damaged, taken away, or destroyed. A just consideration of this infirm, uncertain condition of mankind, so that their prosperity may so easily be disturbed, must engage every wise man rather to cultivate peace and friendship with all, as far as possible{, than to provoke any by unnecessary enmity or injury}.4

II. The rights of men according as they immediately and principally regard either the benefit of some individual, or that of some society or body of people, or of mankind in general as a great community, are divided into private, publick, and common to all.5 The private rights of individuals are pointed out by their senses and natural appetites, recommending and pursuing such things as tend to their happiness: and our moral faculty {or conscience},6 <and the kind motions of the soul> shews us, that each one should be allowed full liberty to procure what may be for his own innocent advantage or pleasure, nay that we should maintain and defend it to him.

{To discover therefor these private rights} we should first attend to the several natural principles or appetites in men,* and then <according to right reason> turn our views toward the general interests of society, and of all around them: that where we find no obstruction to the happiness of others, {or to the common good, thence ensuing,} we should deem it the right of each individual to do, possess, or demand and obtain from others, whatever may tend to his own innocent advantage or pleasure.

Private rights are either natural or adventitious. The former sort, nature itself has given to each one, without any human grant or institution. The adventitious depend upon some human deed or institution.7

III. The private natural rights are either perfect or imperfect. Of the perfect kind these are the chief.8 1. A right to life, and to retain their bodies unmaimed. 2. A right to preserve their chastity. 3. A right to an unblamished character for common honesty, so as not to be deemed unfit for human society. 4. A right of liberty, or of acting according to one’s own judgment {and inclination} within the bounds of the law of nature. 5. A right over life, so far that each one, in any honourable services to society or his friends [to more important men], may expose himself not only to dangers, but to certain death, when such publick good is in view as overballances the value of his life. This our {conscience, or} moral sense, and love of virtue will strongly recommend to us in many cases. 7. [6.] There’s also a sense deeply infixed by nature, of each one’s right of private judgment, {or of judging for himself in all matters of duty,} especially as to religion; for a {base} judgment or opinion cannot of itself be injurious to others: and ’tis plain no man can without guilt counteract his own conscience; nor can there be any virtue in dissimulation or hypocrisy, but generally there’s great guilt in it. Our sentiments therefor about religion and virtue cannot be matter of commerce {or contract, so as to give others a right over them}. Such commerce is no way requisite for any good in society; nor is it in ones power to judge or think as another shall command him. All engagements or contracts of this kind are null and void. <It is therefore evident that this right can not be alienable and that the acts of those that would impose contracts to opinions and leave them to the power of anybody are null and void.> Suppose one has judged amiss and has false opinions <as to religion>: yet while he injures no man, he is using his own external right; that is, {tho’ he acts amiss, yet} much greater evils would ensue if any power were vested in others to compel him by penalties or threatnings of tortures, either to a change of his sentiments, or to a profession of it [to a profession of contrary opinions].

Each one also has a natural right to the use of such things as nature intended to remain common to all; that he should have the same access with others,9 {by the like means,} to acquire adventitious rights; and that he should find equal treatment with his equals. Men have likewise rights to marriage with such as are willing to inter-marry with them, provided they be under no prior bonds of marriage, or hindred by any other just impediment: nor can any third person or society which has not acquired any just power over the parties, pretend a right to obstruct their designs of inter-marriage; or to hinder any who are not their subjects from entering into any other innocent associations or commerce of any kind for their own behoof.

The sense of every one’s heart, and the common natural principles, shew that each one has these perfect rights; nor without maintaining them can there be any social <and peaceful> life: so that they are also confirmed by considerations of common utility, and our more extensive [honourable] affections.

IV. In this respect all men are originally equal, that these natural rights equally belong to all, at least as soon as they come to the mature use of reason; and they are equally confirmed to all by the law of nature, which requires that we should consult the interest of each individual as far as the common utility will allow; and maintain to the feeble and weak their small acquisitions or advantages, as well as their greater acquisitions or advantages to the ingenious and active.10 For ’tis plainly for the common good, <and most sacredly> that no mortal endued with reason {and forethought} should without his own consent, or crime, be subjected to the will of his fellow, without regard to his own interest, except in some rare cases, that the [some great] interest of a society may make it necessary. None of mankind are so stupid and thoughtless about their own interests, as not to count it next to death to have themselves and all that’s dear to them, subjected to another’s pleasure or caprice, and thus exposed to the greatest contumelies. Nature makes none masters, none slaves: and yet the wiser and better sort of men have many imperfect rights superior to those of others, and superior offices and services of humanity are due to them.

But as nature has set no obvious or acknowledged marks of superior wisdom and goodness upon any of mankind; and often weak men may have high notions of their own wisdom; and the worst of men may make the greatest shews of goodness <and virtue>, which their fellows cannot discover to be hypocritical; ’tis plain that no pretences of superior wisdom or goodness will justify a man in his assuming power over others without their own consent; this would be plainly eversive of the common interest [happiness]{, and the source of perpetual wars}.

V. To every imperfect right of individuals there answers a like obligation or duty which our conscience [sense of right and honourable] <and the common utility of all> plainly enjoins, and in some cases most sacredly. These are the chief imperfect rights: each one may justly claim such offices as are profitable to him, and no burden or expense to the performer. Nay every innocent person has a right to such offices of others, as are of high advantage to him, and of small burden or expence to the performers.11 This is particularly the case of men under great calamities, needing the charitable aids of others. Men of eminent characters, tho’ under no calamity, have a right to some higher offices from others, as particularly to their friendly suffrages for their advantage or promotion. Each one whose vices have not made him infamous has a right to be admitted on equitable terms into any societies civil or religious, which are instituted in his neighbourhood, for his more convenient subsistence, or his improvement in piety. And lastly each one, who has not forfeited by some crime, has a right to be treated on an equal footing of humanity with his equals, and with others in proportion to their merits.

VI. Concerning beneficence and liberality, these general maxims are evident,{* } that the importance of any benefit to the receiver, is proportioned jointly to the quantity of the benefit and his indigence: and that benefits are less burdensome to the giver the smaller their value is and the greater his wealth. Hence liberality may be exceedingly advantageous in many cases to him [the needy man] that receives it, and yet of small or no burden to the giver.

Beneficence, which is peculiarly becoming a good man, and eminently displays the goodness of his heart, ought to be practised with these cautions; first, that it don’t hurt the persons it is employed about or the community. 2dly. That it be proportioned to our fortunes, so as not to exhaust its own fountain. 3dly, That it be proportioned to the merits or claims of others. Among these claims we regard, first, the moral characters of the objects, and next their kind affections towards us, and thirdly the social intercourses we have had with them, and lastly the good offices we formerly received from them. None of these considerations are to be neglected, and least of all the last one; since there’s no obligation more sacred than that of gratitude, none more useful in life; nor is any vice more odious than ingratitude, or more hurtful in society. When therefor in certain cases we cannot exercise all the beneficence we desire, offices of gratitude should take place of other offices of liberality.

[1. ]System 2.4, vol. I, p. 280.

[2. ]See System 2.4.2, vol. I, p. 283.

[* ]{This suffices to overturn the fallacious reasonings of Hobs upon the state of nature as a state of war of all against all.} [The reference to Hobbes is more explicit in System 2.4.1, p. 282.]

[3. ]See System 2.4.5, vol. I, p. 290.

[4. ]System 2.4.5, vol. I, p. 292.

[5. ]System 2.4.3, vol. I, p. 284.

[6. ]System 2.4.4, vol. I, p. 285.

[* ]See Grotius de Jure Belli, &c. I. c. 2. 1. See also Sect. 1. of the preceding chapter. [In De iure belli, I.2.1 Grotius connects “ius naturae”with Cicero’s “prima naturae”: cf. De finibus, passim, but particularly III.21, IV.15, and IV.16].

[7. ]System 2.5.1, vol. I, p. 293.

[8. ]On the same private perfect rights see System 2.5.1, vol. I, pp. 293–99.

[9. ]Here, as in many other cases, the translator uses almost the same words used by Hutcheson in System 2.5.1, vol. I, p. 298, suggesting that he had access to a copy of Hutcheson’s posthumous work.

[10. ]See System 2.5.2, vol. I, p. 299 and ff., and cf. Pufendorf, De officio 1.7.

[11. ]See Pufendorf, De officio 1.8.4. On imperfect rights see also System 2.5.4, particularly p. 304.

[* ]{This is taken from Cicero de Officiis Lib. I. 14, 15, &c.} [See Institutio, the front page, notes 2–4. However Hutcheson has also in mind Pufendorf, De officio I.8.]