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CHAPTER III: Concerning the Chief Divisions of Virtue. - Francis Hutcheson, Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria with a Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy [1747]

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Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria with a Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, edited and with an Introduction by Luigi Turco (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007).

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


CHAPTER III

Concerning the Chief Divisions of Virtue.

I. 1 Having shewn that our chief good consists in virtuous activity, our next Inquiry must be, what are the several virtues? and what actions flow from them? and toward what objects?

In explaining our natural {conscience or} sense of what is good and honourable, we shewed that the chief virtues of the soul are kind affections and beneficent purposes of action: and that of these the calm {and stedfast} are more excellent than the passionate, and that the most extensive are the most excellent. Amongst the most excellent too we placed an ardent love of moral excellence, <the highest delight of the soul in it,> an earnest desire of increasing it in ourselves, and an high esteem and love toward all who are possessed of it, with the highest love toward the supreme excellence. Whence appeared our duty of loving God with the highest veneration, and the sacred obligations we are under to cultivate such affections.2

In the middle or lower classes of virtues we placed these narrower affections which either nature or acquaintance have excited: of these the more lovely are such as arise in a virtuous heart upon observing in others the like virtuous dispositions: and hence such friendships as virtue has begot and nourished must appear very lovely.3 There’s also something very engaging in a general courtesy, and sweetness of deportment toward all we have any intercourse with.

We reckon also among the virtues all these habits {or dispositions}, which tend to improve the nobler powers of the soul, or are naturally joined with or subservient to generous affections; and all such too as tend to restrain the meaner sensual appetites, the ordinary obstacles to virtue, and gives us a power to controll them: all these we immediately esteem for themselves. For by the wise contrivance of our Creator, our natural taste [human mind] is so formed, that we immediately approve and esteem all such affections or powers, the more in proportion as they are of greater importance to the general good. And hence it is that we not only approve {and love} the kind affections of a more contracted kind, which are so necessary in the several relations of life, while they are not opposite to any more extensive interest; but we also immediately approve a sincere, ingenuous, candid temper; we praise abstinence or contempt of {wealth and} pleasure, and fortitude: as all these naturally evidence a mind possessed of an high taste for moral excellence, confirmed by an indifference about, or contempt of sensuality, and external advantages, or disadvantages. Nay we immediately relish such a state or motion in the body as carries natural indications of virtue; and all the contrary dispositions whether of mind or body appear disagreeable and offensive.4

Need we mention again some natural sense, different from the moral one, but not unlike it, by which we relish and value some powers of the mind and the body quite different from any of the voluntary virtues. To all the powers God has given us there’s conjoined some sort of sense or relish, recommending that exercise of them we call natural, which is also the most subservient to the general good. Hence we highly approve the pursuits of knowledge and the ingenious arts, a capacity of application, industry, and perseverance. Nay even in bodily exercises {and recreations}, we most approve these which either shew something of ingenuity or strength, or tend to encrease them.5 <On the contrary, the eager seeking after lower pleasures, the effeminate softness of body and soul, useless for honourable and industrious offices, and all those conveniences that foster that softness, are not worthy and suitable to human excellence.>

II. Having given this general {rude} draught of the virtues, ’tis proper to consider their several kinds, that each of them displaying its beauty to us, may more allure us to pursue them.6 Virtue in the largest acceptation, may denote any power or quality which is subservient to the happiness of any sensitive being. In its stricter acceptation it denotes any habit or disposition which perfects the powers of the soul; and thus virtues are divided into the intellectual, which include all improvements of the mind by ingenious arts and sciences; and moral, which are chiefly counted virtues, being perfections of the will {and affections}7; and these are the chief object of Ethicks.

And yet the intellectual virtues are not to be altogether omitted in Morals; not only because they afford a noble branch of happiness, pleasures exceedingly becoming our rational nature; to which whosoever is enured, and has got an high taste for them, is enabled to contemn the meaner enjoyments which lead to vice; whence the sciences have justly been deemed purifications of the soul:* but because they give a more direct aid to the moral virtues. For from a deeper enquiry into nature and the universe, the perfections of the great Creator are displayed, our dutiful veneration toward him increased, the mind led into a just contempt for the low worldly pursuits of mankind; and that humility, or deep consciousness of our own weakness and manifold imperfections, is obtained, which is a chief ornament and perfection in a good character. Nay, without a great deal of knowledge in the lower and ordinary affairs of life, we must be deficient in that practical prudence which is always necessary in our conduct. But these virtues or accomplishments belong principally to other branches of philosophy, or arts. This we suggest only in general, that in the pursuits of knowledge these two faults are to be cautiously avoided, the one that of rash precipitate assenting<, taking as known what is unknown>; and for this purpose we must both take time and make vigorous application, and bring along a mind free from prejudices and prepossessions, or any passionate attachments. The other fault is employing too much keeness upon subjects, perhaps <obscure and> difficult, but of small use or necessity in life.

As to the moral virtues seated in the will; the divisions given of them by different authors are very different. The followers of Aristotle, having this principally in view, that ’tis by immoderate ungoverned passions that we are led into vice, while yet all these passions have been wisely implanted in our nature by the Deity for necessary purposes, they define virtue, “a considerate habit of the soul preserving a mediocrity according to right reason”;8 as indeed it is a great part of the office of virtue to keep the several affections, which are frequently disorderly, from both the extremes of excess and defect. In this view, to explain the several virtues they go through the several natural passions, and their several degrees, when they are either too languid or too vehement; and shew that the middle degrees are the safest, the most advantageous, and the most graceful; and these they count virtuous. Now the several habits by which this mediocrity is preserved, according to a celebrated division among the Antients, they reduce to four classes, which are called the Cardinal Virtues; Prudence, Justice, Temperance and Fortitude: from which they derive all the several branches of virtue.9

III. Prudence they describe “a cautious habit of consideration and forethought, discerning what may be advantageous or hurtful in life”; which must be acquired and preserved by experience and frequent meditation. This habit no doubt is necessary in all the business of life. But one would think prudence were rather to be ranked among the intellectual than the moral virtues: and yet no man can attain to the true solid prudence, whose heart is not improved by the moral virtues, with an high sense of moral excellence; and who has not deeply imbibed the more generous sentiments of goodness. Others may have a sort of crafty sagacity in worldly affairs, which assumes to it self the title of Prudence and Wisdom, but yet is very remote from it. The vices opposite to this virtue are rashness, inconsiderateness, a foolish self-confidence, and craft.

Fortitude they define to be “that virtue which strengthens the soul against all toils or dangers we may be exposed to in discharge of our duty”:10 ’tis this virtue which represses all vain or excessive fears, and gives us a superiority to all the external accidents of our mortal state; grounded on a thorough knowledge of their nature, that no external advantages are to be compared in point of happiness with the possession of virtue, and gaining the approbation of our own hearts, and of God, to whom our tempers must be perfectly known; and that nothing ought so much to be dreaded <or shunned> as vice and the moral deformity of the soul: and consequently, since death must soon befal us in all events, that an early death with virtue and honour is highly preferable to the longest ignominious life. On such principles as these must be founded that true greatness and elevation of mind which is not to be disturbed by external accidents.11

This true grandeur of mind is discovered in these three things; in an high relish and love of moral excellence; in that superiority to and contempt of external accidents just now mentioned; and in a tranquillity free from passion.12 There is therefor no true fortitude in not dreading moral turpitude or just infamy: the truly brave and wise avoid these things above all; as they will also decline any dangers to which no virtuous offices call them. Now as our passionate motions are of two kinds; one, that of passionate desires, the other that of aversions, fears or anger;13 and fortitude regulates these latter, as Temperance does the former; among the branches of Fortitude, are reckoned beside Magnanimity, Constancy, Hardiness, and Patience, Lenity also of temper and Clemency; and, when the publick interest requires it, Rigour and Severity, with such just Resentment as is requisite to repell or restrain injuries.

The vices opposite to Fortitude on one hand, are Pusillanimity and Cowardice, and their common attendant Cruelty; on the other hand, furious boldness and Temerity, which is often attended with obstinacy and ambition, or too keen desires of eminence, inconsistent with that equality of right which should be maintained in every free state.

Temperance is that virtue which restrains and regulates the lower appetites toward sensual pleasures; as ’tis by them that men are most frequently ensnared into all manner of vices, and into a neglect of every thing honourable. In this virtue most remarkably appears the grace and beauty of manners [of words, actions and purposes], which is quite destroyed by sensuality [by the allurements of lower pleasures].

The several branches of Temperance are {Moderation of mind}, Modesty, Chastity, Frugality, a Contentment with, or Relish for plain simple fare, and a Severity of manners in opposition to all obscenity and lewdness. The opposite vices are Luxury, Gluttony, Drunkenness, Impudence, Wantoness, Obscenity, effeminate Softness, and Delicacy as to food and other cares about the body.

But Justice they make the sovereign virtue to which all the rest should be subservient: this they define “an habit constantly regarding the common interest, {and in subserviency to it,} giving or performing to each one whatever is due to him upon any natural claim.”14 Under it they include all the kind dispositions of heart by which a friendly intercourse is maintained among men, or which leads us to contribute any thing to the common interest. Such as Liberality, Beneficence, Friendliness, Gratitude, Magnificence, Courtesy, Humanity, Veracity, Fidelity, Hospitality, Love of our Country, Dutiful affection in the sacred relations of life, and principally Piety toward God, who is conceived as the Ruler and Father of that most venerable and sacred political Body, the Rational Creation, of which our several countries are but small parts. The nature of the three former cardinal virtues may be known from what was said above about the supreme Good, and the comparisons made of the several objects of our natural desires: and the nature of Justice will be more fully explained in the second Book,* where we treat of the several rights of mankind.

These {four} virtues they maintain to be naturally connected and inseparable not only in their highest degree, which they call the Heroic; but in the middle degree, called that of Temperance, {when the lower appetites are easily governed: altho’ they may be separated in the first weaker disposition called the degree of Continence.} And yet from each of them some peculiar duties are derived which they dilate upon very agreeably. But so far for this subject.

IV. There arises here a question of some little difficulty about the original of virtue, whether it arises from the very constitution of our nature, or from instruction and habit, or by some divine influence or power. On which subject we briefly suggest, that whatever flows from any natural principles is as much owing to God, {and we are as much indebted to him for it, as if it had in an extraordinary manner been effected by his power}. Nor ought our gratitude to be less for any benefit, on this account that the liberal Donor has diffused the like goodness amongst many, or that these benefits have been bestowed upon us in a certain regular method, according to some fixed laws, in consequence of a stable series of causes determined at first by the goodness and wisdom of the Author of nature; or because he has used other voluntary agents as his ministers and instruments, {whom he has inclined or excited to do us such good offices}. Any virtues therefor {which we find in ourselves} should be the chief matter of thanksgiving and praises to God. And yet there’s nothing incredible in this that the universal Governor of the world should also by his power inspire and excite men to whatever is glorious and honourable: nay ’tis rather improbable that he who had displayed such goodness in bestowing external advantages on us, should not also exert the same goodness and power in bestowing the more noble benefits. {* } <Nature has a great power, and providence much more, concerning the circumstances that depend on fortune. But instruction, education and discipline would advance the internal powers a great deal>. The concurrence of these {three} causes to be sure [must undoubtedly make men virtuous] [should be desiderable]. We sometimes see an happy natural disposition, with something like a divine impulse, produce great matters without much aid from instruction {or discipline}: but without some tolerable natural disposition, at least without a natural taste or capacity for virtue (which however scarce any one wants altogether) instruction {or custom} would be of little or no effect. {Of these two a good natural disposition seems of greater consequence, as nature is a more stable principle. And yet instruction and habit wonderfully improve the natural disposition;} and ’tis but seldom that without their aids we can expect to see any thing great and eminent.

We shall not dwell further upon that mediocrity insisted on {so much} by Aristotle: for tho’ it well deserves our consideration, yet ’tis plain that the primary notion of virtue does not consist in it. And however it may hold not only as to our lower appetites, and some of the more sublime ones by which we are pursuing more manly enjoyments of a selfish kind, but even in the more narrow affections of good-will, that a middle degree, equally removed from both the extremes of excess and defect, is the most laudable; yet there can be no excess in these affections in which virtue chiefly consists, to wit in the <reverence and> love of God, and in that extensive good-will toward all, or in the love of moral excellence, {provided we have just notions of it}.15

V. There’s another division more obvious and perhaps more natural, according to the several objects toward whom our virtues are to be exercised, into Piety toward God, and Good-will toward Men: to which a third branch may be added of such virtues {as immediately relate to ourselves}, by which a man immediately aims at his own perfection. And altho’ there be nothing morally lovely in mere self-love, and it must be some reference to our duty to God, or to that toward men, which must make a man’s duties toward himself appear venerable or amiable; yet this third branch must not be omitted, since it is by means of a proper self-culture that we must be <fit and> prepared for any honourable services to God or mankind{; and with this reference they are exceedingly amiable}.

In pursuit of this last division, we first explain the duties of Piety, both to shew their true nature, and their importance toward our happiness; next we consider our duties toward our fellows; and lastly that self-culture which is subservient to Piety and Humanity.

[1. ]In the first edition of the Institutio, the first five paragraphs of this chapter were located before the last paragraph of chapter II, section 11. The fact that this catalogue of virtues was part of the chapter entitled “De summo bono et virtute” suggests that the present chapter was a late addition to the first edition. See Introduction, p. xiv.

[2. ]See above, I.11, pp. 21–22.

[3. ]See above, I.12, p. 24; Hutcheson is more explicit on different kinds of benevolence and their degree of moral excellence in the Inquiry on Virtue, III.6, pp. 177–78.

[4. ]See System 1.4.9, vol. I, pp. 66–68.

[5. ]See above I.10, pp. 15–16.

[6. ]This sentence was added in 1745.

[7. ]The division between intellectual and moral virtues is in Aristotle’s ethics and in Cicero’s De finibus V.36.

[* ]Pythagoras and Plato called them καθάρματα ψυχῦς.

[8. ]This definition is from Aristotle. See note 4 in the Latin text.

[9. ]This division is introduced by Plato in Respublica IV and generally resumed afterward in ethics.

[10. ]See Latin text, note 6.

[11. ]See Latin text, note 7.

[12. ]See Latin text, note 8.

[13. ]See above, I.6, p. 9, note *.

[14. ]See Latin text, note 11.

[* ]See book ii, Chap. 2 and Chap. 4.

[* ]{This cannot appear strange to those who ascribe to the constant operation of God those forces in the material world by which its frame is preferred. See Antoninus B.I, c. 17 and B. ix. c. 48.} [The translator refers to the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, but there is not a chapter 48 in book IX.]

[15. ]Added by the translator, but present in the 1742 edition.