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• Book VII: The Attack
• Chapter I: The Attack In Relation to the Defence
• Chapter II: Nature of the Strategical Attack
• Chapter III: Of the Objects of Strategical Attack
• Chapter IV: Decreasing Force of the Attack
• Chapter V: Culminating Point of the Attack
• Chapter VI: Destruction of the Enemy’s Armies
• Chapter VII: The Offensive Battle
• Chapter VIII: Passage of Rivers
• Chapter IX: Attack of Defensive Positions
• Chapter X: Attack of an Entrenched Camp
• Chapter XI: Attack of a Mountain Range
• Chapter XII: Attack of Cordon Lines
• Chapter XIII: ManŒuvring
• Chapter XIV: Attack of Morasses, Inundations, Woods
• Chapter XV: Attack of a Theatre of War With the View to a Decision
• Chapter XVI: Attack of a Theatre of War Without the View to a Great Decision
• Chapter XVII: Attack of Fortresses
• Chapter XVIII: Attack of Convoys
• Chapter XIX: Attack On the Enemy’s Army In Its Cantonments
• Chapter XX: Diversion
• Chapter XXI: Invasion
• Book VIII: Plan of War
• Chapter I: Introduction
• Chapter II: Absolute and Real War
• Chapter Iii
• A —: Interdependence of the Parts In War
• B —: of the Magnitude of the Object of the War and the Efforts to Be Made
• Chapter IV: Ends In War More Precisely Defined
• Chapter V: Ends In War More Precisely Defined ( Continued )
• Chapter Vi
• A. —: Influence of the Political Object On the Military Object
• B. —: War As an Instrument of Policy
• Chapter VII: Limited Object—offensive War
• Chapter VIII: Limited Object—defence
• Chapter IX: Plan of War When the Destruction of the Enemy Is the Object
• Appendix Summary of the Instruction Given By the Author to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince In the Years 1810, 1811, and 1812
• Scheme Which Was Laid Before General Von Gaudy
• The Most Important Principles of the Art of War to Complete My Course of Instruction of His Royal Highness the Crown Prince
• I.—: General Principles to Be Observed In War
• II.—: Tactics Or the Theory of Combat
• 1.—: General Principles
• A. —: For the Defence
• B. —: For the Attack
• 2.—: Principles For the Use of Troops
• 3.—: Principles For the Use of Ground
• III.—: Strategy.
• 1.—: General Principles
• 2.—: Defensive
• 3.—: Attack.
• IV.—: On the Practice In War of the Principles Now Laid Down
• On the Organic Division of Armed Forces *
• Sketch of a Plan For Tactics, Or the Theory of the Combat
• Guide to Tactics, Or the Theory of the Combat
• Errata

CHAPTER IX

ATTACK OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

In the book on the defence, it has been sufficiently explained how far defensive positions can compel the assailant either to attack them, or to give up his advance. Only those which can effect this are subservient to our object, and suited to wear out or neutralise the forces of the aggressor, either wholly or in part, and in so far the attack can do nothing against such positions, that is to say, there are no means at its disposal by which to counterbalance this advantage. But defensive positions are not all really of this kind. If the assailant sees he can pursue his object without attacking such a position, it would be an error to make the attack; if he cannot follow out his object, then it is a question whether he cannot manœuvre the enemy out of his position by threatening his flank. It is only if such means are ineffectual, that a Commander determines on the attack of a good position, and then an attack directed against one side, always in general presents the less difficulty; but the choice of the side must depend on the position and direction of the mutual lines of retreat, consequently, on the threatening the enemy’s retreat, and covering our own. Between these two objects a competition may arise, in which case the first is entitled to the preference, as it is of an offensive nature; therefore homogeneous with the attack, whilst the other is of a defensive character. But it is certain, and may be regarded as a truth of the first importance, that to attack an enemy thoroughly inured to War, in a good position, is a critical thing. No doubt instances are not wanting of such battles, and of successful ones too, as Torgau, Wagram (we do not say Dresden, because we cannot call the enemy there quite War seasoned); but upon the whole, the danger is small, and it vanishes altogether, opposed to the infinite number of cases in which we have seen the most resolute Commanders make their bow before such positions. (Torres Vedras.)

We must not, however, confuse the subject now before us with ordinary battles. Most battles are real “rencontres,” in which one party certainly occupies a position, but one which has not been prepared.