§ 2.: Of Hypotheses and Analogy - Thomas Reid, Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense [1915]
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Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, edited, with an introduction by G.A. Johnston (Chicago: Open Court, 1915).
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- Selections From the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense
- Introduction
- Thomas Reid
- I.—: Introduction to the Philosophy of Common Sense
- § 1.: The Importance of the Subject, and the Means of Prosecuting It
- § 2.: The Impediments to Our Knowledge of the Mind
- II.—: Analysis of a Typical Sensation
- § 1.: The Sensation Considered Abstractly
- § 2.: Sensation and Remembrance, Natural Principles of Belief
- § 3.: Judgment and Belief In Some Cases Precede Simple Apprehension
- § 4.: Two Theories of the Nature of Belief Refuted—conclusions From What Hath Been Said
- § 5.: Apology For Metaphysical Absurdities—sensation Without a Sentient, a Consequence of the Theory of Ideas—consequences of This Strange Opinion
- § 6.: The Conception and Belief of a Sentient Being Or Mind Is Suggested By Our Constitution—the Notion of Relations Not Always Got By Comparing the Related Ideas
- § 7.: There Is a Quality Or Virtue In Bodies, Which We Call Their Smell—how This Is Connected In the Imagination With the Sensation
- § 8.: That There Is a Principle In Human Nature, From Which the Notion of This, As Well As All Other Natural Virtues Or Causes, Is Derived
- § 9.: Whether In Sensation the Mind Is Active Or Passive?
- III.—: Knowledge and Reality
- § 1.: Of Hardness
- § 2.: Of Natural Signs
- § 3.: Of Extension
- § 4.: Of the Visible Appearances of Objects
- § 5.: Of Perception In General
- § 6.: Of the Process of Nature In Perception
- Appendix: of Cause and Power
- IV.—: The Operations of the Mind
- § 1.: Principles Taken For Granted
- § 2.: Of Hypotheses and Analogy
- § 3.: Of Perception
- § 4.: Of Sensation
- § 5.: Of Primary and Secondary Qualities
- § 6.: Of Conception
- § 7.: Of Judgment
- § 8.: Of Common Sense
- § 9.: The First Principles of Contingent Truths
- § 10.: First Principles of Necessary Truths
- V.—: Of Morals
- § 1.: Of Benevolent Affection In General
- § 2.: There Are Rational Principles of Action In Man
- § 3.: Of Regard to Our Good On the Whole
- § 4.: Of the Notion of Duty, Rectitude, Moral Obligation
- § 5.: Observations Concerning Conscience
- § 6.: That Moral Approbation Implies a Real Judgment
- Adam Ferguson
- Of Man’s Progressive Nature
- James Beattie
- Of the Perception of Truth In General
- Dugald Stewart
- I.—: Of the Object of Philosophy, and the Method of Prosecuting Philosophical Inquiries
- II.—: Of the Association of Ideas
- III.—: Of the Power Which the Mind Has Over the Train of Its Thoughts
- IV.—: Of the Influence of Association On Our Active Principles, and On Our Moral Judgments
- V.—: Of Certain Laws of Belief, Inseparably Connected With the Exercise of Consciousness, Memory, Perception, and Reasoning
§ 2.
Of Hypotheses and Analogy
Let us lay down this as a fundamental principle in our inquiries into the structure of the mind and its operation—that no regard is due to the conjectures or hypotheses of philosophers, however ancient, however generally received. Let us accustom ourselves to try every opinion by the touchstone of fact and experience. What can fairly be deduced from facts duly observed or sufficiently attested, is genuine and pure; it is the voice of God, and no fiction of human imagination.
If a philosopher, therefore, pretends to shew us the cause of any natural effect, whether relating to matter or to mind, let us first consider whether there is sufficient evidence that the cause he assigns does really exist. If there is not, reject it with disdain, as a fiction which ought to have no place in genuine philosophy. If the cause assigned really exists, consider, in the next place, whether the effect it is brought to explain necessarily follows from it. Unless it has these two conditions, it is good for nothing.
The conclusion I would draw from all that has been said on analogy, is, that, in our inquiries concerning the mind and its operations, we ought never to trust to reasonings drawn from some supposed similitude of body to mind; and that we ought to be very much upon our guard that we be not imposed upon by those analogical terms and phrases, by which the operations of the mind are expressed in all languages.
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