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• Book VII: The Attack
• Chapter I: The Attack In Relation to the Defence
• Chapter II: Nature of the Strategical Attack
• Chapter III: Of the Objects of Strategical Attack
• Chapter IV: Decreasing Force of the Attack
• Chapter V: Culminating Point of the Attack
• Chapter VI: Destruction of the Enemy’s Armies
• Chapter VII: The Offensive Battle
• Chapter VIII: Passage of Rivers
• Chapter IX: Attack of Defensive Positions
• Chapter X: Attack of an Entrenched Camp
• Chapter XI: Attack of a Mountain Range
• Chapter XII: Attack of Cordon Lines
• Chapter XIII: ManŒuvring
• Chapter XIV: Attack of Morasses, Inundations, Woods
• Chapter XV: Attack of a Theatre of War With the View to a Decision
• Chapter XVI: Attack of a Theatre of War Without the View to a Great Decision
• Chapter XVII: Attack of Fortresses
• Chapter XVIII: Attack of Convoys
• Chapter XIX: Attack On the Enemy’s Army In Its Cantonments
• Chapter XX: Diversion
• Chapter XXI: Invasion
• Book VIII: Plan of War
• Chapter I: Introduction
• Chapter II: Absolute and Real War
• Chapter Iii
• A —: Interdependence of the Parts In War
• B —: of the Magnitude of the Object of the War and the Efforts to Be Made
• Chapter IV: Ends In War More Precisely Defined
• Chapter V: Ends In War More Precisely Defined ( Continued )
• Chapter Vi
• A. —: Influence of the Political Object On the Military Object
• B. —: War As an Instrument of Policy
• Chapter VII: Limited Object—offensive War
• Chapter VIII: Limited Object—defence
• Chapter IX: Plan of War When the Destruction of the Enemy Is the Object
• Appendix Summary of the Instruction Given By the Author to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince In the Years 1810, 1811, and 1812
• Scheme Which Was Laid Before General Von Gaudy
• The Most Important Principles of the Art of War to Complete My Course of Instruction of His Royal Highness the Crown Prince
• I.—: General Principles to Be Observed In War
• II.—: Tactics Or the Theory of Combat
• 1.—: General Principles
• A. —: For the Defence
• B. —: For the Attack
• 2.—: Principles For the Use of Troops
• 3.—: Principles For the Use of Ground
• III.—: Strategy.
• 1.—: General Principles
• 2.—: Defensive
• 3.—: Attack.
• IV.—: On the Practice In War of the Principles Now Laid Down
• On the Organic Division of Armed Forces *
• Sketch of a Plan For Tactics, Or the Theory of the Combat
• Guide to Tactics, Or the Theory of the Combat
• Errata

CHAPTER X

ATTACK OF AN ENTRENCHED CAMP

It was for a time the fashion to speak with contempt of entrenchments and their utility. The cordon lines of the French frontier, which had been often burst through; the entrenched camp at Breslau in which the Duke of Bevern was defeated, the battle of Torgau, and several other cases, led to this opinion of their value; and the victories of Frederick the Great, gained by the principle of movement and the use of the offensive, threw a fresh light on all kinds of defensive action, all fighting in a fixed position, particularly in entrenchments, and brought them still more into contempt. Certainly, when a few thousand men are to defend several miles of country, and when entrenchments are nothing more than ditches reversed, they are worth nothing, and they constitute a dangerous snare through the confidence which is placed in them. But is it not inconsistent, or rather nonsensical, to extend this view even to the idea of field fortification, in a mere swaggering spirit (as Templehof does)? What would be the object of entrenchments generally, if not to strengthen the defence? No, not only reason but experience, in hundreds and thousands of instances, show that a well-traced, sufficiently manned, and well-defended entrenchment is, as a rule, to be looked upon as an impregnable point, and is also so regarded by the attack.* Starting from this point of the efficiency of a single entrenchment, we argue that there can be no doubt as to the attack of an entrenched camp being a most difficult undertaking, and one in which generally it will be impossible for the assailant to succeed.

It is consistent with the nature of an entrenched camp that it should be weakly garrisoned; but with good, natural obstacles of ground and strong field works, it is possible to bid defiance to superior numbers. Frederick the Great considered the attack of the camp of Pirna as impracticable, although he had at his command double the force of the garrison; and although it has been since asserted, here and there, that it was quite possible to have taken it; the only proof in favour of this assertion is founded on the bad condition of the Saxon troops; an argument which does not at all detract in any way from the value of entrenchments. But it is a question, whether those who have since contended not only for the feasibility but also for the facility of the attack would have made up their minds to execute it at the time.

We, therefore, think that the attack of an entrenched camp belongs to the category of quite exceptional means on the part of the offensive. It is only if the entrenchments have been thrown up in haste, are not completed, still less strengthened, by obstacles to prevent their being approached, or when, as is often the case taken altogether, the whole camp is only an outline of what it was intended to be, a half-finished ruin, that then an attack on it may be advisable, and at the same time become the road to gain an easy conquest over the enemy.

[* ]It must be remembered that when Clausewitz wrote, artillery did not possess anything approaching its modern shell-power or range which gives convergence.—Editor.